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Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses)
INQUEST
A preliminary investigation is required before the
filing of a complaint or information for an offense
where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four
years, two months and one day without regard to
fine. As an exception, the rules provide that there is
no need for a preliminary investigation in cases of a
lawful arrest without a warrant involving such type
of offense, so long as an inquest, where available,
has been conducted. Inquest is defined as an
informal and summary investigation conducted by a
public prosecutor in criminal cases involving
persons arrested and detained without the benefit of
a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the
purpose of determining whether said persons should
remain under custody and correspondingly be
charged in court. Leviste vs. Alameda, 626 SCRA
575, G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010
It is imperative to first take a closer look at the
predicament of both the arrested person and the
private complainant during the brief period of
inquest, to grasp the respective remedies available
to them before and after the filing of a complaint or
information in court. BEFORE THE FILING OF
COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN COURT,
the private complainant may proceed in
coordinating with the arresting officer and the
inquest officer during the latters conduct of
inquest. Meanwhile, the arrested person has the
option to avail of a 15-day preliminary
investigation, provided he duly signs a waiver of
any objection against delay in his delivery to the
proper judicial authorities under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. For obvious reasons, this
remedy is not available to the private complainant
since he cannot waive what he does not have. The
benefit of the provisions of Article 125, which
requires the filing of a complaint or information
with the proper judicial authorities within the
applicable period, belongs to the arrested person.
The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its
summary nature and the attendant risk of running
against Article 125, ends with either the prompt
filing of an information in court or the immediate
release of the arrested person. Notably, the rules on
inquest do not provide for a motion for
reconsideration. Leviste vs. Alameda, 626 SCRA
575, G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010
PRESCRIPTION
It is imperative to first take a closer look at the
predicament of both the arrested person and the
private complainant during the brief period of
inquest, to grasp the respective remedies available
to them before and after the filing of a complaint or
information in court. BEFORE THE FILING OF
COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN COURT,
the private complainant may proceed in
coordinating with the arresting officer and the
inquest officer during the latters conduct of
inquest. Meanwhile, the arrested person has the
option to avail of a 15-day preliminary
investigation, provided he duly signs a waiver of
any objection against delay in his delivery to the
proper judicial authorities under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. For obvious reasons, this
remedy is not available to the private complainant
since he cannot waive what he does not have. The
benefit of the provisions of Article 125, which
requires the filing of a complaint or information
with the proper judicial authorities within the
applicable period, belongs to the arrested person.
The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its
summary nature and the attendant risk of running
against Article 125, ends with either the prompt
filing of an information in court or the immediate
release of the arrested person. Notably, the rules on
inquest do not provide for a motion for
reconsideration. Leviste vs. Alameda, 626 SCRA
575, G.R. No. 182677<br/> August 3, 2010
The Olarte case set at rest the conflicting views, and
enunciated the doctrine aforecited by the Solicitor
General. The reasons for the doctrine which We
find applicable to the case at bar reads: In view of
this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide
guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has
reexamined the question and, after mature
consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the
true doctrine is, and should be, the one established
by the decisions holding that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be
merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period
of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed
can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons
buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the
period of prescription shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information without
distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the
court for preliminary examination or investigation
merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed
may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust
to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under
his control. All that the victim of the offense may
do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the
requisite complaint. Francisco vs. Court of Appeals,
122 SCRA 538, No. L-45674 May 30, 1983
Petitioner maintains that, although the charge
against respondents was for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, its prosecution
relates to its efforts to recover the ill-gotten wealth

of former President Ferdinand Marcos and of his
family and cronies. Section 15, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution provides that the right of the
State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public officials or employees is not barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel. But the Court has
already settled in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 317 SCRA
272 (1999), that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution applies only to civil actions for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, not to criminal cases
such as the complaint against respondents in OMB-
0-90-2810. Thus, the prosecution of offenses arising
from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten
wealth contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution may be barred by prescription.
Republic vs. Cojuangco, Jr., 674 SCRA 492, G.R.
No. 139930 June 26, 2012
In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the
Court reckoned the prescriptive period from the
discovery of such loans. The reason for this is that
the government, as aggrieved party, could not have
known that those loans existed when they were
made. Republic vs. Cojuangco, Jr., 674 SCRA 492,
G.R. No. 139930 June 26, 2012
Section 4- Information
-concurrent jurisdiction of Ombudsman and other
prosecuting agencies
The real nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the information,
or from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the
facts in the complaint or information. In People v.
Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647 (2005), the Court
elaborated: For complaint or information to be
sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense,
and the place wherein the offense was committed.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint,
nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated,
these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged
and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to
be charged, and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege
the elements of the crime charged. Every element of
the offense must be stated in the information. What
facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to
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the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of
a crime in the information is to inform the accused
of the nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
People vs. Valdez, 663 SCRA 272, G.R. No.
175602 January 18, 2012
Issue:
WON treachery may be appreciated in the case even
though it was not alleged in the information.
Ruling:
This Court does not find merit in Asilans
contention that he cannot be convicted of murder
because his acts of treachery were not alleged with
specificity in the Information. Section 6, Rule 110
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense
by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of
the offense; and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one
person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information. This Court held that
"[u]nder Section 6, the Information is sufficient if it
contains the full name of the accused, the
designation of the offense given by the statute, the
acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name
of the offended party, the approximate date, and the
place of the offense."48 The Information herein
complied with these conditions. Contrary to
Asilans contention, the qualifying circumstance of
"treachery" was specifically alleged in the
Information. "The rule is that qualifying
circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
Information in order not to violate the accuseds
constitutional right to be properly informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him."
Asilan never claimed that he was deprived of his
right to be fully apprised of the nature of the
charges against him due to the insufficiency of the
Information.
This Court completely agrees with the Court of
Appeals pronouncement that "since treachery was
correctly alleged in the Information and duly
established by the prosecution, x x x [Asilan]s
conviction for the crime of murder is proper."
In any case, it is now too late for Asilan to assail the
sufficiency of the Information on the ground that
there was failure to specifically allege therein how
treachery was carried out. Section 9, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any
ground therefor.- The failure of the accused to

assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed
to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and
(i) of section 3 of this Rule.
In this case, Asilan not only failed to
question the sufficiency of the Information at any
time during the pendency of his case before the
RTC, he also allowed the prosecution to present
evidence, proving the elements of treachery in the
commission of the offense. Asilan is thus deemed to
have waived any objections against the sufficiency
of the Information (People vs. Asilan)
An Information is fatally defective when it is clear
that it does not really charge an offense or when an
essential element of the crime has not been
sufficiently alleged. In the instant case, while the
prosecution was able to allege the identity of the
buyer and the seller, it failed to particularly allege
or identify in the Information the subject matter of
the sale or the corpus delicti We must remem ber
that one of the essential elements to convict a
person of sale of prohibited drugs is to identify with
certainty the corpus delicti Here, the prosecution
took the liberty to lump together two sets of corpora
delicti when it should have separated the two in two
different informations. To allow the prosecution to
do this is to deprive the accused-appellants of their
right to be informed, not only of the nature of the
offense being charged, but of the essential element
of the offense charged; and in this case, the very
corpus delicti of the crime. People vs. Posada, 667
SCRA 790, G.R. No. 194445 March 12, 2012
When ambiguity exists in the complaint or
information, the court has no other recourse but to
resolve the ambiguity in favor of the accused. Here,
since there exists ambiguity as to the identity of
corpus delicti an essential element of the offense
charged, it follows that such ambiguity must be
resolved in favor of the accused-appellants. Thus,
from the foregoing discussion, we have no other
choice but to acquit the accused-appellants of sale
of 12 sachets of shabu People vs. Posada, 667
SCRA 790, G.R. No. 194445 March 12, 2012
INJUNCTION VS. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal
prosecution; Exception.The CA likewise
overlooked a fundamental rule we follow in this
jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine that
injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal
prosecution because public interest requires that
criminal acts be immediately investigated and
prosecuted for the protection of society. However, it
is also true that various decisions of this Court have
laid down exceptions to this rule, among which are:
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a. To afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez v.
Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19
SCRA 95); b. When necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. v.
Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez v. Albano,
supra; Fortun v. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27,
1981, 104 SCRA 607); c. When there is a pre-
judicial question which is sub[-]judice (De Leon v.
Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202); d. When the acts of the
officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas
v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62); e. Where the prosecution is
under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
(Young v. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389); f. When double
jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang v. People
and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140); g. Where the court
has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez v. City
Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where there is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution (Rustia v. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760,
March 25, 1960); i. Where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance (Recto v. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited
in Raoa v. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R,
October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. v. City Fiscal,
L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); x x x j.
When there is clearly no prima facie case against
the accused and a motion to quash on that ground
has been denied (Salonga v. Pao, et al., L-59524,
February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438)[; and] [k.]
Preliminary injunction has been issued by the
Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful
arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez v. Castelo, L-6374,
August 1, 1953). People vs. Grey, 625 SCRA 523,
G.R. No. 180109 July 26, 2010
SECTION 5- WHO MUST PROSECUTE
Suffice it to say that it is indubitably within the
discretion of the prosecutor to determine who must
be charged with what crime or for what offense.
Public prosecutors, not the private complainant, are
the ones obliged to bring forth before the law those
who have transgressed it. Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company vs. Reynado, 627 SCRA 88, G.R.
No. 164538 August 9, 2010
Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court mandates
that all criminal actions must be commenced either
by complaint or information in the name of the
People of the Philippines against all persons who
appear to be responsible therefor. Thus the law
makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file
the charges against whomsoever the evidence may
show to be responsible for the offense. The proper
remedy under the circumstances where persons who
ought to be charged were not included in the
complaint of the private complainant is definitely
not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in
the information. Metropolitan Bank and Trust

