Sps. Salgado v.

Luis Anson

GR 204494

Facts:

Luis Anson is the husband of Severina de Asis-Anson. They had 1 daughter, Maria
Luisa and she was wed to Gaston Maya. Severina had an older daughter to a previous
relationship, Jo ann Diaz and she was also wed to Gerard Salgado. Luis and Severina
acquired several real properties and according to him, since there was no marriage
settlement, the properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge
and consent, Severina executed 3 Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring then properties in
favor of Jo ann. When Severina died, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judcial
Settlement of Estate Deceased Severina adjudicating herself as the sole heir. Due to these
acts, Luis filed a complaint for the annulment of these Deeds against Sps Salgado and Sps
Maya. The latter countered that they were not aware of any marriage between Luis and
their mother Severina but they knew they cohabited as common-law couple and that after
their cohabitation, Luis went to the US and married one Teresita. And due to Partition
Agreement that divided their properties without court intervention, both Sps claim that the
properties herewith are separate and exclusive properties of Severina.

Issue: W/N marriage between Severina and Luis is valid and the subject lands as
conjugal partnership

Held:

Court finds that their marriage is void ab initio for lack of marriage license. Luis
asserted that their marriage was an exceptional one but he failed to justify the lack of
marriage license. He admitted that they did not seek to apply for it. The Partition agreement
is valid. Valdez v RTC Quezon City held that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Art 147 or Art 148 as the case may be, of the Family Code. Also,
attesting that his marriage with Severina was subsisting and valid, he knowingly contracted
to a subsequent marriage abroad, and the Court finds such suspicious and fraudulent
thereby tainting his credibility.

Partition Agreement is Valid Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of
their cohabitation, Luis and Severina executed a notarized Partition Agreement in November
1980, which divided their properties between them without court intervention. Luis sought
to annul such agreement on the ground that "the separation of property is not effected by
the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the
court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial approval,
without which it is void." The Court does not subscribe to Luis' posture.

In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, the Court held that "[i]n a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case
may be, of the Family Code. Article 14 7 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code x x x. "
It provides:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their .ioint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party
who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or
dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation
and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of
the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at
the time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning
for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code,8in relation to Article 147 of
the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations.
Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void
for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license." "Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."'

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition
of the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil
Code that "partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value."
As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that
"partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x."
The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even
without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution
of the Partition Agreement.

Mactan vs Unchuan
On March 2004, respondent Richard Unchuan (Unchuan) filed a complaint for Partial
Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale with Plea for Partition, Damages and
Attorney's Fees before the RTC against MCIAA. Unchuan later filed an Amended Complaint
for of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale, Quieting of Title and/or Payment of Just
Compensation, Rental and Damages and Attorney's Fees.

his complaint, Unchuan alleged, among others, that he was the legal and rightful owner of
Lot No. 4810-A, with an area of 177,176 square meters, and Lot No. 4810-B, with an area
of 2,740 square meters, both located in Barrio Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City, and covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. R0-1173; that the title was registered under the
Qames of the heirs of Eugenio Godinez, specifically, Teodora Tampus, Fernanda Godinez
(the wife of Iscolastico Epe), Tomasa Godinez (the wife of Mateo Ibanez), Sotera Godinez
(the wife of Guillermo Pino), Atanasio Godinez (married to Florencia Pino), Juana Godinez
(the wife of Catalino Cuison), and Ambrosio Godinez (married to Mamerta Inot); and that he
bought the two lots from the surviving heirs of the registered owners through deeds of
absolute sale, all dated December 7, 1998.

Unchuan further alleged that he came to know that Atanacio Godinez {Atanacio), the
supposed attorney-in-fact of all the registered owners their heirs, already sold both lots to
Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), the predecessor of MCIAA; that the sale covered by
the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 3, 1958, was null and void because the registered
owners and their heirs did not authorize Atanacio to sell their undivided shares in the
subject lots in favor of CAA; that no actual consideration was paid to the said registered
owners or their heirs, despite promises that they would be paid; that the deed of absolute
sale did not bear the signature of the CAA representative; that there was no proof that the
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways approved the sale; and that his
predecessors-in-interest merely tolerated the possession by CAA and, later, by MCIAA.

