REGISTRY of PROPERTY matter to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila in consulta under section 200
fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila in consulta under section 200 of the
Arts. 708-711 NCC
ANTONIO GONZALEZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. FELICIANO BASA, JR., and PILAR LOPEZ DE
BASA, oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. 48695
This is an appeal from a decision of the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila instructing
the register of deeds of Manila to register a certain project of partition in its entirety as requested by the
appellee and not in a mutilated form as requested by the appellants.
It appears that in the matter of the estate of the deceased Amalia Arcega y Alfonso Vda. de Basa, case No.
50872 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Pilar Lopez de Basa, as administratix; Feliciano Basa, Jr.,
as sole and universal heir, and Antonio Gonzalez, as creditor and attorney of the estate, presented to the
court a project of partition jointly signed by them and asked that it be approved. The said document
consists of several clauses. Clause 2 contains an inventory of the properties left by the deceased, and
clause 3 contains a list of all the obligations of the estate. Among said obligations is that specified on page
22, letter (d), as follows:
Said project of partition was approved by the court "en todas sus partes" in an order dated January 12,
1938.
Thereafter Feliciano Basa, Jr., thru his present attorney Mr. Benedicto M. Javier, procured from the clerk of
court a certified copy of said project of partition in a modified or mutilated form in that page 22 thereof,
which we have copied above, was omitted at the express request of Attorney Javier. The certification of the
clerk of court, dated June 18, 1941, reads in part as follows:
I, L. PASICOLAN, Clerk of the above-entitled Court, do hereby certify that the attached documents,
consisting of 26 pages, are true and correct copies of "LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION" dated March 16,
1937, "PROYECTO DE PARTICION" dated December 29, 1937, except the entire page 22 thereof, and
the letter "d" in parenthesis and the words "de la clausula tercera" appearing on page 24, which letter "d"
represents the said entire page 22; the "ORDER, dated January 12, 1938, and the "ORDEN" dated
February 12, 1938.
The elimination of the aforementioned page 22, and the letter "d" and the words "de la clausula tercera"
has been expressly requested by Attorney Benedicto M. Javier.
That certified copy, together with the owner's duplicates of the certificates of title covering the real
properties adjudicated to Feliciano Basa, Jr., was presented to the register of deeds of Manila for
registration with a view to the issuance of the corresponding transfer certificates of title in the name of
Feliciano Basa, Jr., free from the mortgage lien in favor of Antonio Gonzalez. The latter, upon learning
thereof, objected to the registration of the project of partition as thus mutilated and requested the register
of deeds, in lieu thereof, to register the certified complete copy of said document which he then and there
presented with a view to the annotation of the mortgage in his favor of the certificates of title to be issued in
the name of Feliciano Basa, Jr. The register of deeds refused to accede to said request of Attorney
Gonzales on the ground that Attorneys Javier & Javier, representing Feliciano Basa, Jr., refused to grant
him authority to annotate said mortgage on the certificates of title to be issued in the name of Basa, and
that since a mortgage is presumed to be a voluntary transaction between the parties he had no authority to
make such annotation without the consent of both parties. Thereupon Attorney Gonzalez submitted the
Administrative Code, with the result already indicated at the outset.
Both parties have filed lengthy briefs entirely out of proportion to the nature of the question involved. The
appellants oppose the registration of the complete certified copy of the project of partition and try to justify
their presentation to the register of deeds of said document in a mutilated condition by alleging (1) that
they are not indebted to Attorney Gonzalez in the sum of P25,250 or any part thereof; (2) "that in the
remote even that they have signed any contract of indebtedness for any amount in favor of Attorney
Antonio Gonzalez, the same was without consideration and they have been deceived in signing it without
being first aware of its contents. insofar [inasmuch ] as Attorney Antonio Gonzales is their "compadre" and
formerly enjoyed their absolute confidence"; and (3) that the mortgage obligation in question was inserted
in said project of partition by Attorney Antonio Gonzalez without their knowledge and consent.
In deciding to comply with the request of the appellants for the registration of the project of partition as
mutilated, over the objection of the appellee, who tendered a complete, certified true copy of the same
document, the register of deeds of Manila impliedly conceded to them the right to repudiate and annul an
obligation evidenced by said document against the will of the obligee and without judicial intervention. That
is obviously wrong. It is precisely his duty to see to it that a document presented for registration is regular
and in due form. The mutilated certified copy was irregular on its face and should have been rejected by
him. In fact his authority in the premises goes no father than this. He has no authority to inquire into the
intrinsic validity of a document based upon proofs aliunde. If he had no authority to inquire into the truth of
appellant's allegation as to lack of consideration for the mortgage in question, much less was he
authorized to assume the truth of such allegation without any investigation. The project of partition in
question of partition in question, having been signed by the parties and approved by the court, is
presumed to be valid and is acceptable for registration in its entirety. Neither of the parties may alter it
without the consent of the other and the approval of the court.
The reasoning of the register of deeds that, inasmuch as a mortgage is a voluntary transaction, he had
authority to register it without the consent of both parties, is fallacious. He confuses the execution of a
mortgage with its registration. It is the execution of the mortgage that is voluntary. Once a mortgage has
been signed in due form, the mortgagee is entitled to its registration as a matter of right. By executing the
mortgage the mortgagor is understood to have given his consent to its registration, and he cannot be
permitted to revoke it unilaterally. The validity and fulfillment of contracts cannot be left to the will of one of
the contracting parties (article 1256 of the Civil Code).
In the last analysis, the case is as if Feliciano Basa, Jr., had presented to the register of deeds a certified
complete copy of the project of partition with the request that the register of deeds take into consideration
only the rights, and ignore the obligations, evidenced by said document. It is the same as if a buyer of real
property who mortgaged the property bought to secure the payment of the purchase price, had presented
the combined deed of sale and mortgage to the register of deeds with the request to transfer the title to
him without annotating the mortgage thereon. Is the register of deeds authorized to comply with such
request? No reasonable person would so contend; and yet that is what the register of deeds of Manila
proposes to do in the present case.
Feliciano Basa, Jr., claims the right to have the properties of his deceased mother transferred to his name
by the register of deeds in virtue of the adjudication contained in the project of partition which was duly
approved by the court; but that adjudication was made expressly subject to the mortgage obligation in
question. Basa certainly cannot invoke and at the same time repudiate the said document. If he wants to
annul the mortgage stipulated in said project of partition and secure a clean title to the property
adjudicated to him, he should first procure the annulment by appropriate judicial action before presenting
said document for registration. He cannot arrogate to himself the right to annul said mortgage or to amend
the court's order approving the project of partition "in all its parts."
The questions of fact raised by appellants in this proceeding concerning the alleged lack of consideration
for the mortgage in question and the circumstances under which they signed the project of partition, should
be litigated in an appropriate judicial action and not in this consulta, wherein the only question that may
properly be determined is whether the register of deeds should accept for registration a certified mutilated
copy or a certified complete copy of the project of partition in question. Needles to say, the decision on this
question cannot affect the right of the appellants to attack the validity of the mortgage in question in an
appropriate separate action.
Benin v. Tuason (57 SCRA 531)
Facts:The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of agricultural
lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of LaLoma (now barrio of San Jose)
in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, that they inherited said parcels of land from
their ancestor Sixto Benin, who inturn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and
their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely,and peacefully,
cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvestedtherefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's
grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyedon March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by
the Bureau of Lands of thelands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the
ownershipover said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940under Tax
Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently
thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs,
constructed their housesthereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc.was actually served with summons. The other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in
accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.
HELD:It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three
parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or successorsin interest of Sixto Benin who
died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs basetheir claim of ownership over the two parcels of land
described in their complaint ontheir being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who
died in 1934.In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land
described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in
1931. It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffsbase their claim of ownership of the three
parcels of land described in the complaint ontheir being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin who
died in 1936. In CivilCase No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of
landdescribed in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara
who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of
land described in their complaint on their beingthe heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who
died in 1931.Therefore, that the decision of this Court, which affirmed the order of the Court of
FirstInstance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and PascualPili (along with
four other plaintiffs) should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias
Arguments: Court had no jurisdiction because the applicant did not republish the changes made in their
application for the technical description of the lands.
The amendment may be made in the application or in the survey plan, or in
both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If the
amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an
area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as
published, a new publication of the amended application must be made.
The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons
concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication
the registration court can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of
land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the
decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision
concerns the newly included land. 11 The reason is because without a new
publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in
registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to
present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of
notice. 12 But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area
covered by the original application and the original plan as previously
published, a new publication is not necessary. 13 In the latter case, the
jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of
a new publication. 14
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION OF HINIGARAN, movant-appellee, vs.
ESTANISLAO YULO YUSAY, ET AL., oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-13313 April 28, 1960
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Hon. Jose S. de la
Cruz, presiding the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to register a mortgage executed by Rafael
Yulo in favor of the movant covering Lot No. 855, Pontevedra Cadastre, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 4979.
The records disclose that on July 20, 1952, Rafaela Yulo executed in favor of the movant a mortgage for
P33,626.29, due from her, her mother, sisters, brothers, and others, which amount she assumed to pay to
the movant. A motion was presented to the court by the movant demanding the surrender of the owner's
duplicate certificate of title that he may annotate said mortgage at the back of the certificate. Estanislao
Yusay, a part owner of the lot, opposed the petition on the ground that he is owner of a part of the property
in question; that the granting of the motion would operate to his prejudice, as he has not participated in the
mortgage cited in the motion; that Rafaela Yulo is dead; that the motion is not verified and movant's rights
have lapsed by prescription. Finally it is argued that his opposition raises a controversial matter which the
court has no jurisdiction to pass upon. Margarita, Maria, Elena and Pilar, all surnamed Yulo, joined the
oppositor Estanislao Yusay, raising the same objections interposed by Yusay.
The existence of the mortgage is not disputed, and neither is the fact that the mortgagor Rafaela Yulo is
part owner of Lot No. 855 of the Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra. The oppositors do not dispute that she is
such a part owner, and their main objection to the petition is that as part owners of the property, the
annotation of the mortgage on the common title will affect their rights.
The court held that even if the ownership of the deceased Rafaela Yulo over the portion of the lot in
question and the validity of the mortgage are disputed, such invalidity of the mortgage is no proof of the
non-existence of the mortgage nor a ground for objecting to its registration, citing the case of Register of
Deeds of Manila vs. Maxima Tinoco Vda. de Cruz, et, al., 95 Phil., 818; 53 Off. Gaz., 2804.
In his Brief before this Court, counsel for appellants argue that the mortgage sought to be registered was
not recorded before the closing of the intestate proceedings of the deceased mortgagor, but was so
recorded only four months after the termination of said proceedings, so that the claim of movant has been
reduced to the character of a mere money claim, not a mortgage, hence the mortgage may not be
registered. In the first place, as the judge below correctly ruled, the proceeding to register the mortgage
does not purport to determine the supposed invalidity of the mortgage or its effect. Registration is a mere
ministerial act by which a deed, contract or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office
of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the
deed, contract or instrument.
The registration of a lease or mortgage, or the entry of a memorial of a lease or mortgage on the register,
is not a declaration by the state that such an instrument is a valid and subsisting interest in land; it is
merely a declaration that the record of the title appears to be burdened with the lease or mortgage
described, according to the priority set forth in the certificate.
The mere fact that a lease or mortgage was registered does not stop any party to it from setting up that it
now has no force or effect. (Niblack, pp. 134-135, quoted in Francisco Land Registration Act, l950 ed., p.
348.)
The court below, in ordering the registration and annotation of the mortgage, did not pass on its invalidity
or effect. As the mortgage is admittedly an act of the registered owner, all that the judge below did and
could do, as a registration court, is to order its registration and annotation on the certificate of title covering
the land mortgaged. By said order the court did not pass upon the effect or validity of the mortgage
these can only be determined in an ordinary case before the courts, not before a court acting merely as a
registration court, which did not have the jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged effect or validity.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against oppositors-appellants. So
ordered.
SAJONAS VS. CA G.R. No. 102377
July 5, 1996
FACTS: The Sajonas couple are before us, on a Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying inter alia to set
aside the CAs decision, and to reinstate that of the RTC
On September 22, 1983, spouses Uychocde agreed to sell a parcel of residential land located in Antipolo,
Rizal to the spouses Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated September 22,
1983. The property was registered in the names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal.
On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on the said
Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property, which was inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full
payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in question
in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a
year after, or on August 28, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that Pilares (defendant-appellant) filed a Civil Case for collection of sum of money
against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties in
the said case under which Uychocde acknowledged his monetary obligation to Pilares amounting to
P27,800 and agreed to pay the same in two years. When Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking
in the compromise agreement, Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the decision
based on the compromise agreement, which the court granted in its order dated August 3, 1982.
Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on August 12, 1982 by the CFI of Quezon City. Pursuant to the
order of execution a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On the same date,
defendant sheriff Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of
Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of the TCT of the subject land.
When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4, 1984 was registered on August 28, 1985, TCT No. N-
79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was issued in the name of the Sajonas
couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title.
On October 21, 1985, the Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon City, hence
the auction sale of the subject property did not push through as scheduled.
On January 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon
Pilares, through a letter to their lawyer. Despite said demand, defendant-appellant Pilares refused to cause
the cancellation of said annotation. In view thereof, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint in the RTC of
Rizal, against Pilares, the judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. The trial court rendered its decision in favor
of the Sajonas couple, and ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from TCT No. N-109417. The
court a quo stated, thus:
It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction that actual notice of an adverse claim is equivalent to
registration and the subsequent registration of the Notice of Levy could not have any legal effect in any
respect on account of prior inscription of the adverse claim annotated on the title of the Uychocdes.
