Trust and the Attribution of Rationality: Inverted Roles Amongst Palestinian Arabs and Jews

in Israel
Author(s): Dan Rabinowitz
Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 517-537
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2803927
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 TRUST AND THE ATTRIBUTION OF RATIONALITY:
INVERTED ROLES AMONGST
PALESTINIAN ARABS AND JEWS IN ISRAEL

DAN RABINOWITZ

HebrewUniversity,
Jerusalem

JewishIsraelistendto regardPalestinianArabs,includingthosewho are citizensof thestateof

Israel,as threatening
and malicious.Nevertheless, personalinteractions
betweenJewsand Arabsin
commerce,industry, government and in relationsbetweenprofessionalsand clientsofteninvolve
explicitand implicitad hocor minimaltrust.Two casesfromNatzeratIllit,a predominantly Jewish
developmenttown establishedby the Israeligovernmentin 1957 nextto the old Arab town of
Nazarethin Galilee,are reviewed.One is of an ArabdoctortreatingJewish patients,the otheris
of an Arab coach in chargeof an exclusively Jewishbasketballteam.The abilityofJewishactors
to investtrustin an Arab is shown to hinge on theirattribution to him of solid, self-seeking
rationality.The analysis
ofthiscase-matenral,
combinedwithrecentsociologicalandanthropological
writingon the linkbetweenrationality and risk-taking,
offersfurther insightinto the natureof
trust.

Introduction
Trustfeatures in sociologicalliteraturein two majorperspectives (Zucker1986).
One, the origins of which are traced back to Parsons(1939; 1969), 'assertsthat
trustresidesin actors'assumptions thatothersin an exchangewillputself-interest
aside in favourof "otherorientation"or "collectivity orientation"'.The other,
whichZuckertracesback to Garfinkel, 'restson some degreeofcollectiveorien-
tationat the beginningof interaction, but self-interest
is oftenexpected and
legitimate at subsequentstagesof theexchange'(1986: 57).
The discourseof trustin sociology1highlights thefunctionof trustas 'a deep
assumption underwriting social order' &
(Lewis Weigart1985b:455; see Shapiro
1987 and Roniger 1990 formorerecentexamples).This article,which focuses
on relations betweenJewsandPalestinian Arabsin Israel,attemptsa morespecific
analysis of the linksbetween risk,rationalityand trustin interpersonal
interaction.
I shall show thatin the adversarialcontextof Jewish-Arabrelationsin Israel
rationalself-interest is not merelya more or less legitimateoption. Rather, I
argue, it becomes the principaland most efficaciousconjectureunderwriting
trust.
JewishIsraelisgenerally view Arabs,includingthePalestinianArabcitizensof
Israel,quite negatively(see Zemach 1980 and Smooha 1992: 233-61 fortwo
outstandingexamples).A distinction is suggested,however,between negative
stereotypes which highlightperceivedinherentqualities (for example white
518 DAN RABINOWITZ

Americans'beliefthatblacks are less proficientand ambitious)and negative

stereotypes which are essentially self-referential
- highlighting perceivedinten-
tions.My argument restson thecontentionthatin theeyesofJewishIsraelis,the
stereotypical Arabis not so much one who is inherently stupidor incapable,as
one whose firstpriorityis to harmJews at all times,regardlessof costs and
benefits.
Rather thandoubtingArabs'capabilities, then,Jewsare suspiciousof Arabs'
intentions,which are ofteninterpreted as irrational.This sense of imminent
dangerdissuadesJewsfrominteraction withArabs- an observationprobablyas
valid forindividualsin dailylifeas it is forofficialteamsin international peace
negotiations. Moreover,lifein IsraelplacesJewsin moredominantroles.Arabs
generallyoccupyless authoritative positions,where theirconductcan be more
readilymonitoredand controlledbyJews.Most routinesituations in Israelin fact
lendJewishIsraelisthefeelingthat'danger'is or can be contained,and thatsafety
netsand exitsare easilyavailableshouldinterpersonal relationsturnsour.2
There are exceptionsthough.This articleis based on ethnographic observa-
tions of the circumstances surroundingtwo unusual individualsoperatingin
NatzeratIlit - a predominantly Jewishdevelopmenttownin Galilee. One is an
Arab paediatricianwho looks afterJewishpatients.The other is an Arab
basketballcoach who, in 1988, took chargeof the town's exclusivelyJewish
team.Tensionsassociatedwiththe statusinversioninvolvedin thesecases,and
with the investment of trustbyJewsin individualArabs,were exacerbatedin
bothinstancesby thefactthattheJewishactorsinvolvedwere otherwiseknown
to hold extremeanti-Arabattitudes, oftenvergingon blatantracism.Put in terms
of Luhmann's(1979) oppositionbetweendanger as builtinto the way theworld
is (i.e. as an aspect of cosmology)and riskas entailedin human attemptsto
controlit (i.e. as an aspectoftechnology), thestarting pointforJewish actorswas
nearerthe pole of 'cosmological(Arab) danger'than thatof a 'rationaltech-
nology'of riskmanagement.
The field,in fact,is wider. Trust is routinelyevidentin Israel as part of
interpersonal interactions and co-operationbetweenArabsandJewsof all politi-
cal persuasions in business,commerceand industrial relations(cf.Smooha 1992;
Horowitz & Lissak1990: -78-9). Explanationsof the phenomenonin termsof
existingtheoriesof professional-client relations,while applicableto the case of
the Arabphysicianand hisJewishpatients,cannotaccountforthe whole spec-
trum of Jewish-Arabinteractionsinvolvingtrust.My more comprehensive
argument is thatwhenparticular Arabsareidentified by theirJewishcounterparts
as quiteobviouslyactingout ofrationalself-interest ratherthanirrational malice,
Jewishsuspicion,ifnot resolved,is at leastsuspended.The old maxim-that'all
Arabshate us all and are out to get us' is eclipsedby the essentially pragmatic
positionthat'Arabs,like all otherpeople, are out firstand foremostto help
themselves'. This,in turn,allowsJewishactorsto perceivetheArabindividualas
more predictable,hence more trustworthy. Ad hoctrustor minimaltrustmay
thenpave theway to relatively relaxedinteraction, at leastwithinspecificlimits.
Anlalytical attention thusshiftsfromtherelatively well documentedrationality
of actorswho investtrust,to the less obvious notion of the rationality which
actorsattribute to counterparts.But thefactthatJewish Israelissometimesperceive
 DAN RABINOWITZ 519

Arabsas rationaland co-operativein spiteof theirbeingArabhas another,more

intriguingimplication.Once a Jewishactorsees an Arabindividualas someone
who has overcomethe inherentresistance to peacefulinteraction
withJews,as
someonewho has somehowmasteredhis own irrational destructivedrives,he is
bound to attributethisparticularArab with an exceptionallysolid rationality.
Probablymoresolid,in fact,thanthatof manypotentialcounterparts who may
happento be Jewish,but whose motivesforco-operationmightbe unknown,
unclearor even dubious. If rationality are indeed so highly
and predictability
valued in businessand professional encounters,therefollowsthe paradoxical,
counter-intuitive expectationthatinterpersonal trustcan in factbe sometimes
foundedin theadversarialcontext.

Background
andmethodology
NatzeratIllit,a townof 28,000 inhabitants (Stateof Israel1988), was established
in 1957 in the midstof an Arabheartland, borderingon the old Arab town of
Nazareth.3Much of the new town's municipalland was formerly under the
jurisdictionofNazareth,and was transferred bycentralgovernment fortheestab-
lishmentofNatzeratIllit.A smallproportion ofthatland,whichhad been owned
by individualArabs,was expropriated 'forpublicneeds'.
Partof a concertedsettlement driveby the Israeligovernment, thenew town
was established withthe objectiveof overturning theArabmajorityin the area.
The town absorbednew Jewishimmigrants fromfifty-nine countries,the main
in
contingents descendingorder of numbersbeing Rumanians,Moroccans,
Russians, Tunisiansand Argentinians. The number of Jewishresidentsrose
steadilythroughoutthe 1960s and the 1970s, with a particularly largerisebe-
tween 1967 and 1973 (see Garbuz 1973). This growthwas arrestedin 1985,
when theJewishpopulationof thetowndeclinedslightly (Stateof Israel1988).
NatzeratIllitwas initially
designedto be exclusivelyJewish. By thelate 1970s,
however,youngArabfamilies beganrentingand buyingflatsin thetown,taking
advantageof the relativelylow prices of real estate.The majorityof Arab
newcomerswere fromneighbouring Nazareth,oftenregardedas themetropoli-
tan capitalof the 700,000 Arab citizensof Israel. Nazareth,one of the only
Palestiniantownswhere residentsstayedput in 1948, in factgrew rapidlyafter
the war, as it absorbeda large numberof villagerswhose villageshad been
destroyedby Israelduringthe war or immediately afterit. The town's uneasy
topographical locationconstraineddevelopment, but not as muchas thetransfer
in 1957 of some 15,000 dunams- approximately 3,500 acres- to themunicipal
controlof NatzeratIllit.This exacerbatedtheacuteshortageoflandfordevelop-
mentin Nazareth,pushingup realestateprices.
By 1989 NatzeratIllithad some 3,500 Arabresidents - roughly15 percent.of
the entirepopulationof the town. The Jewishinhabitants tend to regardthe
Arab presenceas the majordrawbackof theirtown. At the interpersonal level,
however,neighbourlyrelationsbetween individualsand familiestend to be
good.
NatzeratIllitArabsarepredominantly Christian.They are,on thewhole,well
educated,professional, urbanand upwardlymobile (Rabinowitz1990: 36-43),
and perceivethemselves as thesuburbaneliteof adjacentNazareth.NatzeratIllit
520 DAN RABINOWITZ

