G.R. No.

203284 November 14, 2016

NICOLAS S. MATUDAN, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARILYN** B. MATUDAN, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1seeks to set aside the January 31, 2012 Decision2 and
August 23, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the Petition in CAG.R. CV
No. 95392 and the Motion for Reconsideration,4 thus affirming the December 18, 2009
Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-
62827.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Nicolas S, Matudan (petitioner) and respondent Marilyn B. Matudan (Marilyn) were
married in Laoang, Northern Samar on October 26, 1976. They had four children.

In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner and the children lost contact with
her; she had not been seen nor heard from again.

Twenty-three years later, or on June 20, 2008, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage,6docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94.
Petitioner alleged that before, during, and after his marriage to Marilyn, the latter was
psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother; that she consistently
neglected and failed to provide petitioner and her children with the necessary emotional and
financial care, support, and sustenance, and even so after leaving for work abroad; that based
on expert evaluation conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), Marilyn's
psychological incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable; that petitioner's consent to the
marriage was obtained by Marilyn through misrepresentation as she concealed her condition
from him; and that Marilyn is "not ready for a lasting and pennanent commitment like
marriage"7 as she "never (gave) him and their children financial and emotional support x x x and
for being selfish through their six (6) years of cohabitation;"8 that Marilyn beca me "so
despicably irresponsible as she has not shown love and care upon her husband, x x x and that
she cannot properly and morally take on the responsibility of a loving and caring wife x x x."9

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed
the Petition.

The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor having determined that there is no collusion
between the parties, proceedings were conducted in due course. However, trial proceeded in
Marilyn's absence.

Apart from the testimonies of the petitioner, his daughter Maricel B. Matudan (Maricel), and Dr.
Tayag, the following documents were submitted in evidence:
1. Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit10 (Exhibit "A") which was adopted as his testimony on direct
examination;

2. The Judicial Aftidavit11 of Maricel (Exhibit "D"), which was adopted as part of her testimony on
direct examination;

3. The Sworn Affidavit12 of Dr. Tayag (Exhibit "B"), which was considered part of her testimony
on direct examination;

4. Dr. Tayag's evaluation report entitled "A Report on the Psychological Condition of NICOLAS
T. MATUDAN, the petitioner for Nullity of Marriage against respondent MARILYN BORJA-
MATUDAN''13(Exhibit "C"); and

5. Other relevant evidence, such as petitioner's marriage contract/certificate and respective birth
certificates of his children, and a Letter/Notice, with Registry Return Receipt, sent by Dr. Tayag
to Marilyn requesting evaluation/interview relative to petitioner's desire to file a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage (Exhibits "E" to "G").

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On December 18, 2009, the RTC issued its Decision14 dismissing the Petition in Civil Case No.
Q-08-62827 on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove Marilyn's claimed
psychological incapacity. It held, thus:

Petitioner, his daughter Maricel Matudan and psychologist Nedy L. Tayag testified. Petitioner
offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to ''G" which were admitted by the Court.

The State and the respondent did not present any evidence.

From the testimonial and documentary evidence of the petitioner, the Court gathered the
following:

Petitioner and respondent were roamed on October 26, 1976 x x x. They begot four (4) children
x x x. Petitioner and respondent lived together with their children. On June 25, 1985, petitioner
asked respondent [sic] for permission to work and left the conjugal dwelling. Since then she was
never heard of [sic]. Respondent never communicated with the petitioner and her children.
Petitioner inquired from the relatives of the respondent but they did not tell him her
whereabouts.

In his Affidavit which was considered as his direct testimony, petitioner claimed that respondent
failed to perform her duties as a wife to him. Respondent never gave petitioner and their
children financial and emotional support, love and care during their cohabitation. She was
irresponsible, immature and exhibited irrational behavior towards petitioner and their children.
She was self-centered, had no remorse and involved herself in activities defying social and
moral ethics.

On cross-examination, petitioner testified that he and the respondent had a happy married life
and they never had a fight. The only reason why he filed this case was because respondent
abandoned him and their children.
Maricel Matudan was only two (2) years old when respondent left them. She corroborated the
testimony of the petitioner that since respondent left the conjugal dwelling she never provided
financial support to the family and never communicated with them.

Nedy L. Tayag, Psychologist, testified on the 'Report on the Psychological Condition of Nicolas
Matudan' which she prepared (Exhibit "C''). She subjected petitioner to psychological test and
interview. She likewise interviewed Maricel Matudan. She came up with the findings that
petitioner is suffering from Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder and respondent has
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Antisocial Traits. The features of petitioner's disorder are
the following: negativistic attitude, passive resistance, lacks the ability to assert his opinions and
has great difficulty expressing his feelings.

The root cause of his personality condition can be attributed to his being an abandoned child. At
a young age, his parents separated and he was left in the custody of his paternal grandmother.
He lacked a support system and felt rejected. He developed a strong need for nurturance, love
and attention and that he would do anything to attain such.

As for respondent, the manifestation of her disorder are as follows: Preoccupation with pursuing
matters that would make her happy; has a high sense of self-importance; wants to have her way
and disregards her husband's opinions; lacks empathy; wants to have a good life.

Her personality condition is rooted on her unhealthy familial environment. She came from an
impoverished family. Her parents were more pre-occupied with finding ways to make ends meet
to such extent that they failed to give adequate attention and emotional support to their children.

Ms. Tayag further testified that the psychological condition of the parties are grave and
characterized by juridical antecedence as the same already existed before they got married,
their disorders having been in existence since their childhood years are permanent and severe.

The sole issue to be resolved is whether x x x respondent is psychologically incapacitated to

perform her marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Article 36 of the Family Code as amended, states:

'A marriage contracted by any party who at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapicity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.'

Article 68 of the same Code provides:

'The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.'

In the case of Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, January 4, 1995, G.R. No. 112019, the
Honorable Supreme Court held:

'Justice Alicia Sempio Dy, in her commentaries on the Family Code cites with approval the work
of Dr. Gerardo Veloso a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila x x x, who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

For psychological incapacity however to be appreciated, the same must be serious, grave and
'so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.' x x x.

In the case of Santos, it was also held that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.'

It must be emphasized that the cause of action of petitioner is the alleged psychological
incapacity of the respondent. During the pre-trial, the sole issue raised is whether or not
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The alleged personality disorder of the petitioner is clearly not an issue in this
case.

Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds that the totality of the evidence adduced by
petitioner has not established the requisites of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
Again, it must be emphasized that this petition was filed on the ground of the psychological
incapacity of respondent and not the petitioner.

Respondent is said to be suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits.
The salient features of her disorder were enumerated by Nedy Tayag in her report as follows:
pre-occupation with pursuing matters that would make her happy; has a high sense of self-
importance; wants to have her way and disregards her husband's opinions; lacks empathy;
wants to have a good life. Her personality disorder is considered permanent, grave and
incurable. It has its root cause in her unhealthy familial environment during her early
developmental years.

