ALBENSON v CA Albenson Enterprises v.

Court of Appeals
FACTS: Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific
Banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks.
Check was later dishonored for the reason Account Closed. Company traced source of
check and later discovered that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson
made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or
that the signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP
22. It was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who
manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform
Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against
Albenson.
ISSUE: Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.
RATIO: Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didnt have the intent to
cause damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to
them. There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22.
G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993
FACTS: Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries,
Inc. at Baltao Building mild steel plates which the latter ordered and as part of the
payment, a bouncing check was issued by one Eugenio Baltao.
Petitioner, in a sincere attempt to collect the sum of money due them, filed a criminal
complaint against private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao after the latter refused to make
good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand. However, there was a mistake
of identity as there were two Eugenio Baltaos conducting business in the same building
Eugenio S. Baltao and his son, Eugenio Baltao III.
It was found that the signature of the check was not of Eugenio S. Baltao and because of
the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him, respondent Baltao filed a
complaint for damages anchored on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code against
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights (Article 19) has been violated,
resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law.

Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued RULING: No, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse
check based on ff inquiries: of rights. What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00
SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private
Bank said signature belonged to EB respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check. Private
respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand.
EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III. Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless
petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages.
There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof
that: the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal
and that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges were right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
false and groundless injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law
which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether
Elements of abuse of right under Article 19: willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to
there is a legal right or duty exercised in bad faith for the sole intent of prejudicing or another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts
injuring another contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2)
but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is
Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores: done with intent to injure.
there is an act which is legal but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order
or public policy it is done with intent to injure There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing
of the case against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud
A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages.
compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the
issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission
or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of
an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment
of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs
against respondent Baltao.
Elcano vs Hill
77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977
Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from
Crimes
FACTS: Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a
criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with
mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for
damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred
by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent
has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason
of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a
separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened
or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the
marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation
by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but
he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of
his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the
SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins
liability should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity
G.R. No. L-24803 [May 26, 1977]
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of
AgapitoElcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and
MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-
appellees.
Facts of the Case: Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of the plaintiffs
named Agapito Elcano. A criminal complaint was instituted against him but he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill,
couple with mistake. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint for recovery of damages
against defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his
father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was living and getting subsistence, for the
same killing. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants. The Court of First Instance
of Quezon City denied the motion. Nevertheless, the civil case was
finally dismissed upon motion for reconsideration.
Issues: 1. WON the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case. 2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of
the Civil Code may be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that
at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and
getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married.
Ruling of the Court:
1. No, the present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case. Firstly, there is a distinction as regards the proof required in a criminal
case and a civil case. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient
to make the defendant pay in damages. Furthermore, a civil case for damages on the
basis of quasi-delict does is independently instituted from a criminal act. As such the
acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-
delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill.
Although parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the
child, emancipation by marriage is not absolute, i.e. he can sue and be sued in court only
with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. As in the present case, killing
someone else contemplated judicial litigation, thus, making Article 2180 apply to Atty.
Hill.However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity,
the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
Safeguard Security Agency Inc. and Admer Pajarillo vs. Lauro Tangco, et.al
G.R. No. 165732, 14 December 2006
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS: On 3 November 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology
Bank, Katipunan Branch in Quezon City to renew her time deposit. Evangeline, a duly
licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside of her
residence, approached Pajarillo, security guard of Ecology Bank to deposit the firearm for
safekeeping, suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the
abdomen instantly causing her death.
Evangelines husband, Lauro, together with his six minor children filed with the RTC of QC
a criminal case against Pajarillo, where they likewise reserved their right to file a separate
civil action on the said criminal case. Pajarillo was subsequently convicted of homicide in
19 January 2000 by the RTC and the CA upheld the decision with modification on the
penalty on 31 July 2000.
