[G.R. No. 137761.
April 6, 2000] HELD:
GABRIEL LAZARO and the heirs of FLORENCIA PINEDA and EVA
VIERNES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses JOSE
and ANITA ALESNA, respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Alesna filed a civil action for annulment of title,
reconveyance and damages (with prayer for preliminary
injunction) against Petitioners Gabriel Lazaro and the heirs
of Florencia Pineda and Eva Viernes.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioners. Thereafter, the private respondents filed a
Notice of Appeal before the trial court.
CA dismissed the appeal for failure of private respondents
to pay the required docket fees within the prescribed
period. (6 months after the last day to file the notice of
appeal, only after the CA had dismissed the appeal)
Upon motion, the CA reinstated the appeal, invoking the
interest of substantial justice
The petitioners also filed their own Motion for
Reconsideration, which was, however, denied. Hence, this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where the petitioners
impute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction against the CA.
ISSUE:
WON failure to pay the required docket fees within prescribed
period warrants the dismissal of an appeal.
The court rules in the affirmative.
Failure to pay docket and other lawful fees within the
prescribed period is a ground for the dismissal of an appeal.
This rule cannot be suspended by the mere invocation of
"the interest of substantial justice." Procedural rules may be
relaxed only in exceptionally meritorious case.
The payment of the docket and other legal fees within the
prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional.
Section 1 (c), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides: "Failure
of the appellant to pay the docket and other fees as
provided in Section 4 of Rule 41" is a ground for the
dismissal of the appeal. Indeed, it has been held that failure
of the appellant to conform with the rules on appeal
renders the judgment final and executory. Verily, the right
to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of
that right must comply with the statute or the rule.
No specific circumstance or any other explanation was cited
in support of the CAs invocation of "the interest of
substantial justice."
Private respondents failed to offer a satisfactory
explanation why they paid the docket fees six months after
the prescribed period. Indeed, neither they nor the Court of
Appeals showed fraud, accident, mistake, excusable
negligence, or any other reason to justify the suspension of
the aforecited rule.
We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of
substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically
compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. "

Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within

which certain acts must be done, "have oft been held as absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the
orderly and speedy discharge of business. The reason for rules of
this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be
impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules
governing practice x x x. Such rules are a necessary incident to the
proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions." Indeed,
in no uncertain terms, the Court held that the said rules may be
relaxed only in "exceptionally meritorious cases." In this case, the
CA and the private respondents failed to show that this case is one
such exception.
FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and ELENA M. LIBROJO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 148072 July 10, 2007
1. Respondent Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against
petitioner Magestrado. Apparently, Magestrado subscribed and
sworn to an affidavit of loss before the notary public where he
alleged thet lost the owners duplicate copy of the TCT of a certain
parcel of land. Such affidavit was used in support of a Petition For
Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Copy of Certificate of Title.
Apparently, the accused knew fully well that the allegations in the
said affidavit and petition are false, the truth of the matter being
that the subject property was mortgaged to Librojo as collateral for
a loan.
2. An information for perjury against petitioner was eventually
instituted with the MeTC.
3. Magestrado thereafter filed a motion for suspension of
proceedings based on a prejudicial question. Petitioner alleged that
the pending cases for recovery of a sum of money Cancellation of
Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages before the RTC must be
resolved first before the perjury case may proceed since the issues
in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues
raised in the criminal action.
4. MeTC denied petitioners motion for suspension of proceedings.
Subsequent MR was also denied by the trial court.
5. Aggrieved, Magestrado filed a Petition for Certiorari9under Rule
65, with a prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the RTC on the ground that the MeTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying his motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case.
Such was dismissed, with the RTC ruling that there is no prejudicial
question involved as to warrant the suspension of the criminal
action to await the outcome of the civil cases.
6. Dissatisfied, Magestrado filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 against the RTC.
7. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition on the ground that
petitioners remedy should have been an appeal under Rule 44 from
the dismissal by RTC of his Petition for Certiorari.
8. Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court raising the
following issues:
ISSUE:
HELD: PETITION HAS NO MERIT
The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal,
not only because RTC-Branch 83 did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners Petition for
Certiorari but also because RTCs Order of dismissal was a
final order from which petitioners should have appealed in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be
taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
 declared by the Revised Rules of Court to be appealable.
The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order is
also provided in Rule 41 as follows:
Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor
any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy available to
petitioners. Here, appeal was available. It was adequate to
deal with any question whether of fact or of law, whether of
error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion or error of
judgment which the trial court might have committed. But
petitioners instead filed a special civil action for certiorari.
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive.
The right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a
mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law.
