Exploring Smart Sanctions- A Critical Analysis of the Zimbabwe

Democracy and Economic Recovery Act.

A Directed Research

Submitted to Tulane University Law School

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

LLM in International and Comparative Law

By

James Bayanai

May 06, 2016

Prof Feibelman Adam, Supervisor

1
 Abstract

Smart or targeted sanctions have been extensively used by states throughout history to

achieve political objectives. This article examines the United States targeted sanctions

regime against the Zimbabwean government, which have been in place since 2001. The

central thesis of the article is that the United States sanctions on Zimbabwe have thus far

failed to achieve their political and economic objectives. Fourteen years after the

imposition of the sanctions, the Robert Mugabe led Zimbabwean government is still in

power and continues to gain a lot of support from the electorate and some regional bodies

such as Southern African Development Community and the African Union. The

Zimbabwean government has further adopted some effective policies such as the Look

East policy and the multi-currency regime to ameliorate the effects of the sanctions.

Despite targeting a small group of politicians and their families and state owned

institutions, United States smart sanctions have resulted in the suffering of the majority

of the ordinary people more than the intended targets.

Table of Contents

2
ABSTRACT......................................................................................2

INTRODUCTION...............................................................................4

I. DISTINGUISHING SMART SANCTIONS..................................................7

A. DEFINING SMART SANCTIONS..........................................................................7
B. LEGALITY OF UNILATERAL SANCTIONS.................................................................9
C. TYPES OF TARGETED SANCTIONS......................................................................11

II. ZIMBABWE.................................................................................13
A. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION FOR SANCTIONS.................................................13
B. BACKLASH FROM THE WEST............................................................................15

III. ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT ANTI-SANCTIONS MEASURES.....................19

A. LOOK EAST POLICY...................................................................................... 20
B. MULTI-CURRENCY SYSTEM............................................................................. 22

IV. EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS.......................................23

CONCLUSION.................................................................................26

3
Introduction

Sanctions have traditionally been applied by some countries against other countries to

achieve desired political and economic outcomes.1 These encompass the imposition of

embargoes, trade and financial restrictions, and diplomatic isolation2. States have also

extensively used smart sanctions, or targeted sanctions, since time immemorial to achieve

political and economic objectives.3 A clear example of this is the sanctions imposed by

the United States and Europe on Iran over its nuclear program. Targeted sanctions have

also been used against Syria by both the United States and European Union to promote

democratization of Syria.

The President and the Congress of the United States have broad authority to impose

sanctions upon a foreign nation to address unusual and extraordinary threats to the

national security, to advance foreign policy, or to protect the economy of the United

States4. The President can impose sanctions through executive orders pursuant to the

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies

Act (NEA). The United States congress can also pass laws that trigger sanctions against

other countries.

In 2001, Congress imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe by passing the Zimbabwe

1 Ibid
2 Impact of Sanctions-the reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
3 Melanie Marilyne Golliard, Economic Sanctions: Embargo on Stage. Theory and Empirical
Evidence
4 Danny Vinik, Strategic Moves, www.usembassy.gov June 27, 2014

4
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA). In the year 2003 President Bush

passed Executive Order 13288 blocking property of persons undermining democratic

processes or institutions in Zimbabwe. The Executive Order was instrumental in the

freezing of assets in the United States of members of the Zimbabwean government who

were undermining democratic processes in the country. The list of blocked persons was

increased through Executive Order 13391 and 13469 respectively.

On the 3rd of February 2016, President Obama extended sanctions imposed on

Zimbabwean government by the United States after observing that the situation in the

country has not improved since the imposition of the restrictive measures in 2001.

According to President Obama, the extension is designed to protect United States

interests and promote democracy. He further observed that the threat constituted by the

actions and polices of certain members of the government of Zimbabwe and other

persons to undermine Zimbabwes democratic processes or institutions has not been

resolved. Such actions contribute to the deliberate breakdown of rule of law, politically

motivated violence, intimidation and economic instability in Southern Africa region 5.

President Obama further asserted that these actions and policies of the Zimbabwean

government pose an unusual threat to the foreign policy of the United States. President

Obamas assertions sum up United States foreign policy with regards to Zimbabwes

regime change agenda.