On 14 January 1998, respondents filed with the RTC of Marikina City a complaint for
damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard
Security Agency Inc. for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage committed by its security guard. The respondents prayed for actual,
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
The RTC of Marikina rendered judgment in favor of Lauro Tangco et. al. ordering Pajarillo
and Safeguard Security agency Inc. ,jointly and severally, to pay:
157,430.00 as actual damages;
50,000 as death indemnity;
1million pesos as moral damages;
300,000.00 as exemplary damages;
30,000.00 as attorneys fees; and costs of suit.
The RTC ruled that Pajarillo did not act in self-defense; giving no weight to his claim that
Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the incident given that Pajarillo
had not made any such reports to the head office and the police authorities. Pajarillo
should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care in ascertaining the matter
instead of shooting her instantly. The RTC likewise found Safeguard to be jointly and
severally liable with Pajarillo since there was no sufficient evidence to show that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father by simply showing that it required its
guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision as contemplated
under the law. It includes the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are
faithfully complied with.
The CA modified that decision of the RTC saying that Safeguard Security Agency Inc. is
only subsidiarily liable. A motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed and denied by
the CA, hence this petition.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline
2. Whether or not Safeguard Security Agency Inc. should be held solidarily liable
for the damages awarded to respondents in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
RULING: 1. Yes, Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline as
upheld by both the RTC and CA in separate decisions. The SC affirms these decisions
since based on the evidence presented, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claims that
Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously
which Pajarillo mistook as a bank robbery which led him to draw his service firearm and
shot Evangeline.
2. Yes, Safeguard Security Agency Inc. should be held solidarily liable for the damages
awarded to the respondents. The nature of the respondents cause of action is
determined in the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. In the complaint,
the respondents are invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for their
indirect responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillos act of shooting and killing
Evangeline under Article 2176. Thus, the civil action filed by respondents was not derived
from the criminal liability of Pajarillo but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi delict
which is a separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict
committed by Pajarillo and is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of
his employee by operation of law. The Court agrees with the RTCs finding that
Safeguard had exercised diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since records show that he
underwent psychological and neuropsychiatric evaluation, pre-licensing training course for
security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances. However, Safeguard was not
diligent in providing trainings, classroom instructions and continuous evaluation of the
security guards performance. Thus, the SC affirms with modification that the civil
liability of Safeguard Security Agency Inc. is solidary and primary under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals
219 SCRA 115 Civil Law Torts and Damages Breach of promise to Marry Article 21
of the Civil Code
FACTS: In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan,
Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange
student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and
intimate. On Marilous account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the
end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they
expressed their intention to get married. Marilous parents then started inviting sponsors
and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the
occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual
intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating
Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that
he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued
Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. On appeal, Gashem averred that
he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to have violated
Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino
customs and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of
his breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit
and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual congress.
As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin
before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem
not promised to marry her. Gashems blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage
and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy.
As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and even taking advantage
of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary
will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of
torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach
complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal remedy for
the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books such as the absence of a law penalizing a
the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry
was made and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be
recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or if
expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual
damages may be recovered.
Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs. CA
CITATION: 219 SCRA 115
FACTS:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get
married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical
exchange student who later courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even
went to Marilous house to secure approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the
respondent to leave with him in his apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with
him. After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner started maltreating and
threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the apartment while he was in school
and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the petitioner administered a
drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since
he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed
marriage or agreed to be married neither sought consent and approval of Marlious
parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter
deceived him by stealing money and his passport. The private respondent prayed for
damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.
ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.
HELD:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. The court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a
woman to consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the
woman. In that instance, the court found that petitioners deceptive promise to marry led
Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have
carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding
preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws
of the country.
Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.
MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. VS MIGUEL CAMPOS G.R. NO. 138814, APRIL
26, 2009
FACTS: SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 was instituted on 10 February 1994 by respondent
Miguel V. Campos with the Securities, Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a Petition against herein petitioners
Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. (MKSE). The Petition, sought: (1) the nullification of the
Resolution dated 3 June 1993 of the MKSE Board of Directors, which allegedly deprived
him of his right to participate equally in the allocation of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) of
corporations registered with MKSE; (2) the delivery of the IPO shares he was allegedly
