Tat Lan Vca Report March 2014 Ha

Fishery Value Chain Analysis in Rakhine State
Assessment for village level interventions
February 2014
Olivier Joffre and U Moe Aung
Document Prepared for Tat Lan

Project Partners
February 2014
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank the Departments of Fisheries in Myebon, Pauktaw and Kyaukpyu townships as well
as the State Department of Fisheries (DoF). We are grateful to fishermen, collectors and traders for their time and
for providing valuable information. Special thanks are also in order for Oxfam, IRC, Save the Children and Better
Life Organization for administrative and logistical support.
Citation: Joffre Oliver and Moe Aung. 2014. Fisheries Value Chain analysis in Rakhine State. Assessment for village
level interventions. Study conducted for the Tat Lan Project. Oxfam
This report is part of the study set of report that includes 3 case studies:
Fishery Value Chain Analysis in Rakhine State, Assessment for village level interventions : Pauktaw cluster
Fishery Value Chain Analysis in Rakhine State, Assessment for village level interventions : Myebon cluster
Fishery Value Chain Analysis in Rakhine State, Assessment for village level interventions : Kyaukphyu
cluster
The views expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent positions of Oxfam
ii
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ..................................................................................................................................................... ii
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................................... vii
Units used and conversion table ............................................................................................................................. vii
Summary of findings ......................................................................................................................................................1
I. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................................6
II. Tat Lan Project .......................................................................................................................................................7
II.1. Tat Lan Project ....................................................................................................................................................7
II.2. Objectives of the Value Chain Analysis ...............................................................................................................7
III. Approach and Methodology .............................................................................................................................9
III.1. Methodology .....................................................................................................................................................9
III.2. Study site and limitations ................................................................................................................................10
IV. Fishery Sector in Rakhine State and study area .............................................................................................12
IV.1. Overview of Rakhine State and study area .....................................................................................................12
IV.2. Overview of the sector, Importance for livelihood .........................................................................................12
4.2.1. Fisheries & livelihood .............................................................................................................................12
4.2.2. Trends and perception in the fishery sector ..........................................................................................13
4.2.3. Townships specificities ..........................................................................................................................14
IV.3. Value Chain in the Fishery sector ....................................................................................................................15
4.3.1. Shift in market and destination .................................................................................................................15
4.3.2. Regulation and governance in the fishery value chain ..............................................................................16
IV.4. Fishery reform .................................................................................................................................................18
4.4.1. Reform of the tender system.....................................................................................................................18
4.4.2. Impact of the reform on the fishermen .....................................................................................................19
IV.5. Ethnic Violence and its impact on the fishery value chain ..............................................................................21
4.5.1. Original setting, role and interaction between communities ....................................................................21
4.5.2. Impact of recent violence on the fishery sector ........................................................................................24
4.5.3. Replacement of Muslim stakeholders and adaptation strategies: The case of Thea Cheung IDP camp ...26
4.5.4 Recommendations for a Do No Harm Approach in the Fishery sector ...................................................29
V. Fishery Value Chain Analysis - Community Level Focus ......................................................................................30
V.1. fishing activities by the target population ........................................................................................................30
5.1.1. Importance for livelihood and for the poor ...............................................................................................30
iii
5.1.2. Seasonality of the catch .............................................................................................................................31
V.1.3. Fishing equipment, fishing grounds and fish catch ...................................................................................31
V.2. Value Chain Commodities Selection .................................................................................................................34
5.2.1. Method for selection and limitation ..........................................................................................................34
5.2.2. Results per cluster .....................................................................................................................................34
V.3. Dried Shrimp Value Chain .................................................................................................................................38
5.3.1. Value chain and stakeholders ....................................................................................................................38
5.3.2. Catch, volume and processing ...................................................................................................................39
5.3.3. Quality, grade and prices ...........................................................................................................................40
5.3.4. Bargaining power, contract and loans .......................................................................................................41
5.3.5. Value added and economic results ............................................................................................................42
5.3.6. Potential interventions ..............................................................................................................................44
V.4. Mud Crab Value Chain ......................................................................................................................................47
5.4.1. Value Chain and stakeholders ...................................................................................................................47
5.4.2. Crab catch and seasonality ........................................................................................................................48
5.4.3. Quality, grades and prices .........................................................................................................................49
5.4.4. Bargaining power, Contract and Loans ......................................................................................................51
V.5. Penaeus monodon Value Chain ........................................................................................................................56
5.5.1. Value Chain and Stakeholders ...................................................................................................................56
5.5.2. Catch, volume and Season .........................................................................................................................58
5.5.3. Quality, grades and prices .........................................................................................................................59
5.5.4. Bargaining power, Contract and Loans ......................................................................................................59
V.6. Mullet Value Chain ...............................................................................................................................................64
V.6.1. Mullet fisheries ..........................................................................................................................................64
V.6.2. Mullet Value chain and trade ....................................................................................................................64
V.6.3.Price and bargaining power........................................................................................................................65
V.6.4. Economic return of the mullet fishery ......................................................................................................65
V.6.5. Potential Interventions ..............................................................................................................................66
VI. General recommendations and Conclusion ...........................................................................................................68
References and Document consulted ..........................................................................................................................70
iv
Annex ...........................................................................................................................................................................71
List of person and key informants consulted...........................................................................................................71
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Rakhine State and Tat Lan project Area _____________________________________________________ 8
Figure 2: Approach used in the Value chain analysis ___________________________________________________ 9
Figure 3: Location of thevillage clusters in Pauktaw, Myebon and Kyaukphyu Townships ____________________ 11
Figure 4: Offshore fishery catch in Rakhine state (2009-2014) __________________________________________ 13
Figure 5: Interactions between Rakhine and Muslim ethnic groups along the Fishery value Chains Before the Conflict
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 23
Figure 6: Short-term impact of conflict on the fishery sector ___________________________________________ 24
Figure 7: Long-term impact of conlfict on the fishery sector and value chain in Rakhine and Muslim communties _ 25
Figure 8: Thea cheung IDP camp fishery actvities ____________________________________________________ 28
Figure 9: Income source for poor houseoholds in 3 communities visited __________________________________ 30
Figure 10: Seasonal calendar in the Kyaukphyu cluster ________________________________________________ 31
Figure 11: Repartition of fishing gear in the Pauktaw, Myebon and Kyaukphyu clusters _____________________ 32
Figure 12: Fishermen transporting crab traps and fisherman operating a Fence net _______________________ 32
Figure 13: Stow net in the river and fishermen collecting catch in stow net________________________________ 33
Figure 14: Communities selecting commodiites and products __________________________________________ 36
Figure 15: Dried shrimp value chain in the Kyaukphyu cluster __________________________________________ 38
Figure 16: Processing dried shrimp: sorting, drying, removing shell and the final product ____________________ 40
Figure 17: Different sizes of dried shrimp and final packaged product for retailing__________________________ 41
Figure 18: Mud crab value chain in Pauktaw township ________________________________________________ 47
Figure 19: Seasonality of Crab catch in Myebon and Kyaukphyu Clusters _________________________________ 49
Figure 20: Women & trader in Sittwe sorting crab before export to China, crab cages to store crabs before trading
in Pauktaw ___________________________________________________________________________________ 51
Figure 21: P. monodon Value Chain, Myebon CLuster _________________________________________________ 56
Figure 22: Collectors purchasing daly catch in Aung Mingalar (Left), Traders collecting point in Ah Len Chein
(Kyaukphyu) and women sorting P. monodon at the traders shop in Sittwe (right) _________________________ 58
Figure 23: Mullet value chain at the township level (Pauktaw) _________________________________________ 64
v
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: List of communities consulted_____________________________________________________________ 11
Table 2: Summary of main targeted fish and crustaceans species by township _____________________________ 15
Table 3: Example of fish catch per fishing gear for the targeted species in the different clusters _______________ 33
Table 4: Access to boats and motorized boats in the different clusters ___________________________________ 33
Table 5: sampled community and women participation _______________________________________________ 34
Table 6: Summary of criteria slection for the value chain analysis in the different Clusters ___________________ 35
Table 7: Selection of the main commodities in the 3 clusters (by rank) ___________________________________ 36
Table 8: Characterisitcs of the Dried shrimp value chain _______________________________________________ 39
Table 9: Price (Mk per viss) and grade in different selling points and seasons (Peak season/Low season) before loan
interest ______________________________________________________________________________________ 41
Table 10: Cost and return of dried shrimp procesing during the peak season for 1 viss of final prodcut sold in Sane
and Kyaukphyu _______________________________________________________________________________ 43
Table 11: summary table for potential of collective marketing of Dried shrimp in Myebon and Kyaukphyu clusters
villages ______________________________________________________________________________________ 46
Table 12: Characterisitcs of Mud Crab value chain ___________________________________________________ 48
Table 13: crab value chain, prices and relationships between stakeholders _______________________________ 49
Table 14: Crab grades and prices at the village, PAuktaw market and sittwe ______________________________ 50
Table 15: Transaction cost and profit for crab fishermen and village traders for 1 kg of 100 gram size crab _____ 52
Table 16: summary table for potential of crab collective marketing in Pauktaw, Myebon and Kyaukphyu clusters
villages ______________________________________________________________________________________ 55
Table 17: Characterisitcs of P. monodon value chain (capture fisheries) __________________________________ 57
Table 18: Shrimp grade and price at the village and township levels in the Myebon cluster ___________________ 59
Table 19: Economic results for Chilled Penaeus monodon traded at the village level ________________________ 60
Table 20: summary table for potential of collective marketing of P. monodon in Myebon and Kyaukphyu clusters
villages ______________________________________________________________________________________ 63
Table 21: Cost and return of mullet fisheries during the peak season for 1 viss _____________________________ 66
vi
ABBREVIATIONS
BLO Better Life Organization
DoF Department of Fisheries
FDA Fisherfolk Development Association
IDPs Internally Displaced Person
INGO International Non-Governmental Organization
IP Implementing Partner
IRC International Rescue Committee
MFF Myanmar Fisheries Federation
Mk Myanmar Kyat
NAG Network Activities Group
PL Penaeus monodon post larvae
SCI Save the Children International
USD United States Dollars
VCA Value Chain Analysis
VFS Village Fisheries Sub committees
UNITS USED AND CONVERSION TABLE:

International Local (Myanmar)
Weight Kilogram 1.0 Viss 0.6
Area Hectare 1.0 Acre 2.47
Currency US$ 1.0 M Kyat (MK) 983
vii
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Objective of, and context for, the study
This study is part of Tat Lan project. The Tat Lan project is implemented through a package of comprehensive,
mutually-reinforcing interventions to improve livelihoods and food security in Rakhine State with a focus on the
cross-cutting principles of integration, community-based planning, innovation, government engagement, and
inclusion. The project targets Cyclone Giri (2010)- affected areas.
The project aims to improve market access and profit margins for fishermen. This research was designed to
understand the potential for fishing communities in marketing their fishery products and the difficulties they face
and to provide information for designing future interventions.
Methodology
The study identified the main commodities and products in the fishery sector that are important for the poor in
the targeted communities. For each selected commodity (2 to 3 per study site) a Value Chain Analysis at the
township level was carried out to understand the relationship between stakeholders of the value chain, the main
bottlenecks and the economic results for fishermen.
Three study sites in Pauktaw, Myebon and Kyaukphyu townships were selected, with one cluster of villages (3 to 4
villages) in each study site. In each cluster, a community consultation with 34 to 48 fisherfolk and local traders was
carried out during a two-day period for commodity selection and value chain analysis. In addition traders and
collectors at the township level, DoF representatives and key stakeholders such as local organizations and INGOs
were interviewed. Key informants and fishermen were also interviewed regarding the impact of the recent reform
of the fishery law in Rakhine State and the cessation of fishing lots in 2013.
To understand the impact on the fishery value chain of recent ethnic violence in the region, we interviewed fish
traders and fishermen in two IDP camps in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu townships.
Impact of fishery reform
As part of the reform, for the 2012-2013 fiscal year, the local government cancelled 211 fishing lot licenses. Before
the reform, tender operators in charge of collecting taxes from the fishermen collected tax revenue on fishing gear
on behalf of the DoF. Now in the absence of tender, the DoF collects the tax revenue directly from the fishermen
(instead of the tender operator) enforces the regulation on fishing gear. Following cessation of the fishing lots, no
other system has been implemented to manage fisheries.
Within the study sites, the reform of the fishery system did not significantly modify access to fishing grounds, but it
did affect prices. In the absence of tender, the tax to access fishing grounds was reduced from 30,000 Mk per year
and per stow net to 12,000 Mk per year. No significant changes in theft rates, damages to nets or presence of
trawlers in shallow water were reported.
1
In the absence of tender, traditional mechanisms determining the location of stow nets are now the main
regulatory system. The DoF acknowledges this system and uses it to collect information regarding the number of
nets. The DoF faces financial difficulties in supporting tax collection activities, and revenue from tax collection
might be reduced compared to the previous tender system if resources allocated to tax collection remain the
same.
Impact of recent violence on fishery value chain
Tension between the two main ethnic groups, Rakhine and Muslims, led to outbreaks of violence and an open
conflict in June and October 2012. By the end of 2013 violence had resulted in hundreds of deaths and the
displacement of 139,000 individuals, mostly Muslims, in 68 camps.
We found that before the conflict Muslim fisherfolk communities were mostly involved in offshore fisheries,
targeting large-sized fish for both domestic and international markets. They were also involved in mud crab or
shrimp fisheries but to a limited degree. Small-scale Muslim fishermen interacted with ethnic Rakhine traders and
collectors, mostly at the township level for marketing fish. These interactions were rare or inexistent at the village
level.
Muslim fisherfolk communities shifted from fresh fish to processed fish following resettlement in IDP camps.
Muslims in the IDP camp in Sittwe (Thea cheung) can access fishing grounds for a small fee. New marketing
channels to access domestic and international markets were developed 4 to 5 months after resettlement in the
camps. Access to markets depends on a few Rakhine ethnic traders and transporters willing to collaborate with
Muslim communities. The new marketing channels were possible only thanks to past trade relationship between
the communities. Due to pressures by Rakhine ethnic extremists, the cost of trading with outside the IDP camps is
high, with higher transport and supply costs and a high risk of losses for Muslim traders.
Value chain selection
Selection of commodities and products for the study included first the selection of criteria that characterize
commodities. In a second step, the most significant criteria were used to rank the commodities. Communities
value fishery products that require a low entry cost, bring benefit to the entire community, are available all year
and/or with high value and easy to market. Based on these criteria, the communities selected mud crab in all the
clusters, dried and chilled shrimp (P. monodon) in the Myebon and Kyaukhyu clusters and fresh mullet in the
Pauktaw cluster. Women ranked dried shrimp and mud crab higher than chilled shrimp, while men ranked chilled
shrimp as their first choice.
General recommendations
Within the different value chain studied, it was found that current contractual obligations between fishermen and
traders are a major constrain to develop collective marketing, especially in the case of the dried shrimp value
chain. Access to other sources of credit is necessary while the presence of influential traders at the village level
might be a constraint if they are excluded from the intervention.
Experience with collective action was found to be low in the villages, especially regarding marketing. Such
intervention will require important investments to finance the presence of implementing partners, external
2
support and study tours in existing collective marketing groups. We also recommend starting such activity at the
village level to facilitate the building of trust within and between groups, even if in some cases, the small volume of
catch available to be traded might be a limiting factor. Women are important stakeholders in marketing and
processing fishery products, thus need to be engaged in the process.
Dried shrimp
The catch is seasonal, with peaks from May to August, corresponding to 60% of the annual catch. The volume of
catch per household is estimated at about 30 viss per tide in the peak season and 10 viss per tide in the low
season. Dried shrimp processing requires sorting, drying and removing the shell. Women are in charge of
processing and men exclusively of fishing. The Kyaukhpyu cluster trades directly with larger traders at the
collecting points while village collectors and traders are present in villages in the Myebon cluster.
The level of debt among fishermen was found to be more important in Myebon, limiting their bargaining power
and profit. Unfair weighting practices and fixed price 10 to 20% lower than the market price are common in cases
of cash advance by traders. Quality and size of the product were found to be important pricing factors at the
township level, with a price difference of up to 2,000 to 3,000 Mk per viss according to quality.
The economic analysis showed that the producers profit margin could be increased by 64% in the event they can
access current market prices and be debt-free. In addition, collective marketing to mobile collectors or directly to
larger traders in main trade centers could increase the margin by 100%. However, this last option is likely to face
the following barriers to adoption: debts and contractual obligations with traders, insufficient volume produced
within the group and limited to no access to public transport. Investment in transport equipment to reach
townships might be a barrier to collective marketing in the absence of public transport. In addition such type of
marketing requires investing in developing trust within the group and trading a product without guaranteed
pricing. In Myebon, local traders could potentially hamper the development of collective marketing.
Quality improvement by introducing new technology for drying and processing is an option to reach a higher
selling price and build long-term relationships with traders, thus providing high quality products that can compete
with products from the Ayeyarwady Delta.
Mud crab
Mud crab fishery was found to be the most common type of fishing across of the villages, with 154, 118 and 510
households involved in the Pauktaw, Mybon and Kyaukphyu clusters respectively. Mud crab fishery requires a
small investment and allows the possibility of fishing from the shore. The mud crab value chain includes fishermen,
village collectors and traders and mobile collectors and traders in townships or collection centers. The destination
of the catch is Muse at the Chinese border, via Mandalay. Mud crab fishery is seasonal with a peak season from
May to August and a peak price season around the Chinese New Year.
Large traders are found within the Pauktaw cluster with one in the Kyuakphyu cluster, but not in the Myebon one,
where the catch is sold to main trade markets within 1-2 hours of distance. Crab is a high value product but with a
high mortality rate if the storage period goes beyond 3 days. Between 10 to 30% of the catch is sold to mobile
collectors directly at the fishing grounds, at a lower price.
3
Fishermen selling their catch locally or to mobile collectors do not have access to a different grading system. Such
system differentiating crabs based on size and on whether they are gravid females is key for increasing the
fishermens profit. Fishermen require trading their production in main collecting centers to benefit from this
grading system and increase their profit margin by 16%. Compared to the dried shrimp value chain, fishermen tend
to have less debt, and their contract with traders does not include the same price fixing methods as described for
the dried shrimp case study. This can facilitate the development of collective marketing.
Collective marketing of mud crab faces technical barriers with, for example, collection of crab at the fishing
ground. Trust issues within the group are also a barrier to adoption, and will require developing transparency
mechanisms that take into account multiple selling prices according to size and high mortality during transport.
Development of mud crab collective marketing in the Pauktaw cluster might be hampered by competition from
existing large traders, including the village leader.
Iced-chilled shrimp (Penaeus monodon)
Fisherfolk targeting P. monodon use stow and/or trammel nets. In total we estimate that more than 130
households in the Myebon cluster and about 165 households in the Kyaukphyu are involved in P. monodon fishing.
The value chain differs between the Myebon and Kyaukphyu clusters, with several large traders present in
Kyuakphyu villages, due to active shrimp aquaculture in the area. In addition, Kyaukphyu fishermen associated
with chilled shrimp fisheries have less debt compared to the Myebon ones, allowing for more selling point options.
In Myebon, the same trader can be involved in both dried and chilled shrimp, providing cash advance to the same
households. However, price fixing is lower than in the case of dried shrimp (500 Mk to 1,000 Mk per viss).
Grading was found to be different in Myebon and Kyaukphyu, with a system based on size in Kyaukphuy, at both
the village and township levels, while in Myebon it is based on size at the village level and weight at the township
level.
In both clusters the option to improve marketing of the P. monodon involves selling the product to large traders to
benefit from a higher selling price. Economic estimation indicates that profit margins for fishermen could be
increased by 50% in case of collective marketing but will require investment in equipment for storage and
transport. The Myebon cluster can access representatives from large shrimp processing companies in Myebon
Town, while a large trader was found in one of the Kyaukphyu clusters villages. The townships market price can
be obtained through this channel.
As for dried shrimp, developing collective marketing requires access to micro-credit for fishermen and that they
are debt-free, especially in the case of the Myebon cluster. Like for mud crab, a transparency mechanism with
different grading and sorting techniques will be required for such high value product. The volume of the catch is
small in villages and collective marketing will be possible only during the peak season.
Mullet (Mugil cephalus)
Participants in the Pauktaw cluster selected Mullet (Mugil cephalus) as their second choice to develop collective
marketing. This commodity is for the local retail market. It is a low value, but abundant, product. Its economy
engages about 120 households in this cluster.
4
The resource is available almost all year long, with peaks in October-November and March, and decreasing from
December to February. Ninety percent of the catch is sold to Pauktaw and transported directly from the fishing
ground. The remaining 10% is retailed for local consumption directly in the villages.
The average price is about 1,000 Mk per viss, ranging from 800 to 1,500 Mk per viss during the year. Unlike in the
shrimp and mud crab value chains, there are no mobile collectors. The selling price in Sittwe is higher and
estimated at 3,375 Mk per viss at its maximum while the retail price at the village and Pauktaw is about 2,000 to
3,000 Mk/ viss. The demand in Pauktaw is higher and catch can always be sold. According to the fishermen,
Pauktaws Market is a safe selling point compared to the village, especially during periods of peak catch.
Cash advances and loans from traders are not a common practice in this value chain, but fishermen have long-term
relationships with traders.
Collective marketing in Pauktaw can reduce the transport cost with shared transport from the fishing ground to
Pauktaw, representing about 13% of the trade cost in both drift and fence net scenarios. Collective marketing to
Sittwe fish market is economically interesting but will require large investments for transport and to offset the risk
of price fluctuation or low demand from the retail market. The selling price in this market is set by auction.
The marketing constraint due to contractual obligations with the traders is not high and opportunities to choose
the selling point and trader are high. Unlike crab and shrimp, the pricing system does not have grades and the
quality of the product does not vary a lot, stabilizing the mullets price when sold to traders. This transparency can
benefit collective marketing and facilitate contracting with traders to establish prices in advance.
Collective marketing to share the transport cost in Pauktaw, will be the first step to enable an intervention. In case
of positive results, options to trade in Sittwe should be considered. The organization of collective marketing could
prove technically challenging, with marketing organized directly at the fishing ground without transiting through
the village.
5
I. INTRODUCTION
Sharing a border with Bangladesh, Rakhine State is a coastal region of Myanmar. The local economy relies greatly
on aquaculture and fisheries along the coast with a large number of landless households employed by this sector
and living from fishery resources.
In October 2010, the area was hit by Cyclone Giri. Around 260,000 persons were affected and 100,000 were left
homeless. The most affected townships were Myebon, Kyaukpyu, Pauktaw and Minbya. It was estimated that
50,000 acres (>20,000 ha) of coastal aquaculture ponds were damaged. In the four Giri-affected townships, almost
1
150,000 households are now severely food-insecure, while more than 350,000 are moderately food insecure .
More than 50% of the population are considered most vulnerable and rely on non-agricultural wage labor. Cited in
2
the Food Security and Livelihood Assessment (2013) , Rakhine State has some of the worst child survival and
wellbeing indicators in the country, with 39% prevalence of chronic malnutrition, a global acute malnutrition
3
(GAM) rate of 10.8 per cent, and a severe acute malnutrition (SAM) rate for children under five of 2.8% .
Coastal populations are vulnerable and require specific support to improve their livelihoods. Funded by LIFT, the
Tat Lan project, aims to support livelihoods in the Giri affected area. One of the interventions aims to improve
marketing of fishery products by the local population. Fisheries in Rakhine state are facing a rapid decrease of the
catch while the institutional framework regulating them is now under reform by the local government.
Within this context the Tat Lan porject aims to improve the fisheries market access and profit margins via different
interventions. This research was designed to understand both the difficulties and potential for communities in
marketing their fishery products and provide information to design future interventions.
The report is organized as follow. The first section describes the project and outlines the research objectives. The
second section describes the approach used to analyze the fishery value chain. The third section presents a review
of the fishery sector in Rakhine State and the study area, looking at recent institutional changes, the broad
fisheries value chain and the impact on the fishery sector of recent outbreaks of violence.
The fourth section describes and analyzes the value chain for the selected commodities in the 3 study areas,
focusing on the chains economic, governance and structure. The fifth and last section proposes possible
interventions by the Tat Lan project to improve the fishery value chain for the poor.
1
Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Unit (VAM) of the World Food Program (WFP)
2
Food Security and Livelihood Assessment. Rakhine State, Myanmar. 2013.
3
Myanmar Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2009-2010
6
II. TAT LAN PROJECT
II.1. TAT LAN PROJECT