Jews,on theotherhand,perceivethemselves as peripheralto thebustlingcentre

of modernIsraelilifeon the coastalplain.There is a sensein NatzeratIllitof its
beingwhatKramer(1973: 49) calls'a residualcommunity', and whatSpilerman
and Habib (1976: 805) call a 'sink'forthelessresourceful immigrants - a theme
reiterated more recentlyby Ben-Arnand Bilu (1987: 249). The low self-esteem
ofJewishresidents is coupledwitha pervasivesenseof an imminentArabinva-
sion, exacerbatedby an acute feelingof isolationfromthe physicaland cultural
mainstay ofJewishIsrael.
My fieldwork in NatzeratIllitbetweenJanuary 1988 and May 1989 tookplace
at a time when the proportional of
strength the Arab populationin thetownwas
at its height.4Fieldworkincludedopen-endedas well as structured interviews
withbothArabsandJews,casualobservations, collectionof datain local archives
and institutions, and a surveyof 247 Arab households.Most of the material
presentedhereis based on casualtalksand interviews duringthemainperiodof
fieldwork.
A specialnote is in orderregardingdata fromHapoelNatzeratlit basketball
club. Havingpreviously playedin Israel'sprofessionalbasketballleague,I joined
the squad soon aftermovingto NatzeratIllitforfieldwork.As an activeplayer,
my place in thisparticularcontextwas natural.Playersand managementalike
were relatively relaxedabout my presence,showinglittleinterestin my inves-
tigativepersona.All wereawareof thefactthatI was engagedin an investigation
of the town as partof a university degree,but none seemedparticularly preoc-
cupied with the details.This was unlike my experiencein other arenas of
fieldwork, wheremy identityas an investigator was alwaysparamount.Rightly
or wrongly,I judged the unique situationin which I foundmyselfwithinthe
team- a legitimate participantand onlymarginally an observer- to be beneficial.
Not wishingto compromisethisunexpectedvantagepoint,I simplyrefrained
frompositiveacts of inquiry,limitingmyselfto casual,noncommittal queries.
The materialI presenton HapoelNatzeratIllitis thusbasedexclusivelyon casual
observations.I neverhad a notebook,writingutensilsor an audio recorderwith
me in thecontextof thebasketballclub. My entirerecordof it is based on notes
takeniinmediately aftermyreturnhome fromthegym(which,fortunately, was
onlyminutesaway). None of the namesof individualsappearingin the textis
real.

An Arabora doctor?
Like most developmenttowns in Israel,NatzeratIhlitsuffers froma chronic
shortageof doctors.None of the doctorsservingthe communityis a long-term
residentof the town.Many - particularly - live elsewhere,attending
specialists
clinicsonce or twicea week. There is no hospital.KupatHolimKlalit(KHK) -
Israel'slargesthealthinsurancescheme,runby theHistadrut tradeunion federa-
tion- operatestwo medium-sizedclinics,butrequirespatientsto travelto Afula
or even Haifa fora varietyof non-routinechecksand treatments. Macabbi,the
up-and-cominghealthinsurancescheme which challengesKHK's hegemony,
has one smallerclinic.
NeighbouringNazareth,on the otherhand,has a thriving medicalcommu-
and a largenumber
nity.It hasthreehospitals(all runby Christianorganizations),
 DAN RABINOWITZ 521

- all Arab- who are eitherhospitalstaff

ofresidentspecialists themselves or have
A decade-old crisisin public healthin Israel,
readyaccess to hospitalfacilities.
whichhasleftKHK impovenrshed, discouragesNazarenespecialists frommaking
themselvesavailableto patientsexclusivelythroughKHK. One resultis that
privatehealth care in Nazareth thnrves, with most doctors routinelyseeing
patientsprivately.
Dr NawafSa'adawi,a residentof Nazareth,is a paediatrician. Originallyfrom
a villagein westernGalilee,he is one of a handfulof Arabswho graduatedfrom
the medicalschool at the Hebrew University in the 1960s. Afterhis graduation
he workedforKHK fora while.He laterstartedhisown clinicin Nazareth,and
quicklygaineda reputationin both Nazarethand NatzeratIllit.VeteranJewish
residentsof NatzeratIllitoftendescribeSa'adawi as 'the doctorwho raisedthe
childrenofNatzeratIllit'.When,upon arrivalat NatzeratIllitto beginfieldwork,
my spouse and I inquiredabout medicalcare forour baby daughter,a Jewish
residentof NatzeratIllit,a motherof four,told us, withdeliberateexaggeration
in orderto emphasizeherpoint,'thereis onlyone paediatrician aroundhere.His
nameis Doctor Sa'adawi'.
A keen,experienceddiagnostician, Sa'adawi commandsan up-to-dateknowl-
edge of therapeuticmethodsand a comprehensive acquaintancewithspecialists
bothlocallyand beyond.He operatesmainlyfroma privateclinicin downtown
Nazareth,but attendsa clinicof one of thehealthinsuranceschemesin Natzerat
Illitthreeafternoonsa week as well.
We soon began to notice an interesting phenomenonregardingSa'adawi:
manyoftheJewishresidents who testifiedto hisexcellencecame acrosson other
occasionsas stronglyanti-Arab.One exampleis BrakhaBenisho,a Jewishresi-
dentof NatzeratIllitof Moroccan onrgin. Aged 25 at the timeof fieldwork, she
hadjust givenbirthto hersecondchild.
Returningfromthe maternity ward of the regionalmedicalcentrein Afula,
thisis whatshe had to sayof herexperience:
It was O.K. generally.But the Arab women reallybroughtme down. They reallyare like
cattle,givingbirthyear in year out, no fail.They are so primitive- you should have heard
themscreamin the labourroom. It made me so angry.And theytakeso much space. Imagine
- Arab women all over the place, with millionsof noisyrelativesaround them,all chattering
in Arabic. It is disgraceful,
the way the hospitalauthoritiesput themwith us Jewishwomen.
The least they could do, if they insiston helpingthe damned Arabs multiply,is put them
separately.