deprived of, for which he would pay IPO prices; and (3) the payment of P2 million as
moral damages, P1 million as exemplary damages, and P500,000.00 as attorneys fees
and litigation expenses. The SICD issued an Order granting respondents prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin petitioners from implementing or
enforcing the Resolution of the MKSE Board of Directors. Subsequently issued another
Order on 10 March 1994 granting respondents application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, to continuously enjoin, during the pendency of SEC Case No. 02-94-4678, the
implementation or enforcement of the MKSE Board Resolution in question.
On 11 March 1994, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss respondents Petition based on
the following grounds: (1) the Petition became moot due to the cancellation of the license
of MKSE; (2) the SICD had no jurisdiction over the Petition; and (3) the Petition failed to
state a cause of action. The SICD denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners again
challenged Order of SICD before the SEC en banc through another Petition for Certiorari.
The SEC en banc nullified the Order of SICD granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
favour of respondent. SEC en banc annulled the Order of SICD in SEC Case No. 02-94-
4678 denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss, and accordingly ordered the dismissal of
respondents Petition before the SICD. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
RULING: The petition filled by the respondent, Miguel Campos should be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action. A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another.
A complaint states a cause of action where it contains three essential elements of a cause
of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the
defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. If
these elements are absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to dismissal on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action. However, the terms right and obligation are not
magic words that would automatically lead to the conclusion that such Petition sufficiently
states a cause of action. Right and obligation are legal terms with specific legal
meaning. A right is a claim or title to an interest in anything whatsoever that is
enforceable by law while an obligation is defined in the Civil Code as a juridical necessity
to give, to do or not to do. Justice J.B.L. Reyes offers the definition given by Arias Ramos
as a more complete definition: An obligation is a juridical relation whereby a person
(called the creditor) may demand from another (called the debtor) the observance of a
determinative conduct (the giving, doing or not doing), and in case of breach, may
demand satisfaction from the assets of the latter. Art. 1157 of the Civil Code provides
that Obligations arise from (1) Law; (2) Contracts; (3) Quasi-contracts; (4) Acts or
omissions punished by law; and (5) Quasi-delicts. The mere assertion of a right and claim
of an obligation in an initiatory pleading, whether a Complaint or Petition, without
identifying the basis or source thereof, is merely a conclusion of fact and law. (In the case
at bar, although the Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 does allege respondents
right to subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in the stock market at their offering
prices, and petitioners obligation to continue respecting and observing such right, the
Petition utterly failed to lay down the source or basis of respondents right and/or
petitioners obligation.)
Respondent merely quoted in his Petition the MKSE Board Resolution, passed sometime in
1989, granting him the position of Chairman Emeritus of MKSE for life. However, there is
nothing in the said Petition from which the Court can deduce that respondent, by virtue of
his position as Chairman Emeritus of MKSE, was granted by law, contract, or any other
legal source, the right to subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in the stock market
at their offering prices. (allocation of IPO shares was merely alleged to have been done in
accord with a practice normally observed by the members of the stock exchange)
A practice or custom is, as a general rule, not a source of a legally demandable or
enforceable right.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U.CARBONEL, petitioners, vs.
THE INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO
DIONISIO,respondents.[G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987]TOPIC:PONENTE:
FELICIANO, J.AUTHOR:NOTES: (if applicable)FACTS:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975, at about 1:30am, private respondent
Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his
boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation, where he had taken "a shot or
two" of liquor.
He had just crossed an intersection and while driving down the street, his headlights were
turned off. When he switched on his
headlights to bright, he suddenly saw a Ford dump truck some 2 meters away from
his Volkswagen car. It was later found out that he did not a curfew pass that night.
The dump truck belonged to co-petitioner Phoenix, and was parked there by the
company driver, co-petitioner Carbonel. It was parked on the right hand side of the lane
that Dionisio was driving on, but it was parked facing the oncoming traffic. It was parked
a skew so it was sticking out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic.
There were no lights nor were there any early warning reflector devices set anywhere
near the truck, front or rear
Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the truck, which was scheduled to be used the
next morning.
Dionisio, upon seeing the truck, tried to avoid a collision by swerving to the left, but it
was too late. His car smashed into the truck. Dionisio suffered physical injuries, including
permanent facial scars, a nervous breakdown and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix.
Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondents own negligence
in driving at a high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. It
invoked the Last Clear Chance Doctrine: Dionisio had the Last Clear Chance of avoiding
the accident and so Dionisio, having failed to take the last clear chance, must bear his
own injuries alone.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.
ISSUE(S): Whether the collision was brought by respondents own negligence.
HELD: No. Dionisio is guilty of contributory negligent but the legal and proximate cause
of the collision was brought about by theway the truck was parked.
RATIO:
The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the
wrongful or negligent manner in which the dumptruck was parked in other words, the
negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was
anatural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a
substantial and important part of the risk, to which thedefendant has subjected the
plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope
original risk, andhence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally
agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the
defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the
plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic
becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently
driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not
relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory,"
that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack
of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though
such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the Common Law was imported into our
jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is still a matter of debate whether, or to what
extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The doctrine was applied
by Common Law because they had a rule that contributory negligence prevented any
recovery at all by a negligent plaintiff. But in the Philippines we have Article 2179 of the
Civil Code which rejects the Common Law doctrine of contributory negligence. Thus, the
court in this case stated that it does not believe so that the general concept of Last Clear
Chance has been utilized in
our jurisdiction. Article 2179 on contributory negligence is not an exercise in chronology o
r physics but what is important is thenegligent act or omission of each party and the