The Tat Lan project, implemented by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in partnership with Save the
Children UK (SC), Oxfam, and the local non-governmental organization (NGO) Better Life Organization (BLO),
contributes to equitably and sustainably improving the livelihoods of approximately 214 severely and moderately
cyclone-affected communities in the townships of Myebon, Pauktaw, Kyaukpyu and Minbya in Rakhine State
(Figure 1).
The Tat Lan project is implemented through a package of comprehensive, mutually-reinforcing interventions to
improve livelihoods and food security in Rakhine State with a focus on the cross-cutting principles of integration,
community-based planning, innovation, government engagement and inclusion. All interventions are grounded in
a village-based participatory planning process to engage communities, men and women, in the identification,
planning and implementation of development activities and to ensure that the project is responsive, effective and
sustainable. Project activities include the following areas: infrastructure, fisheries and aquaculture, agriculture,
financial services and governance.
For the fishery sector, Tat Lan strengthens village-level fishery groups, builds their technical capacity and promotes
economically and environmentally sustainable fishery and aquaculture practices. Tat Lan approach to supporting
the fishery sector is based on the Network Activities Group (NAG) experience in the Ayeyarwady Delta, where, with
the support of OXFAM, the Fisherfolk Development Association (FDA) has been created and established at the
district and township levels. The national Myanmar Fisheries Federation (MFF) recognizes this association as
official. The aim of the MFFs is to empower fishing communities and to support them, similarly to the Delta
experience, in accessing fishing grounds and improving bargaining power with fish traders through collective
marketing.
The program plans to support Village Fishery Sub committees (VFS,) to be dispatched at the district level by the
FDA. The VFS are composed of the Capture fisheries group, the Aquaculture group and the Processing group. The
project will pilot innovative technologies to connect groups to gender-sensitive value chains and marketing
strategies to help secure increased income for both men and women fisherfolk. Once formed, the groups will
receive support with technical capacity for sustainable fishing practices, fishery co-management training, fish-pot
harvest training and collective marketing.
II.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS

The Value Chain Analysis (VCA) in the fishery sector has several objectives. First, the study seeks to identify the
sectors main commodities and/or products that are important sources of income and labor opportunities for the
poor in the targeted communities. Once the commodities are selected, a Value Chain Analysis is carried out for
each of the commodities or products, with certain limitations. We focus on the local value chain, limiting the scope
of the analysis to the township level. The analysis looks not only at the i) the value chains economy and structure ,
but also at ii) the governance and patron-client relationships within the value chain that might constraint the
development of collective marketing and reduce the benefits harvested by the poorest. This analysis also includes
iii) a gender approach, investigating the role and importance of women in the value chains. The analysis wishes to
7
iv) propose a different option for either collective marketing or other types of interventions for marketing and/or
processing fisheries products that can benefit fisherfolk communities. Considering the recent change in fishery
regulation and the cessation of the fishing lot, the study v) investigates the impact this change has had for local
fishermen and its potential future impact on the value chain structure.
The recent local context of ethnic violence and tension is also taken into account. We briefly vi) look at the past
role of Muslim communities within the value chain, interactions with the Rakhine community and recent market
developments in the camps for Internally Displaced People (IDPs).
FIGURE 1: RAKHINE STATE AND TAT LAN PROJECT AREA
8
III. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
III.1. METHODOLOGY
4
The value chain analysis of fishery commodities and products in Rakhine uses some of the tools presented in M4P .
The approach consists of 4 main components, each focusing on a different type of stakeholders as described in
Figure 2.
Key informant interviews

Yangon Semi-structured Interview with
Rakhine Traders & Collectors
Township level
Focus Group Discussions and

Focus Group Discussions with
Participatory exercises with
IDPs in camps
Fisherfolk community
FIGURE 2: APPROACH USED IN THE VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS
Key informant Interviews
The key informant interviews (detailed list in Annex) provided general information about the recent context of
violence in Rakhine as well as the DoFs opinion of the fishery sector. In each township visited, we consulted the
local DoF, if one present, and local and International NGOs involved in the Tat Lan project. These interviews
provided insight on the local context and existing value chain structure. It helped to identify fish-traders operating
in the township.
Community Consultations
In each township visited, the Implementing Partners (IP) selected a cluster of villages (3 to 4 villages) in which to
implement the projects collective marketing. In each of these clusters (3 in total), we conducted a series of
consultations with local fisherfolk, village fish traders and groups of women during 2 days. The consultations
consisted, at first, of a brief overview and characterization of the fishery sector in the community. In a second
4
M4P (2008). Making Value chain Works Better for the Poor: A toolbook for Practitioners of Value Chain Analysis Version 3.
Making Markets Work Better for the Poor (M4P) Project, UK, DFID. Agricultural Development International, Phnom Penh,
Cambodia.
9
phase, the community selected commodities (or fish products) based on its own criteria. Once the community
selected the most and second most important products or commodities, we carried out a more in-depth value
chain analysis.
During this VCA, we specifically looked at volume of trade and economic aspects, the bargaining power of the
fisherfolk and the patron-client relationship with collectors and traders. Womens role and the importance of
fisheries in livelihoods were included in the consultation, while the governance aspects and contractual
relationships between stakeholders were also investigated within a mixed gender group. Community consultations
also included a brief description of the changes in the value chain and fishery sector due both to the reform of the
fishing lots and to the past role of Muslim traders and fisherfolk within the value chain.
Traders and collectors
In order to get a more global picture of the value chain at the township level, and get a better understanding of the
products final destination, we interviewed traders involved in the selected commodities. This approach was also
necessary in order to investigate the possibility for communities to trade their products directly at the township
level.
The Muslim Community and its former role in the fishery sector
The study team visited 2 IDP camps: Thea Cheung in Sittwe and Kyauk Ta Lone in Kyaukphyu. This visit helped to
understand the past role of Muslim communities and their current fishing and trading activities in the IDP camps.
Thea Cheung was selected because of recent studies highlighting the development of new fish markets within the
camp and fishing activities by the IDPs. Kyauk Ta Lone was the only other camp accessible in the study area, within
Pauktaw, Myebon and Kyaukphyu townships.
A detailed questionnaires guide is provided in a separate document.
III.2. STUDY SITE AND LIMITATIONS

The study area includes in total 3 townships, Pauktaw, Myebon and Kyaukphyu. In total 10 communities were
consulted (Table 1, Figure 3). Additional key informants participated and semi-structured interviewed were
conducted in Myebon, Sittwe and Kyaukphyu townships.
Accessing the villages was the main limiting factor. Time spent travelling to reach the communities reduced the
duration of the consultations. Therefore some exercises needed to be shortened or merged and the methodology
for commodity selection was modified according totime availability. Access to traders in townships, especially in
Sittwe was not always possible, with our study coinciding with seasonal peak activity for crab trading and fish
drying. Pauktaw was not accessible so the DoF and traders from the township were interviewed in Sittwe.
Discussion with Rakhine communities about the past role of Muslim communities in the value chain and about
interactions between communities was sometimes tense, with only limited relevant information collected. Rakhine
fisherfolk or traders typically do not acknowledge having had any interactions with Muslim communities in the
past. Access to Muslim communities in IDP camps was brief and the sampling method was not adequate. The
research team was not able to meet fishing stakeholders in Thea Cheung Camp where only offshore fisheries were
investigated.
10
TABLE 1: LIST OF COMMUNITIES CONSULTED
Township Village Village Tract

Myebon
Taung Gyi Yin Moe Thee Nat Taung
Aung Mingalar* Moe Thee Nat Taung
Zin Yaw Maw Zin Yaw Maw
Kyaukphyu
Ah Lan Chein* Ah lan chein
Min Chawng Min Chawng
Gant Gar (West) Gant Gar
Gant Gar Ywarma Kyauk Ngu
Pauktaw
Gyin Dway Gyin Dway
Tha ze kone Thar Yar Gone
Ah Lel Kyun* Ah Lel Kyun
In a few cases, in Myebon and Kyaukphyu the crab or shrimp value chains included trading villages located in
townships outside of the study area. We could not access those areas to meet with larger traders.
FIGURE 3: LOCATION OF THEVILLAGE CLUSTERS (IN RED) IN PAUKTAW, MYEBON AND KYAUKPHYU TOWNSHIPS
11
IV. FISHERY SECTOR IN RAKHINE STATE AND STUDY AREA
IV.1. OVERVIEW OF RAKHINE STATE AND STUDY AREA

Rakhine State is located on the western coast of Myanmar along the Bay of Bengal. With 344 miles of coastline, it
comprises 4 districts, 17 townships and 3 sub-townships. It also counts several islands in the gulf of Bengal and
shares a border with Bangladesh to the north (Figure 1).
The total population of Rakhine State is over 3.3 million and the population density is 235 persons per square mile
(90.78 per square kilometer). The population is composed of Rakhine Buddhists and other ethnic groups, such as
Chin, and diverse Muslim ethnic groups referred to as Rohingya. The Muslim population is dominant in the
northern part of the state, accounting for 91% and 80% of the population in Northern Rakhine State (NRS) and
Buthidaung district respectively. This ratio declines in the southern districts where it shifts in favor of the Buddhist
population. The Muslim population is present throughout the study area, with differences across townships. It
resides mostly in urban areas or near Kyaukphyu and Myebon, and though more spread-out, in villages in Pauktaw
Township.
5
Based on latest household survey, about 43.5% of the population in Rakhine State is considered as poor . The
poverty level in Rakhine is high, ranked as the second poorest state in the country, with poor infrastructure and
connectivity between townships and affected by cyclones like Giri in 2010. Tan Lan Project targeted the Giri
affected area. Recently, ethnic conflicts between Muslims and other Rakhine ethnic groups eructed leading to the
internal displacement of Muslims and other Rakhine populations into camps and to deep changes in the socio-
economic context and local economy of the state.
IV.2. OVERVIEW OF THE SECTOR, IMPORTANCE FOR LIVELIHOOD

4.2.1. FISHERIES & LIVELIHOOD
Fisheries and aquaculture are traditionally important resources for export, with notably an important shrimp
6
export sector with ties with Bangladesh . Fisheries are a key sector in Rakhine State, with 43% of the population
(out of a total of 3.2 million inhabitants) relying on fisheries or a combination of aquaculture/fisheries and
agriculture. It is estimated that almost 600,000 individuals are involved in capture fisheries and/or aquaculture,
while 150,000 individuals are involved in other stages of the value chain (processing, wholesale, export), including
489 registered fish traders. The LIFT baseline study in 2012 highlighted the importance of casual labor and fisheries
in the income structure of the local population, with 63% of the population involved in casual labor and 43%
ranking this activity as the first source of income, followed by fisheries (24%).
In most of the villages in the Tat Lan project intervention area, fisheries were ranked as the second most important
livelihood activity. However Fishing is mostly for home consumption, to cover the family needs. More intensive
fishing for marketing requires investment in equipment and storage facilities. With a high percentage of landless
5
Figures quoted in ADB (2012) Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development (MNPED) et. al. (2011), integrated
Household Living Survey (2011).
6
Joffre,O and M. Aung. 2012. Prawn Value Chain analysis, Rakhine State, Myanmar. LIFT.
12
households, fisheries are the most accessible resource to the poor and vulnerable. Fisheries were identified as a
7
significant resource for women heads of households .
4.2.2. TRENDS AND PERCEPTION IN THE FISHERY SECTOR

According to interviews with representatives of the DoF and key informants in the fishery sector, fish catch has
dramatically declined over the past decade, even if official statistics show an opposite trend (Figure 4). A recent
8
report suggests a decline of as much as 90% over the past 10 years . A recent stock assessment carried out by the
DoF and Norwegian University estimates that the decline of fisheries in Rakhine has been of about 65% in the last
30 years (U Khin Maung Aye, DoF, pers. com), while the MFF in Rakhine estimates the decline of the fish catch at
70-80% in the last 15 -20 years.
FIGURE 4: OFFSHORE FISHERY CATCH IN RAKHINE STATE (2009-2014, IN THOUSAND VISS)
Shrimp aquaculture, the main production in Rakhine state, shows a steady decline since 2005. In Kyuakpyu
Township, the prawn farming area declined from 7,000 ha in 2002 to about 1,600 ha in 2011. Similar trends were
observed in other townships. The number of seafood processing factories in operation in Rakhine State declined
9
from 18 in 2002 to 11 in 2010 and to only 6 in 2012 . However, the States DoF counted a total of 8 operating
factories in the State: 4 in Tandwe, 4 in Sittwe and one partially operating in Kyaukphyu in 2013. The later might
now become more operative thanks to lower electricity costs since Kyaukphyu is now connected to the national
electricity grid.
The decline of Rakhine fisheries finds its roots in overfishing, lack of enforcement of fishery law and use of illegal
fishing gear. Local fishermen usually blame large trawlers, national and international, as well as baby trawlers
operated by local medium scale fishermen for being responsible for the decline of the catch. The tendering system
of the fishing area that used to be in operation is also blamed as a cause for overfishing. Other factors affecting
fisheries are the loss of habitat (mangroves) for fish, widespread collection of post-larvae shrimp, trawling of adult
shrimp, the lack of other livelihood opportunities for coastal communities and intensified overfishing.
7
Care 2013. Do not harm assessment. Tat Lan project.
8
The Rakhine State Fisheries Partnership. 2013. A development Partnership for improving the governance of fisheries in
Rakhine State. Annex 4 Political economy of Rakhine with a focus on fisheries
9
The Rakhine State Fisheries Partnership. 2013. Opus cited.
13
4.2.3. TOWNSHIPS SPECIFICITIES
Each township has a specific combination of fishery types and products. In the following paragraph we briefly
summarize the key characteristics for the fishery sector in each township, looking specifically at the types of
fisheries and the targeted species (Table 2).
Sittwe Township is a major landing site and trade point for fishery products. In Sittwe, fish traders target high
value fish such as sea bass (Lates calcarifer), grouper (Epinephelus sp), pomfret (Parastromateus niger, Pampus
argentus) and mackerel (Rasterlliger kanagurta). The fish are iced and transported by public bus to the wholesale
market in Yangon and later exported. Other major products found in Sittwes market are dried anchovies, hilsa
(Hilsa toli), sardines (Sardinella fimbriata), P. monodon chilled for export to Yangon, dried shrimp also for Yangons
market, mud crabs (Scylla sp.) and trash fish for the Chinese market.
Sittwe is where processing factories for shrimp and fish and larger traders exporting to China and Yangon are
located. Currently the trade route to Bangladesh is not as important as it was 2 years ago, since the lifting of
international sanctions opened up the Yangon route and the recent ethnic conflict made this one more dangerous.
For fresh fish, small-sized ones are sold directly at the retail market or township market in Sittwe while high value
fish (grouper, pomfret, hilsa, seabass) are sold to traders for the market in Yangon. Mud crab and trash fish are
mostly traded with China, through Mandalay and Muse. Traders of combined shrimp and high value fish are
commonly found in Sittwe. These traders base their supplies on offshore fishing while inshore fishing is mostly for
local consumption and the retail market.
Pauktaw Township counts about 3,000 to 4,000 fishermen with between 700 and 1,000 stow nets to capture fish
and shrimp (Table 2). Also highly productive are the seine nets targeting sardines. About 100 nets for hilsa fish
operating from April to August are registered in the township. The township is clearly separated into offshore
fisheries targeting mackerel, grouper, pomfret, anchovies and sardines and an inshore fisheries within the channel
between islands, where small scale fishermen are fishing mud crabs, mullets (Muggil cephalus), seabass, cat fish
(Arius thalassinus) and different types of shrimp (Penaeus sp. and Metapaneus sp.). The channels have a more
brackish water environment with more distinct seasonal changes in water salinity. Islands facing the open sea host
large fish processing activities with dried anchovies and offshore capture of mackerel.
As Pauktaw, Myebon Townships fisheries include different habitats with inter-islands channels and rivers with
brackish water environment and offshore marine fisheries. According to the DoF, the dominating fisheries in this
township are small-scale inshore ones (within 2 miles), even if offshore trawlers are infringing the inshore area
along the coast. The main targeted species are shrimp Penaeus sp. for export and smaller sized shrimp caught
using stow nets, the dominant type of fishing gear, and sold dried. Hilsa and pomfret are also sought after by
fishermen, as well as mullets and anchovies, and are caught using drift nets. Siseli, a local type of anchovy
capture, is specially processed (removing the head and slice before drying) for the Singapore market. Myebon is
abundant in mantis shrimp (Harpiosquilla harpax), caught all year long with stow nets but with a peak breeding
season from May to August, when the catch is illegal. This product is also for the export market via Yangon. Mud
crab is found in specific areas of Myebon and targeted by Chin and Rakhine communities living more inland along
the rivers. Mud crab is exported to Minbya (400 tons in 2013) for the Chinese market.
As in the other townships visited, large trawlers, national and international, are blamed for the decline in catch. In
addition baby trawlers targeting shrimp are present in Myebon, but they originated in Pauktaw, Kyaukphyu and
Tandwe according to the DoF. As a result of over-fishing, the catch decreased by about 50 to 60%.
14
Kyaukphyu Township has a strong fishery sector with inshore fisheries representing about 72% of the inshore
fishery catch in Rakhine State. The local Muslim community was important and involved in offshore and inshore
fisheries. Prawn and Penaeus mondon and P. indicus, from both capture and aquaculture, dominate the
production. The other main species are anchovies, sardines, catfish, pomfret, indian tassell fish (Polynemus indicus)
and mackerel as well as grouper and seabass. Mud crab is an important commodity with 40,000 viss exported
outside of the township in 2013.
According to the DoF, the decrease in fish catch is explained by several factors, including: a disturbance of the
natural habitat by the pipeline and deep port construction, the degradation of the mangrove forest, damages to
the fishing gear since Cyclone Giri and, in 2013, the absence of 200 fishing vessels previously operated by Muslims,
now resettled in Sittwe. The role of offshore trawlers fishing within the 10 miles inshore limits was not directly
recognized as a cause for the decline in fisheries. However, the DoF acknowledges that given their shortage in
equipment and funds to support operational costs such as monitoring, offshore fishing vessels can only be
controlled with the support of the navy. The DoF focuses on inshore fisheries and tax collection from fishermen.
TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF MAIN TARGETED FISH AND CRUSTACEANS SPECIES BY TOWNSHIP
Offshore Onshore Process and market

