Fitur Artikel:
150163
Bukti-Concept Airborne Sense and Hindari Sistem
dengan ACAS-X Uji penerbangan
U
Tatsuya Kotegawa.General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc., Poway, CA, USA
PENGANTAR
Hari ini,tak berawak sistem pesawat (UAS) operasi biasanya dilakukan di
wilayah udara terpisah dan di bioskop tempur terbatas. Untuk
mengintegrasikan UAS ke dalam Sistem Udara Nasional (NAS), UAS
harus beroperasi dengan aman, efisien, dan kompatibel dengan yang ada
secara ing lalu lintas pesawat berawak sehingga keamanan dan efisiensi
dari wilayah udara tidak terdegradasi [1]. Ada banyak tantangan yang
terbentang di depan untuk memungkinkan UAS akses tidak terbatas ke
NAS, tapi mungkin tantangan teknis terbesar melibatkan memenuhi Lihat
dan Hindari persyaratan (14CFR 91,111 dan 91,113).
Rasa dan menghindari (SAA) adalaha technical capability for a UAS
to fulfill the See and Avoid requirements employing onboard sensors,
hardware and software elements to detect and track nearby air traffic,
convey awareness of potential conflicts to the pilot, and provide guidance
to resolve such conflicts [2]. SAA functionality comprises two distinct
layers of protection: self-separation (SS) and collision avoidance (CA). SS
is the tactical process whereby the UAS remains well clear of oth- er
airspace users, thus fulfilling the separation provision layer within the
ICAO Global ATM Operational Concept [3]. CA, on the other hand, is the
final layer of protection against midair collision risk when progression of a
potential collision is not avoided by SS.
In 2013,a partnership was formed between General Atom- ics
Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI), the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance
System (TCAS) Program Office, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), Honeywell Inc., and BAE Sys- tems to
develop and flight-testa proof-of-concept SAA system. The system is
comprised of Pilot-in-the-Loop SS functionality implemented in the ground
control station (GCS) and airborne CA functionality using the FAAs
Airborne Collision Avoidance system variant for UAS (ACAS X ). Both
systems rely on sur- veillance provided by a suite of airborne sensors
integrated onto a Predator B UAS. Flight tests were conducted in
November-De- U
Authors address: GeneralAtomics Aeronautical Systems,Inc., 4200
Kirkham Way, Poway, CA 92064. E-mail: (tatsuya.
kotegawa@ga-asi.com).
Manuscript received July 30, 2015; revised February 10, 2016,
February25, 2016; ready for publication April 8, 2016.
Review handled by G. Fasano.
0885-8985/16/$26.00 2016 IEEE
September 2016 IEEE A&E SISTEM MAGAZINE
DOI. No 10,1109 / MAES.2016.
cember 2014 involving preplanned encounters between the SAA test
article, NASAs Ikhana PredatorB UAS, as well as manned and unmanned
intruders. This paper describes the SAA systems that were flown, how they
performed, and lessons learned for future development.
FLIGHT TEST OBJECTIVES AND OVERVIEW
The objective of the 2014 flight test was to demonstrate and assess CA and
SS performance of the SAA system integrated onto a UAS in a live flight
environment. The test was conducted in two phas- es: demonstration and
assessment of the CA and SS component of SAA. The SAA system here
also serves as a proof-of-concept system for the RTCA Special Committee
228 (SC-228) to generate Minimum Operational Performance Standards
(MOPS) for a cer- tifiable SAA system on UAS. Specific flight test
objectives, com- bining the research interests of the partners involved in
this effort, are summarized below.
[CA/SS] Flight test a suite of surveillance sensors for SS and CA
including ADS-B and air-to-air radar (ATAR).
[CA/SS] Flight test the surveillance and tracking module (STM) using
surveillance information fused from multiple sensor sources.
[CA] Flight test the threat resolution module (TRM) logic for vertical
and horizontal maneuvers.
[CA] Flight test the interoperability of ACASX with legacy
U
TCAS II systems (responsive coordination) and with other ACASX
systems (active coordination emulation using ADS-B).
[CA] Flight test automatic maneuvering in response to a resolution
advisory (RA).
[SS] Examine effectiveness of several prototype SAA displays for
pilot situation awareness and guidance algorithms for
recommendations to maintain SS with potential conflicts.