Neither can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of
technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial
justice. While every litigant must be given the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from constraints of technicalities, the failure to
perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a
mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.
Certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed
remedy of appeal, where such loss is occasioned by the
petitioners own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.
As it appears, petitioner failed to file a timely appeal, RTC-
Branch 83s dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari had long
become final and executory.
Petitioner categorically denied signing the mortgage
document and it was private respondent who falsified the
same in order to justify her unlawful withholding of the TCT
from petitioner.
The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of the
cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, those
of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be
stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits
and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments,
confusion between litigants and courts.
Judicial order issued pursuant to the courts discretionary
authority is not subject to reversal on review unless it
constitutes an abuse of discretion.
A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that the
subject civil cases are principally for the determination of
whether a loan was obtained by petitioner from private
respondent and whether petitioner executed a real estate
mortgage involving the subject property. On the other
hand, Criminal Case No. 90721 before MeTC-Branch 43,
involves the determination of whether petitioner
committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to
support his request for issuance of a new owners duplicate
copy of the TCT. The purchase by petitioner of the land or
his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing
whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and
fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of the subject
TCT.

G.R. No. 84719 January 25, 1991
YONG CHAN KIM, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HON. EDGAR D. GUSTILO, Presiding Judge, RTC, 6th Judicial
Region, Branch 28 Iloilo City and Court of Appeals (13th Division)
respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Yong Chan Kim was employed as a Researcher at
the Aquaculture Department of SEAFDEC. His field of work
basically required him to travel to various selected
provinces in the country where there are potentials for
prawn culture.
On 15 June 1982, he was issued a travel order which
covered his travels to different places in Luzon from 16 June
to 21 July 1982, a period of thirty 35 days. Within the same
period, petitioner was issued another travel order, requiring
him to travel from the Head Station at Tigbauan, Iloilo to
Roxas City from 30 June to 4 July 1982, a period of 5 days. In
both orders, petitioner received cash advance to defray his
travel expenses.
On 14 January 1983, petitioner presented both travel orders
for liquidation. When the Travel Expense Reports were
audited, it was discovered that there was an overlap of four
(4) days (30 June to 3 July 1982) in the two travel orders for
which petitioner collected per diems twice. (P1,230.00)
It became apparent that he collected per diems and
allowances, when he did not actually and physically travel
as represented by his liquidation papers.
Petitioner however argued that he made make-up trips to
compensate for the trips he failed to undertake under the
first travel order.
In September 1983, two (2) complaints for Estafa were filed
against him before the MCTC. The said court found him
guilty, which was affirmed by the RTC.
The decision of the RTC was received by petitioner on 10
August 1987. On 11 August 1987, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal with the Regional Trial Court which ordered the
elevation of the records of the case to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court on the following day. The
records of the case were received by the Intermediate
Appellate Court on 8 October 1987.
On 30 October 1987, petitioner filed with the appellate
court a petition for review but such was dismissed by the CA
for having been filed out of time.
ISSUE:
HELD: PETITION DENIED
On 19 October 1988, the Court resolved to require the
respondents to comment on the petition for review. The
Solicitor General filed his Comment on 20 January 1989,
after several grants of extensions of time to file the same.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prayed for the dismissal of the
instant petition on the ground that the petitioner should have filed
a petition for review with the then Intermediate Appellate Court
instead of a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court, in
perfecting his appeal from the RTC to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, since the RTC judge was rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over municipal trial courts. The failure of
petitioner to file the proper petition rendered the decision of the
Regional Trial Court final and executory, according to the Solicitor
General.
Petitioner's counsel submitted a Reply wherein she contended that
the peculiar circumstances of a case, such as this, should be
considered in order that the principle barring a petitioner's right of
review can be made flexible in the interest of justice and equity.
Initially, SC denied thepetition for failure of petitioner to sufficiently
show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error,
but upon MR, the SC resolved to set aside their earlier decision in
the interest of justice.
In the present case, petitioner, in filing his Notice of Appeal the very
next day after receiving the decision of the court a quo, lost no time
in showing his intention to appeal, although the procedure taken
was not correct. The Court can overlook the wrong pleading filed, if
strict compliance with the rules would mean sacrificing justice to
technicality.
The imminence of a person being deprived unjustly of his liberty
due to procedural lapse of counsel is a strong and compelling
reason to warrant suspension of the Rules. Hence, we shall consider
the petition for review filed in the Court of Appeals as a Supplement
to the Notice of Appeal
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts.
ANOTHER ISSUE:
Was petitioner under obligation to return the same money (cash
advance) which he had received? NO.
Liquidation simply means the settling of an indebtedness. An
employee, such as herein petitioner, who liquidates a cash advance
is in fact paying back his debt in the form of a loan of money
advanced to him by his employer, as per diems and allowances.