Pauktaw ++ ++ Sittwe and Minbia main collection
South part of the township: North part of the township - points
Shrimp, anchovies, hilsa, sardines, Brackish water environment: Large-scale dry fish processing
grouper, pomfret Shrimp, mullets, seabass, mud South of Pauktaw
crab, hilsa
Myebon -- ++ Market to Minbya and access to
Channels and rivers: Sittwe- Yangon National road.
Shrimp, dried and chilled, hilsa, Representative of large shrimp
anchovies and, mud crab, mantis processing company in Myebon
shrimp
Kyaukphyu +++ ++++ Market to Ann township for crab
Open sea/Offshore fishing: Channels and rivers: Shrimp, Kyaukphyu main market for fish
Grouper, seabass, mackerel, seabass, mud crabs and shrimp before transport to
sardines Yangon.
Shrimp processing factory
IV.3. VALUE CHAIN IN THE FISHERY SECTOR

4.3.1. SHIFT IN MARKET AND DESTINATION
Rakhine fisheries have access to international markets through Bangladesh, Muse and Yangon. Until 2010-2011,
the Bangladesh trade route was used to avoid international sanctions on export. The Kyat exchange rate, better
road connection between Yangon and Rakhine and the reduction of the export tax via the formal export channels
also negatively impacted the trade with Bangladesh in favor of Yangon. In addition, recent violence outbreaks in
the communities in question negatively influenced trade between Bangladesh and Myanmar, with also less
investment from Bangladeshi businessmen in the fishery and aquaculture sectors.
Recent interviews with key informants from the Myanmar Fisheries Federation (MFF) show that the Yangon trade
route is now growing in contrast to the trade with Bangladesh, especially for frozen shrimp. With processing
factories for frozen shrimp, the wholesale market in Yangon is the other main destination for Rakhine seafood
15
products. An agent is in charge of marketing for the auction market or selling to the processing factory for the
traders based in Rakhine. Products are transported via public bus or private trucks.
A new market is now emerging for crab and eel in Rakhine following the recent changes in legislation and terms
of trade at the Chinese border. Until recently, trade was controlled by a public enterprise, in charge of regulating
the auction market in Muse at the Chinese border. Now, this regulatory structure has been dissolved facilitating
the exchange and trade between the countries. This reform triggered new incentives for seafood products to be
exported to China. The trade route that includes Mandalay and Muse concerns specially mud crab for which the
Chinese market offers a higher price especially during the Chinese New Year. As a result, traders and agents
located in Muse finance local traders and collectors in Rakhine Townships to provide them with raw products.
4.3.2. REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE FISHERY VALUE CHAIN
Formal regulation
Fishing and trading fish requires a license issued by the DoF. Collectors and traders can apply for the trading license
at the townships DoF. A license for 10 tons costs 10,000 MK, in addition the trader needs an authorization from
the Townships DoF. No specific trading license is required for dried fish.
Fishermen require a license according to their fishing gear. During the tender system, these licenses were usually
paid by the tender operator while they are now collected directly by the DoF . The licensing fee is limited with, for
example, 12,000 Mk per stow net. The DoF targets about 10 main fishing gear licenses, including stow nets and
different types of drift and gill nets. Also, for example, crab traps or cast nets are rarely under a formal tax and the
DoFs answers about this point differ according to the township. Beside this regulation, no open or closed season
regulates the fisheries. Even if they exist, these rules are not respected or even known by fishermen
Patron-client relationship
At the local level, trade and value chains in the fishery sector are dominated by patron-client relationships, with
fishermen tied to the moneylender, who, in many cases, is the local collector or trader. As described by Boutry et
10
al. (2013) small-scale fisheries in Rakhine are un-predictable and subject to climate hazards. The revenue from
fisheries is seasonal; therefore, fishermen need access to land and/or cash to sustain their livelihoods in case of
shock or low income. The moneylenders at the village level provide this insurance with investments for special
expenses, inputs such as ice and fuel and investment in fishing gears in exchange for the purchasing of fish catch at
a lower price. The patrons high bargaining power was higher during the tender system with control over access to
resources. The tender operator could control extraction of the resources and marketing, with fishermen selling
their catch at a fixed price to the tender operator or to one affiliated collector (Boutry et al. 2013). This system was
found to still be in place in one community only (Aung Mingalar in Myebon), with the local traders purchasing the
fishermens fishing rights to the tender operator and later purchasing the fish catch from the fishermen at lower
fixed price.
This patron-client relationship with tender operator and/or collectors and traders was common. Even after the
fishery sectors reform more than 90% of the fishermen interviewed during this study operates under this type of
10
Boutry M, Htoo S.E, Win T M. 2013. Investigation revenue collection practices and opportunities from the Fisheries Sector in
Rakhine Sate
16
verbal contract. However, the nature of the contracts varies according to the relationship with the trader and
nature of the product. For example, cash advance is not common in crab fisheries. Either not all the crab fishermen
receive cash advances or the amount is limited to 50,000 Mk per fisherman, compared to 100,000 Mk to 700,000
Mk in the case of shrimp fisheries financing stow net maintenance. Lower value products like fish paste or species
like mullets are not important for traders, thus fishermen do not receive cash advances.
Shrimp is the main targeted species for small scale fishermen in the study area. In the case of dried shrimp, the
price difference reaches 1,000 to 2,000 Mk per viss, corresponding to a 10 to 20% reduction compared to the
market price. In addition, local collectors commonly rely on unfair weighting practices, with a viss counting 120
tical instead of 100 tical. The value of the catch for the fishermen ends up being 30 to 40% lower than its real
market value.
For chilled shrimp, the highest value product, the price difference at the local collectors is lower, at 500 to 1,000
Mk, with unfair weighting practices. However it seems that with the decline of the catch, the fixed price rule is
more flexible, with collectors and traders trying to capture the maximum volume when the demand is high and
providing higher prices to fishermen.
In addition to the fixed price and unfair weighting practices, the grading system for crab, dried shrimp and chilled
shrimp is different between local collectors and traders in townships. Usually either only a small grading variation
or no grading system at all is applied at the local level. Collectors buy for example dried shrimp in bulk with a single
price. However, when reselling the product they sort by size at different prices. In the case of chilled shrimp, the
grading system is based on size at the village level and on weight at the township level, allowing a re-sorting of the
product to the traders benefit.
The fishermens bargaining power is therefore very low. They do not have the capacity to store the product while it
is being processed, like in the case of dried shrimp, to wait for higher prices. In the current situation, collectors and
traders wait during production and fishermen have no control over marketing. Access to the townships market
price information is in some locations inconsistent with no access to phone service. However even with access to
market price, fishermen have no bargaining space if contractually bound to the traders
One way for fishermen to access a better market price is by selling at the fishing ground to mobile collectors.
Mobile collectors always offer higher prices, closer to the townships market price, but the grades and weighting
system might not be advantageous to the fishermen. Especially for mud crab and fish, fishermen can sell directly to
the mobile collectors and thus escape their contractual relationship with traders and local collectors. This system
was found in all the communities visited. It also applied to processed products, like dried shrimp, at the village
level. This last aspect shows that the patron-client relationships have some flexibility and access to better market
price is possible to a certain degree.
Local collectors and traders do have similar types of relationships with traders, in townships or collection points,
who finance collectors with cash advances. However, due to larger volumes traded, the price difference is usually
lower than the one used for fishermen, with for example 500Mk to 1,000 Mk lower than the current market price
in the case of dried shrimp. In the case of chilled shrimp, the price difference in some cases is null with traders
seeking to capture the maximum volume. Collectors usually do no reimburse their loans and the traders consider
the cash advance as investment capital. In the case of crab, the local traders are directly financed by traders from
Muse, acting as agents on the ground to collect sufficient amounts of crabs. These types of traders have a very
limited bargaining power.
17
Traders usually enter contractual agreements with several (10 to 30) collectors financing cash advances for them in
exchange of the exclusivity of their product. Dried shrimp traders also tie fishermen to a contract, providing loans
for their equipment. Loans range from 0.1 to 1 million Kyat, sometimes higher for large collectors. For chilled
shrimp, traders do not contract fishermen directly, with too little volume per catch and with fishermen, especially
the ones using stow nets, already bound by contract to dried shrimp traders.
Both fishermen-collectors and collectors-traders have long-term business relationships, sometimes lasting more
than 10 years. While contracts between fishermen and collectors do not seems to have evolved recently, collectors
now receive lower cash advances from traders, coinciding with the decrease of the catch but also with the increase
in bargaining power brought on by access to market price via mobile phone. The loan is usually not paid back if the
supply is regular, while it is returned in the case of lower supply.
IV.4. FISHERY REFORM

4.4.1. REFORM OF THE TENDER SYSTEM
For years a tendering system was in place to manage fisheries in Myanmar, with fishing grounds rented to tender
operators for a determined period, and the central government collecting revenue. Recently the tender system
was decentralized and Rakhine States Government is now in charge of delivering the tender rights and harvesting
the revenue.
The existing Marine Fisheries Law (1990) is a national law. Rakhine State decided to replace this law with one
better tailored and better fitted to the local context. The new law is now being drafted and the DoF is consulting
partners to develop a regulation that will ensure economic growth and sustainability of the resources. Among the
main contentious issues are the definition of closed season and the future of the tender system. The DoF wishes to
include a two months closed season for offshore fishing, but this new rule faces resistance from the private sector
and it is currently still being debated.
In addition, in 2013, the fishing limit for offshore fishing was pushed to 10 miles, modifying legal access to fishing
grounds for trawlers and small-scale fishing boats. According to the MFF, this modification of the regulation will
not bring any changes due to weak law enforcement of offshore boats fishing inshore. The DoF in Kyaukphyu also
acknowledges to lacking equipment and funds to support the operational cost of monitoring offshore fisheries and
to needing support from the Navy to control them.
11
As part of the reform, for the 2012-2013 fiscal year, the government canceled 211 fishing lot licenses , but it is not
clear if this change will be upheld (R. Gregory, pers. com, DoF Rakhine State pers. com). Before this reform, the
revenue from taxation on fishing gears was collected to the tender operator in charge of collecting taxes from the
fishermen. Now in the absence of tender operator, the DoF is in charge of collecting tax revenue directly from the
fishermen and to enforce regulation on fishing gear.
Following cessation of the fishing lots, no other system was put in place to manage fisheries and the resources
while law enforcement of fishing gear is questionable. Past experience in neighboring countries like Cambodia,
show that quickly replacing fishing lots in few months time without ensuring community fisheries were prepared
11
In 2002,15 tenders were issued in Kyauk Phyu, 8 only in 2012, covering 10 % of the fishery area
18
12
led to overfishing and lack of management of the resources in most of the cases . Lifting the tenders will reduce
control of the fishing grounds, and might raise the number of fishermen, the amount of un-registered fishing gear,
together with a decrease in revenue and resources for the DoF.
4.4.2. IMPACT OF THE REFORM ON THE FISHERMEN
Access to fishing grounds

13
According to Pyoe Pin (2013) , Fishery law faces several obstacles in its enforcement including:
Knowledge of the regulation by fishermen;

Lack of law enforcement of the 10 miles limit set for Rakhine coastal waters with large trawlers fishing
inside the exclusion area;
Use of illegal fishing techniques such as illegal baby trawlers fishing in shallow waters
According to a large shrimp trader, the reform of the fishing lots which limits or prevents control of access to
fishing grounds benefits trawlers, and in turn leads to more infringements in inshore waters. However, within the
study area, communities did not mention intensive activity by baby trawlers. This type of fishing practice is found
on the West part of Kyaukphyu and Pauktaw townships, not in channels and rivers, the main type of fishing
grounds of the studied communities.
Lifting the tender rights led to conflicts in certain areas, with lack of control, theft of nets and boats (not verified
during field work), and increased number of fishermen. Currently, the States DoF expects more conflict related to
fishing ground access in the coming years, when resources will be scarce and the access to productive fishing
grounds will be under pressure from a large number of fishermen.
Taxation and revenue for the DoF
Before the reform, tender owning the fishing right enforced access rights to fishing grounds and collected taxes on
fishing gear from the fishermen. The tender operator set the tax. Usually the tax paid by fishermen was higher
than the one stipulated by the law. For example, the tax for fishermen varied from 20,000 to 30,000 MK for a
stow-net, where it should have being only 10,000 to 12,000 Mk.
In addition to tax collection, fishermen had to market their catch through the tender operator or a collector
connected to the tender operator, at a lower price. In Aung Mingalar, the village trader paid fishing rights to the
tender operator in exchange for the catch, paid at a lower price. Different sort of arrangements between traders,
fishermen and tender operators were possible in order to harvest the tax and the catch, but were usually
detrimental to the fishermen. However, as mentioned by Boutry et al. (2013), fishermen had a different
perspective, with the possibility to rely on illegal fishing practices and lack of enforcement by the DoF not
controlling fishing gear in the area.
12
Ratner, B. D. (2006). Community Management by Decree? Lessons from Cambodias Fisheries Reform. Society & Natural
Resources, 19(1), 7986. doi:10.1080/08941920500323344
13
The Rakhine State Fisheries Partnership. 2013. Opus cited
19
The cessation of the tender system did not change the structure of the value chain, with similar collectors and
traders involved with the communities to market the catch. In case of fishermen contractually bound to a collector
or a trader, the fixed price was not changed.
Except for the reduction of the license fee, the impact of the reform was not significant for fishermen.
Communities did not mention any noticeable change in access, or conflict over access, to fishing grounds. Local
customary rules are now used to replace the fishing lots regulation for stow nets.
There are differences across communities and townships. Contrary to Myebon, in Pauktaw no tax is collected on
crab traps and hook lines. In Kyaukphyu the communities visited did not pay any taxes for the last season, but in
the last year no fishing lot was auctioned.
The DoF has the ground support of Township officers and the village tract to collect the tax, but both revenue and
the amount of fishing gear licensed are lower compared to that in 2012 (State DoF pers. com). Before the fishing
gear license was collected directly from the fishing lots owner and the revenue from the tax on fishing gear was
more important. Currently the DoF is using different ways to approach fisherfolk communities in villages and find a
representative from the fishing community to estimate the number of nets and collect the tax. In addition, the DoF
visits Paik hseip (local name for landing site outside of the village) to collect taxes on mobile fishing devices such
as drift nets and gill nets.
The DoF in Pauktaw and Myebon acknowledge that tax collection is not easy and requires support from local
fishermen leaders. In Myebon, tax collection requires several visits, corresponding to peak catch for the different
types of fishing devices. Officers visit villages and make appointments for their next visit to collect taxes. Thus, the
collection rate is not efficient and the operational cost is high. An officer from Myebons DoF estimates the cost of
collecting licenses between 1 to 1.5 million Mk per trip, with several trips required. Up to now no extra budget was
provided to support this cost.
In Kyaukphyu, the DoF collected 60% of its revenue target for 2013-2014 fiscal year, sending officers to villages and
Paik hseip. According to the DoF, this approach benefits both the DoF and the community. The DoF saves time
compared to individual tax collection and reduces the cost of collecting licensing fees from individuals, while
fishermen can pay for an underdetermined percentage of their real number of nets.
Customary rules and community-based management
With the cessation of the fishing lots, previous customary rules for fishing rights and access are now used to
regulate access and solve conflicts. Before implementation of the tender policy, customary law for access and
location of stow net existed in Rakhine. The customary system for fixed net (yay kwin) was described by Boutry
et al.2013 as fishing plots where fishermen informally own the stow net location. These rights can be sold
according to locations productivity and distance between nets, which is regulated by a set of rules. A minimum
distance between 2 units (about 300 yards) and stow nets should be larger than 10 yards, with sufficient space for
navigation in between 2 nets. The nets location including the bamboo pole can be sold by fishermen for 60-80,000
Mk. Up to now no conflict over the location of the stow nets has been observed in the different communities
visited. Whenever conflict for stow net location arises it is managed at the community level without the
involvement of authorities. The DoF now uses this customary system to census the number of stow nets by
community and collect related taxes.
20
In one community in Kyaukphuy, Ah Len Chein, a local tender system is still in place. 3 villages sharing a section of
the river are selling the fishing rights to an individual by auction. In 2013, the fishing rights were 300,000 Mk for a
year and the funds harvested were used to allocate the village funds. This type of community based management
is not common ad should be investigated to understand how the benefits are shared within the communities and if
this type of regulation could benefit fishermen and control fishing intensity before being replicated.
The reform of the tender system did not dramatically modify access to fishing grounds for fishermen, with a lower
entrance or fishing gear tax. Patron-client relationships with traders still exist.
Tax collection is more difficult for the DoF, being in charge of collecting this revenue directly from the fishermen
instead of the tender operator. The DoF is now using customary rules and traditional community based
organization to collect fishing gear licensing fees more efficiently.
IV.5. ETHNIC VIOLENCE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FISHERY VALUE CHAIN
The Muslim community in Myanmar consists of 0.8 million people. Ethnic Muslims, also called Rohingyas, have
been part of the political landscape and economy of Rakhine State for decades. However, Rohingya do not have
citizenship status.
Tension between the two main ethnic groups, Rakhine Buddhists and Muslims, led to outbreaks of violence and
open conflict in June and October 2012. Both sides were involved in, and affected by, violence. It resulted in
14
hundreds of deaths and the displacement of 139,000 individuals, mostly Muslims, in 68 camps in 2013. Muslims
displaced in camps and host villages, are not allowed to leave their camps except in cases of medical emergency.
Within our study area we found IDP camps and host villages in Sittwe, Pautaw, Myebon and Kyaukphyu.
In light of intervention in the fishery value chain it is important to understand the role of the Muslim community
before the violence and the consequent resettlement in camps. How these 2 communities interacted within the
fishery value chain, how Muslims in camps became involved in fisheries and trading seafood products and, to some
extent, who replaced them.
4.5.1. ORIGINAL SETTING, ROLE AND INTERACTION BETWEEN COMMUNITIES

Muslim communities are traditionally involved in the fishery sector as fishermen and traders. Both ethnic groups,
Rakhine Buddhist and Muslims interact along the fishery value chain. Traditionally Muslim fishermen have been
considered more skilled, targeting large fish and fishing in offshore grounds with larger fishing boats and
equipment compared to Rakhine ethnic groups.
Fishing activities and changing circumstances
Within the study area, the Muslim community was not widespread, and significant differences in social structures
and across locations were found. In Pauktaw, Muslim communities were spread across several villages in the
township and involved in small-scale fisheries. Currently some of these villages have become host villages while
14
OCHA Rahine CCCM dashboard November 2013
21
some households were resettled in IDP camps near Pauktaw Township. In Myebon the only Muslim community
was located near the township and now resettled in an IDP camps nearby. This community was involved in
offshore and inshore fisheries, targeting hilsa, anchovies and seabass. In Kyaukphyu, a large Muslim fishing
community was involved in offshore fisheries for mackerel, grouper and pomfret, but has now been displaced to
IDP camps in Pauktaw and Sittwe. A part of this community is now resettled in Thea Cheung camp near Sittwe
town.
15
Based on the Food security and livelihood assessment (2013) carried out in IDP camps and host Muslim villages, a
differentiation was made along the lines of socio-economic status related to past fishing activities. Better-off
Muslim households were involved in the fishing business owning boats and nets. Middle class households were
involved in retail and petty trade of fish or fishing labor, while poor households were more involved in small-scale
fishing activities.
These fishing communities were not intensively involved in small scale inshore fishing, such as shrimp or crabs but
targeted more fish. In cases like Pauktaw, they shared fishing grounds with Rakhine fishermen, while in Myebon
and Kyaukphyu, fishing grounds were located far away from the visited communities and no specific interaction
between fishing communities was found. In Kyaukphyu, Muslims and Rakhine were working on the same fishing
vessels, and marketing their catch, with Paik hseip located nearby each other.
Rakhine and Muslim fishermen had established business relations for trading fish. However, Rakhine traders now
struggle with acknowledging such relationships existed and they typically denied or minimized the role of Muslims
in their trading activities during interviews.
Trading activities and interactions between Muslims and Rakhine
While it is clear that both communities were working together and interacting, it is difficult to assess how much
and what were their contractual relationships. For example it sounds un-realistic for a large fish trader in Sittwe
shipping more than 10 tons of fish per months to Yangon no to have Muslim fishermen or collectors as clients
(suppliers). Whenever a Rakhine trader acknowledged this type of business interactions, the importance of the
trade in terms of volume was reportedly low, with a fish trader estimating his interactions with Muslim traders to 5
-10% of his total volume.
Muslim traders were also involved in chilled and dried shrimp trade as well as mud crab even if these did not
represent the main commodities (Figure 5). For example a shrimp trader in Myebon, had a contractual relationship
with 4 Muslim traders (representing 20% of its collectors), another trader with 2 Muslim collectors. Another trader
in Myebon stated that the Muslim community was not as involved in crab fishing as Rakhine fishermen, but still
represented about 40% of its clients. This trader was working with Muslim collectors. Since now these collectors
are no longer present, Rakhine fishermen need to go to the nearest collector to sell their products. Rakhine traders
were linked to Muslim fishermen and collectors at the paik hseip, where Muslims and Rakhine fishing
communities used to live.
15
Tat Lan Consortium. Food Security and Livelihood Assessment. Rakhine State, Myanmar. 2013.
22
Rakhine
Muslims
FIGURE 5: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN RAKHINE AND MUSLIM ETHNIC GROUPS ALONG THE FISHERY VALUE CHAINS BEFORE THE CONFLICT
Interactions between Muslims and Rakhine ethnic groups were also necessary for Muslims to obtain a trading
license. Without citizenship, obtaining a trading license was not possible and required partnerships with Rakhine
traders or counterparts. A distinct value chain for seafood products between communities was clearly established
but some overlapping and interactions existed. In addition, the fact that now Muslim traders in IDP camps are able
to contact, and trade with, Rakhine traders shows that links and relationships for trading existed before, at the
township level at least, to organize shipments to Yangon or to Bangladesh.
During and after the outbreak of violence, the fishery value chain was affected by a reduced product supply as the
consequence of:
Denied access to fishing grounds for most of the Muslim communities;