On the issue of whether or not plaintiffs (Sajonas) are buyers in good faith of the property of the spouses
Uychocde even notwithstanding the claim of the defendant that said sale executed by the spouses was
made in fraud of creditors, the Court finds that the evidence in this instance is bare of any indication that
said plaintiffs as purchasers had notice beforehand of the claim of the defendant over said property or that
the same is involved in a litigation between said spouses and the defendant. Good faith is the opposite of
fraud and bad faith, and the existence of any bad faith must be established by competent proof.
Dissatisfied, Pilares appealed to the CA assigning errors on the part of the lower court. The appellate court
reversed the lower courts decision, and upheld the annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of
title. The respondent appellate court upheld private respondents theory when it ruled:
The above staled conclusion of the lower court is based on the premise that the adverse claim filed by
plaintiffs-appellees is still effective despite the lapse of 30 days from the date of registration. However,
under the provisions of Section 70 of P.D. 1529, an adverse claim shall be effective only for a period of 30
days from the date of its registration.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULE ON THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR
ADVERSE CLAIM UNDER SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IS ABSOLUTE INASMUCH AS IT FAILED TO
READ OR CONSTRUE THE PROVISION IN ITS ENTIRETY AND TO RECONCILE THE APPARENT
INCONSISTENCY WITHIN THE PROVISION IN ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO IT AS A WHOLE.
HELD: ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent CA dated October 17, 1991 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the RTC finding for the cancellation of the notice of levy on
execution from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 is hereby REINSTATED. The inscription of the
notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is hereby CANCELLED.

The question may be posed, was the adverse claim inscribed in the TCT still in force when private
respondent caused the notice of levy on execution to be registered and annotated in the said title,
considering that more than thirty days had already lapsed since it was annotated ? (Pilares argues that the
adverse claim ceases to have any legal force and effect (30) days after August 27, 1984 pursuant to
Section 70 of P.D. 1529) (referring to the adverse claim of the Sajonas)
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect and a
construction that could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious whole. For taken in solitude, a word or
phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when a
word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. In ascertaining the period of effectivity
of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of
Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:
The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration.
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty
days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation
to the sentence following, which reads:
After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified
petition therefor by the party in interest.
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of
thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete
the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere
lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act. The law, taken
together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective,
otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property.
To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their property, who waited a long time to complete
payments on their property, convinced that their interest was amply protected by the inscribed adverse
claim.
In sum, the disputed inscription of an adverse claim on the TCT No. N-79073 was still in effect on February
12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on execution thereto.
Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon the execution was
encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice of
levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the
petitioners
NOTES:
1. Concededly, annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person
over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right not otherwise provided for by
the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves a
warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a
better right than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice is registered by filing a sworn statement
with the Register of Deeds of the province where the property is located, setting forth the basis of the
claimed right together with other dates pertinent thereto.
2. Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates
a lien upon the land. A person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to
determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property
which are noted on the face of the register or certificate of title, but nevertheless he is bound by the liens
and encumbrances annotated thereon. One who buys without checking the vendors title takes all the risks
and losses consequent to such failure
3. A subsequent sale of property covered by a Certificate of Title cannot prevail over an adverse claim,
duly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of title previous to the sale.
4. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of
Deeds a sworn petition to that effect
1. As to whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good faith of the subject property, the same should be
made to rest on the findings of the trial court. As pointedly observed by the appellate court, there is no
question that plaintiffs-appellees were not aware of the pending case filed by Pilares against Uychocde at
the time of the sale of the property by the latter in their favor. This was clearly elicited from the testimony
of Conchita Sajonas, wife of plaintiff, during cross-examination
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. Good
faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscientious advantage of another, Thus,
the claim of the private respondent that the sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors
has no basis in fact, there being no evidence that the petitioners had any knowledge or notice of the debt
of the Uychocdes in favor of the private respondent, nor of any claim by the latter over the Uychocdes
properties or that the same was involved in any litigation between said spouses and the private
respondent. While it may be stated that good faith is presumed, conversely, bad faith must be established
by competent proof by the party alleging the same. Sans such proof, the petitioners are deemed to be
purchasers in good faith, and their interest in the subject property must not be disturbed.
6. At any rate, the Land Registration Act (Property Registration Decree) guarantees to every purchaser of
registered land in good faith that they can take and hold the same free from any and all prior claims, liens
an encumbrances except those set forth on the Certificate of Title and those expressly mentioned in the
ACT as having been reserved against it. Otherwise, the efficacy of the conclusiveness of the Certificate of
Title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would be futile and nugatory.
ANTONIO PIERO, JR., EMMA BERNAD (assisted by her husband Norberto Bernad) and
FORTUNATO PIERO, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, SEGUNDO M.
REYES, in his capacity as the Provincial Land Officer of Zamboanga del Norte, MARIANO D.
PALERMO, in his capacity as Deputy Public Lands Inspector, NICANOR ALASAAS, EUSEBIO
CAMANSI and TOMAS SUMALPONG, respondents. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, SEGUNDO M.
REYES, in his capacity as the Provincial Land Officer of Zamboanga del Norte and MARIANO
D. PALERMO, in his capacity as Deputy Public Lands Inspector, respondents-appellants. G.R.
No. L-36507 June 14, 1974

Appeal by the Solicitor General from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in
its Civil Case No. 1128, granting the writ of prohibition prayed for by appellees against the appellant
Director of Lands, the Provincial Land Officer of the same province and other subordinate officials who, by
order of said director, had initiated an investigation of alleged fraud claimed to have led to the issuance of
the Free Patents and corresponding Certificates of Title to the said appellees.
This appeal was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on February 20, 1973, the decision of the trial court
being based exclusively on a stipulation of facts as follows:
1. That Antonio Piero, Jr., and Emma Piero Bernad are residents of Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte;
while Fortunate Piero is presently a resident of Negros Oriental;
2. That the identities of Lots Nos. 5790, 5792 and 2532, all of Pls- 100, situated at Napuyan, Dapitan,
Zamboanga del Norte, are submitted (sic); .
3. That Lot No. 5790, Pls - 100 is covered by Free Patent No. V-63411 issued January 30, 1957 in favor of
Antonio Piero, Jr., and Lot No. 5792 Pls - 100 is covered by Free Patent No. V-63420 issued on January
30, 1957 in favor of Emma Piero Bernad, and that Lot 2532 is applied for by Fortunato Piero under
Homestead Application No. V-66441 approved as of January 2, 1953, but up to the present no Patent has
as yet been issued; .
4. That Lot 2532 was formerly part of PSU - 111118, a private survey executed by Surveyor Calixto
Sudiacal in 1939 for Fortunato Piero and that by subsequent survey executed by the ECA, Psu-111118
was subdivided into smaller lots, one of which is now Lot 2532; .
5. That pursuant to Free Patent No. V-63411, Original Certificate of Title No. D-5349 was issued by the
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte in favor of Antonio Piero, Jr., on October 17, 1957; .
6. That pursuant to Free Patent No. V-63420, Original Certificate of Title No. P-5312 was issued by
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte, in favor of Emma Piero on October 17, 1957; .
7. That on August 8, 1958, the Director of Lands issued an order directing the investigation of the protest of
Eusebio Camansi, against the patented application of Antonio Piero Jr., a copy of said order being found
on page 14 of the expediente; and that on March 24, 1959 the Director of Lands thru the Chief Legal
Division directed the Provincial Land Officer at Dipolog, to investigate the protest of Nicanor Alasaas
against the patented application of Emma Piero Bernad, a copy of said order is also being on page 15 of
the expediente;
8. That as regards Lot 5790 Pls - 100 the protest of Eusebio Camansi has been given due course against
the claim of Antonio Piero Jr., which protest has been investigated and terminated, Antonio Piero Jr.,
being represented by his counsel Atty. Jesus Sarmiento;
9. That Nicanor Alasaas filed his protest dated February 27, 1958 and subscribed on March 11, 1958,
before Notary Public, G.R. Dalmacio, Jr., a copy is hereto attached as Exhibit A; and that the protest of
Nicanor Alasaas has been investigated by Atty. Mariano D. Palermo, investigator of the Bureau of Lands,
Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte on August 30, 1959;
10. That with respect to Lot 5792 the same has already been investigated and regarding Lot 5790 the
investigation has already been terminated but no decision has as yet been issued;
11. That with respect to the claim of Tomas Sumalpong against the application of Fortunato Piero
an investigation was conducted on August 21, 1959 but neither Fortunato Piero nor counsel appeared;
that when the said case was rescheduled for October 30, 1959, Atty. Jaime T. Hamoy counsel for
Fortunato Piero filed a motion for postponement on the ground that said counsel had a Criminal Case to
attend to in the Justice of the Peace Court of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, after which the hearing was
rescheduled for December 28, 1959; that in said hearing counsel for Fortunato Piero for the first time
attacked the authority of the investigation on the alleged ground that under the Revised Administrative
Code only the Director of Lands and Chief of Section of said Office can order investigation of land conflicts;
that up to the present no resolution of that issue has as yet been made; and that no written motion bearing
on the same ground interposed before the investigator was ever raised before the Director of Lands;
12. That pursuant to a letter of Atty. Candido Pa. Sumalpong as counsel for Tomas Sumalpong under date
of July 28, 1959, protesting against the above-mentioned homestead application of Fortunato Piero which
letter was addressed to the Director of Lands thru the Provincial Land Officer at Dipolog, Zamboanga del
Norte, the said Provincial Land Officer in the first indorsement dated July 22, 1959 addressed to Deputy
Public Lands Inspector, Mariano D. Palermo, directed the investigation of the case until the said case is
terminated for disposition under the provision of Land Administrative Order No. 13-3 that the said first
indorsement was the sole authority for the investigation of the claim of said Tomas Sumalpong against the
homestead application of Fortunato Piero that as above stated the investigation of the claim of Tomas
Sumalpong was not terminated because counsel for Fortunato Piero attacked the authority for the said
investigation;
13. That in connection with the separate petition of the respondents, Nicanor Alasaas, Eusebio Camansi
and Tomas Sumalpong against the application of the petitioners the same respondents were required by
the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands in a letter dated September 4, 1959 to file a sworn
protest and pay the protest fee within a period of thirty days from the receipt of the said letter, otherwise
the respondents claim will be dismissed and disregarded without further notice; that a copy of said letter is
hereto attached as an integral part of this stipulation of facts as Exhibit "B"; that there is no showing that
respondents complied with the said letter nor is there any showing that the claim of the respondents are
already dismissed (that is as of this date); that on December 18, 1959 the petitioners, thru counsel, filed a
motion to dismiss the alleged protest but up to the present no resolution on has ever been made; that as
shown by this letter of September 4, 1959 which was addressed to Antonio Mabulay, Annex "B"
respondents Tomas Sumalpong, Nicanor Alasaas and Eusebio Camansi were not given copy of this letter,
and that the motion of counsel for the "Dismiss the Protest" (sic) does not show that respondents Tomas
Sumalpong, Eusebio Camansi and Nicanor Alasaas were ever furnished a copy of said motion;
14. That the Director of Lands was actually served with summons on January 20, 1960 as shown by the
return of the City Sheriff of Manila, which return appears on page 25 of the record of this case;
15. That for all matters not covered by this stipulation of facts parties agree to ask for a date for the
reception of evidence.
We hold the appeal to be meritorious. In the light of the facts disclosed in the foregoing stipulation, We
reiterate Cebedo vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-12777, May 22, 1961, 2 SCRA 25, wherein We held
that it is not only the right but the duty of the Director of Lands to conduct the investigation of any alleged
fraud in securing a free patent and the corresponding title to a public land and to file the corresponding
court action for the reversion of the same to the State, if the facts disclosed in the course of such
investigation should so warrant. Consequently, prohibition cannot be issued to enjoin such an investigation
despite the existence of a Torrens title.
Indeed, it is to be clarified that Section 91 of the Public Land Act leaves no other alternative to the Director
of Lands. The provision reads thus:
SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of
any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or
omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such
statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the
application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be
the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the
necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the
application are true, or whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and
for the purpose of such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and
subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In every
investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or
fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the
land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoenas or subpoenas duces tecum lawfully issued by the Director of
Lands or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and specific answers to
pertinent questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation may issue without
further proceedings.
Underlying this section and providing its justification is the Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 1 of
Article XIII of the Constitution of 1935, in force during the material dates of the events herein involved,
declaring that "all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain . . and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State...." And under Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil.
461, "the scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all
lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy
for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation." Accordingly, the right to acquire
disposable lands from the State through any of the means provided for in the Public Land Act,
Commonwealth Act 141, must necessarily be subject to the reservation expressly made in above quoted
Section 91 to the effect that "the statements made in the application shall be considered as essential
conditions and parts of any ... title ... issued on the basis of such application" and that "any false statement
therein or omission of facts altering, changing or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such
statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration or change of the material facts set forth in the
application shall ipso facto 1 produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted."
It is true that under Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, a Torrens title issued on the basis of a free
patent or a homestead patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured. And in repeated previous
decisions of this Court that indefeasibility has been emphasized by Our holding that not even the
Government can file an action for annulment, but at the same time, it has been made clear that an action
for reversion may be instituted by the Solicitor General, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. 2 It
is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be
allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an ever existing authority, thru its duly
authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end
that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the
corresponding action for the reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to
disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over
land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been
acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in
securing such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.
