Did Kushner Keep Tillerson in

the Dark on Saudi-Lebanon

Move?
Efforts by Prince Salman to start a regional crisis backfired, but the drama has left the
secretary of state seething.
By MARK PERRY November 27, 2017

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman has accomplished the

impossible: hes actually united Lebanon, though perhaps only briefly.

The tale of how the 32-year-old bin Salman (or MbS, as hes called),
accomplished this is a tad complex, but its worth the telling. Earlier this
month, on November 2, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, the scion of
the wealthy Hariri family (and the son of the much-admired Rafiq Hariri,
who was assassinated in a car bombing in Beirut in 2005), received a
telephone call in Beirut from a senior Saudi official directing him to fly
immediately to Riyadh to meet with the Saudi Crown Prince. Hariri could
hardly refuse: a dual Lebanese-Saudi citizen, Hariris family fortune (and
funding for his Lebanese political party, the Future Movement) depended
on Saudi largesseso off he went.
The next day, Hariri cooled his heels for four hours waiting for MbS to meet
with him, before being ushered into His Presence, where he was
peremptorily directed to read a television statement announcing his
resignation as Lebanons prime minister and blaming Iran and its Lebanese
proxy, Hezbollah, for plotting to destabilize his country and murder him.
This was high drama, but lousy theatre: Hariris eyes shifted uncomfortably
during his address, as if seeking approval from off-camera handlers that he
was performing as expected. Hariri then popped up in Abu Dhabi, where he
met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan, before returning
to Riyadh, where he reassured the Lebanese public that he was sincere
about resigning, hadnt been detained against his will by the Saudis, and
would soon return to Beirut.

Unfortunately for the Saudis, no one in Lebanon was buying it.

Within hours of Hariris address, officials of his Sunni-dominated Future

Movement speculated that the prime minister was being held against his
will, expressed doubts that his resignation was voluntary and pushed for his
return. Several days later, Lebanese President Michel Aoun (a Maronite
Christian), said that he believed the Saudis had kidnapped Hariri while
Hassan Nasrallah, the Shiite leader of the Iranian-aligned Party of God
(Hezbollah), publicly described Hariris resignation as a Saudi-imposed
decision. Banners began appearing in Beirut (We Want Our PM Back),
and festooned the jerseys of runners participating in a Beirut marathon:
Running For Hariri.

Hariri was suddenly Lebanons poster boy, a martyr-in-the-making. Which

is to say that, within days of his resignation, it was clear that Saudi Arabias
attempt to paint Hezbollah as destabilizing Lebanon had backfired:
Mohammad bin Salmans insistence that Hariri take a tougher stance
against Iran and Hezbollah had made unlikely allies of Lebanons
squabbling factions. Those plotting against Lebanon werent in Tehran, the
Lebanese public decided, they were in Riyadh. But the Lebanese werent the
only ones who werent buying the Saudi line. Neither was the U.S. State
Department.
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who was accompanying the president
during his Asia tour at the time of the Saudi-engineered initiative, was
completely blindsided by the move, as several senior Middle East
diplomats confirmed to TAC. While Tillerson would later be accused of
being totally disengaged from the crisis, several former and current U.S.
diplomats have told us that just precisely the opposite was the case.
Tillerson, they say, had a long and pointed discussion on the Hariri
situation with Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir on November 7, after
having directed Acting Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs, David
Satterfield, to walk point on the issue. Satterfield talked with Hariris
aides in Beirut and told Christopher Henzel, the U.S. charge daffaires in
Saudi Arabia, to meet with Hariri in Riyadh. In Beirut, meanwhile, U.S.
Ambassador Elizabeth Richard was gathering information on the crisis
from Lebanese officials and passing it back to Washington.