In petitions for declaration of marriage (sic), the testimony of the petitioner as to the physical
manifestation of the psychological incapacity is of utmost importance. Unfortunately, petitioner's
testimony particularly his affidavit which was considered as his direct examination contained
only general statements on the supposed manifestations of respondent's incapacity.
Respondent was described therein as irresponsible, immature, self -centered, lacks remorse,
got involved with activities defying social and moral ethics. Petitioner however miserably failed
to expound on these allegations. In fact during his cross-examination, he even contradicted the
allegations in his petition and affidavit. He clearly stated that he had a happy marital relationship
with the respondent and never had a fight with her (TSN, December 5, 2008, page 8).

Petitioner harped on the abandonment of respondent. He even admitted that this the [sic] only
reason why he wants their marriage dissolved (TSN, December 5, 2008, page 9). Abandonment
of spouse however is not psychological incapacity. It is only a ground for legal separation.

Petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage are sui generis, the allegations therein must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence that would warrant the dissolution of the marriage
bond. Absent such proof, the Court will uphold the validity of the marriage for 'the rule is settled
that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility
of the marriage bond.' (Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006).

In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage is on the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is dismissed for insufficiency of

evidence.

SO ORDERED.15

Petitioner moved to reconsider, 16 but in a May 12, 2010 Order,17 the RTC held its ground
reiterating its pronouncement that petitioner failed to demonstrate Marilyn's psychological
incapacity, and that the petition is anchored merely on Marilyn's abandonment of the marriage
and family, which by itself is not equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R CV No. 95392. However, in its
assailed January 31, 2012 Decision, the CA instead affirmed the RTC judgment, declaring thus:

Petitioner-appellant asserts that the ETC should not have denied the petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Marilyn x x x. He maintains that, contrary to the conclusion reached by
the trial court, he was able to establish by the quantum of evidence required, the claimed
psychological incapacity of his wife.

The argument of Nicolas R. Matudan fails to persuade Us.

Verily, instead or substantiating the alleged psychological incapacity his wife, petitioner-
appellant revealed during his cross examination that it was actually his wife's act of abandoning
the family that led him to seek the nullification of their marriage. In fact, during his cross-
examination, he readily admitted that they were happily married and that they never engaged in
bickering with each other.

xxxx

Q: But how would you describe your marital relations [sic]? Were there moments that you were
happy with your wife?

A: Yes, ma' am, that is why we begot four children.

COURT

And so, you so you [sic] had a happy married life then?

FISCAL
I would presume that you had a happy married life, how come your wife just left you like that?
Do you have any idea why your wife just left you like that?

A: She did not communicate with us to tell her whereabouts.

Q: Did you ever have a fight with your wife?

A: None, ma'am.

xxxx

COURT

All right, you stated in this Affidavit that you are filing this case for the declaration of nullity of
marriage because of the psychological incapacity of your wife, what do you mean by that?

WITNESS

'Pinabayaan lang kmning pamilya niya, hindi naman niya sinasabi kung saan siya hahanapin.'
She did not inform us of her whereabouts.

COURT

Is that the only reason why you want your marriage with her dissolved?

WITNESS

Yes, your honor.

As correctly observed by the RTC, abandonment by a spouse, by itself, however, does not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It
must be shown that such abandonment is a manifestation of a disordered personality which
makes the spouse concerned completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state.

Indeed, the term 'psychological incapacity' to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a
mental not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Rorodel Glaviano Molina, the following definitive guidelines
were laid down in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of
the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff: Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.

(3) Tue incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage,

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements established in Santos v. Court of

Appeals that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. These requisites must be strictly complied with, as the grant of
a petition for nu1lity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Using the above standards, We find the totality of the petitioner-appellant's evidence insufficient
to prove that the respondent-appellee is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected
of her as a wife.

Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of the clinical
psychologist cannot be relied upon to substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of the
psychological incapacity of his wife.

It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below. The clinical
psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-appellee's condition was based mainly on the
information supplied by her husband, the petitioner, and to some extent from their daughter,
Maricel. It is noteworthy, however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years of age at the time
the respondent left and therefore cannot be expected to know her mother well. Also, Maricel
would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because she could not
have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know
what was happening between her parents until long after her birth. On the other hand; as the
petitioning spouse, Nicolas' description of Marilyn's nature would certainly be biased, and a
psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description can hardly be considered as
credible. The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v.Angelita Suazo, et al., is illuminating on this score:
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence - the
psychologist's testimony and the psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented.
Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological
condition only in an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions from information coming
from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the
information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the
evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and
stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.

xxxx

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager information coming
from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could
not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelita's psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The methodology employed simply cannot
satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological
report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.

In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was similarly declared
that '[t]o make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition
based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.'

At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the psychological
condition of the respondent-appellee to be insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented Marilyn from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn suffers from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of what she perceives as
manifestations of the same. The report neither explained the incapacitating nature of the alleged
disorder, nor showed that the respondent-appellee was really incapable of fulfilling her duties
due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature.

xxxx

Dr. Tayag's testimony during her cross-examination as well as her statements in the Sworn
Affidavit are no different.

When asked to explain the personality disorder of Marilyn, Dr. Tayag simply replied:

Q: On her case you assessed her as, likewise, suffering from a personality disorder
characterized by Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Anti-Social Trait. Will you please tell to
the Court what do you mean by that personality disorder?

A: In layman's term, once you are being labeled as a narcissistic [sic], this is a person whose
preoccupation are all toward his own self satisfaction both materially or emotionally at the
expense of somebody. They have what you called [sic] strong sense of entitlement thinking that
she can get away whatever [sic] she wants to in pursuit of her own satisfaction at the expense
of somebody. And this is what happened to the respondent. She gave more consideration to her
own satisfaction material wise at the expense of social embarrassment of the children because
of what happened to her.

On the other hand, in her Sworn Affidavit, Dr. Tayag stated:

7. Without a doubt, Marilyn is suffering from a form of personality disorder that rooted [sic] the
downfall of their marriage. As based on the DSM-IV, respondent's behavioral disposition fits
with individuals with NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER with Anti-social traits, as
characterized by her disregard for and violation of the rights of others as well as her failure to
conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing
acts that are clearly immoral and socially despised. Such is also depicted through his [sic]
deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying and conning methods she used upon others in
order to achieve personal profit or pleasure. In addition, her consistent irresponsibility, as
indicated by her repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial
obligations and her lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having
hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another. x x x. And such condition is considered to [sic] grave,
severe, long lasting and incurable by any treatment available.

Accordingly, even if We assume that Marilyn is really afflicted with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with anti-social traits, in the absence of any showing that the same actually
incapacitated her from fulfilling her essential marital obligations, such disorder cannot be a valid
basis for declaring Nicolas' marriage to Marilyn as null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code. To be sure, jurisprudence has declared that not every psychological
illness/disorder/condition is a ground for declaring the marriage a nullity under Article 36. '[T]he
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' [is confined] to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.'

All told, We find that no reversible error was committed by the trial court in rendering its assailed
Decision:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.18 (Citations omitted)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 23, 2012 Resolution, the CA
stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition.

In a November 19, 2014 Resolution,19 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition.