United States foreign policy towards Zimbabwe was also made clear by a

5 The White House, Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Zimbabwe
www.whitehouse.gov March 02, 2016

5
statement made by former United States president George W Bush when he signed into

effect Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 herein referred to as

ZDERA. At the time president Bush said, Today I have signed into law S.494, the

Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001. This Act symbolizes the

clear bipartisan resolve in the United States to promoting human rights, good governance

and economic development in Africa. My administration shares fully the congresss deep

concerns about the political and economic hardships visited upon Zimbabwe by that

countrys leadership. I hope the provisions of this important legislation will support the

people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect peaceful democratic change, achieve

economic growth and restore the rule of law6.

The Zimbabwean government responded to the extension of sanctions by arguing

that those sanctions are illegal because they did not go through the United Nations 7. The

Government of Zimbabwe also introduced measures such as the Look East Policy to

counter the effects of the sanctions. Yet the Look East Policy only ameliorated the effects

of sanctions to a certain extent. Sanctions resulted in the demise of the Zimbabwean

economy, breakdown of the infrastructure, and a lot of brain drain where professionals

moved to other countries in search of greener pastures

This study analyses the use by the United States of the concept of smart sanctions in its

foreign policy against Zimbabwe. The main objective of the paper is to illustrate that the

sanctions, although they specifically target certain individuals and corporations within the

Zimbabwean government they are not working and are having a broad negative effect on

the citizens of Zimbabwe. Part I define the notion of sanctions and explain the concept of

6 Presidential Signing Statements, http://www.coherentbabble.com, December 24, 2001

7 Newsday, US sanctions a non-event- ZANU PF, www.newsday.co.zw, March 4, 2016

6
targeted or smart sanctions. It then proceeds to discuss the legality of sanctions and the

mechanisms, through which sanctions are meant to achieve their objectives. It then

examines on-going sanctions regime against Zimbabwe. Part II discusses the background

and motivation for the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe and describes the legal

instruments applied by the United States such as the Zimbabwe Democracy and

Economic Recovery Act-ZDERA as well as Executive Orders 13288 and 13391. Part III

analyzes Zimbabwes counter measures to the effects of the sanctions such as the Look

East policy. Part IV examines the impact of sanctions on targeted leadership and

institutions of Zimbabwe and whether or not sanctions achieved goals of the United

States. It concludes that the United States smart sanctions in Zimbabwe are not as smart

as they were intended, as they have resulted in the suffering of the general populace.

I. Distinguishing Smart Sanctions

A. Defining smart sanctions

The concept of sanctions has been around at least from the time of the Ancient

Greeks, when Athens imposed a trade embargo on its neighbor Megara in 432 BC 8. Since

then there has been a long history of countries blockading their enemies to compel a

change in behavior9. Different scholars have defined the term sanctions variedly. Jean

Combaccu defines sanctions as measures taken by a State acting alone or jointly with

8 Uri Friedman, Smart Sanctions: A short History

9 Ibid

7
others in reply to the behavior of another state which it maintains, are in contrary to

International law10. M Shane Smith defines sanctions as when a party attempts to change

another partys behavior without the use of weapons or the military 11. On the other hand,

Panos Koutrakos describes sanctions as measures that connote the exercise of pressure

by one state or coalition of states to produce a change in the political behavior of another

state or group of states12. Hufbauer has defined economic sanctions as the deliberate,

government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal of customary trade or financial

relations.13

As highlighted above, sanctions and restrictive measures do not have a universal

definition, but are generally used by the international community as a tool to effect

change in the behavior or policies of states. Restrictive measures or smart sanctions

have similar aims as sanctions; however, they are directed at specific persons or entities

that threaten international security. Restrictive measures do not use force or engender

collective punishment; they are not directed at the state but specific individuals and

institutions14.

Smart sanctions, in theory, differ from conventional sanctions in two major ways.