Nothing said above, however, should be understood as holding that the Court has found that the titles of
appellees have been in fact fraudulently secured. That matter may be resolved only after the Director of
Lands shall have finished his investigation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is reversed and the writ of prohibition sought
by appellees is denied. Costs against appellees.
G.R. No. L-36402. March 16, 1987.] FILIPINO SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND
PUBLISHERS, INC., plaintiff- appellant, vs. BENJAMIN TAN, defendant-appellee.
Plaintiff-appellant:*is the owner of certain musical compositions among which are the songs entitled: "Dahil
SaIyo", "Sapagkat Ikaw Ay Akin," "Sapagkat Kami Ay Tao Lamang" and "The Nearness Of You."*filed a
complaint with the lower court for infringement of copyright against defendant-appelleefor allowing the
playing in defendant-appellee's restaurant of said songs copyrighted in thename of the former.Defendant-
appellee,*countered that the complaint states no cause of action. While not denying the playing of
saidcopyrighted compositions in his establishment, appellee maintains that the mere singing andplaying of
songs and popular tunes even if they are copyrighted do not constitute aninfringement under the
provisions of Section 3 of the Copyright Law.
ISSUE: whether or not the playing and signing of musical compositions which have beencopyrighted under
the provisions of the Copyright Law (Act 3134) inside the establishment of the defendant-appellee
constitute a public performance for profit within the meaning andcontemplation of the Copyright Law of the
Philippines; and assuming that there were indeedpublic performances for profit, whether or not appellee
can be held liable therefor.
Held: NO. It has been held that "The playing of music in dine and dance establishment whichwas paid for
by the public in purchases of food and drink constituted "performance for profit"within a Copyright Law."
Thus, it has been explained that while it is possible in suchestablishments for the patrons to purchase their
food and drinks and at the same time dance tothe music of the orchestra, the music is furnished and used
by the orchestra for the purpose of inducing the public to patronize the establishment and pay for the
entertainment in the purchaseof food and drinks. The defendant conducts his place of business for profit,
and it is public; andthe music is performed for profit.Nevertheless, appellee cannot be said to have
infringed upon the Copyright Law. Appellee'sallegation that the composers of the contested musical
compositions waived their right in favor of the general public when they allowed their intellectual creations
to become property of thepublic domain before applying for the corresponding copyrights for the same is
correct.The Supreme Court has ruled that "Paragraph 33 of Patent Office Administrative Order No. 3(as
amended, dated September 18, 1947) entitled 'Rules of Practice in the Philippines PatentOffice relating to
the Registration of Copyright Claims' promulgated pursuant to Republic Act165, provides among other
things that an intellectual creation should be copyrighted thirty (30)days after its publication, if made in
Manila, or within the (60) days if made elsewhere, failure of which renders such creation public property."
Indeed, if the general public has made use of theobject sought to be copyrighted for thirty (30) days prior to
the copyright application the law deems the object to have been donated to the public domain and the
same can no longer be copyrighted.Under the circumstances, it is clear that the musical compositions in
question had long become public property, and are therefore beyond the protection of the Copyright Law.
MANZANO v CA278 SCRA 688
 The primary purpose of the patent system is notthe reward of the individual but the advancement of the
artsand sciences. The function of a patent is to add to the sumof useful knowledge and one of the
purposes of the patentsystem is to encourage dissemination of informationconcerning discoveries and
inventions.FACTS:Angelita Manzano filed PPO an action for thecancellation of Letters Patent for a gas
burner registered inthe name of respondent Melecia Madolaria whosubsequently assigned the letters
patent to New UnitedFoundry and Manufacturing Corporation (UNITED FOUNDRY,for brevity). Petitioner
alleged that (a) the utility modelcovered by the letters patent, in this case, an LPG gasburner, was not
inventive, new or useful; (b) thespecification of the letters patent did not comply with therequirements of
Sec. 14, RA No. 165, as amended; (c)respondent Melecia Madolaria was not the original, true andactual
inventor nor did she derive her rights from theoriginal, true and actual inventor of the utility modelcovered
by the letters patent; and, (d) the letters patentwas secured by means of fraud or misrepresentation.
Testifying for herself petitioner narrated that herhusband Ong Bun Tua worked as a helper in the
UNITEDFOUNDRY where respondent Melecia Madolaria used to beaffiliated with from 1965 to 1970; that
Ong helped in thecasting of an LPG burner which was the same utility modelof a burner and that after her
husbands separation from theshop she organized Besco Metal Manufacturing (BESCOMETAL, for brevity)
for the casting of LPG burners one of which had the configuration, form and component partssimilar to
those being manufactured by UNITED FOUNDRY.Petitioner presented two (2) other witnesses,namely, her
husband Ong Bun Tua and Fidel Francisco.Private respondent, on the other hand, presentedonly one
witness, Rolando Madolaria, who testified, amongothers, that he was the General Supervisor of the
UNITEDFOUNDRY.Director of Patents Cesar C. Sandiego denied thepetition for cancellation and holding
that the evidence of petitioner was not able to establish convincingly that thepatented utility model of
private respondent wasanticipated.Petitioner elevated the decision of the Director of Patents to the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the decisionof the Director of Patents. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:Whether the dismissal is proper where the patentapplied for has no substantial difference between
the modelto be patented and those sold by petitioner.
HELD: The element of novelty is an essential requisite of thepatentability of an invention or discovery. If a
device orprocess has been known or used by others prior to itsinvention or discovery by the applicant, an
application for apatent therefor should be denied; and if the application hasbeen granted, the court, in a
judicial proceeding in whichthe validity of the patent is drawn in question, will hold itvoid and ineffective. It
has been repeatedly held that aninvention must possess the essential elements of novelty,originality and
precedence, and for the patentee to beentitled to the protection the invention must be new to
theworld.However, The validity of the patent issued by thePhilippine Patent Office in favor of private
respondent andthe question over the inventiveness, novelty and usefulnessof the improved model of the
LPG burner are matters whichare better determined by the Patent Office. The technicalstaff of the
Philippine Patent Office composed of experts intheir field has by the issuance of the patent in
questionaccepted private respondents model of gas burner as adiscovery. There is a presumption that the
Office hascorrectly determined the patentability of the model
and suchaction must not be interfered with in the absence of competent evidence to the contrary. The rule
is settled that the findings of fact of theDirector of Patents, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported bysubstantial evidence. Petitioner has failed to
showcompelling grounds for a reversal of the findings andconclusions of the Patent Office and the Court of
Appeals.Petition DISMISSED.
FELICIANO A. CASTRO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUGENIA SORIANO DE
GOMEZ, SOCORRO A. CASTRO and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO VENTENILLA,
JUSTO V. SISON, SUSANA V. SISON, JOSE V. SISON, SOCORRO V. SISON DE VERA, ELIAS
VENTENILLA, MARIA VENTENILLA, JUAN VENTENILLA, NIEVA VENTENILLA, GUADALUPE
VENTENILLA, VICENTE VENTENILLA, ROSARIO VENTENILLA, MANUEL SORIANO, JOSE
SORIANO, JR., CESAR SORIANO, OLIVA SORIANO, SOLEDAD SORIANO, CARMEN
SORIANO, ANGELES SORIANO, BENJAMIN S. VlLORIA and PAZ S. VILORIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-20122 April 28, 1969
Before us for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 25234-R, dismissing the appeal
from and in effect affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Registration Case
No. 805, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1176.
The original application for registration and confirmation of title was filed by Alejandra Austria on June 6,
1948, covering 10 parcels of land situated in the barrios of Punglo Grande and Caviernesan, as well as in
the poblacion of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. Socorro A. Castro submitted an opposition, alleging that the
lands applied for had been donated to her by the applicant in 1939. On March 2, 1950 the Court rendered
judgment finding that Alejandra Austria had been in possession of the lands in concept of owner since
1894, and consequently, by virtue of the donation, ordered the registration thereof in the name of the
donee, Socorro A. Castro, subject only to the usufruct reserved by the donor in herself for the rest of her
lifetime.
Alejandra Austria was the widow of the deceased Antonio Ventenilla. On March 31, 1950 a number of
persons, claiming to be his heirs 2 (nephews and nieces) appeared and filed a petition to set aside the
decision and the order of general default previously entered, and to have their opposition to the application
admitted. Their petition was granted and the case was set for trial anew. Meanwhile, Alejandra Austria died
and Socorro A. Castro was substituted in her place.
The averment of the oppositors was that the lands applied for were owned by Antonio Ventenilla; that when
he died he left a will bequeathing them in usufruct to his wife Alejandra; and that upon her death they
passed to the said oppositors as his heirs.
The trial court, in its decision rendered on April 4, 1959, rejected both the claims of Socorro A. Castro and
of the oppositors without deciding the question of title for purposes of registration. From that decision only
Socorro A. Castro appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellees did not even file a brief. On July 19,
1962 the appellate court rendered its decision dismissing the appeal, and the case was thereafter elevated
to us on petition for review.
The ten parcels of land applied for may be classified into two groups. Parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10, by
agreement of the parties at the trial, "passed into the possession of Alejandra Austria after the death of
Antonio Ventenilla 3 by virtue of the will left by the deceased Antonio Ventenilla and probated in Special
Proceeding No. 237." With respect to the six other parcels (Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) the parties reached no
agreement. The oppositors contended that they belonged to the said deceased, while the petitioner insists
that Alejandra Austria acquired them by purchase.
The issue in regard to parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10 is whether Alejandra Austria was a mere life
usufructuary thereof, the naked ownership being in the oppositors, as collateral heirs of Antonio Ventenilla,
or was the owner in fee simple, as residuary legatee under his will. The Court of Appeals did not make any
categorical finding one way or the other on this issue, and disposed of it with this equivocal observation:
"But, to say that a parcel of land passed into the possession of a person does not necessarily mean that
said parcel of land formed part of the residuary legacy of said person, for it may mean that said person had
usufructuary right over said parcel of land."
The question, it appears, has already been passed upon by this Court in a previous case. A brief reference
to antecedent facts is necessary, as they are set forth in its decision in G.R. No. 10018, Austria v. Heirs of
Antonio Ventenilla, September 19, 1956. It is there stated that the will of this deceased was admitted to
probate in 1909, in Special Proceeding No. 237 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The widow,
Alejandra Austria was appointed administratrix of the estate. In 1910 the collateral heirs, now oppositors,
filed a petition for the annulment of the will, which petition was denied by the Court below. In the order of
denial, dated October 5, 1910, it was declared: "que heredera Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al
remanente de todos los bienes dejados por el finado, despues so deducir de ellos la pension que
corresponde a cada una de sus coherederos ..." That order was affirmed by this Court on appeal on
January 11, 1912, G.R. No. 6620, 21 Phil. 180.
The next incident took place thirty-eight years later when, on April 22, 1950 herein oppositors filed a motion
in the same testate proceeding claiming, among other things, that Alejandra Austria was merely the life
usufructuary of the estate of the deceased, the naked ownership belonging to the movants; that she was
no longer able to administer the properties; and that she had been disposing of them in violation of her
trust; and praying that said Alejandra Austria be removed as administratrix and another appointed in her
place. The trial Court denied the motion and ruled that the estate case had long since been closed. On
appeal to this Court the order was affirmed (G.R. No. 10018 supra). The decision, penned by Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, ruled as follows on the issue that is pertinent to the case now before us:
We find no merit in the appeal. We agree with the lower Court that the proceedings for the settlement of
the testate estate of the deceased Antonio Ventenilla had long been terminated and closed, and that the
issues now raised by appellants had been settled and decided by the court's order of October 5, 1910,
approving the final accounts of the administratrix Alejandra Austria declaring said administratrix the
residuary legatee of all the movable and immovable properties of the estate after the payment of the
shares of the oilier heirs (sister and nephews and nieces of the deceased) in the proportion of P17.52 per
stripes, conditioned upon their putting up of the bond required by law (Sec. 754, Act 190).
.... Appellants also insist that appellee Alejandra Austria is not the residuary legatee of the estate of Antonio
Ventenilla but only its life usufructuary. This stand has long been proven false and untenable when the
Supreme Court found unmeritorious the appeal of appellants' predecessors from that portion of the Lower
Courts order of October 5, 1910 denying their petition to annul the will of Antonio Ventenilla and declaring
appellee entitled to all the remaining properties of the state. That appellee Alejandra Austria was the
residuary legatee of the estate of the deceased is, therefore, res adjudicata and can no longer be
relitigated by appellants after thirty-eight years. And as appellee had been in the possession and
enjoyment of said properties all these years in the concept of owner, being the residuary legatee thereof,
there is no reason nor justification for the reopening of these proceedings, the appointment of a new
administrator, and the reconstitution of the last will and testament of the deceased Antonio Ventenilla.
The foregoing, considered together with the agreement of the parties at the trial of this case that the four
parcels (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10) passed into the possession of Alejandra Austria by virtue of the will of the
deceased Antonio Ventenilla, as well as with the testimonial evidence concerning Alejandra's continuous
possession as owner thereafter, is sufficient proof of title for purposes of registration.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals side stepped the issue of ownership concerning the six other
parcels (Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). The documentary evidence for the appellant is that these six parcels
were acquired by Alejandra Austria through purchase: Nos. 6 and 7 on January 20, 1912 (Exh. M); Nos. 5
and 8 on February 21, 1911 (Exh. N); No. 4 by virtue of the deed of sale Exh. P; and No. 9 by virtue of the
deeds of sale Exh. 0, dated January 18, 1920; Exh. 0-1, dated May 3, 1924; Exh. 0-2 dated March 6, 1917;
Exh. 0-3, dated Feb. 3, 1917; Exh. 0-4, dated July 13, 1913; Exh. 0-5, dated April 16, 1911; and Exh. 0-6,
dated Nov. 16, 1928. The testimonial evidence confirms the long possession of those, parcels by Alejandra
Austria, and after her death by Socorro A. Castro. The receipts showing the corresponding tax payments
have been submitted and form part of the record.
