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The former Yugoslavia was a federation of six Socialist Republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Each of this Republics had its own
characteristics related to the economic, social, religious and ethnic environment, but all of them
believed in the same idea of having a strong federation of The South Slavs. Even though Yugoslavia
had a very strong ideology supported by good aims, it breaks-up in 1991 and leads to several wars.
Dejan Jovic, lecturer in politics at the University of Stirling in Scotland, treats the topic under
seven causes: economic, ancient ethnic hatred, nationalism, cultural, international, the role of
personality and the fall of empires (101). Much uncertainty still exists about the relationship between
the causes, to what extent and which of them were direct causes and which were indirect?
It has commonly been assumed by scholars like Niko Tos and Vesna Bojicic that the economic
crisis that covered Yugoslavia in the beginning of 80s led to an intense gap between more developed
regions on one side (Slovenia and Croatia) and the less developed ones (Kosovo) on another. Due to
this Slovenia and Croatia were the first ones to call for independence. Later, this became a motivation
also for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The key problem with this explanation is that Yugoslavia
disintegrated at the moment when it was showing some hope related to the economy, thanks to Ante
Markovics economic reforms, that eliminated the inflation, moreover the personal income increased.
The inflation rate, which for the month of December had climbed to 56%, had by the
end of January fallen to 17.3%; by February it was down to 8.4%, by March to 2.4% and for
April it registered only 0.2% industrial productivity has also increased and foreign loans
have been secured to aid the restructuring of the economy (Plestina 166).
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Woodward holds the view that the economic crisis triggered constitutional conflict, which
resulted in the crisis of the state itself, but this would not have necessarily resulted in the break-up
(28-29). Most probably, these small developments in the economy were not enough to keep
Yugoslavia together.
The cultural, nationalistic and ancient ethnic hatred arguments are inter-connected and it
would be impossible to motivate one without another. The cause of the nationalism is directly
connected with history and culture, as there are a number of important differences between Serbs,
Croats, and Bosnians. First of all, Serbs are Orthodox, Croats are Catholics and Bosnians are Muslim,
due to what empire held power other their territories. Additionally, Serbs were not concentrated just
in the Socialist Republic of Serbia, but also on other Republics: 30% of Bosnias population and 10%
of Croatians (Anderson 11-12). This is the reason why Milosevic, the former president of Yugoslavia,
who is ethnically Serb, manipulated with the nationalism of the Serbs and promoted a Greater-Serbia
idea. Laura Silber, Balkans correspondent defined Milosevics action as destruction through a
venomous campaign of nationalist aggression (38). Moreover, 20% of Bosnias population were
Croats (Anderson 12), after Croatia got its independence in 1992, the president Tudjman played the
same game as Milosevic with the scope to divide Bosnia. Misha Glenny, a British journalist argued
that the central factor in the Yugoslav break-up was the relationship between the two biggest ethnic
The essential problem of a Yugoslav state lies in the numerical and political dominance
of Serbs over Croats; the essential problem of a Croatian state lies in the numerical and
Still, Yugoslavia managed to exist peacefully for 46 years (1945-1991) despite the ethnic,
cultural and nationalistic differences. A possible explanation is the role of the personality, more
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specifically Titos role. Tito was the first president of Yugoslavia, he managed to balance all the
disputes within the federation due to his charismatic figure on one hand, but more important as he was
above the law. In 1974, Constitution declared Tito as a president without limitation. He was no longer
just the supreme politician, but the state itself (Tepavac 64). This made Tito an objective arbiter who
succeed to mediate the conflicts within the country. Yugoslavia was seen as a multi-ethnic empire
during his ruling, where Tito didnt associate himself with any ethnic. (Hobsbawm 92). After Titos
death in 1980, disputes arise and there was no central leader, with strong recognition from each citizen
Another cause could be attributed to international powers. After Cold War, Yugoslavia loses
its strategical position between West and East, and with this, it loses the support from the external
actors. David Owen, former British foreign secretary who was sent as a mediator to already divided
Yugoslavia in 1992, claims that the European Union took actions to prevent the conflict in Yugoslavia
too late, EUs ignorant attitude together with the wrong perception of the conflict led to the break-up
The topicality of the study is determined by the fact that there is not a consolidated opinion
regarding the cause of the break-up of Yugoslavia, all the causes listed above try to complete, rather
than exclude each other, to offer an objective overview on the break-up of Yugoslavia. For a deeper
understanding of the whole picture, one has to take into consideration not just one, or several, but all
of them as interdependent causes, as taking them separately will lead to neglection of important
The main aim of this study is to investigate and compare different causes of the disintegration
of Yugoslavia, while the specific objectives of this study are to review the existent theories, to
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determine their role, to show how they are interdependent and to offer an alternative in their
conjugation.