First, they aim to target and penalize the political elites espousing policies and

10 Clara Portela, The EUs Use of Targeted Sanctions- Evaluating Effectiveness

11 M Shane Smith, Sanctions: Diplomatic Tool or Warfare by Other Means
12 Koutrakos 2001
13 Gary Clyde et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition by
14 Brian Sims and Sydney Masamvu, Restrictive Measures and Zimbabwe: Political
Implications, Economic Impact and a Way Forward

8
committing actions deemed reprehensible by the international community15. Second,

smart sanctions protect vulnerable social groups (for example, children, women, and the

elderly) from so-called collateral damage by exempting specified commodities (such as

food and medical supplies) from the embargo 16. This suggested two-pronged sanctions

approach was thus designed to hit the real perpetrators harder and to spare potential

innocent victims, leading to speedier change of sanctioned behavior

B. Legality of Unilateral Sanctions

Only multilateral sanctions that are applied as per Chapter VII of the Charter of

the United Nations are formally authorized under international law 17. The basis for UN

sanctions derives from Chapter VII of the UN Charter and more specifically from Art 41

of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which covers enforcement measures not involving the

use of armed forces18. While Article 41 does not specifically mention the word

sanctions, it lists specific measures making it clear that the list is not exhaustive

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force

are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the

United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial

15 Morgan Franciska Hanks, Aid, Sanctions and Civil Society: An analysis of the impacts of
targeted sanctions on Fijis non-governmental organizations
16 Tamuka Charles Chirimambowa, The Strategic Relevance of Sanctions As A
Democratization Tool In The Third World In An Emerging Multi-Polar World: A Case Study Of
Zimbabwe
17 Prof. Dr. Rahmat Mohamad, Unilateral Sanctions In International Law
18 UN Sanctions- Security Council Report No3 2013
9
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and

other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

The Security Council is vested with the primary responsibility for maintenance

of international peace and security under the Charter of UN19. Towards that objective, the

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is enabled to take measures to impose

economic sanctions apprehending threat or use of force or aggression against its Member

State. Thus, multilateral economic sanctions are used as part of a more sophisticated

system of collective security particularly under the aegis of Security Council20.

In addition to the mandatory sanctions practice of the UNSC, which every

member state is obliged to implement, individual states and international organizations

occasionally impose unilateral sanctions or smart sanctions21. Thus, one can distinguish

the unilateral sanctions practice of individual states and organizations such as the EU,

the US, Canada or Japan - from the mandatory sanctions of the UNSC. Sometimes, both

practices are combined: the UNSC imposes sanctions on a target that certain states or

organizations complement with additional measures22. Unilateral sanctions are generally

employed by powerful nations like the United States, which has resorted to unilateral

sanctions more than any other country as a primary tool of advancing its foreign policy

19 Role of the Security Council, http://www.un.org

20 Prof. Dr. Rahmat Mohamad, Unilateral Sanctions In International Law
21 Clara Portela, The EUs Use of Targeted Sanctions- Evaluating Effectiveness
22 Ibid

10
 There is an ongoing debate on the legality of unilateral sanctions. This is

because the national legislation of the imposing State is applied against the target country

beyond its territory. The unilateral and extraterritorial application of national legislation

violates the legal equality of States and principles of respect for and dignity of national

sovereignty equality and territorial integrity and principle of non-intervention and duty to

cooperate23. It also violates the core principles of 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration.

These include the principle of sovereign equality of states, non-use of force, self-

determination of people, non-intervention into internal affairs of States and fulfilling in

good faith obligations assumed under International Law24

Unilateral sanctions imposed against third parties by virtue of application of

ones own national legislation extra-territorially also breach certain basic tenets of

general principles international law such as principle of self determination, right to

development of citizens and individuals residing in the targeted territory, counter

measures and dispute settlement as well as freedom of trade and navigation25

C. Types of Targeted sanctions

Targeted restrictive measures can be divided into four categories. These are arms

embargoes, travel bans, economic measures and financial measures. Travel bans,

prohibits the targeting country or countries from issuing visas to certain individuals with

23 Prof. Dr. Rahmat Mohamad, Unilateral Sanctions In International Law

24 Ibid
25 Ibid

11
certain exceptions26. This measure is imposed with the objective of creating personal

inconvenience and discomfort to listed individuals and it may sometimes be ambitious to

expect compliance. Travel bans can undermine capabilities, change cost benefit

calculations and function as a powerful name and shame enforcement tool 27. They

generally have limited repercussions unless travelling is a key factor in maintaining

power.