Changes in access to fishing ground for Rakhine communities;
Absence of Muslim traders who are no longer able to continue their activity;
Development of a new trading route and stakeholders in the value chain.
We distinguish between short-term and long-term impacts on the value chain.
23
4.5.2. IMPACT OF RECENT VIOLENCE ON THE FISHERY SECTOR
Short-term impacts
During and just after the violence, communication and transport of goods were affected (Figure 6). Neither
Rakhine nor Muslim traders in the different townships could trade during 3 days to 2 weeks, with lower supply
from the collectors and disrupted transport. This was especially important for perishable products like shrimp and
crabs. Some traders reported severe losses during that period, losing entire shipments of shrimp.
At the community level trading was not disrupted, or it was only for a very short 3-day period. Some local
collectors faced shortage of ice, though they lasted less than a week. Losses due to disruption of communication
were not considered as significant. No damages or losses of equipment or material were reported by the Rakhine
and Chin communities visited, while the Muslim community in Kyaukphyu mentioned the loss of fishing assets
following resettlement in IDP camps.
Long-term impact
Long-term impacts are more significant. With the absence of fishing by Muslim communities, the supply of fish,
and, to a lesser extent of crab and shrimp, is affected (Figure 7). For example in Kyaukphyu, 200 fishing vessels
belonging to Muslim communities are now missing, damaged or anchored in an IDP camp. Lower supply of fish
16
triggered a price increase in the urban market .
According to the MFF shrimp trading with Bangladesh is now reduced because of higher prices in Yangon and
internal conflicts associated with marketing Myanmar products in Bangladesh, not related to inter-ethnic violence.
Rakhine
Muslims
FIGURE 6: SHORT-TERM IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON THE FISHERY SECTOR (RED CROSS INDICATES ABSCENCE OF INTERACTION OR FLOW OF
PRODUCTS/INPUTS)
16
Oxfam 2013. Political economy and governance in Rakhine State, Myanmar.
24
Because the Muslim community was supplying labor on both Rakhine and Muslim fishing vessels, resettlement of
17
Muslims in IDP camps created a labor shortage in the fishery sector . It also accounted for lack of skills, Muslim
fishermen are considered better fishermen than Rakhine ones. Also absence of Muslims in cities like Sittwe
increased labor demands in other fields in which they previously worked further increasing the demand for labor in
the fishery sector.
After the outbreak of violence, access to fishing grounds changed. Beside the fact that Muslims no longer have
access to fishing, Rakhines fishermen (both offshore and inshore) now fear accessing fishing grounds. In rural
communities, especially in the Pauktaw area, small-scale fishermen report accessing fishing grounds in groups to
minimize the risk of attacks. A similar approach is taken for offshore fishing. Fishing grounds away from the village,
or in open seas, are less used. For example a formerly well-used fishing ground in the open sea between Myebon
and Kyaukphyu district is now almost abandoned. In Pauktaw, accessing the main crab and mullet fishing grounds
requires crossing areas where the Muslim community resides. Due to fear of violence, fishermen fish close to the
shore and do not use rowing boats anymore, further limiting their fishing grounds to the village surroundings. As a
result fishing activity decreased by about 50% with no fishing activity at all during the 3 months following the first
outbreak of violence in these communities.
As Muslims in Pauktaw, were heavily involved in shrimps post larvae collection for the aquaculture sector, their
exodus from this community impacted the sector. In 2012, dozens of collectors could be seen operating push nets
along the shore. Following the resettlement of Muslim fishermen into IDP camps, the aquaculture industry might
suffer, with higher market prices for post-larvae P. monodon.
Rakhine
Muslims
FIGURE 7: LONG-TERM IMPACT OF CONLFICT ON THE FISHERY SECTOR AND VALUE CHAIN IN RAKHINE AND MUSLIM COMMUNTIES
17
Oxfam 2013.cited
25
According to the DoF, authorities in Myebon allow access to fishing grounds at alternate times for each community
to minimize incidence of conflict. . Rakhine fishermen fish during the daytime and Muslim ones at night. The
Muslim community is still allowed to go fishing near the IDP camp in the river estuarine. However, fishermen from
each of the communities are now fishing in groups of boats to ensure their security. Recent allegations of attacks
of Rakhine fishermen by Muslim fishermen increased the tension between communities and limited the number of
fishing boats.
Long-term impact in the fishery sector concerns the volume of catch as determined by the access to fishing ground
for both Muslims and Rakhine fishermen. With lower volumes and absence of key stakeholders in the value chain,
who is replacing the missing links and are there new players within the chain structure?
4.5.3. REPLACEMENT OF M USLIM STAKEHOLDERS AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES: THE CASE OF T HEA CHEUNG
IDP CAMP
Degree of access to fishing grounds for Muslim fishermen varies. In some IDP camps like Thea Cheung fishermen
have access to fishing grounds whereas in other camps such as Sittwe, Pauktaw or Kyaukphyu movement is more
restricted. In the camp visited in Kyaukphyu (Kyauk Tat Lone), the Kaman community was not heavily involved in
fisheries. The situation in the host village in Pauktaw was not assessed but secondary information indicates that
communities in host villages have access to fishing grounds, as in the Myebon IDP camp (according to the DoF).
18
During the joint Livelihood Assessment carried out in August 2013 , Thea Cheung camp located outside of Sittwe
was identified as an IDP camp with fishing and fish trading activities. The assessment showed that the arrival of a
fishing community from Kyaukphyu improved the fishing capacity of the hosting communities. Access to fishing
grounds was limited and required several formal authorizations from different authorities and informal fees at the
time of the assessment. Catch was traded through a limited number of Rakhine traders located in Sittwe, who also
provided inputs such as ice and fuel.
We visited Thea Cheung camp in late January 2013 and met with a group of traders, individual fishermen and fish
processors. It appears that the incoming community settled in the camps with their fishing equipment, including
19
23 offshore boats of large capacity . The fleet of the host population is about 300 of which about 200 boats are
for offshore fishing, but have lower capacity than those of the resettling population. Since the arrival of new
traders and new population in the village, the local price for fish increased. For example the price of small-sized
fish increased threefold compared to before the crisis because of limited catch and more important demands by
the IDPs.
Access to fishing grounds and inputs
Fishing techniques are similar for the two populations according to fishermen. In the dry season offshore fishing
targets seabass and mackerel while shrimp and sardines are sought in the rainy season in inshore area. The
offshore area is less accessible in the rainy season when fishermen shift their focus towards inshore fisheries.
Fishing trips are not necessarily constrained and can last more than one week according to fishermen. Inshore
18
opus cited
19
Since their arrival, the guest population sold 5 fishing vessels to support their livelihood, reducing the fleet to 18 boats while
11 boats were left in their original location and thus lost.
26
fishing is for local retailing within and outside of the camp, while 90% of offshore catch is for processing and to
later be sold in Sittwe and the rest of the country.
To access the sea, boats need to pass a checkpoint along the river where the authorities register the crew
composition. It is checked again as the boat returns. Access to fishing grounds does not require authorization from
authorities and the informal tax is equivalent to 3-5 liters of fuel and some large-sized fish when the boat returns.
This un-expected information regarding fishing activities was confirmed by several fishermen met in the camps and
through the observation of vibrant fishery activity around numerous fish dryers (fish-drying platforms). For
example, a group of traders (mix of both hosting and resettled populations) processed about 5,000 viss per week in
the 2014s peak season (Figure 8).
Input price increased since resettlement, with ice prices up by 55% and salt prices (for processing) up by 35% due
to transport costs and risk taken by merchants delivering to the Muslim community. These products are purchased
from Sittwe and Rakhine merchants. The processing plant faced shortage only 1 time in the last 2 months.
Since the displacement of fishermen, the DoF does not collect taxes from boat owners, neither does the township
authority issue boat licenses. However, lack of tax might be an issue, according to fishermen. If the boat requires
reaching another port or landing site in emergency, fishermen cannot provide any registration to the local
authorities.
Technical changes: from fresh to dried fish
The main technical change for the IDPs is the shift from directly marketing fresh fish to now processing it into dried
fish first. Although both communities previously engaged in drying fish, it was less common for the IDPs, who have
now adopted the technique as their main product. Since trade connections with Sittwe are inconsistent, as well as
access to ice limited, catch during the peak season is dried before being marketed. This process creates
employment for both hosting and resettled communities and two types of processors can be found in the camp.
First, we found large processors trading fish and employing full-time employees (more than 10). A second type, the
small-scale processors, purchase fish from the auction market and usually process high value fish. The fish is sold
to retailers in the local market (within the camp) or to wholesalers in Sittwes market via a Rakhine agent for
transporting and selling the product.
27
FIGURE 8: THEA CHEUNG IDP CAMP FISHERY ACTVITIES: OFFSHORE BOATS, DRYING PLATFORM, SMALL SCALE FISH PROCESSING ACTVITIES
(LEFT TO RIGHT- FIRST ROW); ICE DELIVERY IN THE CAMP, STORAGE OF LOBSTER (SECOND ROW)
New agents in the value chain
Access to market is the main change since the outbreak of violence and resettlement into camps. Selling fish in
Sittwe or transporting it to Yangon requires intermediaries, since traders cannot export products outside of the
camps.
To start trading fish products, the IDPs had to re-group their financial capacity since they do not have any more
access to loans from buyers in Yangon. Sometime the groups of traders include IDPs and local traders. These
traders can access loans from relatives located outside Rakhine, through the Hondi system. Trading activities
took 4 to 5 months to launch following resettlement, the time needed to understand the local market, initiate
commercial relationships with fishermen and local traders, and find access to safe transport routes for the
products. This last point was the most complex and difficult.
Export of processed and fresh fish products requires intermediaries (Rakhine ethnic group) located in Sittwe that
can contract transporters. Intermediaries willing to take the risk to work with Muslims are limited to few
individuals. Traders in the IDP camps fix the price with Yangon and contact the intermediary to arrange transport.
In addition, a third intermediary, from a neighboring Rakhine village, can play a role in arranging the transaction
between the traders in the camp and the intermediary arranging transport to Yangon. However, transport from
the camp to the bus depot is by local tuk tuk, which can entail security issues such as interception of the goods by
Rakhine groups opposed to trading activities with Muslim communities. One trader estimates that he lost about
20% of his shipment during the peak season.
The use of intermediaries for transport to Yangon is estimated to have increased by 30% compared to before the
crisis. The cost of the intermediary can fluctuate if there is more pressure from Rakhines anti-Muslim activists. In
addition the price for transport by tuk tuk from the camp to the transporter increased by 100%, from 500 to 1,000
Kyatt per shipment, compared to before the crisis.
28
Even if trade with outside the camps sounds complex, risky and difficult, we observed a trade of live lobsters
(highly perishable and worth several thousands of dollars) for the export market within the IDP camps, showing
that the trade routes between the camp and the Sittwe and Yangon markets is somehow secure enough.
Through observations of the new agents taking risks to trade with Muslim communities, probably driven by
economic profit with an additional cost due to the risk, we can extrapolate that the relationships between Muslim
and Rakhine traders existed before the recent violence. The outbreak of violence modified these relationships,
making Muslim traders in camps more dependent on few Rakhine agents who charge high fees for their services.
Other cases of added value chain complexity
Not all camps present such development of the value chain and interactions between communities. In Kyaukphyu,
Pauktaw and Myebon, interactions are extremely limited and no trade between communities is reported.
In Pauktaw, Rakhine traders explained that Muslim offshore fishing communities are still trading their catch,
through some Rakhine traders, adding another step in the value chain and thus additional costs. Another trader in
Sittwe was trading with Muslim collectors at the village level in Pauktaw. Now these collectors still exist but
require to trade with a Rakhine trader at the village level to ship their product to Sittwe or Pauktaw. It took about
3 to 5 months after the events for them to develop a new network.
4.5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A DO NO HARM APPROACH IN THE FISHERY SECTOR
This study did not follow a Do No Harm Assessment methodology, as this was not its primary objective. However,
all along the study we tried to understand the role of Muslim communities in the sector and their potential
replacement by ethnic Rakhine.
From our study, and for future interventions in the fisheries sector at the community level, we can conclude that
Muslim communities were not heavily involved in crab, shrimp and fish for retail at the local market. Muslim
fishing communities were essentially involved in offshore fishing, targeting high value fish sales.
Intervention in the fishery sector will not have the same impact on Muslim communities if inshore small-
scale fisheries or offshore fisheries are targeted;
Relations and interactions between Muslim and Rakhine fishermen and traders for marketing purposes existed and
still exist but do not sound significant at the village level. There is little share of volume between communities at
the village level. More interactions are found at the township level, where Muslim collectors interact with Rakhine
traders and transporters.
Intervention at the village level and working with existing village structures, will not significantly replace
Muslim collectors and traders.
Tat Lan project will not work in the camps. However, to support the trading activities of the Muslim community,
facilitating trade via infrastructure and formal and safe trade routes will positively impact the income from
fisheries in camps like Thea Cheung.
29
V. FISHERY VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS - COMMUNITY LEVEL FOCUS
V.1. FISHING ACTIVITIES BY THE TARGET POPULATION

The different communities visited presented similarities and dissemblance regarding their fishing techniques,
species targeted and equipment. Within one cluster of villages, fisheries techniques were not homogenous, with
different types of livelihood, equipment or access to fishing grounds. In the following section we summarize the
20
main features and characteristics of each community . A more detailed description is found in the case studies
reports.
5.1.1. IMPORTANCE FOR LIVELIHOOD AND FOR THE POOR

A rapid assessment of the importance of fisheries for households in the different villages shows that fisheries in
general account for more than 20% of the total income. Poor households in all communities do not have access to
their own land and rely on causal labor in rice, salt and/or shrimp farms. Not all the villages have access to land for
agriculture or shrimp farming and some communities like Aung Mingalar in Myebon rely almost entirely on
fisheries (Figure 9).
Within the fisheries, villagers distinguish crab and other fisheries (shrimp and small-sized fish). All the fishery
activities are inshore and small-scale. Crab fisheries are important for income generation, especially for the poor
21
thanks to a low cost of entry . In the Kyaukhpyu cluster the fishermen group estimates that 18% to 20% of their
annual income is generated by crab fisheries, compared to about 10 % for shrimp and small-sized fish.
FIGURE 9: INCOME SOURCE FOR POOR HOUSEOHOLDS IN 3 COMMUNITIES VISITED. AH LEL KYUN (PAUKTAW); AUNG MINGALAR (MYEBON)
AND MIN CHAUWNG (KYAUKPHYU).
Womens involvement in fisheries is limited. They are not involved in fishing and only few of them join their
husbands for stow net or drift net fishing. Women are more likely to join fishing activities in the case of crab
fishing, with fishing trips as long as 7 days, but this is not the most common pattern. Women generally stay in the
villages, occupied by other activities.
Women can fish crabs from the shore, with a hook line, but their main involvement is generally for fish, crab and
shrimp processing. While men are fishing, women are the main stakeholders for post-catch processing and
marketing at the village level. Women are in charge of sorting fish catch, drying fish and shrimp and packaging the
20
Detailed characterizations of communities are found in field report per township
21
50 crab traps cost 50,000 Mk and crab fisheries do not necessarily require a boat
30
final product. For crabs, women are in charge of tightening crab claws. In fish processing women are the key
stakeholders for improvement of products quality.
5.1.2. SEASONALITY OF THE CATCH

Fisheries are one of the main sources of income for the target population. This income is seasonal and un-
predictable. In the study zone, the seasonal calendar of fishing activity can be divided in two main seasons, a low
season from October to April, where shrimp and crab fisheries catch is low, and a high season starting in May until
September to August when catch is higher. Throughout the report, we consider the low season as October to April
and peak season from May to September. An example of fishing calendar in the Kyaukphyu cluster is found in
Figure 10.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Stow net - Shrimp and small fish 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 10 5 5 5
Trammel net for Shrimp 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 7 10 10 0 0
Drift net (Anumyu) (mullet) 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 7 7 10
Drift net (Vermicelli) (seabass) 3 3 3 3 5 5 0 0 5 5 3 3
Hilsa 0 0 0 5 10 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Crab 5 3 3 7 10 10 10 5 5 7 7 7
Hookline (sea bass, mackerel) 0 0 0 10 10 2 10 10 2 0 0 0
Push net (fish paste, shrimp) 0 0 0 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0
Risk at Sea
Numbers represent the level of catch ranging from 0: no catch to 10 : peak catch
FIGURE 10: SEASONAL CALENDAR IN THE KYAUKPHYU CLUSTER
Differences can be found between townships, with Pauktaw and Myebon study-sites more influenced by
freshwater in the rainy season. For example in Pauktaw, mullets and seabass are targeted in the low season using
drift nets. Hilsa fishing talks place in October in Myebon, while for communities in Kyaukphyu it takes place from
April to June.
In addition, the market price varies according to the season, according to the supply, with lower prices in the peak
season. However, this trend is not necessarily true for export products like shrimp and crabs. Mud crab is closely
related to the Chinese market and during the Chinese New Year, in January/February, the price is attractive for
fishermen even if the catch is low. Shrimps market price also fluctuates, depending on demand from processing
factories in Yangon and with the possibility of rising even during the peak season.
V.1.3. FISHING EQUIPMENT, FISHING GROUNDS AND FISH CATCH

Fishing equipment is limited to small-scale fishery types. The most common fishing gear used are crab traps, with
some communities highly specialized in this type of fishing in all townships (Figure 11, Figure 12). Access to crab
fisheries increased since Cyclone Giri. With low cost of entry, crab fisheries are a coping strategy for fisherfolk with
limited investment capacity (1,000 Mk per trap). In addition recent opening of trade with the Chinese market has
provided an additional economic incentive for fishermen to start to invest in crab fisheries with higher prices.
31
FIGURE 11: REPARTITION OF FISHING GEAR IN THE PAUKTAW, MYEBON AND KYAUKPHYU CLUSTERS (AVERAGE WITHIN EACH CLUSTER)
The second most commonly used fishing gear found in these communities is the stow net, locally called Tiger
mouth (Figure 13). This is a passive device, secured in the rivers and channels between islands. Because the
operating location is defined by local customary rules, certain communities like Gyin Dway in Myebon and Gant
Gar West in Kyaukphyu do not have access to such fishing ground, while most fishing households in Aung Mingalar
have one. Stow nets target mostly shrimp, both large-sized P. monodon and small-sized ones for processing into
dried shrimp. Stow nets are also used to catch crabs. Small sized fish are used for drying and /or as fish paste. This
net requires a high investment, costing 700,000 1 million Kyat, and the use of a boat.
FIGURE 12: FISHERMEN TRANSPORTING CRAB TRAPS (LEFT) AND FISHERMAN OPERATING A FENCE NET (RIGHT)
Drift nets and gill nets are common devices, used with boats, and targeting either P. monodon (trammel nets) or
fish such as mullets or seabass. Push nets and cast nets are common. They do not necessarily require a boat and
are used by poor households during the rainy season when access to fishing grounds is limited by weather
conditions. Hook lines for large-sized fish like seabass, hilsa nets (specific type of drift net) and fence nets are less
common. The latest require high investment and need to be operated by at least two boats hence are not common
across communities.
32
FIGURE 13: STOW NET IN THE RIVER AND FISHERMEN COLLECTING CATCH IN STOW NET
Households usually own several types of nets, combining different drift nets, cast nets and crab traps. No data on
fishing gear per households was collected; however, based on the number of nets in villages, crabs and shrimp
appear to be the main targeted species. Fish catch is low and daily estimations are for the fishing period based on
the tide (Table 3). Usually, one tide corresponds to 7 days of fishing, with 3 to 4 days with a peak catch. There are
two tide periods per month.
TABLE 3: EXAMPLE OF FISH CATCH PER FISHING GEAR FOR THE TARGETED SPECIES IN THE DIFFERENT CLUSTERS
Low season Peak season