Company vs. Reynado, 627 SCRA 88, G.R. No.
164538 August 9, 2010
CONTROL OF THE PROSECUTOR
In this case, AAA gave her testimony in court
during the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution. After the prosecution rested its case
and during the presentation of the evidence for the
defense, AAA again testified to tell the court that
she lied when she first testified thereby recanting
her previous testimony. Clearly, even if we consider
the recantation as pardon on the part of the offended
party in favor of appellant, the same cannot be
appreciated for purposes of acquitting the accused
as it was given definitely after the institution of the
criminal action. Once the case is filed in court,
control of the prosecution is removed from the
offended partys hands and any change of heart by
the victim will not affect the states right to
vindicate the atrocity committed against itself. It
must be stressed that the true aggrieved party in a
criminal prosecution is the People of the Philippines
whose collective sense of morality, decency and
justice has been outraged. People vs. Dollano, Jr.,
659 SCRA 740, G.R. No. 188851 October 19, 2011
CONTROL BY COURT
A court that grant a motion of the fiscal to dismiss a
case commits no error and the fiscals view thereon,
in a clash of views with the judge or complainant,
should normally prevail.Thus, a fiscal who asks
for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of
evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that
grant the same commit no error. The fiscal may re-
investigate a case and subsequently move for the
dismissal should the re-investigation show either
that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may
not be established beyond reasonable doubt. In a
clash of views between the judge who did not
investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the
fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those
of the fiscals should normally prevail. On the other
hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor
a writ of prohibition may be issued by the Courts to
restrain a criminal prosecution except in the
extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to
do so for the orderly administration of justice or to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner. Crespo vs.
Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, No. L-53373 June 30, 1987
Once an information is filed in court, the courts
prior permission must be secured if fiscal wants to
reinvestigate the case.The preliminary
investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose
of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is
terminated upon the filing of the information in the
proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of
said information sets in motion the criminal action
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against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find
it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at
such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted
to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true
that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in court or not, once the case had already been
brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal
may feel should be proper in the case thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the
Court, The only qualification is that the action of
the Court must not impair the substantial rights of
the accused, or the right of the People to due
process of law. Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462,
No. L-53373 June 30, 1987
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and
whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal
or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a
motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the
Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the
motion or deny it and require that the trial on the
merits proceed for the proper determination of the
case Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, No. L-
53373 June 30, 1987
A judge acts with grave abuse of discretion when he
grants a prosecutors motion to dismiss criminal
charges against an accused on the basis solely of the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justicehis
reliance on the prosecutors averment that the
Secretary of Justice had recommended the dismissal
of the case is an abdication of the trial courts duty
and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case, in
blatant violation of the pronouncement in Crespo v.
Mogul.Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting the prosecutors motion to
dismiss the criminal charges against the petitioner
on the basis solely of the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice. In moving for the dismissal of
the case against the petitioner, the prosecutor
averred x x x The above quoted Order allowing the
amendment of the information to exclude petitioner
therefrom effectively dismissed the criminal case
against the latter. That the trial judge did not make
an independent evaluation or assessment of the
merits of the case is apparent from the foregoing
order. Judge Masadaos reliance on the prosecutors
averment that the Secretary of Justice had
recommended the dismissal of the case against the
petitioner was, to say the least, an abdication of the
trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a
prima facie case, in blatant violation of this Courts
pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul as reiterated in
the later case of Martinez v. Court of Appeals.
Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., 327 SCRA
588, G.R. No. 126210 March 9, 2000

If the fiscal is not convinced that a prima facie case
exists, he cannot move for the dismissal of the case
and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same.
Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that
a prima facie case exists, he simply cannot move for
the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to
prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceed
and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot impose
his opinion on the trial court. At least what he can
do is to continue appearing for the prosecution and
then turn over the presentation of evidence to
another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his
direction and control (U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32
Phil. 442; U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289). Where
there is no other prosecutor available, he should
proceed to discharge his duty and present the
evidence to the best of his ability and let the court
decide the merits of the case on the basis of the
evidence adduced by both parties. Sta. Rosa Mining
Company vs. Zabala, 153 SCRA 367, No. L-44723
August 31, 1987
The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had
directed the fiscal to move for dismissal of the case
and the motion to dismiss filed is denied by the trial
court, is no justification for the fiscal's refusal to
prosecute the case. It is the court where the case is
filed and not the fiscal that has full control of it. Sta.
Rosa Mining Company vs. Zabala, 153 SCRA 367,
No. L-44723 August 31, 1987
SECTION 8- DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE
(INCLUDING QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES)
Nature and cause of the accusation determined not
by the name given to the offense but by the
description of the manner and circumstance in
which it was committed. ___ It is well-settled that
the nature and cause of the accusation are
determined not by the name given to the offense but
by the description of the manner and circumstances
in which it was committed. The designation of the
offense or of the law violated is a conclusion of law
made by the prosecuting officer but this is not
binding on the court. That conclusion must
ultimately be made only by the court itself after the
trial and following its own ascertainment of the
facts needed to constitute the elements of the crime
attributed to the accused. If an essential element is
not alleged to prove a graver crime, no conviction
therefor may be rendered. Conversely, if the
elements proved constitute a less serious offense,
conviction therefor is justified although it is the
higher offense that is alleged. In other words, it is
the recitals of the facts of the commission of the
offense, and not the nomenclature of the offense,
that should determine the crime being charged in
the information. People vs. Elesterio, 173 SCRA
243, G.R. No. 63971 May 9, 1989
SEC. 13- DUPLICITY OF OFFENSE
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The questioned information is patently defective
because it imputes two distinct offenses.From
the purely procedural perspective, there is much to
fault about the information. The two Chinese clients
who were impleaded with the petitioner were
charged with absolutely nothing, prompting the
respondent judge to peremptorily dismiss the
information as to them. Worse, the information
imputed to the remaining accused two different
offenses, to wit, writing the allegedly libelous letter
and causing the publication of the allegedly libelous
news report. This was not allowed under Rule 110,
Section 12, of the Rules of Court, providing that a
complaint or information must charge but one
offense, except only in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses. If libelous, the letter and the news report
constituted separate offenses that should have been
charged in separate informations. (However, not
having been raised in the motion to quash, that
ground was deemed waived under Rule 15, Section
8, of the Rules of Court.) Manuel vs. Pao, 172
SCRA 225, G.R. No. 46079 April 17, 1989
SEC. 14 AMENDMENT OR SUBSTITUTION
Who may initiate?
Amendment and substitution, distinguished.It
may accordingly be posited that both amendment
and substitution of the information may be made
before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ
in the following respects: 1. Amendment may
involve either formal or substantial changes, while
substitution necessarily involves a substantial
change from the original charge; 2. Amendment
before plea has been entered can be effected without
leave of court, but substitution of information must
be with leave of court as the original information
has to be dismissed; 3. Where the amendment is
only as to form, there is no need for another
preliminary investigation and the retaking of the
plea of the accused; in substitution of information,
another preliminary investigation is entailed and the
accused has to plead anew to the new information;
and An amended information refers to the same
offense charged in the original information or to an
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the original charge, hence substantial
amendments to the information after the plea has
been taken cannot be made over the objection of the
accused, for if the original information would be
withdrawn, the accused could invoke double
jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or
presupposes that the new information involves a
different offense which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original charge, hence
the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, 207 SCRA 134, G.R.
No. 103102 March 6, 1992

The amendment of the information will not require
a new arraignment where the amendment was solely
the inclusion of another accused.We do not find
merit in the first assignment of error. The lack of
arraignment under the amended information is
objected to by accused-appellant Joseph Casey
allegedly on the ground that there is a violation of
his constitutional right to be informed of the charge
against him. There can be a violation of such right,
however, only when the amendment pertains to
matters of substance. In the case at bar, the
alterations introduced in the information refer to the
inclusion of accused-appellant Ricardo Felix to the
same charge of murder. They do not change the
nature of the crime against accused-appellant
Casey. Conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery
and taking advantage of superior strength are
similarly alleged in both informations. No
extenuating circumstance is likewise alleged in
both. Thus the amendment of the information as far
as accused-appellant Casey is concerned is one of
form and not of substance as it is not prejudicial to
his rights. People vs. Casey, 103 SCRA 21, No. L-
30146 February 24, 1981
NEED FOR NEW PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IF SUBSTANTIAL
AMENDMENT
Due process of law demands that no substantial
amendment of an information may be admitted
without conducting another or a new preliminary
investigation.Reinvesti-gation is required in cases
involving a substantial amendment of the
information. Due process of law demands that no
substantial amendment of an information may be
admitted without conducting another or a new
preliminary investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd
Division of the Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 736
(2005), the Court ruled that a substantial
amendment in an information entitles an accused to
another preliminary investigation, unless the
amended information contains a charge related to or
is included in the original Information. Leviste vs.
Alameda, 626 SCRA 575, G.R. No. 182677<br/>
August 3, 2010
The amendment of the Information from homicide
to murder is a substantial amendment which would
make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution
to ask for a preliminary investigation.The
question to be resolved is whether the amendment
of the Information from homicide to murder is
considered a substantial amendment, which would
make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution
to ask for a preliminary investigation. The Court
answers in the affirmative. A substantial
amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative
of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are
merely of form. The following have been held to be
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mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations
which relate only to the range of the penalty that the
court might impose in the event of conviction; (2)
an amendment which does not charge another
offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one; (3) additional allegations which do not
alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of
defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment
which does not adversely affect any substantial
right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that
merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in
the information and not to introduce new and
material facts, and merely states with additional
precision something which is already contained in
the original information and which adds nothing
essential for conviction for the crime charged. The
test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available
after the amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in
the other. An amendment to an information which
does not change the nature of the crime alleged
therein does not affect the essence of the offense or
cause surprise or deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment had each
been held to be one of form and not of substance.
Leviste vs. Alameda, 626 SCRA 575, G.R. No.
182677<br/> August 3, 2010
RULE 111
CIVIL LIABILITY, BASIS THEREOF
The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability where
x x x the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required in civil
cases.The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where x x x the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required in civil cases. On this basis, Emilia insists
that the MTCC dismissed the BP 22 cases against
her not on the ground of reasonable doubt but on
insufficiency of evidence. Hence, the civil liability
should likewise be extinguished. Emilias Demurrer
to Evidence, however, betrays this claim. Asserting
insufficiency of evidence as a ground for granting
said demurrer, Emilia herself argued therein that the
prosecution has not proven [her] guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. And in consonance with such
assertion, the MTCC in its judgment expressly
stated that her guilt was indeed not established
beyond reasonable doubt, hence the acquittal. Lim
vs. Mindanao Wines & Liquor Galleria, 675 SCRA
628, G.R. No. 175851 July 4, 2012
CONSOLIDATION OF CRIMINAL ACTION
WITH CRIMINAL CASE