Arms embargoes refer to the prohibition of selling weapons and related services

not only to entire countries, but also to regions or actors in them 28. This is one of the most

preferred sanctions regime, probably because it is the least harmful for the targeted

society, and also because it can be easily justified in the public debate. Indeed, the first

instinct of international institutions and governments when dealing with conflicts is to

limit the amount of weaponry in the conflict-affected area. However, arms embargoes are

not neutral in their impact and they have been the objects of severe criticism for their

inability to stop the inflow of weapons into the areas subjected to this restriction29.

The third most common sets of sanctions are financial restrictions. These can take

several forms, such as the seizing of bank accounts, prohibition of financial transactions

and denying loans to central banks of targeted countries. Financial sanctions, especially if

imposed in coordination with other foreign policy instruments, can be used to change the

26 Ibid
27 Ibid
28 Ibid
29 Ibid

12
costs/benefits calculation of targets, but they can also be used to deny goods and to

constrain political actors30.

Finally, commodity and service boycotts, which represent the least applied form

of sanction regime, are similar to financial sanctions in their expected impact 31. They

refer to the prohibition of trade in specific goods, such as timber, oil, diamonds etc, and

services, such as insurance coverage for shipments. The degree of impact can be

considerable, especially when the target relies on the sender for a specific type of

technology, and the absence of specific commodities or services can fatally hamper the

economic projects of targets32. It is common for an authoritarian regime to enjoy the

support of a strong group that exploits one particular market; so affecting that market can

have an impact on the calculations of the elite and on the groups that support the ruling

power.

II. Zimbabwe

A. Background and Motivation for Sanctions

Sanctions were imposed against Zimbabwean government in 2003 after it adopted

a fast track land redistribution program expropriating land from white farmers. The

International community including the US condemned the government initiative, which

had its roots in the countrys history. At independence in 1980, the government of

Zimbabwe sought to redress the inherited colonial legacy of glaring and skewed racial
30 Ibid
31 Ibid
32 Ibid

13
inequalities in land redistribution. Yet, between 1980 and 1990 the government managed

to acquire only 3.5 million hectares and resettled 71, 000 households 33. The communal

areas still remained congested, overstocked and overgrazed. Pressure mounted on the

government to accelerate its land reform program.

The new constitution of Zimbabwe obligated the government of Zimbabwe to

acquire land on a willing seller-willing buyer basis34. Where land was offered to the

government, in most cases it was expensive, marginal and occurred in pockets around the

country making it difficult to effect a systematic and managed land reform 35. As a result,

land supply failed to match the demand for land resettlement.

Disappointed at the pace of land redistribution the people brought pressure to bear

on the government by resorting to vigorous protests and land occupations in 1998. The

villagers cited poor soils and congestion as factors that had compelled them to occupy

white farms.

In response the government of Zimbabwe amended the Land Acquisition Act

(Chapter 20:10) to take account of the rapidly changing policy environment in which the

Fast Track land acquisition was being implemented. The following categories of land

were targeted for acquisition by the government; derelict, and under utilized land; land

under multiple ownership; foreign owned land; land contiguous to communal areas36.

33 The Embassy of Zimbabwe Stockholm, Background to Land Reform in Zimbabwe

34 Ibid
35 Ibid
36 Ibid

14
 B. Backlash from the West

The US and the EU attacked the implementation of the fast track land

redistribution program. They believed the expropriation campaign was initiated against a

background of declining support for President Mugabes party (ZANU PF), which

embarked on this policy in an attempt to expand its power base with a view to

forthcoming elections.