The FAA TCAS Program Office is developing the Next Genera- tion
Airborne Collision Avoidance System, ACAS X. ACAS X is a modular
family of variants supporting a variety of aircraft plat- forms and operating
environments with plug-and-play capabilities
53
to leverage additional surveillance sources. ACAS X is a variant
U U
tailored for the performance characteristics of unmanned aircraft.
[4]. The prototype ACAS X systemcomprises two high-level
U
components: the STM and TRM. The STM tracks and computes the
estimated states of a threat aircraft and passes the data to the TRM.
Variations of the STM were used in this test to investigate the utility of
surveillance sources including ADS-B, a prototype
ATAR,TCAS-II, dan fusi data. TRM memilih CA sebuah
manuver menurut sebuah tabel logika dioptimalkan. Dua variasi TRM
digunakan untuk menghasilkan nasihat untuk menyelesaikan ancaman
tabrakan: TRM vertikal (TRM V) untuk menghasilkan nasihat vertikal
(naik atau turun), seperti yang diterapkan di TCAS II terhadap penyusup
tive coopera-; atau TRM horizontal (TRM H) untuk menghasilkan nasihat
horizontal (belok kiri atau kanan untuk heading) terhadap penyusup
nonkooperatif.
Uji terbang dipekerjakan pertemuan direncanakan terdiri dari trek
tertentu tanah, kecepatan tanah, dan profil ketinggian untuk ownship
danpenyusup untuk sampai pada titik terdekat direncanakan proach ap-
(CPA). Untuk memastikan keamanan, skenario pertemuan itu de-
ditandatangani untuk memicu peringatan tanpa offset buatan sambil
menjaga kedua ketinggian dan pemisahan horizontal antara penyusup dan
Figure 1.
ACAS Xu flight test encounter geometries.
54 IEEE A&E SISTEM MAGAZINE
ownship, not relying on the system under test (ACAS X ) to func-
tion correctly to preserve separation and prevent near-midair colli-
sion (NMAC). The scenarios were constructed using representative
horizontal geometries and operationally relevant vertical profiles including
5001000 ft altitude separation and vertical blunders. Figure 1
menggambarkan geometri horisontal dan dua contoh profil vertikal,
termasuk profil vertikal ATAR khusus.
The ACASX prototipe diimplementasikan pada Ikhana untuk ini
U
uji terbang diintegrasikan ke dalam perangkat lunak kontrol
penerbangan untuk memberikan mode manuver dipilih untuk
menanggapi Bps RA. Dalam mode penasehat, pesan RA ditampilkan
XU ke
UAS percontohan di stasiun kontrol tanah (GCS) pada heads- up display
(HUD) untuk tindakan percontohan untuk melaksanakan RA. Dalam
mode auto, komputer penerbangan otomatis bermanuver pesawat
berawak un- dalam menanggapi RA3 s after receiving and displaying an
RA to the pilot. The pilot maintains the ability to regain positive control of
the aircraft anytime during an automatic CA maneuver. Intruder aircraft did
not respond to RAs in this flight test, so the automatic maneuvering
function was disabled for the GA-ASI Predator B used as the unmanned
intruder.
September 2016

Figure 2.
ACAS-X equipment onboard NASA Ikhana.
U
SELF-SEPARATION: AIRBORNE SENSORS WITH SAA
DISPLAYS IN GCS
The objective of SS is to remain well clear of nearby air traffic and
prevent progression to a collision avoidance situation. The cur- rent FAA
definition for UAS well clear is to maintain a minimum (estimated time
to CPA) of 35 s from any airborne threats. The well clear definition also
includes a distance modification (DMOD) to maintain distance of at least
4000 ft horizontally and 700 ft verti- cally from threats regardless of , to
protect from slow closure rate encounters [5].
The remote pilot needs to understand the potential conflict that can
arise from nearby threats in case air traffic control (ATC) or the intruder
do not resolve it in time, and perform the minimal maneuvers to prevent
the projected well clear viola- tion. Projection and assessment of air traffic
to maintain well clear requires significant mental workload on the pilot.
The SS display reduces this mental workload by providing the pilot cur-
rent and projected situational awareness in an intuitive manner as well as
recommend actions to avoid upcoming conflicts. The SS encounter
scenarios were similar to the CA runs, but it was up to the remote pilot to
determine when and how much of the recommended maneuver from the SS
to execute. For example, if an SS display recommended a 20 deg heading
change, conser- vative pilots may maneuver immediately as well as add
buffer and less conservative pilots may wait to react until the situation
becomes more urgent.