MCIAA averred that on April 3, 1958, Atanacio, acting as the representative of the heirs of
Eugenio Godinez, who were the registered owners, sold Lot No. 4810-A and Lot No. 4810-B
to the Republic of the Philippines, represented by CAA. Thereafter, CAA took possession of
the said property upon payment of the purchase price. To corroborate the said transaction,
on September 17, 1969, Atanacio, along with other former registered co-owners, signed a
deed of partition attesting to the fact of sale of the two lots in favor of the government and
admitted its absolute right over the same. Since then, the said lots had been in the
possession of the Republic in the concept of an owner. The said real properties were
declared by the Republic for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 00078 and Tax
Declaration No. 00092. In by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6958, otherwise known as
"The Charter of Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority," the Republic officially turned
over the management of the said lots to MCIAA. On March 3, 2006, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of Unchuan. On November 29, 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in declaring the sale by atanacio void.

Held:

The transaction entered into by Atanacio and CAA, however, was not entirely void because
the lack of consent by the other co-owners in the sale was with respect to their shares only.

Article 493 of the New Civil Code expressly provides: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the
full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

The quoted provision recognizes the absolute right of a co-owner to freely dispose of his pro
indiviso share as well as the fruits and other benefits arising from that share, independently
of the other co-owners. The sale of the subject lots affects only the seller's share pro
indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor's share in the
partition of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-
owners is not null and void; only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

In the case at bench, although the sale transaction insofar as the other heirs of the
registered owners was void, the sale insofar as the extent of Atanacio' s interest is
concerned, remains valid. Atanacio was one of the registered co-owners of the subject lots,
but he was not clothed with authority to transact for the other co-owners. By signing the
deed of sale with the CAA, Atanacio effectively sold his undivided share in the lots in
question. Thus, CAA became a co-owner of the undivided subject lots. Accordingly,
Atanacio' s heirs could no longer alienate anything in favor of Unchuan because he already
conveyed his pro indiviso share to CAA.

G.R. No. 200274

MELECIO DOMINGO, Petitioner,

vs.

SPOUSES GENARO MOLINA and ELENA B. MOLINA, substituted by ESTER MOLINA,

Respondents.

Facts:

In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling,
Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an 18, 164 square meter parcel of
land. The sale was annotated on the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354 covering
the subject property.

During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and
Elena Molina (spouses Molina). On September 10, 1978 or 10 years after Floras death4,
Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts. The
sale to the spouses Molina was annotated at the OCT of the subject property. In 1986,
Anastacio died.

Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a
Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership (Complaint) against the
spouses Molina on May 17, 1999. Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to
the spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the money that Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio
could not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Floras consent, as
Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.
The spouses Molina also asserted that Melecio knew of the disputed sale since he
accompanied Anastacio several times to borrow money. The last loan was even used to pay
for Melecios wedding. Finally, the spouses Molina asserted that Melecio built his nipa hut on
the subject property only in 1999, without their knowledge and consent. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) dismissed the case because Melecio failed to establish his claim that Anastacio
did not sell the property to the spouses Molina.

The RTC also held that Anastacio could dispose of conjugal property without Floras consent
since the sale was necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling in toto.

The core issues of the petition are as follows: (1) whether the sale of a conjugal property to
the spouses Molina without Floras consent is valid and legal; and (2) whether fraud
attended the transfer of the subject property to the spouses Molina.

Ruling:

There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Codes
effectivity on August 3, 1988 and their property relation is a conjugal partnership.

An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Floras surviving heirs, including Anastacio,
with respect to Floras share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation and partition;
Anastacio, on the other hand, owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties
as his share, but this is an undivided interest.

Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership provides:

Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. (399) (emphases supplied)

Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal
properties without an actual partition being first done either by agreement or by judicial
decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest in the subject property.

The OCT annotation of the sale to the spouses Molina reads that "[o]nly the rights, interests
and participation of Anastacio Domingo, married to Flora Dela Cruz, is hereby sold,
transferred, and conveyed unto the said vendees for the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00) which pertains to an undivided one-half (1/2) portion and subject to all other
conditions specified in the document x x x"25 (emphases supplied). At the time of the sale,
Anastacios undivided interest in the conjugal properties consisted of: (1) one-half of the
entire conjugal properties; and (2) his share as Floras heir on the conjugal properties.

Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest,
but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, Anastactios sale to the spouses Molina
without the consent of the other co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacios rights or a
portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred, making the spouses Molina a co-owner
of the subject property to the extent of Anastacios interest. This result conforms with the
well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it
is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).

The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect
of any portion that might belong to the co-heirs after liquidation and partition.

Victoria v Pidlaoan GR 196470

Facts

Victoria (Rosario) and Elma lived together since 1978 until Rosario left for Saudi Arabia. In
1984, Elma bought a parcel of land with an area of 201 square meters in Lucena City and
was issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-50282. When Rosario came home, she
caused the construction of a house on the lot but she left again after the house was built.
ma allegedly mortgaged the house and lot to a certain Thi Hong Villanueva in 1989. When
the properties were about to be foreclosed, Elma allegedly asked for help from her sister-in-
law, EufemiaPidlaoan (Eufemia), to redeem the property.5 On her part, Eufemia called her
daughter abroad, Normita, to lend money to Elma. Normita agreed to provide the funds.6
Elma allegedly sought to sell the land. When she failed to find a buyer, she offered to sell it
to Eufemia or her daughter. On March 21, 1993, Elma executed a deed of sale entitled
Panananto ng Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang Bayad transferring the ownership of the lot
to Normita. The last provision in the deed of sale provides that Elma shall eject the person
who erected the house and deliver the lot to Normita. The document was signed by Elma,
Normita, and two witnesses but it was not notarized. When Elma and Normita were about to
have the document notarized, the notary public advised them to donate the lot instead to
avoid capital gains tax. On the next day, Elma executed a deed of donation in
Normitas favor and had it notarized. TCT No. T-50282 was cancelled and TCT No. T-70990
was issued in Normitas name. Since then, Normita had been paying the real property taxes
over the lot but Elma continued to occupy the house. Rosario found out about the
donation when she returned to the country a year or two after the transaction.13In
1997, the petitioners filed a complaint for reformation of contract, cancellation of TCT No. T-
70990, and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against Eufemia, Normita,
and Herminigilda Pidlaoan (respondents). The petitioners argued that: first, they co-owned
the lot because both of them contributed the money used to purchase it; second, Elma
and Normita entered into an equitable mortgage because they intended to constitute
a mortgage over the lot to secure Elmas loan but they executed a deed of sale instead; and
third, the deed of donation was simulated because Elma executed it upon the notary publics
advice to avoid capital gains tax. In their answer, the respondents admitted that the deed of
donation was simulated and that the original transaction was a sale. They argued, however,
that there was no agreement to constitute a real estate mortgage on the lot. The RTC
ruled that Rosario and Elma co-owned the lot and the house. Thus, Elma could only
donate her one-half share in the lot. The CA reversed the RTCs decision and dismissed the
petitioners complaint.

Issue (1) Rosario is a co-owner because she caused the construction of the house, which
has a higher market value than the lot; (2) the deed of donation is simulated; (3) the
transaction was a mere equitable mortgage; and (4) the CA unduly disturbed the RTCs
factual findings.