Rule 111, Sec. 3(a) of the Rules of Court requires
that the civil action to be consolidated with the
criminal action is one for recovery of civil liability
arising from a criminal offense, or ex delicto.As a
ground for the consolidation of the criminal civil
cases, petitioner invokes Rule 111, Sec. 3(a), Rules
of Court, which provides:Sec. 3. Other civil
actions arising from offenses.Whenever the
offended party shall have instituted the civil action
to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense,
as contemplated in the first paragaph of Section 1
hereof, the following rules shall be observed: (a)
After a criminal action has been commenced, the
pending civil action arising from the same offense
shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be
found until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered. However, if no final
judgment has been rendered by the trial court in the
civil action, the same may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court
trying the criminal action. If the application is
granted, the evidence presented and admitted in the
civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action, without prejudice
to the admission of additional evidence that any
party may wish to present. x x x x. Under the
aforequoted provision, the civil action that may be
consolidated with a criminal action, is one for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal
offense, or ex delicto. In the case at bar, the civil
action filed by the petitioner was for specific
performance with damages. The main relief sought
in the latter case, i.e., the delivery of the certificates
of title to the lots which petitioner had allegedly
fully paid for, was grounded on the Contract to Sell
between the petitioner and the private respondent.
Hence the civil action filed by the petitioner was for
the enforcement of an obligation arising from a
contract, or ex contractu, and not one for the
recovery of civil liability arising from an offense;
hence, the law invoked by the petitioner is
inapplicable. Naguiat vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 164 SCRA 505, No. L-73836 August 18,
1988
Consolidation of a criminal action with a civil
action arising not ex delicto, may still be done under
Sec. 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court.But, as held
in Canos v. Peralta, the consolidation of a criminal
action with a civil action arising not ex delicto, may
still be done, based upon the express authority of
Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which
provides: Section 1. Conso-lidation.When
actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order a joint
hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in
the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay. Naguiat vs.
7
Intermediate Appellate Court, 164 SCRA 505, No.
L-73836 August 18, 1988
Private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of
his right to file the separate civil action by
prescription.Finally, the private offended party
need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription. People vs. Bayotas, 236
SCRA 239, G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
The claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be obligation other than delict. People vs.
Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239, G.R. No. 102007
September 2, 1994
Where the civil liability survives, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way
of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended.Where the civil liability
survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action
for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above. People vs.
Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239, G.R. No. 102007
September 2, 1994
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
A prejudicial question is defined as that which
arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of
the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve the question must be lodged in another
court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused. Ras vs. Rasul,
100 SCRA 125, Nos. L-50441-42 September 18,
1980

For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a
criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
criminal action pending the determination of the
civil, it must appear not only that the civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of
the issues raised in said civil action would be
necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused. Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125, Nos.
L-50441-42 September 18, 1980
Criminal action for estafa (for alleged double sale of
property) is a prejudicial question to a civil action
for nullity of the alleged deed of sale and defense of
the alleged vendors of forgeries of their signatures
in the deed.On the basis of the issues raised in
both the criminal and civil cases against petitioner
and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a
prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a
prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering
that peti tioner Alejandro Ras defense (as
defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and
forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of
Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and
complaining witness in the criminal case) is based
on the very same facts which would be necessarily
determinative of petitioner Ras guilt or innocence
as accused in the criminal case. If the first alleged
sale in favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then
there would be no double sale and petitioner would
be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in
the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed
ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to
be set aside if it were finally decided in the civil
action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was
a forgery and spurious. Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA
125, Nos. L-50441-42 September 18, 1980
Pendency of intestate proceeding will not constitute
a prejudicial action in a criminal case for Theft of
standing crops filed by a person claiming to have a
valid contract by lease on the property from its legal
owner against a person claiming co-ownership of
the land leased. Librodo vs. Coscolluela, Jr., 116
SCRA 303, No. L-56995 August 30, 1982
Pendency of an ejectment case does not constitute a
prejudicial question to the charge of theft filed by
alleged lessee against a person claiming co-
ownership rights with the lessor, for illegal harvest
of sugarcane on land leased. Librodo vs.
Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303, No. L-56995
August 30, 1982
RULE 112
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION-
MANDATORY
The right to have a preliminary investigation
conducted before being bound over to trial for a
criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere
8
formal or technical right; it is a substantial right.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive
his right to a preliminary investigation. While that
right is statutory rather than constitutional in its
fundament, since it has in fact been established by
statute, it is a component part of due process in
criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over to
trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at
risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a
mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive
right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably
exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation,
humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an
opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one
save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable
right. To deny petitioners claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive him of the full
measure of his right to due process. Go vs. Court of
Appeals, 206 SCRA 138, G.R. No. 101837
February 11, 1992
The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation
is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before
or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still
retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the
instant case considering that he was already
arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the
right to preliminary investigation is waived when
the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of
entering a plea at arraignment. In the instant case,
petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to
preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At
the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already
before the Court of Appeals on certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a
preliminary investigation before being forced to
stand trial. Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA
138, G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is
primarily an executive function.The conduct of a
preliminary investigation is primarily an executive
function. Thus, the courts must consider the rules of
procedure of the Department of Justice in
conducting preliminary investigations whenever the
actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. An
examination of the 2008 Revised Manual for
Prosecutors of the Department of Justice-National
Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS Manual), therefore,
is necessary. Abanado vs. Bayona, 677 SCRA 595,
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1804 July 30, 2012
CAN BE WAIVED?
An accused, by entering his plea, and actively
participating in the trial, is deemed to have waived
his right to preliminary investigation.It is
conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a
preliminary investigation in his Motion for

Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman
denied the motion, he never raised this issue again.
He accepted the Ombudsmans verdict, entered a
plea of not guilty during his arraignment and
actively participated in the trial on the merits by
attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-
examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It
was only after the trial court rendered judgment
against him that he once again assailed the conduct
of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for
Reconsideration. Whatever argument Villarin may
have regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary
investigation has therefore been mooted. By
entering his plea, and actively participating in the
trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to
preliminary investigation. Villarin vs. People, 656
SCRA 500, G.R. No. 175289 August 31, 2011
SECTION 6
The general rule is that the judge is not required,
when determining probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo
hearing.The general rule of course is that the
judge is not required, when determining probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to
conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to
personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence. People vs. Dela
Torre-Yadao, 685 SCRA 264, G.R. Nos. 162144-54
November 13, 2012
DISTINGUISH: PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION AND INQUEST
A preliminary investigation is required before the
filing of a complaint or information for an offense
where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four
years, two months and one day without regard to
fine. As an exception, the rules provide that there is
no need for a preliminary investigation in cases of a
lawful arrest without a warrant involving such type
of offense, so long as an inquest, where available,
has been conducted. Inquest is defined as an
informal and summary investigation conducted by a
public prosecutor in criminal cases involving
persons arrested and detained without the benefit of
a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the
purpose of determining whether said persons should
remain under custody and correspondingly be
charged in court. Leviste vs. Alameda, 626 SCRA
575, G.R. No. 182677<br/> August 3, 2010
WHAT IS PROBABLE CAUSE?
Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. It implies probability of guilt and
requires more than bare suspicion but less than
evidence which would justify conviction. Drilon
9
vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 280, G.R. No.
115825 July 5, 1996
Probable cause should be determined in a summary
but scrupulous manner to prevent material damage
to a potential accuseds constitutional right to
liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play.
The preliminary investigation is not the occasion for
the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence
as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime. The validity and merits of a partys defense
or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies
and evidence, are better ventilated during trial
proper than at the preliminary investigation level.
Drilon vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 280, G.R.
No. 115825 July 5, 1996
s early as 1915, in Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,
this Court speaking through Associate Justice
Sherman Moreland defined probable cause as the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted. This definition is still
relevant today as we continue to cite it in recent
cases. Hence, probable cause for an arrest or for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested. And as a protection against false
prosecution and arrest, it is the knowledge of facts,
actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a
reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful
grounds for arresting the accused. Allado vs.
Diokno, 232 SCRA 192, G.R. No. 113630 May 5,
1994
The means of communication as well as the hour of
arrest and other circumstances must be taken into
consideration.For the purpose of determining the
criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for
more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code, the means of communication as well as the
hour of arrest and other circumstances, such as the
time of surrender and the material possibility for the
fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the
necessary information, must be taken into
consideration. Soria vs. Desierto, 450 SCRA 339,
G.R. Nos. 153524-25 January 31, 2005
A preliminary investigation is designed to secure
the respondent involved against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecution. A preliminary
investigation is an inquiry to determine whether (a)
a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there