The flight tests examined three prototype SS displays devel- oped by
GA-ASI and NASA. Data collection for the SS scenarios centered on how
well the pilot interfaced with the displays, and its overall ability for the
UAS to remain well clear (e.g., pilot re- action times, intuitiveness, number
and seriousness of well clear
violations, etc.). However, at the time of the flight test, the well
clear standard was not yet defined and not all displays/encounter
September 2016 IEEE A&E SISTEM MAGAZINE
Kotegawa
scenarios weretuned for the quantitative well clear definition men- tioned
above.
TEST PLATFORM SUMMARY
TEST AIRCRAFT- NASA 870 IKHANA
NASAprovided their unmanned research aircraft Ikhana (vari- ant of the
GA-ASI Predator B) (see Figure 2) as the primary test aircraft. Ikhana was
equipped with additional avionics to enable SAA functionality, including
the Honeywell TPA-100A TCAS II unit, BAE AN/DPX-7 Reduced-size
Transponder with ADS-B 1090 ES IN/OUT, GA-ASI Due Regard Radar
(DRR), and Sense and Avoid Processor (SAAP) hosting the ACAS X
software. The TCAS II and DPX-7 are certified units under the FAA
Technical Standard Orders (TSO), while the SAAP and DRR are units
under test during this flight test. In the GCS, three SAA displays were
U
installed: Conflict Prediction and Display System (CPDS) devel- oped by
GA-ASI, and StratWay+ and Autoresolver both developed by NASA.
Traffic information was shared from Ikhana to the SAA displays through
NASAs Live Virtual Constructive Distributed Environment (LVC-DE),
which also allowed researchers to ob- serve the tests remotely. Modification
on legacy GCS and flight control software further enabled automatic
maneuvers from the ACAS X RAs and appropriate interface with the pilot
station.
INTRUDER AIRCRAFT
Three manned intruders provided by FAA, Honeywell, and NASA flew on
encountersU against Ikhana. Each intruder aircraft with its unique flight
characteristic, size (for radar), and onboard surveil- lance equipment
(TCAS I, TCAS II, ADS-B, GPS recorder, etc.)
contributed to demonstrate the various aspects of ACAS X func-
U
tionality such as interoperability with TCAS and interoperability
55
Bukti-Concept Airborne Sense and Hindari Sistem
Figure 3.
Intruder aircraft details.
in mixed equipage environment. GA-ASI also provided a second Predator
B (N308HK) to demonstrate the first ever UAS vs. UAS collision
avoidance capability. Figure 3 below describes the details on relevant
equipage and tests for each intruder aircraft.
SURVEILLANCE SENSORS AND STM PERFORMANCE
FAA STM USING DISCRETE SURVEILLANCE SOURCES
Two variants of the FAA STM were tested, each usinga dis- crete surveillance
source to investigate the utility of that surveil- lance source for collision
avoidance. The ADS-B STM variant was evaluated for CA against
cooperative intruders and likely, the ATAR STM variant against
noncooperative intruders. ADS- B data transmitted by participation aircraft
was recorded using
yang ACASX sistem pada Ikhana dansebuah Thales 1030/1090 MHz
U
penerima tanah, dan dibandingkan dengan data GPS diferensial sebagai
sumber kebenaran untuk analisis. segmen perwakilan dari ADS-Data B
diperiksa sebagai kegigihan dan konsistensi mereka,
akurasi, dan kualitas yang sebenarnya dibandingkan metrik kualitas dan
p
(NAC
NAC) Menegaskan oleh sistem ADS-B. Dalam sampel yang terbatas
v
digunakan dalam analisis, penyediaan posisi dan kecepatan data dengan
ADS-B yang gigih, kesenjangan dalam pengawasan karena kebisingan atau
antara siklus pesan yang cukup singkat untuk memungkinkan kelangsungan
track melalui celah-celah, kesalahan signifikan yang langka dan
easily detected, and data accuracies were within the limits as- serted in
quality indicators. Surveillance quality was success- ful in meeting both
ADS-B and TCAS standards. ADS-B should continue to be considereda
candidate for passive surveillance for ACAS X .