character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community. To say that Phoenix should be absolved from liability would come close to
wiping out the fundamental law that a man must. respond for the foreseeable
consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Thus, the Last Clear Chance Doctrine
was not applied because the court thinks that it is not applicable in our jurisdiction.
ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 179799
FACTS: The case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of Complaint for violation of B.P. 22
by Emma J. Datuin (Datuin), as Officer-in-Charge of the Accounts Receivables
Department, and upon authority of Sansio Philippines, Inc. (Sansio), against Zenaida R.
Gregorio (Gregorio) and one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors of Alvi Marketing, allegedly for
delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for the numerous appliances
bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio. As the address stated in the complaint was
incorrect, Gregorio was unable to controvert the charges against her. Consequently, she
was indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest, and it was served upon her by the armed
operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) on October 17, 1997, Friday, at
around 9:30 a.m. in Quezon City while she was visiting her husband and their two (2)
daughters at their city residence. Gregorio was brought to the PARAC-DILG Office where
she was subjected to fingerprinting and mug shots, and was detained. She was released
in the afternoon of the same day when her husband posted a bond for her temporary
liberty.
On December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the MeTC a Motion for Deferment of
Arraignment and Reinvestigation, alleging that she could not have issued the bounced
checks, since she did not even have a checking account with the bank on which the
checks were drawn, as certified by the branch manager of the Philippine National Bank,
Sorsogon Branch. She also alleged that her signature was patently and radically different
from the signatures appearing on the bounced checks.
The MeTC granted the Motion and a reinvestigation was conducted. In the course of the
reinvestigation, Datuin submitted an Affidavit of Desistance stating, among others, that
Gregorio was not one of the signatories of the bounced checks subject of prosecution.
On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao, Albay. Sansio and Datuin filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint, being one for damages arising from
malicious prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts constituting
the elements thereof were not alleged in the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based on quasi-delict or
malicious prosecution.
HELD: A perusal of the allegations of Gregorios complaint for damages readily shows
that she filed a civil suit against Sansio and Datuin for filing against her criminal charges
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22; that respondents did not exercise diligent efforts to ascertain
the true identity of the person who delivered to them insufficiently funded checks as
payment for the various appliances purchased; and that respondents never gave her the
opportunity to controvert the charges against her, because they stated an incorrect
address in the criminal complaint. Gregorio claimed damages for the embarrassment and
humiliation she suffered when she was suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon
City while visiting her family. She was, at the time of her arrest, a respected Kagawad in
Oas, Albay. Gregorio anchored her civil complaint on Articles 26, 2176, and 2180 of the
Civil Code. Noticeably, despite alleging either fault or negligence on the part of Sansio
and Datuin, Gregorio never imputed to them any bad faith in her complaint.
Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by the material
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Undeniably, Gregorios
civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article
2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence
of the defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond; (3) the connection
of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and (4)
that there must be no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.
On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages,
prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a
criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal
security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy;
and (6) right to peace of mind.
A scrutiny of Gregorios civil complaint reveals that the averments thereof, taken
together, fulfill the elements of Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code. It
appears that Gregorios rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace
of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite
diligence in determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of
tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed to
ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to
controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Because she was not
able to refute the charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was never found at No. 76 Pearanda St.,
Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi Marketing as stated in the criminal complaint,
Gregorio was conveniently arrested by armed operatives of the PARAC-DILG at her city
residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family. She suffered
embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to
spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering
that she had held several honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the
public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest.
There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand,
Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its vicarious
liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee Datuin.
These allegations, assuming them to be true, sufficiently constituted a cause of action
against Sansio and Datuin. Thus, the RTC was correct when it denied respondents motion
to dismiss
American Express International, Inc. vs. Noel Cordero
G.R. No. 138550 [October 14, 2005]
FACTS: American Express International was a foreign corporation that
issued charge cards used to purchase goods and services at accredited merchants
worldwide to its customers. Nilda Cordero, wife of respondent Noel Cordero, was issued
an American Express charge card. An extension charge card, was likewise issued
to respondent Noel Cordero which he also signed. Respondent, together with his family
went on a three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. The group went to the Watsons Chemist
Shop. While there, Noel picked up chocolate candies and handed his American Express
extension charge card to the sales clerk to pay for his purchases. Susan Chong, the store
manager, informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut
respondents American Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according to
respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the
purchases using her own American Express charge card.
The card was placed in the Inspect Airwarn Support System, a system utilized
by petitioner as a protection both for the company and the cardholders against the
fraudulent use of their charge cards. Once a card suspected of unauthorized use is placed
in the system, the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the
holder. If the true identity of the card owner is established, the card is honored and the
charges are approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated.
 Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against
petitioner. He prayed for the award of moral damages and exemplary damages, as well
as attorneys fees as a result of the humiliation he suffered. According to the trial court,
petitioner should have informed respondent that on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong
Kong attempted to use a charge card bearing similar number to that of respondents card
and that petitioners inexcusable failure to do so is the proximate cause of the
confiscation and cutting of respondents extension card which exposed the latter to
public humiliation for which the petitioner should be held liable. Upon appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.