Issue

Petitioner mainly questions the CA's appreciation of the case, insisting that he was able to prove
Marilyn's psychological incapacity.1wphi1

Petitioner's Arguments
In his Petition and Reply,20 petitioner argues that contrary to the CA's findings, he was able to
prove Marilyn's psychological incapacity which is rooted in Dr. Tayag's diagnosis that she was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which existed even before their marriage, and
continued to subsist thereafter; that her illness is grave, serious, incurable, and permanent as to
render her incapable of assuming her marriage obligations; that the nullification of his marriage
to Marilyn is not an affront to the institutions of marriage and family, but will actually protect the
sanctity thereof because in effect, it will discourage individuals with psychological disorders that
prevent them from assuming marital obligations from remaining in the sacred bond;21 that the
issue of whether psychological incapacity exists as a ground to nullify one's marriage is a legal
question; and that the totality of his evidence and Marilyn's failure to refute the same despite
due notice demonstrate that he is entitled to a declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

Respondent's Arguments

In its Comment22 praying for denial, the Republic argues that the Petition calls for an evaluation
of facts, thus violating the rule that a petition for review on certiorari should be confined to legal
questions. Citing Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris,23which decrees as follows-

Tue issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment
of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such
factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination. It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and
cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case,
run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a
misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case. (Citations omitted)

the State argues that the instant case should be dismissed instead.

The public respondent adds that allegations and proof of irresponsibility, immaturity, selfishness,
indifference, and abandonment of the family do not automatically justify a conclusion of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; that the intent of the law is to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders - existing at the time of the marriage - clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, and depriving the spouse of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the marital bond he/she is about to assume; that
petitioner failed to show how each of Marilyn's claimed negative traits affected her ability to
perform her essential marital obligations; that the supposed psychological evaluation of Marilyn
was in fact based on the one-sided, self-serving, and biased information supplied by petitioner
and Maricel - which renders the same unreliable and without credibility; that petitioner's real
reason for seeking nullification is Marilyn's abandonment of the family; and that all in all,
petitioner failed to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of Marilyn's claimed
psychological incapacity.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

The landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals24taught us that psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. Thus, the incapacity "must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved."25 In this connection, the burden of proving psychological
incapacity is on the petitioner, pursuant to Republic v. Court of Appeals,26or the Molina case.

The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides
in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has
declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of
each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the
incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it
incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological
incapacity. 27

Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 on the
ground that the totality of petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove that Marilyn was
psychologically unfit to enter marriage - in short, while petitioner professed psychological
incapacity, he could not establish its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.

The Court agrees.

Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits
and testimonies of his daughter Maricel and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological
evaluation report on the psychological condition both petitioner and Marilyn. The supposed
evaluation of Marilyn's psychological condition was based solely on petitioner's account, since
Marilyn did not participate in the proceedings.

Indeed, "[w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition."28 "[T]he complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration
of the marriage."29 Petitioner's judicial affidavit and testimony during trial, however, fail to show
gravity and juridical antecedence. While he complained that Marilyn lacked a sense of guilt and
was involved in "activities defying social and moral ethics,"30 and that she was, among others,
irrational, irresponsible, immature, and self-centered, he nonetheless failed to sufficiently and
particularly elaborate on these allegations, particularly the degree of Marilyn's claimed
irresponsibility, immaturity, or selfishness. This is compounded by the fact that petitioner
contradicted his own claims by testifying that he and Marilyn were happily married and never
had a fight, which is why they begot four children; and the only reason for his filing Civil Case
No. Q-08-62827 was Marilyn's complete abandonment of the marriage and family when she left
to work abroad.

'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental-- not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. 31

If any, petitioner's accusations against Marilyn are untrue, at the very least. At most, they fail to
sufficiently establish the degree of Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity.

On the other hand, Maricel cannot be of help either. She was only two years old when Marilyn
left the family. Growing up, she may have seen the effects of Marilyn's abandonment - such as
the lack of emotional and financial support; but she could not have any idea of her mother's
claimed psychological incapacity, as well as the nature, history, and gravity thereof.

Just as well, Dr. Tayag's supposed expert findings regarding Marilyn's psychological condition
were not based on actual tests or interviews conducted upon Marilyn herself; they are based on
the personal accounts of petitioner. This fact gave more significance and importance to
petitioner's other pieces of evidence, which could have compensated for the deficiency in the
expert opinion which resulted from its being based solely on petitioner's one-sided account. But
since these other pieces of evidence could not be relied upon, Dr. Tayag's testimony and report
must fail as well. In one decided case with a similar factual backdrop and involving the very
same expert witness, this Court held:

It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years
from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses under
one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace's departure from their home in 2006 indicates either
a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with her
husband.

Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a
greater burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability of the former's condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn's
testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn.
Glenn's statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to
MaryGrace's traits and acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a
proof on the antecedence of Mary Grace's alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six
months before they got married, they saw each other almost everyday. Glenn saw "a loving[,]
caring and well[-] educated person" in Mary Grace.

Anent Dr. Tayag's assessment of Mary Grace's condition, the Court finds the same as
unfounded. Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the
testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, viz.:

We' cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's psychological
incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side - the petitioner - whose
bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify
the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the
application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above.
For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party
account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have
reacted and responded to the doctor's probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on this basis
characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who
'believes that the world revolves around him'; and who 'used love as a . . . deceptive tactic for
exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him.' x x x

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to

warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent
from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of
the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show
that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's
conclusion in her Report --i.e., that the respondent suffered 'Narcissistic Personality Disorder
with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable' -is an
unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and
portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have
been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement
cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by
only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.32

Finally, the identical rulings of the trial and appellate courts should be given due respect and
finality. This Court is not a trier of facts.

The issue of whether or not psychological inq1pacity exists in a given case calling for annulment
of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such
factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination. It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and
cogent reasons x x x.33

With the foregoing disquisition, there is no need to resolve the other issues raised. They have
become irrelevant.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January 31, 2012 Decision and August 23, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95392 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 214064, February 06, 2017

MIRASOL CASTILLO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FELIPE

IMPAS, Respondent.

DECISION
 PERALTA, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Mirasol Castillo (Mirasol)
challenging the Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated March 10, 2014 and August 28, 2014,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled against the dissolution and nullity of her
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The facts of the case follow:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As their parents were good friends and business partners, Mirasol and Felipe started as friends
then, eventually, became sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe
sustained his affair with his former girlfriend. The couple's relationship turned tumultuous after
the revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they reconciled. They got married in Bani,
Pangasinan on April 22, 1984 and were blessed with two (2) children born in 1992 and in 2001.3

On June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint4 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmarinas, Cavite, Branch 90.

Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was harmonious prompting her to believe that
the same was made in heaven. However, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, Felipe resumed
philandering. Their relatives and friends saw him with different women. One time, she has just
arrived from a trip and returned home to surprise her family. But to her consternation, she
caught him in a compromising act with another woman. He did not bother to explain or
apologize. Tired of her husband's infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and stopped any
communication with him.5 Felipe's irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another woman, not
communicating with her, and not supporting their children for a period of not less than ten (10)
years without any reason, constitute a severe psychological disorder.6

In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila Marie Montefalcon
(Montefalcon) who, in her Psychological Evaluation Report,7 concluded that Felipe is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations. A portion of the report
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

xxxx

The personality disorder speaks of antecedence as it has an early onset, with an enduring
pattern and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture. His
poor parental and family molding (particularly lack of parental parenting) caused him to have a
defective superego and he proved to be selfish, immature and negligent person and followed a
pattern of gross irresponsibility and gross disregard of the feelings of his partner/wife
disregarding the marriage contract and the commitment he agreed on during the wedding. In
other words, the root cause of respondent's flawed personality pattern can be in childhood
milieu. Respondent's familial constellation, unreliable parenting style from significant figures
around him, and unfavorable childhood experiences have greatly affected his perceptions of
himself and his environment in general. The respondent did not grow up mature enough to cope
with his obligations and responsibilities as married man and father.

It also speaks of gravity as he was not able to carry out the normative and ordinary duties of
marriage and family, shouldered by any married man, existing in ordinary circumstances. He
just cannot perform his duties and obligations as a husband, as he entered into marriage for his
own self-satisfaction and gratification, manipulate and denigrate the petitioner for his own
pleasures and satisfaction. In the process, respondent was unable to assume his marital duties
and responsibilities to his wife. He failed to render mutual help and support (Article 68, FC).

Additionally, it also speaks of incurability, as respondent has no psychological insight that he

has a character problem. He would not acknowledge the pain he caused to people around
him. People suffering from this personality disorder are unmotivated to treatment and
impervious to recovery. There are no medications and laboratory examinations to be taken for
maladaptive behavior such as the NPD (Narcissistic Personality Disorder).

Otherwise stated, his personality disorder is chronic and pervasive affecting many aspects of his
life, such as social functioning and close relationships. Apparently, he has failed to develop
appropriate adjustment methods. He lacks the intrapersonal and interpersonal integration that
caused him the failure to understand the very nature of that sharing of life that is directed toward
the solidarity and formation of family.

x x x x8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Decision9 dated January 20, 2012, the RTC in Civil Case No. 4853-11 declared the
marriage between Mirasol and Felipe null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Court hereby declares the marriage contract by the
petitioner MIRASOL CASTILLO to the respondent FELIPE IMPAS on April 22, 1984 in Bani,
Pangasinan to be NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the Clerk of Court is
directed to enter this judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue the
corresponding Entry of Judgment. Thereupon, the Office of the Civil Registrars in Bani,
Pangasinan and Imus, Cavite, are also mandated to cause the registration of the said ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT in their respective Book of Marriages.

Likewise, furnish the petitioner and the counsel of the petitioner, the respondent, the Solicitor
General, 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar R. Jarlos and the Civil Registrar General with
copies hereof.

Upon compliance, the Court shall forthwith issue the DECREE OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

SO ORDERED.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On February 22, 2012, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an Order11 dated
April 3, 2012.

On appeal, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 99686 reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC,
ruling that Mirasol failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe was suffering from
psychological incapacity, thus, incapable of performing marital obligations due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.12 A pertinent portion
of the decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx

Based on the records, it appears more likely that Felipe became unfaithful as a result of
unknown factors that happened during the marriage and not because of his family background.
His tendency to womanize was not shown to be due to causes of a psychological nature that
are grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, it was only after thirteen (13) years of marriage that
he started to engage in extra-marital affairs. In the complaint filed by Mirasol, she said that after
they got married, their relationship as husband and wife went smoothly and that she was of the
belief that she had a marriage made in heaven.

In short, Felipe's marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological
disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. Sexual infidelity,
by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must
be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which
make him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. Since that
situation does not obtain in the case, Mirasol's claim of psychological incapacity must fail.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.

In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Felipe, We
cannot but rule in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 20, 2012 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Upon the denial of her motion for reconsideration, Mirasol elevated the case before this Court
raising the issue, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[Petitioner] was able to establish that respondent is suffering from grave psychological condition
that rendered him incognitive of his marital covenants under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Basically, the issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not the totality of evidence
presented warrants, as the RTC determined, the declaration of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol
and Felipe on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

This Court rules in the negative.

Mirasol alleges that she has sufficiently established that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The conclusions of the trial court regarding
the credibility of the witnesses are entitled to great respect because of its opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses. Since the court a quo accepted the veracity of the petitioner's
premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of Felipe's psychological incapacity drawn
from the expert witness. She claims that Montefalcon was correct in interviewing her for it was
submitted that it was only her who knew best whether her husband was complying with his
marital obligations. Moreover, the OSG admits that personal examination of the respondent by
the clinical psychologist is not an indispensable requisite for a finding of psychological
incapacity.

On the other hand, the OSG argues that Mirasol failed to establish from the totality of evidence
the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of Felipe's alleged Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. The conclusions of the clinical psychologist that he was psychologically incapacitated
and that such incapacity was present at the inception of the marriage were not supported by
evidence. At most, the psychologist merely proved his refusal to perform his marital
obligations.14 Moreover, she has no personal knowledge of the facts from which she based her
findings and was working on pure assumptions and secondhand information related to her by
one side.15

Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be
confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.16 Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must
be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.17

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,18 this Court laid down the more
definitive guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity
cases, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx

(1) The burden of proof to:show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved an favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. x x x

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
xxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. x x x In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. x x x

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x
x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. x x x
x x x19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the facts of
each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.20

As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause,
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However,
such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but
not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The
trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision
not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological
incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would have automatically ensured the granting
of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in
all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions
presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings.23

Guided by the foregoing principles and after a careful perusal of the records, this Court rules
that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish Felipe's psychological incapacity.

Clinical psychologist Montefalcon opined that respondent is encumbered with a personality

disorder classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder deeply ingrained in his personality
structure that rendered him incapacitated to perform his marital duties and obligations. In her
direct testimony, she stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ATTY. BAYAUA:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Question: Were you able to interview and conduct examination on the respondent?
Answer: No, sir.

Question: [W]here did you base your conclusion that supported your findings that the husband
of Mirasol is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage?
Answer: From the interviews I had with the petitioner and also from my interview of the couple's
common friend who validated all information given to me by the petitioner.

Question: You mean to say you were not able to interview the respondent?
Answer: No sir. But I sent him an invitation to undergo the same psychological evaluation I
administered with the petitioner but he did not respond to my invitation.

Question: [W]hat relevant information were you able to gather from your interview of the friend
of the couple?
Answer: She validated every piece of information relayed to me by the petitioner during the
interview.
xxxx

Question: Madam witness, were you able to determine at what point in time in the life of the
respondent did he acquire this disorder that you mentioned?
Answer: The disorder of the respondent already existed even at the time of celebration of their
marriage, although the incapacity became manifest only after their marriage. His disorder
seemed to have started during the early years of his life.