HONEYWELL
U
STM USING SENSOR FUSION
The Honeywell tracking system (HTS) isa multisensor fusion system that
can simultaneously track up to 30 intruder aircraft in real-time [6]. The
HTS, based on a unique application of a multiple hypothesis testing
approach, fuses measurements and statistical information from both
cooperative and noncoopera- tive surveillance sensors in one framework to
track intruder air- craft in three dimensions. ADS-B and TCAS Mode-S
provide a globally unique ICAO ID for each intruder, but TCAS Mode C
and Radar provide sensor specific IDs for each intruder or no IDs. Some of
the largest challenges in sensor fusion research
56 IEEE A&E SISTEM MAGAZINE
are to correlate measurements from cooperative sensors with
noncooperative sensors and manage the IDs that accompany the sensor
measurements as intruders enter and leave the sen- sors field ofmelihat.
Setiap sensor pengawasan juga memiliki karakteristik kinerja unik
termasuk statistik pengukuran, akurasi, probabilitas deteksi / alarm palsu,
bidang pandang, degradasi berdasarkan lingkungan operasi, dan
memperbarui tingkat, lebih lanjut menambah tantangan sensor fusi. HTS
prototipe diuji dalam penerbangan ini sementara disaring lalu lintas udara
be- Yond 20 rentang nm untuk mencegah kelambatan karena untuk
perhitungan beban komputasi pada perangkat keras.
HTS dibagi menjadi tiga subfungsi utama: Data sebagai- sociation,
manajer track, dan filter pelacakan. yang ditunjuk asosiasi Datasensor
pengukuran koperasi atau nonkooperatif ke trek pesawat penyusup aktif.
Manajer track beroperasi
bersama-sama dengan data asosiasi untuk memulai dan mempertahankan
in-
trek truder, mengkoordinasikan ICAO ID dan ID khusus sensor untuk
trek aktif, menghapus trek yang meninggalkanbidang sensor pandang, dan
menolak trek palsu. The co- tapis sekering ditugaskan
pengukuran sensor operasi dan nonkooperatif untuk memperkirakan
the intruder trajectory statistics relative to ownship. These three
subfunctions operate together to estimate single intruder tracks (relative
position, geodetic position, relative vertical/horizontal velocity,
acceleration, azimuth, range, range rate and elevation angle) from multiple
sensor inputs and pass it to the ACAS X
U
TRM and SAA display to determine whether any SS or CA ma- neuvers
are necessary. These features of the multisensor fusion system enable the
UAS to safely operate in various mission profiles and in mixed equipage
situations across nonsegregated airspace.
Figures4 and 5 illustrate the incoming sensor measurements and
tracking performance of the HTS onboard Ikhana, respectively. The two
figures show the North-East-Down position of intruders relative to Ikhana,
as it was initially flying due west and performed a horizontal maneuver to
head due east between t = 200 to t = 285 at constant altitude. HTS was
tracking six distinct intruder targets simultaneously for this particular slice
of data, but will focus on one intruder (ICAO ID 11264663) to demonstrate
its performance. Figure 4 shows inputs from ADS-B, TCAS (Mode S), and
radar for ICAO 11264663. TCAS and ADS-B/radar reports routinely come
in at 0.2 Hz and 1 Hz, respectively. Radar measurements of separate
noncooperative intruders (radar IDs 72 and 73) are also included to
demonstrate the HTSs capability in differentiating in-
September 2016

Figure 4.
Honeywell STM sample surveillance data.
Figure 5.
Honeywell STM sample surveillance data and track output.
truder tracks. TCAS measurements are scattered as compared with ADS-B
due to measurement characteristics of active surveillance. The horizontal
radar measurements correspond very closely to the horizontal ADS-B
measurements, however the vertical radar mea- surements are generally
within 100200 m of the vertical ADS-B
September 2016 IEEE A&E SISTEM MAGAZINE
Kotegawa
measurements. HTS did not receive any ADS-B or TCAS broad- cast from
ICAO ID 11264663 for a portion of the recording due to the 20 nmi range
filter.
Figure 5 shows the tracks generated by HTS using surveil- lance
measurements in Figure 4. The estimated tracks are repre-
57
Bukti-Concept Airborne Sense and Hindari Sistem
Figure 6.