ISSUE: Whether the lower courts gravely erred in awarding moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorneys fees to Cordero.

RULING: YES. The Court ruled that petitioner can revoke respondents card
without notice, as was done. The subject card would not have been confiscated and cut
had respondent talked to petitioners representative and identified himself as the
genuine cardholder. As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card
upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the authorized cardholder.
That could have been accomplished had respondent talked to petitioners representative,
enabling the latter to determine that respondent was indeed the true holder of the card.
Clearly, no negligence which breached the contract could have been attributed to
petitioner. If at all, the cause of respondents humiliation and embarrassment was his
refusal to talk to petitioners representative. It was thus safe to conclude that there was
no negligence on the part of petitioner and that, therefore, it cannot be held liable to
respondent for damages. The petition was granted.

Jose Cangco vs Manila Railroad Co.

30 Phil 768 Civil Law Torts and Damages Distinction of Liability of Employers Under
NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the
Article 2180 and Their Liability for Breach of Contract
selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever
done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does
Facts: On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He
not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or
free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even
omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused
though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which
damage to another.
was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he
failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a
door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious
person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual
injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.
liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of
contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an
watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he
extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a
Issue: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
contractual undertaking or in itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking
obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.
Held: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice
and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means an obligation of law, or the right of the obligee to
and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while
enforce a civil matter in a court of law.
the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person.
He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no
appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under
Article 2180 and their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:
CANGCO VS MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY G.R. L-12191 OCTOBER 14, 1918
FACTS: On January 20, 1915, Jose Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad
Company where he was an employee. As the train drew near to his destination, he arose
from his seat. When he was about to alight from the train, Cangco accidentally stepped
on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice because it was already 7:00pm and it
was dim when it happened. As a result, he slipped and fell violently on the platform. His
right arm was badly crushed and lacerated which was eventually amputated.
Cangco sued Manila Railroad Company on the ground of negligence of its employees
placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a
menace to the security of passenger alighting from the companys trains.
The companys defense was that granting that its employees were negligent in placing an
obstruction upon the platform, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by
plaintiff was his own contributing negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contributing negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
HELD: In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act
that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and
physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of
the passenger, and should be considered.
The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and off
the train at the station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard
either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the
platform where he was alighting. The Supreme Courts conclusion was that the conduct of
the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.
AIR FRANCE VS RAFAEL CARRASCOSO
Civil Law Torts and Damages Negligence Malfeasance Quasi-Delict
Remedial Law Evidence Hearsay Rule Res Gestae Startling Event
FACTS: In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en
route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air
France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air
France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a better right than him.
Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on
board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the planes tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France
for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso
testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to
the planes pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he
noted in the planes journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually
awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance
of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first
class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the
parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding the note
made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
2. Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was not
presented in court is admissible in evidence.
HELD:
1. Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual and on
culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a
contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was
breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;
and Third, that there was bad faith when Air Frances employee compelled Carrascoso to
leave his first class accommodation berth after he was already, seated and to take a
seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments
and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance of a first
class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat.
Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not
contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to
be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses
from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress
of Carrascosos action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public
duty by the Air France a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
2.Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The
subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does
not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened, the
impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement
had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of
the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was
spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness
has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of
the res gestae
# Garcia vs. Salvador
AIR FRANCE V CARRASCOSO September 28, 1966 AIR FRANCE, petitioner, Mar. 20, 2007
vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. J. Ynares-Santiago