The contention of the oppositors below is that these parcels also belonged to the deceased Antonio
Ventenilla. Even assuming this to be so, they would have passed to widow, Alejandra Austria, as the
residuary heir under his will; and as stated by this Court in Case G.R. No. L-10018, supra, "she had been
in possession and on payment of said properties all these years in concept of owner, being the residuary
legatee thereof." In any event whether, as purchaser or as residuary legatee, such possession in concept
of owner constituted sufficient registrable title.
The next issue relates to the donation of all the ten parcels, executed by Alejandra Austria in favor of
Socorro A. Castro. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling that said donation was mortis causa
and consequently void because it did not follow the formalities required of a will, pursuant to Article 620 of
the old Civil Code, 4 the law in force when the donation was made on September 22, 1939.
Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the disposition made. "Did
the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property donated upon the execution of the donation ? If
this is so, as reflected from the provisions contained: in the donation, then it is inter vivos; otherwise, it is
merely mortis causa, or made to take effect after death." 5 Sometimes the nature of the donation becomes
controversial when the donee's enjoyment of the property donated is postponed until after the donor's
death. Manresa comments on this situation as follows:6
When the time fixed for the commencement of the enjoyment of the property donated be at the death of
the donor, or when the suspensive condition is related to his death, confusion might arise. To avoid it we
must distinguish between the actual donation and the execution thereof. That the donation is to have effect
during the lifetime of the donor or at his death does not mean the delivery of the property must be made
during his life or after his death. From the moment that the donor disposes freely of his property and such
disposal is accepted by the donee, the donation exists, perfectly and irrevocably (articles 618 and 623).
Until the day arrives or until the condition is fulfilled, the donation, although valid when made, cannot be
realized. Thus, he who makes the donation effective upon a certain date, even though to take place at his
death, disposes of that which he donated and he cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the
said property in favor of another.lawphi1.nt
The donation at issue in the present case opens with the following disposition:
QUE YO ALEJANDRA AUSTRIA, la primera parte, en consideracion a los meritorios servicios y buenas
atenciones que me haya prestado desde su nina y de los que todavia me esta prestando y seguira
prestandome hasta mi muerte la senorita SOCORRO A. CASTRO, hija Iegitima de mi primo de Segundo
grado, Sergio Castro, hago constar por la presente que expontaneamente y sin influencia de nadie cedo y
traspaso en concepto de DONATION ONEROSA e intervivos a la mencionada senorita SOCORRO A.
CASTRO, en compensacion a sus ya expresados SERVICIOS, los bienes que a continuacion se
describen a saber.
After enumerating the properties donated, the deed of donation recites further:
Tambien hago constar que es nuestro convenio con la citada Donataria que esta Donacion se ha hecho
con las condiciones siguientes, a saber:
(a) Que durante el tiempo en que todavia viviere, la donataria Socorro A. Castro, no tendra ninguna
intervencion ni derecho sobre los productos de los terrenos cedidos en concepts de donacion a su favor;
(b) A mi fallecimiento la donataria pagara todos los gastos que se incurriesen por me intierro de acuerdo
con mi posicion social; y
(c) Despues de mi fallecimiento la nuda propiedad y el derecho de Usufructo de todos los citados bienes
arriba descritos, se consolidaran inmediatamente a favor de la Donataria Socorro A. Castro con la
obligacion de destination anualmente cierta cantidad justa y suficiente de los productos de los terrenos
aqui donados sitos en el barrio Caviernesan para el Sufragio de mi alma y el de mi finado esposo Dn.
Antonio Ventenilla.
It is quite clear from the terms of the donation that the donor intended to and did dispose of her properties
irrevocably in favor of the donee, subject only to the conditions therein expressed, one of which was that
the latter would have no right to the products during the donor's lifetime. This merely indicates a
reservation in herself of the usufruct over said properties, which usufruct would be consolidated with the
naked ownership of the donee upon the former's death. The use of the words "se consolidaran" implied
transfer of the naked ownership, with which the beneficial title would be consolidated upon arrival of the
term thus fixed. In the case of Concepcion vs. Concepcion, August 25, 1952, 91 Phil. 823, this Court,
construing a deed captioned as a donation mortis causa, held:
It is not sufficient to make a donation one mortis causa, requiring execution of the instrument of gift in the
form and manner required for a will, that the instrument of donation states that it is mortis causa, if it can
be gathered from the body of the instrument that the main consideration is not death of the donor but
rather services rendered to him by the donee, or his affection for the latter, and title is transferred
immediately to the donee, even though the gift is conditioned to take effect after death of the donor insofar
as possession and enjoyment of the property is concerned.
By virtue of the donation executed by the original owner and applicant in favor of Socorro A. Castro the
latter succeeded to the properties applied for, and hence registration in the name of her Intestate Estate,
represented in this case by the petitioner as administrator, is in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the lands described in the original application
for registration are ordered registered as indicated above, pursuant to the provisions of the Land
Registration Act. No costs.
FRANCISCO LLENADO y ANA V. DE LLENADO, recurrentes, vs. MARIA HILVANO, recurrida.
G.R. No. L-3280 August 30, 1950
This is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The proven, according to the court,
facts are:
The urban farm, a third of which Maria calls to your domain if full, the deceased today petenecia Gelera P.
Buenaventura, owner written under the Torrens system. As Maria and sister this, call Dolores sewed take
care of mother and sister. P. Ventura, (By this name was commonly known. Gelera P. Buenaventura, and
the same so signed his private correspondence), in 1933 the ceded such third party as compensation and
payment for services rendered by them, Exhs. C and C-1. To formalize this assignment somehow P.
Ventura awarded in favor of Maria's Exh. A written in Visayan, whose translation into English says:
"Cession OF DOCUMENT OF LAND
"I, Br Gelera Buenaventura, of age and resident of Quiot, Merida, Leyte, declare AS FOLLOWS:
"That the land on Which the house of Maria sewed is standing, in Tacloban, Leyte, at MH del Pilar Street,
starting from the cacao tree to the front side, I have Given it to her beginning This Day In Which I make
este documento and not one of my brothers will disturb it as being heir to said land.
"I Have Given This Land in consideration of her services rendered to my mother and my sister Cristeta
Gelera.
"Said Maria sewed Knew about this cession made to her and in truth she is grateful to me, and info we
have signed este documento in the Presence of witness, This date 21st of November, 1938, Tacloban,
Leyte.
(Sgd.) "PB Gelera
(Sgd.) "MARIA sewed."
After the death of the mother of P. Ventura, Maria administer the goods of this in Tacloban, Leyte, and how
she found some difficulty with the brothers of that, I received the letters Exhs. F and G, where in the first
dated July 16, 1938, Father Ventura admonished for their carelessness and tolerance to his brothers what
they did, and the second from July 28, 1939, says :
"Mana Via, I will repeat to you saying that you 'are my administratix of all my belongings in Tacloban. Look
after them since it is to you Whom I will leave them in case I am called by God at last. Feat my brothers Do
not . because i will answer for you on anything Even to come up the house, Should they 'force to ever do it,
accuse them If you see even Their shadows, drive them away,. do not let them step on the lot Because
They are harmful people. I rely on you, Mana. "
Maria and her sister Dolores live in that third party claims that the estate of P. Ventura in a home that
acquired by exchange in 1933 Ulrica de Luna. . ..
Until the death of Father Ventura, which occurred in 1945, Maria has been in possession of such third
party as the owner and the rest of the plot as administrator, without interruption and in a peaceful manner,
and the defendants, the filling handcuff, were his tenants within this third party and paid for the land that
his house occupied the monthly rent of P4.000, Exhs. B, E, E-1 and E-2; but, according filling, I stop
paying those rents because
"A. Then, When Exequiel Gelera and came Told me I was the owner, then it was to him That I Have Been
paying the rentals." (Tnt, p. 30)
Exequiel Gelera is one of the brothers of P. Ventura, and one of the brothers who in their Exhs this
incriminating letters. F and G. Exequiel Gelera and nephews and Agustin Alejandro Gelera on July 19,
1946 sold half of that farm that belonged to P. Ventura, precisely half comprises the third part ceded as
payment and rewards Maria, for Filling of spouses Francisco and Ana Vieto (Anacleta Vieto), granting
favor of these the Exh. 2, in which not only asked to vacate such third party Maria but pay them rent for the
land occupied by the house that she has.
It is transcribed sewed Maria had been serving the mother and sister of Father Ventura, and the same after
the death of his mother, and continued serving him, as administrator of his estate until his death in 1945 is
evident Maria sewed field obtained as payment for services rendered to the mother and sister of the priest,
and services they pay the same donor to the death of this. The donation, therefore, has not been done
only for services but also for those who continuously provide forward until the donor's death.
One could argue that the document Exhibit A donation makes no mention of the services provided to the
donor by the donee. However, if the evidence shows that she has been serving the same donor before and
after the donation, why we have to close your eyes to reality?
In his letter to Maria July 16, 1938, Father Ventura said:
You say that you 'do not not stop them from taking any more things there, Mana Via, this is now a great
mistake of yours since someone is taking care of the house and there is one person responsible to Whom I
have Entrusted Those Things. Obtaining This condition is now much the same as if there is no one living in
the house and anybody can pick things without hindrance Because no one is watching.
Via Mana, the prosecutor said that you 'are the person responsible for all the things Existing until I have
eaten there for them; so, without fear, even if they come to take the devil, Oppose them. . .. Needless to
say, I will not go to another house to look for them since I did not entrust them to any other person but you.
xxx xxx xxx
I repeat that you 'do send a telegram to hand Siquiel (Exequiel Gelera) to return my valise With its
contents without missing anything, Because there May be some documents therein, and then our
relationship as brothers will be sorely Affected. . . . If he is a respectful brother have written to I Should
Have and Should Have Asked me to give him my valise, and I gave shouldnt removed and carried away
anything Belonging to me without my permission. (Exhibit F-1.)
In his letter of November 29, 1938, eight days after the donation granted, said:
About Those Things in the house, keep them. . .. I have nobody to give them to you but. With respect to
my brothers, they 'are only good where there is something for inheritance for they' are ready, but no one
cares at times of distress. At the time my mother and sister no one offered Preferred care needed a hand.
xxx xxx xxx
In closing I will This repeat: do not let any of my brothers touch my things in Tacloban. (Exh. C-1.)
In his letter of June 28, 1939, said:
I will repeat to you saying that you 'are my administratrix of all my belongings in Tacloban. Look after
them.. . . . (Exh. G-1.)
If I wanted to reward the services rendered to his mother and sister, it was natural to reward the services
also decided that henceforth he would lend, the more so since his brother was robbing him of his property.
It is clear that in consideration of the services expected to receive it as an administrator and already
rendered by him, his mother and sister, Father Ventura dono said Mary sewed ground.
We can not disregard the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Force is to declare, according to them,
that the donation has been made with cause, which is not simple remunerative donation. "Donations to
onerous cause shall be governed by the rules of contracts and remunerative by the provisions of this title
in the part exceeding the value of a levy." (Art. 622, Civil Code.) Article 1278 of the same Code provides
that "A contract will be required, regardless of the form in which they are held, provided that they attend the
essential conditions for its validity."
Interpreting this article, the Supreme Court of Spain stated that "contracts are required, whatever the form
in which they are held, the concurrence of the essential conditions for its validity on them, according
categorically mandated by Article 1278 of the Civil Code; following from this principle, and not the validity
of the extrinsic forms required by law for purposes other than the effectiveness depends only contract
between the parties, which therefore can be enforced reciprocally agreed obligations , which confirms that
Article 1279 does not make the effectiveness of the contract to the granting of a public deed, in cases
required by law. " (Manalo against De Mesa, 29 Jur. fil., 523, 529)
In Sison against Ramos (13 Phil. Rep., 56), the Court said that "Article 1280 of the Code does not require
the scope to prove the rule, stating in writing published because, under Article 2178 of with same code, all
contracts, when meet the conditions of validity that expresses the 1261 produce full effect between the
parties, without prejudice to their right to request and obtain public write soar under Article 1279, may not
serve the lack of this requirement to any of those and at least one third to deny the existence and reality of
the contract, when justified by test elements adminisbles right. "
Hence the Court of Appeals, applying the decision in the case of Manalo against De Mesa, supra , I
confirm that of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. In that case it was stated that a donation with onerous
cause is the nature and conditions of a contract and is subject to the rules of contracts and "The provisions
of the Civil Code governing the form of contracts generally do not require that It stipulated between the
parties it was recorded in a public deed, since it is valid and effective and produces all its consequences
under the law the contract verbally and with greater reason held forth in a private document, since Article
1225 of the same code attributed to private document duly authenticated the same value as a public
document among those who had subscribed and their successors . "
The Filling husbands, who have a house on the land, paid to Maria sewed, since 1933, a monthly rental of
P4.This is recognition of your domain for twelve years, and only stopped when Exequiel pay Maria Gelera
made them believe that it was the landowner for having inherited the Father Ventura. This pretended
inheritance is unfounded. Father Ventura and ceased to be owner of the land from that in 1933 Maria
ceded As proof of this domain Filling charged rent for the husbands. Maria when they had acquired in
donation inter vivos , and possessing continuously for more than twelve years in living donor Father
Ventura, this could not, at death, pass by inheritance to his brother and nephews that said land was not
owned.