Encounter summary and recap.
sentative of HTS performance during all flight tests. The HTS is initiated
at t=0 as the ADS-B and TCAS Mode-S measurements become available.
Between t=0 and t=200, the estimated track correctly fused the ADS-B and
TCAS measurements together. HTS also correctly differentiated radar IDs
72/73 from 74 (be- longing to ICAO ID 11264663) and initiated separate
tracks for them. When fusing measurements from multiple sensors origi-
nating from the same intruder aircraft, the HTS places more sta-
tistical significance on the most accurate measurement. ADS-B
is overall a more accurate sensor than TCAS Mode-S, and HTS
algorithms reflect this by distributing weights on sensor measure-
ments accordingly. HTS continued to track the intruder aircraft until the
ADS-B and TCAS Mode S measurements became un- available at t=200,
but reinitialized the fused track with the same fusion ID as they returned at
t=300. As the intruder entered the radar field of view, HTS also fused its
measurements with the
ICAO ID 11264663 track starting at t=480. The vertical radar
measurements caused the estimated track to vary slightly away from the
ADS-B measurements as the HTS began to incorporate the statistical
accuracy of the radar. The radar dropped the track at t=560 and the HTS
continued to track the intruder using the ADS-B and TCAS Mode S
measurements. The HTS maintained radar ID 74 with the track in case of
measurement drop out for an additional 9 s and then deleted its association
from the track completely. The HTS deleted the track completely 4 s after
the ADS-B and TCAS Mode S measurements were stopped in the test
scenario.
58 IEEE A&E SISTEM MAGAZINE
COLLISION AVOIDANCE FLIGHT TEST RESULTS
CA flight tests took place over six flight days in November and December
2014, including four days of encounters between Ikhana and manned
intruders, and two days of encounters between Ikhana and another Predator
B (N308HK) UAS. The six total days of test- ing yielded 113 scripted
encounters, 22 nonscripted encounters, and 13 aborted encounters.
Nonscripted encounters imply acci-
dental triggering of ACAS-X alerts during maneuvers to repo-
sitionaircraft for the next scripted Uencounter. While unplanned, these
nonscripted encounters provided valuable data for ACAS-X
U
V&V. Of the 113 scripted encounters, 103 were against coopera- tive
intruders (series 1030) and 10 were against noncoopera- tive intruders
(series 40 special ATAR). The totals for the test are summarized in Figure
6. Of the 113 scripted encounters, the ACAS logic generated the
scripted/expected alert for 74 encounters
XU
(65%). For 39 encounters (35%), the ACAS X logic generated
U
peringatan yang tidak seperti yang ditulis / diharapkan. Namun, sebagian
besar dari pertemuan ini dapat diklasifikasikan sebagai diterima dan tanda
yang propriate ap- diberikan keterangan dari pertemuan itu sebagai
diterbangkan. Cally Specifi-, nomenklatur yang tidak ditulis / diharapkan
tidak berarti bahwa tanda tidak aman. Banyak dari tanda tersebut berada di
pertemuan di mana tidak ada peringatan yang diinginkan, tetapi waspada
hanya melayani untuk meningkatkan keselamatan. Penyimpangan di
ownship aktual dan penyusup lintasan dari jalur penerbangan yang scripted
(seperti fluktuasi ketinggian, angin, akselerograf timbangkan timing) juga
memberikan kontribusi untuk RA berbeda dari yang diharapkan, tapi tetap
aman mengingat profil sebagai diterbangkan.
September 2016
 Kotegawa

Figure 7.
CPDS horisontal dan vertikal tampilan profil snapshot.

The ACAS X CA uji terbang adalah sukses besar his tersedia di FAA Bps X Penerbangan perdana Laporan Uji
U
U
dijadwalkan
signifikansi torical. Ini ditunjukkan dan divalidasi horizontal dan vertikal to be released August 2015 [7].