Question: In your expert opinion, what would be the likely source of the disorder of the
respondent?
Answer: The disorder of the respondent seemed to have developed during the early years
of his life due to his poor parental and family [molding] particularly lack of parental
guidance. [His] parents separated when he was still young and when [his] mother had another
affair and lived with her common-law husband. Respondent's familial constellation and
[unfavorable] childhood experiences have greatly affected his perceptions of himself and his
environment. Respondent did not grow up mature enough to cope with his obligations and
responsibilities as a married man and father.

x x x24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC noticeably relied heavily on the result of the psychological evaluation by Montefalcon.
A perusal of the RTC's decision would reveal that there was no assessment of the veracity of
such allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the pieces of evidence
presented. Also, there were no factual findings which can serve as bases for its conclusion of
Felipe's psychological incapacity.

The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence
of psychological incapacity.25 The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie
in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render
to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons
upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.26

Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on the juridical antecedence, gravity
and incurability of Felipe's personality disorder, it was, however, admitted that she evaluated
respondent's psychological condition indirectly from the information gathered from Mirasol and
her witness. Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait which brought about his personality disorder
as painted in the evaluation was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of petitioner.
There was no independent witness knowledgeable of respondent's upbringing interviewed by
the psychologist or presented before the trial court. Angelica Mabayad, the couple's common
friend, agreed with petitioner's claims in the interview with the psychologist, confirmed the
information given by petitioner, and alleged that she knew Felipe as "chick boy" or
"playboy"27 She did not testify before the court a quo.

As such, there are no other convincing evidence asserted to establish Felipe's psychological
condition and its associations in his early life. Montefalcon's testimony and psychological
evaluation report do not provide evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Mirasol's
one-sided assertion. The said report falls short of the required proof for the Court to rely on the
same as basis to declare petitioner's marriage to respondent as void.
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him psychologically
incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must still be "medically or clinically
identified," and adequately established by evidence.28 We cannot take the conclusion that Felipe
harbors a personality disorder existing prior to his marriage which purportedly incapacitated him
with the essential marital obligations as credible proof of juridical antecedence. The manner by
which such conclusion was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard
of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity. The lack of corroborative witness
and evidence regarding Felipe's upbringing and family history renders Montefalcon's opinion on
the root cause of his psychological incapacity conjectural or speculative.

Even if the testimonies of Mirasol and Montefalcon at issue are considered since the judge had
found them to be credible enough, this Court cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark with
regard to information on Felipe's pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence
in this case because we only have petitioner's words to rely on. To make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence
as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.29

Anent Felipe's sexual infidelity, Mirasol alleged in her judicial affidavit, to

wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx

Question: You said Madam Witness that after several months you and respondent became
sweethearts, what happened next Madam Witness?

Answer: Sir, while we were already sweethearts, I got dismayed when respondent was
also maintaining another woman who was his former girlfriend.

Question: What was the reaction of the respondent when you told him about his relation
with his former girlfriend?

Answer: Respondent was shocked and became moody Sir. This turned our relationship
sour and it led to being stormy.

Question: You said Madam Witness that you and respondent's relationship became sour
and stormy, what happened next, if any?

Answer: Sir, my relationship with respondent should have been ended had it not been
with the timely intervention of our parents. Respondent and I reconciled.

xxxx
 Question: Madam Witness as you said you finally got married with the respondent as
evidenced in fact by a Marriage Certificate. What happened next after the
marriage?

Answer: After our wedding, our relationship as husband and wife went on smoothly. I was
of the belief that my marriage was made in heaven and that respondent had
already reformed his ways and had completely deviated from his relationship
with his ex-girlfriend;

x x x30

Question: After giving birth to your first child did respondent change or become responsible
considering that he is already a father?

Answer: No, Sir. I thought that having our first child would already change the ways of
respondent. The birth of our first child did not actually help improve respondent's
ways because respondent is really a man who is not contented with one woman
even before we got married;

x x x31

Question: After you gave birth to you[r] second child what happened next Madam Witness?

Answer: Sir, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, respondent is back to his old habit
where he has been seen having relationship with a different woman. This was
also seen by our relatives and friends of respondent.

x x x32
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.33 In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological
incapacity, the respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a
disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the
essential obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be faithful
to his spouse.34 It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.35
As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile did not emanate from a personal
interview with the subject himself. Apart from the psychologist's opinion and petitioner's
allegations, no other reliable evidence was cited to prove that Felipe's sexual infidelity was a
manifestation of his alleged personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and incurable.
We are not persuaded that the natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was medically or
clinically established.

Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.36 Based on the records, this Court finds that there
exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Felipe's sexual infidelity and
irresponsibility can be equated with psychological incapacity as contemplated by law. We
reiterate that there was no other evidence adduced. Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did
not present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Felipe's infidelity notwithstanding
the fact that she claimed that their relatives saw him with other women. Her testimony,
therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.

In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA against the dissolution
and nullity of the parties' marriage due to insufficiency of the evidence presented. The policy of
the State is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage is
the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of the
marriage.37

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari filed by herein petitioner Mirasol
Castillo. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the assailed Decision and Resolution, dated March 10, 2014
and August 28, 2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo,* and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., see separate dissent.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 200072, June 20, 2016

PHILIP YU, Petitioner, v. VIVECA LIM YU, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated September 30, 2011 and
Resolution2 dated January 5, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111414
which granted the petition for the annulment of the Decision3 dated August 20, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 10, Balayan, Batangas.

The factual antecedents are as follows.

Petitioner Philip Yu and respondent Viveca Lim Yu were married on November 18, 1984. They
had four children and maintained their conjugal home at Room 1603 Horizon Condominium,
Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila. In 1993, however, Viveca left the conjugal home with
their four children and filed a Petition for Legal Separation against Philip before the RTC of
Pasig City, Branch 261, for repeated physical violence, grossly abusive conduct against her and
the children, sexual infidelity, and attempt on her life. She prayed for permanent custody over
the children, support, and the dissolution and distribution of their conjugal partnership valued at
approximately P5,000,000.00.4chanrobleslaw

Philip denied the accusations against him claiming that it was Viveca who actually attacked him
a few times. He narrated that his marriage to Viveca was arranged according to the Chinese
tradition and that it was much later when he discovered Viveca's excessively jealous, cynical,
and insecure behaviour. He countered that since she abandoned the family home, taking their
four children away, she was not entitled to support. She was, likewise, unqualified to become
the administrator of their conjugal funds, which had outstanding obligations. Thus, Philip prayed
in his Counterclaim for the declaration of nullity of their marriage due to Viveca's psychological
incapacity, rendering her incapable of complying with her marital obligations.5chanrobleslaw

On April 24, 2007, however, Philip filed a Motion to Withdraw Counterclaim for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage revealing that he no longer had the desire to have his marriage declared
void. Despite Viveca's fervent opposition, the Pasig RTC granted the motion.6chanrobleslaw

On July 1, 2009, the RTC of Pasig City rendered a Decision7 dismissing the Petition for Legal
Separation in the following wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

From the facts obtaining in this case, the Court finds that the parties are in pari
delicto warranting a denial of this petition. Respondent's illicit relationship with Linda Daet
and his repeated verbal and physical abuses towards petitioner come within the purview of pars.
8 and 1 of Art. 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines whereas petitioner's unjustifiable
abandonment bringing with her their children without the knowledge and consent of respondent
and her assaulting respondent with a 10-inch knife are those contemplated in pars. 10 and 9 of
the same code.