According to policymakers in the West, the process was characterized by massive

human rights abuses, violence and absence of rule of law. The EU responded by imposing

an arms embargo along with a visa ban, a freezing of assets and blacklisting 172

individuals and entities37. The US also responded in 2001 by unilaterally sanctioning

Zimbabwe through Executive order 13288 later expanded by 13496 as well as by

promulgating Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act- ZDERA. Thus, the

Zimbabwe sanctions represent the implementation of multiple legal authorities. Some of

these are in the form of executive orders issued by the President. The Executive Order

13288 is one such order that gave rise to the Zimbabwean sanctions. President Bush

under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 USC.170 and section 301

of title 3, United States Code IEEPA passed the Executive order 13288

37 Clara Portela, The EUs Use of Targeted Sanctions- Evaluating Effectiveness

15
The Executive order, barred United States persons from any transactions involving

transferring, paying, withdrawing, or otherwise dealing in the property or interest in

property of blocked persons. Individuals and entities are blocked under the order if they;

i. Be a senior official of the government of Zimbabwe;

ii. Be owned or controlled by, directly or indirectly; the Government of Zimbabwe

or an official or officials of the Government of Zimbabwe

iii. Have engaged in actions or policies to undermine Zimbabwes democratic

processes or institutions
iv. Be responsible for, or have participated in human rights abuses related to political

repression in Zimbabwe
v. Be engaged in, or have engaged in activities facilitating public corruption by

senior officials of the Government of Zimbabwe

vi. Be a spouse or dependent child of any person whose property and interest in

property are blocked

vii. Have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistical or

technological support to the government of Zimbabwe

viii. Be owned, controlled or acting on behalf of any person blocked38

The United States government showed its seriousness towards the Zimbabwe

sanctions regime when President Bush issued another Executive order 13391 39. This

Executive order was an expansion of Executive Order 13288. It authorized the blocking

of additional persons who were engaged in undermining democratic processes or

institutions in Zimbabwe, facilitating public corruption by senior officials or were

responsible for committing human rights abuses related to political repression. According

38 Executive Order 13288 of March 6, 2003

39 Executive Order 13391 of November 22, 2005

16
to the US government the actions and policies of those people continued to pose an

unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy of the United States. President

Obama has recently, extended the sanctions regime brought about by the abovementioned

executive orders.

ZDERA restricts the United States from voting in support of new assistance to

Zimbabwe from international financial institutions except for programs that meet basic

human needs or promote democracy40. The Secretary of the Treasury instructed the US

executive director of each international financial institution to oppose and veto any

extension of any loan credit, or guarantee to the government of Zimbabwe and any

cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed by the Government of Zimbabwe to the

US or any international financial institution41

The law provides benchmarks that have to be met by the Zimbabwean

government before the US decides to lift restrictions on Zimbabwe. The US Treasury

department will only consider debt relief, financial assistance, technical support for

Zimbabwe when rule of law is restored in the country; free and fair elections are held; the

government is committed to transparent land reform; the government fulfills the terms of

its agreement to end war in DRC; military and national police are subordinate to civilian

government

40 US Sanctions Policy: Facts and Myths: Embassy of the United States Harare
41 Cynthia Chipanga & Torque Mude, An analysis of the Effectiveness of Sanctions as a Law
Enforcement Tool n International Law: A Case Study of Zimbabwe from 2001 to 2013

17
 The Act further mandates the President to consult with the European Union,

Canada, and other nations to identify ways to share information regarding individuals

responsible for the deliberate breakdown of the rule of law, politically motivated

violence, and intimidation in Zimbabwe; identify assets of those individuals held outside

Zimbabwe and implement travel and economic sanctions against those individuals and

their associates and families. As of the beginning of 2016, ZDERA targeted 98

individuals from the Zimbabwean government and 68 entities42.

The United States still maintains that ZDERA imposes a sanctions regime that

specifically targets certain individuals in the Zimbabwean government and has no adverse

effect of on the general population of Zimbabwe. However, the truth of the matter is that

ZDERA is an explicit sanctions law against Zimbabwe. The 68 companies that the US

has targeted are essentially about all in terms of the backbone of the countrys economy 43.

To add to that, the blockade of International credit lines brought the whole countrys

economy into disarray. This supports the view that, it is impossible to sanction a

countrys government without sanctioning its people44.

Arguments persist that the economy of Zimbabwe has suffered from restrictive

measures because the measures target both government and government officials in an

economy where the government itself (either as a direct provider of services or a

shareholder in public enterprises) and the targeted officials are all major players in the

42 US Sanctions Policy: Facts and Myths: Embassy of the United States Harare
43 Bryan M. Sims & Sydney Masamvu, Restrictive Measures and Zimbabwe: Political
Implications, Economic Impact and a Way Forward
44 Politics of Sanctions: The Herald
18
economy45. Banking systems are crippled, and there is no access to money to support the

agro-based economy in the country as a whole.