The research strategy is qualitative, designed descriptive, to underline the different factors
referred to the Break-up. The research methods are literature review, qualitative analysis of the
mass-media articles and reportage covering the conflict and the exploration of alternative.
The scientific value of this paper is to fill the gap that shall describe the interconnection of
the causes in question. As understanding the links between causes will lead to a clear and
comprehensive picture of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The practical value is determined by the
complexity of the conflict and it can be used as a case-study for other conflict regions with similar
scenarios.
Introduction, which provides background information about the material, its topicality,
defining the aim and objectives and explaining the methods used, additionally, it shows how
it was structured;
Main body gives background information about each cause separately, argued by different
scholars
Conclusion is explaining the interdependence of the causes and lists the outcomes of the
research
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THE CAUSES OF THE BREAK-UP
The Economic Cause was widely debated by scholars, rather it triggered the crisis in
Yugoslavia or it was a direct cause. It is assumed that the economic crisis from the1970s and early
1980 developed a gap between north and south of Yugoslavia. The north felt slowed down by the poor
south, while the south complained that the developed north is not offering them enough assistance.
Republics such as Slovenia and Croatia claimed for independence for reasons of their further
development and they opposed attempts to limit their economic autonomy provided by the
constitutional compromise in 1974. In 1987, Slovenia claims that it has more chances of economic
Woodward argues that the economic crisis triggered constitutional conflict, which resulted in
the crisis of the state itself. Yet, it would not be enough reasoning for the disintegration of the country.
Paradoxically to the arguments based on the economical decrease, Yugoslavia, in fact, collapsed at
the moment when new market-oriented prime minister Ante Markovics economic reforms were
offering their first positive results, additionally, he eliminated the inflation and increased the personal
income of the citizens of all 6 republics. This were signs of hope for the future of Yugoslavia, yet
what seemed to be hopeful like a new beginning was but a very brief lull before the proverbial storm
(Plestina).
Also, as a proof that economic crisis wasnt the reason for the collapse of the federation is the
attitude of the main leaders of the Yugoslav republics (Milan Kucan - Slovenia; Franjo Tudjman -
Croatia, and Slobodan Milosevic - Serbia) in the last stage of the negotiation regarding the future of
Yugoslavia with EC. All of them refused political compromise in return for substantial economic
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support from EC, that led to the economic failure for all post-Yugoslav states, with a small exception
Hobsbawn calls the economic crisis as a purely negative event rather than a cause of the
break-up. Despite the economic stagnation, still, Yugoslavia was the most developed from all East
European societies.
It is clear that the economic element played a role in the break-up equation, however, leaving
out the human agent, especially of the political actors it cannot fully explain the political phenomena.
It can be easily argued that international actors played an important role both, at the rise and
the fall of Yugoslavia. A significant help was offered to Yugoslavia when it was created, both in 1918
and 1945, but also after to keep its existence. This was due to the strategic position that the Federation
had. Unfortunately, after the Cold War, it lost this ace. The fall of the Berlin War disadvantaged
Yugoslavia. Following this, it was difficult to attract international attention, both on economic and
political issues. Woodward calls this actions the insensitivity of the West. She claims that
Yugoslavia collapsed because of the disintegration of the international order, by which Yugoslavia
The former Yugoslav defense secretary, General Kadijevic, argues that due to the collapse of
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia become vulnerable and this led to west-oriented republics to demand
On another side, we can blame the international actors for not reacting fast enough to the
conflicts within Yugoslavia. On one hand, EC/US wasnt aware of the complexity of the crisis within
the federation (even though CIA warned US in November 1990 that Yugoslavia would violently fall
apart within 18 months, although the crisis point was seen as Kosovo, not Croatia or Bosnia) (Cohen),
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Also, EC didnt have the instruments/institutions that would deal with the crisis. When finally,
EC sends a mediation mission to offer aid if political compromises are achieved, Slovenia and Croatia
were too close to secession, and it was too late for negotiations. Also, it was difficult to understand
the ECs will, on one hand Germany and Austria supported Slovenia and Croatia and lobbied their
independence in the EC, on another hand the UK and France tries to keep Yugoslavia together. The
contrary opinions within EC werent very helpful to Yugoslavia. When ECs peacekeeping efforts
were unsuccessful, the EC began to hand over its tasks to the UN in the last months of 1991.