The military action that Maria was to go to the court authorized by Article 1279 of the Civil Code: granting
his request for a registrable deed according to the Land Registry Act.
Uphold the original ruling, with costs against recurretes.
MACARIA CASTILLO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellee vs. URBANO CASTILLO and MARIA QUIZON,
defendants-appellants. G.R. No. 7050 November 5, 1912
The subject of this suit is a parcel of agricultural land, situated in the barrio of Galamayano, municipality of
San Jose, Province of Batangas, of an area such as is usually required for sowing thirty gantas of seed-
rice, and described and identified by boundaries. It is taken for granted that this land belonged to Simona
Madlangbayan, who died seven years ago. At the present time it is in the exclusive possession of one of
the latter's children, Urbano Castillo, while there are other descendants of hers who have the same right to
wit: A daughter and some grandchildren of the deceased brother of full blood of Urbano Castillo, named
Pio Castillo; the daughter of a sister of full blood of the same defendant, named Alfonsa, likewise
deceased; and a daughter of a half-brother of the said Urbano Castillo, named Estefano Libingting, also
deceased. The descendants of these three family branches claim to be entitled to share with Urbano
Castillo the ownership of the land in question, as being the only property Simona Madlangbayan had left at
her death. Hence, the demand for a division, daughter figures as a defendant therein merely by default.
The defendant Urbano Castillo, a s the sole possessor of the land, endeavored to prove that his mother,
Simona Madlangbayan, had other property which during her lifetime she disposed of to the benefit of some
of the plaintiffs; but the lower court held that this allegation had not been proven, and such conclusion must
be affirmed as it is well-founded and in no wise erroneous.
In the judgment rendered the claim made by the plaintiff was recognized to be valid and the property of the
joint-ownership was ordered to be divided into four parts: One, for Macaria Castillo and her nephews and
nieces, Juan, Clemente, Pedro Lope, Tomasa, and Maria, all surnamed Cadano; another, for Juliana
Libingting; another, for Maria Quizon; and the fourth, for the defendant Urbano Castillo.
The latter entered an exception to this judgment, moved for a rehearing, excepted to the ruling denying the
same, and filed a bill of exceptions, which, however, was held on file until conclusion of the trial and during
the progress of the proceedings had for the division, award of shares and liquidation of fruits, which
operates were all effected through commissioners and as a result thereof the court ordered: (1) That each
coparcener be delivered the part of the property shown on the rough sketch made by the commissioners,
to belong to him or her; (2) that Urbano Castillo pay to each coparcener, as reimbursement of fruits,
P78.18; and (3) that the expense of partition be borne pro rata by all the interested parties.
When, after all this procedure, the case was brought before us on appeal, through the proper bill of
exceptions, the judgment was not impugned on account of the form of division therein ordered, but merely
because of the following assignments of error: .
1. Because the personality of the plaintiffs was recognized, and the amendment of the answer, impugning
such personality, was disallowed.
2. Because the instrument of gift was held to be false, and the gift null and void.

3. Because an indemnity for the fruits was awarded.
With respect to the first assignment of error, it is not a principle authorized by law that heirs of legal age
may not demand the division of a real property, left them by their predecessor-in-interest and held by a
coheir, without first initiating special intestate proceedings during which a judicial administrator is to be
appointed, who alone is vested with the personality to claim the property that belongs to the succession.
On the contrary, such heirs are expressly authorized to do so, unless for the reason of there being unpaid
debts, judicial intervention becomes necessary, which was not alleged as a special defense in this suit.
As much for the preceding reasons as because there was not included in the bill of exceptions the
question relative to the opportune or inopportune motion presented for an amendment of the answer to the
complaint, and which was denied by the lower court, such assignment of error, alleged in this instance, can
neither be considered nor decided.
With reference to the second alleged error, the document declared in the judgment appealed from to be
false, null and void, is one of gift which the appellant avers was executed in his behalf by his predecessor-
in-interest. The finding of falsity, contained in the judgment of the lower court and based on various facts
discussed by him on detail, can not be brought up in this appeal except as a question of fact, with regard to
which no new matter may be introduced inasmuch as no error of fact was alleged to have been committed
in weighing the evidence; and the cogent presumption of law, which can not easily be destroyed except by
strong contrary evidence the only reason advanced by the appellant reenforces the old public
instruments executed in conformity with the Notarial Law, (now repealed) before a notary public, by reason
of their insertion in the protocol or notarial registry and the personal attestation made by that official of the
proceedings and the contents of the instrument characteristic features not enjoyed by a private
instrument which, executed on one date, like the one in question (January 20, 1902), appears to have
been ratified on another (November 15, 1905), before a notary, but with no further authorization on the part
of this official other than such act of affirmation.
And even though the said instrument were not false, the trial court declared it to be void and ineffective.
The alleged gift was in fact null and void, according to the provisions of articles 629 and 633 of the Civil
Code, as its acceptance by the donee was in no manner expressed in the instrument, nor was the
pretended gift consummated pursuant to the provision contained in article 623 of the same code.
The appellant argues that the acceptance in writing of the gift in question, was not necessary, as it was
made for a valuable consideration, and should be subject to the legal provisions governing contracts. If this
alleged gift was really made, it was one of those mentioned in article 619 of the aforecited code, as being
gift "which imposes upon the donee a burden inferior to the value of the gift," for Simona Madlangbayan
apparently stated in the said instrument that she delivered the land to Urbano Castillo in order that he
defray the expenses of her subsistence and burial, "and if perchance anything should remain from the
price of the land, the surplus of the said expenses (?) is granted to him by me." A gift this kind is not in fact
a gift for valuable consideration, but it remuneratory or compensatory, made for the purpose of
remunerating or compensating a charge, burden or condition imposed upon the donee, inferior to the value
of the gift which, therefore, may very properly to be termed to be conditional, and article 622, invoked by
the appellant himself, very clearly prescribes that "gifts for valuable consideration shall be governed by the
provisions of this title with regard to the part exceeding the value of the charge imposed," to say nothing of
the finding of the trial court that the said instrument was false as shown by the evidence and in accordance
with which the defendant did not fulfill the conditions mentioned, since he did not defray the expenses for
the subsistence and burial of Simona Madlangbayan.
With regard to the third assignment of error, the appellant contends that no reimbursement of fruits should
have been awarded the plaintiffs, as no demand for the same was made in complaint and he was unable
to prepare evidence in the matter. The procedure had after the plaintiffs were found to be entitled to the
right of coownership, was in all respect in accord with the provisions of section 191 of the Code of Civil
Procedure , and so well prepared was the appellant in the second part of the trial, for presentation of
evidence, that he stated himself "I do not even wish to cross-examine" (his brief, p. 10).
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered
De Luna v. Abrigo 181 SCRA 150
FACTS:
De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University Foundation. The
donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain terms and
conditions. In case of violation or non-compliance, the property would automatically revert to the
donor. When the Foundation failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna revived the said
donation by executing a Revival of Donation Intervivos with the following terms and conditions:
1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel, Nursery, and
Kindergarten School to be named after St. Veronica
2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least 70% completed three years from
the date of the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions
3) Automatic reversion in case of violation
The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and annotated in the TCT. By a
Deed of Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area the lot donated while the
remaining area was retained by the De Luna.
The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died after the donation) filed a complaint with
the RTC for the cancellation of the donation on the ground that the terms were violated. The
Foundation defended itself by saying that it had partially and substantially complied with the
conditions and that the donor granted it an indefinite extension of time to complete construction.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription (for being filed after 4 years). The
heirs did not file an MR and went straight to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art. 764 NCC-judicial decree of revocation
of the donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144 enforcement of a written contract)
HELD:
10 years
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed
not by the law on donations but by the rules on contract. On the matter of prescription of actions
for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription apply.
The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which
provides:
Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the
value of the burden imposed.
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation
must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation.
However, said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of
Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. The rules
on prescription and not the rules on donation applies in the case at bar.

ASTERIA BAUTISTA, MAXIMA LOMIBAO, FRANCISCO LOMIBAO, JOSE LOMIBAO, FELISA
LOMIBAO and PAULINA LOMIBAO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. EPIFANIO SABINIANO, in his capacity
as Guardian ad litem of the minors MARCELINA SABINIANO and CANDIDA
SABINIANO, defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-4236 November 18, 1952
This is an appeal from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in civil case No.
10516, holding that the donations made by Alberto G. Bautista in favor of Marcelina and Candida
surnamed Sabiniano and Alfredo de Guzman are invalid for lack of acceptance on the part of said donees
who were minors but valid in favor of Atanacio Lomibao who was of age at the time he accepted the
donation in his favor, ordering the defendants Marcelina Sabiniano, Candida Sabiniano and Alfredo de
Guzman to surrender to the plaintiffs, who are the lawful heirs of the deceased Alfredo G. Bautista, the
parcels of land in their possession by virtue of the deed of conditional donation, without special
pronouncement as to costs. The other two defendants, Epifanio Sabiniano and Leonora Cansino, were
joined, because the first is the father of the minor defendants Marcelina and Candida Sabiniano, who
accepted the donation in their behalf, and the second is the mother of the minor Alfredo de Guzman who
accepted the donation in his behalf. The appeal was filed by Epifanio Sabiniano in behalf of his minor
children Marcelina and Candida Sabiniano. Leonora Cansino did not appeal and the plaintiffs also did not
appeal from that part of the judgment which held valid the donation in favor of Atanacio Lomibao who was
of age at the time he accepted the donation.
The deed of donation reads as follows:
DEED OF CONDITIONAL DONATION
KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS:
That, I, Alberto G. Bautista, of legal age, widower and a resident of the barrio of Buenlag,
Binmaley, Pangasinan, Philippines, for and in consideration of my love and affection, and
services rendered by Marcelina Sabiniano, 18 years old, and Candida Sabiniano, 13 years old,
both single, daughters of Epifanio Sabiniano and Maxima Sabiniano (deceased), said Marcela
Sabiniano and Candida Sabiniano are represented for and in their behalf by their stated father,
Epifanio Sabiniano in this regard, who is also a Filipino, of legal age, married for the second
nuptial to Andrada Sabiniano, all residents of Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan,
Philippines; Atanacio Lomibao, Filipino, of legal age, married to Corazon Decena and a resident
of the same place; and Alfredo de Guzman, Filipino, two and one-half (2 ) years old, single
and a resident of the barrio of Nagpalangan, Binmaley, Pangasinan, Philippines represented for
and in his behalf by his mother Leonora Cansino, wife of Andresde Guzman (deceased) Filipina
of legal age, widow and a resident of the same place, of the ward, with sound mind and without
any influence, force, threat, surprise or intimidation, hereby voluntarily convey, concede, give,
donate and transfer by way of conditional donation in favor of the said above-mentioned donees
the following properties to wit:
1. To Marcelina Sabiniano and Candida Sabiniano, the following properties are donated to them
to be divided by each equally share and share alike:
(Here follows the description of the properties donated to Marcelina Sabiniano and
Candida Sabiniano.)
2. To Atanacio Lomibao, married to Corazon Decena, the following property is donated to him.
(Here follows the description of the property donated to Atanacio Lomibao.)
3. To Alfredo de Guzman, minor and represented by his mother Leonora Cansino, the following
property is donated.
(Here follows the description of the property donated to Alfredo de Guzman).
That I am making this donation in favor of the herein stated donees with the following
conditions:
1. That meantime I am still living, these properties donated are all yet at my disposal as well as
the products therein derived, and whatever properties or property left undisposed of me during
my lifetime will be the ones to be received by the donees if any:
2. That in case of my illness, I have still the perfect right to dispose said properties if necessary
to finance all the expenses to be incurred for my sustenance and medical treatment, and
whatever left, if any, of these properties will be the one to be received by the herein donees;
3. That in case of my unexpected death, the herein donees will execute the disposal or if they
are still minors by their respective representatives or administrators to pay all the debts incurred
by me during my lifetime or illness, if any, and to finance my funeral services or ceremonies in
the Roman Catholic Church decently, and whatever properties or property in my favor will be
the ones to be received by the herein donees.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this 7th day of September, 1948, in Binmaley,
Pangasinan, Philippines.
(Sgd.) ALBERTO G. BAUTISTA
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(Sgd.) Illegible (JUAN GUERRERO)
(Sgd.) MODESTO BAUTISTA
ACCEPTANCE
That we, Epifanio Sabiniano, acting for and in behalf of my daughters Marcelina Sabiniano and
Candida Sabiniano, who are minors, Atanacio Lomibao for and in behalf, and Leonora Cansino
acting for and in behalf on son, Alfredo de Guzman who is minor, do hereby do these presents
accept the donations given by the donor, and hereby further extend our gratitude due to the
generosity of the donor.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we hereto set our hands this 7th day of September, 1948, in
Binmaley, Pangasinan.
(Sgd.) EPIFANIO SABINIANO
(Sgd.) ATANACIO LOMIBAO
(Sgd.) LEONORA CANSINO
(Here follows the acknowledgment before the Notary Public.)
The trial Court found that the donation is conditional and onerous, because the donor "continued to be the
owner of the properties donated in spite of the donation" and "because the donees were made to pay
under their personal responsibility all the debts of the donor incurred by him during his lifetime or illness,
and to finance his funeral services upon his death," and held that it is null and void as to Marcelina and
Candida surnamed Sabiniano and Alfredo de Guzman, who were minors and were not duly represented by
their legal representatives upon the acceptance of the donation.