The sanctions regime against Zimbabwe by the United Sates and the European

Union led to severe political and socio-economic challenges that have compromised the

livelihoods of its people. The crisis was characterized by political instability, dilapidated

infrastructure, increased poverty levels, high unemployment, economic meltdown and

hyperinflation. Since then trade and investment with the West have faced continuous

difficulties, which have had a negative impact on Zimbabwes economic growth and

development prospects.

III. Zimbabwe Government Anti-Sanctions Measures

A. Look East Policy

States targeted by sanctions can often find ways of circumventing the effects of

those sanctions through, for example, connivance with friendly nations to bust the

targeted sanctions46. As a sanctions counter measure Zimbabwe government adopted a

Look East policy in 2003. This policy was formulated to curtail the effects of

international isolation by courting investors and political allies from South-East Asia and

the Far East and Pacific countries47. The logic that inspired Zimbabwes Look East policy

45 Bryan M. Sims & Sydney Masamvu, Restrictive Measures and Zimbabwe: Political
Implications, Economic Impact and a Way Forward
46 Tostensen and Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?
47 Zhang Chun, China-Zimbabwe Relations: A Model of China-Africa Relations?

19
was based on the belief that it was better to find a new group of allies that would engage

with Zimbabwe without worrying about its domestic politics, rather than try to curry

favor with states that seek only to weaken the country48.

Although the Look East policy was initially meant to engage Asian and other

Pacific countries its implementation saw the focus shifting to China 49. China has played a

critical role in Zimbabwes political crisis for three reasons: its veto power in the UN

Security Council (UNSC); its own developing-country status; and its non-interference

policy50. As Zimbabwe began to face increasing economic and political turmoil, its

relations with China became more pragmatic and commercially oriented, grounded in the

principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in one anothers internal affairs51

The first major test of the Look East policy was following the disputed June

2008 Zimbabwean presidential election China joined Russia in vetoing United Nations

sanctions proposal52 that would have imposed more travel bans and financial restrictions

on ZANU-PFs top officials

In keeping with its principle of non-interference, China maintained that

Zimbabwes problems were internal and did not constitute an international security threat.

48 Jeremy Youde, The Active Pariah Zimbabwes Look East Policy

49 Zhang Chun, China-Zimbabwe Relations: A Model of China-Africa Relations?
50 Ibid
51 Ibid
52 SC/9396

20
Guijin, Chinas Special Envoy for Africa, explained that Chinas vote was also motivated

by humanitarian concerns over those who would suffer under sanctions53

Since Zimbabwe embarked on the Look East policy, there has been a flurry of

activities as business people from Asian countries, notably China, seek to invest in the

country, looking for lucrative deals in the power and mining sectors, agriculture as well

as general trade54. Zimbabwe- China relations brought a lifeline into the economy of

Zimbabwe and created a paradigm shift from western reliance thereby ameliorating the

effects of sanctions. After the launch of the Look East policy, Chinas investment in

Zimbabwe grew rapidly, and in 2005 about 29 companies were operating in Zimbabwe 55.

Since then, the number has gradually increased, with 42 companies in 2011, 44 in 2012

and 45 in 2013 while most recently the figure is around 6256.

According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China,

Zimbabwes trade with China has steadily increased. It is reported that bilateral trade

between the two countries increased from $52.2 million in 1996 to $275.25 million in

2006, reaching $874.37 million in 2011. This trend continued in 2012 and 2013,

witnessing further growth in bilateral trade with the figure reaching $1 billion in 2012

and $1.1 billion in 201357.

53 Zhang Chun, China-Zimbabwe Relations: A Model of China-Africa Relations?

54 Bayano Valy, Zimbabwe Look East Policy is starting to bear fruit
55 Zhang Chun, China-Zimbabwe Relations: A Model of China-Africa Relations?
56 Ibid
57 Ibid

21
 The Look East policy stabilized the Zimbabwean economy to a limited extent. In

trade, it has provided Zimbabwe with a new and significant revenue stream at a time

when its other trade relationships have largely dried up58. China is now reportedly the

largest purchaser of Zimbabwe's tobacco harvest, and it has become a major player in cell

phones, television, radio, and power generation in the country. It has started shipping oil

to the country via Mozambique's Beira terminal59. In return, it has received numerous

mineral concessionsresources that the Zimbabwean government could not afford to

develop.