Stow net 1-3 viss per day (Shrimp) 1-6 viss/ day (Shrimp)
Crab trap (100 traps) 3- 20 pcs per day 30-100 pieces: peak season
Drift nets 0.1-1 viss per day 0.5-3 viss /day (Shrimp)
0.5 -1 viss per day (Anchovies)
10-15 viss (Fish paste)
Access to fishing boats is different across communities. Boats are classified based on length, ranging from 14 feet
to 22 feet, and the presence/absence of engine. The characteristics of each cluster regarding access to boats are
found in Table 4.
TABLE 4: ACCESS TO BOATS AND MOTORIZED BOATS IN THE DIFFERENT CLUSTERS
Pauktaw Myebon Kyaukphyu

Ratio Boat per 0.23-0.78 0.19 to 1.80 (0.77) 0.32 -0.73 (0.56)
Households
Ratio Motorized boat 10%-77% (58%) 0% 33% (28%) 37%- 74% (47%)
Nb of fishermen without 20 to 30 18 to 45 30 to 80
boat (households)
Variability within and between clusters is important. The ratio of boats per households can be higher than 1 in the
case of fully fishing communities and lower than 0.5 in communities with alternatives livelihoods and access to
land. Communities with low ratio of boats per household also have a high number of fishermen without boat,
relying on fishing from the shore with crab traps, push nets and cast nets.
33
The number of motorized boats is also variable across communities with for example Zin Yaw Maw village in
Myebon relying only on rowing boats, which limits their fishing capacity and access to fishing grounds and markets.
The communitys fishing profile should include boat and equipment. From this exercise we can conclude that catch
volume per household is low. Fisheries are extremely low-intensity in communities with a significant number of
households lacking boats, or having only rowing boats. Targeting poor fishermen therefore requires looking at crab
and shrimp fisheries and small-size fish.
V.2. VALUE CHAIN COMMODITIES SELECTION

5.2.1. METHOD FOR SELECTION AND LIMITATION
Case study reports illustrate in greater detail the method used for commodity selection in each community. We
22
used M4P methodology to first select the most important criteria characterizing the fishery value chain for the
community. These criteria were weighted according to importance and the four with the highest priority were
selected. In a second step the participants listed the main commodities and/or fishery products. Each commodity
was then ranked for all the criteria. The results were weighted according to the importance of the criteria and the
score of each commodity was averaged. In the last cluster (Kyaukphyu), the method for weighting the criteria was
modified to better fit the context and encourage participants input.
Commodities were selected by groups of fishermen, including men and women (Table 5, Figure 14). The results
were disaggregated by gender to identify differences and similarities.
TABLE 5: SAMPLED COMMUNITY AND WOMEN PARTICIPATION

Number of communities 3 3 4
Total number of Households 890 426 962
Total Sample (Nb of women) 34 (15) 48 (21) 36 (14)
The samples in these communities were relatively small compared to the overall population in the villages.
Selection of the participants was based on their fishing activity, representing the different types of fisheries and
fishing gear found in the villages. We could not obtain a perfect gender balance in the groups, but the overall
representation of women is acceptable, ranging from 38% to 44% of the total sample.
5.2.2. RESULTS PER CLUSTER

Criteria selection
Different criteria were selected in the different clusters. However some common criteria are found across these 3
study sites (Table 6), such as benefit to the highest number of households and low entry cost. These two criteria
were consistently assigned high priority and were considered important.
22
opus cited.
34
Benefit to the largest number of households was perceived in different ways, from the largest number of
households involved in this type of fisheries, but also commodities that have a high price and can generate a
greater benefit that will end into largest benefit at the community level.
Low investment refers for example to access to equipment. For example, in mud crab fisheries the minimum cost
of entry was estimated at 150,000 Mk for a boat and 50 traps. Catching shrimp with stows net requires a high
investment, around 1 million Mk, while the use of trammel nets requires about 100,000 Mk, including nets and
boat.
Other important criteria concern availability of resources and market related issues such as high value price and
market access. Participants considered availability throughout the year important since they can catch and
market even small quantities of the commodity and generate revenue to cover the daily needs. Market access
and market price were considered important, with some high value species that can be marketed whenever they
want, even in small quantity.
TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF CRITERIA SLECTION FOR THE VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS IN THE DIFFERENT CLUSTERS
Criteria Pauktaw Myebon Kyaukphyu

Concerns a high number of Households 1.48 0.69 1.2
Availability all year 0.81 - 1.6
Low entry cost 2.15 2.65 1
High and constant market demand 0.48 - 1.2
Potential for processing 0 0.46 0
Low requirement for equipment and technique 0.72 -
(available at the village)
Market access to capture better share of the profit - 1.85 1.2
Access to fishing grounds - 0.44
*values in bold are designated criteria for commodity selection
Potential for processing was selected only in Myebon, where dried shrimp has an important value in terms of
income and is contingent upon improvement of process for higher quality product.
Commodity selection and gender preferences
The list of the main commodities selected by the different clusters contains similarities, with mud crabs, shrimp
and dried shrimp as common products found in all the clusters. Other products, like seabass or mullet (Table 7) are
more specific. Detailed results of the selection are found in the case studies.
In Pauktaw, mullet, a low value fish, and mud crab were the most important commodities, thus received the
highest priority corresponding to 26% and 23% of the votes respectively as the participants first choice. Mud Crab
was identified as the commodity with which the largest number of households is involved. Mullet was considered
a commodity with low technical requirement and available material, and caught with push nets, fence nets or
drift nets.
In Myebon, the community selected 3 different commodities and products: both dried and chilled shrimp received
high scores while mud crab was assigned an average score. Women selected dried shrimp and mud crab. Dried
35
shrimp has potential for improved market access and requires low investment, while its potential for
upgrading of the processing scored high compared to other commodities. Mud crab is characterized by its low
investment required and potential for better market access. Men selected dried shrimp for similar reasons as
women and chilled shrimp because they are primary involved in stow net fishing, the main fishing device for chilled
shrimp.
TABLE 7: SELECTION OF THE MAIN COMMODITIES IN THE 3 CLUSTERS (BY RANK)

Shrimp dried 3 1 3
Shrimp chilled 4 2 1
Crabs 2 3 2
Mullets 1 - -
Seabass 5 4 4
Shrimp paste 6 7 -
Hilsa - 5 -
Anchovies - 6 -
Mantis shrimp - 8 -
In Kyaukphyu, both men and women selected chilled shrimp (P. monodon) as their most important commodity.
The womens group found chilled shrimp of equal importance to dried shrimp and mud crab for the criteria
benefit to all and ranked it the lowest in terms of investment cost. Women think that dried shrimps volume
and availability are high while the cost of entry for dried shrimp and mud crab is lower and is accessible to more
households compared to chilled shrimp. Women ranked the marketability of the shrimp higher than that of the
crab, explaining that the demand for shrimp, chilled and dried is high all year long, while the crab market fluctuates
more. Men operating stow nets focused their selection on chilled shrimp.
FIGURE 14: COMMUNITIES SELECTING COMMODIITES AND PRODUCTS
36
Results show that the community selected commodities and products that are:
Available all year and accessible to all, with low investment;

Both raw material and processed product were selected, showing distinct preferences across gender lines.
Men are involved in fishing large-sized shrimp (P. monodon) and women in processing small-sized shrimp
into dried shrimp;
All products, but mullets in Pauktaw, are high value products for either Yangons market or the export
market
In the following section we present key findings from the analysis of these value chains. We present a value chain
analysis for each of the commodities and products and highlight differences across the study sites. For each value
chain, we present potential interventions and difficulties for future collective marketing or intervention to improve
marketing for communities.
37
V.3. DRIED SHRIMP VALUE CHAIN
Communities in Myebon and Kyaukphyu selected dried shrimp as one key product for their livelihood. In the
following section we share the results for both clusters.
5.3.1. VALUE CHAIN AND STAKEHOLDERS

The value chain for dried shrimp includes several stakeholders, from the households fishing and processing the
shrimp, to various types of collectors (village and mobile), traders at the village level or at collecting centers and
large traders at the township level. An example of the value chain structure in the Kyaukphyu cluster is presented
in Figure 15.
20%
20%
Fishermen &
Processor
60%
Cash advance
FIGURE 15: DRIED SHRIMP VALUE CHAIN IN THE KYAUKPHYU CLUSTER
Village collectors trade smaller volumes than traders and are linked to traders via cash advances. A group of
collectors will usually enter a contract with a single trader. Township or village traders do not receive cash
advances and trade directly with larger markets, at the township level or with Yangon.
Within the 4 villages in the Kyaukphyu cluster, only 1 village has a collector (Table 8). Other villages trade through
this village collector or directly with the main collecting point in Sane, and few in Laung Khaa Taung, a village
located in Ann Township, further away than Sane. About 20% of the production is traded with mobile collectors
contractually bound to Kyaukphyu traders. From the collection points, the production is sent either to Minbu or
38
Tandwe before reaching Yangon or goes back to larger traders in Kyaukphyu before Yangon and its wholesale
market. Large traders also target Tut Taung market. This market supplies other regions in the country like
Mandalay, Muse and Chan State with a more attractive price, higher than in the Yangons Market.
The dried Shrimp value chain in the Myebon cluster differs in several points with i) a major village trader located in
one of the villages (Aung Mingalar), trading directly with Kyaukphyu and Yangon and capturing 65% of the
production; ii) proximity to Myebon Township and larger traders. In this cluster, mobile collectors also operate and
capture about 30% of the production. The products final destination is similar (Yangon) but depending on price
and volume traded, mobile and local village traders and Myebon traders can market their product through Minbya.
In both cases, inputs such as charcoal, nets and other fishing equipment are purchased from the main markets.
Traders can provide nets in the event they entered a contract with the processor and receive cash advances. Only
mobile collectors do not provide cash advances.
TABLE 8: CHARACTERISITCS OF THE DRIED SHRIMP VALUE CHAIN
Kyaukphyu Cluster Myebon Cluster

Number of village collectors 1 > 15 in Taung Gyi In and Aung
Mingalar
Number of village traders 0 5 in total:Aung Mingalar (3) and
Taung Gyi (2)
Distance to the main trade point (hours) Sane : 1.3 Village (village trader/ Mobile
Village: Mobile collectors collectons)
Laung Khaa Taung >3 h Myebon: 1 (Zin Yaw Maw)
Access to public transport Partial (Ah Len Chein) Partial (Taung Gyi In village)
Volume produce (viss per year) 6,000 viss Ah Len Chan 50% 3,420 (Aung mingalar> 50%)
The Kyaukhpyu cluster trades directly with larger traders in collecting points while village collectors and traders
operate in villages in the Myebon cluster. Only one village (Zin Yaw Maw) in Myebon is located closer to the
township center where it trades the production directly. Trade points are determined more by the relationship
between producers and traders than the distance to the market.
For traders, the volume traded determines the market. In the case of Aung Mingalar village, the village trader
targets Myebon in case of under-supply (less than 100 viss) and Kyaukphyu if more than 100 viss. He sells
production directly to Yangon during the peak season when there is over-supply (>200 viss).
5.3.2. CATCH, VOLUME AND PROCESSING
About 100 households in the Kyaukphyu cluster and more than 120 households in the Myebon cluster catch small-
sized shrimps mainly with stow nets. Dried shrimps are Penaeus sp., Metapenaeus sp. and several other mixed
species.
The catch is seasonal, with peaks from May to August, corresponding to 60% of the annual catch. The volume of
the catch is estimated at about 30 viss per tide per household in the peak season and 10 viss per tide per
household in the low season. In average each household catches between 300 and 600 viss per year before
processing in Kyaukphyu. In all the clustesrs the catch dropped in the last years, with an estimated decrease in
volume of about 30% since 2010 and Cyclone Giri.
39
The ratio after processing is 4 to 6 viss of raw product to produce 1 viss of dried shrimp. Men are responsible for
the catch while women are in charge of sorting and processing (Box 1, Figure 16).
Box 1: Processing Dried Shrimp
After sorting, the shrimps are boiled, using firewood and salt. Colorant can be added to the process to improve the color and
fake higher quality. After boiling, shrimps are sun-dried for 2 days in the dried season or smoked using charcoal or firewood
during the rainy season.
For the next step shrimp are smashed to separate the shell from the meat and eyes are removed. Three final products are sold
separately: the dried shrimp, the eyes, and the shell. Ratio is 4:1 in Myebon and higher in Kyaukphyu (estimated to 6:1), with, in
the case of Myebon, 4 viss of raw material needed to produce 1 viss of dried shrimp, 0.1 viss of eyes, and 0.25 viss of shell. In
Kyaukphyu only shell and dried shrimp are sold while eyes are not sold but consumed locally. Shell is used to produce animal
feed and in the preparation of fish paste.
FIGURE 16: PROCESSING DRIED SHRIMP: SORTING, DRYING, REMOVING SHELL AND THE FINAL PRODUCT (LEFT TO RIGHT)
5.3.3. QUALITY, GRADE AND PRICES

The processing methodology determines the products quality and influences the selling price. Quality standards at
the village level include 4 criteria: i) the hardness of the dried shrimp (percentage of water), ii) the presence of
23
salt iii) the color and iv) the size (Figure 17).
The shrimps hardness depends on the drying process: the faster the drying is executed, the harder shrimp can be
produced. The color depends mostly on the use of charcoal or firewood. Firewood produces dark colored shrimp;
while charcoal confers more of a pink or red color. The difference in quality causes the price to vary by about 2,000
to 3,000 Mk per viss (15 to 30% of the price) when sold to a trader in the township. Therefore quality is an
important factor to take into account. Village collectors do not apply such discrimination. Quality becomes a bigger
issue mostly in the rainy season, when smoking the shrimp is required, the drying process is more difficult and salt
is used during the boiling process. To increase weight, processors can spray salted water on the product before
transport.
At the village level size is classified as big or small, corresponding to 2 size sieves, one per size. The price difference
between big and small is about 3,000 Mk per viss, big size being a more valuable product. However this grading
system was observed only in the Kyaukphyu cluster while Myebons producers do not have access to such price
difference as long as the product is marketed to mobile collectors or village traders. In both clusters, traders pay
23
Salt increases water retention in the flesh and thus increases weight and reduces the hardness of the product
40
higher prices for non-salted shrimp. The difference in price across selling points, seasons and sizes is found in Table
9.
FIGURE 17: DIFFERENT SIZES OF DRIED SHRIMP AND FINAL PACKAGED PRODUCT FOR RETAILING
Examples of grade and pricing in the Kyaukphyu cluster are found in Table 9. It shows the market price, before
deduction of 1,000 to 2,000 Mk per viss in case the producer received a loan from the trader.
TABLE 9: PRICE (MK PER VISS) AND GRADE IN DIFFERENT SELLING POINTS AND SEASONS (PEAK SEASON/LOW SEASON) BEFORE LOAN
INTEREST
Grade Gant Gar West Sane Laung Khaa Mobile Kyaukphyu Kyaukphyu
Taung collectors Grade Price
Big (Mk/viss) 12,000/15,000 12,000/15,000 15,000/20,000 13,000/17,000 Medium 18,000/20,000
Small 10,000/13,000 7,000/12,000 10,000/15,000 8,000/14,000 Small 10,000/15,000
(Mk/viss)
Lower Minus 2,000 to 3,000 per viss Super small 6,000
Quality
The grades and market prices for large traders in Kyaukphyu Township are different than at the village level. Size
and presence of salt do matter for the quality of the shrimp. Prices in Kyaukphyu Town are more attractive for
fisherfolk than the local collector. Mobile collectors can compete with the Kyaukphyu price if taking into account
the transport cost to Kyaukphyu. Similar price difference is found in the Myebon cluster, but processors do not
have access to size grades at the village level.
5.3.4. BARGAINING POWER, CONTRACT AND LOANS

As mentioned earlier, most of the producers have contracts with village collectors or traders. Even if the processor
can transform the raw material to allow for a longer storage period, his/her bargaining power is usually very low.
More than 90% of the processor receive cash advances to cover household daily needs during the lean period
(winter) or to maintain or replace their fishing equipment.
The loan provided by the traders include a fixed buying price 1,000 Mk/viss lower in the peak season and up to
2,000 Mk/ viss lower in the low season, corresponding sometime to 20% of the market price. In addition, the
weight scale is generally not in favor of the producer with a difference between 10 to 20%, per viss corresponding
41
to 110 to 120 tical for the trader instead of 100 tical. In addition to this high interest rate (Box 2), producers still
have to reimburse the loan in cash, with a small amount repaid at every transaction
Loans range from 400,000 to 500,000 Mk, with sometimes debts of up to 1.5 million in case of replacement of
stow net. With the increment of the loaned amount, the interest rate with fixed price increases, limiting the
capacity of the processor to re-pay the loan and get out of debt. Within this type of contractual relation, access to
market prices or product storing capacity for 10 to 15 days to wait for higher price do not make any difference.
Collectors and traders fix the price.
Box 2: Example of cash advance and interest rate
For a fisherman processing 80 viss of dried shrimp per year, with an average selling price of 10,000 Mk per viss and
a price reduction of 1,500 Mk per viss, the interest amount is 120,000 Mk per year. In addition to that, if 20% of the
weight is not accounted for by the buyer, the loss represents about 160,000 Mk. Interest rates are important and
represent more than what the processor can re-pay during a peak season.
However, there is a certain degree of flexibility in the contract and fisherfolk acknowledge selling about 20 % of
their production to mobile traders at a better market price and without price penalty due to the interest rate. This
option is easier in the case of the Kyaukphyu cluster where several villages do not have established collectors to
monitor the local trade. In the case of Aung Mingalar, one village in the Myebon cluster, the largest village trader
holding contracts with 56 households is also the village authority. This concentration of economic and legal power
further limits the possibility for producers to trade their production outside of their contractual relationship with
the main village trader.
Interestingly, producers and traders have long-term relationships, in some cases lasting for more than 10 years and
with the trader supporting the households in case of income shock. Even in the event of the relationships being
detrimental to the producers, these represent the only option fishermen have to access credit in the absence of
formal micro-credit or banking institutions in rural areas.
Collectors also receive cash advances from larger traders. A trader in Kyaukphyu works with about 20 local
collectors, providing cash advances or providing investment capital of 0.1 to 1 million, to collectors. The loans run
for several years. Contracts with collectors are different than with fishermen/producers. Loans are considered
initial capital investment for the collector to start his activity. The trader typically purchases the product un-sorted,
with a price difference of 500 Mk to 1,000 Mk lower than the market price in Yangon. The collector is not required
to reimburse the loan if he provides sufficient volume.
5.3.5. VALUE ADDED AND ECONOMIC RESULTS
To quantify the share of profit margin and added value to the product between the different stakeholders in the
township value chain, we envisioned several scenarios using the case of the Kyaukphyu cluster (Table 10). We
estimated the cost and return for a viss of dried shrimp produced in Ah Len Chein village during the peak season.
42
We estimated the gross return and profit under 3 scenarios: i) processor who borrowed from the trader, ii)
24
processor without loans; iii) and trade group of processors selling directly to Kyaukphyu .
We made the following assumption: production cost for raw material is 800 Mk per viss and the production ratio is
6 viss of raw material for 1 viss of dried shrimp. We assume that 1 viss of dried shrimp includes 70% small size and
30% bigger size shrimps, sold at 12,000 and 15,000 Mk per viss respectively, without price reduction in case of a
loan. In the event of the producer receiving a cash advance the selling price is reduced by 2,000 Mk per viss. Cost
of production includes firewood, salt and charcoal in addition to processing equipment. No additional labor is hired
for sorting or processing. The transport cost is calculated based on 10 viss using public transport to Sane or own
private transport in the case of marketing to Kyaukphyu.
TABLE 10: COST AND RETURN OF DRIED SHRIMP PROCESING DURING THE PEAK SEASON FOR 1 VISS OF FINAL PRODCUT SOLD IN SANE AND
KYAUKPHYU
Processor loan Processor no Fishermen Trading directly

loan at the Township
no loan
Buying price 4,800 4,800 4,800
Trade cost
Salt 20 20 20
Firewood 500 500 500
Charcoal 416 416 416
Equipment 187 187 187
Labor 0 0 50
Transport 300 300 800
Total cost 1,424 1,424 1,986
Selling price peak 10,900 12,900 15,000

season
Weight 0.8 0
Gross revenue 3,920 5,520 7,200
Profit margin 2,495 4,095 5,213
% profit margin +64% +108%
increment
The results show that the contractual relationship between the trader and the processor significantly reduces the
processors profit by a 64% margin in the event the processor took out a loan.
Collective marketing by small groups of traders to reach sufficient volume to transport and access a higher price in
large markets like Kyaukphyu is an economically interesting option with an increase of the profit margin. However,
other collective marketing options such as relying on mobile traders at the Tut Taung market in Ann Township
might be a better option with lower or no transport costs (mobile collectors) and a higher selling price.
24
In this last scenario the transport cost is higher, 800 Mk per viss if it includes at least 40 viss. We include the cost of entry
with the requirement of a boat capable of transporting the product to Kyaukphyu. The use of public transport is also an option,
reducing the cost of entry and the nature of the product (dried shrimp) allows for such type of transport.
43
In the case of the Myebon cluster, similar estimations show an increase of the profit margin of more than 50%
when producers are not bound to traders by loans. Within this section of the value chain, the raw product is valued
starting at 4,000 to about 8,000 -10,000 Mk per viss after processing. After transport to the township, this value
increases to between 12,900 Mk to 15,000 Mk per viss. The share of the profit margin along the value chain is
about 64% for the producer without loan and only 36% in the case of fixed price dictated by the village trader. The
contractual relationship between the village trader and the processor almost annihilates the value added by
transforming a low value product into a higher value one.
In the case of the Myebon cluster, distance to the township is not important as producers have the option of
trading their product directly with larger traders there. Trading directly with Myebon is profitable, with low
transport costs, no losses and higher price. However, the cost of entry is high, with equipment and transport
estimated between 0.5 and 1 million Mk for boat, and engine and equipment storage being an additional barrier to
developing collective marketing whenever not already owning a motorized boat. However, we estimated that the
profit margin will increase to 6,103 Mk per viss if the producer is debt-free, sells his product locally at 7,913 Mk per
viss (+31%), trades directly in Myebon and benefits from higher prices and a different grading system.
Collective marketing targeting larger traders in townships or major trade centers is profitable and has limited
transport cost. The cost of entry might be a barrier for certain communities without engine boats and limited
transport capacity. However, other social barriers to improve marketing access are currently limiting the benefits
harvested by producers who are bound to moneylenders.
5.3.6. POTENTIAL INTERVENTIONS