On anotheroccasionBrakhacomplainedaboutKHK, ofwhichshe is a member,

emphasisingthequeues, therudeserviceand theincompetent
doctors.She then
relatedthefollowingincident:
My older daughterwas once ill with a rareinfectionwhich no one in KHK trackeddown. It
went on and on. The child was suffering. We had no sleep forweeks. Eventuallyit was too
much to endure,and I went to Sa'adawi. Imagine- going to his clinicin the shuk(the market)
in downtownNazareth.All thoseArabs,and the dirt.So foul.But then,Sa'adawi, I swear,had
one quick look at the poor child,and knew exactlywhat was wrong. He told me, then and
there: it was an infection.A rare one. He wrote the prescription.I got the medicine. The
child was well withina day. Not thatit did not cost. It did, and how: those Arabsknow too
well how to take money. Especiallyfromus.5

Dina Hirsh,aged 27 at thetimeoffieldwork, fromTel-Avivand of

originally
Europeanorigin,is anotherexample.Herselfthemotherofa one-year-oldchild,
522 DAN RABINOWITZ

she was once presentwhen a friendwho had recently givenbirthin themedical

centrein Afuladescribedher experience.The narratorhad apparently seen an
Arab woman who had givenbirthto a stillbornbaby. 'She was so stupidand
primitive,thatArab woman', she told her listeners,'thatshe completelylost
control,and the baby ended up suffocating'. To this Dina reacted instan-
taneously:'Oh good. One lessArab'.
This notwithstanding,Sa'adawi was Dina's ultimateauthority on child-care-
fromnutrition throughhygieneto treatment ofrealand imaginedillnesses.There
were weeks when she attendedhis clinic threeor fourtimes.She refusedto
consultany otherdoctor,insisting thatthe efficacy of his treatment was unsur-
passed.
Brakhaand Dina obviouslyhold extremeviews regardingArabsand Arab-
Jewishrelations.For Brakha,everything about her experiencewith Sa'adawi
which is objectivelyArab (thelocationof the clinicin Nazareth,the shuk,the
people on the way) is negativeand threatening. Conversely,all aspectsof the
experiencewhichare objectivelynegative(thecost,the distance,the dirtin the
shuk)she subjectivelylinksto Arabness.Dina resolvestheproblemof Sa'adawi's
identityby othermeans.Being a memberof the healthinsuranceschemewith
whichhe is affiliated,
she is not normallyforcedto attendhis privateclinic,and
is thussparedthe 'Nazarethexperience'to whichBrakhawas subjected.In the
contextof theNatzeratIllitclinicwherehe sees Dina and herinfant,Sa'adawi's
Arabnessis virtuallyobliterated.His (real) familyname is not stereotypically
Arab.His forename, a moretypicalArabnamewithan obviousMuslimconno-
tation,is omittedfromspokenas well as writtencommunicationin the clinic.
His Hebrewis meticulousand authoritative, and is oftenmixedwithEnglishand
Latinexpressions.
Brakha Benisho had only one episode involvingSa'adawi, an experience
whichwas obviouslytrying forher.Only one aspectstandsin gloriousisolation:
thedoctor'sunassailableprofessionalism. She attributesherdaughter'sremedyto
a specific,magicmomentwhichstandsout fromtherestof time- a miraculous
instancein which all takesplace simultaneously: the man observes,identifies,
pronouncesa diagnosis,and curesby prescription. That is the briefmomentin
which,forher,Sa'adawi ceasesbeingArab. For Dina, thismnoment is extended
by herinsistence
to a routine,buttressed thatSa'adawi'sefficacy is unrivalled.For
her too, one thingis indisputable:it is an excellent,trustworthy doctorwho
looks afterherson,not an Arab.

Theunderdog
as coach
NatzeratIllithas one competitivebasketballteam,HapoelNatzeratIllit(hence-
forthHNI). Formedin the 1970s,when itjoined division5 (Liga Gimel)- the
bottomdivisionof Israel'sNationalLeague - the team took a few yearsto be
promotedto division4 (LigaBet),whereit competedfrom1984 to 1990.6
The 1988-9 squad offersa fairlyrepresentativecross-sectionof theJewish
populationof thetown.The oldestplayer(notcountingtheanthropologist) was
The youngestwere three17-year-oldschool-
a 28-year-olddrivinginstructor.
boys.There were two conscripts,a police sergeant,a shop-keeper,a technician
and a bank clerk.Five playerswere of NorthAfricanorigin,fourwere of East
 DAN RABINOWITZ 523

European origin,and threewere nativesof the Soviet Union who arrivedin

NatzeratIllitas toddlersin the early1970s. There were no Arab playersin the
team.
HNI playerswereloud and clearregarding theirattitudestowardsArabs.One
of the conscripts,a militarypoliceman,was stationedas a wardenat a nearby
military prison,guardingPalestinianprisonersapprehendedduringriotsin the
Intffada.7On one occasion,when the team was at a restaurant forlunch, he
recountedthe suppressionof a riotwhich had takenplace in the prisona few
days earlier.His gleefuland gruesomelydetailedaccount had clubs and hose
pipes,blackeyesand blue faces,streaksofblood, brokentoes,twistedfingers and
heavilybreathing prisoners.His audience,savetwo who remainedexpressionless,
was as sympathetic and attentiveas he was proud. When one of the younger
playersqueriedwhether'you guysevershowmercy',theanswerwas a recitation
in unisonby two or threeof his older matesto the effectthat'these sons of
bitches,who threwstoneson our soldiersand hurledabuse on the stateand the
army- theydeserveno mercy'.
Anotherplayer,a police sergeant,was occasionallysummonedwith his unit
fortoursofdutyinJerusalem, to police theFridayprayersat theAl Aksamosque
on the Temple Mount. He once announcedthathe was going to missan ap-
proachingtrainingsessionas his unitwas about to go to Jerusalem'to beat and
blow thoseArabsto bits.Show themthecostof messingwiththepolice'.
One playercomplainedon severaloccasionsthathisfamily's business
transport
was systematically
ruinedby unfaircompetition fromArabs.He repeatedly stated
thathe was planningto move to adjacentMigdalHaemek,since'NatzeratIllitis
graduallybecomingan Arab town'. Anotherplayer,an avowed supporterof
Meir Kahana's ultra-right Kach movement,once expressedcontentwith the
Lockerbiedisasterof December 1988, when a Pan Americanairlinerwas blown
up in flight
above westernScotland,killinghundreds.He said:
That's good. It will teach the Americanswho Yasser Arafatreallyis, and thattheyshould not
deal withhim. That is what the Arabswant to do to everyone.This is how theyare, and this
is why I don't want themhere or anywhereelse.8

These statements wereadmittedly madein public,in thecontextofa relatively

young,all-male,exclusivelyJewish sportsteam,wherediscursive survivalhinged
on lucidity.Debates,manyof which took place in a van on the way to or from
away-games,tendedto consistof short,bold statements, oftenbreedingverbal
extremism. In privateconversations,
someplayerscame acrossas somewhatmore
restrained.The overallpicture,however,is clearenough.HNI players,likemany
residentsin NatzeratIllit,had definiteideas regarding Arabs.As faras theywere
concernedArabs were as dangerousfor Israel as they were detrimentalfor
NatzeratIllit.Nice as theymaybe as neighbours, at the end of the day theyare
out to get theJews,who mustin turnget tough.
As the 1988/9 season approached,9HNI managementbegan looking fora
new coach who would harnessthetalentand ambitiontheybelievedwas present
in thesquad,so as to promotetheteamto thethirddivision.Financiallimitations
and a shortageof qualifiedlocal candidatesnarrowedthe choice considerably,
untilthe team manager,a devoted volunteeron behalfof the local workers'
524 DAN RABINOWITZ

council,10cameup witha surprising choice. In August1988, followingextended

negotiations,he recruitedShafikDaher, an Arabcoach of about 30 yearsof age.
Daher had an outstanding record.Six previousseasonssaw him coach three
clubs,all ofwhichwerepromotedat theend ofhisfirst yearas coach. One ofthe
three,a club in Nazareth,had been promotedunderhimfromfifth to fourthto
thirddivisionin two straight seasons,missingfurther promotionthe following
seasonbya whisker.Thiswas correctedin 1987-88,Daher's fourth yearas coach,
when historywas made: the club was promotedagain,thusbecomingthe first
ever Arab club to make Israel'sNationalBasketballLeague Division Two - a
fullyprofessional, big league. Typical of manyperipheralclubs in Israel,once
promotedto theseniordivisiontheclub chose to droptheirlocal coach and hire
a better-known one, withmore experiencein the majorleagues. ShafikDaher
was thusfiredafterhis mostsuccessful season.Frustratingas thismayhave been
forhim,it enabledhimto respondpositivelyto HNI's offerand thusto become
thefirstArabeverto coach aJewishteamin Israeliteamsports.11
Reproducedbelow is Daher's openingspeechto theHNI squad at thebegin-
ningof his firsttrainingsessionas coach. At eighto'clock sharp,he stood up in
frontof theplayerswho were seatedon a benchalong thewall in thegym,and
spokeas follows:
Firstof all, ifany of you considerbeinglate even by one second fora practice,or forany drill
I set, he'd betternot come at all. Likewise,if anybodyhas a pain in his hand, in his leg, in his
stomachor whatever,he'd betterstayaway. I don't like thesestories.This mustbe understood
now. My languageis good enough. You will understandwhateverI have to say.
You probablyknow me, or have heard of me. So far,everyteam I coached was promoted.
And I intendto go on thatway. You will all have to work hard.I may not be here nextyear,
but you will. You remainhere. This is your team. I shall insistthatyou give everything(to
the team),which you will.
I did not come here to make new friends.I do not want you to be my friends,I don't need
it. My wife,back home, loves me, and thatis enough forme. We are here to work,and work
hard. I shallnot let you offor exemptyou fromanything.What I want is to practiseas much
as possible.We have a monthand fivedays untilthe firstmatch. I would like us to practise
fiveor six timesa week, includinga concentratedday of trainingon Saturdays,frommorning
to evening,or at leastfrommorningto noon. If anyonehas a problemwiththis,let him speak
out now.
The playerswere silent.The combinationof the tone and the demands,which
represented a quantumleap foran essentiallyamateurclub, was overwhelming.
An inconclusivebriefdiscussionof dates and timesfor approachingsessions
ensued,thenthepracticebegan.
Daher proved to be eloquent,meticulousin his demandsand verytough.
Playersrepeatedlyfoundthemselves penalizedwithextrarunsforimperfect ex-
ecutionof drillsand exercises,particularly
forfailureto completethemwithin
the time budgetsallocated.The practice,which was exceptionallylong, was
The coach did notsmile,madeno jokes and reprimanded
relentless. thoseplayers
who attemptedto exchangea fewhushedwordswithone another.There were
two shortintervalsfordrinking water,each timedto lastthreeminutessharp.
Two strenuous hoursafterhe beganthesession,Daher finally blew thewhistle
thatit was over,uttereda rapid'good night'and was out of thegym.
to signify
The exhaustedplayers,distortedwithpain and effort, at once collapsedon the
floor.One of themexclaimed:'This is not a trainingsession.It is the Intifada'.
Anotheradded that'thisguyhas had specificordersfromthePLO: he is hereto
 DAN RABINOWITZ 525