Notwithstanding the foregoing Court's findings, the same becomes moot with the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties, on the ground of the psychological
incapacity of petitioner, Viveca Yu, pursuant to the Decision of Branch 10, RTC of
Balayan, Batangas, which attained its finality on October 13, 2008. Since the marriage of
the parties was declared a nullity there is, therefore, no legal basis to issue a decree of legal
separation to the spouses whose marriage has already been declared of no force and effect.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED, for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Claiming to be completely unaware of the proceedings before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas,
nullifying her marriage with Philip on the ground of her psychological incapacity, Viveca filed a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment9 before the CA seeking to annul the Decision dated August
20, 2008 of said court. According to Viveca, jurisdiction over her person did not properly vest
since she was not duly served with Summons. She alleged that she was deprived of her right to
due process when Philip fraudulently declared that her address upon which she may be duly
summoned was still at their conjugal home, when he clearly knew that she had long left said
address for the United States of America. Viveca likewise maintained that had Philip complied
with the legal requirements for an effective service of summons by publication, she would have
been able to rightly participate in the proceedings before the Batangas court.

On September 30, 2011, the CA granted Viveca's petition ruling as follows:

The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage affecting the personal status of private
respondent is in the nature of an action in rem. This is so because the term "personal status"
includes family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife.

With this premise in mind, it is beyond cavil that the court a quo was justified in resorting
to Summons by publication. Petitioner is a nonresident defendant who left the Philippines with
her children way back in 1997 and has now been living in the United States of America. The
court a quo validly acquired jurisdiction to hear and decide the case given that as adumbrated,
in a proceeding in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to
confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

Still and all, there is more to this case than meets the eye. Private respondent knew that
petitioner left the conjugal home on account of their marital difficulties. She temporarily
resided at her parent's house in Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. But during the
pendency of the Legal Separation case, she lived in Quezon City. This much was
revealed by private respondent himself in the Amended Answer with Counterclaim filed
in the Legal Separation suit-
"10. After abandoning the conjugal abode on 24 August 1993, petitioner resided at her
parent's house in Richbelt Condominium, Annapolis Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, until she moved to her present address in October 1993. x x x x
This knowledge notwithstanding, private respondent declared before the court a quo that
the "last known address" of petitioner was still her conjugal abode at Unit 1603 Horizon
Condominium, Mcralco Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. While private respondent knew that
it was well-nigh impossible for petitioner to receive Summons and other court notices at
their former conjugal home, still, he supplied the aforesaid address.

We cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that private respondent moved for the dismissal of
his counterclaim for nullity of marriage in the Legal Separation case in 2007 as he had by
then had the sinister motive of filing the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage before the court a quo. Private respondent knew that if he breathed a word on
the filing and pendency of the latter Petition, petitioner would vigorously resist it as
revealed by her tenacious opposition in the proceedings before the RTC-Pasig.

The deceitful scheme employed by private respondent deprived petitioner of her

constitutional right to due process which ensued in her failure to participate in the
proceedings before the court a quo. To Our mind, this compelling justification warrants
the annulment of judgement.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its Resolution dated January 5, 2012, the CA denied Philip's Motion for Reconsideration
finding no cogent and persuasive reason to revise or reverse its Decision. Hence, this petition
invoking the following grounds:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY
DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO DESPITE ITS ACCURATE FINDINGS THAT THE COURT
A QUO PROPERLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION IN REM THROUGH
SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION.

II.

THE PUBLICATION OF THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO, SUMMONS, THE COMPLAINT
AS WELL AS THE DECISION RENDERED THEREIN IS NOTICE TO THE WHOLE WORLD
INCLUDING RESPONDENT. RESPONDENT WAS THEREFORE CONSTRUCTIVELY
NOTIFIED OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS HAVING BEEN
DULY NOTIFIED BY PUBLICATION.

III.

RESPONDENT HAS BEEN DOMICILED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR MORE
THAN TEN (10) YEARS AND WHOSE ADDRESS IS UNKNOWN TO PETITIONER. AS FAR
AS PETITIONER IS CONCERNED, UNIT 1603 HORIZON CONDOMINIUM, MERALCO
AVENUE, PASIG CITY IS THE LAST KNOWN ADDRESS OF RESPONDENT, BEING THE
CONJUGAL HOME.

IV.

PETITIONER IS CURRENTLY NOT A RESIDENT OF THE CONJUGAL HOME.

V.

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND/OR THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF BALAYAN, BATANGAS, APPEARED AS COUNSEL FOR THE STATE
AND FULLY PROTECTED THE INTEREST OF THE STATE INCLUDING THE INTEREST OF
RESPONDENT.

VI.

PETITIONER CANNOT BE FAULTED FOR MOVING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF HIS

COUNTER-CLAIM FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, WHICH IS ALLOWED
BY SECTION 2, RULE 17 OF THE NEW RULES OF COURT AS AMENDED, AND SAID
WITHDRAWAL WAS EVEN APPROVED BY THE RTC OF PASIG.

VII.

THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF DECISION FILED BEFORE THE COURT OF

APPEALS WAS DEFECTIVE AND NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 47 OF THE NEW
RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED, FOR HAVING FAILED TO STATE AND ALLEGE THE
DEFENSES THAT RESPONDENT HAS AGAINST PETITIONER.

VIII.

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE DEFENSES THAT ARE AVAILABLE TO

RESPONDENT ARE THOSE THAT WERE PRESENTED IN THE LEGAL SEPARATION CASE
THAT WAS DISMISSED BY THE RTC OF PASIG CITY, SAID GROUNDS ONLY BOLSTER
THE FACT THAT THE DECISION DATED AUGUST 20, 2008 OF THE RTC OF BALAYAN,
BATANGAS, CORRECTLY NULLIFIED THE MARRIAGE DUE TO RESPONDENT'S
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.

IX.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT OBSERVE AND FOLLOW SECTIONS 6 AND 7 OF
RULE 47 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED.
In essence, Philip questions the appellate court's judgment of setting aside the decision of the
Batangas RTC despite its own finding that said court validly acquired jurisdiction when
Summons was duly served on Viveca by publication. He maintains that since service of
summons was properly accomplished by publication thereof in a newspaper of general
circulation as well as its personal service on Viveca at her last known address, it logically
follows that any and all resolutions rendered by the trial court are valid and binding on the
parties. Thus, the decision of the Batangas court which acquired jurisdiction over the res should
be immutable as it is already final and executory.11chanrobleslaw

Philip also questions the appellate court's choice of supporting jurisprudence alleging them to
be inapplicable to the instant case. He asserts that the teachings in Spouses Belen v. Judge
Chavez,12Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank,13 and Ancheta v. Judge Ancheta14 fail to
be instructive simply because they involve substituted service of summons whereas the mode of
service in this case is by publication. Philip further asserts that said jurisprudential doctrines
even teach us that in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such as the case at hand, jurisdiction
over the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court for as long as the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res. Thus, summons must be served upon the defendant not for
the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements, which in this case was duly complied with when Viveca, who is a non-resident,
not found in the Philippines, was served with summons by publication.15chanrobleslaw