B. Multi-Currency System

The sanctions regime caused hyperinflation in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe went

through a period of currency instability since the inception of the sanctions. During the

height of the inflation from 2008-2009 inflation was estimated to be at 79.6 billion

percent. In 2009 Zimbabwe stopped printing its currency and announced the introduction

of the multi-currency regime. The government adopted some foreign currency as official

legal tenders to facilitate commerce. The government adopted the South African Rand,

US Dollar, Botswana Pula, Australian dollar. The system entails the de jure abandonment

of the countrys own currency and the de facto adoption of other countrys currency,

generally as its legal tender60.

58 Jeremy Youde, Why Look East? Zimbabwean Foreign Policy and china
59 Ibid
60 Colls Ndlovu, Zimdollar versus the multi currency system, www.bulawayo24.com, 0ctober 28 2013

22
 The multi-currency regime has helped the country avoid losses that might occur

from the declining value of its own domestic currency. It has proved effective in the

reduction of inflation, removal of distortions in both foreign exchange and goods

markets, resuscitation of financial sector services, overall business confidence building

and policy consistency and predictability on key policy fundamentals61.

IV. Evaluating the Effects of Sanctions

Generally, the utility of targeted sanctions rests in their capacity to concentrate the

costs on specific individuals, entities or groups of economic measures, while limiting the

collateral harm experienced by a countrys population 62. Targeting alone does not ensure

that sanctions instruments will exert the necessary pressure on an offending regime 63. It is

expected that by freezing assets and enforcing travel bans on elites it will create

incentives for them to make concessions, or at least facilitate negotiations over issues in

dispute64. Sanctions should be understood to be effective if they prompt significant

concessions or movement in the targets policy positions65.

While the United States have imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe for violation of

human rights, failure to follow democratic principles and bad governance, there is no

doubt that sanctions are also being used to further its political interests 66. This includes a
61 Joseph Noko, Dollarization: The Case of Zimbabwe
62 Risa Brooks Sanctions Memo Sept 2009
63 Ibid
64 Ibid
65 Jan Grebe, And They Are Still Targeting: Assessing the Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions
against Zimbabwe
66 Musiwaro Ndakaripa, United States/ European Union Sanctions and the Contestation for
Political Space in Zimbabwe, 2000 to 2012

23
change of government which will result in the ZANU PF led government being

effectively replaced by the opposition MDC-T as the ruling party. This political objective

remains unachievable.

The paradox of US sanctions on Zimbabwe is that while the rationale was to force

Zimbabwe government to reform they are achieving the opposite, as they seem to be

hardening the governments authoritarian grip on power and its Anti-Western rhetoric in

foreign policy67. The government continues to gain a lot of support from the people and

regional bodies such as Southern African Development Community by blaming all the

economic woes and political instability on the imposition of sanctions68.

The Zimbabwean government has used sanctions against the opposition MDC-T

by presenting it as a Western stooge thereby cementing its support with the locals 69. This

has been possible because of the effects of sanctions on the citizens of Zimbabwe.

Despite ZDERAs targeting of specific corporations and individuals, its effects have

extended to the whole economy and the general populace. ZDERA effectively reduces

Zimbabwes access to the foreign exchange it needs to import necessities from abroad,

including chemicals to treat drinking water, a significant point is the persistent cholera

outbreak70. Development aid from the World Bank is also cut off, denying the country

access to funds to build and repair the infrastructure needed to run a modern economy.

67 Ibid
68 Ibid
69 Ibid
70 Stephen Gowans, Understanding the Crisis in Zimbabwe

24
 The imposition of targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe brought with it bad publicity, a

record low credit rating, and a pariah state tag 71. Investors pulled out of the country,

avoided making new investments, or were commandeered by their countries not to make

new or further investments in Zimbabwe72. Targeted sanctions led to sustained

disinvestment and de-industrialization in Zimbabwe73. In addition, sanctions harmed the

governments capability to obtain foreign currency, making it more difficult to procure

essential raw materials and goods such as petroleum and pharmaceuticals.