kill us'. Nobody laughed,and therewere no more remarks.People pensively

collectedtheirgearand left.
Daher's openingspeech,whichto an extentdetermrined theatmospherein the
teamfortheweeksand monthsto come, shattered a numberof implicitassump-
tionswhich NatzeratIllitJews- and IsraeliJewsin general- have regarding
interpersonal relationsbetweenJewsand Arabs.The speechwas of a dominant,
confident,oftenthreatening Arab, issuingparticular,unrelentingdemandsto
Jews.It was deliveredin immaculate, authoritative Hebrew ofthekindone tends
to expect fromIsraeliArmyofficerstalkingto subordinates,not fromArabs
addressing Jews.12 It portrayed the Arabas an ambitious,successful professional,
notan underdog.It impliedthatin thecontextofHNI it isJews,notArabs,who
are more prone to backwardness ('I may not be here nextyear.You will. You
stayhere'). It had an autonomous,proudArabrejectingthepotentialclosenessof
hisJewishcounterparts ('I do notneed you as myfriends... My wife,back home,
loves me and thatis quite enoughforme').
Daher's capacityand willingness to departfromstereotypical modes of 'Arab'
behaviourtoJewswas demonstrated on variousotheroccasionswhichI can only
brieflymentionhere. He was astutelyinquisitiveand matterof factwhen con-
scnptsand armyreservists foundthattheirmilitary serviceclashedwithpractices
and matches.His discourseand expositiondrew on explicitmilitary metaphors
such as valour,esprit de corps in battle,mutualdependenceunderfireand control
of territory - an imagerywhich deviatedsharplyfromtheJewishstereotypeof
theArabas one who shiesaway fromanythingeven remotelylinkedto military
affairs.The salienceofvaluessuchas military valour,camaraderie and soldier-like
responsibility to thedefinitions of Israelinessin generaland of Israelimanhoodin
particularhas been alluded to by severalwriters(see Horowitz & Kimmerling
1974; Katriel1986: 30-1; Ben-Ari1989; Helman n.d.). One implicationis that
Israelisfindgreatdifficulty in extendingthesevaluesand applyingthemto non-
Israelis,leastof all to Arabs.Daher's choice of such metaphorsthuseffectively
appropriated themfroma hithertoexclusivelyJewish sphereof use.
Other instanceshad Daher use the term'us' forthe team,and allude to 'our
mentality'- meaningthe team'smentality.In both instancesthe all-pervasive
gulfbetween Arabsand Jewsin Israelwas temporarily glossedover. This was
coupled with a strictavoidance on Daher's partof displayingany signsof his
nationalidentityin the contextof HNI. He took greatcare not to use Arabic
words in his speech, to the extentof being acutelyembarrassed when Arabic
words- includingones oftenused byJewsin Hebrew - somehow creptinto a
sentence.The fewexplicitreferences to hisidentitywere strictly On
folkloristic.
one occasion he explainedthat'amongstus [theHebrew word used was etslenu]
thereis a sayingthatifyou eat Zaa'taryou become leaner,and have muchenergy
and speed.13 So beforeyou come to the nextsessionmake sureyou have some
Zaa'tar'. Anothertime he had to reschedulea practicesessionbecause, as he
explainedit, a cousinhadjust marriedand, sinceall his eveningswere takenup
by basketball(he coached a youthteamin Nazarethon alternatenights),he had
'not yetbeen able to visitand greethim.Sunday,unfortunately, remainsmyonly
availableevening'.While extendedformalweddingcelebrationsare known in
some onental Jewish communitiesin Israel too, their observanceamongst
526 DAN RABINOWITZ

PalestinianArabsis customary. By raisingthispointDaher was clearlysignalling

hisArabness.
The Za'atar and wedding episodes dispelledthe uneasysilence which had
shroudedDaher's identity.Significantly, however,theseepisodeswere charac-
terizedby theirnon-threatening nature.They engenderedthe folklorization of
Daher's Arab identity, ratherthanitspoliticization, thusfacilitating
a more re-
laxed treatment of a loaded issue. An unbrokensilence,I suspect,mighthave
been construedas a morepoliticizedexpression.KnowingDaher'spoliticalincli-
nations,the driftof which was an anathemato HNI players,one can safely
speculatethatdelvinginto theissuesof identityand politicsmore explicitly and
comprehensively would have broughtimmensetensionto his relationships with
playersand management alike.
Daher'spersonalauthority notwithstanding, theweeksjust priorto theformal
seasonand immediately afteritscommencement exposeda growingriftbetween
the coach and his playersin termsof attitudesand commitment.The players,
mostof whom had neverplayedprofessionally, foundit exceedinglydifficult to
adjusttheirdemandingbasketballscheduleto theirprofessional, familialand so-
cial commitments.The resultwas incompleteattendanceat practicesand
matches.Many sessionstook place withfewerthanten men - the all-important
quorum needed for drillsand game plans. Shafik Daher grew bitterand
and madeno secretofhismisgivings.
frustrated, It thentranspiredthathe was not
gettingas much supportas he expectedfromthe managementor fromthe
leadershipof the local workers'council.Most members,I laterdiscovered,had
been uneasyabout hiringan Arabcoach all along.
The firstmatchesin Septemberbroughtlessthansatisfactory results.Defeatin
thefirsttwo matchesmade the seasonlook unpromising. The players'attendance
did not improve,and an earlycrisiswas in the making.An emergencymeeting
convenedin mid-Octoberby one of the veteranplayersand the teammanager
was attendedby all theplayersand the coach. During the meetinganotherfact
emerged:Daher was stillawaitinghis firstsalarysince he began coaching in
August.
The players,who had been preoccupiedwith the reasonswhich prompted
Daher to coach HNI fromthe fourthdivisionafterpromotinghis formerclub
fromthirdto second,were now askingthemselves whyhe was willingto go on
forsucha long timewithoutpay.At thatjuncture,a veteranand highlyregarded
playervolunteeredan explanation:Daher,he said,electedto coach HNI so as to
demonstrate thathe could succeed witha Jewishteam. 'He needs to prove it',
saidtheplayer,'itis thekeyto hisfuturecareeras coach'. This interpretation met
with instantapprovalfromthe playersand was adopted as the most plausible
solutionto theriddle.
In mid-October,havingrealizedthatneitherhis wages nor new blood were
forthcoming, ShafikDaher decidedto suspendhimself fortwo weeks.This move
had considerablerepercussions, thoughhardlyin thedirectionwhichDaher had
envisaged.The teammanager,who had recruitedDaher in the firstplace, and
who remainedthe mediatorbetween the coach and his employers(the local
workers'council),resigned.Threenew volunteersfromoutsidetheinnerringof
Labour activistsquicklysteppedinto the managerialbreach,formingthe new
 DAN RABINOWITZ 527

management committee.14The new committeeimmediately embarkedupon an

energeticand successful effort.
fund-raising Unrestrictedbyanymoralobligations
to the self-suspendedDaher, theyalso appointeda new provisionalcoach - a
veteranplayerwhose experience,considerablenaturalleadershipand immediate
made him the obvious choice. As thingsturnedout, he ended up
availability
coachingtheteamfortherestof theseason,and did reasonablywell.
By the time the team seemed to be functioning smoothlyunder the new
managementand coach in earlyNovember,the local workers'council officials
had lost even the limitedinteresttheyhad in it before.One resultwas the
disowningof Daher, whose claimsto be paid forthe monthshe had worked
were simplyignored.His courtclaimagainsthis ex-employers was stillawaiting
judgmentin late 1992.
The players,too, were quick to lose sightof theirformercoach. Daher's
professional impacton the team was soon eroded by new ideas and attitudes
broughtin by his successor,and his name was hardlymentionedany more. In
earlyDecember,some sevenweeks afterhis departure,the followingconversa-
tion took place betweentwo playersduringa practicesession.The new coach
hadjust introduceda novel exercise,but one of theplayersfoundit similarto a
drillhe alreadyknew. He turnedto his mateand said: 'This is like the drillwe
used to havewith... thatguy.He used to do thiswithus, remember? What was
his name? ... the Arab'.