Hence, Philip faults the CA in finding that due to his bad faith in maliciously supplying the
Batangas court with an erroneous address wherein Viveca may supposedly be summoned, she
was deprived of her constitutional right to due process, warranting the annulment of the subject
judgment. According to him, as far as he was concerned, Viveca's last known address was their
conjugal home. This is because the addresses supplied in the proceedings of the Legal
Separation case before the RTC of Pasig City were merely temporary in nature.16 Philip recalled
that when Viveca left their conjugal abode on August 24, 1993, she temporarily stayed at her
parents' house in Greenhills, Mandaluyong, for less than two months then, thereafter, stayed at
her temporary residence at Domingo Street, Cubao, Quezon City, in October 1993. Considering
that said addresses were merely temporary, Philip claims that he should not be faulted for using
their conjugal abode as Viveca's "last known address." According to him, what is mandated by
the rules as the defendant's "last known address" is his or her last known permanentaddress,
and certainly not one of temporary nature.17chanrobleslaw

The petition is bereft of merit.

Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases

as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that judgments may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.18 The objective of the remedy of annulment of
judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to
the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground
relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the
original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set
aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case
as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.19chanrobleslaw

Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of
the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of
the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party.20 Fraud is extrinsic
where the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by means of
fraud or deception, as by keeping him away from court, or by a false promise of a compromise;
or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of
the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party
and connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real
contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to
set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.
Ultimately, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court.21chanrobleslaw

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Through
its service, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.22 As a rule, Philippine courts cannot
try any case against a defendant who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines
because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily
appears in court. Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, however, enumerates the actions in
rem or quasi in rem when Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
because they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident
defendant is not essential.23 Said section provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or
the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a
lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part,
in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been
attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines
by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy
of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any
order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60)
days after notice, within which the defendant must answer. (17a)
Thus, under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the
country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the
action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of
which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines.24chanrobleslaw

In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three
modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and
sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant's last
known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider
sufficient.25cralawredchanrobleslaw

In the present case, it is undisputed that when Philip filed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, an action which affects his personal status, Viveca was already residing in the United
States of America. Thus, extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court is the proper mode by which summons may be served on Viveca, a non-resident
defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In compliance therewith, Philip claims that Viveca
was duly served summons because: (1) copies of the summons, complaint, and order of the
Batangas court were published in Tempo, a newspaper of general circulation on March 27,
2008 and April 3, 2008;26 and (2) the sheriff served copies of the summons, complaint, and
order of the Batangas court on Viveca at their conjugal home in Pasig City, her last known
address.27 Thus, he contends that the second mode of extraterritorial service of summons
mentioned above - by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by
registered mail to the defendant's last known address - was sufficiently complied with. The Court
finds, however, that such service of summons on their conjugal home address cannot be
deemed compliant with the requirements of the rules and is even tantamount to deception
warranting the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment.

Philip fervently asserts the propriety of their conjugal home address as Viveca's "last known
address," well within the true meaning and intent of the rules. But as borne by the records of the
instant case, not only is he mistaken, factual considerations herein belie his claims of good faith.
First and foremost, it is undisputed that the parties herein are also parties in a Legal Separation
case, previously filed by Viveca way back in 1994. There was, in said case, a disclosure of their
basic personal information, which customarily includes their respective local addresses, wherein
they may be served with court papers. In fact, as pointed out by the appellate court, Philip knew
that Viveca had already left their conjugal home and moved to a different local address for
purposes of the pendency of the Legal Separation case, as shown by his stipulation in his
Amended Answer with Counterclaim that "after abandoning the conjugal abode on 24 August
1993, petitioner resided at her parent's house in Richbelt Condominium, Annapolis Street,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, until she moved to her present address in October
1993." Thus, Philip cannot be allowed to feign ignorance to the fact that Viveca had already
intentionally abandoned their conjugal abode and that of all the addresses that Viveca resided
at, their conjugal home in Horizon Condominium is her least recent address. In fact, it may very
well be considered as the address she is least likely to be found considering the circumstances
in which she left the same. Note that from the very beginning of the Legal Separation case in
1994, all the way up until the promulgation by the Pasig RTC of its decision thereon in 2009,
there is no showing that Viveca had ever received any document in relation to said case, nor is
there any proof that Philip had ever sent any pertinent file to Viveca, at the conjugal address.
There is, therefore, no reason for Philip to assume, in good faith, that said address is in truth
and in fact Viveca's "last known address" at which she may receive summons. His contention
that the rules require the defendant's "last known address" to be of a permanent, and not of a
temporary nature, has no basis in law or jurisprudence.

In addition, the Court is curious as to why Philip filed the instant Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage28 before the RTC of Batangas City on February 15, 2008 when less than a year
before filing the same, he had motioned the RTC of Pasig City on April 24, 2007 to withdraw his
counterclaim for the same declaration of nullity of marriage.29 In his petition before the Court,
Philip explained that he withdrew his counterclaim in the Legal Separation case in his "desire to
explore the possibility of having a so-called 'universal settlement' of all the pending cases with
respondent and her relatives for the sake of his love for his four (4) children."30 Yet, in an
apparent, direct contravention of this so-called "desire," he filed an identical action which sought
the same nullity of his marriage with Viveca. Thus, while there may be no outright admission on
Philip's part as to a sinister motive, his inconsistent actions effectively negate his claims of good
faith.

It is interesting to note, moreover, that as pointed out by Viveca, Philip does not even reside in
Batangas, the city of the court wherein he filed his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
In a Certification31 issued by Ricardo V. Bautista, Barangay Chairman of Poblacion 1,
Calatagan, Batangas, it was categorically stated that "the name Philip Yu is not a resident of
Barangay Poblacion 1, Calatagan, Batangas." Section 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, otherwise
known as the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the date of filing. Or in the case of non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is, therefore, evident that not only did Philip contradict his previous Motion to Withdraw his
Counterclaim for the Declaration of Nullity of marriage, he even violated a basic mandate of law
so as to be able to file the same action before a different court in a city he was not even a
resident of.

Thus, while individually and in isolation, the aforementioned doubtful circumstances may not
instantly amount to extrinsic fraud, these circumstances, when viewed in conjunction with each
other, paint a deceitful picture which resulted in a violation of Viveca's constitutional right to due
process. True, the service of summons in this case is not for the purpose of vesting the court
with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of complying with the requirements of fair play or due
process. But because of Philip's employment of deceptive means in the service of summons on
Viveca, said purpose of satisfying the due process requirements was never accomplished. To
this Court, when Philip declared before the Batangas court that Viveca's last known address
was still their conjugal home with full and undisputed knowledge that she had already
intentionally abandoned the same and had even established a more recent, local residence
herein evinces a clear lack of good faith. As a result, Viveca never had knowledge of the filing of
the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage suit, only finding out about the same when the Pasig City
RTC had promulgated its decision on the Legal Separation case. It is clear, therefore, that
because of the service of summons at the erroneous address, Viveca was effectively prevented
from participating in the proceedings thereon.