Due to lack of access to foreign currency and ability to trade meaningfully with

the United States and Europe, hundreds of companies in Zimbabwe have closed down

throwing tens of thousands of workers on the streets. For example, A report by National

Social Security Authority revealed that the period July 2011 to July 2013 saw a total of

711 companies close down leaving 8 336 individuals jobless. The current unemployment

rate in Zimbabwe is estimated around 95%74. In the past decade sanctions have led to a

massive brain drain of people in search of greener pastures abroad. An unprecedented

economic decline blamed on the sanctions has seen millions of Zimbabweans seek refuge

overseas and in neighboring countries.

CONCLUSION

71 Dennis Masaka, Paradoxes in the Sanctions Discourse in Zimbabwe: A critical Reflection

72 Ibid
73 Herald, 7 July 2011
74 CIA World Fact book

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 United States officials defend the sanctions regime by stating that the sanctions

are not against the country as a whole, but a small group of individuals they believe

undermine democratic processes75. Contrary to the assertion by the United States that

sanctions in Zimbabwe are targeted at a small number of persons, the reality is that the

stiff grip of the sanctions is being felt all over the economy thereby indirectly affecting

the ordinary people.

Thus, United States targeted sanctions have largely failed to achieve their main

political objectives of democratizing Zimbabwe. Targeted sanctions as a form of

reformative punishment may actually harden, rather than reform, the political stance of

the targeted individuals. In the context of the targeted sanctions regime in Zimbabwe, the

targeted individuals have actually hardened, rather than softened, their stance with respect

to the fundamental issues that led to the imposition of targeted sanctions, such as the land

reform program, the rule of law, press freedom, free and fair elections, and democratic

political transitions. Innocent citizens have also felt the unpleasant consequences of the

targeted sanctions although they were supposed to be protected from them.

The targeted individuals have manipulated the sanctions into a broad national

problem that requires everyones attention. Some targeted individuals have moved their

bank accounts from the US to China and other friendly countries to avoid detection. This

complicates the effectiveness of targeted sanctions as a deterrent and reformative measure

on those who are targeted by them. As a result, targeted sanctions often fail to change the

75 Matt W Dawson, How Economic sanctions Affect Poor People

26
behavior of the targeted individuals to the specifications of the senders and this is also

true in the case of the targeted sanctions regime on Zimbabwe.

Its over a decade since the US sanctions were imposed. The Zimbabwean

government is still in power and continues to attract a lot of support from the locals and

the regional bodies such as the Africa Union and Southern African Development

Community. It is clear that the primary objective of the sanctions regime to effect a

regime change or democratize Zimbabwe has not yet been achieved.

The situation in Zimbabwe remains tense: The economic breakdown has not

stopped and the political crisis has not yet been solved. The political and economic

situation has actually become even worse since the sanctions implementation. At the

same time, the Zimbabwean government is increasing its efforts to blame the sanctions

for the economic breakdown and the political crisis. The government uses the anti-

sanctions rhetoric to publicly undermine the legitimacy of the sanctions regime. Too

many loopholes, weak enforcement, no clear strategy and a weak communication of the

political objectives have undermined their effectiveness.

Efforts such as the Look East Policy and introduction of multi-currency regime

by the government of Zimbabwe to minimize the effects of sanctions have been fruitful

but only to a limited extend. China and other Asian countries as well as Russia have been

supportive of Zimbabwes economic and political reforms.

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 Due to the ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions against Zimbabwe the European

Union has revisited its stance on Zimbabwe and has softens sanctions while the US has

extended its own. It may be time for the United States to engage Zimbabwe

diplomatically rather than pursue a clandestine regime change agenda through unilateral

sanctions. For sanctions to succeed they must form part of coherent focused policies

designed to achieve specific, feasible changes. The measures against the Zimbabwean

government were never part of carefully calibrated, coordinated, multilateral efforts to

either change the behavior of the government or precipitate regime change.

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