TheBlackprofessional
revisited
Dim-aHirsh,BrakhaBenisho and the basketballplayersof HNI exemplifyan
interestingand not uncommonphenomenon.While subscribing to crudederog-
atorygeneralizations regardingArabs,theyare nevertheless willing,in certain
circumstances, to trustand even subordinatethemselves to Arabindividuals.
In his The rebirthofanthropological
theoryStanleyBarrettdefinesthe notionof
'contradictionsin personalattributes'(Barrett1984: 150-8). People's stereotypes
and preconceptions of personalattributes,
Barrettargues,tendto be arranged'in
binaryopposition'which 'push towardpolar extremes'(1984: 157). Thus the
'dumb blonde' syndromereflects an ostensiblecontradiction betweenbeing in-
telligentand being beautiful,converselyFalstaffand Cassius reinforcethe
stereotypicalopposition,forShakespeareand his audiences,betweenbeing fat
and beinggloomy,and so on. Barrettconcentrates on the classiccontradiction
representedby the black professional. White people, he asserts,hold certain
assumptions about blacks.Blacks are 'supposedto be poor; theyare slaves,or
field-hands,or migrantlabourers,or factory workers.When one comes acrossa
black physician,which of his (or her) statusesdominates,race or profession?'
(1984: 157-8).
The problemwas long ago addressedby Hughes (1945) and Lenski (1954).
Hughes (1945: 355) observedthatnon-white,female,non-Protestant physicians
of 'lower social stock'are acceptedby whiteAmericansonlyin the mostacute
emergencies or as exotichealersforthedesperate.This assertion, wlhileprobably
more trueof the United Statesin the 1940s thanof the nationwidesituation
theretoday,'5is nevertheless revealingforour presentstudytoo. More recent
researchlikewisein-dicates thatthe chiefnegativecharacteristics which white
528 DAN RABINOWITZ

Americanstendto attribute to blacksare lack of ambition,lack of competence

and intelligence, underachievement, lazinessand inconsistency (see,forexamples,
E.G. Cohen 1982; 1984). Schuman(1982: 346-9) assertsthatthepsychogenetic
beliefsregardingthe sourcesof black underachievement which were typicalof
Americanwhitesin theearlytwentieth centuryhavebeen replacedin thesecond
partof the centuryby a kind of environmental determinism. The key charac-
teristics,however,seem to remainat the level of blacks'performance (see also
Campbell& Schuman1968).
An important distinctionmustbe made,however,betweentheNorthAmer-
ican case as characterized above and theone observedin NatzeratIllit.The main
difficulty facingwhite Americanswhen confrontedwith a black professional
seemsto lie in reconciling professionalperformance withthestereotype ofblacks
as poor achievers- an incoherencerevolvingaroundblacks'capabilities or, more
precisely,the assumedabsencethereofExposed to a relatively affluent, urbane
and educatedArab community, NatzeratIhitJewshave an easierand less per-
plexing time realizingthatArabs can be successfulachievers.The perceived
contradiction in personalattributespresentedby an Arabprofessional or an auto-
nomous Arab in a position of authorityis thus considerablyweaker.Jewish
Israelis,includingthe residentsof NatzeratIllit,seem to be preoccupiedwith
otherderogatory aspectsofArabness.
The negativeviews of Arabsheld by IsraeliJewshave been monitoredperi-
odicallyby means of attitudeand stereotypesurveys(see Peres & Levy 1969;
Peres 1971; Robin 1972; Levy & Guttmann1976; Zemach 1980; Bizman &
Amnir 1982; Smooha 1988; 1989; 1992). A striking featureof mostsurveyresults
is thatthequalitieswhichJewishIsraelisattribute to Arabsare primarily self-ref-
erential.When askedto commenton 'theArabs',Jewsdo notprimarily focuson
inherentcognitiveor affective characteristicsascribedto Arabs.Rather,theytend
to concentrateon Arabs' intentionsand conspiratorial designsvis-d-vis Jews.
Peres,who assertsthat'attitudes ofJewstowardsArabsare obviouslydominated
by thestruggleagainsttheArabworld' (1971: 1029), indicatesthat76 per cent.
of IsraeliJews ofEuropeanoriginand 83 per cent.of thoseof orientalextraction
believe that'everyArab hatesallJews'.Peres and Levy (1969) likewisesuggest
thatJewsview Arabsas potentially violent.
In her much quoted surveyof 1980, Mina Zemach askedJewishIsraelire-
spondentsto specifythefirstfivewordswhichspringto mindupon hearingthe
term'IsraeliArab' or upon thinkingof it. The wordswere thengrouped-into
fourteensub-groups.The largestsub-group(including35.2 per cent. of the
expressions used)was characterized by Zemach as 'reflecting negativeemotions-
hatred,fear,suspicion'(1980: 82). An additional13 per cent.of expressions were
associatedwith the Israeli-Arabconflict('PLO', 'terror','murder','hatredof
Jews','theenemy')or withtheHolocaust('concentration camps','antisemitism',
'Germany').This yieldeda totalof 48.2 per cent.offirst reactionsdirectly linked
to Arab ill-intentions. Only 16.5 per cent. of the expressionscited referred to
perceivedinherentcharacteristics of Arabs('dirty','lazy', 'familyoriented','sav-
age', 'diligent','ignorant','poor', 'miserable').
In his treatment of what he callsJewishethnocentricism, Smooha likewise
attributes thewayJewsfeelregarding Arabsto thepersistence of the Israeli-Arab
 DAN RABINOWITZ 529

conflictand to ArabdissentwithinIsrael(Smooha 1988; 1989: 150). Trope, too,

indicatesthatJewishstereotypes of Arabsprimarily reflecttheperceptionsof the
JewishactorsofArabs'intentions vis-d-visJews(Trope 1989: 135).16
The self-referential
natureof thestereotypes ofArabsheldby IsraeliJewsmay
be typicalof situationsof protractedconflict.More generally,such stereotypes
implythe attribution of irrationality.
JewishIsraelisperceiveArabsas motivated
primarily by hatred,as revengefulratherthanself-seeking, as given to raging
maliceratherthandedicatedto carefulchoiceswhichwould servetheirown best
interests.This view of theArab,I believe,is pervasivethroughout JewishIsrael.
The notionthatanyArab can turnhis skinat any time,denyhis own interests
and allow hisdark,demonicalternate selfto possesshimand hisactions,features
regularly in the discourseof right-wing politicalleaders.It is oftenreflectedin
headlinesin thepopularIsraelipressdescribing Arabs'assaultsagainstJews,such
as theone in YediotAharonot of 16 July1991 whichreads:'He ranwiththeaxe,
waved itaboutand assaultedas ifpossessedby a craze'.This attitudeis also found,
however,in less likelyquarters,such as in Amos Oz's descriptionof the Arab
twinsin My Michael(Oz 1968). A. Cohen's studyof the image of the Arab in
Israeliliterature
(Cohen 1987) includesa diversesampleofsimilardepictions.
Let me sum up the argumentso far.The problemfacingNatzeratIllitJews
when confronted byan Arabin a positionofauthority is nothisfaculty. Arabness
forthemdoes not excludeexcellencea priori. Their difficulty lies in reconciling
Arabnesswiththebenevolentintentions requiredforresponsible authority and for
properprofessional performance. The issueof trust,not thatof aptitude,is at the
core here.