Tillersons initial reaction to the Hariri resignation was in keeping with his
low-key approach. He gathered the facts, solicited advice, advised calm and
held his temper. In private, however, Tillerson was seething. This was the
second time in six months that the Saudis had taken a major diplomatic
initiative without issuing a heads-up to the U.S.a violation of the
unwritten no surprises rule that is standard courtesy among close allies.
The first surprise had come in June, when the Saudis broke off relations
with Qatar and placed it under an economic embargo. The anti-Qatar move
embarrassed the U.S., split the Gulf Cooperation Council and shattered U.S.
efforts to forge a united anti-Iran Sunni bloc. And, as was the case with the
Saudi-engineered Hariri resignation, the Qatar crisis had come with nary a
warning from the Saudis to their most important ally.

But according to a senior Middle East diplomat with whom TAC spoke,
Tillerson wasnt only angered by Saudi Arabias failure to give the U.S. a
heads-up on their Lebanon plans, he suspected that the White House knew
of the plan for Hariri ahead of time, but failed to tell him. The culprit, as
had been the case of the Qatar crisis, was Jared Kushner, the presidents
36-year-old son-in-law, whose official role in the White House is described
by an avalanche of titles that rivals anything given a Saudi royal: Senior
Advisor to the President, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy,
and Special Representative for International Negotiations. More crucially,
Kushner is close to MbS, who Kushner had met with (ostensibly about the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process), during an under-the-radar trip to the
region at the end of October.

Kushner and MbS arent just close, theyre very, very close, the senior
Middle East diplomat told TAC. I suppose theres an outside possibility
that Kushner was as surprised about the Hariri move as Tillerson, but I
really doubt it. Its unimaginable that bin Salman didnt tell Kushner what
he was planning. But this same diplomat dismissed the notion that bin
Salman asked for Kushners approval of the Saudi initiativethat Kushner
green lighted it. Thats not the way this works, he said. I doubt that the
Saudis needed a green light. They dont think they need anyones
permission to do what they want, they take it for granted that Kushner
supports them. Their calculation is that he has more influence with the
president than Rex Tillerson.

In truth, this diplomat says, neither the U.S. nor Tillerson should have been
surprised by the Saudi moveor MbS distaste for Saad Hariri. Tensions
between the Lebanese prime minister and the Saudis had been festering
since mid-May, when a Hariri-backed delegation of bankers arrived in
Washington to lobby the Congress against imposing tough new sanctions
on Lebanese financial institutions suspected of being affiliated with
Hezbollah. Lebanese officials told members of Congress that increased
regulatory pressure would damage Lebanons fragile banking sector and
endanger its financial stability. Hariri himself appeared in Washington in
July to buttress these efforts. As a result, Congress carefully dampened the
impact of the proposed sanctions, fearing that any attempt to target
Hezbollah would undermine the fragile Lebanese economy.

That was a final straw for the Saudis, this diplomat says. They were
absolutely disgusted. As far as they were concerned, Hariri was caving in to
the Iranians. By the end of the summer, the Saudis were determined to get
rid of the prime minister and replace him with his older brother, Bahaa, a
Saudi resident and Saad competitor who has long wanted to replace his
brother as head of the Future Movement. This was a plot and months in
the making, a senior aide to Lebanese President Michel Aoun told The
American Conservative in an email. Saad refused to fall in line with Saudi
Arabias plan to confront the Iranians. So MbS decided to make him pay.
But Hariri had not only run afoul of Mohammed bin Salman, hed also
crossed Thamer Al Sabhan, Saudi Arabias Minister of Gulf State Affairs, a
fervid, and MbS partisan. At key points in the crisis, and even as
Mohammed bin Salman remained silent, Al Sabhan had issued threats
against Iran, Hezbollahand Saad Hariri. His most outspoken public
statement came in the midst of the Hariri crisis, on November 7and was
aimed at the Lebanese prime minister.