fungsi memperingatkan, teknik koordinasi, ponse autores-, dan penggunaan
berbagai sumber surveilans untuk CA. uji terbang ini juga menandai
pertama kalinya bahwa sistem pesawat tak berawak CA diterbangkan tanpa SELF-SEPARATION FLIGHT TEST RESULTS
offset buatan; pelajaran dan keselamatan membangun pendekatan akan
memberikan jalan ke depan untuk tes penerbangan di masa depan. Selain Self-separationis a preventive measure carried out by the UAS pi- lot to
prestasi ini beberapa pengalaman pertama memaparkan sejarah lainnya mitigate a UAS from entering a collision avoidance scenario. The pilot is
termasuk: provided with nearby air traffic situational awareness through a dedicated
display that also recommends maneuvers to maximize the distance and
CmenunjukkanCA horisontal safety from other airborne objects de- tected by the sensors. Three SS
systems CPDS, Autoresolver, and StratWay+ were assessed in this flight
CADS-Bsebagai sumber pengawasan tunggal untuk CA
test and are described in this section. Details on StratWay+ are omitted from
Ckoordinasi interoperabilitas responsif dengan TCAS this article as analysis was still underway at time of publication.

CAktifemulasi koordinasi dalam penerbangan langsung

CAutomaneuveringpada pesawat tak berawak untuk CA CPDS

CDuapesawat tanpa awak diuji untuk CA tanpa set off buatan
The data collected and the benchmarks achieved during this flight test
will serve the unmanned aircraft community by inform- ing surveillance
requirements and engagement with the operational community on standards
and measures of performance. The inter- actions with the community that
result from this will help inform
CPDS is an SAA display developed by GA-ASI to enable a Pilot- in-the-
Loop SS concept [8]. Figure 7 displays a snapshot of the CPDS running
under a simulated encounter. CPDS is composed of horizontal (top) and
vertical (bottom) cross-sections of the conflict geometry, providing the
pilot an intuitive, three-dimensional un- derstanding of nearby
traffic/associated threats via "no-go" head- ing bands and conflict probes
(areas to avoid due to projected loss

future iterations of ACAS X logic, as the system is developed and of well clear). Many of its design requirements follow from DO-
U

integrated with SS functionality. Full results and analysis will be 317B [9] but its modular architecture allows flexible implementa-

September 2016 IEEE A&E SISTEM MAGAZINE 59

Bukti-Concept Airborne Sense and Hindari Sistem
Figure 8.
HMD filter impact on CPDS conflict probe. Left: Conflict probe without HMD filter. Right: Conflict probe with HMD filter.
tion of new features as UAS, SAA, MOPS, and the quantitative definition
of well clear evolve.
The SS flight test investigated the impact of a horizontal miss- distance
(HMD) filter on CPDS. The HMD filter is additional logic to reduce the
false alarm from the well clear requirement by using measured intruder
acceleration to detect HMDs that are sufficiently large so as not to be a
threat, similar to those in commercial TCAS II systems (version 7.0 or later)
[10]. Figure 8 illustrates the impact of HMDs on the CPDS conflict probes,
notice that without the HMD filter there is additional padding around the
areas that projects a well clear violation. The HMD filter can significantly
influence the conflict probe geometry [11], and ultimately the pilot's
decision to execute SS maneuvers. For the encounter scenario illustrated in
Figure 8, the pilot decided to maneuver based on conflict probe generated
without the HMD filter. With the HMD filter, the pilot decided to maintain
its path because the filter removed the "false alarm" conflict probe areas on
ownship's heading, providing him confidence that well clear will not be
breached. The HMD filter requirement on SS display is preferred from an
ATC standpoint, as it reduces the frequency of UAS maneuvers, keeping
aircraft traffic trajectories predictable, minimizes flight plan deviations, and
makes it easier for control- lers to manage.
AUTORESOLVER
Autoresolveris an SS algorithm developed by NASA Ames imple- mented
into the Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS), a research pilot/operator
interface to control UAS managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory
(AFRL) [12]. Originally designed for ATC ground-based separation
assurance system to manage en route air- craft, the Autoresolver algorithm
was adapted to assist UAS pilots
60 IEEE A&E SISTEM MAGAZINE
in remaining well clear [13]. Unlike CPDS, VSCS/Autoresolver is a
directive guidance system which issues SS maneuver advisories that direct
the UAS pilot to fly a specific heading or altitude in order to remain well
clear.