It is contented that the donation is pure and even if it be onerous or conditional the same is valid because
the acceptance was made by their parents.
The view we take of the terms of the deed entitled "Conditional Donation" under consideration and analysis
renders it unnecessary to dissert on the nature, character and effects of a pure act of generosity or a
simple donation, of remuneratory or compensatory and of conditional or onerous donations a charge,
gravamen or obligation imposed upon the donee less in value than that of the property donated as well
as those with a term or subject to suspensive or resolutory condition there being a clear distinction
between disposition and execution. The conveyance to the donees by way of donation of the properties
described in the deed did not actually take effect on the date of the execution of the deed and of the
acceptance thereof for the reason hereafter to be stated. It is also unnecessary to express opinion on
whether the acceptance made in the deed is lawful and valid, for the reason that the owner reserved
during his lifetime the right to dispose of the properties purportedly donated and to benefit from the
products thereof. Except in the instances expressly provided by law, such as the subsequent birth of
children of the donor, failure by the donee to comply with the conditions imposed, ingratitude of the donee
and reduction of the donation in the event of inofficiousness thereof, a donation is irrevocable. If the donor
reserves the right to revoke it or if he reserves the right to dispose of all the properties purportedly
donated, there is no donation. If the disposition or conveyance or transfer takes effect upon the donor's
death and becomes irrevocable only upon his death, it is not an inter vivos but a mortis causa donation.
The disposition of the properties in favor of the appellants not having been done in accord with the
provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, there was no lawful and valid
transmission thereof to them.
There is no merit in the contention that when the plaintiffs moved for the dismissal of their complaint the
trial court should have dismissed it, because the motion to dismiss was made upon certain technical
grounds which need not be restated and because after answer the dismissal of the complaint lies within
the discretion of the trial court.
Upon the foregoing grounds the judgment appealed from rendered against the appellants Marcelina and
Candida surnamed Sabiniano, represented by Epifanio Sabiniano, their guardian ad litem, is affirmed. No
costs shall be taxed.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION
January 28, 1953
PADILLA, J.:
This case is again before us for motion for reconsideration.
Appellants drew our attention to article 639 of the Civil Code which provides that "The donor may reserve
to himself the right to dispose of some of the property bestowed as a gift or to encumber it with a charge
for the payment of money;" and to article 634 of the same code which provides that "A donation may
include all the present property of the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership, or in
usufruct, an amount sufficient to support him in a manner appropriate to his station;" and contend that the
consideration of the donation was the love and affection and services rendered by the donees, the
appellants, and not the death of the donor, that the right to dispose of the property donated is authorized
by article 639 referred to; and that the right to usufruct which may be reserved pursuant to article 634 is
more extensive than the reservation to receive products of the lands donated.
All the reasons advanced in the motion for reconsideration were considered and taken into account when
the case was decided on the merits.
In the case of Balaqui, et al., vs. Dongso, et al., 53 Phil. 673, invoked by the appellants, this court held that
the donation was inter vivos, despite the fact that the title to the property donated did not pass to the
donee during the donor's lifetime, because of the undertaking made by the latter to answer to the donee,
his heirs and successors for the title to the property donated. In the opinion of this Court the latter clause
annulled the former. And the case decided by the Supreme Court of Spain on January 28, 1898 cited to
support the Court's rule involved or dealt with a donation or dowry of P80,000 reales made in a marriage
settlement, given out of the donor's pure generosity and to recipient's deserts and not in consideration of
death or peril, though the delivery of the amount donated was deferred after the donor's death.
If the donor reserves the right to dispose of all and not some of the property purportedly donated he in
effect reserves the right to revoke it, because if it be held to be a donation and therefore title thereto
passed to the donee, the donor could no longer dispose of it. To enable him to dispose of it he must
reacquire the title to the property by conveyance to him by the donee. If the donor can dispose of it without
need of reacquiring from the donee title thereto because title did not pass to the latter the reservation of
the right to dispose of all the properties donated is in effect a reservation of a right to revoke the purported
donation totally or partially.
Manresa's comment quoted by the appellants in the printed motion does not bolster up their contention, for
it says:
While it reserves the right to dispose of a thing not making the reservation to any condition , it actually
retains title on her . . . donation takes effect during the lifetime of the donor , transmitting at least a right of
usufruct or a revocable domain
In the instant case the donor not only reserved in two paragraphs the dominio sobre ella but the derecho
de usufructo as well.
Alejandro v. Geraldez 78 SCRA 245
DOCTRINE: A transfer mortis causa should be embodied in a last will and testament (Art. 728). It should
not be called donation mortis causa. It is in reality a legacy. If not embodied in a valid will, the donation is
void.
FACTS:
Andrea Diaz sued her brother, Angel Diaz, in the Court of First Instance for the partition of Lot 2502
donated to them by their parents. The Alejandros (compulsory heirs husband and children of sister
Olimpia Diaz) intervened in the said case, claiming one-third of Lot No. 2502 and that the donation of this
lot to Andrea and Angel was a void mortis causa disposition.
The trial court held that the said deed of donation was a donation mortis causa because the ownership of
the properties donated did not pass to the donees during the donors' lifetime but was transmitted to the
donees only "upon the death of the donors". However, it sustained the division of Lot No. 2502 into two
equal parts between Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz on the theory that the said deed of donation was
effective "as an extra-judicial partition among the parents and their children. Consequently, the Alejandro
intervenors were not given any share in Lot No. 2502.
On appeal before the SC, the Alejandro intervenors contend that the said donation is mortis causa; that
they are entitled to a one-third share in Lot No, 2502, and that the trial court erred in characterizing the
deed as a valid partition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Alejandro intervenors should be awarded one-third of Lot No. 2502 square meters thereof, as
intestate heirs of the Diaz spouses.
HELD:
Not entitled. Questioned donation valid.
To resolve that issue, it is necessary to determine whether the deed of donation is inter vivos or mortis
causa.
The Code prescribes different formalities for the two kinds of donations. An inter vivos donation of real
property must be evidenced by a public document and should be accepted by the donee in the same deed
of donation or in a separate instrument. In the latter case, the donor should be notified of the acceptance in
an authentic form and that step should be noted in both instruments. (Art. 749, Civil Code. As to inter vivos
donation of personal property, see art. 748).
On the other hand, a transfer mortis causa should be embodied in a last will and testament (Art. 728,
supra). It should not be called donation mortis causa. It is in reality a legacy (5 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 6th
Ed., p. 107). If not embodied in a valid will, the donation is void (Narag vs. Cecilio, 109 Phil. 299; Aznar vs.
Sucilla 102 Phil. 902; Tuazon vs. Posadas, 54 Phil. 289; Serrano vs. Solomon, 105 Phil. 998, 1002).
From articles 728 to 732, it is evident that it is the time of effectivity (aside from the form) which
distinguishes a donation inter vivos from a donation mortis causa . And the effectivity is determined by the
time when the full or naked ownership (dominum plenum or dominium directum) of the donated properties
is transmitted to the donees. (See Lopez vs. Olbes, 15 Phil. 540; Gonzales and Fuster Fabra vs. Gonzales
Mondragon, 35 Phil. 105). The execution of a public instrument is a mode of delivery or tradition (Ortiz vs.
Court of Appeals, 97 Phil. 46).
The donation in the instant case is inter vivos because it took effect during the lifetime of the donors. It was
already effective during the donors' lifetime, or immediately after the execution of the deed, as shown by
the granting, habendum and warranty clause of the deed.
In that clause it is stated that, in consideration of the affection and esteem of the donors for the donees
and the valuable services rendered by the donees to the donors, the latter, by means of the deed of
donation, wholeheartedly transfer and unconditionally give to the donees the lots mentioned and described
in the early part of the deed, free from any kind of liens and debts. Thus, the habendum and warranty
clause is the donors' declaration that they donate Lot No. 2502, the property in litigation, in equal shares to
their children Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz.
The acceptance clause is another indication that the donation is inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being
in the form of a will, are never accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. Acceptance is a
requirement for donations inter vivos. In the acceptance clause herein, the donees declare that they
accept the donation to their entire satisfaction and, by means of the deed, they acknowledge and give
importance to the generosity and solicitude shown by the donors and sincerely thank them.
In the reddendum or reservation clause of the deed of donation, it is stipulated that the donees would
shoulder the expenses for the illness and the funeral of the donors and that the donees cannot sell to a
third person the donated properties during the donors' lifetime but if the sale is necessary to defray the
expenses and support of the donors, then the sale is valid. The limited right to dispose of the donated lots,
which the deed gives to the donees, implies that ownership had passed to them by means of' the donation
and that, therefore, the donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. That is a characteristic of
a donation inter vivos.
However, paragraph 3 of the reddendum in or reservation clause provides that "also, while we, the
spouses Gabino Diaz and Severa Mendoza, are alive, our administration, right, and ownership of the lots
mentioned earlier as our properties shall continue but, upon our death, the right and ownership of the
donees to each of the properties allocated to each of them shall be fully effective." Evidently, the
draftsman of the deed did not realize the discordant and ambivalent provisions thereof. The habendum
clause indicates the transfer of the ownership over the donated properties to the donees upon the
execution of the deed. But the reddendum clause seems to imply that the ownership was retained by the
donors and would be transferred to the donees only after their death.
We have reflected on the meaning of the said contradictory clauses. All the provisions of the deed, like
those of a statute and testament, should be construed together in order to ascertain the intention of the
parties. Our conclusion is that the reddendum or reservation clause refers to the beneficial ownership
(dominium utile) and not to the naked title and that what the donors reserved to themselves, by means of
that clause, was the management of the donated lots and the fruits thereof. But, notwithstanding that
reservation, the donation, as shown in the habendum clause, was already effective during their lifetime and
was not made in contemplation of their death because the deed transferred to the donees the naked
ownership of the donated properties.
That conclusion is further supported by the fact that in the deed of donation, out of the eight lots owned by
the donors, only five were donated. Three lots, Lots Nos. 4168, 2522 and 2521 were superflously reserved
for the spouses or donors in addition to one- third of Lot No. 2377. If the deed of donation in question was
intended to be a mortis causa disposition, then all the eight lots would have been donated or devised to
the three children and daughter-in-law of the donors.
The trial court's amended decision is reversed insofar as it pronounces that the deed of donation is void.
That donation is declared valid as a donation inter vivos. The disputed lot should be partitioned in
accordance with that deed between Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz.
Puig v. Penaflorida
16 SCRA 136
DOCTRINE: The reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the property during her lifetime in the
deed does not indicate that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime but that the donor merely reserves
power to destroy the donation at any time.
FACTS:
On April 10, 1953, Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon died in the City of Iloilo, without forced heirs, leaving
certain properties in the City and province of Iloilo. She left a will and was survived by nephews and
nieces, children of her predeceased brother, Catalino Ubalde, and sister, Luisa Ubalde, married to Ariston
Magbanua.
It also appears that besides her will, the deceased had executed two notarial deeds of donation. One,
entitled Donacion Mortis Causa, was executed in favor of her niece, Estela Magbanua, married to Mariano
Peaflorida, purporting to convey to the donee the properties covered by TCT Nos. 2338 and 18951 of the
Registry of Deeds of Iloilo. Two, the deceased executed another deed of donation, also entitled "Escritura
de Donacion Mortis Causa" in favor of the same donee, Estela Magbanua Peaflorida, conveying to her
three parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 925, 927 and 11042 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo .
There was a condition in the instrument saying that if at the date of her death the donor had not
transferred, sold, or conveyed one-half of lot 58 of the Pototan Cadastre to other persons or entities, the
donee would be bound to pay to Caridad Ubalde, married to Tomas Pedrola, the amount of P600.00, and
such payment was to be made on the date the donee took possession of Lot No. 58.
ISSUES:
Are the two donations inter vivos or mortis causa? (It being admitted that in the latter event the donations
are void for not being executed with testamentary formalities.)
HELD:
The Court held that the first donation is a valid donation inter vivos while the second one is a donation
mortis causa.
An essential characteristic of dispositions mortis causa is that the conveyance or alienation should be
(expressly or by necessary implication) revocable ad nutum, i.e., at the discretion of the grantor or so-
called "donor," simply because the latter has changed his mind. In consequence, the specification in a
deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos,
rather than a disposition mortis causa
The Court further said that the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to
the effect that the donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor" are not controlling criteria ; such
statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real
intent of the transferor.

In case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order
to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
Tested by the foregoing principles, the donation of November 24, 1948, while somewhat ambiguous,
should be held inter vivos in character. Admittedly, it is designated as "mortis causa," and specifies that it
will take effect upon the death of the donor; but, as previously stated, these expressions are not
controlling, and, in the instance, before us, are contradicted by other provisions indicating a contrary intent.
Thus,
The conveyance of the properties described in the deed appears made in consideration of the
undertaking of the donee, Estela Magbanua, to bear "all expenses for medical treatment, hospital
expenses and/or burial of the Donor," without limiting the time when such expenses are to be incurred. In
fact, the use of the words "y/o entierro" (and/or burial) strongly suggests that the illness and hospitalization
expenditures to be borne by the donee may or may not be connected with the donor's last illness.