theprofessional
Trusting
Trusthas oftenbeen portrayed as a bulwarkofrelationships betweenprofession-
als and clients.The serviceideal mentionedby Willensky(1964) presupposes
trust.Both professional and client,it is argued,mustbelieve thatthe client's
interestsare paramount.This beliefseparatesthe professional encounterfrom
otherkindsof transaction. It is essentialfortheperformance of theprofessional's
taskas it securesthefreeflowof information, withoutwhichtheprofessional is
unableto perform.
Goode has takenthe issue further. Society,he argues(1969: 292-3), grants
professional autonomyonlywhen it is deemed essentialforadequateperform-
ance of theservice.In exchange,theprofession undertakesto exerciseeffective
internalcontrolover ethicsand performance. The more the clientis exposedto
potentialdamage,the more important it becomesforthe widersocietyto spell
out the checksand penaltiesthatwould protecthim or her. Goode goes on to
identify the 'personprofessions' - thosewhich deal with the individual'sbody,
personality or reputation- as onesin whichthepublicis particularly awareofthe
professionial'scapacityto harmtheclient,intentionally or otherwise.The public
is equallyaware,however,thatpersonprofessionals such as physicians,psych-
iatrists
or divorceattorneys are particularly restricted
by codes of conduct,ethics
and ideology.Paradoxically, it is in thepersonprofessions thatclientsoftenfeel
they are best protectedfromthe potentiallyhazardousside-effects of being
handledby professionals.17
530 DAN RABINOWITZ

There are of courseculturaland historical variations.An impressionistic view

of mainstream Israel,forexample,would suggestthatphysicians, judges, pro-
fessionalsoldiersand civil engineersenjoy a fair amount of popular trust.
Advocates,clergymen, academicsand mediapeople, on the otherhand,are not
so fortunate.
BrakhaBenishoand Dina Hirshcould be seen as takinga double riskwithDr
Sa'adawi. One is theconventionalriskthatthephysicianmightharmtheirchild-
ren or familiesby misuseof the powerfultools of his trade- his expertise,his
prescriptive authority, and theintimateknowledgeof thefamilywhichhe accu-
mulates.The otheris the specificdangerthatthe doctor,being Arab,would
attemptto cause indiscriminate damageto hisJewishpatients.It is, afterall, the
samesortofdamagewhich,accordingto theirworldview,everyArabalwayshopes
uponeveryJew,andwhichtheythemselves
to inflict openlywishon Arabchildren.
One is thustemptedto concludethatwherepersonalwell-beingis at stake,the
comprehensive distrust of Arabs'intentionson the partof BrakhaBenisho and
Dina Hirsh is subordinatedto the basic faithin the professionalintegrity of
physicians,whatevertheirnationalaffiliation. In the well-orderedcontextof
theirencounterwith Sa'adawi the two women are clearlyconfidentof their
abilityto distinguish good faithfrommalice. This confidenceis what enables
themto transform the 'danger'presentedby the encounter,in a world where
everyArab is construedto be threatening, into a manageablerisk,anldthusto
move - in Luhmann'sterms(1979, and see below) - froma 'cosmological'to a
more'rationaltechnological'solution.
But what about the coach? Coaching basketball,at least in Israel,does not
constitutea profession in the normalsociologicalsense. Neitherthe coach nor
thosewho hirehim (the club management)subscribeto the serviceideal. The
interaction betweencoach and playersis betterdescribedas one whereinterests
are fusedratherthanone in which the interests of playersor the club are para-
mount. Also, basketballcoaches in Israel exercise only a limitedversionof
professional autonomy.
The Arabcoach,quiteobviously,is lessof a potentialthreatto hisplayersand
to management thanthephysicianis to patients.This is not to say,however,that
dangeris completelyabsent.What ifthe coach discriminates againsta particular
playerbecauseoftheplayer'sobviouspoliticalleanings?Whatifhe is out to harm
the club representing theJewishtown which so obtrusively assertsitselfin the
Arabheartland, havingexpropriated largetractsofArablands?What ifhe seeshis
unusualposition,in chargeof youngJewishmales,as a golden opportunity for
sweet revengeforthe humiliationand suffering inflictedon his people in the
Intifada?Whatifhe does,afterall,gethisordersfromthePLO, as thebitter joke
at theend of thefirst sessiontriedto suggest?
These fantasiesnotwithstanding, the playersclearlydisplayeda remarkable
abilityto disregardtheirown strongfeelingsand attitudestowardsArabsand to
trustShafikDaher, acceptinghis authority unquestioningly. This, as well as the
plethoraofotherinstances in whichJewsinvesttrustin Arabsin non-professional
contextssuch as commerce,industryor government,compels us to seek an
alternativeexplanationthatwould be applicablebeyond the realm of strictly
professionalinteractions.
 DAN RABINOWITZ 531

Risk,rationality andtrust
Trustoccupieswhat Spencer-Brown(1971) calls the unmarkedspace between
thefaIniliar and theunfamiliar. Luhmann(1979; 1988) specifiesthatspace as the
transition zone betweencosmology - where the world is assignedwith distinct,
fixeddangers- and technology - wherethesensationof precariousness givesway
to a new beliefin technicalsolutions.It is in thismiddlegroundthatwe meetthe
rationalconstruction of both riskand trustwhose complementarity or mutual
entailment hasbecome a featureofvirtually everyventureand decisionin mod-
ern life. Trust,where it exists,is a tentativebridge,consciouslyconstructed
betweentheimpossibleand thefeasible.
ShafikDaher displaysa well defined,familiar persona- thatof the ambitious,
determinedand successful competitor.This imageis substantiated by two addi-
tionaland relatedfactors. First,he consistentlyavoidsdisplayofanyaspectsofhis
personhoodnotdirectly relatedto hisidentity as an ambitiouscoach. He repudi-
ates personalencountersto the extentof remainingunaware of his players'
surnames, and,forthatmatter,of theirignoranceregarding his.18He is indiffer-
ent to theplayers'failureto recognizehimas a residentof NatzeratIllit,and to
theirtendencyto associatehim with Nazareth,where he is known to have
coached before.On anotherlevel,he carefully circumvents uncontrolledrefer-
ence to his nationalaffiliation, makingsure that this emotive aspect of his
personhood crops up only in contextsand idioms which are innocuously
folkloristic,not politicallysalient.As a result,the rangeof humanqualitiesand
attributes in termsof whichplayersare able to relateto him is fairlyrestricted.
The restriction, in fact,is so severethatit eventuallyexactsa heavyprice. The
lack of personalfaithfulness on thepartof theplayersbecame painfully obvious
whenDaher foundhimself isolatedfromHNI management and feltcompelledto
leave.
The otheraspectof Daher's restricted identityis even more important.His
outstanding previousrecord,hisfastidious attitudetowardspracticeand perform-
ance, and his totalcommitment to basketballand to his own ideas of it were in
perfectaccordwithhis apparentambitionand deep motivation.All thisdid not
requireexplicitformulation: theplayerscould and did discoverit forthemselves.
Thus in October 1988, when it transpired thatbesidesDaher's professional
frustration with the inadequateattendancein practicesand the disappointing
performance in the league he had yet to receivehis firstsalary,playersbecame
preoccupiedwithhisintentions. The easiestsolutionforthemto adopthad to do
with his perceivedprofessional ambition.They agreedthathis stintwith HNI
was an important and evenvitalstepping-stone in hiscareer.This freshdiscovery
exemptedthemfromtheendemicsearchforcrypticexplanations to theriddleof
an Arabwho choosesto co-operatewithJews.Their distrust and lack of clarity
regardingArabs' intentions,while not eradicatedaltogether,were easilysus-
pended.
Both Daher and Sa'adawi, who are identified by theirJewish counterparts as
employinghighlyrationalcalculations,representa cleardeparturefromthe ir-
rationalmaliciousmould whichJewishIsraelisso oftenattribute to Arabs.The
ambitiouscoach is understoodto be therebecausehe seeksa brilliant career.The
doctorwantsto remaina doctor,and as faras BrakhaBenishois concerned,he
532 DAN RABINOWITZ

also wants the client'smoney. Likewise,Arab keepersof shops in Nazareth

(whereNatzeratIllitJewspurchasemostof theirprovisions),Nazarene garage
ownersor Arabpartiesto joint ventureswithJewsall have long-terminterests
which theJewishactorseasilydiscernand willinglyendorse.This makes the
Arabsmorepredictable, thusmoretrustworthy, offering
theomnipresent
Jewish
anxietyof maliciousArabintentionsa sensible,context-related
exit.