We will treat the government in Lebanon as a government declaring war

on Saudi Arabia due to the aggression of Hizbollah, Al Sabhan told Al
Arabiya, the Saudi owned news channel. It was an astonishing statement,
and read in Washington as an or else threat against Haririhe would
resign his position and tow the Saudi line, or else. The problem for Al
Sabhan, and for the Saudis, is that the more reckless their rhetoric became,
the more the Lebanese dug in their heels. The Saudi mistake was in
thinking that wed roll over, this officials says. We didnt.

Nor did Rex Tillerson. On November 10, the State Department issued a
press statement under Tillersons name (On The Situation In Lebanon),
supporting Hariri (We respect Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Al-Hariri as
a strong partner of the United States.), at the same time that it took a
swipe at Iranand the Saudis. The United States cautions against any
party, within or outside Lebanon, the statement read, using Lebanon as a
venue for proxy conflicts or in any manner contributing to instability in that
country.

November 10, as it turns out, marked the most significant moment in the
Hariri crisis. On the day the Tillerson statement was issued, Tillersons
point man on the issue, David Satterfield, had a meeting with Thamer Al
Sabhan at the State Department. Al Sabhan was in Washington for
meetings, which included one at the White House. The Satterfield-Al
Sabhan meeting did not go well, according to the senior diplomat with
whom we spoke. In fact, the description is an understatement.

The meeting was ugly, confrontational, a former ambassador who

received a read out of the meeting explained to us. Satterfield laid down
the lawthe U.S. did not support the Saudi initiative, thought that what the
Saudis were doing was destabilizing, wanted Saad to remain as prime
minister and would not support Bahaa as his replacement. This senior
diplomat says that Satterfield was dismissive of the Saudi attempt to shift
the mantle of the Future Movement onto Bahaas shoulders. Satterfield
made it clear that the U.S. didnt think that Bahaa was up to the job, then
added his own judgment: Hes unpredictable, lazy.

In the days following the Satterfield-Al Sabhan meeting, the Hariri crisis
has subsided.Denying that he was detained against his will by the Saudis,
Hariri arrived in Paris on Saturday, where met with French President
Emmanuel Macron, then made his way to Beirut via Cairo on Wednesday.
His return was triumphant. He appeared at a military parade marking his
countrys independence, spoke to cheering crowds outside of his home
and all but renounced his Riyahd decision to resign as Lebanons prime
minister. I offered my resignation to President Aoun and he asked me to
delay presenting it, to allow for more consultations and deliberations, and I
agreed to his request, Hariri said.

The unlikely hero in all of this might well be Rex Tillerson, who quietly
engineered a U.S. policy at odds with the views of Donald Trumpand his
son-in-law. The exact details of how Tillerson pulled this off remain
unknown (I think Tillerson just told Trump what he was going to do, the
senior diplomat with whom we spoke speculates, and then just did it.),
even as the odds against him mount: he remains the target of former and
current State Department officials for failing to fill empty Foggy Bottom
offices, remains the object of rumors that he will be replaced, is widely
disliked by reporters covering the State Department for his detachment
(and for refusing to approve reporters requests to travel with him), and is
regularly dismissed in the diplomatic community for his stylefor what is
described as his vanishing act on foreign policy issues.

More crucially, Tillersons views are sharply at odds with a White House
that has shown a willingness to take Saudi claims at face value. Which
means that what was obvious in June, when the Saudis purposely shattered
the Arab worlds united Sunni front against Iran, is even more obvious
nowin the midst of the Hariri crisis. The U.S. is running two foreign
policies in the Middle East, the senior diplomat with whom we spoke says.
Theres a White House foreign policy thats in the hands of Jared Kushner
and another that is being engineered by Rex Tillerson. And which foreign
policy will prevail? The question brought a laugh from the senior diplomat.
Its not really that hard to figure out, he said. Rex Tillerson will be
secretary of state until he decides not to beor gets fired. But Jared
Kushner will probably be the presidents son-in-law forever.

Mark Perry is a foreign policy analyst, a regular contributor to The

American Conservative and the author of The Pentagons Wars, which was
released in October. He tweets @markperrydc