Criteria for accessing potential for collective marketing of dried shrimp are listed below:
No influential village trader linked with local authorities

Reasonable distance from, and accessibility to, main collection point or major trade market with higher
price and grading system at least 2,000 Mk per viss higher than village market price;
Minimum volume produced: 40 / 50 viss per group and per tide by producer to significantly reduce
transport cost;
Presence of, and access to, mobile traders;
Use of standard weight practice;
Social capital of the community;
Willingness to improve product quality through improved processing techniques and to potentially enter
an agreement with traders for premium quality price;
For the village, we estimated each of the above criteria, based on qualitative scale following community
consultations (Table 11).
As a pre-requisite, to develop collective marketing, producers should be free from debt with collectors and traders.
The first criterion is a major constraint since in all the villages visited producers were highly indebted and bound to
longtime contractual obligations with traders. Freeing producers from debt and out of the routine patron-client
relationship will require external support and access to other sources of credit.
Collective marketing should include village clusters. First, villagers were reluctant to market collectively within
groups that include several villages and preferred to develop village-based groups, due to trust issues. Second,
some selected villages (like Zin Yaw Maw) within the same cluster are 1 hour or more away by boat from the
nearest trading center and could not logistically merge into a cluster.
44
Trust issues arise whenever one individual markets the product away from the village on behalf of a group of
producers. The selling price in trade centers is not usually guaranteed and depends on the quality estimated by the
buyers and the market demand. The selling price is typically finalized just before the transaction.
Trusting relationships with traders and guaranteed price might possibly be developed once the product
quality is homogeneous, according to traders in Myebon (Daw Than Shwe; Daw Thein Thein Hla) and
Kyaukphyu (U Ba Win).
Collective marketing groups at the village level can act as a village trader and purchase at a higher market
price than local traders thus limiting trust issues. The group can later transport and market the product in
larger markets. In this case the group takes on the risks associated with transport and price fluctuation.
Social capital and capacity for collective action should be assessed before collective marketing. Ah Lein Chein
25
village provided an example of collective action with the development of a community pond while the cluster of
villages in Kyaukphyu successfully developed a fishing lot system to finance the communitys funds. This type of
collective action can be an indicator for initiating collective marketing.
Presence of existing trader(s) in the village might constrain the development of a marketing group, especially if
the trader is linked to the local authority like in Aung Mingalar. In this case, any project activity should ensure the
existing trader participates in, and supports, the collective marketing groups.
Transport and access to larger markets and the presence of mobile collectors are important factors. Even without
transport, the presence of mobile collectors during the peak season can significantly maximize benefits. In
addition, major traders in townships are willing to cover the transport cost in case of large volume to trade (up to
200 viss per shipment), which can be achievable in a village during the peak period.
Potential for quality improvement of dried shrimp, resulting in an increase of the selling price, is realistic. Benefits
due to higher quality can be achieved with the introduction of new techniques driven by the main traders
knowledge of the market requirement in Yangon. U Ba Win, a large trader located in Kyaukphyu, already offered to
train processors to improve the quality of dried shrimp. Upgrading methodology will be effective only if processors
can gain economic benefits. Thus an in depth market assessment of quality and price of dried shrimp and of the
possibility of agreements with traders to secure premium prices needs to be carried out before the introduction
and scaling out of new techniques.
Introduction of Improved stove and/or sun drier design for drying the shrimp. Improving stoves will reduce the
cost of charcoal and reduce the risk of charcoal shortage that lowers the shrimps quality. This type of improved
processing will also reduce the consumption of charcoal and firewood at the village level with a non-negligible
impact on natural resources.
25
Boutry M.;Tin Myo Win, Saw Eh Htoo. 2013. Survey of the Political Sociologies and Resource Access Patterns to Identify Pilot
Villages in Giri-affected Rakhine
45
TABLE 11: SUMMARY TABLE FOR POTENTIAL OF COLLECTIVE MARKETING OF DRIED SHRIMP IN MYEBON AND KYAUKPHYU CLUSTERS VILLAGES
Myebon Cluster Kyaukphyu Clustet

Aung Mingalar TaungGyi yin Zin Yaw Maw Ah Lan Chein Min Chawng Gant Gar Gant Gar Ywarma
(West)
Absence of debts Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
Village trader Very Low Low High High High High Low
Distance and Medium High Very High Taunt Tut Taung
accessibility to
market Kyaukphyu
Minimum volume High Medium Low High Medium Medium Very Low
produced
Presence and High High Low High High High Very Low
access to mobile
traders
Social capital m.d m.d m.d High m.d m.d m.d
46
V.4. MUD CRAB VALUE CHAIN
Mud crab (Scylla sp.) was selected in all of the three clusters as an important commodity for fisherfolk
communities. Mud crab is a high value product for the export market requiring low skills and low investment with
not even a boat required to fish crabs from the shore. Mud crab fishery was found to be the most common type of
fishing across all the villages, with 154 (17%), 118 (28%) and 510 (53%) households involved in crab fisheries in
Pauktaw, Mybon and Kyaukphyu clusters respectively.
In the following section we present a crab value chain analysis based on the Pauktaw cluster case study, and we
highlight the main differences and similarities with the Myebon and Kyaukphyu cases.
5.4.1 VALUE CHAIN AND STAKEHOLDERS

The mud crab value chain includes fishermen, village collectors and traders, mobile collectors and traders in
townships or collection centers (Figure 18). The destination of the catch is Muse at the Chinese border, via
Mandalay. The main traders in the Pauktaw cluster are found in Sittwe. For Myebon, Laung Dayeik and Kyi Gaung
Taung villages are the main collection centers connected to the market via the Sittwe Yangon road. In the
Kyaukphyu cluster, Tut Taung in Ann Township is the main market for mud crabs in the study area (Table 12).
Village Transporters
Collector
5% - Winter Thazekone
2% - Peak Village
Trader Collection
70-90%
Ah Lel Kyun
70% - Winter Center
(2)
82% - Peak Sittwe Agent
Fisherfolk 9-10 traders Muse

25% - Winter
16% - Peak
Traders
Pauktaw
Mobile
10-30% (4)
Collectors
Minbya,
Pauktaw
Cash advance
FIGURE 18: MUD CRAB VALUE CHAIN IN PAUKTAW TOWNSHIP
Two village traders in Ah Lel Kyun harvest most of the catch in the village. These traders hold a contractual
relationship with collectors based in surrounding villages, thus increasing the traders catch area. Village traders
can provide about 4 to 6 tons of product per month to larger traders in Pauktaw or Sittwe.
47
Between 10 to 30% of the catch is sold to mobile collectors directly at the fishing grounds. These types of
collectors are common in all the study sites and their presence is inherent to the fishing schedule and the biology
of the crab. Fishermen sometime stay more than 7 days (1 tide period) at the fishing ground while crabs can
survive a maximum of 3 days, stored on the boat. Therefore, fishermen need to market their catch during their
fishing trip to mobile collectors with contracts with larger traders in Pauktaw or Minbya.
Some fishermen sell their catch directly to one of the 4 main traders in Pauktaw Township. The largest collection
center is found in Sittwe, with 6 large collectors trading with China and Yangon and several intermediaries at the
landing site in the Sittwe port. The intermediaries are considered mostly transporters but none of the fishermen
from the study area markets his catch there.
In the Myebon cluster, no large village trader was found but several village collectors present have contracts with
larger traders located at the collection center. Myebon Township was not found to be a large trading center for
crab with only one trader, acting as an agent for a trader located in Muse. The Kyaukphyu cluster presents
similarities with Pauktaw, with one trader located in one of the selected villages, collecting crabs from other
villages via collectors and selling them at Tut Taung, the market in the area.
TABLE 12: CHARACTERISITCS OF MUD CRAB VALUE CHAIN
Pauktaw Cluster Myebon Cluster Kyaukphyu Cluster

Number of village collectors 2 8 2
Number of village traders 2 0 2
Distance to the main trade 2-3h 1h Myebon 1h-2h Tut Taung
point (hours) 1-2h - Laung Dayeik and Kyi 5h Taung Goat
Gaung Taung
Access to public transport Yes Partial/not direct Partial/not direct
5.4.2 CRAB CATCH AND SEASONALITY

Crab fishery is seasonal, with a peak catch from April to August. The clusters differ slightly (Figure 19). More than
half of the catch is concentrated during 4 months. During peak catch prices are usually lower. A specificity of this
market is the high price driven by high demand during the Chinese New Year in January and February. Fishermen
are aware of this seasonal market fluctuation and specifically target markets such as Tung goat market in Gant Gar
village where 4 of them collectively trade their catch to access better prices during this season.
Crab can be fished with or without boats. Most fishermen use 30 to 100 traps and the fishing ground can be
located 1 to 3 hours from the village, in mangrove and brackish water environments. Fishing trips can be as long as
7 days. Women sometimes participate, but this is not common and their involvement in the value chain is
restricted to sorting crabs and tightening crab claws.
As for shrimp, crab catch depends on the tide, with peak periods twice a month and with about 14 days of fishing
per month. Catch per household varies based on fishing capacity and the devices used, with mostly crab traps but
also stow nets. For the later devices, crab is considered a by-catch and not the primary targeted species.
48
FIGURE 19: SEASONALITY OF CRAB CATCH IN MYEBON AND KYAUKPHYU CLUSTERS
Examples of fish catch and trade flow along the value chain in Pauktaw are listed in Table 13. Low and peak
seasons present large differences for fishermen. Volumes traded by village collectors are small. Collectors in
Pauktaw trade a limited amount of crabs, while village traders show significant amounts of trade indicating that
the catch within the cluster area is important in volume and value.
TABLE 13: CRAB VALUE CHAIN, PRICES AND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS
Catch & Trade Contractual relationship

Fisherfolk High season 3-50 kg per day (100 traps) Loans to collectors or village collectors in
Low season 2- 15 kg per day (100 traps) exchange of selling the production landed
at the village
Village Collectors 40 kg per week Only small quantity and re- Provide small loans : 5,000 to 10,000 Mk
sold to Village trader In contract with village traders
Mobile collectors 10-30% of the catch when fishing 7-10 days No loans Opportunistic sell/purchase
Village Traders Low season: 1,200-2,000 kg/ week Loans to fishers: 50,000 to 100,000 Mk
Peak season: 2,000 3,500 kg/week Loans to village collectors
Sittwe trader 0.5 to 1.5 tons per day in winter
1 to 3.5 tons per day in peak season
In Myebon, catch volumes per fisherman using stow nets are of the same order, but village collectors, selling to the
agent trade larger amounts, between 40 to 110 kg per day during peak season. In Kyaukphyu (using only traps)
estimation of the catch per fisherman is slightly lower, with lower fishing intensity and average catch below 10 kg
per day in the peak season.
The mortality rate during the storage process varies between 5% to 10% for the fisherfolk and 5% for the traders,
with a peak of 20%-30% in the summer when the temperature is high. Storage duration in each step is about 3 to 4
days maximum. No crab fattening was observed in the study area.
5.4.3. QUALITY, GRADES AND PRICES

The quality standards include color, which needs to be green-brown; other colors are rejected. Gravid females
have a higher price in the Chinese market but not necessarily when sold to a local trader. In case females are not
gravid the seller does not access the special price, even in Pauktaw. If more than one claw or leg is broken the price
is reduced. All crabs must be sold alive.
49
Although mud crabs are sold by the piece in some cases (village collectors in Kyaukphyu cluster), kilogram is the
most common unit. Mud crabs are for the export market. Regulation stipulates that only crab above 100 g can be
exported, therefore the unique grade used at the village is the 100 g threshold, sometime lowered to 90 g. Similar
grading is followed by the village trader in Gant Gar (Kyukphyu cluster) who differentiates between 2 sizes, above
and below 100g, with a decrease in the purchasing price of 30 to 25% for the lower grade. Only in Zin Yaw Maw, a
village in the Myebon cluster, the collector applies different pricing based on weight with a 100g base weight
paying up to two and three times the base price for crab whose weight is more than 200 and 300 g respectively.
Grading and pricing change when accessing major collection points like Sittwe or Tut Taung market in Ann
Township (Table 14, Figure 20). For the Chinese market the number of grades is more detailed with 6 classes for
male and non-gravid females and 4 classes for gravid females, thus allowing for a higher profit for the trader after
re-sorting the crabs.
TABLE 14: CRAB GRADES AND PRICES AT THE VILLAGE, PAUKTAW MARKET AND SITTWE
Grade in Village & Pauktaw Grade in Sittwe

Size per crab Mk/kg in Jan 2014 Price range Size per crab Mk/kg in Jan Price range
(gram) (Mk/Kg) (gram) 2014 (Mk/Kg)
>90 g 2,200 1,500 3,200 >230 6,000 4,000 5,000
<90 1,000 700 1,400 >150 5,000 3,000 4,000
>100 2,500-2,800 1,500 - 3,500
70-100 1,300 1,500 800 1,400
Gravid female 5,500-6,000 -
>150
Gravid female 2,200 -
<150
The most common class is the 100 gram crab. During the Chinese New year period traders in Pauktaw purchase at
a flat rate of 25,000 Mk for 11 kg, equivalent to 2,272 Mk/kg for crab of 100 grams and more. While in Sittwe the
price is slightly higher with 2,500 Mk/ kg for the same grade according to a large trader.
In the Myebon cluster, access to the trader in the township does not allow for a better grading system. The trader
purchases the catch in bulk, with a single grade (100 g). In this cluster the average price varies between 400 and
900 Mk per kg in the peak season and 900 to 1,800 Mk per kg in the low season, when sold to village collectors. In
Kyaukphyu, prices at the village are of the similar range, from 800 Mk per kg to 1,700 Mk/kg during the low
season.
In Sittwe and other main collection centers there is a more complex weight-based grading system with an
additional scale for gravid females. This can further increase the value of the catch. Unfortunately fisherman in all
of the clusters visited cannot access this grading system, nor the resulting profit potential.
50
Fishermen do not have access to price information in the village, whereas traders can and do store their product
for a day or two to wait for higher prices. However, storage duration is short and mortality rate is high especially in
the summer.
As mentioned in Table 13, fishermen, collectors and traders have a contractual relationship. Cash advances to
fishermen are less common than in the shrimp fishery, especially in Myebon and Kyaukphyu. In Pauktaw cash
advances are possible for fishermen from the same village as the trader. In other villages the cash advance is of a
lower amount when provided by village collectors.
FIGURE 20: WOMEN & TRADER IN SITTWE SORTING CRAB BEFORE EXPORT TO CHINA, CRAB CAGES TO STORE CRABS BEFORE TRADING IN
PAUKTAW
The loans provided by the village trader range from 50,000 to 100,000 Kyats. These loans are paid back either in
kind (crabs) or cash after selling the crabs. There is no interest rate. Fisherfolk have to sell their catch to the traders
but some scale differences were reported. Sometimes moneylenders deduct the size of the crab purchased. In this
case fishermen sell to mobile traders while at the fishing ground, but at a lower price (usually 200 Mk per kg lower
than market price). The fishermens bargaining power is low when they are under pressure to sell their product
before the mortality rate becomes too high.
In the Myebon cluster, there is no substantial price variation, with or without loans, but the moneylender has
exclusivity over the catch. Not all the fishermen have access to loans while the cash advances in Taung Gyi Yin
village are smaller (10,000 to 20,000 Mk as well as traps). A similar situation was observed in the Kyaukphyu
cluster with limited cash advances and no price differences.
At the next level, village collectors receive cash advances from traders. For example, the trader in Myebon works
with 10 villages, with one or two collectors in each village and provides loans of 100,000 to 500,000 Mk. The trader
does not differentiate the price regardless of cash advance. The Myebon trader also receives regular cash advances
from traders in Muse to purchase the product. This trader is tight to a specific trader while traders in Pauktaw or
Sittwe are not contractually bound and can choose their buyer in Muse.
Having borrowed smaller amounts, fishermen are less bound to traders than in the dried shrimp value chain. In
addition there is no price differentiation and a lower percentage of fishermen have contracts with the village
collector or trader in each cluster.
51
To estimate economic results and the potential benefit of trading directly with a large trader, we relied on the
example of the Pauktaw cluster, with fishermen contracting a large trader in Sittwe directly. This approach allows
for a higher selling price and for sorting the product into 6 grades instead of 2.
Within the current value chain, the value added for a crab of 100g is 200to 600 Mk per kg between the village and
Sittwe, with for example 1 kilogram (> 90 grams) sold at the village for 2,200 MK per kg and later sold in Sittwe for
up to 2,500-2,800 Mk per kg. If we use a 9:1 ratio, with 90% of the crab sold as 100 g class at 2,800 Mk/kg and 10%
of the crab sold at 150 g class (5,000 Mk per kg) the final average price in Sittwe is of 3,020 Mk/kg, increasing the
value added between the village and Sittwe, to about 800 Mk per kg.
For this calculation we estimated that the fishermen catch in average about 45 kg of crab every 10 days or an
average of 500 kg per year. The cost for fishermen is high compared to the village trader. They need to factor in
transport,high investment costs for equipment and depreciation, with traps needing to be replaced every 6
months and boats every 3 years. This high investment cost explains the need for cash advance.
Traders minimize their investment in equipment by hiring transporters. Their total transaction cost is limited in the
case of crab with no ice and limited spoilage to 4 to 5% of the volume traded. Traders capture 20% of the profit
margin in this section of the value chain. However, this calculation does not take into account the re-sorting
process between the village and Sittwe, nor the loan re-payment (Table 15).
TABLE 15: TRANSACTION COST AND PROFIT FOR CRAB FISHERMEN AND VILLAGE TRADERS FOR 1 KG OF 100 GRAM SIZE CRAB IN MK PER KG
Fisherfolk (Mk/kg) Village trader Fisherfolk collective

(Mk/kg) marketing to Sittwe
Buying price or production cost 0 2,200 0
Selling price 2200 3,020 3,020
Gross revenue 2200 820 3,020
Trade cost 715 452 1,288
Transportation 330 44 * 44
Labor 0 40 40
Spoilage 4% 88 Mk/kg 4% - 88 Mk/kg 8%
Depreciation Equipment 99 28 192
Regulatory Fee 0 Negligible per kg Negligible per kg
Profit margin 1,485 368 1,731

% share of profit 80 20 100
Increase profit margin 16%
*The transportation cost for the trader includes the price for public transportation, the cost of unloading and selling the product.
In a scenario where fisherfolk market their crab directly to a trader in Sittwe, with an average price of 2,800 for
a100 g crab (90% of the volume) and 5,000 Mk per kg for crab above 180 g (10% of the crabs), the profit margin,
including the trade cost to Sittwe, is estimated at 1,731 per kg. The gross margin could increase by about 16%
compared to the current situation. In this estimation, transport and equipment costs, are similar to those incurred
by the trader.
52
Access to other markets, like Pauktaw or Sittwe can be favorable to fishermen only if they trade a larger volume. A
trader in Sittwe estimates that a minimum 50-60 Kg in one trip is necessary hence making a significant difference
when trading 150 kg. In our calculations we do not account for an increase of the volume, which would reduce the
trading cost for equipment and transport cost per weight unit.
Collective marketing can be beneficial for fishermen by providing access to better pricing and grading systems in all
the clusters. Some initiatives with crab collective marketing were already observed in Gant Gar village in
Kyaukphyu Township where 4 fishermen shared transport costs to reach a larger market and access better prices
by selling directly to a trader.