is a probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering the
person or persons who may be reasonably charged
with a crime. Probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt. The
investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief.
Probable cause implies probability of guilt and
requires more than bare suspicion but less than
evidence which would justify a conviction. A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime
has been committed by the suspect. However, while
probable cause should be determined in a summary
manner, there is a need to examine the evidence
with care to prevent material damage to a potential
accuseds constitutional right to liberty and the
guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect
the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses
in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials
arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.
Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 478 SCRA 387, G.R. No. 163593
December 16, 2005
Probable cause implies probability of guilt and
requires more than bare suspicion, but less than
evidence which would justify a conviction. Pineda-
Ng vs. People, 634 SCRA 736, G.R. No. 189533
November 15, 2010
Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the
evidence presented against the respondents, it
would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is
ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused, they
should be relieved from the pain of going through a
full blown court case. When, at the outset, the
evidence offered during the preliminary
investigation is nothing more than an
uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an
alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint should
not prosper so that the system would be spared from
the unnecessary expense of such useless and
expensive litigation. Tamargo vs. Awingan, 610
SCRA 316, G.R. No. 177727 January 19, 2010
Notwithstanding the pendency of the Information
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
especially considering the reversal by the Secretary
of Justice of his earlier Resolution, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
anchored on the alleged grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the
part of Secretary of Justice, remains an available
remedy to the aggrieved party; The decision
whether to dismiss the case or not rests on the sound
discretion of the trial court where the Information
was filed despite a resolution by the Secretary of
Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss
the case, and not even if the Secretary of Justice is
10
affirmed by the higher courts.We wish to point
out that, notwithstanding the pendency of the
Information before the MTCC, especially
considering the reversal by the Secretary of Justice
of his May 31, 2006 Resolution, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
anchored on the alleged grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the
part of Secretary of Justice, was an available
remedy to Flores as an aggrieved party. In the
petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals is not
being asked to cause the dismissal of the case in the
trial court, but only to resolve the issue of whether
the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of
discretion in either affirming or reversing the
finding of probable cause against the accused. But
still the rule standsthe decision whether to
dismiss the case or not rests on the sound discretion
of the trial court where the Information was filed.
As jurisdiction was already acquired by the MTCC,
this jurisdiction is not lost despite a resolution by
the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information
or to dismiss the case, notwithstanding the
deferment or suspension of the arraignment of the
accused and further proceedings, and not even if the
Secretary of Justice is affirmed by the higher courts.
Flores vs. Gonzales, 626 SCRA 661, G.R. No.
188197 August 3, 2010
The task of the presiding judge when the
Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or non-
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused; The purpose of the mandate of the judge to
first determine probable cause for the arrest of the
accused is to insulate from the very start those
falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial.As
enunciated in Baltazar v. People, 560 SCRA 278
(2008), the task of the presiding judge when the
Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or non-
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that the offense charged
in the Information, or any offense included therein,
has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. In determining probable cause, the average
man weighs the facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence
of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies
on common sense. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and that
it was committed by the accused. Probable cause
demands more than suspicion; it requires less than
evidence that would justify conviction. The purpose
of the mandate of the judge to first determine
probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to

insulate from the very start those falsely charged
with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial.
People vs. Court of Appeals, 626 SCRA 352, G.R.
No. 161083 August 3, 2010
Upon the filing of an Information, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) judge has the following options:
(1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he
or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of
arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of
probable cause, order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five days from notice,
the issue to be resolved by the court within thirty
days from the filing of the information. People vs.
Court of Appeals, 626 SCRA 352, G.R. No. 161083
August 3, 2010
It is settled that the determination of whether
probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in
court of an accused should be consigned and
entrusted to the DOJ, as reviewer of the findings of
public prosecutors. To accord respect to the
discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons
of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not
interfere with the prosecutors determination of
probable cause for otherwise, courts would be
swamped with petitions to review the prosecutors
findings in such investigations. The courts duty in
an appropriate case is confined to the determination
of whether the assailed executive or judicial
determination of probable cause was done without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal
information is defined as such facts as are sufficient
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Alejandro vs. Bernas, 657 SCRA 255, G.R. No.
179243 September 7, 2011
RULE 113 (Arrest)
NO NEED TO PERSONALLY EXAMINE
COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES OR
CONDUCT TRIAL DE NOVO IN
DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE
The general rule is that the judge is not required,
when determining probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo
hearing.The general rule of course is that the
judge is not required, when determining probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to
conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to
personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence. People vs. Dela
Torre-Yadao, 685 SCRA 264, G.R. Nos. 162144-54
November 13, 2012
11
MEANING OF IN HIS PRESENCE
ection 5(a) provides that a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit, an offense. Section 5(a) refers to arrest
in flagrante delicto. In flagrante delicto means
caught in the act of committing a crime. This rule,
which warrants the arrest of a person without
warrant, requires that the person arrested has just
committed a crime, or is committing it, or is about
to commit an offense, in the presence or within
view of the arresting officer. People vs. Alunday,
564 SCRA 135, G.R. No. 181546 September 3,
2008
WHEN TO CHALLENGE
Roselle raised this issue only during appeal, not
before she was arraigned.Roselle claims that the
police did not make a valid arrest in her case since
they arrested her without proper warrant and did not
apprise her of the rights of a person taken into
custody as the Constitution and R.A. 7438 provide.
But Roselle raised this issue only during appeal, not
before she was arraigned. For this reason, she
should be deemed to have waived any question as to
the legality of her arrest. People vs. Santiago, 642
SCRA 639, G.R. No. 191061 February 9, 2011
An accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue
or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignment. Any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made before
he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived. Sy vs. People, 655 SCRA 395,
G.R. No. 182178 August 15, 2011
WHEN WAIVED? EFFECT?
Where the accused voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, he is deemed to have
waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have
attended his arrest.After a thorough review of the
records of the case and for reasons that will be
discussed below, we find that appellant can no
longer question the validity of his arrest, but the
sachet of shabu seized from him during the
warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence
against him. The records show that appellant never
objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he
raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled
with his active participation in the trial of the case,
we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates
that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have

waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have
attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects
only the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in
itself, be the basis of his acquittal. People vs.
Racho, 626 SCRA 633, G.R. No. 186529<br/>
August 3, 2010
MEANING OF PROBABLE
CAUSE;RELIABLE INFORMATION NOT
ENOUGH
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be
justified under the second instance of Rule 113.
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without
warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon probable cause which means an
actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in
the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based
on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded
on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the
part of the peace officers making the arrest. People
vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, G.R. No. 125299 January
22, 1999
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE/HOT PURSUIT
ersonal knowledge of facts must be based on
probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion,
therefore, must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not
require the arresting officers to personally witness
the commission of the offense with their own eyes.
People vs. Uyboco, 640 SCRA 146, G.R. No.
178039 January 19, 2011
RULE 114 (BAIL)
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, we
held that jurisprudence is replete with decisions on
the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail,
especially in cases involving offenses punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
where bail is a matter of discretion. Under the
present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting
12
bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. It
must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail
in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges
on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt
of the accused is strong, and the determination of
whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In
order for the latter to properly exercise his
discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to
determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In
fact, even in cases where there is no petition for
bail, a hearing should still be held. Zuo vs.
Cabebe, 444 SCRA 382, A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-
RTJ November 26, 2004
In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following
rules outlining the duties of the judge in case an
application for bail is filed: 1. In all cases whether
bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail
or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure); 2. Where bail is a matter of
discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of
the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7
and 8, id.); 3. Decide whether the guilt of the
accused is strong based on the summary of evidence
of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the accused is
not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval
of the bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise the
petition should be denied. Zuo vs. Cabebe, 444
SCRA 382, A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ
November 26, 2004
BAIL AFTER CONVICTION
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, the accused who has been
sentenced to prison must typically begin serving
time immediately unless, on application, he is
admitted to bail. An accused not released on bail is
incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that
his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously
convicted accused who is denied bail loses his
liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed.
Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed,
however, the accuseds interest in bail pending
appeal includes freedom pending judicial review,
opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and
avoidance of potential hardships of prison. On the
other hand, society has a compelling interest in
protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an
individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison
time. Other recognized societal interests in the
denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention
of the accuseds flight from court custody, the
protection of the community from potential danger