(Anderson)
Indeed, EC and US reacted too late in the crisis, but it cannot be seen as a primary cause of the
break-up, as Yugoslavia wasnt fully depended on this external powers, moreover it was promoting a
After the fall of Communism, nationalism was stronger than liberalism, Djilas claims. Being
stronger it constituted the main alternative. Also, it is important to underline that the nationalism from
1980s was mostly created by intellectual elites, rather than an authentic feeling. Why it was possible
to awake such strong nationalistic feelings? There are a lot of differences among republics: historical,
economic and cultural. And with a constant ideological narrative it isnt very difficult to accommodate
Also, the nationalism become stronger due to the 1974 Constitution that promoted anti-statist
as completed (as Kardelj formulated it in 1970), and their republics as sovereign states (as formulated
in the 1974 constitution), the ideological narrative of Yugoslav communism in practice shielded and
promoted nationalism in its constitutive nations. As Goati argues the seeds of Yugoslav collapse are
within the political elite. By promoting a non-ethnic base for Yugoslav unity, the elite made
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nationalism the main rhetorical antipode to the dominant ideology of the regime. Additionally, by
declaring everyone who is against the system a nationalist, they promoted nationalism is the main
alternative, most genuine opposition of the regime. Excluding it from public sphere led to the inclusion
of it underground sphere.
After communism, the nationalistic groups wanted to establish the state that was missing, not
persevering one that already exists. For Poland or Hungary, the 1989 revolution meant establishing of
their own independent state without Soviet patronage. While these nations saw Soviet Union as the
main obstacle in creating their state, Croats, Slovenians, Albanians saw Belgrade as the main obstacle.
The difference is that Hungary and Poland are rather a homogenous ethnically, and this wasnt the
case of Yugoslavias republics. With Serbs living on the territory of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia, with
Croats living both in Croatia and Bosnia, and with Kosovo and Albanians in Serbia. After Yugoslav
independence from Moscow, there was no external actor to blame for the crisis and this weakened the
federation unity.
As there was a lack of a single Yugoslav cultural space and political institutes that would
represent every single citizen of Yugoslavia, the creation of the Yugoslav nation was very difficult, if
not impossible. The separate culture system resulted in creating 6 political nations and after their
independent states.
Countries democratization also didnt play favorable in keeping the federation united. With
the massive protest from Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins (minority rights) as well as public demands
from Slovenia (who feared of becoming a minority in Yugoslavia), the Yugoslav elites should have
thought of new ways to keep the federation together. Although neither Milan Kucan nor Slobodan
Milosevic were originally ethnic nationalists, their political pragmatism and the context in which they
acted led them to act like someone who has jumped on to the tiger of nationalism and is
finding it difficult to get off again without the tiger eating him (Owen).
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The (realistic) chance of Yugoslavia becoming a member of the European Union in the
foreseeable future, in which case national identities would have found themselves under two supra-
national lids (Yugoslav and European) additionally mobilized the sense of being endangered among
the ethnic nationalists. It was based on fears (primarily among the intellectual and political elites) that
the status of their ethnic groups would be decreased from one of completed constitutive nations (as
recognized by the 1974 constitution) to one of a minority in the new democratic structure of the
country (Horowitz). Consequently, the nation-states were seen as not only desirable, but as a necessary
The division between Eastern and Western Christianity and between Christianity and Islam
couldnt play an invisible role in the collapse of Yugoslavia. John Stuart Mill is his book Consideration
on Representative Government suggest that where there is not a common shared culture you build a
government on the national sentiment. Most probably, this was the case of Yugoslavia, as they tried
to create Yugoslav identity rather than ethnic/cultural one, but it wasnt strong enough to keep the
federation together. It is obvious that cultural, religious, linguistic, economic, historical diversities
motivate nations to build their own independent state, and within Yugoslavia these differences were
Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian president used the cultural argument in his narrative to justify
the break-up of Yugoslavia and also to legitimize the conflict between Croats and Bosnians in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. (Wachtel)
This aspect is very interesting to analyze, as arguments can be brought from early history of
any ethnic group and it brings very logical explanation to the break-up. But it is unclear why
Yugoslavia managed to exist in symbiosis of all this different cultures (Catholics, Orthodox, Muslims)
for 45 years and collapsed so suddenly and in short time. We definitely must give credits to peoples
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beliefs and to the importance of self-identification through culture (even though usually these beliefs
are created by opinion-makers and ideologues and used to manipulate masses). Most probably there
were still hate between cultures that was planted long time ago, and was just covered by the shining
Yugoslavia had 2 personalities that played an important role in its collapse. First is the Josip
Tito, during his service was the only one who took decisions regarding the federation, he was
the one deciding in regards to foreign affairs, defense, security, etc. His strategy was to identify
himself with the state, not with an ethnical or nationalistic group, and this helped to solve any
cultural/ethnic disputes that could arise, and legitimized him before every citizen. With his politics,
he was keeping Yugoslavia together, even though the federation was decentralized following 1974
constitution. This is why, it is commonly assumed that with the death of Tito, Yugoslavia was also
sentenced to death.