FACTS: Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that Facts: Ranida D. Salvador started working as a trainee in the Accounting Department
left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc. As a prerequisite for regular employment, she
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air underwent a medical examination at the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia who
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to is a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test and on
Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the October 22,1993, CDC issued the test result indicating that Ranida was "HBs Ag:
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he Reactive." The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as examiner and the rubber
was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a stamp signature of Castro as pathologist. When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr.
"white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, the latter apprised her that the findings indicated
vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Thus, based on the medical
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. After some report submitted by Sto. Domingo, the Company terminated Ranidas employment for
commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. failing the physical examination. When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her
ailment, the latter suffered a heart attack and was confined at the Bataan Doctors
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: Hospital. During Ramons confinement, Ranida underwent another HBs Ag test at the said
1. CFI Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by hospital and the result indicated that she is non-reactive. She informed Sto. Domingo of
way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the this development but was told that the test conducted by CDC was more reliable because
difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- it used the Micro-Elisa Method. Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing, and
Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of this time, the Anti-HBs test conducted on her indicated a "Negative" result. Ranida also
the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit. underwent another HBs Ag test at the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-Elisa
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 Method. Result: non-reactive Ranida submitted the test results from Bataan Doctors
to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs Hospital and CDC to the Executive Officer of the Company who requested her to undergo
against petitioner. another similar test before her re-employment would be considered. Thus, CDC
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for conducted another HBs Ag test on Ranida which indicated a "Negative" result.
first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a Ma. Ruby G. Calderon, Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge of CDC, issued a Certification
first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. correcting the initial result and explaining that the examining medical technologist
(Garcia) interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or reactive.Company rehired
ISSUE: Is Carrascoso entitled to damages? RanidaJuly 25, 1994 - Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
Garcia and a purportedly unknown pathologist of CDC, claiming that, by reason of the
RULING: Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his erroneous interpretation of the results of Ranidas examination, she lost her job and
right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights, while Ramon was
from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class hospitalized and lost business opportunities. Castro was named as the pathologist Garcia
compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and reiterated the scientific
established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a explanation for the "false positive" result of the first HBs Ag test in his December 7,1993
meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a letter to the respondents Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and
"state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive only when a case was referred to him; that he did not examine Ranida; and that the test
of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." results bore only his rubber-stamp signature.

For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, Trial Court dismissed complaint respondents should have presented Sto.
must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: Domingo and medicalexpert to testify on the explanation given by GarciaCA reversed TC
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner decision Garcia maintains he is not negligent, thus not liable for damages, because he
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the followed the appropriate laboratory measures and procedures as dictated by his training
latter for the damage. and experience; and that he did everything within his professional competence to arrive
at an objective, impartial and impersonal result.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an Issue: WON CDC is liable
action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by Held: Yes, CDC is liable. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the
the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. For health care
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either
nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or
stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not
is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case ofquasi-delict. have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is guilty
Damages are proper. of negligence.
Elements of an actionable conduct:
1) Duty 2) Breach 3) Injury 4) Proximate causation
Duty: Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes,
as well as rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the
health of the people by preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed
and inadequately supported clinical laboratories and by improving the quality of
performance of clinical laboratory examinations. Their business is impressed with public
interest, as such, high standards of performance are expected from them. Violation of a
statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to do
something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable to whoever may be
injured thereby.
Violations of RA 4688 (The Clinical Laboratory Law) committed by CDC:
1)CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required
bylaw, but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist. Castro was named
as head of CDC, but his infrequent visits to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an
effective administrative supervision and control over the activities in the laboratory.
2) Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of
Castro, who admitted that he does not know and has never met her.
3) Disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without the
authorization of Castro. Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which
followed after the release of the HBsAG test result. However, his failure to comply with
the laws and rules promulgated and issued for the protection of public safety and interest
is failure to observe that care which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Injury: Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcias failure to
comply with the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the
service for failing the physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis;
and was compelled to undergo several more tests. All these could have been avoided had
the proper safeguards been scrupulously followed in conducting the clinical examination
and releasing the clinical report.
Art. 20 provides legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision.
Art. 20: Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another,shall indemnify the latter for the same. Orlando Garcia guilty of gross negligence.
#
Garcia, Jr. v. Salvador (2007) / Ynares-Santiago
Facts: Ranida Salvador started working as a trainee in LBHT. She underwent a medical
exam @ CDC with Garcia (medtech) conducting the HBs Ag test. Her result was
REACTIVE. The company physician (Sto. Domingo) told her she is suffering from HepaB,
and based on the medical report SD submitted, LBHT terminated her employment. Ranida
told her father Ramon about her condition, then the latter suffered a heart attack and was
confined at Bataan Doctors Hospital. Ranida took another HBs Ag test in BDH, and the
result was NON-REACTIVE. She told Dr. SD about it but the latter said the CDC test was
more reliable, so she took another test at CDC again, and the result this time was NON-
REACTIVE. She took the same test used in CDC @ BDH and the result was NON-
REACTIVE (four tests!). She submitted the results to the LBHT ExecOff who requested her
to undergo under test (WTF!) - result is NEGATIVE (5th test, haha), so LBHT rehired her.
Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages against medtech Garcia +
pathologist Castro, claiming that the erroneous interpretation led her to lose her job,
suffer mental anxiety, while Ramon was hospitalized + lost business opportunities. Garcia
denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence; explained "false positive."
Castro said he did not examine Ranida, and that the results bore only his stamped
signature.
RTC dismissed the Salvadors' complaint for failure to present sufficient evidence.
CA reversed this and ordered Garcia to pay moral damages (50k), exemplary damages
(50k), and atty's fees (25k). Castro was exonerated.
Issue and Holding
WON CA correctly found Garcia liable for damages. YES
1. WON a person is negligent is a question of fact -- petition for review on
certiorari limited to reviewing errors of law
1. Negligence - failure to observe for the protection of another's interest
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which circ demand, whereby
the other suffers injury
1. ALL ELEMENTS OF AN ACTIONABLE CONDUCT ARE PRESENT
IN THIS CASE
1. Duty
2. Breach
3. Injury
4. Proximate causation
2. Negligence is a violation of statutory duty -- so many laws were
broken!
1. CDC is not administered, directed, supervised by licensed
physician but by a licensed medtech
1. Castro's infrequent visit barely qualifies as an
admin supervision and control
2. Garcia conducted HBs Ag test of Ranida without Castro's
supervision
3. HBs Ag test result released to Ranida without Castro's
authorization
3. Garcia's failure to comply with laws, rules promulgated for the
protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe the care which
a reasonably prudent health care provider would observe --> BREACH OF
DUTY!
4. Injuries suffered by Ranida could have been avoided had proper
safeguards been followed
5. NCC 20 is the legal basis for award of damages to one who suffers
whenever another commits an act in violation of some legal provision
Damages, fees upheld. Garcia guilty of gross negligence.
G.R. No.179446: January 10, 2011

LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC. Petitioner vs. GLODEL BROKERAGE

CORPORATION and R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION Respondents

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: Columbia Wire and Cable Corporation (Columbia) insured a cargo of copper cathodes
through R&B Insurance Corporation (R&B). Columbia also engaged the services of Glodel
Brokerage Corporation (Glodel) for the transport of the cargo to Columbia facilities. Glodel then
engaged the services of Loadmasters Customs Services (Loadmasters) for the delivery of said
cargo to Columbia. Out of 12 trucks, owned by Loadmasters, used to deliver the cargo of
Columbia, only 11 made it to their respective destinations. /span>Columbia claimed the amount
of loss from R&B, which sued both Glodel and Loadmasters. The RTC ruled in favor of R&B, but
did not hold Loadmasters liable. Both R&B and Glodelappealed the judgement. The Court of
Appeals modified the decision of the RTC and ruled that Loadmasters, being the agent of Glodel,
is liable to Glodel for all the damages it might be required to pay.

ISSUES: Whether or not Loadmasters is an agent of Glodel, and whether or not it may be held
liable under the transaction between Glodel and Columbia.

HELD: Petition is partly meritorious

Civil Law: Glodel and Loadmasters are both common carriers, as they hold out their carriage
services to the public. As such, under the Civil Code, they are mandated to show extraordinary
diligence in the conduct of transport. In the case at bar, both Glodel and Loadmasters were
negligent as the cargo failed to reach its destination. Loadmasters failed to ensure that its
employees would not tamper with the cargo. Glodel failed to ensure that Loadmasters is
sufficiently capable of completing the delivery. Glodel and Loadmasters are therefore joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable to R&B Insurance.

Loadmasters cannot be considered an agent of Glodel. Loadmasters in no way represented itself

as such, and in the transfer of cargo, did not represent itself as doing such in behalf of Glodel.
In fact, Loadmasters is not privy to the agreement between Glodel and Columbia. It cannot be
considered an agent of Glodel, and cannot be held liable to Glodel.

Remedial Law: Though Glodel has, admittedly, a cause of action against Loadmasters, it has
effectively waived it by failing to raise the cross-claim. The rules of procedure states that
compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims not pleaded are deemed waived. They cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.

LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., vs. GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION and

R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION, / G.R. No. 179446 / January 10, 2011

FACTS: The case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court assailing the August 24, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
82822.
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor
of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks.
On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel "Richard Rey" from Isabela,
Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the same date.
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes
from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the
services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbias
warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City.
The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by
its employed drivers and accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Of the six (6) trucks route
to Balagtas, Bulacan, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1) truck, loaded with 11
bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo.
Later on, the said truck, was recovered but without the copper cathodes. Because of
this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount
ofP1,903,335.39. After the investigation, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount
ofP1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.
R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and
Glodel before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), It sought reimbursement of the
amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed that it had been
subrogated "to the right of the consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be held
legally liable for the loss."
On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision holding Glodel liable for damages
for the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters counterclaim for damages and
attorneys fees against R&B Insurance.
Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered that the appellee is an agent of appellant Glodel,
whatever liability the latter owes to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation as insurance
indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be paid by appellee Loadmasters. Hence,
Loadmasters filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to determine their
liability for the loss of the subject cargo.
RULING: The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Judgment is rendered declaring petitioner
Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. and respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation jointly and
severally liable to respondent
Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by
land, water or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. Loadmasters is a
common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by land, through its
trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the
carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry
goods for the general public. Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of
Article 1732. For as stated and well provided in the case of Schmitz Transport & Brokerage
Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier,
the transportation of goods being an integral part of its business.
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case, as required
by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that
extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection
observe for securing and preserving their own property or rights. With respect to the time frame
of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary
diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and
received by, the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.
The Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R &
B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the
contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is
not a valid defense.
For under ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose
employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the
shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused by its
employees who acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to
the warehouse.
Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to ensure
that Loadmasters would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo
to the designated destination. Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters. Its
defense of force majeure is unavailing.
For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot come to its aid on
equitable grounds. "Equity, which has been aptly described as a justice outside legality, is
applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of
procedure." The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the cudgels for a party who has been at
fault or negligent.
Equitable Leasing Corporation vs Suyom
388 SCRA 445 (2002)
Facts: On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the
house cum store of Myrna Tamayo in Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was
destroyed which caused death and injury. Tutor was charged with and later convicted of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries.
Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, it was known that the registered
owner of the tractor was Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. On April 15,
1995, respondents filed against Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable
Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a Complaint for damages.
The petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that the
former was no longer in possession and control thereof at the time of the incident. It also
claimed that Tutor was an employee, not of Equitable, but of Ecatine.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was liable for damages based on quasi delict for the
negligent acts.
Held:
The Lease Agreement between petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the intention
of the parties to enter into a finance lease agreement. Ownership of the subject tractor
was to be registered in the name of petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been
fully paid by Edwin Lim.
Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor. Thus, a Deed of
Sale over the tractor was executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented by Edwin
Lim. However, the Deed was not registered with the LTO.
Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the
registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident.The Court has consistently
ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful
operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned.
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary
liability for the deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.
#
Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Lucita Suyom, Marissa Enano, Myrna Tamayo and Felix
Oledan
[G.R. No. 143360, 5 September 2002, 388 SCRA 445]
Facts:
A tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into a hous
e - c u m - s t o r e i n To nd o, Ma n ila . Pa rt o f th e ho use wa s d est ro yed. Tw o
pe op le d ied a nd four we re injured .
T u t o r w a s c o n v i c t e d o f r e c k l e s s i m p r u d e n c e resulting in
multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries. Verification with the Land Transportation
Office revealed that the registered o wne r o f th e t ract o r was Eq u ita b le Leas ing
Co rp o rat ion w ho lea sed it to Edwin Lim. The relatives of the victims filed a civil case
for damages. T h e R e g i o n a l T r i a l C o u r t r u l e d a g a i n s t E q u i t a b l
e a n d o r d e r e d i t t o p a y damages to the victims relatives. Up on
E qu itab le s appe a l, t he C ou rt o f Appea ls s us ta ined t he RTC. Eq u it ab le filed a
petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether Equitable Leasing is liable for damages

Held/Ratio:
Yes, Equitable Leasing is liable. The petition is denied and the CA decision is affirmed. As
the registered owner of the tractor, Equitable Leasing is liable for the
actso f R a u l T u t o r e v e n i f h e w a s a c t u a l l y t h e e m p l o y e e o f
E q u i t a b l e s fo rme r les see, Eca t in e Co rpo ra t io n, wh o beca me t he a ct ua l
o wn er o f the tractor by virtue of a deed of sale not registered with the LTO.
Regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered
o w n e r i s t h e lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned;
consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of operation. In
the eyes of the law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual
owner/operator being considered as merely the agent of the registered
o wn er/ope rat o r. The princ ip le app lies e ve n if t he reg is te red o wne r o f any
vehicle does not use it for public service. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to
identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or any damage or injury is caused by
the vehicle, responsibility can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
F a ilu re to reg is te r t he deed o f s a le sh ou ld no t p re jud ice vic t ims , wh o ha ve
t he rig ht to re ly on th e princ ip le t hat t he reg is te red o wne r is liab le for
damages caused by the negligence of the driver. E q u ita b le Leas ing c an t h ide
be h ind the a lle gat ion tha t Tu to r wa s Eca t ine Corps employee, because it will
prevent victims from recovering their lo ss o n the ba s is o f Eq u it ab le s ina ct ion in
fa iling t o reg is te r t he sa le. The no n -re g ist rat io n is E qu itab le s fa u lt , w h ic h
s ho u ld face the lega l consequences thereof.