To develop collective marketing of mud crabs, the following variables need to be assessed:
High volume of catch during the peak season, capable or collecting at least 50 kg every 2 days and if
possible 150 kg;
Short distance to the fishing ground limiting marketing to mobile collector;
Low debt level for the fishermen;
Access to public transport to reach trading markets and limit transport costs
Access to large traders providing at least 6 different grades for the product;
Absence of a large mud crab trader in the village.
Collective marketing of mud crab needs to tackle the following constrains of the mud crab value chain:
Low bargaining power due to high mortality of the product, short storage capacity and catch sold directly
at the fishing ground;
Lower benefits due to unfavorable grading system at the village and higher levels, no access to Chinese
markets grading system;
Collective marketing therefore requires access to larger traders benefiting from the new trade regulation with
China and its auction market in Muse.
In all of the cases, minimum volume required and different landing schedule might hamper group development
and trust building within the group. With different landing schedules and a limited storage period, fishermen could
be reluctant to wait for fear of high mortality. Therefore, collection needs to be large enough within a day to ship
50-60 kg of product every day during the peak period. This threshold should be achievable if 20 fishermen join
each group with at least 3 kg catch every day during the peak period. In case of limited catch or of fishing ground
located far away, like in Myebon, mobile collection might be required to collect sufficient amounts of crab and
limit the amount sold to mobile collectors directly at the fishing ground. This adds an additional cost, but it could
be more economically appealing than selling to mobile collectors as long as the volume is important enough.
With a highly perishable product and price fluctuation, the community mentioned lack of trust during collective
trade as a possible barrier for adoption. Guaranteed prices and mechanisms for good governance and
transparency of accounts need to be developed. Collective action for crab marketing requires rules created by the
group to take in account the risk of mortality during transport, price transparency regarding grades and market
fluctuations. Small groups of neighbors and relatives have a better chance to succeed at the beginning.
53
Not all the clusters have the same potential for collective marketing of mud crab. Table 16 explores the potential
of developing collective marketing by ranking different parameters for each village.
In Ah Len Chein village in the Pauktaw cluster, 2 existing traders with contractual relationships with the fishermen
compete. In addition one of the trader is linked to the local authority. Therefore other villages (GyinDway and
Thazekone) in this cluster might be a better location to start collective marketing. In addition resources in the crab
fishery declined by 40-50% in the last 10 years with recent conflicts further limiting fishing activities by preventing
access to certain fishing grounds.
This cluster presents some advantages for collective marketing, with access to public transport to Sittwe from Ah
Len Chein, access to large traders in Sittwe and availability of market price information. Moreover, it presents the
option to contract traders and get a 24h price guaranteed by the traders. Mr U Ah Chin, a large trader in Sittwe
was already interested in supporting a group of fishermen and purchasing their catch.
In the Myebon cluster, Myebons Market is not attractive for collective marketing. The trader located in Myebon
does not provide interesting pricing and grading systems. Other market places such as Kyi Gaung Taung or Laung
Dayeik need to be investigated to find traders providing appealing prices and willing to guarantee them for 24
hours. Access to public transport is limited and private transport might be required, thus increasing the trade cost.
Compared to the Pauktaw cluster, fewer fishermen are contractually bound to collectors and the level of debt is
lower, facilitating the development of marketing groups
The Kyaukphyu cluster possesses good potential with low debt levels, high number of fishermen involved in the
crab fishery, small scale traders providing a better grading system and who can be the basis for a collective
marketing group and finally an already existing collective initiative for marketing crabs. Developing a collecting
center using the existing trading structure in Gant Gar village could be explored with increasing volume traded and
with direct access to better grading and higher prices.
The possibility of marketing small-sized crab to recently established soft shell crab farms in Kyaukphyu was
explored, but the farms owner, already contractually bound to mobile crab collectors, was not interested in
contracting a fishermens group.
Fattening crab requires skills, access to land and involves a high mortality rate, which makes this activity risky. Also,
fishermen require daily cash for sustenance and the community surveyed did not select fattening as first option.
However, the experience of the local partners and NAG regarding mud crab fattening might be interesting to
consider when developing pilots in selected communities to increase the benefits from the catch.
54
TABLE 16: SUMMARY TABLE FOR POTENTIAL OF CRAB COLLECTIVE MARKETING IN PAUKTAW, MYEBON AND KYAUKPHYU CLUSTERS VILLAGES
Pauktaw Myebon Cluster Kyaukphyu Clustet
Ah LelKyun Gyin Dway Thazekone Aung TaungGyi Zin Yaw Ah Lan Min Gant Gar Gant Gar
Mingalar yin Maw Chein Chawng (West) Ywarma
Absence of Very Low Medium Medium High Low High High High High Low
debts
No Very Low Medium Medium Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
Influential
Village
trader
Distance High Medium Medium High High Very Low High High High High
and
accessibility
to market
Minimum High Low Medium Low Medium Medium High High High High
volume
produced
Presence of High High High High High Very Low High High High High
Trader with
grading
system
Previous Very low Very low Very low Very low Very low Very low Very low Very low Very low Medium
experience
of
collective
marketing
55
V.5. PENAEUS MONODON VALUE CHAIN
Both Myebon and Kyaukphyu clusters selected chilled shrimp (mostly P. monodon) as an important commodity for
26
their livelihood . The following section presents the results of the Myebon cluster and highlights differences and
similarities with the value chain in Kyaukphyu. We specifically focus on capture fisheries while aquaculture
production of P. monodon is not included in this analysis. Aquaculture production represents most of the
P.monodon production in the townships, especially in the Kyaukphyu cluster.
5.5.1. VALUE CHAIN AND S TAKEHOLDERS
The P. monodon value chain structure in the Myebon cluster is presented in Figure 21.
Nets
Ice
Fishermen &
Processor
Cash advance
FIGURE 21: P. MONODON VALUE CHAIN, MYEBON CLUSTER.
26
This commodity also received a high rank in the Pauktaw cluster, but still lower than mud crabs and mullets.
56
Fisherfolk targeting P. monodon use either stow nets or trammel nets (a type of drift net). In Aung Minglalar
village, only stow nets were recorded, while in other villages, both stow and trammel nets are present. In total we
estimated that more than 130 households (30%) in the Myebon cluster and about 165 households (17%) in the
Kyaukphyu cluster are involved in P. monodon fishing.
Catch is sold to village collectors who have contracts with larger traders in Myebon or Minbya (Figure 22). These
collectors provide cash advances to fishermen. A village trader in Aung Mingalar finances loans to stow net
operators and sells the production in Kyaukphyu Township with Yangon as final destination. This village trader is
the same person involved in dried shrimp trading, thus financing stow nets and purchasing both fresh and dried
shrimp from the same fishermen with whom he holds a contract (56 in total in Aung Mingalar village).
The catch varies between villages, with the highest catch recorded in Aung Mingalar, with a maximum of 600 viss
per day during the peak season and only 100 viss in Zin Yaw Maw (Table 17). This catch drops by more than 10
times in the low season.
Village traders can store the volume for 6 to 7 days in an ice box and extend that to up to 15 days, if necessary, to
reach a sufficient volume to transport to the township. Ice is purchased in Myebon directly or delivered by boat.
Ice shortage can happen, especially during the peak season as storms can stop trade between Myebon and the
villages. Traders in villages estimate ice shortages occurring about 3 to 10 times per year and increasing losses of
raw product.
The minimum amount to trade with Myebon Township is about 10 viss per shipment. For the TaungGyi In collector
interviewed, if the amount is larger than 120 viss, the destination of the product is Minbia, where prices are
higher. Transport is by public boat (from Zin Yaw Maw and Taung Gyi In) or private boat to the nearest public boat
access in the case of Aung Mingalar. In the latter case, the trader markets the catch in Kyaukphyu Township. Local
traders estimate spoilage and loss due to storage and quality at 1% to 3%.
TABLE 17: CHARACTERISITCS OF P. MONODON VALUE CHAIN (CAPTURE FISHERIES)
Kyaukphyu Cluster Myebon Cluster

Number of village 9 Ah Len chein 2 Aung Mingalar
collectors/traders 2 in Gant Gar Ywarma 6 in Taung Gyi Yin
1in Gant Gar (West) 1 in Zin Yaw Maw
1 in Min Chawng
Distance to the main trade Kyaukphyu -3 h Kyaukphyu 1 day
point (hours) Minbya :2-3 hours
Myebon: 1 (Zin Yaw Maw)/2 hours Taung Gyi
Yin
Access to public transport Partial (Ah Len Chein) Partial (Aung mingalar village)
TaungGyi In (Yes)
Zin Yaw Maw (Yes)
Volume traded 21 tons per year (4 villages) 100 600 (viss per day/village in peak season)
Four large traders, including the representative of Peace Maker Co. Ltd., a large shrimp processing company,
operate in Myebon. They work with collectors in villages, providing cash advances. The product in Myebon is re-
sorted, iced and packaged for transport by boat and later by truck to Yangon. Since the lifting of international
sanctions and recent ethnic violence, Yangon has become a more attractive destination to sell iced-chilled P.
monodon.
57
According to a township trader, the volume of shrimp traded in Myebon decreased by 40% since 2010 and Cyclone
Giri. This volume includes shrimp sourced from both aquaculture and capture fisheries. Capture fisheries account
for about 20% of the total volume traded in Myebon Township. A similar figure was reported by traders in
Kyaukphyu, confirming a drop in both aquaculture production and capture fisheries for P. monodon in the region.
In Kyaukphyu, the main difference in the value chain is the presence of several large traders at the village level,
either operating independently, or via contractual relationships with traders in Kyaukphyu Township. They trade
10 to 100 times more than village collectors, with for example a volume of 500 to 7,500 viss per tide in Ah Len
Chein. Village traders provide cash advances to the collectors but not necessarily to the fishermen. Large village
traders are found mostly in Ah Len Chein village and fisherfolk from this village can access them with better prices
than the village collectors. The main collection center in the township is Kyaukphyu town, with township traders
able to trade up to 10,500 viss of shrimp per tide in the peak season as in the case of a trader holding a contract
with 10 village collectors.
A processing factory exists in Kyaukphyu. However, even following recent reduction in electricity cost in
Kyaukphyu, the cost of production here is still too high compared with the processing factory in Yangon. .
FIGURE 22: COLLECTORS PURCHASING DALY CATCH IN AUNG MINGALAR (LEFT), TRADERS COLLECTING POINT IN AH LEN CHEIN
(KYAUKPHYU) AND WOMEN SORTING P. MONODON AT THE TRADERS SHOP IN SITTWE (RIGHT)
5.5.2. CATCH, VOLUME AND SEASON

P. monodon fisheries follow the same calendar as dried shrimp with a peak season from May to August and one
correlated with the tides. One tide corresponds to 7 days of catch with 3 to 4 days where the catch is higher. Most
of the catch is related to stow net operation with an estimated 8 to 10 viss of catch per day during nip and spring
tide. The average catch per stow net for the peak season is estimated between 300 and 600 kg in the Myebon
cluster.
Estimations in Kyaukphyu found significantly lower catch, with around 150 viss for stow net and around 60 viss
with trammel nets. Catch per day during nip and spring tide is low, from 0.5 to 2 viss for trammel net and 1 to 2
viss with stow net in the peak season.
Households in Kyaukphyu operated in general 2 stow nets or 3 trammel nets. Trammel nets require a lower
investment, 10,000 Mk per net compared to 700,000 Mk per stow net. Trammel nets are less popular in Myebon.
58
5.5.3. QUALITY, GRADES AND PRICES
There is no processing at the village or township level. After sorting the catch, women remove the head and village
collectors store the product in boxes with ice before transporting them to the collecting center at the township.
In the Myebon cluster, both at the village and township level, 4 grades are applied, but the shrimp are sorted by
size in the village and by weight at the township (Table 18). Re-sorting of the product adds additional profit for the
village collector/trader, with a very low price for both large-sized and small-sized shrimps at the village level
compared to the township.
TABLE 18: SHRIMP GRADE AND PRICE AT THE VILLAGE AND TOWNSHIP LEVELS IN THE MYEBON CLUSTER
Grades- Village Range price (Mk per viss) Grades Township Range price (Mk per viss)
>4 inches 18,000-20,000 <15 piece per 450 g 26,000 27,000
4 inches 9,000 -12,000 <20 piece per 450 g 21,500 -22,000
3- 4 inches 6,000 9,000 <30 piece per 450 g 18,500 19,000
<3 inches 3,000 5,000 >30 piece per 450 g 12,000 13,000
In Kyaukphyu, only 3 grades, based solely on size, exist at both the village and township levels. Grades by weight
are found only at a later stage in Yangon. In addition, prices differ between villages. In Ah Lei Chein, the main
village trader markets his product directly to the largest traders in Kyaukphyu, thus getting high prices, without any
intermediaries. By contrast, in Min Chawng village, one smaller trader operates between the village collector and
the larger trader sending the product to Yangon. This additional step in the value chain structure reduces the
buying price for fisherfolk by about 2,000 Mk per viss for each grade.

In Myebon, the contracts provided by the village traders/collectors are different than in the dried shrimp value
chain. For chilled shrimp, a similar weight system is applied, but the buying price is lower by 500-1,000 Mk per viss,
while the price difference is of 1,000 to 2,0000 Mk per viss for dried shrimp, with a weight difference. This
difference might be explained by the high value of the product and the limited catch per fisherfolk. Collectors and
traders want to harvest the maximum volume and prefer to limit their margin on the product to target larger trade
volume.
Fisherfolk have a very low bargaining power, contractually bound to sell highly perishable products to village
collectors. Even with access to price information they cannot bargain the price. In Aung Mingalar village, a single
village trader combines cash advances to fisherfolk for both products, providing different types of fixed prices and
weighting techniques according to the product.
In the Kyaukphyu cluster, where aquaculture is more dominant, the contractual relationship between fisherfolk
and traders is slightly different. Loans to fishermen are not common and traders do not provide loans to purchase
stow nets knowing that the fishermen already received cash advances from dried shrimp traders. The fishermen
receive loans from collectors for trammel nets, but the maximum amount loaned is about 50,000 Mk. Loans and
cash advances have different rules according to villages, with sometimes a fixed price lower than the market price
and/or a different weighting system. Pricing information is very scarce and provided by the collector even if
accessing market price information would be possible by phone. Once loans are contracted, the fishermen do not
have the capacity to bargain a selling price even if familiar with the price in Kyaukphyus Market. The loan needs to
59
be reimbursed after each tide, but cash advances in case of income shock or replacement of equipment are
possible for the fishermen. Contracts with village collectors and traders sound less sustainable than in the case of
dried shrimp, lasting 2 to 4 years except for cases in which the collector is bankrupt and the debt cleared.
At the township level in both Myebon and Kyaukphyu, traders now faced with increasing competition from other
traders, must provide collectors with the best price in order to ensure a certain volume. Collectors now have more
power to bargain with larger collectors/traders even if the later provide cash. According to township traders, the
prices to collectors are similar with or without loans since there is too much competition between traders for a
limited volume and profit is earned by re-sorting the product.
The number of large traders is now decreasing in the townships, increasing competition between traders for P.
27
monodon and increasing the bargaining power of small traders and village collectors as already observed in 2012 .

We estimated profit margins for fisherfolks and traders in Myebon (Table 19). Our valuation assumes a catch in
Aung Mingalar village of 1 viss of P. monodon (size 3-4 inches) and sold to the village collector for 6,000 Mk. After
transport the collector sells the product in Myebon at the lowest grade for 13,000 Mk. No fixed price or different
weighting are applied during this transaction. The Cost of equipment for the fishermen is estimated for a total
catch of 300 viss per year and includes boat without engine, cost of the net and its installation for 3 years.
TABLE 19: ECONOMIC RESULTS FOR CHILLED PENAEUS MONODON TRADED AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL
Fishermen Village Collector/Trader Collective marketing to

Myebon
Buying price per viss 0 6,000 0
Selling price per viss 6,000 13,000 13,000
Equipment 1,022 900 1,922

Maintenance 256 90 346
Labour 50 50
Ice cost 77 77
Spoilage 260 260
Transport cost 0 60 60
Total Trade cost per viss 1,278 1,437 2,715
Gross revenue per viss 6,000 7,000 13,000
Profit margin per viss 4,722 5,563 10,285
% profit margin 46% 54% 100%
No license fee is applied for the trader or the fisherman since it is negligible, corresponding to about 3 Mk per viss,
with absence of tax collection in 2013-2014 in this village. Equipment cost and maintenance of the village
28
collectors are based on previous studies .
The total trade cost is higher for the trader who invested more in equipment for transport to Myebon. Transport
cost and losses due to spoilage during storage and transport further increase the trade cost for the trader. In
27
Joffre O. and Moe A. 2012. Prawn value chain analysis, Rakhine State. LIFT Project.
28
Joffre O and Moe A. 2012. Opus cited
60
Myebons case the price difference between village and township is substantial, by more than double, increasing
the traders gross revenue. However, the trader takes the risk to store and transport the product while fishermen
do not. Compared to dried shrimp the share of the profit margin between the fisherfolk and the collector is
balanced between the fisherfolk and the traders, due to the absence of loans and of unfair weighting practices.
By marketing directly to the township, fishermen can increase their profit margin by about 50%. In this case,
fishermen take the risk of price fluctuation, transport cost and losses due to spoilage. The cost of entry is higher
than in the dried shrimp value chain, with more substantial investment needed in storage facility and ice. In
addition, trading directly with the township requires a minimum volume to cover the transport cost. That is a
minimum volume that cannot be obtained by a single fisherman and thus requiring collective marketing. In our
estimation of collective marketing we assume similar costs as for the trader, which might not be the case in reality
because of extra costs related to collective action.
In the case of the Kyuakphyu cluster, a large trader in Ah Lein Chein village facilitates access to attractive market
prices compared to those of village collectors. A large trader (Dwa Ma Myint Hlaing) in this village provides market
prices closer to the one observed in Kyaukphyus Market. Without a fixed price or unfair weighting practices, the
profit margin by selling to a large trader can be as high as 6,700 Mk per viss. Therefore, the best option for
fisherfolk is to market their shrimp catch via this large trader. Fisherfolk from Ah Len Chain can access this trader
directly. Other villages can organize a collective group to share cost and labor to market the shrimp via Ah Len
Chein.

Potential interventions in the P. monodon value chain and criteria for potential for collective marketing are almost
similar to the ones for the dried shrimp value chain. The main differences concern the absence of processing
technique which could be upgraded for quality improvement.
Criteria for accessing potential for collective marketing of dried shrimp are as follows:
Absence of influential village trader contracting fisherfolk;

Distance and accessibility to main collection point, major trade market or large collector with higher price
and grading system at least 2,000 higher than the village market price;
Minimum volume produced: 40 / 50 viss per group of fishermen and per tide to significantly reduce
transport cost;
Social capital of the community;
For the village, we estimated each of the above criteria, based on qualitative scale following community
consultations (Table 11).
As for dried shrimp producers, being free from debt is necessary to develop collective marketing. However, in the
case of P. monodon, the level of debt is less important than in the dried shrimp value chain, especially in Kyaukpyu.
However, freeing producers from debt and from the patron-client relationship will require external support and
access to other source of credits.
Collective marketing should be first developed at the village level. Some villages, like Zin Yaw Maw, are relatively
far from other villages and operate as an independent unit. Even if located nearby, the volume of catch can be
limited while transport cost and time spent transporting the product to the next collecting center might hamper
the development of collective marketing. Smaller unit for the collection of the product should be developed at the
61
village level, thus requiring another layer of transaction costs and necessitating transparency and clear rules
regarding grading and prices within the group members.
Trust issues regarding the selling price can be minimized compared to the case of the dried shrimp value chain. In
the case of the Myebon cluster, access to a price guaranteed for 24h is possible. Peace Maker Ltd Cie is already
interested in purchasing products from the group of fishermen. Similar types of relationships can be developed
with large traders in Ah Len Chein village in the Kyaukphyu cluster. In both cases, supporting groups of fishermen
can help to raise the trading companys public profile (in the Myebon cluster) and the trader (in Kyaukphyu) who
happens to be the wife of the village leader, a politically influential figure. In both cases, the volume collected will
not be significant for the groups.
Social capital and capacity for collective action should be assessed before collective marketing. As mentioned in
the dried shrimp value chain, Ah Lein Chein village showed an example of collective action with the development
29
of a community pond while the cluster of villages in Kyaukphyu successfully developed a fishing lot system to
finance the communitys funds. This type of collective action can be an indicator for initiating collective marketing.
Existing trader(s) contracting fishermen in the village might constrain the development of a marketing group,
especially if the trader is linked to a local authority like in Aung Mingalar. In this case, any project activity should
ensure the existing trader participates in, and supports, the collective marketing groups. By contrast, the presence
of a large trader in Ah Len Chien in Kyaukphyu provides an opportunity, with access to better and guaranteed
pricing. Mrs. Ma Myint Hlaing, the spouse of the village leader is already interested in partnering with groups of
fisherfolk and providing them Kyaukphyu markets prices minus transport cost. Contracting fishermen can help her
gain market shares and collect a larger volume within her catch area.
Seasonality might be an issue, with groups only able to market their products during the peak season, especially in
the case of the Myebon cluster where the marketing groups have to transport their products to the township.
Villages with low production, like Zin Yaw Maw, might not reach the minimum threshold of volume needed to
trade often enough to create an incentive for this type of collective marketing. In the case of Kyaukphyu, the
selling point is based in the village thus limiting transport cost and the minimum volume traded.
Collective marketing will require investment in equipment and ice to improve storage capacity, as well as
investment in transport equipment whenever access to public transport is not possible.
29
Boutry M.;Tin Myo Win, Saw Eh Htoo. 2013. Survey of the Political Sociologies and Resource Access Patterns to Identify Pilot
Villages in Giri-affected Rakhine
62
TABLE 20: SUMMARY TABLE FOR POTENTIAL OF COLLECTIVE MARKETING OF P. MONODON IN MYEBON AND KYAUKPHYU CLUSTERS VILLAGES
Myebon Cluster Kyaukphyu Clustet