Autoresolver calculates ownship and intruder trajectories each time
surveillance data is updated. It analyzes the ownship trajec- tory against
intruder trajectories in order to calculate CPA, detect any upcoming well
clear violations and determine the appropriate alert/maneuver to resolve the
potential conflict. Autoresolvers performance is particularly sensitive to
the ownship state and surveillance data quality used for trajectory synthesis
because its logic reevaluates threat detection and resolution at each surveil-
lance data update instance. Ideally, Autoresolver would detect and resolve
potential well clear violations with a single attempt. However, during the
flight test Autoresolver issued intermittent alerting and inconsistent
resolution maneuvers due to the varia- tion in horizontal and vertical CPA
prediction errors, shown in Figure 9 for the encounter scenarios flown. Data
points under each scenario bins are CPA prediction errors calculated by Au-
toresolver throughout the encounter. The pilots maneuvered away from the
intruder aircraft during the encounter based on Autore- solver warnings, so
a "truth" CPA was not available. Instead, the Autoresolver-predicted CPA
was compared with an expected CPA based on the flight test cards.
Horizontal CPA error is the differ- ence between the predicted horizontal
CPA and the expected hori- zontal CPA specified for each scenario. A
negative error means that the pilot was on a trajectory that would have been
closer than expected if no SS maneuver was executed. Corrected vertical
CPA is the difference between the predicted vertical CPA and the ac- tual
altitude difference. This correction factors out actual flight altitude
differences such that both aircraft appear to be coaltitude. A box-whisker
plot format summarizes CPA prediction error sta-
September 2016

Figure 9.
Autoresolver horizontal and vertical CPA prediction error.
tistics for each scenario. The red + is the mean while the red line indicates
the median. The blue box bounds the 25-75 percen- tile CPA values. The
black whiskers bound the 9-91 percentile CPA values. The most notable
observation in the CPA analysis, albeit from a limited number of
encounters, is the variability of the vertical CPA relative to the vertical
alerting threshold of 900 ft. The boxes representing the 25-75 percentiles
can be seen to span as much as 600 ft (e.g. scenario S35b-2). This CPA
variability can cause the predicted CPA to bounce in and out of the alert-
ing threshold, especially the vertical threshold. Although Autore- solvers
directive guidance design made it particularly sensitive to CPA variations,
improved methods for processing ownship state and surveillance data
would provide more accurate and consistent CPA predictions and,
consequently, more stable alerting for all trajectory-based SAA systems.
MAJU
2014 ACAS-X uji terbang membentuk konsep bukti-of-
U
landasan bagi sistem UAS SSA berdasarkan Predator B, dan yang pertama
kali untuk menunjukkan dikoordinasikan resolusi neuvers ma otomatis
dalam pertemuan antara dua pesawat tak berawak. komunikasi menyeluruh
antara organisasi bermitra adalah kunci keberhasilan, dan pelajaran selama
pengembangan sistem / perencanaan uji terbang kontribusi signifikan untuk
mengidentifikasi dan memitigasi risiko
September 2016 IEEE A&E SISTEM MAGAZINE
Kotegawa
on subsequent flight tests. Further improvements on hardware and software
enabling CA and SS individual and fused sensor surveil- lance are in
progress to increase reliability and performance of the SAA system.
Followingthe success of the 2014 flight test, several more flight tests
are underway to expand and validate the SAA system functionality. The
radar hardware enhancement will expand its field of view (up to 220 deg
horizontally) and target tracking ca- pabilities by adding an additional
antenna to the subsystem. More complex encounter geometries, some
involving multiple intruders, will further challenge the CA and SS
algorithms. The 2014 flight test examined the CA and SS functionality
separately. The next significant step is to integrate the two together;
specifically, it is critical that SS alerts appear before and are interoperable
with CA alerts. SAA system development for UAS is an extremely complex
task, and unrealistic to achieve singlehanded. A strong partner- ship
between industry, government, and academia is essential to develop the key
system that can allow unrestricted UAS access to
NAS. Pemerintah dan industri mitra untuk Bps X de-
velopment merencanakan tindak lanjut uji terbang pada tahun 2016 yang
akan Fur- ther meningkatkan dan mengembangkan sistem ini dan
memberikan data untuk mendukung kegiatan sertifikasi masa depan. tindak
pada uji terbang akan menampilkan peningkatan logika dan mencakup U
lebih banyak prototipe dibangun di atas produksi-hardware avionik siap. uji
terbang ini merupakan langkah pertama menuju kemampuan CA
bersertifikat untuk UAS.
61
Bukti-Concept Airborne Sense and Hindari Sistem
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