G.R. No.
108817 May 10, 1994 even if Jopson was already notified of the termination of the original
ESPERANZA P. SUMULONG, represented by MARIO P. SUMULONG,
petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and INLAND TRAILWAYS,
INC., respondents.
Topic: Rule 70: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Doctrine/s:
1. Difference of Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer [refer to the
table].
2. In an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff
is deemed sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is
sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the
refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law.
Facts:
1. On June 1989, a Contract of Lease was executed between
Sumulong and Jopson covering a specific area of lanf (premises).
The Contract of Lease states that in case of non-payment of rentals
or abandonment, the lease contact is automatically terminated
and cancelled. As such, Sumulong will have the right to enter
and take possession of the premises.
2. Jopson Supermarket was then sold to Inland Suprmarket. After
inspection, Sumulong discovered that Jopson vacated and deserted
the preises, and has tolerated the illegal entry of Inland Trailways,
without any valid agreement. On November 1989, pursuant to such
abandonment, the lease contract was automatically terminated, and
SUmulong took possession of the premises.
3. A couple of days later, Inland Trailways allegedly misrepresented
that Jopson Supermarket has resumed operations under Inland
Supermarket, misleading Sumulong into accepting a check payment
from Inland Trailways. However, Sumulong then discovered that
Jopson does not have any interest in Inland Trailways/Supermarket,
nor was Inland granted a sublease contract by Jopson.
4. Sumulong informed Jopson again of such termination of the lease
contract. During the take over of Sumulong, Inland persuaded
Sumulong to grant it the temporary use of the premises, pending
negotiations for the lease contract. However, Sumulong eventually
decided to not lease the premises.
5. However, without Sumulongs knowledge, Inland, through strategy
and stealth, allegedly procured a sublease contract with Jopson,
lease contract.
6. Inland persuaded Sumulong again to allow Inland to enter the
premises as it allegedly misrepresented that it was ready to finalize
the lease contract. However, it eventually refused to execute the
lease contract, and failed to deliver the monetary consideration.
7. Through stealth and strategy, it was alleged that Inland illegally
deprived Sumulong of the possession of the premises, and despit
repeated demands to vacate, Inland refuses to do so.
8. Sumulong filed a case for forcible entry against Inland Trailways,
alleging that Inland entered the premises by stealth and strategy,
since it had no sublease when it entered the premises.
9. Inland, however, argues that the complaint should have been an
unlawful detainer.
10. MTC ruled in favor of Sumulong, ordering Inland to vacate the
premises, as well as pay Sumulong reasonable compensation.
11. RTC reversed the MTC, holding that Sumulong was not in prior
physical and actual possession of the land. Since such is an
essential element of forcible entry, the complaint should fail.
12. CA, upon petition for review, affirmed the RTC, holding that
Sumulong failed to specifically aver in her complaint such facts which
would clearly show her cause of action for forcible entry. Sumulong
failed to show that she has been deprived possession by force,
intimidation, stealth, threat or strategy,
13. Hence, this petitioner for review on certiorari, where Sumulong avers
that prior possession should not be reckoned from June 1989, as
held by the RTC and CA, but should be reckoned from November,
1989, when she regained actual physical possession of the
premises.
14. Sumulong further contends that the deed executed by Jopson made
no stipulation regarding sublease. Assuming such stipulation was
made, the sublease was void as Jopson had no more authority to
sublease as the contract of lease in its favor had been cancelled and
terminated by virtue of the abandonment of the premises.
Issue/s:
1. W/N the complaint by Sumulong before the MTC failes to state a
cause of action for forcible entry Yes.
2. W/N judgment may be rendered for unlawful detainer instead Yes.
Held:
Sumulongs Complaint failed to State the Cause of Action for Forcible Entry
 1. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer is governed by Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court:
Forcible Entry
one is deprived of physical
possession of any land or
building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or right to hold possession under
stealth.
the possession is illegal from
the beginning and the only
issue is who has the prior
possession de facto.
Plaintiff must allege and prove
that he was in prior physical
possession of the property until
he was deprived by defendant
Unlawful Detainer
one unlawfully withholds
possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his
any contract, express or
implied.
possession was originally lawful
but became unlawful by the
expiration or termination of the
right to possess and the issue
of rightful possession is the one
decisive, for in such action, the
defendant is the party in actual
possession and the plaintiff's
cause of action is the
termination of the defendant's
right to continue in possession.
Plaintiff need not have prior
physical possession,
Sumulong designated its complaint as for forcible entry, her
allegations sufficiently establish a case for unlawful detainer.
2. In an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is
unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff, or is refusing to
vacate, is sufficient.
3. It can be seen from the allegations that the re-occupation by Inland
was by virtue of Sumulongs tolerance as Inland promised to
negotiate a new lease contract. Possession by tolerance is lawful.
However, such possession necessarily provides for an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand. In this case, Sumulong
repeatedly demanded for Inland to vacate the premises, in which it
refused to do so. Hence, Inlands possession became unlawful. Such
allegations are sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional
requirement of demand in an unlawful detainer case.
4. Hence, Sumulongs complaint sufficiently establishes a cause of
action for unlawful detainer.

2. Sumulong claims that she had prior physical possession. However,

her allegations show that she allowed Inland to re-occupy the
premises in various dates. Such re-occupation cannot be through
strategy or stealth. Strategy means machination or artifice. In this
case, there was no machination or artifice by Inland as there was
negotiations regarding the lease contract. Stealth means any
secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance
into, or remain within residence of another without permission.
However, this does not apply in this case.
3. Sumulongs argument of prior physical possession is also refuted
by the fact that her complaint states that Inland has been in
possession of the premises from June 1989 to present. Also, any
illegality of such possession was removed by the acceptance of
rentals by Sumulong from Inland.
4. Clearly, the complaint fails to show cause of action for forcible entry.

The complaint is considered as a complaint for unlawful detainer

1. However, thecomplaint should not have been dismissed merely for
its failure to state cause of action for forcible entry. Although