Aung Mingalar TaungGyi yin Zin Yaw Maw Ah Lan Chein Min Chawng Gant Gar Gant Gar Ywarma
(West)
Absence of debts Very Low Low Low Medium Medium Low Medium
Access to trader High High High High Medium Medium Medium
with better price
and guaranteed
price
Distance to Medium High Very High Very high High High High
market and
transport
Minimum volume High Medium Low High Medium Medium Very Low
produced
Social capital m.d m.d m.d High m.d m.d m.d
63
V.6. MULLET VALUE CHAIN
Participants of the Pauktaw cluster selected Mullet (Mugil cephalus, Nga kin gyine) as their second choice to
develop collective marketing. This commodity is for the local retail market. It has low value but is abundant and a
large number of fisherfolk in the community catch it.
V.6.1. MULLET FISHERIES

Mullet is a very common fish caught by using two main devices: drift nets and fence nets. Both types of nets are
used by more than 120 households (or 13% of the households) within the cluster of 3 villages. The resource is
available almost all year long, with a peak in October and November, decreasing from December to February and
another peak catch in March. From March to July the catch can decrease all the way to zero but is found again in
September. Therefore fishing season and the revenue from mullet fisheries are the opposite of those from shrimp
and mud crab fisheries the other main fishery resources in these communities.
Fishing grounds for this species are channels between islands and along the shore. Drift and fence nets do not
differ much in terms of volume caught. The drift nets average catch in the peak season is between 4 and 10 viss
while the fence net can harvest 4 to 20 viss.
V.6.2. MULLET VALUE CHAIN AND TRADE

The value chain is short and simple. It involves fisherfolk and traders in Pauktaw Township who later retail to
middlemen (Figure 23).
Pauktaw/village
Ice; Net
Middelmen
Pauktaw
Inshore & river fishing
traders
(fence net & drift net)
90% Retails
Fisherfolks
Cash advance
Village retails
10%
River fishing (drift net) <3 viss
FIGURE 23: MULLET VALUE CHAIN AT THE TOWNSHIP LEVEL (PAUKTAW)
64
Men are is charge of fishing while women sort and trade fish in the village. Mullets can be processed in small
quantities (salt and dried) but the value of the processed product is not high in the market. The fishing ground is
located about 5 miles away from the cluster of villages.
Ninety percent of the catch is sold to Pauktaw and transported directly from the fishing ground every two or three
days, each time a sufficient amount is caught. The threshold volume for marketing the catch is 30 viss,
corresponding to a cooler box. Fishermen need a cooler box and ice to store their catch in between two trips to
Pauktaw. In the case of fishermen using rowing boats the spoilage rate can be high and reducing the benefits from
the catch.
Traders in Pauktaw re-sell the product to middlemen supplying neighboring villages and for retailing directly in the
Pauktaws Market. In addition about 10% of the catch from the cluster is retailed directly in the villages for local
consumption.
V.6.3.PRICE AND BARGAINING POWER

Cash advance and loans from traders are not a common practice in this value chain. However, relationships with
traders in Pauktaw appear to be strong, with for example all the fishermen from Thazekone selling their fish to the
same trader in Pauktaw. Fishermen using fence net (not the most common), borrow money from the trader to
finance the equipment. The loans are of about 100,000 Mk or less since mullet is a low-value and abundant
species.
Even without loans, the fishermens bargaining power is low, due to lack of capacity to store the catch and the
trader fixing the price. The average price is about 1,000 Mk per viss, ranging from 800 to 1,500 Mk per viss during
the year and, unlike in the shrimp and mud crab value chains, there are no mobile collectors.
The selling price in Sittwe is higher and estimated at 3,375 Mk per viss at its maximum. However, transport cost to
reach the auction market in the morning requires travelling by private boat. Public transport is not an option,
reaching Sittwe only in early afternoon. The difference in price between the retail market in the village (about
2,400 Mk per viss) and the price offered by the Pauktaw trader is substantial, but market demand in the village is
not high, much lower than the supply. The demand in Pauktaw is higher and catch can always be sold. Pauktaws
Market is a safe selling point according to the fishermen, especially in periods of peak catch.
V.6.4. ECONOMIC RETURN OF THE MULLET FISHERY

For a brief valuation of the cost and return of the mullet fisheries (Table 21), we assume an average selling price of
1,000 viss. We estimated cost and return of this type of fishery for 3 scenarios: i) fence net selling in Pauktaw; ii)
drift net selling in Pauktaw and iii) drift net selling in Sittwe at the auction market
Costs of entry is high for fence nets, with boat, engine and net reaching almost 1 million Mk. Cost of entry is lower
for drift nets, about 300,000 Mk, not including boats. Boats (150,000 to 380,000 Mk for engine boats) can be used
for 3 to 4 years, but nets need more frequent replacement and maintenance.
Drift nets produce a better margin with lower costs associated with the catch- requiring less labor and ice. Drift
nets catch less than fence nets, with, in average 240 viss per fishing trip compared to 600 viss in the case of fence
net. Also in the latest instance trips to Pauktaw are less frequent with marketing directly in the village being more
common. Margin is higher with drift nets than fence nets; however, fence nets catch other fish and crustaceans,
which are not taken into account in this calculation.
65
Collective marketing in Pauktaw could reduce the transport cost, with shared transport from the fishing ground to
Pauktaw, representing about 13% of the trade cost in both drift and fence net scenarios.
In the last scenario we use a selling price in Sittwe of 3,000 Mk per viss, cost of transport is double compared to
Pauktaw, with 18,000 Mk per trip for selling a volume equivalent to 90 viss. This volume corresponds to 3 cooler
boxes, and achievable by a group of 5 fishermen within a day during the peak season. Investment in equipment is
higher, with the need for bigger boats and engines. The entry cost is estimated at 0.7 million Mk (without fishing
devices), for the purchase of boat and engine to reach Sittwe.
TABLE 21: COST AND RETURN OF MULLET FISHERIES DURING THE PEAK SEASON FOR 1 VISS
Fence Net Drift Net Drift Net

Selling in Pauktaw Selling in Pauktaw selling in Sittwe
Selling price 1,000 1,000 3,000
Gross revenue 1,000 1,000 3,000
Trade cost 758 470 995

Transport 100 62.5 200
Depreciation 92 85 166
Labor 250 62.5 62.5
Ice 100 25 35
Spoilage 40 40 40
Regulatory Fee 0 0 not estimated
Profit margin 242 531 2,192
The simulation shows that marketing in Sittwe is highly profitable, even if the market price drops to 2,000 Mk per
viss, which might be the case in the peak season. The profit margin remains higher than when selling in Pauktaw.
However, this option involves different risks, with transportation dependent on weather and the journey to Sittwe
entailing additional potential risks that fishermen do not want to take. Also, the selling price cannot be fixed, with
an auction system in place at the fish market in Sittwe, increasing the risk of low economic return.
Absence of pricing guarantee will discourage fishermen from marketing their catch directly in Sittwe, with a long
transport route (>2-3 hours) compared to Pauktaw (1 hour).
V.6.5. POTENTIAL INTERVENTIONS

Unlike the crab value chain, the constraint for marketing due to contractual relationships with the traders is not
high while opportunities to choose the selling point and trader are. Unlike with crab and shrimp, the pricing system
does not have grades and the quality of the product does not vary a lot, stabilizing the price of the mullet. This
characteristic represents a competitive advantage for collective marketing with more transparency, while also
facilitating partnering up with traders to establish prices in advance.
Group marketing might be an option to increase profit margins via reduction of the transport costs. Fishermen fish
in groups and market their production individually to Pauktaw center. One option to reduce transport cost will be
to market the catch collectively from the fishing ground to Pauktaw or via a collecting center at the village,
66
depending on the route. Collective marketing from the fishing ground might be more challenging but should be
discussed with fishermen.
Potential for marketing catch in Sittwe should be investigated if the transport cost is shared. The selling price in
Sittwe is more than double that in Pauktaw. Fishermen owning large boats should be encouraged to market in
Sittwe and a market assessment for fresh mullet in Sittwe should be carried out. In addition to mullets, other
products such as seabass, caught in lower amounts, could also be collectively marketed, according to seasons.
Comparatively there are more opportunities of developing collective marketing in Ah Ley Kyun or Thazekone
villages, since the number of drift nets are more substantial (above 50 households compared to Gyin Dway village).
Dried mullet is not considered a high value product. Sittwes vibrant dried fish market does not count dried
mullets as one of the main species, with already dozens of high value dried fish such as anchovies or mackerel.
Mullets are not considered delicate in taste and the market potential is really low. However, dried mullet for small
retailing at the village level might have more potential.
Processing this abundant resource during the peak season can help to improve marketing. Pilots for processing,
drying and salting the fish could be tested to evaluate the quality of the product and its marketability. Processing
mullet can be tested in periods of peak catch, when weather conditions are favorable. However, the marketing
potential is limited and Pauktaw and Sittwe markets for such dried fish should be explored further.
67
VI. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This study aimed to understand what are the most important fishery commodities and products for poor fisherfolk
communities in the Cyclone Giri-affected areas in Myanmar. It then reviewed the value chains of selected
commodities to propose potential interventions around collective marketing.
We found a certain degree of variation within the 3 study sites, based on ecological diversity leading to distinctive
types of fisheries. The approach suggested the development of village clusters. Within each cluster studied, a
certain level of diversity was found regarding fishing techniques, with for example differences in access to fishing
grounds and some villages specializing in stow net fishing, while others without access to this type of fishing
devices, specializing in drift nets or crab traps. Clusters are not homogeneous and targeted commodities also differ
according to villages.
In all study sites, the types of fisheries were found to be of low intensity, with communities engaged in small-scale
inshore fisheries. The poorest households fish without boats and represent a significant amount of households in
the communities.
Two out of three clusters selected the same type of commodities: shrimp, both chilled and dried, and mud crabs.
Two of these commodities, P. monodon and mud crab are for the export market and are considered as high value
products, while dried shrimp is for the national market. Only one cluster of villages, Pauktaw, selected mullets, a
local and abundant fish for the local market. In all cases and for all commodities, both fishermen and traders
indicated that catch trends have been declining by at least 40% in the last 5 years, causing us to question the
sustainability of the resource and the future of fisherfolks livelihood.
The value chain analysis of shrimp showed that fishermen are highly indebted with local collectors and traders. In
the absence of alternative sources of credits, fisherfolk are forced to contract loans from traders and collectors to
sustain their livelihood during the lean period and/or when facing income shock, such as after Cyclone Giri when
replacement of fishing equipment and assets was needed. Loans significantly limit the profit of fisherfolk due to
price fixing and associated weighting practices. Loans also trap fisherfolk, unable to re-pay their debts, within this
endless cycle. The debt and loan system was found less constraining in the case of P. monodon and mud crab value
chains compared to the dried shrimp value chain, but still exist and limits profits for fisherfolk.
The value chain analysis also showed that collective marketing could create opportunities for fisherfolk to access
better prices and grading systems. Volume traded at the village level for each commodity was found in most of the
cases sufficient to access larger markets and thus facilitating better grading systems like in the case of mud crab.
Therefore, project interventions to improve marketing of the fishery product should aim to access higher market
prices by marketing to larger traders in major collection centers in the townships, share transport cost and access
more favorable grading systems. In each cluster, local opportunities were found, with traders interested in
establishing trade relationships with groups of fishermen. In addition, in the case of dried shrimp, improvement of
the quality was found to potentially lead to an increase of the selling price and to developing a long-term
relationship with traders.
The communities studied are not experienced with collective action and collective marketing. The selected
products are highly perishable, happen to be sold at the fishing ground in some cases, and are characterized by
fluctuating market prices. Collective marketing also faces the challenge of building trust within groups due to
68
specific distinguishing characteristics. In addition, it will require fisherfolk to be cleared of debts and have the
freewill of choosing their marketing channel, which in some communities will be difficult. Collective marketing also
faces competition from existing marketing channels such as village collectors and traders, now established in the
villages for years.
Facing several challenges, we recommend developing pilot sites in selected communities, starting at the village
level before expanding to the cluster level. Achieving success in these communities requires a significant presence
of Implementing Partners to, first form groups and later support their activities.
A study tour of identified marketing group leaders to existing collective marketing groups and FDA and VFS in the
Delta will contribute to building the communities trust in this approach. We found that communities were
reluctant to consider this approach mostly due to lack of knowledge and experience.
Potential for improvement of fisherfolks profit margin is possible. It will require significant changes in the value
chain, skipping the village level trading system in most of the cases and empowering fisherfolk communities to
increase their bargaining power. Women are involved in trading and processing products such as dried shrimp and
should be considered major actors in future marketing groups.
69
REFERENCES AND DOCUMENT CONSULTED
Boutry M, Htoo S.E, Win T M. 2013. Investigation revenue collection practices and opportunities from
the Fisheries Sector in Rakhine Sate
Boutry M.;Tin Myo Win, Saw Eh Htoo. 2013. Survey of the Political Sociologies and Resource Access
Patterns to Identify Pilot Villages in Giri-affected Rakhine
CARE International. 2013. Do No Harm Assessment. Tat Lan Sustainable Food Security and Livelihood
Program. September
Joffre Olivier and Moe Aung. 2012. Prawn value chain analysis, Rakhine State. LIFT Project.
M4P. 2008. Making Value chain Works Better for the Poor: A toolbook for Practitioners of Value Chain
Analysis Version 3. Making Markets Work Better for the Poor (M4P) Project, UK, DFID. Agricultural
Development International, Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Pyoe Pin Project .2013. Political Economy of Rakhine with a Focus on the Fishery (sic.)
Rakhine CCCM dashboard November 2013
Rakhine State Fisheries Partnership .2013. A Development Partnership for improving the Governance of
Fisheries in Rakhine State. July.
Ratner, B. D. 2006. Community Management by Decree? Lessons From Cambodias Fisheries Reform.
Society & Natural Resources, 19(1), 7986. doi:10.1080/08941920500323344
Roos Josefine. 2013. Conflict Assessment in Rakhine State. February / March.
Tat Lan Consortium. 2013. Food Security and Livelihood Assessment. Rakhine State, Myanmar.
70
ANNEX
LIST OF PERSON AND KEY INFORMANTS CONSULTED
Name Description Contact

1 U Yin Myein Program Officer, NAG
2 U Aung Kyaw Thein Pyo Pin project
3 U Han Tun Vice President - MFF
4 U Soe Tun Secretary, Prawn Association
5 U Tin Hla Exporter
6 U Khin Maung Soe Consultant, My FISH 09 8502443
7 Xaviea Tezzo My FISH 9421179731
8 U Khin Maung Aye Principle, DOF Training Centere 09 73062551
9 U Soe Myint State Fishery Officer, Rakhine State 09 8502998
10 U Myint Thein Dy State Fishery Officer, Rakhine State 09 421736774
11 U Htin Aung Kyaw NAG
12 U Myint Soe NAG
13 U Thein Tun Aye Field Officer, Rakhine Thahaya 09 4100479
Tta.arakan.akb@gmail.com
14 U Soe Myint Tun Field Officer, Rakhine Thahaya 09 450543034
15 Daw wai Wai Paing Admin Officer, Rakhine Thahaya 09 450540153
16 U Hla Kyaw Rakhine Thahaya/ Manager of dried shrimp trading 09 4964210
17 U Aung Htike Secretary, Rakhine MFF 09 8500907
18 U San Kyaw Hla Vice Chairman, Rakhine MFF 09 8500816
19 U Win Zaw Trader (dried shrimp and fish), Sittwe 09 8500500
20 U Aung Win Zaw MAK Trading, Shrimp Collector, Sittwe 09 8500993
21 U zaw Min Tun ZMT Trading, Fish Collector, Sittwe 09 41000233
22 U Aung Kyaw Tun Township Fishery Officer, Pauktaw Township 09 42175007
23 U Kyaw Lin Oo Crab Trader, Pauktaw 09 420099689
24 U Hla Maung Tha Dried Fish Trader/Collector, Pauktaw 09 421746490
25 U Aye Thar Aung Prawn and Fish collector, Pauktaw 09 8501025
26 U Maung Thant Zin Prawn and Fish collector, Pauktaw 09 49660495
27 U Kyaw Soe Hlaing Prawn Farmer, Pauktaw 09 448013153
28 U Ah Chin Crab Trader, Sittwe 09 5680766
71
29 U Tin Maung Shwe Township Fishery Officer, Myebon 09 250602959
30 Daw Thein Thein Hla Dried shrimp trader, Myebon 09 49674843
31 Daw Saw Khine Crab trader, Myebon 09 421748026
32 Daw Than Shwe Dried Shrimp trader, Myebon 09 8524051
33 U Aung Naing Soe Director, Peace Maker Co. Ltd, Myebon; Prawn trader 09 421721578
34 U Thein Tun Manager, U Soe Wing Prawn Collector, Ah Lan Chein 09 49679210
village, Kyauk Phyu
35 U Nyunt Maung Prwan Trader, K.T.Ht Trading, Kyaukphyu
36 U Tun Tin District Fishery Officer, Kyauk Phyu 09 8510105
37 U Ba Win Dried Shrimp Trader, Kyauk Phyu 09 49650157
38 Josefine Roos Consultant 09 4500 46062
39 Adam Burke Oxfam consultant Skype call
40 Rick Gregory Fishery specialist, consultant for Pyo Pin project Skype call
41 Maxime Booutry Anthropologist, consultant for Pyo Pin projec 09 250 54 21 01
42 U Tun Wai Owner of the soft shell crab fattening farm - 098501247
Kyaukphyu
43 Dwa Ma Myint Hlaing Prawn trader, ah Len Chein 09496650321
72

Tat Lan Vca Report March 2014 Ha

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Tat Lan Vca Report March 2014 Ha

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Fishery Value Chain Analysis in Rakhine State

Assessment for village level interventions

Olivier Joffre and U Moe Aung

Document Prepared for Tat Lan

DoF Department of Fisheries

FDA Fisherfolk Development Association

IDPs Internally Displaced Person

INGO International Non-Governmental Organization

IRC International Rescue Committee

MFF Myanmar Fisheries Federation

NAG Network Activities Group

PL Penaeus monodon post larvae

SCI Save the Children International

USD United States Dollars

VCA Value Chain Analysis

VFS Village Fisheries Sub committees

UNITS USED AND CONVERSION TABLE:

Weight Kilogram 1.0 Viss 0.6

Area Hectare 1.0 Acre 2.47

Currency US$ 1.0 M Kyat (MK) 983

Objective of, and context for, the study

Impact of fishery reform

Impact of recent violence on fishery value chain

Value chain selection

Iced-chilled shrimp (Penaeus monodon)

Mullet (Mugil cephalus)

II.1. TAT LAN PROJECT

II.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS

FIGURE 1: RAKHINE STATE AND TAT LAN PROJECT AREA

Key informant interviews

Focus Group Discussions and

FIGURE 2: APPROACH USED IN THE VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS

Key informant Interviews

Traders and collectors

A detailed questionnaires guide is provided in a separate document.

III.2. STUDY SITE AND LIMITATIONS

Township Village Village Tract

IV.1. OVERVIEW OF RAKHINE STATE AND STUDY AREA

IV.2. OVERVIEW OF THE SECTOR, IMPORTANCE FOR LIVELIHOOD

4.2.2. TRENDS AND PERCEPTION IN THE FISHERY SECTOR

FIGURE 4: OFFSHORE FISHERY CATCH IN RAKHINE STATE (2009-2014, IN THOUSAND VISS)

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF MAIN TARGETED FISH AND CRUSTACEANS SPECIES BY TOWNSHIP

Offshore Onshore Process and market

IV.3. VALUE CHAIN IN THE FISHERY SECTOR

4.3.2. REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE FISHERY VALUE CHAIN

IV.4. FISHERY REFORM

4.4.2. IMPACT OF THE REFORM ON THE FISHERMEN

Access to fishing grounds

Knowledge of the regulation by fishermen;

Taxation and revenue for the DoF

Customary rules and community-based management

4.5.1. ORIGINAL SETTING, ROLE AND INTERACTION BETWEEN COMMUNITIES

Fishing activities and changing circumstances

Trading activities and interactions between Muslims and Rakhine

Denied access to fishing grounds for most of the Muslim communities;

We distinguish between short-term and long-term impacts on the value chain.

Access to fishing grounds and inputs

Technical changes: from fresh to dried fish

New agents in the value chain

Other cases of added value chain complexity

4.5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A DO NO HARM APPROACH IN THE FISHERY SECTOR

V.1. FISHING ACTIVITIES BY THE TARGET POPULATION

5.1.1. IMPORTANCE FOR LIVELIHOOD AND FOR THE POOR