Emphasizing the onerous character of the transaction is the requirement that if the donee
should predecease the donor, Governor Peaflorida shall assume the obligations of the donee,
"especialmente" (but not exclusively) "los gastos de ultima enfermedad y entierro de la donante" (par. 4),
and this undertaking was assumed even if the properties donated would not go to Peaflorida but to the
donee's children and descendants (par. 3). It was evidently because of this liability, unconnected with the
conveyance, that Peaflorida had to sign the document together with the donee. It is easy to see that
unless the conveyance were to be effective before the death of donor,, the obligations assumed by the
donee and Governor Peaflorida (her husband) would be without consideration (causa). Such conditions
(consent, subject matter, causa or consideration and observance of the formalities or solemnities required
by law) are all present in the deed of November 24, 1948.
Again, while there is a clause that the donor reserved her right "to mortgage or even sell the
donated property, when and if she should need funds to meet her own needs," this last sentence of the
stipulation appears incompatible with the grantor's freedom to revoke a true conveyance mortis causa, a
faculty that is essentially absolute and discretionary, whether its purpose should be to supply her needs or
to make a profit, or have no other reason than a change of volition on the part of the grantor-testator. If the
late Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon wished or intended to retain the right to change the destination of her
property at her sole will and discretion, there was no reason for her to specify the causes for which she
could sell or encumber the property covered by her bounty.
It is no objection to our view that the donation of November 24, 1948 should provide that it is
not to be recorded until after the donor's death (par. 5), since the absence of registration would affect only
subsequent purchasers, without denying the validity and obligatory effects of the conveyance as between
the parties thereto.
As for the second deed of donation, the text thereof is clear that no proprietary right was intended to pass
to the alleged "donee" prior to the "donor's" death, and that the same was a true conveyance mortis causa,
which by law is invalid because it was not executed with the testamentary formalities required by the
statutes in force at the time. Here, unlike in the previous donation the designation is donation mortis causa
is confirmed by the fact that no signs contradict or limit the unqualified and unrestricted right of the donor to
alienate the conveyed properties in favor of other persons of her choice at any time that she should wish to
do so; it is so expressed in the deed, and it indirectly recognizes the donor's power to nullify the
conveyance to the alleged "donee" whatever the "donor" wished to do so, for any reason or for no
particular reason at all. As we have seen, this faculty is characteristic of conveyances post mortem or
mortis causa: for the right of the transfer or to alienate the "donated" property to someone else necessarily
imports that the conveyance to the "donee" will not become final and definite in favor of the latter until the
death of the "donor" should exclude every possibility that the property maybe alienated to some other
person.
The Insular Life Assurance Company vs Ebrado, 80 SCRA 181
Fact:
On September 1, 1968, Buenaventura Ebrado issued by the Insular Life Assurance Policy No 009929 a
whole-life plan with a rider for Accidental Death. Buenaventura designated Carponia Ebrado as the
revocable beneficiary in his policy. He referred her as his wife.
On October 21, 1969, Buenaventura Ebrad died as a result of an accident when he was hit by a falling
tree. Carponia filed with the insurer a claim for the proceeds of the policy as the designated beneficiary
therein. Although she admits that she and the insured Buenaventura were merely living as husband and
wife without the benefits of marriage. Pascuala de Ebrado, valid wife, also filed her claim as the widow of
the deceased insured.
Issue: Can a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of legally married man
claim the proceeds thereof in case of death of the latter?
Ruling: In essence, a life insurance is no different from a civil donation insofar as the beneficiary is
concerned. Both are founded upon the same consideration: liberality. A beneficiary is like a donee because
from the premiums of the policy which the insured pays out of liberality, the beneficiary will receive the
proceeds or profits of said insurance. As a consequence, the proscription in Article739 of the New Civil
Code should equally operate in life insurance contracts. The mandate of Article 2012 cannot be laid aside:
any person who cannot receive a donation cannot be named a beneficiary in the life insurance policy of
the persons who cannot make the donation.
Note following Articles from the Civil Code:
Article 2011 - "The contract of insurance is governed by special laws. Matters not expressly provided for in
such special laws shall be regulated by this Code."
Article 2012 - "Any person who in forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be
named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the person who cannot be make a donation to him."
Article 739- "The donations shall be void:
1. Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the title
of donation.xx
In the case provided to in No.1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the
donor or donee; and the guilt of the donee may be provided by preponderance of evidence in same
action."
Why was the common law wife not ed to collect the proceeds despite the fact that she was the
beneficiary? Isnt this against Sec. 53?
It is true that SC went against Sec. 53. However, Sec. 53 is NOT the only provision that the SC had to
consider. Art. 739 and 2012 of CC prohibit persons who are guilty of adultery or concubinage from being
beneficiaries of the life insurance policies of the persons with whom they committed adultery or
concubinage. If the SC used only Sec. 53, it would have gone against Art. 739 and 2012
In the Matter of the Trusteeship of Minors Benigno, Angela and Antonio, all surnamed Perez y
Tuason. J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner and appellee, vs. ANTONIO PEREZ, Judicial Guardian
of Angela and ANTONIO PEREZ Y TUASON, oppositor and appellant. G.R. No. L-18872
July 15, 1966
This appeal was originally taken to the Court of Appeals, and subsequently certified to Us for the reason
that it involves a purely legal question. The order appealed from was issued by the Court of First Instance
of Rizal on April 4, 1957 in trusteeship proceeding No. Q-73.
The trust was established pursuant to the will of the late Angela S. Tuason, particularly the clause which
reads as follows:
FOURTH . My unique instituted as heirs to my said three children, at the rate of one-ninth of the estate
who fails to each bequeath to my son Antonio equivalent two -ninths of the estate portion : "And finally
bequeath to my grandchildren as may be sons of my daughter Angela , an equivalent two -ninths of the
estate portion . Such three legates however, are suietos to send qui mentioned in the following paragraph .
Both legacy for my grandchildren mentioned will be administered by my executor , J. Antonio Araneta (and
failing this , his brother Salvador Araneta ) , with broad powers to sell themselves and their product
purchase other goods and entitled to charge for his administration , reasonable fees . powers said will be
the administrator of a trustee with broader powers allowed by law. Shall , however , held quarterly ,
account of his administration to the legatees as may be older and tutors who are minors . And also , should
be served with participation that corresponds to each legatee in net income from the administration . The
administration of a group ceased when all my grandchildren that group should come to his coming of age ,
and a majority of them may agree upon the termination of the administration . For grandchildren must
understand each other not only men but also grandchildren 's grandchildren mujeres.
Appellee J. Antonio Araneta was appointed trustee on March 24, 1950 and he qualified on the following
May 5 when he took his oath of office. The beneficiaries of the trust are Benigno, Angela and Antonio, all
surnamed Perez y Tuason, the last two being represented by appellant Antonio Perez, who is their father
and judicial guardian.
In the order appealed from the lower court approved, upon petition of the trustee, a deed of donation
executed by him on April 30, 1955 in favor of the City of Manila covering a lot pertaining to the trusteeship,
with an area of 853.1 square meters. Such approval was given over the opposition of appellant Antonio
Perez. As found by the lower court, the said lot was being used as a street and had been so used since
prior to its acquisition by the late Angela S. Tuason. The street leads to other lots also pertaining to the
trusteeship with an area of 8,176.6 square meters, and it is through the said street that the tenants
occupying those other lots pass in going to and from their respective houses. On the lot in question the
trustee had been paying a realty tax of P100.00 yearly.
The lower court also found that the lots aforementioned would be converted into a residential subdivision
and that for the purpose the corresponding plan has been prepared; that the lot donated to the City of
Manila appears on the plan to be included among the areas covered by the street lay-outs as required by
law; and that the donation would save the trusteeship the amount of the realty tax and relieve it from the
duty of maintaining the lot in usable condition as a street. There can be no dispute therefore that the
donation was beneficial to the trusteeship, not to say necessary under the law if the planned residential
subdivision is to be realized.
Appellant does not deny the beneficial aspects of the donation. But he maintains that it is invalid on the
ground that under Article 736 of the Civil Code "guardians and trustees cannot donate the properties
entrusted to them". It should be remembered that this article is a new provision of the Civil Code, which
took effect only on August 30, 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) and does not apply retroactively to the
testamentary trust established upon the death of Angela S. Tuason on March 20, 1948, taking into account
Articles 2253 and 2255, which provide against such retroactive operation on acts or events that took place
under former laws. There being nothing in the old Civil Code which prohibits a trustee from donating
properties under trusteeship, and considering that the powers given to herein appellee as trustee are of a
plenary character, subject only to the limitation that they should be permissible under the law; considering
further that when the testatrix conferred such powers she must have had in mind the law that was in force
at the time; and considering finally that after all a trust is created for the benefit of the cestuis que trust and
that in this particular case the acts of the trustee are subject to the supervision of the Court, We see no
reason why the donation in question should not be allowed.
The new Civil Code, in prohibiting a trustee from donating properties entrusted to him does so for the
protection of the trust beneficiaries and evidently contemplates gifts of pure beneficence, that is, those
which are supported by no other cause than the liberality of the donor. But when the donation, as in the
present instance, is clearly in their interest, to say it cannot be done would be contrary to the spirit and
intent of the law.
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
EUFEMIA PAJARILLO, CLAUDIO SUTERIO, JR., NYMIA SUTERIO and MARILYN
SUTERIO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THIRD CIVIL CASES DIVISION,
SALUD SUTERIO and PEDRO MATIAS,respondents. G.R. No. 72908 August 11, 1989
NO CASE PASTED here.. So taas!!
Genato v. Lorenzo
23 SCRA 618
DOCTRINE: The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by done must be simultaneous and the
acceptance by a person other than the true done must be authorized by a proper power of attorney set
forth in a public document
FACTS:
The property under dispute in this case is the 530 shares of stocks of Genato Commercal Corporation,
which has P100 par value, of the deceased Simona B. De Genato (Director and secretary-treasurer of the
said company). The petitioners herein, 2 heirs of Simona, are claiming that they own 530 shares of stocks
of Genato Commercal Corporation because of the donation made by Simona to them.
Respondents (other remaining heirs), however, are trying to recover from the petitioners, their co-heirs, the
said stocks so they can include it in the intestate estate which should later be distributed among all the
surviving children of the decedent.
Four or five days after having Florentino Genato elected and designated as Assitant Secretary-Treasurer
of the Corporation, 265 shares were issued in favour of Florentino Genato and another 265 were issued in
favour of Francisco G. Genato. These were not presented as evidence in the course of the trial; they were
merely mentioned by Florentino Genato in the course of his testimony as a witness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid donation? -- NO
HELD:
There was no valid donation for lack of proper acceptance. Incontestably, one of the two donees was not
present at the delivery, and there is no showing that Francisco Genato had authorized his brother,
Florentino to accept for both of them. The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by done must be
simultaneous and the acceptance by a person other than the true done must be authorized by a proper
power of attorney set forth in a public document. None has been claimed to exist in this case.
Aldaba v. CA
27 SCRA 263
DOCTRINE: A letter showing an intention to donate is not sufficient to prove donation; and most certainly
not the form required by law in donations.
FACTS:
Two lots owned by Belen Aldaba are being disputed in this case.
Belen was a prominent and rich woman. Petitoners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, father and
daughter, lived with Belen Aldaba for 10 years and took care of her until her death. Belen had presumptive
heirs her surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother Cesar Aldaba (represented as the
respondents in this case.) After the death of Belen, the respondents asked the petitioners to leave the
premises and upon their refusal, the former instituted an ejectment case.
The petitioners argue that Belen really intended to donate the property to them as evidence by the note
written by Belen to them which reads;
June 18, 1953
Jane,
Huag kayong umalis diyan. Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo. Alam nila na iyan ay sa inyo.
Belen A. Bautista.
They also argue that the property was for compensation of their services which amounted to P53,000. The
respondents contend that the letter no way proves a donation.
TC ruled that Estanislao Bautitsta is the absolute owner of the property in question. CA affirmed TCs
ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a disposition of property by Belen in favor of the petitioners -- NO
HELD:
For the following reasons: (1) The note was insufficient conveyance, and hence could not be considered
as evidence of a donation with onerous caus. The note can be considered, at most, as indicative of the
intention to donate. (2) no notarial document was executed by Belen to the petitioners during those 10
years. (3) P53,000 worth of services made by the petitioners no way proves the alleged donation. If at all,
the petitioners believed that the gratuitous use of the property was not sufficient to compensate them for
their services, they could have presented their claims in the intestate proceedings, which they themselves
could have initiated, if none was instituted.
The SC emphasized that there was no express agreement between the parties and that respondents Jane
did not even expect to be compensated.
BONIFACIA MATEO vs. GERVACIO LAGUA 29 SCRA 864 October 30, 1969
FACTS:
Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in consideration of his
marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on May 15, 1917 and thereafter the
couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title remained in the donors name.
In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant daughter, who lived
with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on the donated lots. At first, Cipriano
gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots harvests, but in 1926 he refused to deliver to petitioner the said
share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action and won for her possession of the lots plus
damages.
On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his younger son,
herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped giving to
petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondents
name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.
The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered
cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio
and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two lots. While the case was
pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41
years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the
combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that
Cipriano could have freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Ciprianos other
heir, Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to
reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for being
inofficious.
HELD:
Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial courts order of dismissal
sustained.
Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the decedent
must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property
owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to
it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and
only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in
order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the
donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donees share as legitime in the
properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be seen that, with the evidence then before the
court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its
reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.
Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator
shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator
that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.