In Acance v. Court of Appeals,33 where the extraterritorial service of summons on the non-
resident, US citizen, defendants therein were held to be defective due to the absence of proof
that the summons, complaint, and order of the court were duly served at their last known correct
address, the Court ruled that the failure to strictly comply correctly with the requirements of the
rules regarding the mailing of copies of the summons and the order for its publication is a fatal
defect in the service of summons.34Citing Dulap, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,35 it elucidated
as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is the duty of the court to require the fullest compliance with all the requirements of the statute
permitting service by publication. Where service is obtained by publication, the entire
proceeding should be closely scrutinized by the courts and a strict compliance with every
condition of law should be exacted. Otherwise great abuses may occur, and the rights of
persons and property may be made to depend upon the elastic conscience of interested parties
rather than the enlightened judgment of the court or judge.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and
given an opportunity to defend those interests.37 When defendants are deprived of such
opportunity to duly participate in, and even be informed of, the proceedings, due to a deceitful
scheme employed by the prevailing litigant, as in this case, there exists a violation of their due
process rights. Any judgment issued in violation thereof necessarily suffers a fatal infirmity for
courts, as guardians of constitutional rights cannot be expected to deny persons their due
process rights while at the same time be considered as acting within their jurisdiction.38 This
Court, therefore, deems as proper the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment issued
without proper service of summons.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated September 30, 2011 and Resolution dated January 5, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 111414 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity
of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration,
they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated
July 18, 2012 and Resolution3 dated June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the Decision4of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting petitioner
Norberto Abella Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.5 Norberto was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum.6

In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged
Norberto with bigamy.7 The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being
then legally married to GINA M. GAERLAN, and without such marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or
subsequent marriage with ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage has all
the legal requisites for its validity with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL
knowing fully well prior to and at the time of the celebration of the second marriage he was
already married to the said GINA M. GAERLAN.
Contrary to law.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.9

According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice)
at the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children.10

After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to
another womanf.]"11 She eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a
certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract
registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for
bigamy against Norberto.12

On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime
in 1987.13"After much prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get
married in 1994."14

Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake
marriage"15 with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.16 Nevertheless, despite Norberto's
revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice
were married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children.17

Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having
an affair with a married man. He was able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone
conversation with her paramour.18

Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the
affair. The lawyer also warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may incur if she
continued seeing her paramour.19

Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal
Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.20

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid
marriage with Gina, Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of
bigamy. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 1, 2010 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella
Vitangcol GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum imprisonment to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor as maximum imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the
penalty imposed in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 25, dated September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the
penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced. Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,23 which the Court of Appeals denied in the
Resolution dated June 3, 2013.24

Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment25 to which Norberto filed a Reply.26

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case.27 He presents as
evidence a Certification28 from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that
the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife,
Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriagethe
marriage licensethe prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage.29

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of
the crime of bigamy. According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
that punishes bigamy mentions that requirement.30 Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must be
resolved in favor of the accused[,]"31 Norberto prays for his acquittal.32

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto's prior valid marriage with
Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise
proved that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his first
marriage was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice; and that the second
marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Norberto,
therefore, should be convicted of bigamy.33

The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that
it has no record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first
wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner's first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy
charge.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage
license is suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no
marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the
civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing
to have his alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending,
he did not present any decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. - The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following
elements:
[first,] that the offender has been legally married;
[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.34ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the
civil registrar of the municipality where they were married had no record of the marriage license
allegedly issued in their favor.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was
still legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him
of the crime charged.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner's first marriage was
solemnized on July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines became
effective on August 3, 1988.35Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines36 govern the validity of his first marriage.

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which
renders the marriage void from the beginning:37
Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The fourth requisitethe marriage licenseis issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.38 The marriage license represents
the state's "involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested."39

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties."40

Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which
states:
[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and
License Issuance available in this office, no record could be found on the alleged issuance of
this office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and
MS. GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.41ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This Certification does not prove that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not
exist.42

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage
contract between him and his first wife, Gina.43 The marriage contract between petitioner and
Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner's first marriage.44 This
"should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any
record of the marriage[.]"45

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro46 was originally an action for the declaration of nullity of
a marriage.47 As part of its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that states that the
marriage license "cannot be located as said license . . . does not appear from [the local civil
registrar's] records."48

This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license."49 This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of 'due
search and inability to find' sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a]
marriage license ... to the contracting parties."50

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The
certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no
prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal
prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having
been issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose
of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the
certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to
establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute
for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That
the license now cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.

A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are
concerned. Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The
motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.

This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario. In Cario,51 the marriage
contract between Santiago Cario and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license
number.52 In addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no record of any marriage
license issued to Santiago Cario and Susan Nicdao.53 This court declared Santiago Cario's
first marriage void for having been solemnized without a marriage license.54

In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number
freely and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their
solemnizing officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage
was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and
17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first
marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as
spurious was presented. In other words, petitioner's belief that there was no marriage license is
rendered untrue by his own actuations.

This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first
marriage, petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The admission
of a marriage contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to discharge the
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of evidence
will, thus, pass on to the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that
the marriage license cannot be found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no
such marriage license was issued.

The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract.55 There is
no evidence to show that the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have
been issued from its source. There is no proof as to whether the licenses issued before or after
the document in question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There is no evidence
that relates to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would have shown
whether there was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have
contributed to the proper judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar
implies.

This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of
official functions to the civil registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions is too remotely detached to the
conclusion that there is no marriage license.

At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar's function without
the context just discussed can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the
marriage license in his office. This presumption does not mean that the marriage license did not
exist. Nor does it mean that the marriage license was issued.

However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract
duly executed by petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The
marriage contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions by a public officer should likewise be applicable to infer a
conclusion that the marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.

Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a

deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched conclusionalthough this is not always the case
that a well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many
criminal cases can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within the discretion
of a government employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a document, which may
be accurate but which he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can
easily be created by an accused. Much of the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the
trial court judge evaluates the demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer to that discretion as
much as to make our own judgment based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by
the trial court. Using both, we have no reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court.

II

Assuming without conceding that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner's first marriage was not judicially
declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code.56 The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.

As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.57 that

parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage
is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article
40 of the Family Code:59
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime
of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is to ... contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by
simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void
for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first."60 Further, "[a] party may even enter
into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisiteusually the marriage licenseand
thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the
first on the assumption that the first marriage is void."61

For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court
En Banc as petitioner insists.62

The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he
subsequently married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994.63 As for the last element of
bigamy, that the subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is presumed.
The crime of bigamy was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice without his
first marriage to Gina having been judicially declared void.64

With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the
crime charged.

III

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed
on petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense. The court then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the
penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending
circumstances are considered.65

The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.66 The penalty next lower to that is prision
correccional. Prision correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years;67 hence, the minimum penalty can be any period within this range.

As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period,
there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period
ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.

Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. The ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties are within the ranges
as previously computed. The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.

Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law 'to uplift
and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness[,]'"68 we lower the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary