G.R. No.
198452 February 19, 2014 Sections 15, 15-A and 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VICENTE ROM, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated 9 August 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00579
affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated 24 June
2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 10, in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-55062, CBU-
55063 and CBU-55067, finding herein appellant Vicente
Rom guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 153 (illegal sale of shabu), 15-A4 (maintenance
of a drug den) and 16 5 (illegal possession of shabu),
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, also known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659.6 In Criminal Case Nos. CBU-55062 and
CBU-55063, for respectively violating Sections 15 and
16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
the trial court imposed on the appellant the penalty of
prision correccional in its medium period ranging
between two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day,
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months, as
maximum. While in Criminal Case No. CBU-55067, that
is for violating Section 15-A, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, the trial court sentenced the
appellant to reclusion perpetua and he was likewise
ordered to pay a fine of 500,000.00. The Court of
Appeals, however, modified and reduced the penalty in
Criminal Case Nos. CBU-55062 and CBU-55063 to an
imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as maximum, after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
In three separate Informations7 all dated 1 September
2000, the appellant was charged with violation of
On arraignment, the appellant, with the assistance of
6425, as amended. The three Informations read:
Criminal Case No. CBU-55062
That on or about the 31st day of August 2000, at about
10:30 P.M. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [herein
appellant], with deliberate intent and without being
authorized by law, did then and there sell, deliver or give
away to a poseur buyer one (1) heat sealed plastic packet
of white crystalline substance weighing 0.03 gram
locally known as "shabu", containing
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated
drug.8 (Emphasis and italics supplied).
Criminal Case No. CBU-55063
That on or about the 31st day of August 2000, at about
10:30 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [appellant], with
deliberate intent and without being authorized by law,
did then and there have in [his] possession and control or
use the following:
Four (4) heat sealed plastic packets of white crystalline
substance weighing 0.15 gram locally known as "shabu",
containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, without the corresponding license or
prescription.9(Emphasis and italics supplied).
Criminal Case No. CBU-55067
That on the 31s[t] day of August, 2000, at about 10:30
P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [appellant], with
deliberate intent, did then and there knowingly maintain
a den for regulated users along the interior portion of
Barangay T. Padilla in violation to (sic) the provision of
Sec. 15-A of Art. III of RA 6425.10 (Emphasis supplied).
1
counsel de parte, pleaded NOT GUILTY 11 to all the
charges. A pre-trial conference was conducted on 2 April
2001, but no stipulation or agreement was arrived
at.12 The pre-trial conference was then terminated and
trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Officer 2
Marvin Martinez (PO2 Martinez), the designated poseur-
buyer; PO3 Franco Mateo Yanson (PO3 Yanson); and
Police Senior Inspector Marvin Sanchez (P/Sr. Insp.
Sanchez), the team leader of the buy-bust operation
against the appellant. They were all assigned at the Vice
Control Section of the Cebu City Police Office (VCS-
CCPO). The testimony, however, of P/Sr. Insp. Mutchit
G. Salinas (P/Sr. Insp. Salinas), the forensic analyst, was
dispensed13 with in view of the admission made by the
defense as to the authenticity and due existence of
Chemistry Report No. D-1782-200014 dated 1 September
2000 and the expertise of the forensic analyst.
The prosecutions evidence established the following
facts:
Two weeks prior to 31 August 2000, the VCS-CCPO
received confidential information from their informant
that alias Dodong, who turned out later to be the
appellant, whose real name is Vicente Rom, was engaged
in the illegal sale of shabu and also maintained a drug
den at his residence in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City.
Thus, the VCS-CCPO, particularly PO2 Martinez,
conducted surveillance and monitoring operation. 15
On 31 August 2000, at around 10:15 p.m., P/Sr. Insp.
Sanchez, Chief of VCS-CCPO, formed a team to
conduct a buy-bust operation against the appellant. The
buy-bust team was composed of PO2 Martinez (poseur-
buyer), Senior Police Officer 1 Jesus Elmer Fernandez
(SPO1 Fernandez), PO3 Yanson, PO3 Benicer
Tamboboy (PO3 Tamboboy), PO3 Jaime Otadoy (PO3
Otadoy) and P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez (team leader). Being the
designated poseur-buyer, PO2 Martinez was provided
with a 100.00 peso bill and a 10.00 peso bill buy-bust
money bearing Serial Nos. AD336230 and AM740786,
respectively, and both were marked with the initials of
PO2 Martinez, i.e. "MM." The former amount would be
used to buy shabu while the latter amount would serve as
payment for the use of the drug den.16
After the briefing, the buy-bust team proceeded to the
target area and upon arrival there at around 10:20 p.m.,
PO2 Martinez proceeded directly to the appellants
house, which was earlier pointed to by their informant,
who was also with them during the buy-bust operation.
The rest of the buy-bust team strategically positioned
themselves nearby. Once PO2 Martinez reached the
appellants house, he knocked on the door, which the
appellant opened. PO2 Martinez subsequently told the
appellant that he wanted to buy shabu worth 100.00.
The appellant looked around to check if PO2 Martinez
had a companion. Seeing none, the appellant took out his
wallet from his pocket and got one heat-sealed plastic
packet containing white crystalline substance, later
confirmed to be shabu, and gave it to PO2 Martinez. The
latter, in turn, gave the 100.00 peso bill marked money
to the appellant. While this sale transaction was going
on, PO3 Yanson and P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez were only five
to eight meters away from PO2 Martinez and the
appellant. P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez clearly witnessed the sale
transaction as it happened right outside the door of the
appellants house.17
Afterwards, PO2 Martinez told the appellant that he
wanted to sniff the shabu, so the latter required the
former to pay an additional amount of 10.00 as rental
fee for the use of his place. After paying the said amount,
the appellant allowed PO2 Martinez to enter his house.
Once inside the house, PO2 Martinez was directed by the
appellant to proceed to the room located at the right side
of the sala. Upon entering the said room, PO2 Martinez
saw three persons, later identified to be Jose Delloso
(Delloso), Danilo Empuerto (Empuerto) and Arnie
Ogong (Ogong), already sniffing shabu.18
Thereupon, PO2 Martinez made a missed call to P/Sr.
Insp. Sanchez, which was their pre-arranged signal, to
signify that the whole transaction was consummated.
After the lapsed of about 10 to 15 seconds, the rest of the
team, who were just few meters away from the
appellants house, barged in and identified themselves as
police officers. PO2 Martinez then told PO3 Yanson to
hold the appellant. PO3 Yanson grabbed the appellant
and made a body search on the latter that led to the
recovery of four heat-sealed transparent plastic packets
containing white crystalline substance, which were
inside the appellants brown wallet that was tucked in his
pocket; the buy-bust money consisting of 100.00 peso
bill and 10.00 peso bill; and 280.00 consisting of two
100.00 peso bills, one 50.00 peso bill and three
10.00 peso bills believed to be the proceeds of the
appellants illegal activities. The one heat-sealed plastic
packet of shabu bought by PO2 Martinez from the
appellant remained in the possession of the former. 19
The appellant, Delloso, Empuerto and Ogong were
informed of their constitutional rights and were later
brought by the buy-bust team to their office, together
with the confiscated items, for documentation. At the
office of the buy-bust team, the confiscated items were
given to their investigator, SPO1 Fernandez, who
marked the one heat-sealed plastic packet containing
white crystalline substance, which was the subject of the
sale transaction, with VRR-8-31-2000-01 (buy-bust)
while the other four heat-sealed plastic packets
containing white crystalline substance, which were
recovered from the appellant, were similarly marked
with VRR-8-31-2000-02 to VRR-8-31-2000-05. The
"VRR" in the markings are the initials of the appellant,
i.e., Vicente Ramonida Rom.20
Thereafter, all the five heat-sealed plastic packets
containing white crystalline substance, together with the
Request for Laboratory Examination, were brought by
PO3 Yanson to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which
examination yielded positive results for the presence of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu,"21 as
evidenced by Chemistry Report No. D-1782-2000.22
For its part, the defense presented the appellant and
Teresita Bitos, whose testimonies consist of sheer
2
denials. Their version of the 31 August 2000 incident is
as follows:
At around 10:15 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. of 31 August 2000,
the appellant was at the house of his daughter, Lorena
Cochera (Lorena), in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, as
Lorena had asked her father to get the monthly house
rental fee from Teresita Bitos, whose nickname is
"Nene." While the appellant and Nene were talking, the
police officers suddenly barged in. The appellant noticed
that PO2 Martinez proceeded to the inner portion of the
house and opened the door of the rooms. Nene stopped
them but the police officers told her to just keep quiet.
The police officers went on opening the door of the two
rooms, where they saw three male persons. The police
officers frisked the appellant and the three other men.
The police officers likewise took appellants wallet
containing 360.00. The appellant then requested Nene
to tell his daughter that he was arrested. Thereafter, the
police officers brought the appellant and the three other
men to the police station.23
The appellant denied that he sold shabu to PO2
Martinez. He also denied that he was maintaining a drug
den and that he allowed persons to sniff shabu inside the
house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, in exchange for
a sum of money. The appellant likewise denied that he
knew the three other men who were arrested inside the
room in the said house. The appellant claimed instead
that he knew PO2 Martinez prior to 31 August 2000
because the latter usually stayed at the house to
apprehend snatchers. Also, a week before 31 August
2000, he and PO2 Martinez had a conversation and he
was asked to pinpoint the "fat fish," which is the code for
the big time pusher. When he said that he does not know
of such pusher, PO2 Martinez got angry. The appellant
maintained that on 31 August 2000, he was no longer
living in the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, as
his daughter had already brought him to Minglanilla,
Cebu, as early as July 1999. On the said date, Nene was
already occupying the house and had subleased one of its
rooms as his daughter Maya told him so. The appellant
admitted that a year prior to 31 August 2000, and before
he transferred to Minglanilla, he was apprehended for
illegal possession of shabu.24
The narration of the appellant was corroborated by Nene
on all material points.
Testifying on rebuttal, PO2 Martinez denied that he
knew the appellant prior to 31 August 2000. PO2
Martinez clarified that he came to know the appellant
only on the night that they conducted the buy-bust
operation.25
Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to
be credible, competent and convincing as they were able
to satisfactorily prove all the elements of the offenses
charged against the appellant, the trial court, in its
Decision dated 24 June 2002, held the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 15, 15-
A and 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended. The trial court disposed of the case as follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING
CIRCUMSTANCES, the Court finds the [herein
appellant] for
1) Criminal Case No. CBU-55062, for
violating Section 15, Article III, Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, GUILTY. There being
no mitigating nor any aggravating
circumstance proven, the Court hereby
imposes the penalty of PRISION
CORRECCIONAL in the MEDIUM PERIOD
ranging between TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum[,]
to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS, as maximum;
2) Criminal Case No. CBU-55063, for
violating Section 16, Article III, Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, GUILTY. In the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the Court imposes the penalty of
PRISION CORRECCIONAL in the MEDIUM
PERIOD ranging between TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY, as
minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS, as maximum; and
3) Criminal Case No. CBU-55067, for
violating Section 15-A, Article III, Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, GUILTY. The
court hereby imposes upon the [appellant] the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a
FINE of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(500,000.00) PESOS.
The five (5) heat-sealed plastic packets of white
crystalline substance containing methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, locally known as shabu, are hereby
CONFISCATED in favor of the government and shall be
destroyed in accordance with the law prohibiting said
drug.26 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied).
The appellant appealed the trial courts Decision to this
Court via Notice of Appeal.27 However, pursuant to this
Courts decision in People v. Mateo,28 the case was
transferred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate
review.
On 9 August 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered the
now assailed Decision affirming with modification the
ruling of the trial court. Its decretal portion reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
Decision of the RTC, Branch 10, Cebu City in Criminal
Cases No. CBU-55062, CBU-55063 and CBU-55067 is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION
concerning Criminal Cases No. CBU-55062 and CBU-
55063, for which [the herein appellant] is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment from six months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two
months of prision correccional, as maximum of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.29
The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of the
appellant on all the charges against him as the
3
prosecution was able to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt since all the essential elements of
illegal sale and possession of shabu were duly proven by
the prosecution. As to the charge of maintaining a drug
den, the same was also established by the fact that PO2
Martinez himself paid 10.00 to sniff the shabu in one of
the rooms of the appellants house. The appellants
denial, therefore, cannot prevail over the evidence hurled
against him.
The Court of Appeals, however, deemed it necessary to
modify the penalty in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-55062
and CBU-55063. It explained that the sale of less than
200 grams of shabu is punishable with a penalty ranging
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal,
depending on the quantity. In this case, the quantity of
shabu illegally sold to the poseur-buyer by the appellant
was 0.03 gram. Pursuant to the second paragraph of
Section 20,30 Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, the proper penalty to be imposed for the illegal
sale of 0.03 gram of shabu would be prision
correccional. Also, in this case, the appellant had in his
possession 0.15 gram of shabu, which is punishable also
with imprisonment of prision correccional. Thus,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant
must be sentenced to an imprisonment of six months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two
months of prision correccional, as maximum, in
Criminal Case No. CBU-55062, as well as in Criminal
Case No. CBU-55063.31
Still unsatisfied, the appellant appealed the Court of
Appeals Decision to this Court via Notice of Appeal. 32
Both the appellant and the Office of the Solicitor
General manifested33 that they would no longer file their
respective supplemental briefs as the issues have already
been fully discussed in their respective appeal
briefs34 with the Court of Appeals.
The appellants assignment of errors as stated in his
Appellants Brief are as follows:
 I. The Regional Trial Court erred in convicting
the [herein appellant] notwithstanding the
inherent incredibility of evidence for the
prosecution;
II. The Regional Trial Court gravely erred in
allowing the evidence of the prosecution
despite the indubitable evidence that the
[appellant] i[s] innocent of the crime[s]
charged; [and]
III. The Regional Trial Court erred in
convicting the [appellant] in spite of the failure
of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
[appellant] beyond reasonable doubt.35
The appellant avers that the testimony of the poseur-
buyer was absurd, illogical, contrary to reason and
highly incredible for no person who is engaged in an
illegal transaction would leave the door of the house
open after such transaction. Moreover, no person would
sell shabu to a buyer when he knew all along that the
said buyer was a police officer as it was ridiculous to
expose oneself to the danger of being caught and
arrested.
The appellant similarly holds that the entry in the house
was illegal and there was certainly no transaction that
took place therein. The search and the seizure made in
connection thereto were also invalid. Thus, the pieces of
evidence allegedly obtained by the police officers were
inadmissible for being the "fruit of a poisonous tree."
The same cannot be used against him in violation of his
rights.
The appellant believes that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as their
testimonies as to the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case were contrary to human conduct,
especially with regard to the allegation that he
knowingly maintained a drug den, since he was no
longer the owner of the house, which was the subject of
the search, and he did not live there anymore.
The appellants contentions are devoid of merit.
In essence, the issues in this case hinge on the credibility
of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial court
which are factual in nature and which involve the
credibility of witnesses are accorded with respect, more
so, when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of
facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported
conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The
reason behind this rule is that the trial court is in a better
position to decide the credibility of witnesses having
heard their testimonies and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial. 36 The rule finds
an even more stringent application where the trial courts
findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.37
After a careful perusal of the records, this Court finds no
cogent or compelling reason to overturn the findings of
both lower courts, which were adequately supported by
the evidence on record.
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, like shabu, the following essential elements must
be duly established: (1) identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 38 Succinctly,
the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer, as
well as the receipt of the marked money by the seller,
successfully consummates the buy-bust transaction.
Hence, what is material is the proof that the transaction
or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti as evidence.39
In the case at bench, the prosecution was able to
establish the above-enumerated elements beyond moral
certainty. The prosecution witnesses adequately proved
that a buy-bust operation actually took place on which
occasion the appellant was caught red-handed giving one
heat-sealed plastic packet containing white crystalline
substance to PO2 Martinez, the poseur-buyer, in
exchange for 100.00. PO2 Martinez, being the poseur-
4
buyer, positively identified the appellant in open court to
be the same person who sold to him the said one-heat
sealed plastic packet of white crystalline substance for a
consideration of 100.00,40 which when examined was
confirmed to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu per Chemistry Report No. D-1782-2000 issued by
P/Sr. Insp. Salinas, Head, Chemistry Branch, PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory Office 7. Upon presentation
thereof in open court, PO2 Martinez duly identified it to
be the same object sold to him by the appellant as it had
the marking "VRR-8-31-2000 (buy-bust)," which SPO1
Fernandez had written thereon in their presence. 41 This
testimony of PO2 Martinez was corroborated by P/Sr.
Insp. Sanchez, who was just five to eight meters away
from the former and the appellant during the sale
transaction.42
Evidently, the prosecution had established beyond
reasonable doubt the appellants guilt for the offense of
illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 15, Article III
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
We already had occasion to show the unacceptability of
the contention of the appellant that the testimony of the
poseur-buyer was absurd, illogical, contrary to reason
and highly incredible for no person who is engaged in an
illegal transaction would leave the door of the house
open after such transaction. In case after case, we
observed that drug pushers sell their prohibited articles
to any prospective customer, be he a stranger or not, in
private as well as in public places, even in the daytime.
Indeed, the drug pushers have become increasingly
daring, dangerous and, worse, openly defiant of the law.
Hence, what matters is not the existing familiarity
between the buyer and the seller or the time and venue of
the sale, but the fact of agreement and the acts
constituting the sale and the delivery of the prohibited
drugs.43
With regard to the offense of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following elements
must be proven: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possesses the said
drug.44 All these elements have been established in this
case.
On the occasion of the appellants arrest for having been
caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu, PO3 Yanson
conducted a body search on the former resulting to the
recovery of four more heat-sealed plastic packets
containing white crystalline substance inside his wallet
that was tucked in his pocket with an aggregate weight
of 0.15 gram, which were later confirmed to be
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. PO3
Yanson identified in open the court the said four heat-
sealed plastic packets of shabu with markings "VRR-8-
31-2000-02" to "VRR-8-31-2000-05" written thereon by
SPO1 Fernandez to be the same objects recovered from
the appellant.45 PO2 Martinez, the poseur-buyer,
corroborated this testimony of PO3 Yanson.46
Definitely, the records do not show that the appellant has
the legal authority to possess the four heat-sealed plastic
packets of shabu. Settled is the rule that possession of
dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of
such possession. As such, the burden of evidence is
shifted to the accused to explain the absence of
knowledge or animus possidendi,47 which the appellant
in this case miserably failed to do.
There is also no truth on the appellants claim that the
entry in the house was illegal making the search and the
seizure in connection thereto invalid, rendering the
pieces of evidence obtained by the police officers
inadmissible for being the "fruit of a poisonous tree."
This Court in Dimacuha v. People48 clearly states:
The Constitution enshrines in the Bill of Rights the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. To give
full protection to it, the Bill of Rights also ordains the
exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in
violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
In People v. Chua Ho San [citation omitted] we pointed
out that the interdiction against warrantless searches and
seizures is not absolute and that warrantless searches and
seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in the following instances: (1) search of
moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs
searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and
frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental
to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless
search and seizure pursuant to an equally warrantless
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognizes permissible warrantless arrest,
to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto; (2) arrest effected in
hot pursuit; and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
Here, the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto while
in the act of delivering 1.15 grams and in actual
possession of another 10.78 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) as a result of an entrapment
operation conducted by the police on the basis of
information received from Benito Marcelo regarding
petitioner's illegal drug trade. Petitioner's arrest,
therefore, was lawful and the subsequent seizure of a bag
of shabu inserted inside the cover of her checkbook was
justified and legal in light of the prevailing rule that an
officer making an arrest may take from the person
arrested any property found upon his person in order to
find and seize things connected with the crime. The
seized regulated drug is, therefore, admissible in
evidence, being the fruit of the crime. 49 (Emphasis
supplied).
To repeat, the appellant, in this case, was caught in
flagrante delicto selling shabu, thus, he was lawfully
arrested. Following Dimacuha, the subsequent seizure of
four heat-sealed plastic packets of shabu in the
appellants wallet that was tucked in his pocket was
justified and admissible in evidence for being the fruit of
the crime.
5
With the foregoing, this Court is fully convinced that the
prosecution had likewise proved beyond a shadow of
reasonable doubt that the appellant is guilty of the
offense of illegal possession of shabu in violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
Going to the charge of maintaining a drug den in
violation of Section 15-A, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, the prosecution had also
established appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or
regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its
existence may be proved not only by direct evidence but
may also be established by proof of facts and
circumstances, including evidence of the general
reputation of the house, or its general reputation among
police officers.50 In this case, this fact was proven by
none other than the testimony of PO2 Martinez, the
poseur-buyer, who after buying the shabu had told the
appellant that he wanted to sniff the same to which the
latter responded by requiring the former to pay a rental
fee of 10.00. The appellant, thereafter, allowed PO2
Martinez to enter his house and directed him to proceed
to one of the rooms located at the right side of the sala.
Upon entering the said room, PO2 Martinez saw three
other persons already sniffing shabu. 51 This testimony of
PO2 Martinez was corroborated by PO3 Yanson and
P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez.52
Moreover, as aptly observed by the Court of Appeals,
several peso bills were found in the appellants wallet,
including three 10.00 peso bills, which circumstances
bolstered the prosecutions assertion that the appellant
has indeed allowed his house to be used as a drug den
for a fee of 10.00 per person.53
In his attempt to exonerate himself, the appellant
vehemently asserts that he was no longer the owner of
the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, and he was
no longer residing therein. The defense also presented
Teresita Bitos to corroborate this claim of the appellant.
The testimony of Teresita Bitos corroborating the
appellants testimony was not credible.1wphi1 She
herself admitted that the appellant requested her to
testify in his favor.54
Also, considering the seriousness of the charges against
the appellant, he did not bother to present his daughter,
who is the alleged owner of the house in Barangay T.
Padilla, Cebu City, to bolster his claim.
Time and again, this Court held that denial is an
inherently weak defense and has always been viewed
upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with
which it can be concocted. Inherently weak, denial as a
defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of
the appellant, as in this case. The defense of denial
assumes significance only when the prosecutions
evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, which is not the case here. Verily,
mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is negative self-serving evidence which cannot
be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of
the prosecution witness who testified on affirmative
matters.55 Moreover, there is a presumption that public
officers, including the arresting officers, regularly
perform their official duties. 56 In this case, the defense
failed to overcome this presumption by presenting clear
and convincing evidence. Furthermore, this Court finds
no ill motive that could be attributed to the police
officers who had conducted the buy-bust operation. Even
the allegation of the appellant that PO2 Martinez got
angry with him when he failed to pinpoint the big time
pusher cannot be considered as the ill motive in
implicating the appellant on all the three charges against
him for this is self-serving and uncorroborated.
Given all the foregoing, this Court sustains the
appellant's conviction on all the charges against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00579 dated
9 August 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179408, March 05, 2014
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ABIGAIL R. RAZON
ALVAREZ AND VERNON R. RAZON, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 dated August 11,
2006 and the resolution3 dated August 22, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 89213 on the
validity of the four search warrants issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 115.
The CA rulings (i) quashed the first two search warrants,
similarly docketed as Search Warrant No. 03063, issued
for violation of Article 308, in relation to Article 309, of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and (ii) declared void
paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the other two search warrants,
also similarly docketed as Search Warrant No. 03064,
issued for violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
401.4
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
is the grantee of a legislative franchise 5 which authorizes
it to carry on the business of providing basic and
enhanced telecommunications services in and between
areas in the Philippines and between the Philippines and
other countries and territories,6and, accordingly, to
establish, operate, manage, lease, maintain and purchase
telecommunications system for both domestic and
international calls.7 Pursuant to its franchise, PLDT
offers to the public wide range of services duly
authorized by the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC).
6
PLDTs network is principally composed of the Public
Switch Telephone Network, telephone handsets and/or
telecommunications equipment used by its subscribers,
the wires and cables linking these handsets and/or
equipment, antennae, transmission facilities, the
international gateway facility (IGF) and other
telecommunications equipment providing
interconnections.8 To safeguard the integrity of its
network, PLDT regularly conducts investigations on
various prepaid cards marketed and sold abroad to
determine alternative calling patterns (ACP) and network
fraud that are being perpetrated against it.
To prevent or stop network fraud, PLDTs ACP
Detection Division (ACPDD) regularly visits foreign
countries to conduct market research on various prepaid
phone cards offered abroad that allow their users to
make overseas calls to PLDT subscribers in the
Philippines at a cheaper rate.
The ACPDD bought The Number One prepaid card a
card principally marketed to Filipinos residing in the
United Kingdom for calls to the Philippines to make
test calls using two telephone lines: the dialing phone
an IDDcapable9 telephone line which makes the call
and through which the access number and the PIN
number printed at the back of the card are entered;
and the receiving phone a caller identification (caller
id) unitequipped telephone line which would receive
the call and reflect the incoming callers telephone
number.
During a test call placed at the PLDTACPDD office,
the receiving phone reflected a PLDT telephone number
(28243285) as the calling number used, as if the call
was originating from a local telephone in Metro Manila.
Upon verification with the PLDTs Integrated Customer
Management (billing) System, the ACPDD learned that
the subscriber of the reflected telephone number is
Abigail R. Razon Alvarez, with address at 17 Dominic
Savio St., Savio Compound, Barangay Don Bosco,
Paraaque City. It further learned that several lines are
installed at this address with Abigail and Vernon R.
Razon (respondents), among others, as subscribers. 10
To validate its findings, the ACPDD conducted the same
test calls on November 5, 2003 at the premises of the
NTC in Quezon City (and in the presence of an NTC
representative11) using the same prepaid card (validation
test). The receiving phone at the NTC premises reflected
the telephone numbers registered in the name of Abigail
as the calling number from the United Kingdom.12
Similar test calls subsequently conducted using the
prepaid cards Unity Card and IDT Supercalling
Cardrevealed the same results. The calleridequipped
receiving phone reflected telephone numbers 13 that are in
the names of Experto Enterprises and Experto Phils, as
subscribers, with a common address at No. 38 Indonesia
St., Better Living Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco,
Paraaque City. It turned out that the actual occupant of
these premises is also Abigail. Subsequently, a validation
test was also conducted, yielding several telephone
numbers registered in the name of Experto
Phils./Experto Enterprises as the calling numbers
supposedly from the United Kingdom. 14
According to PLDT, had an ordinary and legitimate call
been made, the screen of the calleridequipped
receiving phone would not reflect a local number or any
number at all. In the cards they tested, however, once the
caller enters the access and pin numbers, the respondents
would route the call via the internet to a local telephone
number (in this case, a PLDT telephone number) which
would connect the call to the receiving phone. Since
calls through the internet never pass the toll center of the
PLDTs IGF, users of these prepaid cards can place a call
to any point in the Philippines (provided the local line is
NDDcapable) without the call appearing as coming
from abroad.15
On November 6, 2003 and November 19, 2003, Mr.
Lawrence Narciso of the PLDTs Quality Control
Division, together with the operatives of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), conducted an ocular inspection at
17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound and at No. 38
Indonesia St., Better Living Subdivision both in
Barangay Don Bosco, Paranaque City and discovered
that PLDT telephone lines were connected to several
pieces of equipment.16 Mr. Narciso narrated the results of of each telephone line/number xxx were enclosed in a
the inspection, thus fabricated wooden cabinet with safety padlock. Said
10. During [the] ocular inspection [at 17 Dominic Savio wooden cabinet was situated on the concrete wall inside
St., Savio Compound], Ms. Abigail Razon Alvarez the compound near the garage entrance gate. The
allowed us to gain entry and check the telephone telephone inside the wiring installations from the
installations within their premises. First, we checked the protector to the connecting blocks were placed in a
location of the telephone protectors that are commonly plastic electrical conduit routed to the adjacent room at
installed at a concrete wall boundary inside the the second floor.17
compound. Some of these protectors are covered with a On December 3, 2003, Police Superintendent Gilbert C.
fabricated wooden cabinet. Other protectors are installed Cruz filed a consolidated application for a search
beside the said wooden cabinet, xxx. The inside wiring warrant18 before Judge Francisco G. Mendiola of the
installations from telephone protectors to connecting RTC, for the crimes of theft and violation of PD No.
block were routed to the said adjacent room passing 401. According to PLDT, the respondents are engaged in
through the house ceiling. a form of network fraud known as International Simple
Resale (ISR) which amounts to theft under the RPC.
11. xxx. Upon entering the socalled adjacent room, we
immediately noticed that the PLDT telephone lines were ISR is a method of routing and completing international
connected to the equipment situated at multilayered long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae and/or
rack. The equipment room contains the following: wave frequencies which are connected directly to the
a. 6 Quintum router; domestic exchange facilities of the country where the
call is destined (terminating country); and, in the
b. 13 Com router; process, bypassing the IGF at the terminating country. 19
c. 1 Cisco 800 router; Judge Mendiola found probable cause for the issuance of
the search warrants applied for. Accordingly, four search
d. 1 Nokia Modem for PLDT DSL; warrants20 were issued for violations of Article 308, in
relation to Article 309, of the RPC (SW A1 and SW A
e. 1 Meridian Subscribers Unit[;] 2) and of PD No. 401, as amended (SW B1 and SW B
2) for the ISR activities being conducted at 17 Dominic
f. 5 Personal Computers[;] Savio St., Savio Compound and at No. 38 Indonesia St.,
Better Living Subdivision, both in Barangay Don Bosco,
g. 1 Computer Printer[; and] Paranaque City. The four search warrants enumerated the
objects to be searched and seized as follows:
h. 1 Flatbed Scanner[.] 1. MERIDIAN SUBSCRIBERS UNIT AND PLDT DSL
12. We also noticed that these routers are connected to LINES and/or CABLES AND ANTENNAS and/or
the Meridians subscriber unit ("SU ) that has an similar equipment or device capable of transmitting air
outdoor antenna installed on the top of the roof. waves or frequency, such as a Meridian Subscribers
Meridians SU and outdoor antenna are service Unit, Broadband DSL and telephone lines;
components used to connect with wireless broadband
internet access service of Meridian Telekoms. 2. PERSONAL COMPUTERS or any similar equipment
or device capable of accepting information applying the
xxxx prescribed process of the information and supplying the
result of this process;
18. During the site inspection [at No. 38 Indonesia St.,
Better Living Subdivision], we noticed that the protector 3. NOKIA MODEM or any similar equipment or device
7
that enables data terminal equipment such as computers
to communicate with other data terminal equipment via a
telephone line;
4. QUINTUM Equipment or any similar equipment
capable of receiving digital signals from the internet and
converting those signals to voice;
5. QUINTUM, 3COM AND CISCO Routers or any
similar equipment capable of switching packets of data
to their assigned destination or addresses;
6. LINKS DSL SWITCH or any similar equipment
capable of switching data;
7. COMPUTER PRINTERS AND SCANNERS or any
similar equipment or device used for copying and/or
printing data and/or information;
8. SOFTWARE, DISKETTES, TAPES or any similar
equipment or device used for recording or storing
information; and
9. Manuals, phone cards, access codes, billing
statements, receipts, contracts, checks, orders,
communications and documents, lease and/or
subscription agreements or contracts, communications
and documents relating to securing and using telephone
lines and/or equipment[.]21
On the same date, the PNP searched the premises
indicated in the warrants. On December 10, 2003, a
return was made with a complete inventory of the items
seized.22 On January 14, 2004, the PLDT and the PNP
filed with the Department of Justice a joint complaint
affidavit for theft and for violation of PD No. 401
against the respondents.23
On February 18, 2004, the respondents filed with the
RTC a motion to quash24 the search warrants essentially
on the following grounds: first, the RTC had no authority
to issue search warrants which were enforced in
Paraaque City; second, the enumeration of the items to
be searched and seized lacked particularity; and third,
there was no probable cause for the crime of theft.
On March 12, 2004, PLDT opposed the respondents'
motion.25
In a July 6, 2004 order, 26 the RTC denied the
respondents' motion to quash. Having been rebuffed 27 in
their motion for reconsideration, 28 the respondents filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA. 29
RULING OF THE CA
On August 11, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed
decision and resolution, granting the respondents'
petition for certiorari. The CA quashed SW Al and
SW A2 (for theft) on the ground that they were issued
for nonexistent crimes. 30 According to the CA,
inherent in the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of search warrant is the accompanying
determination that an offense has been committed.
Relying on this Courts decision in Laurel v. Judge
Abrogar,31 the CA ruled that the respondents could not
have possibly committed the crime of theft because
PLDTs business of providing telecommunication
services and these services themselves are not personal
properties contemplated under Article 308 of the RPC.
With respect to SW Bl and SW B2 (for violation of
PD No. 401), the CA upheld paragraphs one to six of the
enumeration of items subject of the search. The CA held
that the stock phrase or similar equipment or device
found in paragraphs one to six of the search warrants did
not make it suffer from generality since each paragraphs
enumeration of items was sufficiently qualified by the
citation of the specific objects to be seized and by its
functions which are inherently connected with the crime
allegedly committed.
The CA, however, nullified the ensuing paragraphs, 7, 8
and 9, for lack of particularity and ordered the return of
the items seized under these provisions. While the same
stock phrase appears in paragraphs 7 and 8, the
properties described therein i.e., printer and scanner,
software, diskette and tapes include even those for the
respondents' personal use, making the description of the
things to be seized too general in nature.
8
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, 32 PLDT
went to this Court via this Rule 45 petition.
THE PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS
PLDT faults the CA for relying on Laurel on three
grounds: first, Laurel cannot be cited yet as an authority
under the principle of stare decisis because Laurel is not
yet final and executory; in fact, it is the subject of a
pending motion for reconsideration filed by PLDT
itself; second, even assuming that Laurel is already final,
the facts in Laurel vary from the present
case. Laurel involves the quashal of an information on
the ground that the information does not charge any
offense; hence, the determination of the existence of the
elements of the crime of theft is indispensable in
resolving the motion to quash. In contrast, the present
case involves the quashal of a search warrant. Third,
accordingly, in resolving the motion, the issuing court
only has to be convinced that there is probable cause to
hold that: (i) the items to be seized are connected to a
criminal activity; and (ii) these items are found in the
place to be searched. Since the matter of quashing a
search warrant may be rooted on matters extrinsic of
the search warrant, 33 the issuing court does not need to
look into the elements of the crime allegedly committed
in the same manner that the CA did in Laurel.
PLDT adds that a finding of grave abuse of discretion in
the issuance of search warrant may be justified only
when there is disregard of the requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant[.] 34 In the present case, the
CA did not find (and could not have found) any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC because at the
time the RTC issued the search warrants in
2003, Laurel had not yet been promulgated.
In defending the validity of the nullified provisions of
SW Bl and SW B2, PLDT argues that PD No. 401
also punishes unauthorized installation of telephone
connections. Since the enumerated items are connected
to the computers that are illegally connected to PLDT
telephone lines, then these items bear a direct relation to
the offense of violation of PD No. 401, justifying their
seizure.

The enumeration in paragraph 8 is likewise a proper
subject of seizure because they are the fruits of the
offense as they contain information on PLDTs business
profit and other information relating to the commission
of violation of PD No. 401. Similarly, paragraph 9
specifies the fruits and evidence of violation of PD No.
401 since it supports PLDTs claim that the respondents
have made a business out of their illegal connections to
PLDT lines.
THE RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS
The respondents counter that while Laurel may not yet
be final, at least it has a persuasive effect as the current
jurisprudence on the matter. Even without Laurel, the
CAs nullification of SW Al and SW A2 can withstand
scrutiny because of the novelty of the issue presented
before it. The nullification of paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of
SW Bl and SW B2 must be upheld not only on the
ground of broadness but for lack of any relation
whatsoever with PD No. 401 which punishes the theft of
electricity.
OUR RULING
We partially grant the petition.
Laurel and its reversal by the Court En Banc
Before proceeding with the case, a review of Laurel is in
order as it involves substantially similar facts as in the
present case.
Baynet Co., Ltd. (Baynet) sells prepaid cards, Bay
Super Orient Card, that allow their users to place a call
to the Philippines from Japan. PLDT asserted that
Baynet is engaged in ISR activities by using an
international private leased line (IPL) to course Baynets
incoming international long distance calls. The IPL is
linked to a switching equipment, which is then
connected to PLDT telephone lines/numbers and
equipment, with Baynet as subscriber.
To establish its case, PLDT obtained a search warrant.
On the strength of the items seized during the search of
Baynets premises, the prosecutor found probable cause
for theft against Luis Marcos Laurel (Laurel) and other
Baynet officials. Accordingly, an information was filed,
alleging that the Baynet officials take, steal and use the
international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by
[ISR activities] xxx effectively stealing this business
from PLDT while using its facilities in the estimated
amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice
of PLDT[.] 35
Laurel moved to quash the information on the bold
assertion that ISR activities do not constitute a crime
under Philippine law. Laurel argued that an ISR activity
cannot entail taking of personal property because the
international long distance telephone calls using PLDT
telephone lines belong to the caller himself; the amount
stated in the information, if at all, represents the rentals
due PLDT for the callers usage of its facilities. Laurel
argued that the business of providing international long
distance calls, i.e., PLDTs service, and the revenue
derived therefrom are not personal property that can be
appropriated.
Laurel went to the Court after failing to secure the
desired relief from the trial and appellate courts, 36raising
the core issue of whether PLDTs business of providing
telecommunication services for international long
distance calls is a proper subject of theft under Article
308 of the RPC. The Courts First Division granted
Laurels petition and ordered the quashal of the
information.
Taking off from the basic rule that penal laws are
construed strictly against the State, the Court ruled that
international long distance calls and the business of
providing telecommunication or telephone services by
PLDT are not personal properties that can be the subject
of theft.
One is apt to conclude that personal property standing
alone, covers both tangible and intangible properties and
are subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code. But
the words Personal property under the Revised Penal
Code must be considered in tandem with the word take
9
in the law. The statutory definition of taking and
movable property indicates that, clearly, not all personal
properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The
general rule is that, only movable properties which have
physical or material existence and susceptible of
occupation by another are proper objects of theft, xxx.
xxxx
xxx. Business, like services in business, although are
properties, are not proper subjects of theft under the
Revised Penal Code because the same cannot be taken
or occupied. If it were otherwise, xxx there would be
no juridical difference between the taking of the business
of a person or the services provided by him for gain, vis
avis, the taking of goods, wares or merchandise, or
equipment comprising his business. If it was its intention
to include business as personal property under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code, the Philippine
Legislature should have spoken in language that is clear
and definite: that business is personal property under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
xxxx
The petitioner is not charged, under the Amended
Information, for theft of telecommunication or telephone
services offered by PLDT. Even if he is, the term
personal property under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code cannot be interpreted beyond its seams so as
to include telecommunication or telephone services or
computer services for that matter. xxx. Even at common
law, neither time nor services may be taken and occupied
or appropriated. A service is generally not considered
property and a theft of service would not, therefore,
constitute theft since there can be no caption or
asportation. Neither is the unauthorized use of the
equipment and facilities of PLDT by [Laurel] theft under
[Article 308].
If it was the intent of the Philippine Legislature, in 1930,
to include services to be the subject of theft, it should
have incorporated the same in Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Legislature did not. In fact, the Revised
Penal Code does not even contain a definition of
services.37
PLDT38 moved for reconsideration and referral of the
case to the Court En Banc. The Courts First Division
granted the referral.
On January 13, 2009 (or while the present petition was
pending in court), the Court En Bancunanimously
granted PLDTs motion for reconsideration. 39 The Court
ruled that even prior to the passage of the RPC,
jurisprudence is settled that any personal property,
tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable
of appropriation can be the object of theft. 40 This
jurisprudence, in turn, applied the prevailing legal
meaning of the term personal property under the old
Civil Code as anything susceptible of appropriation and
not included in the foregoing chapter (not real
property). 41 PLDTs telephone service or its business of
providing this was appropriable personal property and
was, in fact, the subject of appropriation in an ISR
operation, facilitated by means of the unlawful use of
PLDTs facilities.
In this regard, the Amended Information inaccurately
describes the offense by making it appear that what
[Laurel] took were the international long distance
telephone calls, rather than respondent PLDTs business.
xxxx
Indeed, while it may be conceded that international
long distance calls, the matter alleged to be stolen xxx,
take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that
such international long distance calls were personal
properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not
have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely
encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said
calls using its complex communications infrastructure
and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said
telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such
telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the
use of these communications facilities without the
consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft,
which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services
and business.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication
and the telephone service are personal property under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of
engaging in ISR is an act of subtraction penalized
under said article.42
The Court En Bancs reversal of its Laurel Division
ruling during the pendency of this petition significantly
impacts on how the Court should resolve the present
case for two reasons:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, the Laurel En Banc ruling categorically equated an
ISR activity to theft under the RPC. In so doing,
whatever alleged factual variance there may be
between Laurel and the present case cannot
render Laurel inapplicable.
Second, and more importantly, in a Rule 45 petition, the
Court basically determines whether the CA was legally
correct in determining whether the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion. Under this premise, the CA
ordinarily gauges the grave abuse of discretion at the
time the RTC rendered its assailed resolution. In
quashing SW Al and SW A2, note that the CA relied
on the Laurel Division ruling at the time when it was still
subject of a pending motion for reconsideration. The CA,
in fact, did not expressly impute grave abuse of
discretion on the RTC when the RTC issued the search
warrants and later refused to quash these.
Understandably, the CA could not have really found the
presence of grave abuse of discretion for there was
no Laurel ruling to speak of at the time the RTC issued
the search warrants.
These peculiar facts require us to more carefully analyze
our prism of review under Rule 45.
Requisites for the issuance of search warrant; probable
cause requires the probable existence of an offense
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees
the right of persons to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
10
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The purposes of the constitutional provision against
unlawful searches and seizures are to: (i) prevent the
officers of the law from violating private security in
person and property and illegally invading the sanctity of
the home; and (ii) give remedy against such usurpations
when attempted or committed.43
The constitutional requirement for the issuance of a
search warrant is reiterated under Sections 4 and 5, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. These
sections lay down the following requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant: (1) the existence of
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must
examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.44 Should any of these requisites be
absent, the party aggrieved by the issuance and
enforcement of the search warrant may file a motion to
quash the search warrant with the issuing court or with
the court where the action is subsequently instituted. 45
A search warrant proceeding is a special criminal and
judicial process akin to a writ of discovery. It is designed
by the Rules of Criminal Procedure to respond only to an
incident in the main case, if one has already been
instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since it is at most
incidental to the main criminal case, an order granting or
denying a motion to quash a search warrant may be
questioned only via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.46
When confronted with this petition, the higher court
must necessarily determine the validity of the lower
courts action from the prism of whether it was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of
discretion, jurisprudence refers to the capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or to the exercise of power in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility or in a manner so patent and gross as to amount
to an invasion of positive duty or to the virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of the law.47
In a certiorari proceeding, the determination translates
to an inquiry on whether the requirements and
limitations provided under the Constitution and the
Rules of Court were properly complied with, from the
issuance of the warrant up to its implementation. In view
of the constitutional objective of preventing stealthy
encroachment upon or the gradual depreciation of the
rights secured by the Constitution, strict compliance with
the constitutional and procedural requirements is
required. A judge who issues a search warrant without
complying with these requirements commits grave abuse
of discretion.48
One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of
a search warrant is that it must be issued based on
probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in
connection with one specific offense. In search warrant
proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 49
In the determination of probable cause, the court must
necessarily determine whether an offense exists to justify
the issuance or quashal of the search warrant 50 because
the personal properties that may be subject of the search
warrant are very much intertwined with the one specific
offense requirement of probable cause.51 Contrary to
PLDTs claim, the only way to determine whether a
warrant should issue in connection with one specific
offense is to juxtapose the facts and circumstances
presented by the applicant with the elements of the
offense that are alleged to support the search warrant.
Reviewing the RTCs denial of the motion to quash telephone services or the business of providing these
SWAl and SW A2 services could be the subject of theft under the RPC had
not yet reached the Court when the search warrants were
a. From the prism of Rule 65 applied for and issued.
The facts of the present case easily call to mind the case However, what distinguishes Columbia from the present
of Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA52 involving copyright case is the focus of Columbias legal
infringement. In that case, the CA likewise voided the rationale. Columbias focus was not on whether the facts
search warrant issued by the trial court by applying a and circumstances would reasonably lead to the
doctrine that added a new requirement (i.e., the conclusion that an offense has been or is being
production of the master tape for comparison with the committed and that the objects sought in connection with
allegedly pirate copies) in determining the existence of the offense were in the place to be searched the
probable cause for the issuance of search warrant in primary points of focus of the present
copyright infringement cases. The doctrine referred to case. Columbias focus was on whether
was laid down in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. the evidence presented at the time the search warrant
Court of Appeals. 20th Century Fox, however, was was applied for was sufficient to establish the facts and
promulgated more than eight months after the search circumstances required for establishing probable cause to
warrants were issued by the RTC. In reversing the CA, issue a search warrant.
the Court ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Nonetheless, Columbia serves as a neat guide for the CA
Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine to decide the respondents' certiorari petition.
of stare decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it is our In Columbia, the Court applied the principle of non
considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot retroactivity of its ruling in 20th Century Fox, whose
be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the finality was not an issue, in reversing a CA ruling. The
quashal of Search Warrant No. 87053. [The] petitioners' Courts attitude in that case should have been adopted by
consistent position that the order of the lower court[,] the CA in the present case a fortiori since the ruling that
xxx [which denied the respondents'] motion to lift the the CA relied upon was not yet final at the time the CA
order of search warrant^] was properly issued, [because resolved to quash the search warrants.
there was] satisfactory compliance with the then
prevailing standards under the law for determination of b. Supervening events justifying a broader review
probable cause, is indeed well taken. The lower court under Rule 65
could not possibly have expected more evidence from
petitioners in their application for a search warrant other Ordinarily, the CAs determination under Rule 65 is
than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing and limited to whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion
judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding in granting or denying the motion to quash based on
of probable cause.53 facts then existing. Nonetheless, the Court recognizes
that supervening facts may transpire after the issuance
Columbia could easily be cited in favor of PLDT to and implementation of the search warrant that may
sustain the RTCs refusal to quash the search warrant. provide justification for the quashal of the search warrant
Indeed, in quashing SW Al and SW A2, the CA never via a petition for certiorari.
intimated that the RTC disregarded any of the requisites
for the issuance of a search warrant as these For one, if the offense for which the warrant is issued is
requirements were interpreted and observed under subsequently decriminalized during the pendency of the
the then prevailing jurisprudence. The CA could not petition for certiorari, then the warrant may be
have done so because precisely the issue of whether quashed.54 For another, a subsequent ruling from the
11
Court that a similar set of facts and circumstances does
not constitute an offense, as alleged in the search warrant
application, may be used as a ground to quash a
warrant.55 In both instances, the underlying reason for
quashing the search warrant is the absence of probable
cause which can only possibly exist when the
combination of facts and circumstances points to the
possible commission of an offense that may be
evidenced by the personal properties sought to be seized.
To the CA, the second instance mentioned justified the
quashal of the search warrants.
We would have readily agreed with the
CA if the Laurel Division ruling had not been
subsequently reversed. As things turned out, however,
the Court granted PLDTs motion for reconsideration of
the Court First Divisions ruling in Laurel and ruled that
the act of engaging in ISR is xxx penalized under xxx
article [308 of the RPC]. 56 As the RTC itself found,
PLDT successfully established in its application for a
search warrant a probable cause for theft by evidence
that Laurels ISR activities deprived PLDT of its
telephone services and of its business of providing these
services without its consent.
b1. the stare decisis aspect
With the Court En Bancs reversal of the
earlier Laurel ruling, then the CAs quashal of these
warrants would have no leg to stand on. This is the dire
consequence of failing to appreciate the full import of
the doctrine of stare decisis that the CA ignored.
Under Article 8 of the Civil Code, the decisions of this
Court form part of the countrys legal system. While
these decisions are not laws pursuant to the doctrine of
separation of powers, they evidence the laws' meaning,
breadth, and scope and, therefore, have the same binding
force as the laws themselves. 57 Hence, the Courts
interpretation of a statute forms part of the law as of the
date it was originally passed because the Courts
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the interpreted law carries into
effect.58
Article 8 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle
of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle established matters) that
enjoins adherence to judicial precedents embodied in the
decision of the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by
all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis, in
turn, is based on the principle that once a question of law
has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument. 59 The doctrine of
(horizontal) stare decisis is one of policy, grounded on
the necessity of securing certainty and stability of
judicial decisions.60
In the field of adjudication, a case cannot yet acquire the
status of a decided case that is
deemed settled and closed to further argument if the
Courts decision is still the subject of a motion for
reconsideration seasonably filed by the moving party.
Under the Rules of Court, a party is expressly allowed to
file a motion for reconsideration of the Courts decision
within 15 days from notice. 61 Since the doctrine of stare
decisis is founded on the necessity of securing certainty
and stability in law, then these attributes will spring only
once the Courts ruling has lapsed to finality in
accordance with law. In Ting v. VelezTing,62 we ruled
that:
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower
courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in
its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
In applying Laurel despite PLDTs statement that the
case is still subject of a pending motion for
reconsideration,63 the CA legally erred in refusing to
reconsider its ruling that largely relied on a nonfmal
ruling of the Court. While the CAs dutiful desire to
apply the latest pronouncement of the Court in Laurel is
expected, it should have acted with caution, instead of
excitement, on being informed by PLDT of its pending
motion for reconsideration; it should have then followed
the principle of stare decisis. The appellate courts
application of an exceptional circumstance when it may
order the quashal of the search warrant on grounds not
existing at the time the warrant was issued or
12
implemented must still rest on prudential grounds if only
to maintain the limitation of the scope of the remedy
of certiorari as a writ to correct errors of jurisdiction and
not mere errors of judgment.
Still, the respondents attempt to justify the CAs action
by arguing that the CA would still rule in the way it
did64 even without Laurel. As PLDT correctly pointed
out, there is simply nothing in the CAs decision that
would support its quashal of the search warrant
independently of Laurel. We must bear in mind that the
CAs quashal of SW Al and SW A2 operated under the
strictures of a certiorari petition, where the presence of
grave abuse of discretion is necessary for the corrective
writ to issue since the appellate court exercises its
supervisory jurisdiction in this case. We simply cannot
secondguess what the CAs action could have been.
Lastly, the CAs reliance on Savage v. Judge Taypin65 can
neither sustain the quashal of SW Al and SW A2.
In Savage, the Court granted the certiorari petition and
quashed the search warrant because the alleged crime
(unfair competition involving design patents) that
supported the search warrant had already been repealed,
and the act complained of, if at all, gave rise only to civil
liability (for patent infringement). Having been
decriminalized, probable cause for the crime alleged
could not possibly exist.
In the present case, the issue is whether the commission
of an ISR activity, in the manner that PLDTs evidence
shows, sufficiently establishes probable cause for the
issuance of search warrants for the crime of theft.
Unlike in Savage, the Court in Laurel was not
confronted with the issue of decriminalization (which is
a legislative prerogative) but whether the commission of
an ISR activity meets the elements of the offense of theft
for purposes of quashing an information. Since the
Court, in Laurel, ultimately ruled then an ISR activity
justifies the elements of theft that must necessarily be
alleged in the information a fortiori, the RTCs
determination should be sustained on certiorari.
The requirement of particularity in SWB1 and SWB
2

On the issue of particularity in SW Bl and SW B2, we
note that the respondents have not appealed to us the CA
ruling that sustained paragraphs 1 to 6 of the search
warrants. Hence, we shall limit our discussion to the
question of whether the CA correctly ruled that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion insofar as it refused to
quash paragraphs 7 to 9 of SW Bl and SWB2.
Aside from the requirement of probable cause, the
Constitution also requires that the search warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. This requirement of particularity in
the description, especially of the things to be seized, is
meant to enable the law enforcers to readily identify the
properties to be seized and, thus, prevent the seizure of
the wrong items. It seeks to leave the law enforcers with
no discretion at all regarding these articles and to give
life to the constitutional provision against unreasonable
searches and seizures.66 In other words, the requisite
sufficient particularity is aimed at preventing the law
enforcer from exercising unlimited discretion as to what
things are to be taken under the warrant and ensure that
only those connected with the offense for which the
warrant was issued shall be seized. 67
The requirement of specificity, however, does not require
technical accuracy in the description of the property to
be seized. Specificity is satisfied if the personal
properties' description is as far as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow it to be so described. The nature of the
description should vary according to whether the identity
of the property or its character is a matter of
concern.68 One of the tests to determine the particularity
in the description of objects to be seized under a search
warrant is when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued.69
Additionally, the Rules require that a search warrant
should be issued in connection with one specific
offense to prevent the issuance of a scattershot
warrant.70 The onespecificoffense requirement
reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search
warrant should issue only on the basis of probable
cause.71 Since the primary objective of applying for a
search warrant is to obtain evidence to be used in a
subsequent prosecution for an offense for which the
search warrant was applied, a judge issuing a particular
warrant must satisfy himself that the evidence presented
by the applicant establishes the facts and circumstances
relating to this specific offense for which the warrant is
sought and issued.72Accordingly, in a subsequent
challenge against the validity of the warrant, the
applicant cannot be allowed to maintain its validity
based on facts and circumstances that may be related to
other search warrants but are extrinsic to the warrant in
question.
Under the Rules, the following personal property may be
subject of search warrant: (i) the subject of the offense;
(ii) fruits of the offense; or (iii) those used or intended to
be used as the means of committing an offense. In the
present case, we sustain the CAs ruling nullifying
paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of SW Bl and SW B2 for failing
the test of particularity. More specifically, these
provisions do not show how the enumerated items could
have possibly been connected with the crime for which
the warrant was issued, i.e., P.D. No. 401. For clarity, PD
No. 401 punishes:
Section 1. Any person who installs any water,
electrical, telephone or piped gas connection without
previous authority from xxx the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, xxx, tampers and/or
uses tampered water, electrical or gas meters, jumpers or
other devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas is
stolen; steals or pilfers water, electric or piped gas
meters, or water, electric and/or telephone wires, or
piped gas pipes or conduits; knowingly possesses stolen
or pilfered water, electrical or gas meters as well as
stolen or pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone
wires, or piped gas pipes and conduits, shall, upon
conviction, be punished with prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from two thousand to
six thousand pesos, or both.73
Paragraphs 7 to 8 of SW Bl and SW B2 read as
follows:
7. COMPUTER PRINTERS AND SCANNERS or any
similar equipment or device used for copying and/or
printing data and/or information;
13
8. SOFTWARE, DISKETTES, TAPES or any similar
equipment or device used for recording or storing
information; and
9. Manuals, phone cards, access codes, billing
statements, receipts, contracts, checks, orders,
communications and documents, lease and/or
subscription agreements or contracts, communications
and documents relating to securing and using telephone
lines and/or equipment[.]74
According to PLDT, the items in paragraph 7 have a
direct relation to violation of PD No. 401 because the
items are connected to computers that, in turn, are linked
to the unauthorized connections to PLDT telephone
lines. With regard to the software, diskette and tapes in
paragraph 8, and the items in paragraph 9, PLDT argues
that these items are fruits of the offense and that the
information it contains constitutes the business profit
of PLDT. According to PLDT, it corroborates the fact
that the respondents have made a business out of their
illegal connections to its telephone lines.
We disagree with PLDT. The fact that the printers and
scanners are or may be connected to the other illegal
connections to the PLDT telephone lines does not make
them the subject of the offense or fruits of the offense,
much less could they become a means of committing an
offense.
It is clear from PLDTs submission that it confuses the
crime for which SW Bl and SW B2 were issued with
the crime for which SW Al and SWA2 were issued:
SW Bl and SW B2 were issued for violation of PD
No. 401, to be enforced in two different places as
identified in the warrants. The crime for which these
search warrants were issued does not pertain to the crime
of theft where matters of personal property and the
taking thereof with intent to gain become significant
but to PD No. 401.
These items could not be the subject of a violation of PD
No. 401 since PLDT itself does not claim that these
items themselves comprise the unauthorized
installations. For emphasis, what PD No. 401 punishes is
the unauthorized installation of telephone connection
without the previous consent of PLDT. In the present
case, PLDT has not shown that connecting printers,
scanners, diskettes or tapes to a computer, even if
connected to a PLDT telephone line, would or should
require its prior authorization.
Neither could these items be a means of committing a
violation of PD No. 401 since these copying, printing
and storage devices in no way aided the respondents in
making the unauthorized connections. While these items
may be accessory to the computers and other equipment
linked to telephone lines, PD No. 401 does not cover this
kind of items within the scope of the prohibition. To
allow the seizure of items under the PLDTs
interpretation would, as the CA correctly observed, allow
the seizure under the warrant of properties for personal
use of the respondents.
If PLDT seeks the seizure of these items to prove that
these installations contain the respondents' financial gain
and the corresponding business loss to PLDT, then that
purpose is served by SW Al and SW A2 since this is
what PLDT essentially complained of in charging the
respondents with theft. However, the same reasoning
does not justify its seizure under a warrant for violation
of PD No. 401 since these items are not directly
connected to the PLDT telephone lines and PLDT has
not even claimed that the installation of these items
requires prior authorization from it.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision and the
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No.
89213 are hereby MODIFIED in that SW Al and SW
A2 are hereby declared valid and constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199032 November 19, 2014
RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the
Decision2 dated April 25, 2011 and the Resolution 3 dated
October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 113017 upholding the validity of Search
Warrant No. 09-14407.4
The Facts
On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP),
through Police Senior Superintendent Roberto B.
Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch50 (Manila-RTC) for a warrant to search
three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in
Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged
remains of the victims summarily executed by the so-
called "Davao Death Squad" may be found. 5 In support
of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola)
discussion on the particular reasons from which the
was presented to the RTC and there testified that he
personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in
December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that
buried the victims.6
Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as
Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC, found
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and
thus, issued Search Warrant No. 09-144077 which was
later enforced by the elements ofthe PNP-Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group, in coordination
withthe members of the Scene of the Crime Operatives
on July 15, 2009.The search of the Laud Compound
caves yielded positive results for the presence of human
remains.8
On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4
Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized
Evidence9 premised on the following grounds: (a) Judge
Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a
search warrant since he had been automatically divested
14
of his position asVice Executive Judge when several
administrative penalties were imposed against him by
the Court;10 (b) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to
issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which was to be
enforced in Davao City;11 (c) the human remains sought
to be seized are not a proper subject of a search
warrant;12 (d) the police officers are mandated to follow
the prescribed procedure for exhumation of human
remains;13 (e) the search warrant was issued despite lack
of probable cause;14 (f) the rule against forum shopping
was violated;15 and (g) there was a violation of the rule
requiring one specific offense and the proper
specification of the place to be searched and the articles
to be seized.16
The Manila-RTC Ruling
In an Order17 dated July 23, 2009, the Manila-RTC
granted the motion of Laud "after a careful consideration
[of] the grounds alleged [therein]." Aside from this
general statement, the said Order contained no
Manila-RTC derived its conclusion.
Respondent, the People of the Philippines (the People),
filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 which was,
however, denied in an Order19 dated December 8, 2009,
wherein the Manila-RTC, this time, articulated its
reasons for the warrants quashal, namely: (a) the People
failed to show any compelling reason to justify the
issuanceof a search warrant by the Manila RTC which
was to be implemented in Davao City where the offense
was allegedly committed, in violation of Section 2, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court;20 (b) the fact that the alleged
offense happened almost four (4) years before the search
warrant application was filed rendered doubtful the
existence of probable cause;21 and (c) the applicant, i.e.,
the PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping as the
subject matter of the present search warrant application
is exactly the sameas the one contained in a previous
application22 before the RTC of Davao City, Branch 15
(Davao-RTC) which had been denied.23
Unconvinced, the People filed a petition for
certioraribefore the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No.
113017.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision24 dated April 25, 2011, the CA granted the
Peoples petition and thereby annulled and set aside the
Orders of the Manila-RTC for having been tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
It held that the requirements for the issuance of a search
warrant were satisfied, pointing out that an application
therefor involving a heinous crime, such as Murder, is an
exception to the compelling reasons requirement under
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as explicitly
recognized in A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC25 and reiterated in
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,26 provided that the application is
filed by the PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOC-TF) or the Reaction Against Crime Task Force
(REACT-TF),27with the endorsement of its head, before
the RTC of Manila or Quezon City, and the warrant be
consequently issued by the Executive Judge or Vice-
Executive Judge of either of the said courts, as in this
case.28
Also, the CA found that probable cause was established
since, among others, witness Avasola deposed and
testified that he personally witnessed the murder of six
(6) persons in December 2005 and was actually part of
the group that buried the victims two bodies in each of
the three (3) caves.29 Further, it observed that the Manila-
RTC failed to consider the fear of reprisal and natural
reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case,
stating that these are sufficient reasons to justify the
delay attending the application of a search
warrant.30 Accordingly, it deemed that the physical
evidence of a protruding human bone in plain view in
one of the caves, and Avasolas first-hand eye witness
account both concur and point to the only reasonable
conclusion that the crime ofMurder had been committed
and that the human remains of the victims were located
in the Laud Compound.31
Finally, the CA debunked the claim of forum shopping,
finding that the prior application for a search warrant
filed before the Davao-RTC was based on facts and
circumstances different from those in the application
filed before the Manila-RTC.32
Dissatisfied, Laud moved for reconsideration which was,
however, denied in a Resolution33 dated October 17,
2011,hence, this petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues for the Courts resolution are as follows: (a)
whether the administrative penalties imposed on Judge
Peralta invalidated Search Warrant No. 09-14407; (b)
whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to issue the
said warrant despite non-compliance with the compelling
reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule126 of the
Rules of Court; (c) whether the requirements of probable
cause and particular description were complied with and
the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court was violated; and (d) whether the
applicant for the search warrant,i.e., the PNP, violated
the rule against forum shopping.1wphi1
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
A. Effect of Judge Peraltas Administrative Penalties.
Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
which provides that "[t]he imposition upon an Executive
Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of an administrative
penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically
operate to divest him of his position as such,"Laud
claims that Judge Peralta had no authority to act as Vice-
15
Executive Judge and accordingly issue Search Warrant
No. 09-14407 in view of the Courts Resolution in Dee
C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta 34 wherein he was
administratively penalized with fines of 15,000.00 and
5,000.00.35
While the Court does agree that the imposition of said
administrative penalties did operate to divest Judge
Peraltas authority to act as ViceExecutive Judge, it must
be qualified thatthe abstraction of such authority would
not, by and of itself, result in the invalidity of Search
Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that Judge Peralta
may be considered to have made the issuance as a de
facto officer whose acts would, nonetheless, remain
valid.
Funa v. Agra36 defines who a de factoofficer is and
explains that his acts are just as valid for all purposes as
those of a de jureofficer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned, viz.:
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment
from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the
office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is
valid on its face. He may also be one who is in
possession of an office, and is discharging [his] duties
under color of authority, by which is meant authority
derived from an appointment, however irregular or
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.
Consequently, the acts of the de factoofficer are just as
valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so
far as the public or third persons who are interested
therein are concerned.37
The treatment of a de factoofficers acts is premised on
the reality that third persons cannot always investigate
the right of one assuming to hold an important office
and, as such, have a right to assume that officials
apparently qualified and in office are legally
such.38 Public interest demands that acts of persons
holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid
statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public
as distinguished from the officer in question is
concerned.39 Indeed, it is far more cogently
acknowledged that the de factodoctrine has been
formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer
principally, but rather for the protection of the public and
individuals who get involved in the official acts of
persons discharging the duties of an office without being
lawful officers.40
In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the
following elements must concur: (a) there must be a de
jureoffice; (b) there must be color of right or general
acquiescence by the public; and (c) there must be actual
physical possession of the office in good faith.41
The existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in
this case. Undoubtedly, there is a de jureoffice of a 2nd
Vice-Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a colorable
right to the said office as he was duly appointed to such
position and was only divested of the same by virtue of a
supervening legal technicality that is, the operation of
Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC as above-
explained; also, it may be said that there was general
acquiescence by the public since the search warrant
application was regularly endorsed to the sala of Judge
Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila-
RTC under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice Executive
Judge.42Finally, Judge Peraltas actual physical
possession of the said office is presumed to bein good
faith, as the contrary was not established. 43 Accordingly,
Judge Peralta can be considered to have acted as a de
factoofficer when he issued Search Warrant No. 09-
14407, hence, treated as valid as if it was issued by a de
jureofficer suffering no administrative impediment.
B. Jurisdiction of the Manila-RTC to Issue Search
Warrant No. 09- 14407; Exception to the Compelling
Reasons Requirement Under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M.No. 03-8-02-SC states the
requirements for the issuance of search warrants in
special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manilaand Quezon
City. These special criminal cases pertain to those
"involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as
violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as
amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be
enacted by Congress, and included herein by the
Supreme Court." Search warrant applications for such
cases may befiled by "the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police(PNP)
and the AntiCrime Task Force (ACTAF)," and
"personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies." As
in ordinary search warrant applications, they "shall
particularly describe therein the places to be searched
and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed
in the Rules of Court." "The Executive Judges [of these
RTCs] and,whenever they are on official leave of
absence or are not physically present in the station, the
Vice-Executive Judges" are authorized to act on such
applications and "shall issue the warrants, if justified,
which may be served in places outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the said courts."
The Court observes that all the above-stated
requirements were complied with in this case.
As the records would show, the search warrant
application was filed before the Manila-RTC by the PNP
and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame
Versosa,44 particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized (as will be
elaborated later on) in connection with the heinous crime
of Murder.45 Finding probable cause therefor, Judge
Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge,
issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which, as the rules
state, may be served in places outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the said RTC.
Notably, the fact that a search warrant application
involves a "special criminal case" excludes it from the
compelling reason requirement under Section 2, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court which provides:
16
SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall
be filed. An application for search warrant shall be
filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial
jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the
application, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime isknown,
or any court within the judicial region where
the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed,
the application shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending. (Emphasis supplied)
As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of
A.M. No. 03-8- 02-SC, the rule on search warrant
applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs
for the above-mentioned special criminal cases "shall be
an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court." Perceptibly, the fact that a search warrant is
being applied for in connection with a special criminal
case as above-classified already presumes the existence
of a compelling reason; hence, any statement to this
effect would be super fluous and therefore should be
dispensed with. By all indications, Section 12, Chapter V
of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon
City RTCs to issue warrants to be servedin places
outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the
parameters under the said section have been complied
with, as in this case. Thus, on these grounds, the Court
finds nothing defective in the preliminary issuance of
Search Warrant No. 09-14407. Perforce, the RTC-Manila
should not have overturned it.
C. Compliance with the Constitutional Requirements for
the Issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 and the
One-SpecificOffense Rule Under Section 4, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court.

In order to protect the peoples right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution)
provides that no search warrant shall issue except upon
probable causeto be determined personally by the
judgeafter examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to besearched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court states that a search warrant shall not be issued
except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offenseto be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident
from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his
deposition, stated that he personally witnessed the
commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact,
part of the group that buried the victims:
Q9-Who are these six (6) male victims who were killed
and buried in the caves in December 2005 at around 9:00
p.m.?
A9-I heard Tatay Laud calling the names of the two
victims when they were still alive as Pedro and Mario. I
dont know the names of the other four victims.
Q10-What happened after Pedro, Mario and the other
four victims were killed?
A10-Tatay Laud ordered me and the six (6) killers to
bring and bury equally the bodies inthe three caves. We
buried Pedro and Mario altogether in the first cave,
located more or less 13 meters from the makeshift house
of Tatay Laud, the other two victims in the second cave
and the remaining two in the third cave.
Q11-How did you get there at Laud Compound in the
evening of December 2005?
A11-I was ordered by Tatay Laud to go [to] the place. I
ran errands [for] him.46
Avasolas statements in his deposition were confirmed
during the hearing on July 10, 2009, where Judge Peralta
conducted the following examination:
Court: x x x Anong panandaan mo? Nandoon ka ba
noong naghukay, nakatago o kasama ka?
Mr. Avasola: Kasama po ako sa pagbuhat ng mga tao, sir.
Court: Mga ilang katao?
Mr. Avasola: Anim (6) po.
Court: May mass grave ba na nahukay?
17
Mr. Avasola: May tatlong kweba po na maliliit yung isa
malaki. x x x.47
Verily, the facts and circumstancesestablished from the
testimony of Avasola, who was personally examined by
Judge Peralta, sufficiently show that more likely than not
the crime of Murder of six (6) persons had been
perpetrated and that the human remains in connection
with the same are in the place sought to be searched. In
Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc.,48 the Court explained the
quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable
cause for a search warrant, as follows:
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. A finding of probable cause needs only torest
on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction. The existence depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination. However, the findings of
the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor
run counter to the clear dictates of reason. 49
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the
quantum of proof to establish the existence of probable
cause had been met. That a "considerable length of time"
attended the search warrants application from the
crimes commission does not, by and of itself, negate the
veracity of the applicants claims or the testimony of the
witness presented. As the CA correctly observed, the
delay may be accounted for by a witnesss fear of
reprisal and natural reluctance to get involved in a
criminal case.50 Ultimately, in determining the existence
of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be
personally examined by the judge in their totality,
together with a judicious recognition of the variable
complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case.
To the Courts mind, the supposed delay in the search
warrants application does not dilute the probable cause
finding made herein. In fine, the probable cause
requirement has been sufficiently met.
The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance
with the constitutional requirement that there be a
particular description of "the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized."
"[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient if
the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish
it from other places in the community. Any designation
or description known to the locality that points out the
place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads
the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement."51
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 evidently complies with
the foregoing standard since it particularly describes the
place to be searched, namely, the three (3) caves located
inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Maa,
Davao City:
You are hereby commanded to makean immediate search
at any time [of] the day of the premises above
describe[d] particularly the three (3) caves (as sketched)
inside the said Laud Compound, Purok 3, Brgy. Ma-a,
Davao Cityand forthwith seize and take possession of
the remains of six (6) victims who were killed and
buried in the just said premises.
x x x x52 (Emphases supplied)
For further guidance in its enforcement, the search
warrant even made explicit reference to the
sketch53 contained in the application. These, in the
Courts view, are sufficient enough for the officers to,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to
be searched, which they in fact did.
The things to be seized were also particularly described,
namely, the remains of six (6) victims who were killed
and buried in the aforesaid premises. Lauds posturing
that human remains are not "personal property" and,
hence, could not be the subject of a search warrant
deserves scant consideration. Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3.Personal property to be seized. A search
warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or
fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means
of committing an offense. (Emphases supplied)
"Personal property" in the foregoing context
actually refers to the things mobility, and not
to its capacity to be owned or alienated by a
particular person. Article416 of the Civil
Code,54 which Laud himself cites,55 states that
in general, all things which can be transported
from place to place are deemed to be personal
property. Considering that human remains can
generally be transported from place toplace,
and considering further that they qualify under
the phrase "subject of the offense" given that
they prove the crimes corpus delicti, 56 it
follows that they may be valid subjects of a
search warrant under the above-cited criminal
procedure provision. Neither does the Court
agree with Lauds contention that the term
"human remains" is too all-embracing so as to
subvert the particular description requirement.
Asthe Court sees it, the description points to
no other than the things that bear a direct
relation to the offense committed, i.e., of
Murder. It is also perceived that the description
is already specific as the circumstances would
ordinarily allow given that the buried bodies
18
would have naturally decomposed over time.
These observations on the descriptions
sufficient particularity square with the Courts
pronouncement in Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc.
v. Judge Ruiz,57 wherein it was held:
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the
things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow(People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 [1932]); or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law
by which the warrant officer may be guided in
making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad
Santos, J.); or when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which
the warrant is being issued(Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised
Rules of Court) x x x If the articles desired to be seized
have any direct relation to an offense committed, the
applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other
than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the
articles subject of search and seizure should come in
handy merely to strengthen such evidence. (Emphases
supplied)58
Consequently, the Court finds that the particular
description requirement both as to the place to be
searched and the things to be seized had been complied
with.
Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-
offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court as above-cited which, to note, was intended to
prevent the issuance of scattershot warrants, or those
which are issued for more than one specific offense. The
defective nature of scatter-shot warrants was discussed
in the case of People v. CA59 as follows: There is no
question that the search warrant did not relate to a
specific offense, in violation of the doctrine announced
in Stonehill v. Diokno and of Section 3 [now, Section 4]
of Rule 126 providing as follows:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. Significantly, the
petitioner has not denied this defect in the search warrant
and has merely said that there was probable cause,
omitting to continue that it was in connection withone
specific offense. He could not, of course, for the warrant
was a scatter-shot warrant that could refer, in Judge
Dayrits own words, "to robbery, theft, qualified theft or
estafa." On this score alone, the search warrantwas
totally null and void and was correctly declared to be so
by the very judge who had issued it.60
In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA,61 the Court, however,
settled that a search warrant that covers several counts of
a certain specific offense does not violate the one-
specific-offense rule, viz.:
That there were several counts of the offenseof copyright
infringement and the search warrant uncovered several
contraband items in the form of pirated video tapes is not
to be confused with the number of offenses charged. The
search warrant herein issued does not violate the one-
specific-offense rule. (Emphasis supplied)62
Hence, given that Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was
issued only for one specific offense that is, of Murder,
albeit for six (6) counts it cannot be said that Section 4,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court had been violated.
That being said, the Court now resolves the last issue on
forum shopping.
D. Forum Shopping.
There is forum shopping when a litigant repetitively
avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded
on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court to increase his chances of obtaining a
favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. 63
Forum shopping cannot be said to have been committed
in this case considering the various points of divergence
attending the search warrant application before the
Manila-RTC and that before the Davao-RTC. For one,
the witnesses presented in each application were
different. Likewise, the application filed in Manila was
in connection with Murder, while the one in Davao did
not specify any crime. Finally, and more importantly, the
places to be searched were different that inManila
sought the search of the Laud Compound caves, while
that in Davao was for a particular area in the Laud Gold
Cup Firing Range. There being no identity of facts and
circumstances between the two applications, the
ruleagainst forum shopping was therefore not violated.
Thus, for all the above-discussed reasons, the Court
affirms the CA Ruling which upheld the validity of
Search Warrant No. 09-14407.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated April 25, 2011 and the Resolution dated October
17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No.
113017 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205823, August 17, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
v. REGIE BREIS Y ALVARADO AND GARY
YUMOL Y TUAZON,*Appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
19
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated 26 June 2012
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04916,
affirming the Decision2 dated 14 February 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Baguio City (trial
court) in Criminal Case No. 30409-R.
The Facts
Appellants Regie Breis y Alvarado (Breis) and Gary
Yumol y Tuazon (Yumol) were charged with violation of
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That in the afternoon of February 10, 2010, at Gov. Pack
Road, this City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in
conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession,
custody and control marijuana with a recorded net
weight of 8,181 grams of dried marijuana leaves/fruiting
tops wrapped in plastic and further wrapped with brown
packaging tape and placed inside a brown box, without
the authority of law and knowing fully well that said
dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops are dangerous drugs,
in violation of the afore-cited provisions of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW to Sec. 11 of RA 9165.3
Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial
ensued, where the prosecution presented witnesses
Intelligence Officers 1 Elizer Mangili (IO1 Mangili) and
Ryan Peralta (IO1 Peralta) of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency - Cordillera Administrative Region
(PDEA-CAR); while the defense presented the
testimonies of appellants.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution's version of the facts, as summarized by
the trial court, is as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Around 3:00 o'clock PM of February 10, 2009 (sic), an
informant went to the PDEA-CAR field office at Melvin
Jones, Harrison Road, Baguio City and offered the
information that the accused were bound to transport a
box of marijuana from Baguio City to Dau, Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Mangili gathered that the accused have been
frequently traveling from Pampanga to Baguio to get
marijuana bricks from their supplier at La Trinidad,
Benguet. Mangili referred the informant to Senior
PDEJA Officer Tacio for further interview and then the
matter was referred to the PDEA Officer-in-Charge
Edgar Apalla, who after careful evaluation, ordered
Agent Tacio to form a team for the entrapment of the
accused.
Agent Tacio created a team composed of Mangili and
Peralta as arresting officer and seizing officer,
respectively, and briefed them on the operations to be
conducted. Tacio disclosed to the team that the accused
were to transport by a public transport bus from Baguio
City to Dau, Pampanga bricks of marijuana packed in a
carton and that the departure from Baguio was scheduled
at around 5:00 o'clock PM of that day. The accused Breis
would be in a white t-shirt with "Starbucks" logo and
dark jeans while accused Yumol would be wearing a
black t-shirt with a white print and blue jeans. Both the
accused were described as standing about 5 feet and 5
inches, thin, and dark complexion.
When the briefing was through, the team proceeded to
the Genesis Bus terminal at Governor Pack Road,
Baguio City at around 4:30 o'clock PM. Due to time
constraints, the PDEA team chose not to secure any
warrant nor coordinate with the nearest police station.
Upon reaching the bus terminal, Mangili asked the bus
conductor to identify the bus which would leave at 5:00
o'clock PM. Mangili was directed to Genesis bus with
plate number TXX 890. Thus, pretending to be
passengers, Mangili and Peralta boarded the bus and
they observed two male individuals whose physical
appearances fitted the descriptions given by the
informant. Both agents likewise saw a box placed in
between the legs of accused Breis.
Mangili sat behind the accused while Peralta, stood near
where the accused were seated. In order to have a clearer
view of the box tucked in between the feet of accused
Breis if the same fit the box described by informant,
Mangili took the seat opposite where the accused were
seated and saw that the box was with the markings
"Ginebra San Miguel" and which was described by the
informant. Mangili then casually asked accused Yumol
who owned the "Ginebra San Miguel" box, the accused
replied that it was theirs.
Accused Yumol suddenly stood up and tried to leave but
before he could do so, Peralta blocked his way while
Mangili confronted accused Breis and asked what was
contained in the box. Instead of answering, Breis shoved
Mangili and tried to flee but Mangili was able to block
his way as he was much larger than the accused Yumol
(sic). Mangili ordered him to sit down.
Agent Peralta then summoned the back-up officers to
help secure the bus and subdue the accused. After
introducing themselves as PDEA agents, Mangili asked
the accused Breis to open the box but Breis ignored the
request which made Mangili lift and open the box. He
took one brick and discovered it was marijuana. The
"Ginebra San Miguel" box yielded three more bricks of
marijuana. Mangili then marked the items on site.
Agent Peralta then informed the accused that they were
being arrested for violation of Rep. Act No. 9165 and
then he read their constitutional rights in Pilipino to
them.
Thereafter, the team returned to the PDEA-CAR office
of Melvin Jones, Baguio City for documentation such as
the preparation of the affidavits of Agents Mangili and
Peralta, Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of both
accused, Request for Physical Exam and Request for
Laboratory Exam. Inventory likewise was done around
7:43 o'clock PM on February 10, 2010 at the said PDEA-
CAR office.
After the documentation and inventory, the accused were
brought to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical
Center (BGHMC) and Medico-Legal Certificates were
20
issued showing that the accused had no external signs of
physical injuries at the time of their examination.
Chemistry Report No. D-08-2010 indicates that the
confiscated items from the accused yielded positive to
(sic) the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drugs (sic). 4
Version of the Defense
The defense's version of the facts, as summarized by the
trial court, is as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Accused, both construction workers, left Dau,
Mabalacat, Pampanga for Baguio at around 6:00 o'clock
AM of February 9, 2010 to visit a certain Edwin Garcia,
an acquaintance and a resident of Loakan, Baguio City.
Edwin Garcia had offered the accused to be upholsterers
in his upholstery business way back in December of
2008.
At around 11:00 o'clock AM, the accused arrived in
Baguio City and because they did not know the exact
address and contact number of Edwin Garcia, they took a
chance and decided to take a cab to Loakan. However,
they failed to find Garcia's house despite asking the
residents of Loakan. So, they decided to go back to the
Genesis bus terminal and go back home to Pampanga.
Upon reaching the terminal, they ate and took the 4:30
o'clock PM bus for Pampanga. They were already
boarded when accused Yumol stepped out to buy a bottle
of water. Thereafter, Mangili went near accused Breis
and uttered something inaudible, and thinking that the
seat he was occupying was Mangili's, accused Breis
stood up to give up his seat but instead Mangili pushed
him and accused Breis asked what seems to be the
problem. Mangili then asked if he owns the box under
the seat in front of his, Breis replied in the negative.
Mangili then opened the box, got one of the bricks
contained therein, sliced the same and saw that it was
marijuana. Accused Breis, infuriated, retorted that the
accusation is baseless and malicious.
Mangili then summoned his companions and they
dragged accused Breis outside the bus when suddenly,
accused Yumol arrived and inquired what the commotion
was all about. The group then asked if he (Yumol) was a
companion of accused Breis and when he answered
positively, Yumol was likewise apprehended.
Both the accused were then brought to the PDEA Office
and were forced to admit ownership of the box of
marijuana, but they refused and thus they were hit with
the bricks of marijuana. One of the agents even squeezed
the scrotum of accused Yumol in the hope that he will
admit ownership over the box of marijuana.5
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's
version, upholding the presumption of regularity in favor
of the PDEA agents and finding no evil or ill-motive on
their part. On the other hand, the trial court found
appellants' defense of frame-up too incredible and
outlandishly preposterous. The trial court also held that
the warrantless search and seizure and the warrantless
arrest of appellants were valid. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:6redarclaw
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the
accused Regie Breis y Alvarado and Gary Yumol y
Tuazon GUILTY beyond any reasonable doubt and they
are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and each to pay a fine of
P5,000,000.00.
Both the accused are immediately ORDERED TO BE
TRANSFERRED to the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.7
The lone assignment of error in the Brief for the
Accused-Appellants is as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.8
In their appeal, appellants argued that the PDEA agents
did not comply with Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II
of RA 9165, and that the prosecution failed to establish
the chain of custody over the seized items.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court, holding that the requirements of Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 were satisfied. Further, the Court
of Appeals found no break in the custody of the seized
items that might compromise their evidentiary integrity.
The appellate court also upheld the legality of the
warrantless search and arrest of appellants. The
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of
Appeals reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
appealed Decision dated February 14, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 61,
in Criminal Case No. 30409-R, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.9
In the present appeal, appellants and appellee adopted
their respective briefs10 filed before the Court of Appeals
as their supplemental briefs.11redarclaw
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
Procedure on Seizure and Custody of Drugs
Appellants argue that the procedure on seizure and
custody of drugs, specified in Section 21, paragraph 1,
Article II of RA 9165, was not complied with. In support
of this contention, appellants state that: (1) the PDEA
agents did not immediately conduct the inventory at the
place where the items were seized, and did so only at the
PDEA-CAR field office;12 and (2) the representatives
from the media, barangay and Department of Justice
(DOJ) were present during the inventory conducted at
21
the field office, but not at the place of the seizure during
actual confiscation.13redarclaw
Appellants are mistaken. The PDEA agents who
apprehended appellants did not deviate from the
procedure prescribed by law and regulations. Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165 provides the
procedure to be followed in the seizure and custody of
dangerous drugs:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
This is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165,
which reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory' and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable,
in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items; x x x. (Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)
Appellants insist that the PDEA agents should have
conducted the inventory at the place where the drugs
were seized. However, the IRR clearly provides that in
case of warrantless seizures, the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team.
The physical inventory and photograph were conducted
at the PDEA-CAR field office, a fact that appellants
themselves acknowledge14 and testified to by IO1
Mangili15 and IO1 Peralta.16redarclaw
The requirement of the presence of a representative from
the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official
during the physical inventory and photograph was also
complied with. The representatives from the media and
the DOJ and an elected barangay official were present at
the inventory conducted at the PDEA-CAR field office,
as evidenced by their signatures17 on the Inventory of
Seized Item18 and photographs taken during the
inventory.19 In fact, this is not contested by
appellants.20redarclaw
Hence, we find no deviation from the procedure
prescribed by Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA
9165 and its IRR.
Chain of Custody Established
What IO1 Mangili did in the bus upon seizure of the
drugs was to mark the same, which is not to be confused
with taking the physical inventory. Marking is not a
requirement of RA 9165 or its IRR, but has been held to
be an initial stage in the chain of
custody:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Nonetheless, the Court has acknowledged the practical
value of the process of marking the confiscated
contraband and considered it as an initial stage in the
chain of custody - a process preliminary and preparatory
to the physical inventory and photograph requirements in
Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This step initiates the process of protecting innocent
persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of
protecting as well the apprehending officers from
harassment suits based on planting of evidence under
Section 29 [of Republic act No. 9165] and on allegations
of robbery or theft.
"Marking" is the placing by the apprehending officer of
some distinguishing signs with his/her initials and
signature on the items seized. It helps ensure that the
dangerous drugs seized upon apprehension are the same
dangerous drugs subjected to inventory and photography
when these activities are undertaken at the police station
or at some other practicable venue rather than at the
place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody"
rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to
truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the
chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence
should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
"Immediate confiscation" has no exact definition.
Indeed, marking upon immediate confiscation has been
interpreted as to even include marking at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team. In this
case, the dangerous drugs taken from accused-appellants
were marked in his presence immediately upon
confiscation at the very venue of his arrest. 21 (Citations
omitted)
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory
to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction.22 What assumes primary importance in drug
cases is the prosecution's proof, to the point of moral
certainty, that the prohibited drug presented in court as
evidence against the accused is the same item recovered
from his possession.23redarclaw
Appellants argue that the prosecution was not able to
establish the chain of custody over the seized
drugs:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
22
The irregularities in the handling procedure of the seized
items are manifold. There is no indication what steps
were taken after the seizure, whether the items were
turned over to the investigator or to the desk officer
before SPO4 Abordo allegedly delivered it to the crime
laboratory.
How can the trial court rule that the integrity of the
corpus delicti was preserved when in fact, the
prosecution failed to identify who was in possession of
the marijuana from the place of the seizure; to whom the
same was turned over; and how it came to the custody of
SPO4 Abordo who allegedly delivered the seized items
at (sic) the laboratory. Nor was there any prosecution's
evidence showing the identity of the person who had the
custody and safekeeping of the drug after its examination
and pending presentation in court.24
Appellants' argument fails to impress.
The links that the prosecution must endeavor to establish
with respect to the chain of custody are the
following: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable,
of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 25redarclaw
In this case, the prosecution adequately established the
unbroken chain of custody over the marijuana seized
from appellants.
The records show that the seized drugs were marked
immediately upon confiscation by IO1 Mangili with his
initials and signature, the date, and the letters A, B, C or
D to distinguish the bricks, in the presence of
appellants.26redarclaw
The seized drugs were brought, together with appellants,
to the PDEA-CAR field office. IO1 Mangili acted in
both capacities of apprehending officer and investigating
officer. IO1 Mangili and IO1 Peralta testified that they
conducted the investigation and the
inventory.27redarclaw
IO1 Mangili and IO1 Peralta also testified that it was
their evidence custodian, Senior Police Officer 4 Abordo
(SP04 Abordo), who brought the seized drugs to the
Crime Laboratory for examination.28 A thorough review
of the records reveals that the Request for Laboratory
Exam29 shows that the seized drugs were delivered on 10
February 2010 by SP04 Abordo and received by Police
Officer 2 Florendo and Police Senior Inspector Rowena
Fajardo Canlas (PSI Canlas). PSI Canlas was the
forensic chemist who conducted the examination on the
seized drugs and signed Chemistry Report No. D-08-
201030(chemistry report).
The chemistry report indicates that the "specimen
submitted are retained in this laboratory for future
reference."31 Through subpoena32 upon PSI Canlas, the
marijuana was brought to court and marked during the
preliminary conference held on 7 April 2010. 33redarclaw
Appellants contend that the prosecution's failure to
discuss in detail each link in the chain of custody
negated the integrity of the evidence. This is
misplaced:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x It must be remembered that testimony about a
perfect chain is not always the standard as it is
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken
chain. As such, what is of importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items. The integrity of the evidence is
presumed to be preserved, unless there is a showing of
bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been
tampered.34 (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Mali,35 we held:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes
the dangerous drug itself. To sustain conviction, its
identity must be established in that the substance bought
during the buy-bust operation is the same substance
offered in court as exhibit. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function as it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.36
In this case, the prosecution was able to show that the
same drugs seized and marked by IO1 Mangili were the
same ones he identified at the trial. 37 Further, the records
consistently show that the markings on the bricks of
marijuana consisted of the initials and signature of IO1
Mangili, the date and A, B, C, or D, as evidenced by the
photograph38 taken during the inventory and the
chemistry report describing the submitted specimen as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A-One (1) carton knot tied with gray plastic straw
labeled GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL with markings '02-
10-2010 ELM and signature', containing four (4) bricks
of dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops each wrapped
with plastic and further wrapped with brown packaging
tape with the following markings and recorded net
weights:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A-1 - [02-10-2010-A ELM and signature] = 2000.1
grams
A-2 = [02-10-2010-B ELM and signature] = 2158.3
grams
A-3 = [02-10-2010-C ELM and signature] = 2051.1
grams
A-4 = [02-10-2010-D ELM and signature] = 1971.5
grams39
(Emphasis supplied)
The presumption is that the PDEA agents performed
their duties regularly. There being no evidence showing
bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been
tampered, we find that the prosecution sufficiently
established the chain of custody. Consequently,
the corpus delicti was also established.
Warrantless Search and Seizure and Arrest
Although it was not raised as an error, it is imperative
that we rule on the validity of the warrantless search and
23
seizure and the subsequent warrantless arrest of
appellants.
It is well settled that no arrest, search and seizure can be
made without a valid warrant issued by a competent
judicial authority. No less than the Constitution
guarantees this right -
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.40
Further, any evidence obtained in violation of this
provision is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.41 However, the rule against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of exceptions, such as the
search of moving vehicles. In People v. Libnao,42 the
Court held:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are
allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing
a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases,
however, are limited to routine checks where the
examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such would be constitutionally permissible only
if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a
belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to
the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle
contains a[n] item, article or object which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction.43
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable
cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the items, articles or objects sought in connection with
said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law
are in the place to be searched. 44 The determination of
probable cause must be resolved according to the facts of
each case.45redarclaw
The Court has ruled in several dangerous drug
cases46 that tipped information is sufficient probable
cause to effect a warrantless search. In People v.
Mariacos,47 the police received at dawn information that
a baggage of marijuna was loaded on a passenger
jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. There, the
informant described the bag containing the prohibited
drugs. The Court held that the police had probable cause
to search the packages allegedly containing illegal
drugs.48redarclaw
In the present case, the vehicle that carried the prohibited
drugs was about to leave. The PDEA agents made a
judgment call to act fast, as time was of the essence. The
team arrived at the terminal around 15 minutes 49 before
the bus was scheduled to depart. Upon boarding the bus,
IO1 Mangili and IO1 Peralta identified two men fitting
the description given by the informant in possession of a
box described50 by the informant to contain marijuana.
Moreover, the PDEA agents had reasonable suspicion
based on appellants' behavior that the latter were
probably committing a crime. IO1 Mangili casually
asked appellant Yumol who owned the box at their
(appellants') feet. After answering that it belonged to
them (appellants), Yumol suddenly stood up and tried to
leave. IO1 Peralta prevented him from getting off the
bus. Then IO1 Mangili asked appellant Breis what was
contained in the box. Instead of answering, Breis shoved
IO1 Mangili and tried to flee. It must be noted that IO1
Mangili identified himself as a PDEA agent before either
appellant tried to leave the bus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Q And you wanted to confirm your suspicion by
asking from Gary Yumol who owns the box?
A Yes, sir.
Q And Gary Yumol, of course, did not give you any
answer?
A He said that it is theirs.
Q Did you also talk to the companion of Gary
Yumol?
A After Gary stood up suddenly I also spoke to
Regie Breis.
Q And did he also give you any answer?
A He just pushed me and tried to leave the bus.
xxx
x
Q Before you talked to Gary Yumol did you
identify yourself as PDEA agents?
A When I asked him who owns the box, I then
identified myself.
Q Did you ask them if you can see the contents of the
box?
A I told Regie to open the box but he did not want
that's why I was the one who opened it.
Q Gary Yumol according to you stood up?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when he stood up, he was held by Agent
Peralta?
A Yes, sir.
Q And Regie Breis also stood up after you talked to
him?
A Yes, sir.
Q But he was also held by Agent Peralta?
A I was the one who told him to sit down.
Q Before you told him to sit down did you
introduce yourself as a PDEA agent?
A Yes, sir.51 (Emphasis supplied)
Appellants' act of standing up to leave the bus under
different circumstances may be natural; but it is not so in
this case. In People v. Aminnudin,52 the warrantless arrest
of Aminnudin based on an informant's tip that he was
carrying marijuana was declared unconstitutional
because there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest. There, the Court found that "[t]o all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel."53redarclaw
24
In contrast to the instant case, appellants were attempting
to get out of a bus that was about to leave the terminal,
and not one that had just arrived, where the other
passengers were, as can be expected, seated in
preparation for departure. It is unnatural for passengers
to abruptly disembark from a departing bus, leaving their
belongings behind. Any reasonable observer would be
put on suspicion that such persons are probably up to no
good. To a trained law enforcement agent, it signaled the
probability that appellants were committing an offense
and that the objects left behind might be contraband or
even dangerous articles.
Indeed, as observed by the PDEA agents, appellants
were not simply passengers carrying a box in a bus.
They engaged in suspicious behavior when they tried to
flee after IO1 Mangili showed interest in their box and
identified himself as a PDEA agent. Worse, in his
attempt at flight, Breis pushed IO1 Mangili, already
knowing that the latter was a PDEA agent. This brazen
act on the part of Breis only cemented the belief that
appellants were likely hiding a wrongdoing and avoiding
capture by law enforcers.
The act of Breis in physically pushing IO1 Mangili and
attempting to flee constitutes resistance defined under
Article 151 of the Revised Penal Cjode (RPC). 54 Before
a person can be held guilty of the crime of resistance or
disobedience to a person in authority, it must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew that the
person he disobeyed or resisted is a person in authority
or the agent of such person who is actually engaged in
the performance of his official duties.55redarclaw
As a PDEA agent, IO1 Mangili is a law enforcement
agent and as such is an agent of a person in authority as
defined in the RPC.56 IO1 Mangili was in the act of
investigating a lead, and possibly apprehending violators
of RA 9165, in accordance with the mandate of the
PDEA.57 He announced his identity as such agent to
appellants. It may even be gleaned that knowing that IO1
Mangili was a PDEA agent was precisely the cause of
the attempted flight of appellants.
The laying of hands or using physical force against
agents of persons in authority when not serious in nature
constitutes resistance or disobedience under Article 151,
and not direct assault under Article 148 of the
RPC.58 This is because the gravity of the disobedience to
an order of a person in authority or his agent is measured
by the circumstances surrounding the act, the motives
prompting it and the real importance of the
transgression, rather than the source of the order
disobeyed.59 The pushing of IO1 Mangili is not of such
serious defiance to be considered direct assault, but is
resistance nonetheless.
The Court has held justified resistance to illegal or
abusive acts of agents of persons in authority. In Chan
Fook,60 the Court quoted Groizard:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A person in authority, his agent or a public officer who
exceeds his power can not be said to be in the exercise of
the functions of his office. The law that defines and
establishes his powers does not protect him for anything
that has not been provided for.
The scope of the respective powers of public officers and
their agents is fixed. If they go beyond it and they violate
any recognized rights of the citizens, then the latter may
resist the invasion, specially when it is clear and
manifest. The resistance must be coextensive with the
excess, and should not be greater than what is necessary
to repel the aggression.
The invasion of the prerogatives or rights of another and
the excess in the functions of an office, are the sources
that make for legitimate resistance, especially, in so far
as it is necessary for the defense of the persons or their
rights in the manner provided for in article 8 of the Penal
Code.61
Unlike the officer in Chan Fook, IO1 Mangili did not
exceed his authority in the performance of his duty. Prior
to Breis' resistance, IO1 Mangili laid nary a finger on
Breis or Yumol. Neither did his presence in the bus
constitute an excess of authority. The bus is public
transportation, and is open to the public. The expectation
of privacy in relation to the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches in a public bus is not the same as
that in a person's dwelling. In fact, at that point in time,
only the bus was being searched, not Yumol, Breis, or
their belongings, and the search of moving vehicles has
been upheld.
Moreover, appellants are not in any position to claim
protection of the right against unreasonable searches as
to the warrantless search of the bus. The pronouncement
of the United States Supreme Court (USSC) in Rakas v.
Illinois62 regarding the Fourth Amendment rights 63 is
instructive:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, which, like
some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously
asserted. A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search
and seizure only through the introduction of damaging
evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises
or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment
rights infringed. And since the exclusionary rule is an
attempt to effectuate the guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment, it is proper to permit only defendants
whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to
benefit from the rule's protections.64 (Citations omitted)
It being established that IO1 Mangili was not in violation
of Yumol's or Breis' rights as he was searching the bus,
there is no excess of authority, clear and manifest or
otherwise, for either Yumol or Breis to lawfully resist.
Hence, the act of Breis in pushing IO1 Mangili was an
unlawful resistance to an agent of a person in authority,
contrary to Article 151 of the RPC.
Breis' commission of a crime in view of, and against IO1
Mangili, and proclivity for resorting to acts of violence
further justify the warrantless search of appellants.
A further point. Appellants each attempted to alight from
a departing bus, leaving behind their belongings. They
may be deemed to have abandoned the box in their
flight. A thing is considered abandoned and possession
thereof lost if the spes recuperandi (the hope of
recovery) is gone and the animus revertendi (the
intention of returning) is finally given up. 65 That
appellants got up to leave a departing bus without
bringing their box points to the absence of both spes
25
recuperandi and animus revertendi. Indeed, although
their flight was thwarted by the PDEA agents, both
appellants intended to leave the box behind without
returning for it. Abandonment has the effect of
converting a thing into res nullius.66redarclaw
In the United States, abandoned articles, such as those
thrown away, are considered bona vacantia, and may be
lawfully searched and seized by law enforcement
authorities.67 Put to question in Abel v. United
States68 was the admissibility of incriminating articles,
which had been thrown away, that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation recovered without warrant. The USSC held
that the articles were abandoned and that there was
nothing unlawful in the government's appropriation of
such abandoned property.69 In Hester v. United
States,70 defendants and his associates ran away from
officers, and in the process discarded a jar and a jug. The
USSC held no Fourth Amendment violation occurred
when officers examined the contents of the discarded
items without warrant.71 In California v. Hodari,12 police
officers, without warrant, pursued defendant who threw
a rock of cocaine into an alley as he was running. The
USSC upheld the admissibility of the abandoned
cocaine.73redarclaw
Applied analogously, there is no objectionable
warrantless search and seizure of the box of marijuana
abandoned in the bus by appellants.
Given the above discussion, it is readily apparent that the
search in this case is valid.
Having been found with prohibited drugs in their
possession, appellants were clearly committing a
criminal offense in the presence of IO1 Mangili and IO1
Peralta. The subsequent warrantless arrest falls under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
xxxx
Hence, the warrantless arrest of appellants is lawful.
Defenses of Denial and Frame-Up
Appellants' defenses of denial and frame-up were
disbelieved by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination.74 We find no reason to deviate from this
rule.
The defenses of denial and frame-up cannot prevail over
the positive and categorical assertions of the PDEA
agents who were strangers to appellants and against
whom no ill-motive was established. 75Further, such
defenses failed to overcome the documentary and
physical evidence presented by the prosecution.
In light of the foregoing, appellants' conviction for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs is in order.
Penalty for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
The penalty for illegal possession of dangerous drugs is
provided in Section of RA 9165:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
SEC. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty
of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person, who, unless authorized by law/, shall possess
any dangerous drug in the following quantities,
regardless of the degree of purity
thereof:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x x
7) 500 grams or more of marijuana;
xxxx
The penalty imposed upon appellants is in order.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated 26 June 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04916, affirming the Decision
dated 14 February 2011 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61, Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 30409-R,
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 188794
HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing
the Decision2 dated March 31, 2009, and the
Resolution3dated July 10, 2009, of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31154. The appealed decision
affirmed the joint judgment4 dated September 5, 2007, of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao City,
Albay, which convicted petitioner Honesto Ogayon of
violating Sections 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165.5
The Antecedent Facts
On December 1, 2003, two Informations were filed
against Ogayon for the crimes allegedly committed as
follows:
I. Criminal Case No. 4738:
That at about 5:20 oclock (sic) in the morning of
October 2, 2003 at Barangay Iraya, Municipality of
Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control four (4) pcs. of small aluminum foil, four (4) pcs.
Of disposable lighter in different colors, one (1) blade
trademark "Dorco," and one (1) roll aluminum foil,
instruments used or intended to be used for smoking or
consuming shabu, without authority of law, to the
damage and prejudice of the public interest and welfare. 6
II. Criminal Case No. 4739:
That at about 5:20 oclock (sic) in the morning of
October 2, 2003 at Barangay Iraya, Municipality of
Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with deliberate intent to violate the law,
and without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control two (2) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets containing 0.040 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), with full
knowledge that in his possession and control is a
dangerous drug, to the damage and prejudice of the
public interest and welfare.7
During his arraignment in Criminal Case Nos. 4738 and
4739 on January 21, 2004, and March 17, 2004,
respectively, Ogayon denied both charges and pleaded
"not guilty." The joint pre-trial held on May 5, 2004
yielded only one factual admission on the identity of the
accused.8 A joint trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecution Version
On October 2, 2003, at around 5:20 a.m., Police Chief
Inspector Elmer Ferrera, together with the other
members of the Albay Provincial Police Office,

26
proceeded to Ogayons house in Barangay Iraya,
Guinobatan, Albay, to enforce Search Warrant No. AEK
29-2003.9The warrant was for the seizure of shabu and
drug paraphernalia allegedly kept and concealed in the
premises of Ogayons house. Barangay Tanod Jose
Lagana (Tanod Lagana) and Kagawad Lauro Tampocao
assisted the police team in conducting the search. 10
Upon reaching Ogayons house, the police team noticed
several persons inside a nipa hut located nearby.
Suspecting that a pot session was about to be held, the
police team restrained two of the five persons and
immediately proceeded to Ogayons house. After
introducing themselves as police officers, Senior Police
Officer Herminigildo Caritos (SPO4 Caritos) informed
Ogayon that they had a warrant to search his place.
SPO4 Caritos handed a copy of the warrant to Ogayon,
who allowed the police team to conduct the search. 11
Led by SPO4 Caritos, some members of the police team
went to the comfort room located about five meters away
from Ogayons house. When they searched the area, they
found an object (wrapped in a piece of paper with blue
prints) that fell from the wooden braces of the roof.
Upon SPO4 Caritos inspection, the paper contained two
(2) small, heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that the
police team suspected to contain shabu.
The search of the comfort room also uncovered four (4)
disposable lighters, one (1) knife measuring six inches
long, used aluminum foil, one (1) roll of aluminum foil,
and a "Dorco" blade.12 SPO4 Caritos then placed his
initials on the two (2) plastic sachets before joining the
rest of the police officers who were conducting a search
in Ogayons house. The police officers who searched
Ogayons house found live ammunition for an M-16
rifle.
After conducting the search, the police team prepared a
Receipt of Property Seized. 13 The receipt was signed by
the seizing officers, representatives from the Department
of Justice and the media, and two (2) barangay officials
who were present during the entire operation.14
The police team thereafter arrested Ogayon and the two
(2) other persons who had earlier been restrained, and
brought them to Camp Simeon Ola for booking. The
seized items were likewise brought to the camp for
laboratory examination. In his Chemistry
Report,15 Police Superintendent Lorlie Arroyo (forensic
chemist of the Philippine National Police Regional
Crime Laboratory) reported that the two (2) plastic
sachets seized from Ogayons place tested positive for
the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.16
The Defense Version
The defense presented a different version of the events.
Testifying for himself, Ogayon disavowed any
knowledge of the prohibited drugs and claimed that he
saw the seized items for the first time only when they
were being inventoried. His statements were
corroborated by the testimony of his wife, Zenaida
Ogayon.
Ogayon asserted that prior to the search, he was asleep in
his house. His wife Zenaida woke him up because
several policemen and barangay officials came to his
house. He claimed that the police team did not present
any search warrant before conducting the search, and it
was only during trial that he saw a copy of the warrant.
He recounted that the police officers, splitting into two
groups, conducted a simultaneous search of his house
and the comfort room located nearby. He noticed that
SPO4 Caritos, who was part of the group that searched
the comfort room, came out and went to the Barangay
Hall. Shortly after, SPO4 Caritos returned, accompanied
by Tanod Lagana. SPO4 Caritos again went inside the
comfort room, leaving Tanod Lagana waiting outside.
SPO4 Caritos thereafter came out from the comfort room
and ran towards Ogayons house while shouting
"positive, positive."17
The RTC Ruling
27
On September 5, 2007, the RTC rendered a joint
judgment convicting Ogayon of the two criminal charges
against him. Relying on the presumption of regularity,
the RTC rejected Ogayons frame-up defense. The
dispositive portion of the joint judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, under the above considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
a. In Criminal Case No. 4738, accused,
Honesto Ogayon y Diaz is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 12, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165,
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002," for his unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia, namely: four
(4) pcs. small aluminum foil, one (1) roll
aluminum foil, four (4) pcs. disposable
lighters, and one (1) pc. blade; thereby
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and
one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay a FINE
of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00);
b. In Criminal Case No. 4739, accused,
Honesto Ogayon y Diaz is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 11, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165,
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002," for his unlawful
possession of two (2) pcs. Small heat-sealed
plastic sachets containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu," with total net weight
of 0.0400 gram; thereby, sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to fourteen (14) years and to pay a FINE
of three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00).18
Ogayon appealed to the CA. This time, he questioned the
validity of the search warrant, claiming it was
improperly issued. He argued that the search warrant
was defective for lack of transcript showing that the
issuing judge conducted an examination of the applicant
for search warrant and his witnesses.
The CA Ruling
In accordance with Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, a judge must examine under oath and in writing
an applicant for search warrant and his witnesses.
Although the CA found no evidence in the records
showing compliance with this requirement, it
nevertheless upheld the search warrants validity due to
Ogayons failure to make a timely objection against the
warrant during the trial.
That Ogayon objected to the prosecutions formal offer
of exhibits, which included the search warrant, was not
sufficient for the CA. Ogayon merely claimed that the
chemistry report was not executed under oath, the items
were not illegal per se, and that he did not sign the
Receipt of Property Seized since he was not present
when the seized items were confiscated. The CA noted
that the objections were not based on constitutional
grounds, and for this reason, concluded that Ogayon is
deemed to have waived the right to question the legality
of the search warrant.19
Based on the search warrants validity, the CA affirmed
Ogayons conviction for possession of drugs and drug
paraphernalia. Although the comfort room was located
outside Ogayons house, the CA declared that he
exercised exclusive control over it and should rightly be
held responsible for the prohibited drugs and
paraphernalia found there.
As with the RTC, the CA relied on the presumption of
regularity of the police teams operation and found
Ogayons claim of frame-up to be unsupported. The CA
thus ruled that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt that Ogayon was liable for the crimes charged.
The Issues
In the present petition, Ogayon raises the following
assignment of errors:
I.
The CA erred in finding that Ogayon had waived his
right to question the legality of the search warrant.
II.
Even granting without admitting that Ogayon had
already waived his right to question the legality of the
search warrant, the search conducted was still highly
irregular, thereby rendering the seized articles as
inadmissible in evidence.
Ogayon primarily argues that there was a violation of his
constitutional right to be secure in his person, house,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. He denies waiving the right through his
supposed failure to assail the search warrants validity
during the trial. On the contrary, he claims to have
objected to the prosecutions formal offer of the search
warrant.
Even assuming that he questioned the search warrants
validity only during appeal, Ogayon contends that this
should not be interpreted as a waiver of his right. Since
an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open
for review, any objection made on appeal, though not
raised before the trial court, should still be considered.
Ogayon next argues that the search conducted by the
police team on his premises, pursuant to an already
defective search warrant, was highly irregular. He and
his spouse were in their house when SPO4 Caritos
allegedly discovered the shabu in the comfort room
located outside their house, so they were not able to
witness the search. Moreover, he claimed that there were
other persons near the premises of his house (and the
comfort room) when the search was conducted. Hence, it
could not indubitably be concluded that the seized items
28
were under his actual and effective control and
possession.
The Courts Ruling
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
one of the fundamental constitutional rights. Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution, reads:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. [emphasis ours]
This right has been included in our Constitution since
1899 through the Malolos Constitution 20 and has been
incorporated in the various organic laws governing the
Philippines during the American colonization, 21 the 1935
Constitution,22 and the 1973 Constitution.23
The protection afforded by the right is reinforced by its
recognition as a fundamental human right under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 24 to both of
which the Philippines is a signatory. 25 Both the Covenant
and the Declaration recognize a persons right against
arbitrary or unlawful interference with ones privacy and
property.26
Given the significance of this right, the courts must be
vigilant in preventing its stealthy encroachment or
gradual depreciation and ensure that the safeguards put
in place for its protection are observed.
Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
is central to the right, and its existence largely depends
on the finding of the judge conducting the
examination.27 To substantiate a finding of probable
cause, the Rules of Court specifically require that
Rule 126, Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record.
The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath, the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statem gether
with the affidavits submitted. [emphasis ours]
Ogayons appeal of his conviction essentially rests on his
claim that the search warrant was defective because
"there was no transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings in which the issuing judge had allegedly
propounded the required searching questions and
answers in order to determine the existence of probable
cause."28We find that the failure to attach to the records
the depositions of the complainant and his witnesses
and/or the transcript of the judges examination, though
contrary to the Rules, does not by itself nullify the
warrant. The requirement to attach is merely a
procedural rule and not a component of the right. Rules
of procedure or statutory requirements, however salutary
they may be, cannot provide new constitutional
requirements.29
Instead, what the Constitution requires is for the judge to
conduct an "examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce," after
which he determines the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of the warrant. The examination
requirement was originally a procedural rule found in
Section 98 of General Order No. 58,30 but was elevated
as part of the guarantee of the right under the 1935
Constitution.31 The intent was to ensure that a warrant is
issued not merely on the basis of the affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, but only after
examination by the judge of the complainant and his
witnesses. As the same examination requirement was
adopted in the present Constitution, we declared that
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are
insufficient to establish the factual basis for probable
cause.32 Personal examination by the judge of the
applicant and his witnesses is indispensable, and the
examination should be probing and exhaustive,
notmerely routinary or a rehash of the affidavits. 33
The Solicitor General argues that the lack of depositions
and transcript does not necessarily indicate that no
examination was made by the judge who issued the
warrant in compliance with the constitutional
requirement.
True, since in People v. Tee,34 we declared that
[T]he purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be
taken is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to the
existence of probable cause.1wphi1 The Bill of Rights
does not make it an imperative necessity that depositions
be attached to the records of an application for a search
warrant. Hence, said omission is not necessarily fatal, for
as long as there is evidence on the record showing what
testimony was presented.35
Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement is
shown by the depositions and the transcript. In their
absence, however, a warrant may still be upheld if there
is evidence in the records that the requisite examination
was made and probable cause was based thereon. There
must be, in the records, particular facts and
circumstances that were considered by the judge as
sufficient to make an independent evaluation of the
existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the
search warrant.36
The Solicitor General claims that, notwithstanding the
absence of depositions and transcripts, the records
indicate an examination was conducted. In fact, a
statement in the search warrant itself attests to this:
Search Warrant
xxxx
29
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after
examination under oath of the applicant and his
witnesses that there is probable cause to believe that
respondent, without authority of law, has under his
possession and control the following articles to wit:
---Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "Shabu" and
paraphernalia which are kept and concealed in the
premises of his house particularly in the kitchen and in
the CR outside his house both encircled with a red
ballpen, as described in the sketch attached to the
Application for Search Warrant, located at Bgy. Iraya,
Guinobatan, Albay.37 (emphasis and underscore ours)
Generally, a judges determination of probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant is accorded great
deference by a reviewing court, so long as there was
substantial basis for that determination. 38 "Substantial
basis means that the questions of the examining judge
brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the
place sought to be searched."39
Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself,
we find nothing in the records of this case indicating
that the issuing judge personally and thoroughly
examined the applicant and his witnesses. The absence
of depositions and transcripts of the examination was
already admitted; the application for the search warrant
and the affidavits, although acknowledged by Ogayon
himself,40 could not be found in the records. Unlike in
Tee, where the testimony given during trial revealed that
an extensive examination of the applicants witness was
made by the judge issuing the warrant, the testimonies
given during Ogayons trial made no reference to the
application for the search warrant. SPO4 Caritos testified
that he was among those who conducted the surveillance
before the application for a search warrant was made.
However, he was not the one who applied for the
warrant; in fact, he testified that he did not know who
applied for it.41
The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which
we can infer that the requisite examination was
made, and from which the factual basis for probable
cause to issue the search warrant was derived. A
search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional
requirements for its issuance; otherwise, it is void. Based
on the lack of substantial evidence that the search
warrant was issued after the requisite examination of the
complainant and his witnesses was made, the Court
declares Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003 a nullity.
The nullity of the search warrant prevents the Court from
considering Ogayons belated objections thereto.
The CA declared that Ogayon had waived the protection
of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures
due to his failure to make a timely objection against the
search warrants validity before the trial court. It based
its ruling on the procedural rule that any objections to
the legality of the search warrant should be made during
the trial of the case. Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court provides the manner to quash a search warrant or
to suppress evidence obtained thereby:
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to
suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to quash a
search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained
thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court
where the action has been instituted. If no criminal
action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and
resolved by the court that issued the search warrant.
However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a
criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the
motion shall be resolved by the latter court. [emphasis
ours]
We find the CAs casual treatment of a fundamental right
distressing. It prioritized compliance with a procedural
rule over compliance with the safeguards for a
constitutional right. Procedural rules can neither
diminish nor modify substantial rights;42 their non-
compliance should therefore not serve to validate a
warrant that was issued in disregard of the constitutional
requirements. As mentioned, the existence of probable
cause determined after examination by the judge of the
complainant and his witnesses is central to the guarantee
of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The ends of
justice are better served if the supremacy of the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is preserved over technical rules of procedure.
Moreover, the courts should indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights; we should not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. 43 In
People v. Decierdo,44 the Court declared that
"[w]henever a protection given by the Constitution is
waived by the person entitled to that protection, the
presumption is always against the waiver." The
relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid out
convincingly.
In this case, the only evidence that Ogayon waived his
constitutional right was his failure to make a timely
motion during the trial to quash the warrant and to
suppress the presentation of the seized items as evidence.
This failure alone, to our mind, is not a sufficient
indication that Ogayon clearly, categorically, knowingly,
and intelligently made a waiver. 45 He cannot reasonably
be expected to know the warrants defect for lack of data
in the records suggesting that defect existed. It would
thus be unfair to construe Ogayons failure to object as a
waiver of his constitutional right. In People v.
Bodoso,46 the Court noted that "[i]n criminal cases where
life, liberty and property are all at stake The standard
of waiver requires that it not only must be voluntary, but
must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences."
At this point, we note the purpose for the enactment of
Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court a relatively
new provision incorporated in A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC or
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective
30
December 1, 2000). The provision was derived from the
policy guidelines laid down by the Court in Malaloan v.
Court of Appeals47to resolve the main issue of where
motions to quash search warrants should be filed. In
other words, the provision was "intended to resolve what
is perceived as conflicting decisions on where to file a
motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence
seized by virtue thereof."48 It was certainly not
intended to preclude belated objections against the
search warrants validity, especially if the grounds
therefor are not immediately apparent. Thus, Malaloan
instructs that "all grounds and objections then available,
existent or known shall be raised in the original or
subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant,
otherwise they shall be deemed waived," and that "a
motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections
not available, existent or known during the proceedings
for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the
hearing of the motion to suppress."
A closer reading of the cases where the Court supposedly
brushed aside belated objections would reveal that the
objections were disregarded because they had been cured
or addressed based on the records.
In Demaisip v. Court of Appeals,49 the accused asserted
that the search warrant was never produced in court, thus
suggesting its absence. The Court, however, noted that
"there were supposed testimonies of its existence."
In People v. Tee,50 the accused claimed that the issuing
judge failed to exhaustively examine the complainant
and his witnesses, and that the complainants witness (a
National Bureau of Intelligence operative) had no
personal knowledge of the facts comprising probable
cause, but the Court brushed these claims aside. It found
that the witness knowledge of the facts supporting
probable case was not based on hearsay as he himself
assisted the accused in handling the contraband, and that
the issuing judge extensively questioned this witness. In
People v. Torres,51 the accused assailed the validity of the
search conducted pursuant to a search warrant as it was
supposedly made without the presence of at least two
witnesses, but the Court found otherwise, citing the
testimonies taken during the trial contradicting this
claim. A similar objection was made by the accused in
People v. Nuez,52 but the Court noted the testimony of
the officer conducting the search who stated that it was
made in the presence of the accused himself and two
barangay officials.
The rulings in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, 53 People v.
Court of Appeals,54 and People v. Correa55 are without
significance to the present case. As mentioned, Malaloan
v. Court of Appeals involved the question of where
motions to quash search warrants should be filed, and
the guidelines set therein was applied in People v. Court
of Appeals. People v. Correa, on the other hand, involved
a warrantless search of a moving vehicle.
We reiterate that the requirement to raise objections
against search warrants during trial is a procedural rule
established by jurisprudence. Compliance or
noncompliance with this requirement cannot in any way
diminish the constitutional guarantee that a search
warrant should be issued upon a finding of probable
cause.1wphi1 Ogayons failure to make a timely
objection cannot serve to cure the inherent defect of the
warrant. To uphold the validity of the void warrant
would be to disregard one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution.
In the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. AEK 29-
2003, the search conducted on its authority is likewise
null and void. Under the Constitution, any evidence
obtained in violation of a persons right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.56 With the
inadmissibility of the drugs seized from Ogayon' s home,
there is no more evidence to support his conviction.
Thus, we see no reason to further discuss the other issues
raised in this petition.
WHEREFORE, under these premises, the Decision
dated March 31, 2009, and the Resolution dated July 10,
2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31154
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
judgment of conviction, as stated in the joint judgment
dated September 5, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Lig ity, Albay, in Criminal Case Nos. 4738
and 4739, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
petitioner HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ is
ACQUITTED of the criminal charges against him for
violation of Republic Act No. 9165.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196052
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JOCELYN POSADA y SONTILLANO and
FRANCISCO POSADA y URBANO, Appellants.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal of accused-appellants Jocelyn
Posada y Sontillano (Jocelyn) and Francisco Posada y
Urbano (Francisco) assailing the September 30, 2010
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03768. The CA Decision
affirmed with modification the January 13, 2009
Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
43, Virac, Catanduanes, finding accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Case
In its January 13, 2009 Judgment, the RTC found
accused-appellant Jocelyn guilty of illegal possession of
2.2825 grams and accused-appellant Francisco guilty of
illegal possession of 24.2313 grams
methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as shabu.
The RTC held, among others, that the prosecution was
31
able to prove all the elements of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. It found the search warrant, which led
to the immediate arrest of accused-appellants, valid and
the chain of custody of the seized items preserved.
Accordingly, the RTC sentenced accused-appellant
Jocelyn to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, as maximum; and sentenced accusedappellant
Francisco to suffer life imprisonment. It also ordered
them to pay fines of Three Hundred Thousand
(P300,000.00) Pesos and Four Hundred Thousand
(P400,000.00) Pesos, respectively.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with the
modification that accused-appellant Jocelyn is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as
maximum. The CA added that any question on the
validity of the search warrant was closed in a September
21, 2006 Resolution,3 in which the RTC denied accused-
appellants Motion to Quash Search Warrant. The CA
further ruled that the certification signed by accused-
appellant Jocelyn was not a confession but an
acknowledgment of the fact that the police had
conducted a search of their premises by virtue of the
search warrant; that the search was conducted in an
orderly manner; and that the search was conducted in her
presence and in the presence of Kagawad Jena Arcilla
(Kag. Arcilla).
On October 27, 2010, the accused-appellants filed their
notice of appeal following the September 30, 2010
Decision on the ground that it was contrary to facts, law,
and applicable jurisprudence.
Our Ruling
We affirm the accused-appellants conviction.
The search warrant was valid.
of
The Office of the Solicitor General correctly argued that
any question as to the validity of the search warrant was
closed by the September 21, 2006 Resolution of the
RTC, which the accused-appellants opted not to question
further. As mentioned by the CA, the judicial finding of
probable cause in issuing a search warrant should not be
doubted when the judge personally examines the
applicant and/or witnesses and there is no basis to doubt
his reliability and competence in evaluating the evidence
before him.4With regard to the designation of the place
to be searched, the RTC sufficiently justified that the
search warrant particularly described the place to be
searched: a sketch showing the location of the house to
be searched was attached to the application and the
search warrant pointed to only one house in the area. 5
A long-standing rule is that a description of the place to
be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. Any designation or description known to the
locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement. 6 Taking from
American Jurisprudence, "[t]he determining factor as to
whether a search warrant describes the premises to be
searched with sufficient particularity is not whether the
description is sufficient to enable the officer to locate
and identify the premises with reasonable effort."7
The elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
were established.
For the successful prosecution of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs the following essential elements must
be established: (a) the accused is in possession of an item
or object that is identified to be a prohibited or
dangerous drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possesses the said drug.8 he prosecution was able to
establish the presence of all the required elements for
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165.
The presented evidence showed that early in the morning
of April 8, 2006, police officers went to the house of the
accused-appellants in Virac, Catanduanes, to implement
a search warrant. After the search warrant was read,
accused-appellant Francisco argued with the police
officers though later insisted that he be allowed to have
breakfast before anything else. While PO1 Jigger
Tacorda (PO1 Tacorda) and Kagawad Eva Sarmiento
(Kag. Sarmiento) were escorting him to the nearby
eatery, they saw him throw something on the pavement.
PO1 Tacorda immediately accosted and reprimanded
accused-appellant Francisco while Kag. Sarmiento
picked up the plastic sachets containing a white
crystalline substance. A total of thirtyseven (37) sachets
were recovered from the pavement which were
photographed by PO3 Raul Santos (PO3 Santos), and
then were turned over to the crime laboratory for
inventory, documentation, and examination. The results
of the examination of the contents of the thirty-seven
(37) plastic sachets done in the crime laboratory showed
that these contained shabu.
Thereafter, Kag. Arcilla and accused-appellant Jocelyn
accompanied P/Supt. Samuel Villamer, PO1 Julius
Jacinto (PO1 Jacinto), PO1 Arlan Sevilla (PO1 Sevilla),
and PO1 Tacorda to the place designated in the search
warrant. While searching the kitchen, PO1 Jacinto came
upon a plastic bag of charcoal near the stove. He
examined its contents and found a matchbox hidden
between the pieces of charcoal. Inside the matchbox
were five (5) heat-sealed plastic transparent sachets
containing a white crystalline substance. PO3 Santos
photographed the plastic sachets and then turned these
over for inventory and documentation. Upon
examination of the contents of the five (5) plastic sachets
in the crime laboratory, the forensic chemist found that
they likewise contained shabu. When accused-appellant
Jocelyn was asked during trial about the picture showing
the location of the charcoal stove, she categorically
declared that it was "charcoal and the place where I
place the charcoal."9 Thus, the RTC correctly appreciated
the admission that she had control over this item. 10
32
From these established facts, it is clear that accused-
appellants knowingly possessed shabu a prohibited
drug without legal authority to do so in violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
We rely on the RTCs assessment of the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, absent any showing that certain
facts of weight and substance bearing on the elements of
the crime have been overlooked. We particularly note
that the accused-appellants even testified that they did
not know any reason or ill motive on the part of the
police officers to charge and prosecute them for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. In addition, the police
officers are presumed to have regularly performed their
official duties, absent contrary convincing evidence.
The Chain of Custody was preserved.
After a careful reading of the records, we also find that
the chain of custody over the forty-two (42) plastic
sachets of shabu was not broken.1wphi1 Based on the
records, PO1 Jacinto narrated how he found the five (5)
heatsealed transparent plastic sachets and how he turned
over said items to PO1 Sevilla after they were
photographed by PO3 Santos. Kag. Arcilla, who was
present during the search, corroborated his testimony.
The RTC found that PO1 Jacinto properly placed all five
(5) plastic sachets in a transparent plastic bag which was
sealed with masking tape and duly signed by him. As for
the thirty-seven (37) plastic sachets, PO1 Sevilla
testified that Kag. Sarmiento saw Francisco throw the
plastic sachets on the pavement; and that Kag. Sarmiento
and he picked up said plastic sachets. The RTC found
that all thirty-seven (37) plastic sachets were placed in a
transparent plastic bag which was sealed with masking
tape duly signed by Kag. Sarmiento. Finally, PSI
Josephine Macura Clemen (PSI Clemen) narrated that
the fortytwo (42) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substances were turned over to the
crime laboratory for qualitative examination; that said
confiscated items were thereafter found positive for
shabu, and were identified by PSI Clemen herself before
the RTC.
It is settled that the failure to strictly follow the
directives of Section 21, Article II of RA Republic Act
No. 9165 is not fatal and will not necessarily render the
items confiscated inadmissible. What is important is that
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are preserved. The succession of events in this case show
that the items seized were the same items tested and
subsequently identified and testified to in court. We thus
hold that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs
seized from the accused-appellants were duly proven not
to have been compromised.
Signing the Certification of Orderly Search was not an
extrajudicial confession.
Finally, as the CA correctly pointed out, when accused-
appellant Jocelyn signed the Certificate of Orderly
Search, she did not confess her guilt to the crime
charged. She merely admitted to the fact that a lawful
search was conducted while she was in the same
premises.
The CA imposed the correct penalty.
We sustain the penalty imposed by the CA as it is in
accordance with the penalty prescribed under Section 11,
Article II of RA No. 9165, in relation to Section 1 of RA
No. 4103, as amended, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
WHEREFORE, the September 30, 2010 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03768 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199087, November 11, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. JERRY PUNZALAN AND PATRICIA
PUNZALAN, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION at around 4:30 in the morning, Intelligence Agent 1
Liwanag Sandaan (IA1 Sandaan) and her team
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: implemented a search warrant5 issued on October 28,
2009 by then Manila RTC Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
to (i) make an immediate search of the premises/house of
Accused-appellants Jerry Punzalan and Patricia Punzalan accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan, Vima
seek the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Punzalan, Jaime Punzalan, Arlene Punzalan-Razon and
Appeals (CA) dated October 28, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR Felix Razon who are all residents of 704 Apelo Cruz
HC No. 04557 which affirmed the Joint Decision2dated Compound, Barangay 175, Malibay, Pasay City; and (ii)
March 29, 2010 and the Order3 dated June 21, 2010 of to seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch of assorted dangerous drugs, including the proceeds or
116 in Crim. Case No. R-PSY-09-01162-CR convicting fruits and bring said property to the court.
them of violation of Section 11, Article II of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A.
Since there are three houses or structures inside the
No. 9165). compound believed to be occupied by the accused-
appellants, a sketch6 of the compound describing the
Accused-appellants were charged under the house to be searched was prepared and attached to the
Information4 docketed as Crim. Case No. R-Y-09-01162- search warrant.
CR for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, which reads as The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Team
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary tasked to conduct the search was composed of IA1
Sandaan as team leader, SI2 Esteban and IO2 Jessica
That on or about the 03rd day of November 2009, in Alvarado (IO2 Alvarado) as arresting officers and IO1
Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the Pagaragan as seizing officer. 7 IO1 Pagaragan made
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named lateral coordination with the Southern Police District,
accused, without authority of law did then and there Tactical Operations Unit, as evidenced by the Pre-
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their Operation Report8 dated November 3, 2009 and
possession, custody and control 40.78 grams of Authority to Operate9.
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, (shabu) a dangerous
drug. Before proceeding to the target area, they passed by the
barangay hall to coordinate with Barangay Chairman
CONTRARY TO LAW. Reynaldo Flores, Kagawad Larry Fabella and Kagawad
cralawlawlibrary Edwin Razon. The team likewise brought with them a
media representative affiliated with "Sunshine Radio" to
cover the operation. From the barangay hall, they walked
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty
to the charge. toward the target place using as a guide the sketch they
prepared.
During the trial, the prosecution presented Intelligence
Officer 1 Aldwin Pagaragan (IO1 Pagaragan), Special When they were already outside the house of Jerry and
Investigator 2 Juancho Esteban (SI2 Esteban), Barangay Patricia Punzalan, which is a three-storey structure, IA1
Chairman Reynaldo Flores and Barangay Kagawad Sandaan knocked on the door. A woman, later identified
as accused-appellant Patricia Punzalan, slightly opened
Larry Fabella as witnesses.
the door. When they introduced themselves as PDEA
agents and informed the occupant that they have a search
The prosecution established that on November 3, 2009,
warrant, Patricia immediately tried to close the door but
33
was not successful since the PDEA agents pushed the
door open. The team was able to enter the house of Jerry
and Patricia Punzalan who were both surprised when
found inside the house. IO1 Pagaragan showed and read
the search warrant infront of accused-appellants.
Inside the house, the team immediately saw plastic
sachets placed on top of the table. 101 Pagaragan was
able to seize nine (9) heat-sealed plastic sachets, two (2)
square-shaped transparent plastic containers and a small
round plastic container. All three (3) plastic containers
contained smaller heat-sealed plastic sachets of white
crystalline substance of suspected shabu. There were
also other paraphernalia, guns, money and a digital
weighing scale. Accordingly, SI2 Esteban and IO2
Alvarado effected the arrest of accused-appellants Jerry
and Patricia Punzalan after informing them of their
constitutional rights. 101 Pagaragan immediately marked
the seized items by placing the marking "ADP". After
searching and marking the evidence found on the first
floor, the team, together with the barangay officials and
accused-appellants, proceeded to, and conducted the
search on the second and third floors but found nothing.
They went downstairs where they conducted the
inventory of recovered items. 101 Pagaragan prepared
the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized10 and a
Certification of Orderly Search 11which were later signed
by the barangay officials.
After their arrest, accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia
Punzalan were brought to the PDEA Office in Quezon
City for investigation. IO1 Pagaragan presented the
seized evidence to Atty. Benjamin Gaspe, who prepared
the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, 12 Request for Drug
Test/Physical and Medical Examination. They likewise
caused the preparation of their respective affidavits.
Photographs were also taken during the actual search and
inventory. Laboratory examination of the seized pieces
of drug evidence gave positive results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known
as shabu, a dangerous drug.13
Thereafter, the accused-appellants were charged with
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for
illegal possession of 40.78 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous
drug.
In denying the charge, accused-appellant Jerry Punzalan
testified that at around 5:45 in the morning of November
3, 2009, he was at his store located at 704, A-44 Apelo
Cruz Street, Pasay City. Their house and store are two
separate structures which are 70 meters apart. Patricia
was inside the store fixing the grains. Jerry was about to
open the store when he saw men running toward their
main house, carrying a tank with hose attached to it.
Jerry followed them and saw the men applying acetylene
on their steel gate. Jerry shouted at them but the men
poked their guns at him and when he answered in the
affirmative after being asked if he is Jerry, they placed
him in metal handcuffs, held him at the back of his shirt
and brought him to his garage, about 30 meters from
their house. He was later made to board a van, which is
about five meters away from the garage. Inside the van,
his wife Patricia was already there with her hands bound
in plastic. They stayed there for more or less three hours.
Then, Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores arrived.
They were brought by the PDEA agents to their main
house. Upon reaching the house, accused-appellants
noticed that their belongings were already scattered.
Inside their house, there were two kagawads, two female
and two male PDEA agents, whom they later identified
as IO1 Pagaragan, IA1 Sandaan, SI2 Esteban and IO2
Alvarado, Kagawad Larry Fabella and Kagawad Edwin
Razon. Their pieces of jewelry, cash amounting to
P985,000 or almost a million pesos, 3,711 US dollars,
3,100 Holland, Euro, Malaysian Ringgit, things
belonging to their children like PSP, gameboy, video
camera, 14 units of cellphone, licensed gun, and three
kilos of gold were likewise missing. Jerry testified that
he kept a huge amount of cash in the house because he is
engaged in "5-6" money-lending business. He also sells
rice from Bulacan.
From the van, the PDEA agents made them go up to the
4th floor. He heard his children crying inside the room of
his eldest child at the third floor. Accused-appellants
explained that they sleep in the store because they close
late at night and wake up very early. Their things were
already scattered but no search was conducted upstairs.
34
They were led down, brought out of the house and
boarded the van. They were later brought to the PDEA
office in Quezon City.
The defense also presented as witness accused-
appellants' daughter, Jennifer Punzalan, to corroborate
their claim. She testified that on November 3, 2009,
between 5:45 and 6:00 o'clock in the morning, she was
inside her room, together with her younger siblings. Her
parents were at the store. The last time she saw her
parents was on the night of November 2, 2009. In the
morning of the following day, there were people
searching their house. She was inside the room together
with her siblings when somebody entered and searched
the room. They just covered themselves with a blanket.
She left the room at noontime when the persons who
entered the room and her parents were no longer inside
the house. They left the house only when Kagawad
Edwin Razon fetched them.
Another witness presented by the defense is Kagawad
Edwin Razon who testified that when he arrived at the
house of accused-appellants, after he was summoned by
Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores for the purpose of
conducting a search in the house of the Punzalans, the
door was open, there was a .45 pistol on top of the table,
an agent of PDEA was marking the exhibits which seem
to be shabu, and the cabinets were already opened. There
were four PDEA agents when he reached the house. He
also noticed a reporter and a photographer. He sat for a
while and then accused-appellants were brought inside
the house, who came from the van. Later, he signed a
document containing the list of evidence spread on the
table. He said that they did not conduct any search
because they just made a house tour up to the third floor.
Lastly, accused-appellant Patricia Punzalan testified that
on November 3, 2009, between 5:45 and 6:00 o'clock in
the morning, she was inside the store located at 704-A44
Apelo Cruz Street, Pasay City. Their house is 50 meters
away from the store. Then, she noticed that there were
many gun-carrying men, so her husband, Jerry, followed
them. She went out to check what is going on. Two
armed men then approached her and asked for her name.
After she gave her name, Pat, they tied her hands with
plastic. Then a van passed by and she was asked to board
the van. After the van had run a few meters, it was
parked for more or less three hours. Thereafter, the
driver alighted and then the door was opened. She saw
her husband who was already in handcuffs and was
made to board the van. They also saw Barangay
Chairman Reynaldo Flores. They were made to alight
from the van and were brought inside the house. The
door was already open and some PDEA agents,
Kagawad Edwin Razon, Kagawad Larry Fabella and a
reporter were there. One lady was sitting and another
woman was standing. The reporter was sitting. The male
PDEA agent was marking some plastic sachets, which
they claimed to be shabu. They stayed inside the house
for more or less one hour during which photographs
were taken by the PDEA agents. She further said that
while she was in her store, her four children were inside
their house. PDEA agents brought them out and they
were made to board the van.
In a Joint Decision14 dated March 29, 2010, the trial
court convicted accused-appellants for violation of
Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and sentenced them
to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.
The trial court held that the issuance of a search warrant
against the premises of different persons named therein
is valid as there is no requirement that only one search
warrant for one premise to be searched is necessary for
its validity. Also, the address of the accused-appellants
Jerry and Patricia Punzalan was clearly and adequately
described. A sketch that specifically identifies the places
to be searched was attached to the records and such
description of the place was unquestionably accurate that
the PDEA agents were led to, and were able to
successfully conduct their operation in the premises
described in the search warrant.
The trial court also ruled that the implementation of the
search warrant sufficiently complied with the
requirements of the law. Despite accused-appellants'
assertion that they were arrested outside their house and
were made to board a van parked along the street beside
the river and were not allowed by the PDEA agents to
witness the search conducted inside the house, the trial
court was convinced that accused-appellants Jerry and
Patricia Punzalan were in fact inside their house and
were physically present during the conduct of the search.
The trial court gave weight to the prosecution's version
and found no reason to doubt the credibility of IO1
Pagaragan, whose testimony was sufficiently
corroborated by SI2 Esteban. The court found no
showing of any improper or ill motive on the part of both
PDEA agents to testify against the accused-appellants
and neither was there evidence that the two PDEA agents
were not properly performing their official duties and
functions at that time. On the other hand, the defense
merely offered alibi and bare denials which cannot
overcome the presumption of regularity of performance
of functions accorded to 101 Pagaragan's and SI2
Esteban's detailed declarations under oath.
In its findings, the trial court observed that there were
actually two phases of the search done in the Punzalan
house. The first or initial search was done at the ground
floor of the house, immediately after the PDEA agents
gained entry and was beyond doubt made in the presence
of both accused. This is where the bulk of illegal drugs
were found, confiscated and consequently marked. The
trial court further stated that it is of no moment that the
barangay officials were not able to witness the said
initial search and their failure to arrive on time to witness
the first or initial search at the ground floor of the
Punzalan house, or even their total absence thereat, will
not render the subject search invalid and unlawful
inasmuch as their presence is not required. The trial
court held that the prosecution successfully and
sufficiently established that the two accused were
present during the initial search, thus, satisfying the
requirement of a lawful and valid search.
The second phase of the search was conducted at the
upper floors of the house after the markings on the 293
sachets of confiscated specimens were completed by 101
Pagaragan. This was witnessed and participated in by the
barangay officials. Finally, after the search of the entire
house was concluded, it is not disputed that an inventory
35
of all the items seized was conducted by 101 Pagaragan
in compliance with the provisions of Section 21, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165. In fact, it was admitted by the
barangay officials that they were requested to wait for
the DOJ representative, to which they willingly acceded.
Accused-appellants filed a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied in the Order 15 dated June 21, 2010. The
trial court modified the Joint Decision by increasing the
penalty to life imprisonment and the fine to P400,000.00.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-
appellants. The CA held that there was a valid search and
seizure conducted and the seized items are admissible in
evidence. The prosecution was able to prove all the
elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs: (1)
the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
The pertinent portion of the CA Decision
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Given the foregoing, We do not find any error committed
by the trial court in convicting accused-appellants for
Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. From the
evidence adduced, their guilt to the crime charged have
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Since the seized
shabu weighs 40.78 grams, the modified penalty of life
imprisonment and fine of P400,000.00 is maintained
pursuant to Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal
is DENIED. The assailed Joint Decision dated March
29, 2010 and the Order dated June 21, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are
here AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants set forth the
following errors allegedly committed by the
CA:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 1. That the SEARCH WARRANT NO. 09-14814
issued by JUDGE ED[U]ARDO PERALTA,
Jr., of Branch 17-RTC Manila, was in fact
illegally procured and unlawfully
implemented.
2. The Prosecution miserably failed to establish
the guilt of accused- appellants for alleged
possession of illegal drugs as the requirement
demanded by Chain-in-Custody [chain of
custody] Rule were never met.
3. The Prosecution failed to establish the guilt of
the accused-appellants beyond reasonable
doubt.17
cralawlawlibrary
In assailing the validity of the search warrant, accused-
appellants claim that the PDEA agents who applied for a
search warrant failed to comply with the requirements
for the procurement of a search warrant particularly the
approval of the PDEA Director General. Accused-
appellants also contended that the court which issued the
search warrant, the RTC of Manila, Branch 17, had no
authority to issue the search warrant since the place
where the search is supposed to be conducted is outside
its territorial jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded. A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, entitled
"Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of
Executive Judges and Defining their Powers,
Prerogatives and Duties" as approved by the Court in its
Resolution of January 27, 2004, as amended,
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special
criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila
and Quezon City. - The Executive Judges and, whenever
they are on official leave of absence or are not physically
present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the
RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to
act on applications filed by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for
search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal
gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property
Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the
Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other
relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress,
and included herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such
agencies or their respective duly authorized officials and
shall particularly describe therein the places to be
searched and/or the property or things to be seized as
prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges
and Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the
warrants, if justified, which may be served outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.
x x x x18cralawlawlibrary
In the instant case, aside from their bare allegation,
accused-appellants failed to show that the application for
search warrant of the subject premises was not approved
by the PDEA Regional Director or his authorized
representative. On the contrary, the search warrant issued
by the RTC of Manila, Branch 17 satisfactorily complies
with the requirements for the issuance thereof as
determined by the issuing court,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Pursuant to Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution,
Sections 2 to 5, Rule 126 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, modified by Section 12 of Supreme Court En
Bane Resolution in A.M. No. 03-08-02-SC dated
January 27, 2004, and Certification dated October 28,
2009, it appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned
after personally examining under oath Agent Liwanag B.
Sandaan and Agent Derween Reed both of Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency Metro Manila Regional
Office, that there is probable cause, there are good and
sufficient reasons, to believe that undetermined quantity
of assorted dangerous drugs, particularly shabu,
including the proceeds or fruits and those used or
intended to be used by the respondents as a means of
36
committing the offense, you are hereby commanded to
make an immediate search at any time in the day or night
of the premises above described and forthwith seize and
take possession of the undetermined quantity of assorted
dangerous drugs including the proceeds 01 fruits and
bring said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as
the law directs.19cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, we find no merit in accused-appellants' claim
that the RTC of Manila, Branch 17, had no authority to
issue the assailed search warrant since the place to be
searched is outside its territorial jurisdiction. As
aforecited, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC clearly authorizes the Executive Judges and the Vice-
Executive Judges of the RTC of Manila and Quezon City
to issue search warrants to be served in places outside
their territorial jurisdiction in special criminal cases such
as those involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling,
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well
as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, as in this case, for as long as the parameters
under the said section have been complied with.
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause
requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection
with that offense are in the place to be searched. There is
no exact test for the determination of probable cause in
the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly
dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of
exercising their judicial function. When a finding of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is
made by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by
reviewing courts.20
Accused-appellants insist that they were not inside their
house and were inside the closed van when their house
was searched. They allege that upon forcibly breaking
into their house through the use of an acetylene torch,
the members of the raiding party handcuffed them,
dragged them outside and held them for three hours
inside a van while conducting the' search of the
premises. They thus argue that theshabu seized by the
PDEA agents were inadmissible in evidence.

We affirm the conviction of accused-appellants.
It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial court
which are factual in nature and which involve the
credibility of witnesses are accorded with respect, more
so, when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of
facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupportive
conclusions can be gathered from such findings. 21 The
reason behind this rule is that the trial court is in a better
position to decide the credibility of witnesses having
heard their testimonies and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial. This rule finds
an even more stringent application where the trial court's
findings are sustained by the CA. 22
After carefully reviewing the records of the case, we find
no cogent reason to overturn the findings of both the
lower courts, which were adequately supported by the
evidence on record. It cannot be overemphasized that in
cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence should be given to the narration of the incident
by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are
police officers who are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence
to the contrary.23
In the instant case, like the trial and the appellate courts,
we are not persuaded by accused-appellants' claim that
they were not inside their house but were inside a closed
van when their house was searched. In weighing the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses vis-a-vis that of
the defense, we find that the former is more worthy of
credit. Both IO1 Pagaragan and SI2 Esteban clearly
narrated how the search on the house of accused-
appellants was conducted. As aptly noted by the trial
court and concurred in by the appellate court, there were
actually two phases of the search done in the house of
accused-appellants. The first or initial search was done at
the ground floor of the house, immediately after the
PDEA agents gained entry. 101 Sandaan knocked on the
house and a woman, later identified as Patricia Punzalan
slightly opened the door and when they introduced
themselves as PDEA agents and informed the occupant
that they have a search warrant, Patricia immediately
tried to close the door but was prevented by the PDEA
agents from closing it and they were able to enter the
premises. IO1 Pagaragan showed and read the search
warrant in front of the accused-appellants and the agents
searched the house and immediately found several heat-
sealed transparent sachets of white crystalline substance
of suspected shabu. Immediately, the seized items were
marked "ADP" in the presence of accused-appellants and
media practitioner Jimmy Mendoza. It has been
sufficiently shown by the prosecution that accused-
appellants were present when their house was searched.
The pictures taken during the marking and inventory and
showing the accused-appellants in their house are clear
proof that they were present when their house was
searched and the illegal drugs found were seized. It was
only after the marking of the drugs and while the PDEA
agents waited for the barangay officials to arrive that
accused-appellants were made to board the van. This
explains the testimony of Kagawad Edwin Razon that
accused-appellants were not inside their house when he
arrived. After the barangay officials arrived, accused-
appellants were brought back to the house for the
continuation of the search of the upper floors but they
found no additional contrabands. They then went back to
the ground floor to conduct inventory of the seized
items.
The testimonies of the police officers who caught
accused-appellants in flagrante delicto in possession of
illegal drugs during the conduct of a valid search are
usually credited with more weight and credence, in the
absence of evidence that they have been inspired by an
improper or ill motive. Here, there is no proof of any ill
motive or odious intent on the part of the police officers
to impute such a serious crime to accused-appellants.
On the other hand, accused-appellants hammer on the
supposed inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses such as whether barangay officials were
present at the time of the conduct of the search. The
latter was sufficiently explained by the prosecution while
the other inconsistencies pertain to minor details and are
so inconsequential that they do not affect the credibility
of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
37
We have previously held that discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring
to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the
central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility.
Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each
other on important and relevant details concerning the
principal occurrence. In fact, such minor inconsistencies
may even serve to strengthen the witnesses' credibility as
they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been
rehearsed.24
Notably, Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal
Procedure provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made
in presence of two witnesses. - No search of a house,
room, or any other premises shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member
of his family or in the absence of the latter, two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality.cralawlawlibrary
As correctly ruled by the CA, even if the barangay
officials were not present during the initial search, the
search was witnessed by accused-appellants themselves,
hence, the search was valid since the rule that "two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality" must be present applies only in the
absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or
any member of his family.
To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the following elements must be
established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.25 In the case at bench, the prosecution was able to
establish with moral certainty the guilt of the accused-
appellants for the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Accused-appellants were caught in
actual possession of the prohibited drugs during a valid
search of their house. It bears stressing that aside from
assailing the validity of the search, accused-appellants
did not deny ownership of the illegal drugs seized. They
have not proffered any valid defense in the offense
charged for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
As to accused-appellants' assertion that the chain of
custody rule has not been complied with when no
inventory or acknowledgment receipt signed by Atty.
Gaspe was submitted in evidence and that no evidence
was shown as to the condition of the specimen upon its
presentation to Atty. Gaspe, who was not presented in
court to explain the discrepancy, we are also not
persuaded.
This Court has time and again adopted the chain of
custody rule, a method of authenticating evidence which
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. This
would include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom
it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which
it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item
and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.26
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
9165 on the handling and disposition of seized
dangerous drugs provides as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items[.]cralawlawlibrary
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the
prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the
suspect is the very same substance offered in court as
exhibit. Its identity must be established with unwavering
exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. 27 In this
case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was
duly established from the time the heat-sealed plastic
sachets were seized and marked by 101 Pagaragan to its
subsequent turnover to Atty. Gaspe of the PDEA Office
in Quezon City. 101 Pagaragan was also the one who
personally delivered and submitted the specimens
composed of 293 sachets of shabu to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for laboratory examination. The specimens
were kept in custody until they were presented as
evidence before the trial court and positively identified
by IO1 Pagaragan as the very same specimens he
marked during the inventory.
The fact that the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized
38
was not signed by Atty. Gaspe does not undermine the
integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized
from accused-appellants. The failure to strictly comply
with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized
drugs does not render an arrest of the accused illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible.28 What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 29
With regard to the handling of the seized drugs, there are
no conflicting testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that
would cast doubt on the integrity thereof as evidence
presented and scrutinized in court. It is therefore safe to
conclude that, to the unprejudiced mind, the testimonies
show without a doubt that the evidence seized from the
accused-appellants at the time of the search was the
same one tested, introduced and testified to in court. In
other words, there is no question as to the integrity of the
evidence against accused-appellants.
In fine, we find no error on the part of the CA in
affirming the trial court's conviction of accused-
appellants of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of accused-appellants Jerry Punzalan and Patricia
Punzalan of the crime charged. We likewise find proper
the modification by the trial court of the penalty imposed
to life imprisonment and a fine of P400,000.00
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal
is DISMISSED. The Decision dated October 28, 2011
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04557 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 214490, January 13, 2016
HOWARD LESCANO Y CARREON @ Drug Special Operation Team (CAIDSOT) of Olongapo
"TISOY", Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
"Law enforcers should not trifle with the legal
requirement to ensure integrity in the chain of custody of
seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. This is
especially true when only a miniscule amount of
dangerous drugs is alleged to have been taken from the
accused."1
This resolves an appeal of a conviction for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs or for violation of Section 5 2 of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
On July 10, 2008, an Information charging petitioner
Howard Lescano (Lescano) with illegal sale of
dangerous drugs was filed. This Information
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the eight[h] (8 th) day of July, 2008, in
the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while being under the influence of illegal drug,
particularly THC-metabolites, did then and there
wil[l]fully, and unlawfully and knowingly deliver and
sell during a buy-bust operation, conducted at Tabacuhan
Road, corner Tulio St., Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, to PO3
Hortencio Javier [one hundred pesos] P100.00 . . . worth
of marijuana fruiting tops, which is a dangerous drug in
one (1) heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet weighing
one gram and four[-]tenths (1.4) of a gram.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
According to the prosecution, on July 6, 2008, an
informant sought the assistance of the City Anti-Illegal
City. The informant alleged that drug-pushing activities
were taking place at the corner of Tulio and Tabacuhan
Streets.4
Acting on this tip, the CAIDSOT monitored the area and
allegedly found the informant's claims to be true.
CAIDSOT operatives relayed the results of their
surveillance to their Chief, P/Insp. Julius Javier (P/Insp.
Javier). P/Insp. Javier then instructed them to conduct a
buy-bust operation.5
A briefing for the operation took place. It was decided
that PO3 Hortencio Javier (PO3 Javier) would be the
poseur buyer and that he would be introduced by the
informant to Lescano. In addition to PO3 Javier, the buy-
bust team was composed of: PO1 Ferdinand Mataverde
(PO1 Mataverde) as immediate back-up, PO1 Lawrence
Reyes, PO1 Sherwin Tan, and P/Insp. Javier. SPO1 Allan
Delos Reyes (SPO1 Delos Reyes) was assigned as the
investigator and PO1 Lowela Buscas was designated as
the recorder.6 A PI00.00 bill with serial number
CM283073 was set aside for the operation. PO3 Javier
marked it by placing the letters "HJ" on its upper left
corner.7 The team further agreed that PO3 Javier would
remove his cap as a signal to the buy-bust team that the
sale had already been consummated.8
PO3 Javier and the informant arrived at the corner of
Tulio and Tabacuhan Streets at 4:40 p.m. on July 8,
2008. By then, the other members of the team were
already within the area.9
While walking towards Tulio Street, the informant
pointed to Lescano who was standing alone, about three
(3) meters away, allegedly waiting for a prospective
customer. PO1 Mataverde stayed behind about seven (7)
meters from PO3 Javier and the informant. 10
The informant introduced PO3 Javier to Lescano.
Lescano asked PO3 Javier how much marijuana he was
willing to buy. PO3 Javier responded by handing the
marked PI 00 bill to Lescano. 11 Lescano then gave PO3
Javier a medium-sized plastic sachet supposedly
containing marijuana.12 At this, PO3 Javier gave the pre-
39
arranged signal to the buy-bust team. PO1 Mataverde
approached them and introduced himself as a police
officer. He then frisked Lescano and recovered the buy-
bust money.13
The rest of the buy-bust team arrived as Lescano was
about to be handcuffed. PO3 Javier marked the medium-
sized plastic sachet with the initials "HJ" and turned it
over to SPO1 Delos Reyes. Lescano was then brought to
the CAIDSOT office for investigation. 14
Inside the CAIDSOT office, an inventory was allegedly
conducted and photographs of the marked money and
the sachet were taken. The sachet allegedly containing
marijuana weighed 1.4 grams.15
A Receipt of Evidence was prepared. P/Insp. Javier
asked the Hospital Administrator of the James L. Gordon
Memorial Hospital to conduct a physical examination on
Lescano. He also asked the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory to examine Lescano's urine and the
contents of the sachet seized during the buy-bust
operation.16 PO3 Javier and PO1 Mataverde also
executed a Joint Affidavit of Apprehension. 17
Testifying during trial, PO3 Javier positively identified
the drug specimen.18 The Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory also issued a report on Lescano's urine
stating that dangerous drugs were present in Lescano's
system.19 The laboratory examination on the sachet also
yielded a positive result for marijuana. 20
Lescano was then charged for violating Section 5 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Upon arraignment, Lescano entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial ensued. 21
The prosecution presented the following pieces of
evidence to support its allegations: (1) the testimony of
PO3 Javier; (2) the corroborative testimony of SPOl
Allan Delos Reyes; (3) Letter Request for Laboratory
Examination; (4) Letter Request for Drug Test; (5)
Chemistry Report No. DT-080-2008-OCCLO; (6) the
sachet allegedly seized from Lescano; (7) the Joint
Affidavit of PO3 Javier and PO1 Mataverde; (8) the
Coordination Form; (9) the PDEA Certification of
Coordination; (10) the Receipt of Evidence; (11)
photographs of the marijuana; and (12) the P100.00 bill
with serial number CM283073 marked with the initials
"HJ."22
In his testimony, Lescano denied that he was selling
marijuana. He claimed that on July 8, 2008, at around
5:00 p.m., he was at Tulio Street just sitting and passing
time when P/Insp. Julius Javier arrived and introduced
himself as a police officer. P/Insp. Javier then frisked
Lescano but the search turned out futile as nothing was
recovered from him. Other police officers arrived. PO1
Mataverde and PO3 Javier then told him that something
was confiscated during the frisking. Lescano insisted
that there was nothing confiscated from him. The
officers, however, replied by stating: "Don't worry,
tomorrow there will be."23He was then charged with
illegal sale of prohibited drugs. 24
In support of Lescano's testimony, the defense also
presented the testimony of Rogelio Jacobo (Jacobo),
Lescano's neighbor. According to Jacobo, he was waiting
for his niece at a nearby store along Tulio Street, about
six (6) to seven (7) meters away from where Lescano
was standing when he saw the latter being accosted by a
police officer. Jacobo then approached them and asked
what the problem was. The officer replied by saying:
"Baka pati ikaw isama namin." Jacobo then informed the
relatives of Lescano that he had been
arrested.25cralawred
In the Decision26 dated September 30, 2011, the Regional
Trial Court found Lescano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal sale of prohibited drugs. Lescano was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P500,000.00. The dispositive portion of
the trial court Decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused HOWARD
LESCANO Y CARREON GUILTYbeyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 5, RA 9165 and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00
plus costs, and to suffer the accessory penalties under
Section 35 thereof.
The accused being under detention shall be credited in
the service of his sentence with the full time during
which he has undergone preventive imprisonment
subject to the conditions imposed under Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of
marijuana fruiting tops weighing 1.4 grams is forfeited
in favor of the government and to be disposed of in
accordance with law.
SO DECIDED.27ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
In the Decision28 dated November 13, 2013, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. In the
Resolution dated September 18, 2014, the Court of
Appeals denied Lescano's Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal was filed.
For resolution is the issue of whether petitioner Howard
Lescano's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 was established.
Subsumed in the resolution of this issue is the question
of whether the prosecution was able to establish
compliance with the requisites of Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165.
I the physical inventory and photograph shall be
The elements that must be established to sustain
convictions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs are
settled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
the following elements must first be established: (1)
proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug as evidence.29cralawlawlibrary
40
As regards corpus delicti, Section 21 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as
amended by Republic Act No. 10640 stipulates
requirements for the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia. Specifically, with respect to custody
before the filing of a criminal case, Section 21, as
amended, provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the
media who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That
conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided,
finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures and custody over
said items.
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon
confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the
PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination
results, which shall be done by the forensic laboratory
examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt
of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not
allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a
partial laboratory examination report shall be
provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of
dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic
laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification
shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said
examination and certification[.] (Emphasis supplied)
cralawlawlibrary
Compliance with Section 21's requirements is critical.
"Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing
identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the
offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of
these offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the
acquittal of an accused."30
We reiterate our extensive discussion on this matter
in People v. Holgado:31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As this court declared in People v. Morales, "failure to
comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 implie[s] a concomitant failure on the part of the
prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus
delicti." It "produce[s] doubts as to the origins of the
[seized paraphernalia]."
The significance of ensuring the integrity of drugs and
drug paraphernalia in prosecutions under Republic Act
No. 9165 is discussed in People v. Belocura:
Worse, the Prosecution failed to establish the identity of
the prohibited drug that constituted the corpus
delicti itself. The omission naturally raises grave doubt
about any search being actually conducted and warrants
the suspicion that the prohibited drugs were planted
evidence.
In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal
drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody of
the incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure
and confiscation until the moment it is offered in
evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence. It
is not enough that the evidence offered has probative
value on the issues, for the evidence must also be
sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts in issue.
The evidence is not relevant merely because it is
available but that it has an actual connection with the
transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This
is the reason why authentication and laying a foundation
for the introduction of evidence are important.
In Malilin v. People, this court explained that the
exactitude required by Section 21 goes into the very
nature of narcotics as the subject of prosecutions under
Republic Act No. 9165:
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with
respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small
and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in
nature and similar in form to substances familiar to
people in their daily lives. Graham vs. State positively
acknowledged this danger. In that case where a
substance later analyzed as heroinwas handled by two
police officers prior to examination who however did not
testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the
exhibit at the time it was in their possessionwas
excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court
pointing out that the white powder seized could have
been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking
powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records
or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit
at least between the time it came into the possession of
police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition, testimony of the state as to
the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that
41
they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are
subject to scientific analysis to determine their
composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly
close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility,
that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the
same there could have been tampering, alteration or
substitution of substances from other casesby accident
or otherwisein which similar evidence was seized or in
which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory
testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard
more stringent than that applied to cases involving
objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a
more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of
the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it
improbable that the original item has either been
exchanged with another or been contaminated or
tampered with.
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement
provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures the integrity
of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or
drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the nature
of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity
(e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the
relation of the substances or items seized to the incident
allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of
the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to
have been in possession of or peddling them.
Compliance with this requirement forecloses
opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering
of evidence in any manner.
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-
compliance with Section 21 indicates a failure to
establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-compliance
suffices as a ground for acquittal. As this court stated
in People v. Lorenzo:
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited
drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a
persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity
of the prohibited drug must be established with moral
certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of
possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same
substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that
needed to sustain a guilty verdict.
The prosecution's sweeping guarantees as to the identity
and integrity of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia will
not secure a conviction. Not even the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties will
suffice. In fact, whatever presumption there is as to the
regularity of the manner by which officers took and
maintained custody of the seized items is "negated."
Republic Act No. 9165 requires compliance with Section
21.
Even the doing of acts which ostensibly approximate
compliance but do not actually comply with the
requirements of Section 21 does not suffice. In People v.
Magat, for instance, this court had occasion to
emphasize the inadequacy of merely marking the items
supposedly seized: "Marking of the seized drugs alone
by the law enforcers is not enough to comply with the
clear and unequivocal procedures prescribed in Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165."
The exactitude which the state requires in handling
seized narcotics and drug paraphernalia is bolstered by
the amendments made to Section 21 by Republic Act
No. 10640. Section 21(1), as amended, now includes the
following proviso, thereby making it even more stringent
than as originally worded:
Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant
is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures:
In People v. Nandi, this court explained that four (4)
links "should be established in the chain of custody of
the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court."
In Nandi, where the prosecution failed to show how the
seized items were handled following the actual seizure
and, thereafter, turned over for examination, this court
held that the accused must be acquitted:
After a closer look, the Court finds that the linkages in
the chain of custody of the subject item were not clearly
established. As can be gleaned from his forequoted
testimony, PO1 Collado failed to provide informative
details on how the subject shabu was handled
immediately after the seizure. He just claimed that the
item was handed to him by the accused in the course of
the transaction and, thereafter, he handed it to the
investigator.
There is no evidence either on how the item was stored,
preserved, labeled, and recorded. PO1 Collado could not
even provide the court with the name of the investigator.
He admitted that he was not present when it was
delivered to the crime laboratory. It was Forensic
Chemist Bernardino M. Banac, Jr. who identified the
person who delivered the specimen to the crime
laboratory. He disclosed that he received the specimen
from one PO1 Cuadra, who was not even a member of
the buy-bust team. Per their record, PO1 Cuadra
delivered the letter-request with the attached seized item
to the CPD Crime Laboratory Office where a certain
PO2 Semacio recorded it and turned it over to the
Chemistry Section.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the considered
view that chain of custody of the illicit drug seized was
compromised. Hence, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of duties cannot be applied in this case.
Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police
committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious
evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty is made in the context
of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the
performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure
in the performance thereof. The presumption applies
when nothing in the record suggests that the law
enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official
duty required by law; where the official act is irregular
42
on its face, the presumption cannot arise. In light of the
flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were
obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty.
With the chain of custody in serious question, the Court
cannot gloss over the argument of the accused regarding
the weight of the seized drug. The standard procedure is
that after the confiscation of the dangerous substance, it
is brought to the crime laboratory for a series of tests.
The result thereof becomes one of the bases of the
charge to be filed.32 (Emphases in the original)
cralawlawlibrary
II
As regards the items seized and subjected to marking,
Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act, as amended, requires the performance of two (2)
actions: physical inventory and photographing. Section
21(1) is specific as to when and where these actions must
be done. As to when, it must be "immediately after
seizure and confiscation." As to where, it depends on
whether the seizure was supported by a search warrant.
If a search warrant was served, the physical inventory
and photographing must be done at the exact same place
that the search warrant is served. In case of warrantless
seizures, these actions must be done "at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable."
Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3)
persons to be present during the physical inventory and
photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or
the person/s from whom the items were seized; second,
an elected public official; and third, a representative of
the National Prosecution Service. There are, however,
alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first (i.e.,
the accused or the person/s from whom items were
seized), there are two (2) alternatives: first, his or her
representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to the
representative of the National Prosecution Service, a
representative of the media may be present in his or her
place.
Section 21 spells out matters that are imperative. "Even
the doing of acts which ostensibly approximate
compliance but do not actually comply with the
requirements of Section 21 does not suffice." 33 This is
especially so when the prosecution claims that the
seizure of drugs and drug paraphernalia is the result of
carefully planned operations, as is the case here.
People v. Garcia34 underscored that the mere marking of
seized paraphernalia, unsupported by a physical
inventory and taking of photographs, and in the absence
of the persons required by Section 21 to be present, does
not suffice:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Thus, other than the markings made by PO1 Garcia and
the police investigator (whose identity was not
disclosed), no physical inventory was ever made, and no
photograph of the seized items was taken under the
circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its
implementing rules. We observe that while there was
testimony with respect to the marking of the seized items
at the police station, no mention whatsoever was made
on whether the marking had been done in the presence of
Ruiz or his representatives. There was likewise no
mention that any representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, or any elected official had been
present during this inventory, or that any of these people
had been required to sign the copies of the
inventory.35 (Citations omitted)
cralawlawlibrary
III
The flaws noted in Garcia are precisely the same errors
that taint the integrity of the operations of the buy-bust
team and, ultimately, of the corpus delicti of the offense
allegedly committed by petitioner.
It is glaring that despite the prosecution's allegations that
a buy-bust operation was carefully planned and carried
out, it admitted that Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act was not faithfully complied with.
While an inventory was supposed to have been
conducted, this was done neither in the presence of
petitioner, the person from whom the drugs were
supposedly seized, nor in the presence of his counsel or
representative. Likewise, not one of the persons required
to be present (an elected public official, and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the
media) was shown to have been around during the
inventory and photographing.
We are, in effect, left with no other assurance of the
integrity of the seized item other than the self-serving
claims of the prosecution and of its witnesses. These
claims cannot sustain a conviction. As in Garcia, the
mere marking of seized items, done in violation of the
safeguards of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act,
cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt.
The Court of Appeals made much of the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions. It
intimated that this presumption trumped the presumption
of innocence of an accused in light of how "all the
evidence [supposedly] points to the conclusion that
[petitioner] sold the marijuana." 36 This is a serious error.
Again, as we stated
in Holgado:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The prosecution's sweeping guarantees as to the identity
and integrity of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia will
not secure a conviction. Not even the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties will
suffice. In fact, whatever presumption there is as to the
regularity of the manner by which officers took and
maintained custody of the seized items is "negated."
[The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act] requires
compliance with Section 21.37cralawlawlibrary
Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act, as amended, leaves room for deviating from its own
requirements. It includes a proviso stating that
"noncompliance of [sic] these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures and custody over
said items." However, the prosecution failed to establish
the existence of any such justifiable grounds. If at all, its
own claims that the buy-bust operation was carefully
conceived of and carried out make its position even more
43
dubious. These claims are all the more reason to expect
that Section 21(1) shall be complied with meticulously.
Again, our observations in Holgado are on
point:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is true that Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a
proviso to the effect that "noncompliance of [sic] these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures and
custody over said items." However, the prosecution has
not shown that when the buy-bust operation was
allegedly conducted on January 17, 2007 and the sachet
was supposedly seized and marked, there were
"justifiable grounds" for dispensing with compliance
with Section 21. Rather, it merely insisted on its self-
serving assertion that the integrity of the seized sachet
has nevertheless been, supposedly, preserved. The
omission became more glaring considering that the
prosecution asserted that the events of January 17, 2007
entailed a carefully planned operation, engendered by
reports of drug-related activities along C. Raymundo
Street. This planning even led to the application for and
issuance of a search warrant.
cralawlawlibrary
IV
As this court has also previously observed in decisions
involving analogous circumstances, "[t]he miniscule
amount of narcotics supposedly seized . . . amplifies the
doubts on their integrity."38 What is involved here is all
but a single sachet of 1.4 grams of plant material alleged
to have been marijuana.
In People v. Dela Cruz,39 we noted that the seizure of
seven (7) sachets supposedly containing 0.1405 gram of
shabu (a quantity which, we emphasized, was "so
miniscule it amounted] to little more than 7% of the
weight of a five-centavo coin . . . or a one-centavo coin")
lent itself to dubiety.
In Holgado:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by
itself not a ground for acquittal, this circumstance
underscores the need for more exacting compliance with
Section 21. In Malilin v. People, this court said that "the
likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to
an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one
that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and
similar in form to substances familiar to people in their
daily lives."
. . . .
Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual
intricacies of cases involving violations of Republic Act
No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly
uncomplicated and barefaced narrative must be
scrupulously considered. Courts must employ
heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases
involving miniscule amounts of drugs. These can be
readily planted and tampered[.]40 (Citations omitted)
cralawlawlibrary
With the integrity of the corpus delicti of the crime for
which petitioner was charged is cast in doubt, it follows
that there is no basis for finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Petitioner must be acquitted.
We echo the same words with which we
ended Holgado:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with
prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165 involving
small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously
short of prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish."
We are swamped with cases involving small fry who
have been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they
are certainly a bane to our society, small retailers are but
low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of drug
cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should
realize that the more effective and efficient strategy is to
focus resources more on the source and true leadership
of these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these
executive and judicial resources expended to attempt to
convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under
doubtful custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent
in the overall picture. It might in fact be distracting our
law enforcers from their more challenging task: to
uproot the causes of this drug menace. We stand ready to
assess cases involving greater amounts of drugs and the
leadership of these cartels.41cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
dated November 13, 2013 and Resolution dated
September 18, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 05391 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Howard Lescano y Carreon is
hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is
confined for any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director
of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau
of Corrections is directed to report to this court, within
five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, the action he
has taken. Copies shall also be furnished to the Director
General of Philippine National Police and the Director
General of Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency for
their information.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 199371, February 03, 2016
PETRON LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION AND
TOTAL GAZ LPG DEALERS
ASSOCIATION, Petitioners, v. NENA C. ANG,
ALISON C. SY, NELSON C. ANG, RENATO C.
ANG, AND/OR OCCUPANTS OF NATIONAL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts discovered during surveillance operations
conducted by the authorities on the basis of information
44
and evidence provided by the complainants constitute
personal knowledge which could form the basis for the
issuance of a search warrant.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside
the September 2, 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89220 and its November 17,
2011 Resolution3 dismissing petitioners' appeal and
denying their Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioners Petron LPG Dealers Association and Total
Gaz LPG Dealers Association, together with other
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) associations, filed a
letter-complaint4 before the National Bureau of
Investigation-Ilocos Regional Office (NBI-IRO),
requesting assistance in the surveillance, investigation,
apprehension and prosecution of respondents Nena C.
Ang, Alison C. Sy, Nelson C. Ang, Renato C. Ang, and
National Petroleum Corporation (Nation Gas) for alleged
illegal trading of LPG products and/or underfilling,
possession and/or sale of underfilled LPG products in
violation of Sections 2 (a) and (c), in relation to Sections
3 and 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 335 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 18656(BP 33, as amended),
which provide -
Section 2. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are
prohibited and penalized:
(a) Illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum
products;
(b) x x x x
(c) Underdelivery or underfilling beyond authorized
limits in the sale of petroleum products or possession of
underfilled liquefied petroleum gas cylinder for the
purpose of sale, distribution, transportation, exchange or
barter;
x x x x
Sec. 3. Definition of terms, For the purpose of this Act,
the following terms shall be construed to mean:
Illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products -
x x x x
(C) Refilling of liquefied petroleum gas cylinders
without authority from said Bureau, or refilling of
another company's or firm's cylinders without such
company's or firm's written authorization;
x x x x
Sec. 4. Penalties. Any person who commits any act
herein prohibited shall, upon conviction, be punished
with a fine of not less than twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000) but not more than fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000), or imprisonment of at least two (2) years but
not more than five (5) years, or both, in the discretion of
the court. In cases of second and subsequent conviction
under this Act, the penalty shall be both fine and
imprisonment as provided herein. Furthermore, the
petroleum and/or petroleum products, subject matter of
the illegal trading, adulteration, shortselling, hoarding,
overpricing or misuse, shall be forfeited in favor of the
Government: Provided, That if the petroleum and/or
petroleum products have already been delivered and paid
for, the offended party shall be indemnified twice the
amount paid, and if the seller who has not yet delivered
has been fully paid, the price received shall be returned
to the buyer with an additional amount equivalent to
such price; and in addition, if the offender is an oil
company, marketer, distributor, refiller, dealer, sub-
dealer and other retail outlets, or hauler, the cancellation
of his license.
Trials of cases arising from this Act shall be terminated
within .thirty (30) days after arraignment.
When the offender is a corporation, partnership, or other
juridical person, the president, the general manager,
managing partner, or such other officer charged with the
management of the business affairs thereof, or employee
responsible for the violation shall be criminally liable; in
case the offender is an alien, he shall be subject to received a dated receipt7 for the purchase. Thereafter, the
deportation after serving the sentence. filled Starflame LPG cylinder was examined, weighed,
inspected, marked, and photographed.
If the offender is a government official or employee, he
shall be perpetually disqualified from office. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In particular, respondents were alleged to be refilling
On December 7, 2005, the NBI, through De Jemil, filed
Shellane, Gasul, Totalgaz, Starflame, and Superkalan
two Applications for Search Warrant 8 to conduct a search
Gaz LPG cylinders and selling, distributing and
of the Magsingal LPG refilling plant. The applications
transporting the same without the required written
were filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
authorization from the alleged respective owners of these
Bauang, La Union. Judge Ferdinand A. Fe' of RTC
cylinders - namely, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Branch 67 propounded the required searching questions,
Corporation, Petron Gasul Corporation, Total
to which De Jemil and Antonio provided the
(Philippines) Corporation, Caltex (Philippines)
answers.9 De Jemil further submitted a sketch and
Corporation (Caltex), and Superkalan Gaz Corporation.
vicinity/location map10 of the place to be searched; a
December 6, 2005 Certification11 or authority to apply
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI-IRO - through
for a search warrant issued by his superior, Atty. Rustico
its agent Marvin de Jemil (De Jemil) - conducted
Q. Vigilia, NBI-IRO Regional Director; the receipt for
surveillance and test-buy operations. Thus, on November
the test-buy refilled Starflame LPG cylinder obtained
24, 2005, De Jemil and an undercover NBI asset,
from Barba Gas on November 24, 2005; written
Leonardo Antonio (Antonio), proceeded to the sales
Certifications12 to the effect mat Nation Gas is not an
office of one of Nation Gas's alleged customers in Vigan
authorized LPG refiller of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
City, Barba Gas Marketing Center (Barba Gas) - a dealer
Corporation, Petron Gasul Corporation, Total
of LPG and cylinders. De Jemil and Antonio waited until
(Philippines) Corporation, Caltex and, Superkalan Gaz
a Barba Gas delivery truck was loaded with Starflame
Corporation; corporate documents of Nation Gas
LPG cylinders. The truck then left, with De Jemil's
obtained from the Securities and Exchange Commission
vehicle tailing behind. The truck proceeded to and
(SEC); and photographs13 of the Barba Gas delivery
entered a fenced compound located in Magsingal, Ilocos
truck involved in the refilling operation on November
Sur. The entrance to the compound contained a sign
24, 2005, unloading of the refilled LPG cylinders from
which read "LPG Refilling Plant". De Jemil interviewed
the delivery truck after coming from the Magsingal
residents within the vicinity, and it was learned that the
refilling plant, the refilled Starflame LPG cylinder
compound belonged to or was occupied by Nation Gas.
purchased and obtained from the test-buy, and the blank
seal covering the test-buy refilled Starflame LPG
De Jemil and Antonio waited at a distance. After about
cylinder - supporting the allegation that the refilling was
one hour, the Barba Gas truck emerged from the
not authorized as the seal was not a Caltex Starflame
compound. De Jemil then followed the truck back to the
seal.
Barba Gas sales office at Jose Singson street in Vigan,
where the refilled Starflame LPG cylinders were
The trial court issued Search Wan-ant Nos. 2005-59 and
unloaded. The two then proceeded to the test-buy phase
2005-60,14 which were served the following day, or on
of the operation; with an empty eleven-kilogram (11 kg.)
December 8, 2005, at the Magsingal LPG refilling plant.
Starflame LPG tank in hand, they went to Barba Gas and
Items specified in the search warrants were seized and
purchased one of the refilled Starflame LPG cylinders
duly inventoried and receipted.15 Thereafter, a
unloaded from the truck. The Barba Gas employee took
Consolidated Return of Search Warrants 16 was filed.
De Jemil's empty cylinder and replaced it with a filled
one. De Jemil paid P510.00 for the filled cylinder and
On February 7, 2006, respondents filed a Motion to
45
Quash17 Search Warrant Nos. 2005-59 and 2005-60,
arguing that the issuing court did not comply with the
requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant; that
there is no probable cause to issue the subject search
warrants, as the certifications issued by the complainants
- to the effect that Nation Gas was not an authorized
refiller -was not authenticated, the same being mere
private documents which required authentication; that
De Jemil and Antonio have no personal knowledge of
the charges, as well as the truthfulness and authenticity
of said certifications; that the issuing court should not
have consolidated the two applications, but should have
considered them separately in order to arrive at an
independent evaluation thereof; that the seizure of
Shellane, Gasul, Total Gaz, and Superkalan cylinders
was unlawful since there is no specific allegation and
evidence of underfilling or illegal refilling - if at all, the
inspection was limited to determining if the cylinders
were refilled with or without the authority of the
complainants; that as a result, the warrants issued were
illegal general warrants; and that the warrants covered
machinery and equipment classified as real property.
On August 4, 2006, the issuing court released an
Order18 quashing the subject warrants. It held that De
Jemil and Antonio had no personal knowledge that
Nation Gas was not an authorized LPG refiller of the
complaining LPG companies/associations; that no
member or representative of the complainants was
presented as witness to the search warrant applications;
that there is no evidence of illegal refilling since De
Jemil and Antonio did not witness the supposed refilling
of Barba Gas's Starflame LPG cylinders - including the
test-buy cylinder - by Nation Gas; that the certifications
issued by the LPG companies were hearsay and not
based on personal knowledge, since the testimonies or
depositions of those who issued them were not taken and
presented to the issuing court; that Caltex's certification
does not at all state that Nation Gas was an unauthorized
refiller; and that the testimonies or depositions of those
who tested the Starflame cylinder -who merely issued a
certification of test results - were not taken and
submitted to the court, thus rendering said certification
mere hearsay. The issuing court concluded that there is
no probable cause to issue the subject warrants, and there
is no reasonable ground to believe that an offense has
been committed by the respondents. It decreed,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Search Warrants
Nos. 2005-59 and 2005-60 are hereby ordered
QUASHED for lack of probable cause.
The objects seized by virtue thereof are declared
inadmissible for any purpose. The applicant, NBI
Supervising Agent Marvin E. De Jemil, or any of his
authorized representatives, who was authorized to
temporarily retain possession and custody of the seized
goods/objects for safekeeping at the warehouse located
at Barangay Dilan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, is ordered to
immediately return all the seized items to the
respondents.
SO ORDERED.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration;20 however, the same was denied in a
January 11, 2006 Order.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners interposed an appeal before the CA. On
September 2, 2011, the assailed Decision was rendered
denying petitioners' appeal. The appellate court held, as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The appellants22 argue that aside from the testimony of
De Jemil and Antonio, other documents were presented
at the time of the hearing on the application for Search
Warrant No. 2005-59. They posit that these are sufficient
to establish probable cause and as such, there was no
need for the presentation of persons who certified that
Nation was not authorized to refill the branded LPG
cylinders. They point out that probable cause is only
concerned with probabilities and the standard for its
determination is only that of a reasonable prudent man.
They stress that after the surveillances and test-buy
operations done by De Jemil and Antonio, the two
already acquired personal knowledge of the offenses
committed by the respondents-appellees. 23 It is claimed
too that the RTC's finding, that the certification did not
state Nation was not authorized to refill, was a vain
attempt to steer clear of respondents-appellees' lack of
46
authorization. It is alleged further that although De Jemil
and Antonio did not sign the inspection report detailing
the weight of the LPG cylinder acquired during the test-
buy operations, they were physically present and actually
involved in the weighing done, giving them personal
knowledge of the under filling by Nation. The appellants
aver too that there is no proof that those who weighed
the acquired cylinder were employed by them.
x x x x
In reviewing what transpired below, the Court's 'task ... is
not to conduct a de novodetermination of probable cause
but only to determine whether there is substantial
evidence in the records supporting the Judge's decision.'
This being the rule, the petition must fail.
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of
a search warrant requires that the facts surrounding the
basis for the application must be within the personal
knowledge of the applicant or his witnesses. If this does
not obtain, the finding of probable cause of a judge may
be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based
on his finding may be quashed since 'the Judge must
strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution
and the statutory provisions.' The circumstances at hand
repeal that there is enough basis for the RTC to quash the
Subject Warrants.
De Jemil and Antonio relied on sources furnished to
them made by persons not presented as witnesses. They,
thus, testified as to the truth of facts they had no personal
knowledge of. 'Search warrants are not issued on loose,
vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or
belief.' For instance, de Jemil testified as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"Q You said that the gas tanks are under filled, is that
correct?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What you mean to convey is that the gas tanks do
not contain the required gas to be put inside the gas
 tanks required by law?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q How were you able to verify this?
A It was examined and inspected by the personnel of
the LPG Dealers Association, your Honor. A Yes, your Honor."
xxx
Q Do you know who owns that refilling station in
Magsingal?
xxx
A The Nation Petroleum Corporation, your Honor.
Q And you claimed that the refilling is being done in
that refilling station...?
A Yes...
Q Why, is it an authorized refilling station for Caltex?
A No, your Honor.
Q ... [W]hat brand of LPG gas is it authorized to make
refills?
A He [sic] was not authorized to refill branded LPG
cylinders including Caltex LPG cylinders as well as
other branded LPG cylinders, your Honor.
xxx
Q Do you have a certification to show that it is not
authorized as a refilling center?
while a portion of Antonio's testimony
goes:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Q What was the result of the test-buy?
A After [the] testing conducted by Mr. Kenneth Igoy
and Mr. Alex Dosuhan of the LPG Dealers
Association, the examination turned out positive that
the LPG cylinder subject of the test-buy was under-
filled and that the Nation Gas was also using [an]
unauthorized seal..."
[From] their answers, [it could be gleaned that] De Jemil
and Antonio had no personal knowledge that the LPG
acquired during the test-buy was underfilled and that
Nation had no authorization. They may have seen a truck
carrying empty cylinders enter Nation's premises and
exit after with alleged under-filled cylinders but the
requirement of the law is more precise. They should
have had personal knowledge that the cylinder
concerned was under-filled and that Nation lacked
authority. It cannot be ignored that both De Jemil and
Antonio did not see the subject cylinder being filled
[nor] did they test its weight personally. Furthermore,
they were just furnished a certification that Nation did
not have any right to refill. Indeed, their respective
sworn statements read in part as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
'5. I likewise secured a Certification dated 27 August
2005 from Atty. Adarlo who confirmed that Nation Gas
is not one of those entities authorized to refill LPG
cylinders bearing the brands of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation, Petron Corporation, Total (Philippines)
Corporation, Caltex Philippines, Inc.[,] and Superkalan
Gaz Corporation.'chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
47
-oXo-
'5. Pinagbigay-alam sa akin na ang Nation Gas ay
walang pahintulot na nagkakarga ng mga Shellane,
Petron Gasul, Totalgaz, Caltex Starflame[,] at
Superkalan Gaz na tangke ng LPG dahil ang Nation
[G]as ay Mndi pinahintulutan ng mga nabanggit na mga
lehitimong kompanya.'
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 25 which
was denied through the CA's second assailed Resolution
of November 17, 2011. Hence, the instant Petition.
In an August 28, 2013 Resolution, 26 this Court resolved
to give due course to the
Petition.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Issues
Petitioners allege that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
THE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A DECISION NOT
IN ACCORD WITH THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THE HONORABLE COURT AS REGARDS THE
DETERMINATION OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
OF WITNESSES IN SEARCH WARRANT
APPLICATIONS. CERTAINLY, THERE IS A NEED
TO REVERSE AND SET ASIDE THE RULING OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT NBI AGENT DE
JEMIL AND HIS WITNESSES HAD NO PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE THAT THE RESPONDENTS
COMMITTED ILLEGAL TRADING AND
UNDERFILLING OF LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
(LPG) PRODUCTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE IN SEARCH
WARRANT
APPLICATIONS.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners' Arguments
In their Petition and Reply 28 seeking reversal of the
assailed CA dispositions and a declaration of validity as
to the subject Search Warrants, petitioners essentially
argue that in resolving the appeal, the appellate court
failed to consider that in search warrant applications,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required - rather,
only probable cause is needed; that based on the
evidence submitted with the applications, such probable
cause existed; that De Jemil and Antonio had personal
knowledge of the offenses being committed by the
respondents, that is, they actually witnessed the illegal
refilling and underfilling of the subject test-buy LPG
cylinder, as the same was examined and weighed in their
presence; that under Section 2(3) of BP 33, as amended,
there is a presumption of underfilling when the seal is
broken, absent or removed; that while the complainants'
witnesses were not introduced into the proceedings, De
Jemil and Antonio were nonetheless able to acquire
personal knowledge of respondents' illegal acts when
they conducted their surveillance and test-buy
operations; and that personal knowledge acquired during
surveillance and investigation conducted based on the tip
of a confidential informant satisfies the requirement of
probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent's Arguments
In their Comment30 seeking denial of the Petition,
respondents claim that the Petition raises issues of fact;
that under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the applicant
for a search warrant and his witnesses should have
personal knowledge of facts in order to establish
probable cause; that the issuing court and the CA are
unanimous in their findings that the applications for
search warrant should be denied; that De Jemil and
Antonio have no personal knowledge mat the subject
test-buy LPG cylinder was refilled by respondents, as
they did not enter the premises of the Magsingal LPG
refilling plant; that there is no truth to De Jemil and
Antonio's claim that they actually examined and weighed
the test-buy LPG cylinder, as they admitted during the
proceedings that it was the LPG dealers' association that
inspected and weighed the same; that the surveillance
and test-buy operations failed to establish the
accusations leveled against respondents, and for this
reason, the lack of personal knowledge by De Jemil and
Antonio and failure to present the complainants'
witnesses were not cured.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
In Del Castillo v. People,31 the relevant principles
governing the issuance of a search warrant were
discussed, as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are:
(1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause
must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the
judge must examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she
may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify
on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. x x x Probable cause for a
search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it
was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands
more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence
which would justify conviction. The judge, in
determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of
the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed
and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of
the circumstances standard. x x
x32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners claim that respondents are engaged in the
illegal trading and refilling of Shellane, Gasul, Totalgaz,
Starflame, and Superkalan Gaz LPG cylinders, as they
were not authorized dealers or refillers of Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation, Petron Gasul Corporation, Total
(Philippines) Corporation, Caltex, and Superkalan Gaz
Corporation. Additionally, they accuse respondents of
underfilling LPG cylinders. To prove illegal trading and
refilling, they presented written certifications to the
effect that Nation Gas was not an authorized LPG refiller
of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, Petron Gasul
48
Corporation, Total (Philippines) Corporation, Caltex, and
Superkalan Gaz Corporation. And to prove underfilling,
they presented photographs as well as the results of an
examination of the refilled Starflame LPG cylinder
obtained through De Jemil's test-buy.
The Court finds the evidence presented sufficient to
prove probable cause; the issuing court and the CA thus
patently erred in quashing the search warrants. Where
the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record, the same cannot bind this
Court.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Ty v. NBI Supervising Agent De Jemil,34 the Court
declared that what BP 33, as amended prohibits is the
refilling and underfilling of a branded LPG cylinder by a
refiller who has no written authority from the brand
owner; this proceeds from the principle that the LPG
brand owner is deemed owner as well of the duly
embossed, stamped and marked LPG cylinders, even if
these are in the possession of its customers or
consumers. Such illegal refilling/underfilling may be
proved by: 1) conduct of surveillance operations; 2) the
conduct of a test-buy; 3) written certifications from LPG
companies such as Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation, Petron Gasul Corporation, and Total
(Philippines) Corporation detailing and listing the
entities duly authorized to deal in or refill their
respective LPG cylinders, and excluding a particular
LPG trader/refiller from the lists contained in said
certifications; and 4) the written report and findings on
the test and examination of the test-buy cylinder. Thus,
the Court held:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Probable violation of Sec. 2 (a) of BP 33, as amended
First. The test-buy conducted on April 15, 2004 by the
NBI agents, as attested to by their respective affidavits,
tends to show that Omni illegally refilled the eight
branded LPG cylinders for PhP 1,582. This is a clear
violation of Sec. 2 (a), in relation to Sees. 3 (c) and 4 of
BP 33, as amended. It must be noted that the criminal
complaints, as clearly shown in the complaint-affidavits
of Agent De Jemil, are not based solely on the seized
items pursuant to the search warrants but also on the
test-buy earlier conducted by the NBI agents.
Second. The written certifications from Pilipinas Shell,
Petron[,] and Total show that Omni has no written
authority to refill LPG cylinders, embossed, marked or
stamped Shellane, Petron Gasul, Totalgaz[,] and
Superkalan Gaz. In fact, petitioners neither dispute this
nor claim mat Omni has authority to refill these branded
LPG cylinders.
Third. Belying petitioners' contention, the seized items
during the service of the search warrants tend to show
that Omni illegally refilled branded LPG cylinders
without authority.
x x x x
As petitioners strongly argue, even if the branded LPG
cylinders were indeed owned by customers, such fact
does not authorize Omni to refill these branded LPG
cylinders without written authorization from the brand
owners Pilipinas Shell, Petron[,] and Total. In Yao, Sr. v.
People, a case involving criminal infringement of
property rights under Sec. 1.55 of RA 8293, in affirming
the courts a quo's determination of the presence of
probable cause, this Court held that from Sec. 155.1 of
RA 8293 can be gleaned that 'mere unauthorized use of a
container bearing a registered trademark in connection
with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or
services which is likely to cause confusion, mistake or
deception among the buyers/consumers can be
considered as trademark infringement. The Court
affirmed the presence of infringement involving the
unauthorized sale of Gasul and Shellane LPG cylinders
and the unauthorized refilling of the same by Masagana
Gas Corporation as duly attested to and witnessed by
NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and test-
buys.
Similarly, in the instant case, the fact that Omni refilled
various branded LPG cylinders even if owned by its
customers but without authority from brand owners
Perron, Pilipinas Shell[,] and Total shows palpable
violation of BP 33, as amended. As aptly noted by the
Court in Yao, Sr. v. People, only the duly authorized
dealers and refillers of Shellane, Petron Gasul and, by
extension, Total may refill these branded LPG cylinders.
Our laws sought to deter the pernicious practices of
unscrupulous businessmen.
Fourth. The issue of ownership of the seized branded
LPG cylinders is irrelevant and hence need no
belaboring. BP 33, as amended, does not require
ownership of the branded LPG cylinders as a
condition sine qua non for the commission of offenses
involving petroleum and petroleum products. Verily, the
offense of refilling a branded LPG cylinder without the
written consent of the brand owner constitutes the
offense regardless of the buyer or possessor of the
branded LPG cylinder.
After all, once a consumer buys a branded LPG cylinder
from the brand owner or its authorized dealer, said
consumer is practically free to do what he pleases with
the branded LPG cylinder. He can simply store the
cylinder once it is empty or he can even destroy it since
he has paid a deposit for it which answers for the loss or
cost of the empty branded LPG cylinder. Given such
fact, what the law manifestly prohibits is the refilling of
a branded LPG cylinder by a refiller who has no written
authority from the brand owner, Apropos, a refiller
cannot and ought not to refill branded LPG cylinders if it
has no written authority from the brand owner.
Besides, persuasive are the opinions and
pronouncements by the DOE: brand owners are deemed
owners of their duly embossed, stamped and marked
LPG cylinders even if these are possessed by customers
or consumers. The Court recognizes this right pursuant
to our laws, i.e., Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines. Thus the issuance by the DOE [of] Circular
No. 2000-05-007, the letter-opinion dated December 9,
2004 of then DOE Secretary Vincent S. Perez addressed
to Pilipinas Shell, the June 6, 2007 letter of then DOE
Secretary Raphael P.M. Lotilla to the LPGIA, and DOE
Department Circular No. 2007-10-0007 on LPG
Cylinder Ownership and Obligations Related Thereto
issued on October 13, 2007 by DOE Secretary Angelo T.
Reyes.
49
Fifth. The ownership of the seized branded LPG
cylinders, allegedly owned by Omni customers as
petitioners adamantly profess, is of no consequence.
The law does not require that the property to be seized
should'be owned by the person against whom the search
[warrant] is directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession
of the property sought to be seized. Petitioners cannot
deny that the seized LPG cylinders were in the
possession of Omni, found as they were inside the Omni
compound.
x x x x
Probable violation of Sec. 2 (c) of BP 33, as amended
Anent the alleged violation of Sec. 2 (c) in relation to
Sec. 4 of BP 33, as amended, petitioners strongly argue
that there is no probable cause for said violation based
upon an underfilling of a lone cylinder of the eight
branded LPG cylinders refilled during the test-buy.
Besides, they point out that there was no finding of
underfilling in any of the filled LPG cylinders seized
during the service of the search warrants. Citing DOE's
Bureau of Energy Utilization Circular No. 85-3-348,
they maintain that some deviation is allowed from the
exact filled weight. Considering the fact that an isolated
underfilling happened in so many LPG cylinders filled,
petitioners are of the view that such is due to .human or
equipment error and does not in any way constitute
deliberate underfilling within the contemplation of the
law.
Moreover, petitioners cast aspersion on the report and
findings of LPG Inspector Navio of the LPGLA. by
assailing his independence for being a representative of
the major petroleum companies and that the inspection
he conducted was made without the presence of any
DOE representative or any independent body having
technical expertise in determining LPG cylinder
underfilling beyond the authorized quantity.
Again, we are not persuaded.

Contrary to petitioners' arguments, a single underfilling
constitutes an offense under BP 33, as amended by PD
1865, which clearly criminalizes these offenses. In Perez
v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc., the
Court affirmed the validity of DOE Circular No. 2000-
06-010 which provided penalties on a per cylinder basis
for each violation x x x.
x x x x
The Court made it clear that a violation, like
underfilling, on a per cylinder basis falls within the
phrase of any act as mandated under Sec. 4 of BP 33, as
amended. Ineluetably, the underfilling of one LPG
cylinder constitutes a clear violation of BP 33, as
amended, The finding of underfilling by LPG Inspector
Navio of the LPGIA, as aptly noted by Manila Assistant
City Prosecutor Catalo who conducted Ae preliminary
investigation, was indeed not controverted by
petitioners.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
An examination of petitioners' evidence in the instant
case reveals that it is practically identical to that
presented in the Ty case. A complaint was filed with the
NBI, which conducted surveillance and test-buy
operations; written certifications were submitted to the
effect that the respondent was not an authorized refiller
of the LPG companies' branded cylinders; finally, an
inspection of the test-buy cylinder was conducted, and
the results thereof embodied in a written document
which was submitted as evidence in the proceedings.
Moreover, photographs taken indicate that Barba Gas
was not an exclusive dealer/distributor of Caltex
Starflame cylinders and LPG products, and that the
cylinders involved - including the test-buy cylinder -
belonged to Caltex, the same being stamped with its
Starflame mark.
Thus, applying Ty in its entirety to the present case, the
Court finds that there exists probable cause for the
issuance of search warrants as applied for by petitioners.
Probable cause for purposes of issuing a search warrant
refers to "such facts and circumstances which could lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item(s),
article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in
the place to be searched."36 On the other hand, probable
cause for purposes of filing a criminal information refers
to "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondents are probably guilty thereof. It is such set of
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe mat the offense
charged in the Information, or any offense included
therein, has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested."37 Thus, while Tyrefers to preliminary
investigation proceedings, and the instant case is
concerned with applications for the issuance of search
warrants, both are resolved based on the same degree of
proof; the pronouncement in Ty may therefore apply to
the present controversy.
On the claim of lack of personal knowledge, the Court
subscribes to petitioners' argument that facts discovered
during surveillance conducted by De Jemil and Antonio -
on the basis of information and evidence provided by
petitioners - constitute personal knowledge which could
form the basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Indeed, as was declared in Cupcupin v. People,38 which
petitioners cite, the surveillance and investigation
conducted by an agent of the NBI obtained from
confidential information supplied to him enabled him to
gain personal knowledge of the illegal activities
complained of.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
September 2, 2011 Decision and November 17, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
89220 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The validity
of Search Warrant Nos. 2005-59 and 2005-60
is SUSTAINED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 208137, June 08, 2016
MARIA CECILIA OEBANDA, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR AND/OR THE OCCUPANTS AND
50
EMPLOYEES OF VISAYAN FORUM
FOUNDATION, INC., Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, ACTING, C.J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the
(1) Order2 dated 19 November 2012, denying the Urgent
Motion to Quash Search Warrant dated 24 September
2012, and (2) Order3 dated 3 June 2013, denying the
Motion for Reconsideration dated 26 December 2012, of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
102. The Orders issued by the RTC pertain to Search
Warrant No. 4811(12)4 for violation of Article 172(2) of
the Revised Penal Code or the crime of falsification by
private individuals and use of falsified documents.
The Facts
In a letter dated 6 August 2012, the United States Office
of Inspector General, through Special Agent Daniel
Altman, sought the assistance of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate alleged financial fraud
committed by Visayan Forum Foundation, Inc. (Visayan
Forum), a nonstock, non-profit corporation, against the
United States Agency for International Development
(USAID). Visayan Forum was then receiving funding
from USAID which suspected that Visayan Forum was
fabricating documents and official receipts for purchase
of goods and services to justify expenses and advances
covered by USAID funding.
On 29 August 2012, two NBI Agents, Atty. Dennis R.
Villasfer and Atty. Erickson Donn R. Mercado, entered
the premises of Visayan Forum with principal address at
No. 18, 12th Avenue, Brgy. Socorro, Cubao, Quezon City.
The NBI Agents represented themselves to be part of the
audit team of B.F. Medina and Company, an independent
external audit firm accredited by USAID and engaged by
Visayan Forum to conduct an audit of its USAID funds.
After gaining entry, the NBI Agents went through boxes,
sifted through documents and photocopied some
documents and receipts.
On 31 August 2012, the NBI Agents, under the
authorization of the NBI Deputy Director for Special
Investigation Service, jointly applied for a search
warrant with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98. The
NBI Agents cited violation of Article 172(2) of the
Revised Penal Code5 and alleged that petitioners Maria
Cecilia Oebanda (Oebanda), the Executive Director of
Visayan Forum, and/or the occupants and employees of
Visayan Forum are in possession or have in their control
falsified private documents which were used and are
being used to defraud the donors of USAID, to its
damage and prejudice.
On the same date, Judge Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan
(Judge Cabochan), the Presiding Judge of RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 98, conducted a hearing on the
application for search warrant. Plaintiff People of the
Philippines presented the following witnesses: (1) Atty.
Dennis R. Villasfer, NBI Agent, Anti-Graft Division; (2)
Atty. Erickson Donn R. Mercado, NBI Agent, Anti-Graft
Division; (3) Maria Analie L. Villacorte (Villacorte), a
former bookkeeper of Visayan Forum; and (4) Celestina
M. Aguilar (Aguilar), an auditor from B.F. Medina and
Company.
After Judge Cabochan personally examined the
applicants, the two NBI Agents, and their witnesses, and
was satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application was based, Judge Cabochan issued Search
Warrant No. 4811(12) against Visayan Forum. The
relevant portion of the warrant states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate
search in the day time of the premises above-described
and forthwith seize and take possession of the following
personal property:
a) Following Books of Accounts and records covering
periods from 2005-2011: General Ledger, Subsidiary
Ledger on Advances from Employees, Bank Statements,
Reconciliation Statements, Cash Disbursement Books,
Check Vouchers, Journal Vouchers, Daily Time Records,
Service Contract of all Employees, Service Contracts of
all Contractors billed to the US AID Port Project, Fund
Accountability Statements;
b) Desktops and Laptops of the Finance Manager,
Finance Officer, Bookkeeper and Administration Officer;
c) Unused pre-printed Official Receipts, Official
Receipts and Petty Cash Vouchers which can be bought
from bookstore, VFFI Cash Vouchers and Stationeries;
and bring said property to the undersigned to be dealt
with as the law directs.
This Search Warrant should be valid for ten (10) days
from date of issuance.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the afternoon of 31 August 2012, the NBI
implemented the search warrant against Visayan Forum
and seized more than 30 boxes of documents, as well as
the computers of the finance manager, finance officer,
and administration officer.
On 24 September 2012, petitioners filed an Urgent
Motion7 to Quash the Search Warrant on the ground of
lack of probable cause to issue the search warrant.
In an Order dated 19 November 2012, Presiding Judge
Ma. Lourdes A. Giron of the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 102, denied the motion. Judge Cabochan of RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 98, who originally issued the
search warrant, inhibited herself from the case.
On 26 December 2012, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration. This was denied in an Order dated 3
June 2013.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The main issue is whether the RTC committed reversible
error in finding that probable cause exists to issue Search
Warrant No. 4811(12).
51
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
At the outset, this petition was filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court which is limited to questions of law. For a
question to be one of law, it must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them.
In Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp, Inc.,8 we held that the
pivotal issue of whether there was probable cause to
issue the search warrant is a question of fact. In the
present case, the resolution of this issue would require
this Court to inquire into the probative value of the
evidence presented before the RTC. Petitioners have
raised an argument that requires us to make an
examination of the transcript of stenographic notes taken
during the search warrant proceedings. This is exactly
the situation which Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court prohibits by requiring the petition to raise only
questions of law.
Because this Court is not a trier of facts, a re-
examination of factual findings cannot be done through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. This Court is not duty-bound to analyze
and weigh again the evidence considered in the
RTC.9 Further, this case does not fall under any of the
exceptions10 laid down in the Rules.
However, in order to put finis to this case, we will
discuss and go through the issues submitted by
petitioners.
On whether the judge asked probing and exhaustive
questions
Petitioners submit that the judge who issued the search
warrant did not sufficiently ask probing, exhaustive, and
extensive questions. Petitioners insist that the judge must
not simply rehash the contents of the affidavits but must
make her own extensive inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application.
In an application for search warrant, the mandate of the
judge is for him to conduct a full and searching
examination of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. The searching questions propounded to the
applicant and the witnesses must depend on a large
extent upon the discretion of the judge. Although there is
no hard-and-fast rule as to how a judge may conduct his
examination, it is axiomatic that the said examination
must be probing and exhaustive and not merely
routinary, general, peripheral or perfunctory. He must
make his own inquiry on the intent and factual and legal
justifications for a search warrant. The questions should
not merely be repetitious of the averments stated in the
affidavits/deposition of the applicant and the witnesses. 11
In the present case, the Transcript of Stenographic
Notes,12 comprised of 72 pages which was taken during
the hearing, shows that Judge Cabochan extensively
interrogated the two NBI Agents who applied for the
search warrant. By representing themselves to be part of
the audit team of B.F. Medina and Company, the two
NBI Agents were able to freely enter and move around
Visayan Forum's premises. There, the NBI Agents were
able to sufficiently observe the layout of the office
buildings, the location of relevant documents and
equipment, and the movement of the employees. Most
importantly, the NBI Agents were able to distinctly
describe the alleged wrongful acts that Visayan Forum
committed and was committing at that time. The relevant
portions of NBI Agent Villasfer's testimony state:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Villasfer: Your Honor, this document is the Joint
Application for Search Warrant which I executed
together with agent Atty. Erickson Donn R. Mercado.
Your Honor, last August 29, 2012 at around 10:00
o'clock in the morning we conducted a Surveillance
together with the auditors from BF Medina. Atty.
Erickson Mercado and I posed as one of the staff of the
auditing firm and went to the subject area and we acted
as auditors and we personally observed the documents
and the rooms in the buildings and we saw the other
documents and unused receipts fabricated by the VFFI,
Your Honor.
x x x x
and [saw] the Official Receipts, altered documents
Court: When you went to the premises which you are there, Your Honor.13 (Emphasis supplied)
wanted to be searched at No. 18 12 thAvenue, Brgy. The other applicant, NBI Agent Mercado, corroborated
Socorro, Cubao, Quezon City, what have you seen or NBI Agent Villasfer's testimony and explained what he
what have you observed? had observed from the surveillance. The relevant
portions of his testimony provide:
Atty. Villasfer: Your Honor, when we conducted the chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
auditing, we saw from the documents presented to us x x x x
located at the building, at the back of the compound
because there are two (2) buildings, Your Honor. At the Court: Earlier you heard your co-applicant Atty. Villasfer
ground floor, we saw the altered documents. These testified, what can you say about his testimony?
are receipts being altered and fabricated for purposes
of their audit being conducted by the B.F. Medina Atty. Mercado: Yes, Your Honor, I confirmed the
and Company. Furthermore, we went there to verify the truthfulness of the statements being made by my co-
information given by the witnesses. applicant and in addition, Your Honor, in the course of
our surveillance and investigation, we also have a chance
x x x x to photocopy these receipts, these documents from VFFI
and we were able also to make a sketch of the place,
Court: What other things have you seen when you went particularly Agent Villasfer together with our one
there at the subject premises? witness, they were able to go to the second, third floors
of both buildings. In our application, we have the
Atty. Villasfer: Official Receipts, Your Honor, Books of attached sketch of the building, Your Honor. And, in
Account and records covering period from 2005 to 2011; addition, Your Honor, I also observed the demeanor of
General Ledger, Subsidiary Ledger on Advances from the people there, elusive/evasive because we posed as
Employees, Bank Statements, Reconciliation Statements, members or staff of the auditing company, we can freely
Cash Disbursement Books, Cash Vouchers, Journal loiter around without being detected that we are NBI
Vouchers, Daily Time Records, Service Contract of all Agents. We are aware that the people there will not
Employees, Service Contracts of all Contractors billed to question us considering that they are familiar with new
the US AID Port Project, Fund Accountability faces since the auditors bring with them staff, their OJTs
Statements, Desktops and Laptops of the Finance when they go there. So in that case, we can freely access
Manager, Finance Officer, Bookkeepers and all possible rooms where these documents subject of this
Administrative Officer, unused pre-printed Official Application for Search Warrant are
Receipts, Official Receipts and Petty Cash Vouchers kept.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
which can be bought from bookstores, VFFI Cash The records also show that the NBI Agents' two
Vouchers and Stationeries, Your Honor. witnesses, Villacorte and Aguilar, submitted their
respective affidavits and were subjected to the same
Court: Earlier, you said that you have access to the probing questioning by the trial judge. The testimony of
folders? Atty. Villasfer: Yes, Your Honor. Villacorte states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Court: Please clarify. Were you able to really examine x x x x
one by one all these things, that's why you were able to
identify? Court: Do you affirm and confirm that you have
voluntarily executed your Affidavit without fear or
Atty. Villasfer: Yes, Your Honor. We opened the boxes pressure from anyone?
and examined the folders, and we personally verified
52
Ms. Villacorte: Yes, Your Honor. "25. T: Ginawa nyo ba naman ang inuutos ni Mrs.
Ms. Villacorte: Yes, Your Honor. Oebanda?
Court: Now, you tell me how did you become a witness
here? x x x x S: Opo."

Ms. Villacorte: Because I do not want to become a part Court: And where are those unused receipts? "26. T: Alam mo ba na ito ay mali?
of the crime because I might get involve, Your Honor.
Ms. Villacorte: Before the auditors came, we placed S: Alam kopo na ito ay mali."
Court: Why, what did you do? those unused receipts in the boxes.
"27. T: Bakit ginawa mo pa din?
Ms. Villacorte: I resigned from the Visayan Forum last Court: Including those partially used receipts in a
July 15, 2012, Your Honor. booklet? S: Dahil sa takot ko na ako po ay mawalan ng trabaho
kapag hindi ako sumunod."
Court: How were the NBI Agents able to get in touch Ms. Villacorte: Yes, Your Honor, x x x.
with you in order to utilize you as a witness now? where are those documents as stated in your Sinumpaang
x x x x Salaysay which you accomplished or fabricated upon the
Ms. Villacorte: Because at the time of the audit, the orders of Mrs. Oebanda?
auditors came to know me because I was still there, Your Court: As of the date of the application for the Search
Honor. Warrant you were no longer connected with the VFFI? Ms. Villacorte: Those were the documents we presented
to the auditors, Your
Court: Why did they single you out, why not any other Ms. Villacorte: Yes, Your Honor. Honor.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
employee or employees? Aguilar, one of the auditors that was with the NBI
Court: By the way, all these documents stated by the Agents when Visayan Forum was audited, gave a more
Ms. Villacorte: Because I was the bookkeeper of US other witness Ms. Aguilar regarding the things that were detailed picture of the fraud indicators which she had
AID, Your Honor. Court: How many bookkeepers are asked by Mrs. Oebanda about the pre-printed receipts, observed in the course of her audit of Visayan Forum.
there in your office, if you know? booklets, etcetera, pertaining to questions and answers The relevant portions provide:
numbers 23 to 27 of your Sinumpaang Salaysay quoted chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ms. Villacorte: The bookkeepers are one of our project as follows: x x x x
bases, Your Honor, and, I was the one handling the
USAID department, Your Honor. "23. T: Bakit kayo ipinatawag ni Mrs. Oebanda kung Court: Earlier, the two applicants here for Search
natatandaan mo? Warrant stated that when they entered the premises to be
x x x x searched, they said that they posed as auditors of your
S: Sinabi ngapo niya sa amin na may mga auditors na company?
Court: x x x. Those pre-printed receipts the applicants darating para i-audit ang USAID fund. Nagbigay po sya
want now to be seized, where are those said receipts? ng instruction na kailangan punuan ng mga resibo an[g] Ms. Aguilar: Yes, Your Honor.
mga unliquidated na cash advances."
Ms. Villacorte: In the locker, Your Honor. Court: You are Court: And according to them, you Mrs. Aguilar were
sure about that? with them when they entered the premises, will you
"24. T: Anong ibig kahulugan ngpunuan ng resibo? confirm that?
Ms. Villacorte: We have not used it yet and the[y] were
left, and that is what they will use just in case there were S: Ibig pong sabihin ay maghanap o gumawa po kami Ms. Aguilar: Yes, Your Honor. I confirm that and also
remaining unliquidated accounts, Your Honor. ng resibo at pagkatapos ay gagawa[n] din po namin ng my father, the managing partner of our firm was with us,
liquidation report at iyon naman ang i-attach namin sa Mr. Benjamin F. Medina.
Court: What you did was you used those booklets to mga vouchers."
cover for the other expenses of the VFFI? Court: And also everything they have stated about the

53
sketch of the building and that you are also very much
aware of the set-up of that building one and building
two?
Ms. Aguilar: Yes, Your Honor, but on that day, Atty.
Dennis came with me to inspect the various floors of the
two buildings. I just made an alibi that it's part of our
audit procedures.
Court: And you also confirm the fact that based on the
sketches that are attached now to the application for
Search Warrant, will you confirm that it is also of your
own personal knowledge that those properties listed in
their application for Search Warrant under paragraph 2
sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) were really found within
the subject premises as shown from the marked
sketches?
Ms. Aguilar: Yes, Your Honor.
Court: The reason for this is because you were one of the
companions of Atty. Villasfer when you went to the
subject premises?
Ms. Aguilar: Yes, Your Honor. And I was also the one
who showed to both of them the altered receipts and
invoices and also the other documents relating to our
audit findings.
x x x x
Court: Those things were not covered by your Affidavit,
Mrs. Aguilar. Do you confirm now what Atty. Villasfer
manifested a while ago?
Ms. Aguilar: Yes, Your Honor. Actually, it is included
in my Affidavit as one of our audit findings because
one of our audit findings [is] alterations of receipts
and invoices. I think it is number ten (10) or eleven (11),
Your Honor. And I showed to the applicants some of
the photocopied vouchers that we notice[d) that were
alteredbecause, Your Honor, this organization, we had
the entrance conference [i]n January of this year. Based
on routine audits, they will be given two weeks to
prepare for us, but they allow[ed] us to start the audit
only in April. So there were delays in the audit, Your
Honor. Ms. Aguilar: Yes, Your Honor. And, these boxes we
initially audited them during our first month of field
Court: It was supposed to be [i]n January 2012 but you work. So what we did, I am curious as an auditor where
were allowed only when? those documents are. x x x.
Ms. Aguilar: April 18, 2012, Your Honor, to be exact. On Court: Which are already missing?
that date, on April 18, there were still some missing
documents that we already requested [from] them during Ms. Aguilar: Yes, Your Honor. And, I have also
our entrance conference, Your Honor. And, we observed suspicions, Your Honor, of pre-printed booklets because
that while we were conducting our audit field work, there are various pre-printed booklets of original receipts
they were also doing manufacturing of documents. which the company used, they are non-existing anymore.
We clearly observed many documents that were They just used the company name and the address and
altered during our audit and I have some examples they had it printed by the printing press, their favored
of photocopie[d] documents. x x x. Your Honor, this printing press and they used it as a sort of justification
NGO, they received grants from USAID, not only from for their expenditures. But, as auditors, we are trying to
USAID, but from other donor agencies, twelve to be se[e] whether they are valid or not. So, I am also
exact including the USAID. What they do is, they suspecting that [they are] hiding these documents.
received grants and these grants are supposed to help
traffic victims which they have in their different regional Court: Why did you have suspicions?
offices. However, we validated the authenticity of the
number of the actual beneficiaries from third party Ms. Aguilar: Because, of course, if they had it pre-
confirmations. We need confirmation with DSWD and printed, they wouldn't show it to us.
we noted that based on their record and their reports
to the DSWD, there were various Court: What about those other documents, which you
inconsistencies.Many, I just included maybe two (2) of suspected were already missing at the time when you
the inconsistencies in the number. And also we validated went back to make an audit of these accounts or the
with the USAID. The report that they submitted to the existing ledgers?
USAID, there were also inconsistencies. x x x. So, as
auditors, these are indicators of fraud. x x x. Ms. Aguilar: Because during our field work sometime in
June, when we audit, there are schedules from 10:00 to
Court: What were these documents which you 5:00. We come home then we go there the following day,
discovered: the books of Books of Accounts, Ledgers, we noticed that there were ballpens left on a table
etcetera, as listed in the application? and when we check[ed] the vouchers, most of them
they tampered [them] already or they removed
Ms. Aguilar: Yes, Your Honor. Court: Will you explain something and they changed [them] to [other]
further? document[s]. So what we did, we taped the boxes and I
signed them to seal them. Those were audited already,
Ms. Aguilar: The thirty-two boxes for the check that's what we did. Then I counted it and I knew that five
vouchers and journal vouchers were there, Your Honor[.] to six boxes were missing because initially, [there were]
[W]hen we went back on Wednesday, August 29, 2012, thirty-eight (38) boxes. But, thirty-two (32) [were] only
[h]owever, there [were] five (5) to six (6) boxes which left when we came back that June.
[were] missing already.
x x x x
Court: Missing?
54
Court: Well, that was just your suspicion.
Ms. Aguilar: Yes, just like what I've said, Your
Honor, these are indicators of fraud and indicators of
their intentions to conceal or destroy all
incriminating evidence.
x x x x
Ms. Aguilar: x x x. And also we want to secure the
computers because the data that [were] presented to us,
attached to [these] documents inside the boxes, they are
computer printed.
Court: That's why you wanted also to get all those
computers and the laptops.
Ms. Aguilar: Yes, Your Honor because during the
course of our audit, they changed the figures and
dates and sometimes the names of the employees if it
is cash advance.16 (Emphasis Supplied)
Clearly, the records show that Judge Cabochan
personally examined NBI Agents Villasfer and Mercado,
the applicants for the search warrant, as well as their
witnesses, Villacorte and Aguilar. The interrogations
conducted by the trial judge showed that the applicants
and their witnesses had personal knowledge of the
offense petitioners committed or were then committing.
The judge properly asked how the applicants came to
know of the falsification, where it was committed, what
was involved, the extent of their participation, and what
they have seen and observed inside Visayan Forum's
premises. We believe that the questions propounded on
them were searching and probing. The trial judge made
an independent assessment of the evidence submitted
and concluded that the evidence adduced and the
testimonies of the witnesses support a finding of
probable cause which warranted the issuance of a search
warrant for violation of Article 172(2) of the Revised
Penal Code.
Absent a showing to the contrary, it is presumed that a
judicial function has been regularly performed. 17The
judge has the prerogative to give his own judgment on
the application of the search warrant by his own
evaluation of the evidence presented before him. We
cannot substitute our own judgment to that of the judge.
On whether there was probable cause to issue the
search warrant
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge
and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for personal property described therein and bring
it before the court.18 The relevant provisions on the
issuance of a search warrant for personal property, as
governed by Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, state:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A
search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. - The
judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath, the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements,
together with the affidavits submitted.
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. - If the
judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application is based or that there is probable cause to
believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which
must be substantially in the form prescribed by these
Rules.
To paraphrase this rule, a search warrant may be issued
only if there is probable cause in connection with a
specific offense alleged in an application based on the
personal knowledge of the applicant and his witnesses.
This is the substantive requirement for the issuance of a
search warrant. Procedurally, the determination of
probable cause is a personal task of the judge before
whom the application for search warrant is filed, as he
55
has to examine the applicant and his or her witnesses in
the form of "searching questions and answers" in writing
and under oath. The warrant, if issued, must particularly
describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.19
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause
requires such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.20 In People v. Punzalan,21 we held that there
is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in
the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly
dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of
exercising their judicial function.
Here, the records show that the applicants for the search
warrant and their witnesses were able to sufficiently
convince the judge of the existence of probable cause
based on their own personal knowledge, or what they
have actually seen and observed, in Visayan Forum's
premises. The NBI Agents related to the RTC how they
entered Visayan Forum, in the guise of representing
themselves as part of the audit team of B.F. Medina and
Company. The NBI Agents personally saw that Visayan
Forum's employees and occupants altered and fabricated
documents and official receipts covered by USAID
funding. They even photocopied some documents and
receipts proving such fabrication. Also, the NBI Agents
were able to particularly describe Visayan Forum's
premises, exactly locating the place to be searched with
sketches of the buildings and various floors and rooms.
Further, they described in great detail the things that
were seized documents, receipts, books of account and
records, and computers used by Visayan Forum's
employees.
Likewise, the NBI Agents' witnesses, Villacorte and
Aguilar, were able to substantiate the statements and
allegations of the NBI Agents by testifying on what they
have personally seen and experienced while working in
Visayan Forum, and how they came to know that fraud
was being perpetrated by the company. Thus, the
applicants' and their witnesses' testimonies, together with
the affidavits they [presented, are adequate proof to
establish that there exists probable cause to issue the
search warrant for violation of Article 172(2) of the
Revised Penal Code.

In Century Chinese Medicine Co. v. People,22 we held

that the determination of probable cause does not call for
the application of rules and standards of proof that a
judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.
As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is
concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral
certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage
proof beyond reasonable doubt.

When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a

search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is
accorded respect by the reviewing courts. Here, in
issuing the search warrant, Judge Cabochan sufficiently
complied with the requirements set by the
Constitution23 and the Rules of Court. 24 Therefore, we
find nothing irregular

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Orders

dated 19 November 2012 and 3 June 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102
are AFFIRMED. The validity of Search Warrant No.
4811(12) is SUSTAINED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

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