and the avoidance of delay in punishment. Under
what circumstances an accused may obtain bail
pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between
the interests of society and those of the accused.
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise
discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to
those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that
discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the
fundamental principle that the allowance of bail
pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity
but with grave caution and only for strong reasons,
considering that the accused has been in fact
convicted by the trial court. Leviste vs. Court of
Appeals, 615 SCRA 619, G.R. No. 189122 March
17, 2010
CAPITAL OFFENSE
The defense counsel insists that the accused should
be entitled to bail considering the abolition of the
death penalty in the 1986 Constitution. He advances
the argument that due to the abolition of the death
penalty, murder is no longer a capital offense being
no longer punishable with death. This is erroneous
because although the Constitution states that the
death penalty may not be imposed unless a law
orders its imposition for heinous crimes
(Constitution, Art. III, Section 19 [1]), it does not
follow that all persons accused of any crime
whatsoever now have an absolute right to bail. In
Art. III, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, capital
offenses is replaced by the phrase offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua. People vs.
Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 81389 February
21, 1989
The test to determine whether the offense charged is
capital is not the penalty to be actually imposed on
accused in view of attendant circumstance, but the
penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged.The petitioner however submits that even
assuming that the evidence of guilt against him is
strong, the charge of murder, as to him who is only
16 years old, cannot be capital because the death
penalty cannot be imposed on account of his
minority which entitles him to a penalty reduction
of one degree. In effect, under petitioners
submission, the test to determine whether the
offense charged is capital, is the penalty to be
actually imposed on him in view of the attendant
circumstances. Bravo, Jr. vs. Borja, 134 SCRA 466,
No. L-65228 February 18, 1985
Petitioners posture hardly finds support in the law.
Under Section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
a capital offense is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission, and at the
time of the application to be admitted to bail, may
be punished by death. It is clear from this
13
provision that the capital nature of an offense is
determined by the penalty prescribed by law, with
reference to which it is relatively easy to ascertain
whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. Moreover, when the Constitution or the law
speaks of evidence of guilt, it evidently refers to a
finding of innocence or culpability, regardless of the
modifying circumstances. Bravo, Jr. vs. Borja, 134
SCRA 466, No. L-65228 February 18, 1985
Nevertheless, where it has been established without
objection that the accused is only 16 years old, it
follows that, if convicted, he would be given the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law,
which effectively rules out the death penalty. The
Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from
one who is accused of a capital offense where the
evidence of guilt is strong. The obvious reason is
that one who faces a probable death sentence has a
particularly strong temptation to flee. This reason
does not hold where the accused has been
established without objection to be a minor who by
law cannot be sentenced to death. Bravo, Jr. vs.
Borja, 134 SCRA 466, No. L-65228 February 18,
1985
CUSTODY OF THE LAW VS JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED:
RELEVANCE?
A person applying for admission to bail must be in
the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke
the processes of that court.The statement in Pico
v. Judge Combong, Jr., 215 SCRA 421 (1992), cited
by the Court of Appeals should not have been
separated from the issue in that case, which is the
application for admission to bail of someone not yet
in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of
our pronouncement in Pico reads: A person
applying for admission to bail must be in the
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke
the processes of that court. Respondent Judge
should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts
of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction
over the body of the accused before considering the
application for bail. While we stand by our above
pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail,
we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the
aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative
relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Miranda vs. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377, G.R. No.
158763 March 31, 2006

There is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to
quash which requires that the accused should be
under the custody of the law prior to the filing of a
motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing
the information had no authority to do so. Custody
of the law is not required for the adjudication of
reliefs other than an application for bail. However,
while the accused are not yet under the custody of
the law, any question on the jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Alawiya vs. Datumanong, 585 SCRA 267, G.R. No.
164170 April 16, 2009
RULE 115
RIGHT OF ACCUSED AT TRIAL
Should the trial court fail to accord an accused
reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his
defense, the exercise by the Court of its certiorari
jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a denial
of due process. Marquez vs. Sadiganbayan 5th
Division, 641 SCRA 175, G.R. Nos. 187912-14
January 31, 2011
A searching inquiry, under the Rules, means
more than informing cursorily the accused that he
faces a jail term but so also, the exact length of
imprisonment under the law and the certainty that
he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a
penal colony. People vs. Francisco, 635 SCRA
440, G.R. No. 192818 November 17, 2010
The stipulation of facts signed by the parties, that is,
the accused, his counsel and the prosecutor, in a
criminal case is recognized as a declaration
constituting judicial admission and is binding upon
the partiesthe stipulated facts stated in the pre-
trial order amount to an admission by the accused
and a waiver of his right to present evidence to the
contrary.The assertion of the accused that the
minority of AAA was not established because the
prosecution failed to present her birth certificate in
evidence deserves scant consideration. The
Informations specifically alleged that AAA was a
minor, i.e., barely 14 years old on July 14, 1999 and
September 1999, when she was raped by her own
father. The accused himself, with the assistance of
counsel, categorically admitted during pre-trial that
AAA was his daughter and that she was only 14
years old on July 14, 1999 and in September 1999.
These stipulations are binding on this Court because
they are judicial admissions within the
contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The stipulation of facts signed by
the parties, that is, the accused, his counsel and the
prosecutor, in a criminal case is recognized as a
declaration constituting judicial admission and is
14
binding upon the parties. The stipulated facts stated
in the pre-trial order amount to an admission by the
accused and a waiver of his right to present
evidence to the contrary. Although the right to
present evidence is guaranteed by the Constitution,
such right may be waived expressly or impliedly.
Thus, the rule that no proof need be offered as to
any facts admitted during a pre-trial hearing applies.
People vs. Bodoso, 623 SCRA 580, G.R. No.
188129 July 5, 2010
It is well settled that to be heard does not only
mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings.Since a pre-suspension
hearing is basically a due process requirement,
when an accused public official is given an
adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible
defenses against the mandatory suspension under
R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no
reason to complain that no actual hearing was
conducted. It is well settled that to be heard does
not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of
procedural due process exists. Miguel vs.
Sandiganbayan, 675 SCRA 560, G.R. No. 172035
July 4, 2012
The right of confrontation is held to apply
specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a
two-fold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an
opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by
cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to
observe the deportment of witnesses. Go vs. People,
677 SCRA 213, G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012
The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by
the Constitution, the supreme law of the land. This
right is granted to minimize the imbalance in the
adversarial system where the accused is pitted
against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the
state. In the words of Justice Black, this is a
recognition xxx that an average (accused) does not
have the professional skill to protect himself xxx
before a tribunal with power to take his life or
liberty, wherein the (prosecutor) is xxx an
experienced and learned counsel. People vs. Serzo,
Jr., 274 SCRA 553, G.R. No. 118435 June 20, 1997
The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the
precise moment custodial investigation begins and
being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
People vs. Lara, 678 SCRA 332, G.R. No. 199877
August 13, 2012
Like other constitutional rights, the right against
self-incrimination, including the right of a person
under investigation to remain silent and to counsel,

and to be informed of such right, may be waived.
To be valid, however, a waiver of the right must not
only be voluntary; it must be made knowingly and
intelligently (People vs. Caguioa, supra), which
presupposes an awareness or understanding of what
is being waived. It stands to reason that where the
right has not been adequately explained and there
are serious doubts as to whether the person
interrogated knew and understood his relevant
constitutional rights when he answered the
questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of rights.
People vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289, No. L-59378
February 11, 1986
The right against self-incrimination is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips
of the accused an admission of guiltit does not
apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is
not an incrimination but as part of object
evidence.In an attempt to exclude the DNA
evidence, the appellant contends that the blood
sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests
were conducted in violation of his right to remain
silent as well as his right against self-incrimination
under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right
is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is
simply against the legal process of extracting from
the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does
not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded
is not an incrimination but as part of object
evidence. People vs. Yatar, 428 SCRA 504, G.R.
No. 150224 May 19, 2004
Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot
review an order granting the demurrer to evidence
and acquitting the accused on the ground by
insufficiency of evidence because to do so will
place the accused in double jeopardy.A demurrer
to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested
its case and the trial court is required to evaluate
whether the evidence presented by the prosecution
is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds
that the evidence is not sufficient and grants the
demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is
one on the merits, which is equivalent to the
acquittal of the accused. Well-established is the rule
that the Court cannot review an order granting the
demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to
do so will place the accused in double jeopardy.
Bangayan, Jr. vs. Bangayan, 659 SCRA 590, G.R.
No. 172777 October 19, 2011
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements
are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2)
a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant
had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant
15
was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. However, jurisprudence allows for
certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered
final even if it was made on motion of the accused,
to wit: (1) Where the dismissal is based on a
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the
prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a
judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.
(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of
the accused, because of the denial of his right to a
speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.
Bangayan, Jr. vs. Bangayan, 659 SCRA 590, G.R.
No. 172777 October 19, 2011
The only instance when the accused can be barred
from invoking his right against double jeopardy is
when it can be demonstrated that the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to
make its case against the accused or where the trial
was a sham. Bangayan, Jr. vs. Bangayan, 659
SCRA 590, G.R. No. 172777 October 19, 2011
A review of the findings of the CA acquitting
Socorro of the charge against her is not warranted
under the circumstances as it runs afoul of the
avowed constitutional right of an accused against
double jeopardy. A verdict of acquittal is
immediately final, and a re-examination of the
merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate
courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same
offense. People vs. Court of Appeals, 660 SCRA
323, G.R. No. 187409 November 16, 2011
It is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial on the
merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot
be appealed on the ground of double jeopardythe
only exception where double jeopardy cannot be
invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial
resulting in a denial of due process. People vs.
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), 631 SCRA 128,
G.R. No. 173396 September 22, 2010
The constitutional right of the accused against
double jeopardy proscribes appeals of judgments of
acquittal through the remedies of ordinary appeal
and a Rule 45 petition. Ysidoro vs. Leonardo-
Castro, 665 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 171513 February 6,
2012
The rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly
invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated on two (2)
exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of
acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by
the court; and where the prosecution had been
deprived of due process. Ysidoro vs. Leonardo-
Castro, 665 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 171513 February 6,
2012