Similarly, as stated in the assailed decision of the lower court, "if the
amount of the cash advance he received is less than the amount he
spent for actual travel . . . he has the right to demand
reimbursement from his employer the amount he spent coming
from his personal funds. In other words, the money advanced by
either party is actually a loan to the other. Hence, petitioner was
under no legal obligation to return the same cash or money, i.e., the
bills or coins, which he received from the private respondent.
Since ownership of the money (cash advance) was transferred to
petitioner, no fiduciary relationship was created. Absent this
fiduciary relationship between petitioner and private respondent,
which is an essential element of the crime of estafa by
misappropriation or conversion, petitioner could not have
committed estafa.
Additionally, it has been the policy of private respondent that all
cash advances not liquidated are to be deducted correspondingly
from the salary of the employee concerned. The evidence shows
that the corresponding salary deduction was made in the case of
petitioner vis-a-vis the cash advance in question.
G.R. No. 76221 July 29, 1991
SPOUSES RUBEN AND LUZ GALANG, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND LEONARDO DE LEON, respondents.
In an ejectment suit filed by private respondent Leonardo
de Leon, against petitioners spouses Ruben and Luz Galang,
the MeTC rendered a decision in favour of respondent. RTC
affirmed. Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals in a petition for review.
Petition was given due course, which also required
petitioners to deposit the amount of P80.40 for costs within
three (3) days from notice thereof, failure of which, the
petition shall be dismissed (September 1, 1986).
Petitioners' counsel received said resolution on September
5, 1986. On September 9, 1986, or four (4) days from
receipt, he filed a motion for extension of 30 days from
September 8, 1986 within which to pay costs.
On September 16, 1986, the Court of Appeals promulgated
a resolution dismissing the petition for review for failure of
petitioners to pay the costs of P80.40 within three (3) days
from notice of the resolution. The motion of petitioners for
an extention of time to pay costs was likewise denied in the
same resolution for having been filed 1 day after due date,
hence out of time.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending
that their counsel was not able to notify them of the order
to pay costs within three (3) days from September 5, 1986.
Such was denied.
On the same date, or on October 9, 1986, petitioners filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration praying for the
acceptance of the deposit of P80.40 and for the issuance of
a restraining order. CA denied.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in denying the pleadings filed by the petitioners.
HELD: NO.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities
and that the rules of procedure should not be strictly
enforced at the cost of substantial justice, this does not
mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at
random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and
assessment of the issues and their just resolution. Justice
eschews anarchy. The Court in said case stated, thus:
Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed
by due process whatever the source of such rights, be it the
Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
LEGAL BASIS OF CAs DECISION: CA, pursuant to its rule-
making power, promulgated an en banc Resolution on
August 12, 1971 governing the practice to be observed in
elevating to the Court of Appeals for review decisions of
CFIs (now RTCs) in cases falling under the original exclusive
jurisdiction of municipal and city courts. In the said
resolution, it is clear that upon failure of the petitioner to
deposit the amount for costs within the said period of three
(3) days, the petition shall be dismissed. Records show that
petitioners filed on September 9, 1986, or one (1) day after
 expiration of the three (3) day period, a motion for a 30-day
extension of time to deposit costs. Yet even if said motion
were granted by the Court of Appeals, the purchase and
payment by petitioner of the Money Order on October 13,
1986 for costs was five (5) days late from the expiration of
the supposed 30 day extension on October 8, 1986.
Manifestly, there was no serious intention on the part of
petitioners to comply in good faith with the order of the
Court of Appeals.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they
are required to be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed. In the instant case, petitioners failed to
persuade the Court to extend liberality.
Moreover, while the case was on appeal before the RTC,
petitioners ignored the order dated May 14, 1986 of the
said RTC to file their memorandum within ten (10) days
from notice. It is apparent that even that early stage of the
case, petitioner's had already chosen to ignore the order of
the RTC.
The reason cited that petitioners were not themselves
furnished with a copy of the resolution does not call for a
liberal application of the Rules as well. It is basic that notice
to counsel is notice to the client.
Even so, the SC, Court in the exercise of its discretionary
power, finds that the instant petition lacks merit.
The legitimate need of the owner/lessor to repossess his property
for use of any immediate member of his family is a valid ground to
eject petitioners from the questioned premises.
The desire of private respondent to repossess the questioned
premises in order to provide his parents and sister with a decent
place to stay must be given the traditional respect and recognition.
Besides, it was not clearly proven that private respondent is an
owner of any other property in Manila.