On another hand, there was Slobodan Milosevic, who tried to follow the same path the Tito
did (at the beginning he was even seen as Tito), but affiliating himself to an ethnic group and
promoting a strong nationalistic rhetoric, he didnt manage. Hoping to rise the nationalism of the Serbs
located in other republics, rather than Serbia, wasnt seemed appropriately by other leaders. Most
probably, he didnt play the cards right with Slovenia and after Croatia, that lately, as snow-ball effect
For sure, both of them influenced decisively Yugoslav politics and not only, but it is too narrow
to say that Yugoslavia was living in peace or broke-up due to one personality. All the decisions and
actions they were taking were also influenced by other factors and they were catalyzed by citizens or
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elites wills. Both of them tried to find a compromise between their own views and those of others.
The role of personality is a strong one, but it isnt strong enough to explain the break-up fully.
Eric Hobsbawm drafted this argument, explaining that Yugoslavia developed as a multi-ethnic
empire (on the model of Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian Empire that had before its creation included
its main regions (Kedourie)), rather than to become a nation-state constructed by liberals. It can be
seen as a possible explanation for Titos period of the ruling, as he never identified with any ethnic
group. As a Communist, the ideology was more important for him, than the nationality, he became a
supra-national arbiter in inter-ethnic conflicts. Progressively, the ideological leaders were substituted
by representative leaders of republics, so there wasnt anymore the supra-national position at the top
of the empire. The 1974 constitution was the transition from an empire-like ideological structure to a
fragmented semi-confederalist, this was too large extent the beginning of the de-Titoization of
Yugoslavia, that de facto started 6 years after his death. Unlike Tito, Milosevic could not be seen as
an impartial arbiter, but more as a representative of one segment of the society (Serbs). In order to
become the new Tito, Milosevic had to change the constitution and destroy the existing political
The fall of empires argument is very complex, as it links several other elements and theories
like weakness of nationalism, the role of personality, ideology, etc.), it is difficult to compare
Yugoslavia with real empires, where commonly there was a dominant nation and which used colonial
expansion in order to lower tensions inside the metropolis. Yugoslavia can be called metaphorically
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Conclusion
Yugoslavia collapsed and in response there were created 5 independent states. As showed in
this paper there are many theories and arguments to explain what happened. It is very difficult to
declare which cause was the most important and relevant to the crisis, as they are all interconnected
and interdependent. Some of them played the role of triggers, some of catalyzers, some were direct,
while other indirect, some were genuine, and other more conspirator, some were internal and other
external.
It is clear that in early 1990, Yugoslavia was in a very delicate and fragile situation, and
nationalistic emotions and actions of first, Milosevic and then by Slovenia's leaders and Croatia's
President Tudjman, were sufficient to trigger violence. Structures to handle the disputes were lacking
internally (Yugoslavia), as well as externally (EC). EC and other external actors missed the chances
to solve peaceful all the disputes, and there for sure was a real need for it.
Even though some causes of the collapse are logical and evident, one shall also take in
consideration the human factor, the subjectivity and sometime illogical actions that one can take.
Speaking here of everyone: elites, political powers, masses, but also every single citizen. It is very
difficult to neglect history, your ethnic provenience, religion and values. Where there was impossible
to create a new set of values, the Yugoslav ones to satisfy the needs of all groups, the collapse was
inevitable.
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Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth, edited by David Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, Longman,
Cohen, Lenard J. Embracing Democracy in the Western Balkans: From Post Conflict Struggles
Djilas, Aleksa. Razgovori za Jugoslaviju. Conversations for Yugoslavia, 1993. Belgrade, Prometej.
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Glenny, Misha. The Fall of Yugoslavia: the third Balkan war. Penguin Books, 1996.
Hobsbawm, Eric. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge UP, 1990.
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