nce the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts
to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the
accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. People vs.
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 665 SCRA 89,
G.R. Nos. 153304-05 February 7, 2012
Elements of Double Jeopardy.Clearly, double
jeopardy has set in. The elements of double
jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the
accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the
case was dismissed without his express consent.
People vs. Atienza, 673 SCRA 470, G.R. No.
171671 June 18, 2012
Requisites of a valid trial in absentia are: (1) the
accused has already been arraigned; (2) he has been
duly notified of the trial: and (3) his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.Section 14(2), Article 3 of
the Constitution provides, inter alia, that trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable. The requisites then
of a valid trial in absentia are: (1) the accused has
already been arraigned; (2) he has been duly
notified of the trial; and (3) his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. Parada vs. Veneracion, 269 SCRA
371, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1353 March 11, 1997
Right to cross-examine is a personal one, it may be
forfeited by failure of a party to avail of the ample
opportunity given him.In Savory Luncheonette
vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, and the cases
cited thereunder, the Court, speaking through
Justice Muoz Palma, has provided us with a
concise overview of the right to cross-examination
as a vital element of due process. Thus: The right
of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or
civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasijudicial powers,
is a fundamental right which is part of due process.
However, the right is a personal one which may be
waived expressly or impliedly by conduct
amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-
examination. Thus, where a party has had the
opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to
cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or
allowed to remain in the record. The conduct of a
party which may be construed as an implied waiver
of the right to cross-examine may take various
forms. But the common basic principle underlying
the application of the rule on implied waiver is that
the party was given the opportunity to confront and
16
cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to
take advantage of it for reasons attributable to
himself alone. Fulgado vs. Court of Appeals, 182
SCRA 81, G.R. No. 61570 February 12, 1990
Where death prevents cross-examination without
fault on the part of the party offering such
testimony, an order to strike out such testimony is
not justified.Having had the liberty to cross-
examine and having opted not to exercise it, the
case is then the same in effect as if private
respondent had actually cross-examined. We
therefore hold that it was gross error for both the
trial court and the Appellate Court to dismiss the
complaint in Civil Case No. 10256 on the ultimate
ground that there was an alleged failure of cross-
examination. The wholesale exclusion of
testimonies was too inflexible a solution to the
procedural impasse because it prejudiced the party
whose only fault during the entire proceedings was
to die before he could be cross-examined. The
prudent alternative should have been to admit the
direct examination so far as the loss of cross-
examination could have been shown to be not in
that instance a material loss. And more
compellingly so in the instant case where it has
become evident that the adverse party was afforded
a reasonable chance for cross-examination but
through his own fault failed to cross-examine the
witness. Where death prevents cross-examination
under such circumstances that no responsibility of
any sort can be ascribed to the plaintiff or his
witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all
that has been obtained in the direct examination.
Fulgado vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 81, G.R.
No. 61570 February 12, 1990
Right to Speedy Trial; In determining the right of
the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more
than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the
case.The right of the accused to a speedy trial has
been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. This right requires that
there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or
oppressive delays. The right is deemed violated
when the proceeding is attended with unjustified
postponements of trial, or when a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the case being
tried and for no cause or justifiable motive. In
determining the right of the accused to speedy trial,
courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case. The conduct of both
the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.
Also to be considered are factors such as the length
of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right,
and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.
Villareal vs. People, 664 SCRA 519, G.R. No.
151258 February 1, 2012

An accuseds right to speedy trial is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
Factors to consider and balance on whether
petitioner was deprived of his right.Exhaustively
explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an
accuseds right to speedy trial is deemed violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining
whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the
factors to consider and balance are the following:
(a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c)
assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d)
prejudice caused by such delay. Mari vs. Gonzales,
657 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 187728 September 12,
2011
Designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by
holding criminal prosecution suspended over him
for an indefinite time and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice, said right is considered
violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the
case of Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA 294
(2004), this Court significantly ruled as follows: x
x x In determining whether the accused has been
deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be
considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for
the delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right;
and (d) prejudice to the defendant. xxxx Imperial
vs. Joson, 635 SCRA 71, G.R. No. 160067
November 17, 2010
RULE 116 ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
EFFECT OF DENIAL
No valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid
arraignment.In sum, the Court cannot send the
appellant to die in the electric chair on the basis of
the procedural irregularities committed by, and the
inadmissible evidence considered by the trial court.
In Binabay vs. People, et al., a ponencia of Mr.
Chief Justice R. Concepcion, this Court held that no
valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid
arraignment. Since in the case at bar, the
arraignment of the appellant is void, his judgment
of conviction is also void. In fairness to the
appellant, and in justice to the victim, the case has
to be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. There is no philosophy of punishment
that allows the State to kill without any semblance
of fairness and justice. People vs. Alicando, 251
SCRA 293, G.R. No. 117487 December 12, 1995
NO ARRAIGNMENT IN ABSENTIA
A plea of "not guilty" " entered in absentia by a
military court for an accused is not valid.We hold
that AGUILAR had not been legally arraigned
when a plea of "not guilty" had been entered for her
17
together with the other defendants who had refused
to plead. There can be no arraignment or plea in
absentia. Under both the 1964 Rules of Court and
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a defendant
must be present at the arraignment and must
personally enter his plea. Even under Section 62 of
the Manual of Courts Martial, it is provided that
"during arraignment, the accused and personnel will
stand." Nolasco vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 502, No. L-
68347, No. L-69482 November 7, 1985
PLEA TO A LESSER OFFENSE
Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution
does not have sufficient evidence to establish the
guilt of the accused of the crime charged.Plea
bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does
not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of
the accused of the crime charged. However, if the
basis for the allowance of a plea bargain in this case
is the evidence on record, then it is significant to
state that in its earlier Resolution promulgated on
January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan had evaluated
the testimonies of twenty (20) prosecution witnesses
and declared that the conglomeration of evidence
presented by the prosecution is viewed by the Court
to be of strong character that militates against the
grant of bail. Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by
the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably, chose
to plea bargain with the accused Major General
Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient
to secure a conviction. At this juncture, it is not
amiss to emphasize that the standard of strong
evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to
an accused is markedly higher than the standard of
judicial probable cause which is sufficient to initiate
a criminal case. Hence, in light of the apparently
strong case against accused Major General Garcia,
the disciplining authority would be hardpressed not
to look into the whys and wherefores of the
prosecutions turnabout in the case.
Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the
Philippines, 679 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 196231
September 4, 2012
PLEA TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE
Plea of guilty to the crime of robbery with
homicide; Three requirements to be observed by the
trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense
has been entered by the accused under Sec. 3, Rule
116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.Under
the new formulation three (3) things are enjoined of
the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital
offense has been entered by the accused: 1. The
court must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea; 2. The court must require
the prosecution to present evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and 3. The court must ask the accused if
he desires to present evidence in his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires. People vs. Camay,
152 SCRA 401, No. L-51306 July 29, 1987

WHAT IS SEARCHING INQUIRY?
A searching inquiry likewise compels the judge to
content himself reasonably that the accused has not
been coerced or placed under a state of duress.A
searching inquiry likewise compels the judge to
content himself reasonably that the accused has not
been coerced or placed under a state of duressand
that his guilty plea has not therefore been given
improvidentlyeither by actual threats of physical
harm from malevolent quarters or simply because of
his, the judges, intimidating robes. People vs.
Dayot, 187 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 88281 July 20,
1990
There can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge
may conduct a searching inquiry.While there can
be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may
conduct a searching inquiry, as to the number and
character of questions he may put to the accused, or
as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it,
since each case must be measured according to its
individual merit, taking into consideration the age,
educational attainment, and social status of the
accused confessing guilt, among other things, the
singular barometer is that the judge must in all
cases, fully convince himself that: (1) the accused,
in pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily, and (2)
he, in so doing, is truly guilty, and that there exists a
rational basis for a finding of guilt, based on his
testimony. People vs. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637, G.R.
No. 88281 July 20, 1990
EFFECT OF IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF
GUILTY
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry
should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it
was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a guilty plea to the accusedthe
conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of
judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy
themselves that the accused had not been under
coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and
consequences of their guilty plea. People vs.
Baharan, 639 SCRA 157, G.R. No. 188314 January
10, 2011
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt
are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment.In People v. Oden, 427 SCRA 634
(2004), the Court declared that even if the
requirement of conducting a searching inquiry was
not complied with, [t]he manner by which the plea
of guilt is made loses much of great significance
where the conviction can be based on independent
evidence proving the commission by the person
accused of the offense charged. Thus, in People v.
Nadera, 324 SCRA 490 (2000), the Court stated:
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt
are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
18
judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and
credible evidence to convict the accused, the
conviction must be sustained, because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the
accused but on evidence proving his commission of
the offense charged. People vs. Baharan, 639 SCRA
157, G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011
PLEA MUST BE UNCONDITIONAL
Plea of Guilty; Plea of guilty must be unconditional
and of such nature as to foreclose defendants right
to defend himself from the charge, leaving the court
no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by
law.The essence of a plea of guilty is that the
accused admits his guilt, freely, voluntarily, and
with a full knowledge of the consequences and
meaning of his act and with a clear understanding of
the precise nature of the crime charged in the
complaint or information. While it is true that a plea
of guilty admits all the allegations in the
information including the aggravating and
qualifying circumstances, the repeated and emphatic
qualification stated by the defendant-appellant as
regards his plea of guilty should have drawn the
attention of the trial court that the plea was made
without a full knowledge of its consequences.
Apparently, counsel failed to advise him as to the
meaning and effect of the technical language used
in the information qualifying the acts constituting
the offense. In order to be valid, the plea must be an
unconditional admission of guilt. It must be of such
nature as to foreclose the defendants right to
defend himself from said charge, thus leaving the
court no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed
by law. People vs. De Luna, 174 SCRA 204, G.R.
No. 77969 June 22, 1989
ILLEGAL ARREST WAIVED IF NOT RAISED
IN ARRAIGNMENT
A warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect
and any objection to it is waived when the person
arrested submits to arraignment without any
objection.The CA correctly ruled on the question
of legality of the warrantless arrests of accused-
appellants. A warrantless arrest is not a
jurisdictional defect and any objection to it is
waived when the person arrested submits to
arraignment without any objection, as in this case.
Accused-appellants are questioning their arrest for
the first time on appeal and are, therefore, deemed
to have waived their right to the constitutional
protection against illegal arrests and searches.
People vs. Aminola, 630 SCRA 384, G.R. No.
178062 September 8, 2010
All procedural irregularities in the arrest of accused
must be raised at his arraignment.First of all,
accused-appellant never raised this issue before his
arraignment. He never questioned the legality of his
arrest until his appeal. On this alone, the contention
must fail. It has been ruled time and again that an

accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity
with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue
or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before his arraignment.
Any objection involving the procedure by which the
court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. People
vs. Tan, 634 SCRA 773, G.R. No. 191069
November 15, 2010
RULE 117 MOTION TO QUASH
DEFINED
We define a motion to quash an Information as
the mode by which an accused assails the validity of
a criminal complaint or Information filed against
him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or
for defects which are apparent in the face of the
Information. This motion is a hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the Information,
for which reason, the court cannot consider
allegations contrary to those appearing on the face
of the information. Antone vs. Beronilla, 637 SCRA
615, G.R. No. 183824 December 8, 2010
We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not
attach in favor of the accused on account of an order
sustaining a motion to quash. More specifically, the
granting of a motion to quash anchored on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense is not a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense. Antone vs. Beronilla, 637 SCRA
615, G.R. No. 183824 December 8, 2010
NO JURISDICTION OVER PERSON
An accused is estopped from assailing the legality
of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue, or to move
for the quashal of the information against him on
this ground, before arraignment.As to the
regularity of appellants arrest, we have consistently
ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing the
legality of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue, or
to move for the quashal of the information against
him on this ground, before arraignment. Here,
appellant was arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty
and actively participated in his trial. He raised the
issue of the irregularity of his arrest only during his
appeal to the CA. He is, therefore, deemed to have
waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to
the jurisdiction of the court through his counsel-
assisted plea during the arraignment, by actively
participating in the trial, and by not raising the
objection before his arraignment. People vs. Palma,
614 SCRA 784, G.R. No. 189279 March 9, 2010
An accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue
or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignmentany
objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made before
19
he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived. Rebellion vs. People, 623 SCRA
343, G.R. No. 175700 July 5, 2010
FACTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE OFFENSE
It is settled that in considering a motion to quash on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, the test is whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the offense charged as defined
by law.The second issue was raised by petitioner
in the context of his Motion to Quash Information
on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. It is settled that in considering
a motion to quash on such ground, the test is
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of
the offense charged as defined by law. The trial
court may not consider a situation contrary to that
set forth in the criminal complaint or information.
Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioner[s]
against the charge under the information must be
proved by [him] during trial. Such facts or
circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for
a motion to quash the information on the ground
that the material averments do not constitute the
offense. Soriano vs. People, 611 SCRA 191, G.R.
No. 162336 February 1, 2010
TEST OF IDENTITY OF OFFENSES
Filing of information for discharge of firearm after
previous charge for offense of alarm and scandal.
The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be
accorded merit as the two indictments are perfectly
distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may
appear to be connected in fact. The protection of
double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense or identical offense. In the case at bar,
granting that the two indictments arose from the
same act, they describe and constitute essentially
different felonies having fundamentally diverse
indispensable elements. People vs. Doriquez, 24
SCRA 163, Nos. L-24444-45 July 29, 1968
REMEDY VS. DENIAL OF MOTION TO
QUASH
In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a
motion to quash filed by the accused results in the
continuation of the trial and the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.A preliminary
consideration in this case relates to the propriety of
the chosen legal remedies availed of by the
petitioner in the lower courts to question the denial
of his motion to quash. In the usual course of
procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the
accused results in the continuation of the trial and
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and
the lower courts decision of conviction is appealed,

the accused can then raise the denial of his motion
to quash not only as an error committed by the trial
court but as an added ground to overturn the latters
ruling. Galzote vs. Briones, 657 SCRA 535, G.R.
No. 164682 September 14, 2011
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an
interlocutory order and is not appealable; A direct
resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an
exception rather than the general rule, and is a
recourse that must be firmly grounded on
compelling reasons. Galzote vs. Briones, 657 SCRA
535, G.R. No. 164682 September 14, 2011
RULE 119 TRIAL
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STATE WITNESS
AND PROTECTED WITNESS
The discharge of an accused under R.A. No. 6981 is
distinct from the discharge of an accused under
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedurethe immunity provided under
R.A. No. 6981 is granted by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) while the other is granted by the
court.The discharge of an accused under
Republic Act No. 6981 as availed of by the
prosecution in favor of the private respondents, is
distinct and separate from the discharge of an
accused under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. The discharge of an
accused to be a state witness under Republic Act
No. 6981 is only one of the modes for a participant
in the commission of a crime to be a state witness.
Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, is another mode of discharge.
The immunity provided under Republic Act No.
6981 is granted by the DOJ while the other is
granted by the court.
Witness Protection and Security Benefit Program
(WPSBP); In the discharge of an accused under
R.A. No. 6981, only compliance with the
requirement of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is required but not the
requirement of Rule 119, Section 17.Rule 119,
Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, contemplates a situation where the
information has been filed and the accused had been
arraigned and the case is undergoing trial. The
discharge of an accused under this rule may be
ordered upon motion of the prosecution before
resting its case, that is, at any stage of the
proceedings, from the filing of the information to
the time the defense starts to offer any evidence. On
the other hand, in the discharge of an accused under
Republic Act No. 6981, only compliance with the
requirement of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is required but not the
requirement of Rule 119, Section 17. Yu vs.
Presiding Judge, RTC of Tagaytay City, Br. 18, 494
SCRA 101, G.R. No. 142848 June 30, 2006
20
The discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state
witness because he does not appear to be the most
guilty, is highly factual in nature.The rule
prevailing in this jurisdiction is that the discharge of
an accused to be utilized as a state witness because
he does not appear to be the most guilty, is highly
factual in nature. The discretionary judgment of the
trial court on this factual issue is seldom interfered
with by the appellate courts except in case of grave
abuse of discretion, which we find not present in the
case at bar. Yu vs. Presiding Judge, RTC of
Tagaytay City, Br. 18, 494 SCRA 101, G.R. No.
142848 June 30, 2006
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure applies in equal force when the
exclusion of a witness is sought on the usual ground
of lack of probable cause, or when it is for
utilization of the accused as state witness, or on
some other ground.There can be no quarrel as to
the fact that what is involved here is primary an
amendment of an information to exclude some
accused and that the same is made before plea.
Thus, at the very least, Section 14, Rule 110 is
applicable which means that the amendment should
be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with
notice to the offended party and with leave of court.
What seems to complicate the situation is that the
exclusion of the accused is specifically sought for
the purpose of discharging them as witnesses for the
State. The consequential question is, should the
requirements for discharge of an accused as state
witness as set forth in Section 17, Rule 119 be made
as additional requirements (i.e., Section 14, Rule
110 and Section 17, Rule 119) or should only one
provision apply as ruled by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 or
Section 17, Rule 119)? An amendment of the
information made before plea which excludes some
or one of the accused must be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court in
compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. Section 14,
Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the
exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision
applies in equal force when the exclusion is sought
on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or
when it is for utilization of the accused as state
witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.
Soberano vs. People, 472 SCRA 125, G.R. No.
154629 October 5, 2005
DEMURRER
Once the court grants the demurrer, the grant
amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of
the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy.As a rule, once
the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to
an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused
would violate the constitutional proscription on

double jeopardy. Notably, the proscription against
double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on
errors of judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction.
Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double
jeopardy will not attach, these are: (i) on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and/or (ii) where there is a
denial of a partys due process rights. People vs.
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 665 SCRA 89,
G.R. Nos. 153304-05 February 7, 2012
In a criminal proceeding, the burden lies with the
prosecution to prove that the accused committed the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt, as the
constitutional presumption of innocence ordinarily
stands in favor of the accused.Under the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the Sandiganbayan is under no
obligation to require the parties to present additional
evidence when a demurrer to evidence is filed. In a
criminal proceeding, the burden lies with the
prosecution to prove that the accused committed the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt, as the
constitutional presumption of innocence ordinarily
stands in favor of the accused. Whether the
Sandiganbayan will intervene in the course of the
prosecution of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction, competence and discretion, provided
that its actions do not result in the impairment of the
substantial rights of the accused, or of the right of
the State and of the offended party to due process of
law. People vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division),
665 SCRA 89, G.R. Nos. 153304-05 February 7,
2012
he court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may
require or allow the prosecution to present
additional evidence (at its own initiative or upon a
motion) after a demurrer to evidence is filed. People
vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 665 SCRA
89, G.R. Nos. 153304-05 February 7, 2012
The rule generally prevailing is that certiorari does
not lie to review a trial courts interlocutory order
denying a motion to dismiss (or to acquit), which is
equivalent to a demurrer to evidence, filed after the
prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its
case. Ong vs. People, 342 SCRA 372, G.R. No.
140904 October 9, 2000
From a denial of a demurrer to evidence, appeal in
due time is the proper remedy but if the denial is
attended by grave abuse of discretion, the denial
may be assailed through a petition for certiorari.
Ong vs. People, 342 SCRA 372, G.R. No. 140904
October 9, 2000
A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of
the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain the issue. Ong vs.
21
People, 342 SCRA 372, G.R. No. 140904 October
9, 2000
Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a
demurrer thereto is such evidence in character,
weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial
or official action demanded according to the
circumstances.Sufficient evidence for purposes of
frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in
character, weight or amount as will legally justify
the judicial or official action demanded according to
the circumstances. To be considered sufficient,
therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the
commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree
of participation therein by the accused. In the
instant case, the prosecution miserably failed to
establish by sufficient evidence the existence of the
crime of estafa and other deceit. Ong vs. People,
342 SCRA 372, G.R. No. 140904 October 9, 2000
If the accused files a Demurrer to Evidence with
prior leave of court and the same is denied, he may
adduce evidence in his defense. However, if the
Demurrer to Evidence is filed by the accused
without prior leave of court and the same is denied,
he waives his right to present evidence and submits
the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence
for the prosecution. Bautista vs. Cuneta-Pangilinan,
684 SCRA 521, G.R. No. 189754 October 24, 2012
The granting of a demurrer to evidence should be
exercised with caution, taking into consideration not
only the rights of the accused, but also the right of
the private offended party to be vindicated of the
wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted,
the accused is acquitted and the private complainant
is generally left with no more remedy. Bautista vs.
Cuneta-Pangilinan, 684 SCRA 521, G.R. No.
189754 October 24, 2012
RULE 120 JUDGMENT
REQUIREMENTS OF A VALID JUDGMENT
Requisites of a Valid Judgment of Conviction.In
any event, a judgment of conviction, pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, is
sufficient if it states: 1) the legal qualification of
the offense constituted by the acts committed by the
accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission; 2)
the participation of the accused in the offense,
whether as principal, accomplice or accessory; 3)
the penalty imposed upon the accused; and 4) the
civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act
or omission to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil
action has been reserved or waived. We find that
all of these are sufficiently stated in the trial courts
Decision. D'Aigle vs. People, 675 SCRA 206, G.R.
No. 174181 June 27, 2012
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a
judgment of acquittal shall state whether the

evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either
case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist. Abellana vs. People, 655 SCRA 683,
G.R. No. 174654 August 17, 2011
JUDGMENT FOR 2 OR MORE OFFENSES
In case of variance
While Villamar did compel Cortez to do something
against the latters will, it must be stressed that the
same cannot be categorized as an act of illegal
detention. Still, when Villamar was erroneously
charged for illegal detention, such oversight will not
preclude a guilty verdict for the crime of grave
coercion. In the early case of U.S. v. Quevengco,
and, recently, in People v. Astorga, we ruled that
the offense of grave coercion is necessarily included
in illegal detention; as such, an information for
illegal detention will not bar the accused from being
convicted of grave coercion, instead of the original
charge. People vs. Villamar, 298 SCRA 398, G.R.
No. 121175 November 4, 1998
When there is a variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in
the offense charged or of the offense charged which
is included in the offense proved.Under Section
4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, when there is a variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information,
and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved. As
explained by this Court in People v. Abulon, 530
SCRA 675 (2007): However, following the variance
doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to
Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure,
appellant can be found guilty of the lesser crime of
acts of lasciviousness. People vs. Rellota, 626
SCRA 422, G.R. No. 168103<br/>[Formerly G.R.
Nos. 155930-32] August 3, 2010
STATE MAY CHALLENGE ACQUITTAL OR
DISMISSAL
Exception to the rule on double jeopardy.The
state may challenge the lower court's acquittal of
the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on
the latter in the following recognized exceptions:
(1) where the prosecutor is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case,
tantmount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where
there is a finding of mistrial; or (3) where there has
been a grave abuse of discretion. Villareal vs.
22
People, 664 SCRA 519, G.R. No. 151258 February
1, 2012
It is true that a private complainant cannot bring an
action questioning a judgment of acquittal, except
insofar as the civil aspect of the criminal case is
concerned. In the case at bar, we agree with
petitioner that this issue was rendered moot when
the Solicitor General, in representation of the
People, changed his position and joined the cause of
petitioner, thus fulfilling the requirement that all
criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor.
Merciales vs. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 345,
G.R. No. 124171 March 18, 2002
RULE 121 NEW TRIAL OR
RECONSIDERATION
New and material evidence
Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court,
the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a)
the evidence was discovered after trial (in this case,
after investigation); (b) such evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching,
and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably
change the judgment.
It must emphasized that an erroneous admission or
rejection of evidence by the trial court is not a
ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision if
there are other independent evidence to sustain the
decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had been
admitted, would not have changed the decision.
Payumo vs. Sandiganbayan, 654 SCRA 277, G.R.
No. 151911 July 25, 2011
It has been held that the mistakes of the attorney as
to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency,
relevancy, materiality or immateriality of a certain
evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof
are not proper grounds for a new trial. Payumo vs.
Sandiganbayan, 654 SCRA 277, G.R. No. 151911
July 25, 2011
DISTINGUISH FROM MOTION TO RE-OPEN
OR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
distinction should be made between a Motion for
New Trial and Motion to Reopen Trial. A Motion
for New Trial may be filed after judgment but
within the period for perfecting an appeal (Sec. 1.
Rule 37, Rules of Court). A Motion to Reopen Trial
may be presented only after either or both parties
have formally offered and closed their evidence, but
before judgment. Agulto vs. Court of Appeals, 181
SCRA 80, G.R. No. 52728 January 17, 1990
There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court
for motions to reopen trial. It is albeit a recognized
procedural recourse or devise, deriving validity and

acceptance from long, established usage. The
reopening of a case for the reception of further
evidence before judgment is not the granting of a
new trial. Agulto vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA
80, G.R. No. 52728 January 17, 1990
A motion for new trial in civil or criminal actions
may be applied for and granted only upon specific,
well-defined grounds set forth respectively in Rules
37 (Section 1) and 121 (Section 2). On the other
hand, the reopening of a case for the reception of
additional evidence after a case has been submitted
for decision but before judgment is actually
rendered is. It has been said, controlled by no other
rule than that of the paramount interests of justice,
resting entirely in the sound judicial discretion of a
Trial Court; and its concession, or denial, by said
Court in the exercise of that discretion will not be
reviewed on appeal unless a clear abuse thereof is
shown. Agulto vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 80,
G.R. No. 52728 January 17, 1990
RULE 126-SEARCH AND SEIZURE
SEARCH WARRANT DISTINGUISHED ROM
WARRANT OF ARREST
The determination of probable cause in preliminary
investigations is based solely on the evidence
presented by the complainant regardless of whether
or not the respondent in that case is named in the
proceedings for a search warrant.To begin with, it
cannot be contended that complainant Leovigildo
Mantaring, Sr. could not be proceeded against
simply because he was not included in the search
warrant issued against Gamo and Leovigildo
Mantaring, Jr., who is apparently his son. The
determination of probable cause in preliminary
investigations is based solely on the evidence
presented by the complainant, regardless of whether
or not the respondent in that case is named in the
proceedings for a search warrant. As correctly
pointed out by the OCA, the issuance of a search
warrant and of a warrant of arrest requires the
showing of probabilities as to different facts. In the
case of search warrants, the determination is based
on the finding that (1) the articles to be seized are
connected to a criminal activity, and (2) they are
found in the place to be searched. It is not necessary
that a particular person be implicated. On the other
hand, in arrest cases, the determination of probable
cause is based on a finding that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be arrested has
committed it. Mantaring vs. Roman, Jr., 254 SCRA
158, A.M. No. RTJ-93-964 February 28, 1996
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or
a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A
search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an
order in writing issued in the name of the People of
the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for
personal property and bring it before the court. A
23
search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process
akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made
necessary because of a public necessity. Malaloan
vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249, G.R. No.
104879 May 6, 1994
It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely
a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond
only to an in coo ident in the main case, if one has
already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In
the latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would
involve some judicial clairvoyance to require
observance of the rules as to where a criminal case
may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no
such action having as yet been instituted, it may
ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction other
than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be
seized are then located. This is aside from the
consideration that a criminal action may be filed in
different venues under the rules for delitos
continuados or in those instances where different
trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction
over the same criminal offense. Malaloan vs. Court
of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249, G.R. No. 104879 May
6, 1994
Where a search warrant is issued by one court and
the criminal action based on the results of the search
is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not
the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to
retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only
with the issuing Courtsuch a motion may be filed
for the first time in either the issuing Court or that
in which the criminal action is pending.The
guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search
warrant is issued by one court and the criminal
action based on the results of the search is
afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the
rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to
retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only
with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed
for the first time in either the issuing Court or that
in which the criminal action is pending. However,
the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court
first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the
exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon
are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the
rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated
in the third policy guideline which indeed is what
properly applies to the case at bar. People vs. Court
of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400, G.R. No. 126379 June
26, 1998
It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to
search a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually
searchedalthough not that specified in the
warrantis exactly what they had in view when
they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in
 24

their supporting evidence. What is material in

determining the validity of a search is the place
stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants
had in their thoughts, or had represented in the
proofs they submitted to the court issuing the
warrant.The case at bar, however, does not deal
with the correction of an obvious typographical
error involving ambiguous descriptions of the
place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of
a place different from that clearly and without
ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In
Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification
was immediately perceptible on the face of the
warrants in question. In the instant case, there is no
ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies
outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a
meeting of minds as to the place to be searched
between the applicants for the warrant and the
Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to
substitute for the place that the Judge had written
down in the warrant, the premises that the executing
officers had in their mind. This should not have
been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police
officers to search a place different from that stated
in the warrant on the claim that the place actually
searchedalthough not that specified in the
warrantis exactly what they had in view when
they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in
their supporting evidence. What is material in
determining the validity of a search is the place
stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants
had in their thoughts, or had represented in the
proofs they submitted to the court issuing the
warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in
the context of the facts of this case, all four (4)
apartment units at the rear of Abigails Variety
Store would have been fair game for a search.
People vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400, G.R.
No. 126379 June 26, 1998