It is settled that a lease on a month to month basis is a lease
contract with a definite period.If it is shown that the lessor needs
the property for his own use or for the use of any immediate
member of the family or for any of the other statutory grounds to
eject under Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, then the lease is
considered terminated as of the end of the month, after proper
notice or demand to vacate has been given. As early as June 7,
1985, private respondents had demanded that petitioners vacate
the premises in question on September 15, 1985. The ejectment
case was filed on October 7, 1985 after a lapse of more than three
(3) months from receipt of said notice.
That law, let it be stressed, is not less humane because it
favors the landlord, for social justice is for fairness to all or it
is no justice at all.
GREGORIO DIMARUCOT y GARCIA, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 183975 September 20, 2010
For resolution in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
is the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying petitioners
omnibus motion to reconsider the August 29, 2007 Resolution
dismissing his appeal, to expunge the same from the Book of Entries
of Judgment, and to give petitioner a period of thirty (30) days
within which to file the appellants brief.
FACTS:
Petitioner is accused for Frustrated Murder in the RTC for
hitting Angelito Rosini y Go with an iron pipe, thereby
inflicting upon the latter physical injuries, which ordinarily
would have caused his death. Petitioner was eventually
convicted.
Upon receiving the notice to file appellants brief,
petitioner thru his counsel de parte requested and was
granted additional period of twenty (20) days within which
to file said brief. This was followed by three (3) successive
motions for extension which were all granted by the CA.
Eventually, however, the CA dismissed the appeal for failure
of the appellant to file the required appellants brief within
the reglementary period which expired on June 6, 2007.
In its MR, petitioners counsel admitting that he was at fault
in failing to file the appellants brief due to personal
problems emanating from the counsels wifes recent
surgical operation. It was thus prayed that the CA allow
petitioner to file the brief until October 4, 2007. The brief
was still not filed at the given date, hence the denial of the
MR. As per Entry of Judgment, the Resolution of August 29,
2007 became final and executory on January 4, 2008.
On May 8, 2008, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (1) To
Reconsider the Resolution, (2) To Expunge The Same From
Book Of Entries Of Judgment, and (3) To Give Accused-
Appellant A Final Period Of Thirty Days To File Appellants
Brief. Petitioner reiterated that his failure to file the appeal
brief was solely the fault of his lawyer who is reportedly
suffering from personal problems and depression. He also
cited his advanced age (he will turn 76 on May 30, 2008)
and medical condition (hypertension with cardiovascular
disease and pulmonary emphysema).
CA denied, holding that petitioner is bound by the mistakes
and negligence of his counsel, such personal problems of a
counsel emanating from his wifes surgical operation are
not considered mistake and/or negligence contemplated
under the law as to warrant reconsideration of the dismissal
of the subject appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petitioners appeal
HELD: NO.
A criminal case may be dismissed by the CA motu proprio
and with notice to the appellant if the latter fails to file his
brief within the prescribed time. The phrase with notice to
the appellant means that a notice must first be furnished
 the appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be
dismissed. However, even in the absence of notice to the
appellant, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
the CA in considering the appeal abandoned with the failure
of petitioner to file his appeal brief despite four (4)
extensions granted to him and non-compliance to date.
Dismissal of appeal by the appellate court sans notice to the
accused for failure to prosecute by itself is not an indication
of grave abuse.
The appellant took no steps either by himself or through
counsel to have the appeal reinstated, such an attitude of
indifference and inaction amounts to his abandonment and
renunciation of the right granted to him by law to prosecute
his appeal.
Also, the dismissal of his appeal having become final, it was
too late in the day for petitioner to file the Omnibus Motion
on May 8, 2008, which was four (4) months after the finality
of the resolution dismissing the appeal.
The negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the
client. There are exceptions to this rule, however, in this
case, we find no reason to exempt petitioner from the
general rule. The admitted inability of his counsel to attend
fully and ably to the prosecution of his appeal and other
sorts of excuses should have prompted petitioner to be
more vigilant in protecting his rights and replace said
counsel with a more competent lawyer. Instead, petitioner
continued to allow his counsel to represent him on appeal
and even up to this Court, apparently in the hope of moving
this Court with a fervent plea for relaxation of the rules for
reason of petitioners age and medical condition. Verily,
diligence is required not only from lawyers but also from
their clients.
Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding
effect of counsels negligence and allowed a litigant another
chance to present his case (1) where the reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of
law; (2) when application of the rule will result in outright
deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where
the interests of justice so require. None of these exceptions
obtains here.
For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing
short of clear abandonment of the clients cause must be
shown.
The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of
due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who
seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to
appeal is lost.
Strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable
for the orderly and speedy disposition of justice. The Rules
must be followed, otherwise, they will become meaningless
and useless.