COLLADO vs. ALONZO
15 SCRA 562
Facts: Juan A. Alonzo and Marcelino G. Collado both ran as candidates for mayor of Ballesteros,
Cagayan for the 12 November 1963 elections. Alonzo won. Collado commenced an action to disqualify
Alonzo on the ground, among others, that the latter had incurred or made excessive expenditures, contrary
to the Election Law, when he promised to donate his salary as mayor of the town for the education of
indigent but deserving students during his campaign speeches.
Issue: Whether Alonzo committed excessive or unlawful expenditures.
Held: Alonzo did not spend, in his election campaign, more than the total emoluments attached to the
office for one year. The promise (or donation) was not an expenditure during the campaign. Though it has
been held previously that Direct promises, or statements made by candidates for election, that they will, if
elected, serve for less than the regularly established salary or fees of the office frequently have been held
to be within the denunciation of not only provisions of corrupt practices, but also constitutional, statutory, or
common-law inhibitions against bribery; the current situation is differentiated. Alonzo did not promise to
waive collection of his salary but intended to collect it. He merely undertook to spend it in such a way as to
help bright and deserving students not necessarily voters whose identity could not be known at the
time of the elections. It may not be said that this or that voter had been influenced by the scholarship offer,
for Alonzo to violate Section 49 of the Election Law (Unlawful expenditures).
Oracion v. Juanillo and Principe (O.G. No. 48676 April 26, 1949)
Facts: Cecilio Juanillo, married to Maria Perolina, was the owner of the land in question of this case since
1924. Francisco Principe lived and grew up with the spouses who had no children. The land was donated
to him in 1923. When Maria Perolina died, Cecilio married Barbara Juanillo and Pacita Juanillo was born
into the marriage.
Leon Oracion, Creditor of Cecilio, was able to obtain judgment from the Justic of Peace Court of Cavinti
ordering the latter to deliver four cows and their calves or to pay P300 and by virtue of a writ of execution
issues the previous day, the sheriff attached the land and announced it for auction on Feb 19, 1936.
Oracion gave Principe the right to repurchase the property in one year but the latter failed to repurchase it
on the same year and so a final deed of sale was executed by the sheriff in favor of Oracion. Oracion
secured a writ of possession of the land but Principe refused to deliver it on the strength of the deed of
donation and on his contention that the indebtedness to Oracion had already been paid.
Pacito Juanilla contended, with her birth, the donation in favor of Principe was ipso facto revoked and upon
her fathers death in 1938, she inherited the property.
Principe contented that the land was conjugal property of Cecilio and his first wife, Maria, that the donation
was only partly revoked by reason of the birth of Pacita, that the donation was not revoked as to the one-
half of the property which belonged to the first wife.
Issue: WON there was revocation of the donation of the land upon the birth of the child?
Held: Revocation and return of the property to donor are not self-operative and self-executory. In virtue of
the birth of Pacita, the donation was revoked pursuant to article 644 of the Civil Code, and the property is
to be reverted to the donor, according to article 645 of the same code, but both the revocation and the
return of the property to the donor or his heir are not self-operative or self-executory and if the done
refuses to part of the property, resort to judicial action should be taken under Art. 646 of the Civil Code,
which provided further, that the action cannot be renounced and shall be transmitted on the death of the
donor to his children and to their legitimate descendants.
WON Pacitas intervention effected as revocation of the donation?
Held: Yes, Pacitas appearance in this case as intervenor claiming the property, served the purposes of an
action for revocation provided for by Art. 646 of the Civil Code. The intervention was filed withi the five
years provided by the Civil Code as she was not yet 5 years old when her mother represented her in the
intervention.-MJA
PACITA ORTIZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ANDRES BASADA,
respondents. G.R. No. L-7307
Pacita Ortiz and Cresencia Ortiz pray for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R.
No. 7691-R, dismissing their complaint against Andres Basada for recovery of a parcel of land in Lapinig,
Samar, described as follows:
Terreno cocalero ubicado en el municipio de Lapinig, Samar, lindante al Norte Basilio Piangdon, ahora
Pedro Mojica; al Este Eugenio Montibon, ahora solar de la escuela; al sur Colina; y al Oeste
Octavia Anacta, ahora Donata Abique, con un areade 3,200 m.c., poco mas o menos a avaluado en
P100.00 bajo el Tax No. 4649. (Dec. CA. p. 1).
As determined by the Court of Appeals, the parcel of land in question belonged originally to the spouses
Bonifacio Yupo and Vicenta de Guerra. On April 19, 1940, the owners donated the lot (among others) to
their grandchildren, petitioners Ortiz, by public document acknowledged before Notary Public Liberato
Cinco, and couched in the following terms:
DEED OF DONATION
LET IT BE KNOWN BY ANYBODY WHO MIGHT SEE THIS:
That, we, BONIFACIO YUPO AND VICENTA DE GUERRA, Married to each other, both of age, residing at
barrio Lapinig, Palapag, Samar, Philippines and CRESENCIA ORTIZ-PINANGAY, ALEJANDRO ORTIZ
and PACITA ORTIZ, also of age all of them, the first one residing at the same place and the two others at
the barrio of Potong, Palapag, Samar, have agreed on the following:
THAT BONIFACIO YUPO and VICENTA DE GUERRA, for and in consideration of the liberality and love to
their grandchildren, CRESENCIA ORTIZ-PINANGAY, ALEJANDRO ORTIZ and PACITA ORTIZ, announce
to everybody that that at their free will give and donate to CRECENCIA ORTIZ-PINANGAY, ALEJANDRO
ORTIZ and PACITA ORTIZ three (3) parcels of land which are as follows:
Tax No. 19738, Awang, Lapinig, Palapag, Samar, bounded in the North Jacoba Enage; East Jacoba
Enage and Swamp, South Awang Stream; and on the West Fermin Espinisin, Teresa Cesesta and
Francisco Donceras.
Tax No. 4649, Lapinig, Palapag, Samar; bounded in the North Basilio Piangdon; on East Eugenio
Montibon; and the South Colina; and the West Octavio Anacta.
Tax No. 12144, Potong, Palapag, Samar, bounded on the North Bo. de Potong; on the East Playa
Mar; South Juan Sidro; on the West Juan Sidro.
We trust that the donees would divide the lands donated to them by themselves.
That CRESENCIA ORTIZ-PINANGAY, ALEJANDRO ORTIZ and PACITA ORTIZ, hereby accept this
donation intervivos of the abovementioned three (3) parcels of land and that they hereby manifest their
gratefulness to the sympathy, love and liberality and benevolence of BONIFICIO YUPO and VICENTE DE
GUERRA.
In truth hereof, we have placed our names below this 19th day of April, 1940 at Palapag, Samar.
(SGD.) CRESENCIA ORTIZ-PINANGAY
(SGD.) ALEJANDRO ORTIZ (FDO.) BONIFACIO YUPO
(SGD.) PACITA ORTIZ (FDO.) VICENTA DE GUERRA
Signed in the presence of:
Signature illegible
Signature illegible
ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY NOTARY PUBLIC LIBERATO B. CINCO.
(Exhibit D-2, trans. of Exh. D) (Dec. CA. pp. 2-3).
The donors were duly notified of donee's acceptance. Alejandro Ortiz died without issue in Capas, Tarlac,
as a prisoner of war, during the last occupation by the Japanese.
It appears further that on August 14, 1941, the donor spouses executed another notarial deed of donation
of the same property, in favor of Andres Basada, nephew of the donor Vicenta de Guerra, subject to the
condition that the donee would serve and take care of the donors until their death. This donation was also
duly accepted by the donee in the same instrument (Exh. 1-a).
In 1947, the first donee (Ortiz) filed revindicatory action against the second donee (Basada) alleging that in
1946, the latter entered and usurped the land donated to and owned by them, and refused to vacate the
same. Basada claimed ownership of the land on the ground that the donation in favor of the Ortizes had
been revoked. The Court of First Instance of Samar upheld Basada's claim and dismissed the complaint,
on the ground that the donees Ortiz had abandoned the donors "to public mercy", with" most base
ingratitude and highly condemnable heartlessness"
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter correctly held that the donation in favor of appellants Ortiz
had been duly perfected in accordance with law, and it should "stand until after its revocation should have
been asked and granted in the proper proceedings," citing our decision in Ventura vs. Felix, 26 Phil. 500-
503. It added that the subsequent donation of the property to Basada " is not, certainly, the way a prior
donation should be revoked."
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the complaint, holding that:
However, to all appearances, the donors in the instant case had always reserved for themselves the
possession and use of the properties donated. This may be inferred from the fact that the Ortizes were in
possession of the land in question from the time it was donated to them until the donors left their house,
and that later, we believe, Basada took possession of it after the donation thereof in his favor was signed
and the donors went to live with him. The recovery of possession of the land sought by plaintiff is,
therefore, premature because one of the donors in behalf of whom Basada is now in occupancy of the
property is still living. At least he should have been included in the case to determine whether he really had
parted definitely not only with the ownership but also with the use and possession of the land.
Dec. CA. p. 9).
We agree with the petitioners that the conclusion thus drawn is unwarranted. From the time the public
instrument of donation (Exh. D) was executed and acknowledged by donors and donees in 1940, the latter
acquired not only the ownership but also the possession of the donated property, since the execution of a
public instrument of the conveyance is one of the recognized ways in which delivery (tradition) of lands
may be made (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1463; new Civil Code, Art. 1498), unless from the terms of the deed,
the contrary is expressed or inferable. In the present case, the donation (Exh. D) is on its face absolute
and unconditional, and nothing in its text authorizes us to conclude that it was limited to the naked
ownership of the land donated. Considering that under the law, a donation of land by Public instrument is
required to express the charges that the donee must assume (old Civil Code, Art. 633; new Civil Code, Art.
749), the absence in the deed of any express reservation of usufruct in favor of the donors in proof that no
such reservation was ever intended.
The mere fact that the donors remain in the property after donating it is susceptible of varied explanations
and does not necessarily imply that possession or usufruct was excluded from the donation. And the
donees Ortiz having been vested with ownership and attendant possession since 1940, it is clear that the
subsequent donation of the property in favor of respondent Basada confered on the latter no right
whatever over the property as against the former donees.
Wherefore, and without prejudice to any action of revocation that may lawfully apertain to the donors, the
decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Court of First Instance of Samar dismissing the complaint are
hereby reversed, and the respondent Andres Basada is sentenced to restore possession to petitioners
Cresencia and Pacita Ortiz. The records of the case are ordered remanded to the Court of origin for
assessment of the damages suffered by the petitioners. Cost against respondent Andres Basada.
Cruz v. Court of Appeals
140 SCRA 245
DOCTRINE: In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some
or all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within
four years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into account
the whole estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. Of course, the burden of proof is on
the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of
which annulment or reduction of the donation can be adjudged.
FACTS:
Eduvigis J. Cruz, a childless widow, donated a 235.5 sq.m residential lot in San Isidro, Taytay Rizal
together with the two-door apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces private respondents herein, in a
deed of donation entitled "Kasulatan Sa Kaloobpala". The property was accordingly transferred to the
names of private respondents.
Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after which she extrajudicially tried to revoke the
donation, but the donees resisted, alleging that: (a) the property in question was co-owned by Eduvigis
Cruz and her brother, the late Maximo Cruz, grandfather of the donees, hence the latter own 1/2 of the
property by inheritance; and (b) Eduvigis Cruz owns another property, an agricultural land of more than two
hectares situated in Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, hence the donation did not impair the presumptive
legitime of the adopted child.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of donation in the CFI.
Trial court rendered a decision revoking the donation.
On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint.
Thus, prompted herein petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed the complaint to annul the subject donation. -- YES
HELD:
In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some or all of his
properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within four years
from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into account the whole
estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. (Civil Code, Articles 760, 761 and 763). Of
course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the requirements
prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation can be adjudged.
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that the subject donation
impairs the legitime of the adopted child. Indeed it contains no indication at all of the total assets of the
donor. Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there is unrebutted evidence that the
donor has another piece of land (27,342 sq. m.) situated in Dolores, Taytay, Rizal worth P273,420.00 in
1977, although then subject to litigation.
The legal situation of petitioner-donor, as plaintiff, is made worse by the factual finding of the CA that the
grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of the donated land, the effect of which is
to reduce the value of the donation which can then more easily be taken from the portion of the estate
within the free disposal of petitioner. onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. The rules on prescription and not the rules on
donation applies in the case at bar.
De Luna v. Abrigo
181 SCRA 150

FACTS:
De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University Foundation. The donation was
embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain terms and conditions. In case of
violation or non-compliance, the property would automatically revert to the donor. When the Foundation
failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna revived the said donation by executing a Revival of
Donation Intervivos with the following terms and conditions:

1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel, Nursery, and Kindergarten School
to be named after St. Veronica
2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least 70% completed three years from the date of
the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions
3) Automatic reversion in case of violation

The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and annotated in the TCT. By a Deed of
Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area the lot donated while the remaining area was
retained by the De Luna.

The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died after the donation) filed a complaint with the RTC for
the cancellation of the donation on the ground that the terms were violated. The Foundation defended itself
by saying that it had partially and substantially complied with the conditions and that the donor granted it
an indefinite extension of time to complete construction.

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription (for being filed after 4 years). The heirs did
not file an MR and went straight to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art. 764 NCC-judicial decree of revocation of the
donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144 enforcement of a written contract)

HELD:
10 years
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause.

Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by the
law on donations but by the rules on contract. On the matter of prescription of actions for the revocation of
onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription apply. The same rules apply under the
New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which provides:

Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations
by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden
imposed.

It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation must be
brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, said
article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that