andco-existence
Generalization
Three interesting questionswhichemergefromthisanalysiscan onlybe briefly
exploredhere.First,do people generalizefromspecificinteractions involvingad
hoctrustto the widerarenaofJewish-Arab relations?My observations of HNI
basketballplayers,ofJewishpatientstreatedby Arabphysicians and ofJewswho
have ongoingeconomic ties with Arabsprovideno evidence to suggestsuch
generalization.No shifthas been observedon the partof theJewishpartiesto
suchinteractions towardsmilderattitudes regarding Arabs.This seemsalso to be
thecasein instancesofeconomicco-operation, whereJewishpartners, customers
or employersof Arabstendto identify theircounterparts in the reasonableand
legitimateguise of Homoeconomicus. The initialtendencyto see the Arab as a
non-rational, bloodthirsty creaturemaybe mitigated by therecognitionoffamil-
iarcalculations.But howevereffective withinspecific,recognizedcontexts,these
realizationsdo not appearto spilloverto otherspheres.
ShiftingJewishattitudes towardsthe Arabinvolvementin NatzeratIllit'sreal
estatemarket(Rabinowitzn.d.) providea vividexample.When negotiating the
sale of theirown apartments to Arab buyers,Jewishresidentsof NatzeratIllit
seemto be awareoftherationaland egotistical mannerin whichindividualArabs
carryon. During the negotiations Jewishwould-be sellersoftenlearn of the
personalcircumstances whichpushpotentialArabbuyersto seekaccommodation
in NatzeratIllit:thehousingshortagein Nazareth,thedesireto breakawayfrom
a suffocating familyenvironmentand so on. Once the specificdeal is over,
however,thisview of the situationis ofteneclipsedby a more generalview of
the problem'of Arabsmovinginto NatzeratIllit.The representation of reality
now changes.The sameArabwho, before,was partyto a rationaland mutually
rewardingdeal, is now construedas partof a sinister and threatening conspiracy
on thepartof 'theArabs'to takeoverthe townand dominatetheJews.
Allport's(1954) assumptionthatfriendly attitudestowardsindividualsbelong-
ing to an outgroupshouldgeneratea friendly attitudetowardsthe group as a
whole has been refutedon empiricalgroundsby severalwriters.Horwitz and
Rabbie (1989: 118) tendto go alongwithAmir's(1969) empiricalresults, which
do not supportthenotionof generalization. Pettigrew(1979) is in line withthis
negativeconclusion.He interprets people'sfailureto generalizebyindicatingthat
theirfirstpriority is to defendthe stereotypes theyhold. This invariablyleads
themto view thefavourableconductof membersof theoutgroupas exceptions
to the rule. For theirpart,Horwitz and Rabbie believe thatgeneralization is
feasibleonce persons'can distinguish betweenthepositiveactionsof individuals
and thenegativeactionsof theirgroup'(1989: 119).
A person's action against my own interestscan still be attributedto
familiar- and hencelegitimate - motives.Jewishresidents ofNatzeratIlliteasily
 DAN RABINOWITZ 533

understand Arabindividualswho seek a betterdeal fortheirfamiliesby buying

cheaperapartments in NatzeratIllit.Moreover,thiskindofrealizationcan some-
timeshappenat the collectivelevel too, as was the case with Israelis'view of
Egypt.FollowingSadat'svisittoJerusalem in 1977,theEgyptians wereperceived
by Israelisas genuinelyseekingpeace fortheirown sake.This enabledIsraelisto
modifytheirown retrospective viewsofEgypt'searlierresortto war.
The issuethatremainsis thatof transference. Addressing theissuein termsof
rationalityand perceivedintentions entailsa distinctionbetweentheprivateand
the collectivedomains.In thisrespect,thereis no evidenceto suggestany con-
nexionbetweenwhatNatzeratIllitJewssee as thelegitimateattempts of Nawaf
Sa'adawi and ShafikDaher to further theirown personalcareers,and whatthey
perceiveto be the maliciouscollectivedriveof Israel'sArabsor the Palestinian
nationalmovementat large.Only a realizationon the partof Israelisthatthe
Palestiniansas a group guide themselvesprimarily by self-seeking -
rationality
ratherthanby irrational hatred- can facilitate a shiftof attitudetowardsthem.
Shouldthathappen,a changealongthelineswe witnessedin theindividualcases
discussedabove is perfectly possible.But a generalization fromone domainto the
otheris nowhereevident.
The second questionis whetherany of thiscan be applied to the realmof
interventive effortsformutualunderstanding and betterco-existencebetween
embattledgroups.Individualsand organizations committedto thisworthycause,
it mustbe pointedout, oftenfindsolace and encouragement fromevidenceof
'normal'patternsof co-existencesuch as, forexample,economic co-operation.
But if generalization is indeed unlikely,attemptsto use context-related ad hoc
trustas an anchorageforthepromulgation of an ethosof peacefulco-existence
seem futile.My analysisin facthighlights the salience of the freshand inde-
pendentdiscoverybyJewishactorsof an underlying calculativementalityon the
part of Arabs.The chances of successfully reproducingthisin educationalor
otherwisecontrivedcontextsare slim.
Finally,thereis the questionof mutuality.Do PalestinianArab citizensof
Israeltendto attribute rationalityto theirJewish Israelipartners?The evidenceat
handis onlyimpressionistic, and myanswer- in theaffirmative - cainthusonly
be tentative. Beforeand mainlyafter1948 thePalestinianArabswho interacted
withIsraelis,in particular thosePalestinians who became citizensof Israel,have
been exposedto a wide varietyofJewishactivitywhich theyseem to interpret
primarily as genuineefforts on the partof theJewsto bettertheirown lot. As
membersof theminonrty groupafter1948 theArabshave alwaysbeen carefully
attunedto trendsand processesin theJewishconmnunity, and have gradually
gaineda thoroughknowledgeof it. The intensivepreoccupationof theJewish
community in Israelwiththeformidable problemsassociatedwithinfrastructure
and economic development,housing,agriculture, industry and otherareas,has
oftenbeen directly at theArabs'expense:theexpropriation of Arabland,active
discrimination againstArabs in budget allocation,restnrcted opportunitiesfor
Arab individuals,discriminatory laws of citizenshipand so on. No-one is more
aware of the ubiquityand gravityof theseinequalitiesthan Israel'sPalestinian
Arabsthemselves. And yet,I suggest,mostPalestinianArabcitizensof Israeldo
not attribute toJewishIsraelisan irrational obsessionto cause harmto themat all
534 DAN RABINOWITZ

in thepatternofArabpoliticalprotestwithinIsrael,whose
costs.This is reflected
veryexistenceimpliesa basicbeliefon thepartof Arabsin negotiatedimprove-
ment.This beliefcould hardlybe sustainedifJewishIsraeliswere attributed with
irrationalanti-Arabmalice.
This, I believe,createsa majordistinction betweenthePalestinianArab citi-
zens of Israel and Palestiniansand Arabs elsewhere,includingthe occupied
territories.The overriding interpretationof Israelin the Arabworldremainsan
essentially one, wherebyIsraelis portrayed
self-referential as an evil entity,inex-
plicably and constantlyobsessed with dominatingArab land and Arab
sovereignty. Arabmilitaryand politicalrhetoricis rifewithexplicitreferences to
Israelas drivenby satanicforcesratherthanby thereasonablepursuitof realistic
goalsand interests.
The PalestinianArabcitizensof Israel,in spiteof theirestrangement fromthe
mainstream ofthestate,stillseemto hold a firmbeliefin therationality ofJewish
Israel.This maybe one of thereasonsfortheirgenuinedetermination to stickto
a futurewithintheJewish-dominated state.