Held:

First, we rule that Elma transferred ownership of the entire lot to Normita. One who deals
with property registered under the Torrens system has a right to rely on what appears on
the face of the certificate of title and need not inquire further as to the propertys
ownership. A buyer is charged with notice only of the claims annotated on the title. The
Torrens system was adopted to best guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect
their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. In the
present case, the records of the case show that Elma alonepurchased the lot in 1984 from
its previous owners. Accordingly, TCT No. T-50282 was issued solely in her name. Thus,
Normita bought the lot relying on the face of the TCT that Elma and no other person owned
it. We acknowledge that registration under the Torrens system does not create or vest
title. A certificate of title merely serves as an evidence of ownership in the property.
Therefore, the issuance of a certificate of title does not preclude the possibility that persons
not named in the certificate may be co-owners of the real property, or that the registered
owner is only holding the property in trust for another person.28In the present case,
however, the petitioners failed to present proof of Rosarios contributions in purchasing the
lot from its previous owners. The execution of the transfer documents solely in Elmas name
alone militate against their claim of co-ownership. Thus, we find no merit in the
petitioners claim of co-ownership over the lot. At this point, we address the petitioners
claim that Rosario co-owned the lot with Elma because the value of the house constructed
by Rosario on it is higher than the lots value. We find this argument to be erroneous. We
hold that mere construction of a house on anothers land does not create a co-ownership.
Article 484 of the Civil Code provides that co-ownership exists when the ownership of
an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Verily, a house and a lot are
separately identifiable properties and can pertain to different owners, as in this case: the
house belongs to Rosario and the lot to Elma. Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that if a
person builds on anothers land in good faith, the land owner may either: (a) appropriate
the works as his own after paying indemnity; or (b) oblige the builder to pay the price of the
land. The law does not force the parties into a co-ownership. A builder is in good faith if he
builds on a land believing himself to be its owner and is unaware of the defect in his title or
mode of acquisition0As applied in the present case, Rosarios construction of a house on the
lot did not create a co-ownership, regardless of the value of the house. Rosario, however,
is not without recourse in retrieving the house or its value. The remedies available to her
are set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code. Second, on the nature of the transaction
between Elma and Normita,we find that the deed of donation was simulated and the parties
real intent was to enter into a sale. The petitioners argue that the deed of donation was
simulated and that the parties entered into an equitable mortgage. On the other hand, the
respondents deny the claim of equitable mortgage and argue that they validly acquired the
property via sale The RTC ruled that there was donation but only as to half of the
property. The CA agreed with the respondents that the deed of donation was not
simulated, relying on the presumption of regularity of public documents. We first dwell on
the genuineness of the deed of donation. There are two types of simulated documents
absolute and relative. A document is absolutely simulated when the parties have no intent
to bind themselves at all, while it is relatively simulated when the parties concealed their
true agreement. The true nature of a contract is determined by the parties intention, which
can be ascertained from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.35 In the
present case, Elma and Normitas contemporaneous and subsequent acts show that they
were about to have the contract of sale notarized but the notary public ill-advised them
to execute a deed of donation instead. Following this advice, they returned the next day
to have a deed of donation notarized. Clearly, Elma and Normita intended to enter into a
sale that would transfer the ownership of the subject matter of their contract but disguised
it as a donation. Thus, the deed of donation subsequently executed by them was only
relatively simulated. The CA upheld the deed of donations validity based on the principle
that a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity. This presumption,
however, is overthrown in this case by the respondents own admission in their answer that
the deed of donation was simulated. Judicial admissions made by a party in the course of
the proceedings are conclusive and do not require proof.36 Notably, the respondents
explicitly recognized in their answer that the deed of donation was simulated upon the
notary publics advice and that both parties intended a sale.