NOTES
This articleis based on fieldworkconductedin NatzeratIllit betweenJanuary1988 and May
1989. Subsequenttripswere made in 1989, 1990 and 1991. Partialfundingforthe projectwas
receivedfromthe WilliamWyse Fund, TrinityCollege, Cambridge,the MerchantTaylor Fund,
Pembroke College Cambridge,and the AVI Foundation of Geneva. I am gratefulto Ernest
Gellner,Declan Quigley,EnrkCohen, BarukhKimmerling,Yoram Bilu, Henry Rosenfeld,Tim
Ingold and to the two anonymousreviewersappointedby Man for theircommentson earlier
versionsof the text,and to Don Handelmanforhis commentson trustin the adversarialcontext.
I am also indebtedto membersof the writing-upseminarin Cambndge (1990), and to partici-
pantsin the staffseminarsin the departments of Sociologyand Anthropologyat Haifa University
(1990), and at the Hebrew UniversityofJerusalem(1991), fortheirvaluablesuggestions.
1 Theoreticaldiscussionsof the main issuesrelatedto trustcan be foundin Blau (1964; 1968),
Deutch (1962), Garfinkel(1963; 1967), Henslhn(1972), Holzner (1973), Luhmann(1979; 1988),
Barber (1983), Lewis & Weigart (1985a, 1985b), Zucker (1986), Shapiro (1987) and Roniger
(1990). My own analysisfollowsthe perspectiveof Hart's (1988) discussionof the Frafrasof
Accra, Gambetta's (1988) analysisof the nineteenthcenturymafiosi in SoutherniItaly, and
Lorenz's (1988) argumentconcerningthe relationships between industnalistsand sub-contractors
in France.
2 Smooha (1992: 236-7) indicatesthatIsraeliJews regardtheirdominancein interpersonal in-
teractionwithArabsas takenforgranted,and are consistently averseto changein thisrespect.
3My spellingof the town's name, 'Natzerat Illit', is a tranlsliteratioin
of its officialHebrew
name. Natzeratis the officialHebrew appellationof the neighbouringold Arab town E-Nasera,
known in Eniglishas Nazareth; lit is 'upper'. It should be noted, however, that Israelimaps,
signpostsand documentsin Englishcarrythe town's name in a vanetyof forms,includingUpper
Nazareth,Nazareth lit and NatzeretIllit.Writersin Englishuse variousformstoo, mostfrequent
of which is UpperNazareth- a termhardlyever utteredin dailyuse.
The Jewishinhabitants of NatzeratIllit are appalled wheneverthey encounterthe erroneous
suggestionthattheirtown and adjacentArab Nazarethmightbe one and the same. Cunously,
however,manyof them referto theirtown as simplyNatzeret- the folktermmost oftenused
by JewishIsraelisforold Arab Nazareth.In recentyearstheyhave been more ofteninclinedto
use NatzeretIllit.
The Arab inhabitants of the area, includingthose residingin NatzeratIllit,use otherappella-
tions for it. One most frequentlyused is E-Shikun- 'The housing estate'. Nasserael U'iya -
'Upper Nazareth'- is also used sometimes,as is NatzeretIllit.
4 This articledoes not cover the significant changes which occurredin Natzerat Illit as of
1990, afterthe arrivalof an unprecedentedwave of Jewishimmigrants fromthe then Soviet
 DAN RABINOWITZ 535

Union. The wave, which resultedin the additionof 7,000 to 10,000 Jewishresidentsto the
town by early1992, is havinga far-reaching impacton a varietyof aspectsof the social life of
the town,not leaston relationsbetweenJewsand Arabs.
5 Since Sa'adawl is presently with KHK, where Bracha and her familyare in-
not affiliated
sured,her visitto him had to be paid forprivately.The selectionof specialistsin NatzeratIllit
being as poor as it is, to consulta Jewishspecialistshe would have had to look further afield,to
Haifa or Afula.
6 Followingthe 1990 season HapoelNatzerat lit was promotedto the 3rd division.In 1991 it

competedforpromotionto the 2nd, eventuallylosing by a narrowmargin.It remainsNatzerat

Illit'sonlycompetitivebasketballteam,and one of the town's chiefsportingrepresentatives.
7 The popular uprisingof the Palestiniansin the terntories occupied by Israel since 1967,
which began in December 1987.
8 Investigations in Britainand abroad have establishedunequivocallythat the PLO was not
involvedin eitherplanningor executingthe operation.
9 Most sportsin Israelare played in year-longseasonswhich tend to correspondto the aca-
demic calendar,beginningin Septemberor October and ending in June. Summer monthsare
used forrest,regroupingand preparations forthe comingseason.
10 Competitivesportin Israelis controlledby politicallyonented sportsfederations. The big-
gest federation,Hapoel,to which the NatzeratIllit basketballteam belongs,is affiliated with the
Histadrut trade union federation.The local Histadrut branchis the chiefsource of fundingand
organizational resources.
11Arabshave not ascendedto significant heightsin any of Israel'smain sportingestablishments.
Two outstanding exceptionsare the rathermarginalsportsof weightlifting and boxing,which are
considerablymore popular in the Arab sector than they are amongstJews. Arab coaches and
managershave made theirmarkin thesetwo sports.The head coach of the Israelinationalteam
in 1991 was a ChristianArab. 1991-2 also saw Rifa't Turk of Jaffa,a formerfootballplayerof
Israel'snationalteam and Hapoel Tel-Aviv,appointedas Hapoel Tel-Aviv'scoach (undera Jewish
manager).
12 Daher's proficiency in the productionof such parlancewas probablyacquired duringhis
academic trainingat Israel'smain sportsacademy,the Wingate Institute(named afterthe Bntish
Colonel Charles Ord Wingate). The Institutetrainsstudentsto use curt, military-like orders
when issuingexercisedemandsto theirfuturetraineesand students.Militarytone andjargon thus
featureas an integralpartof physicaleducationin Israel.
13 Zaa'tar is the Arabic word forthyme.It is also the name of a popular spice, made in Arab

householdsby grindingthymewith other herbs. In recentyearsit has become almostequally

popular amongstJews in Israel.The name Zaa'tar has been incorporatedinto Hebrew with no
alteration, thoughmostIsraelisare aware of itsArabicongin.
14 The nationwidecrisisof the Hapoel sportsfederationbroughtabout a similarsolution in

manybranches.Locally organizedvoluntaryassociationswere ofteninvitedto take over the re-

sponisibility forseniorcompetitiveteams,sometimeseven foryouthactivities.Relinquishingsome
controlover a potentialfocusof public interest, the local workers'council branchthusneverthe-
less freeditselffromcripplingdebtsand a considerableworkloadforitsofficials.
15 Hughes (1945) went on to indicate,forexample,thatthe common solutionin the U.S.A.

seems to have been a formof voluntarysegregation,by which, for example, women lawyers
representwomen clients and black personnelmanagers'act only in referenceto negro em-
ployees'.
16 These findings, with theiremphasison intentionsratherthan attributes, suggesta certain
modificationof Said's assertionthatthe Zionistview of Palestinians- which he sees as an ampli-
ficationof the Westernview of the Orient - portraysthe Palestiniansas equally vicious and
stupid(Said 1980: 26).
17 Recent studiesof trustas a social reality(Lewis & Wiegert 1985a), trustas a commodity

(Shapiro 1987) and the concertedefforts aimed at the productionof trust(Zucker 1986) seem to
adopt a similarapproachto trustas a 'climate'regulatedby and forsociety.
18 For non-Arabicspeakerssuch as HNI players, ShafikDaher's real name is somewhatdifficult
to fathom:both partscould denote eithera familyname or a forename.In fact,most players
were unclearas to which was what. Some who addressedhim or referred to him by his surname
were obviouslyunderthe impressionthattheywere usinghis forename.
536 DAN RABINOWITZ
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Faire confiance et rationaliser: l'inversion des roles au sein des

populations arabes palestiniennes etjuives en Israel

R&sivme
En Israel,lesjuifsonttendancea consld&rer lesarabespalestiniens,memeceux qui sontde nationalit&
isra6lienne,comme etant dangereuxet malveillants.Pourtant,les relationspersonnellesqui
s'&tablissententrejulfset arabesdansle commerceet l'industrie, au niveau du gouvernementou
blen entreles membresdes professions lib&raleset leursclients,se developpentdansun climatde
confiancemutuelleexpliciteou implicite,mimnmale et limit&eau contexte. L'articlefaitpartde
deux etudessitu&esa NatzeratIllit,une villerecenteengee en 1957 parle gouvernement isra&llen
a la penph&riede la vleille cite arabe de Nazarethen Galilke.La premiere&tudeportesur un
medecin arabe et ses patientsjulfs. La deuxieme,sur un entraineurde basket-ballarabe et son
&quipe,dont tous les membressontjuifs.Ces &tudesmontrentque lesjulfssontpretsa accorder
leur confiancea un arabe,a partirdu momentouicelul-clsembleagirselon ses int6ratspropres.
Ces donnees,ainsique les travauxsociologiqueset anthropologiques recentsexplorantla relation
entrensque et rationalit&,apportentde nouveauxelementspour une meilleurecomprehension de
la confiance.

DepartmentofSociology
andSocialAnthropology,
HebrewUniversity
ofJerusalem,
MountScopus,
Jerusalem
91905, Israel