Inalvez vs Nool GR No 188145

Facts:

This petition stemmed from a complaint for recovery of possession over a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3058625 with an area of 10.2135 hectares
situated at Villa Aglipay, San Jose, Tarlac, filed by Spouses Primo and Juliana Inalvez
(Juliana) (petitioners) against Bayang Nool (Bayang), Allan Nool and Celestino Nool
(respondents), with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The
records showed that the subject property was originally covered by TCT No. 583986
originally registered in the names of Spouses Nicolas and Francisca Nool and Spouses
Cornelio and Bayang, with an area of 15.1441 ha. On May 3, 1965, Spouses Cornelio and
Bayang sold a large portion of their one-half share of the landholding to the petitioners and
Maria Zamora (Zamora), which sale was inscribed on the title as Entry No. 5-4972.7
Consequently, TCT No. 58398 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 584398 was issued
in the names of the following co-owners: Spouses Nicolas and Francisca (one-half share);
Zamora (one-fourth share); Spouses Cornelio and Bayang (one-eighth share); and the
petitioners (one-eighth share).9 On June 4, 1979, Spouses Nicolas and Francisca sold their
entire one-half share over the property in favor of Spouses Abraham and Olivia Macayanan
(Spouses Macayanan), which sale was inscribed on the title as Entry No. E-19-7847.10
Then, on April 16, 1980, the new set of owners, namely, Spouses Macayanan, Zamora,
Spouses Cornelio and Bayang, and the petitioners executed a Real Estate Mortgage11
(REM) over the whole property in favor of Tarlac Development Bank (TDB) to secure a loan
of Pl0,000.00.12 Unfortunately, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the title to the subject
property was consolidated with TDB, together with the corresponding issuance of TCT No.
188251.13 On April 17, 1985, TDB sold the parcel of land to the petitioners and Spouses
Jim and Liberty Baluyot (Spouses Baluyot).14 Hence, TCT No. 188251 was cancelled
andTCT No. 18825215 was issued in the names of the petitioners and Spouses Baluyot. 16
Meanwhile, the respondents continued possession of the subject lot. On October 3, 1991,
pursuant to an Agreement of Subdivision, 17 the property was subdivided as follows: Lot 1
with 138,734 square meters to the petitioners, and Lots 2 and 3 with 10,000 sq m and
2,707 sq m, respectively, to Spouses Baluyot. The portion pertaining to the petitioners was
separately titled under TCT No. 260916, and was later replaced by TCT No. 262142,18
showing that the original area of 138,734 sq m had been reduced to 133,809 sq m.19 On
March 24, 1998, the petitioners caused their property to be subdivided into nine sub-lots,
by virtue of which subdivision, TCT No. 262142 was cancelled and new titles were issued,
namely, TCT Nos. 305854 to 305862. The petitioners also declared the property for tax
purposes.20 On June 16, 2000, the petitioners instituted a complaint for ejectment,
collection of shares and damages, against the respondents before the DARAB-Region III
docketed as DARAB Case No. III-T-1952-00. The petitioners alleged that since Bayang is
Juliana's sister, they allowed the respondents to cultivate 2-ha portion of the subject
property covered by TCT No. 305862,21 with an area of 102,135 sq m, with the obligation
to share the landowners 25% of the harvest proceeds thereof. The respondents' cultivation
thereof was purportedly conditioned upon the payment to the petitioners of a rightful share
in the produce. Thus, when the respondents failed to fulfil their undertaking, the
petitioners instituted an ejectment complaint against them. For her part, Ba yang averred
that she and her late husband were the actual and registered co-owners of the subject
property, which they inherited from her father, together with the petitioners. Bayang denied
having sold portions of their property to the petitioners and Zamora. She also disclaimed
knowledge as to how their original title was replaced by TCT No. 58439 showing the
acquisition by the petitioners of one-eight portion of the property and the corresponding
reduction of their share. urther denied having signed any document consenting to the
mortgage of the subject property and refuted the genuineness of her husband's signature as
appearing on the REM executed with TDB. Lastly, the respondents argued that they are
deemed to have already acquired the subject property through ordinary acquisitive
prescription since they have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the
subject property for more than 30 years.23 On January 14, 2002, the DARAB dismissed the
case upon finding that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties.24 Dissatisfied,
the petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession, damages with an application for
preliminary injunction25 against the respondents before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-09. The case was raffled to Branch 68. After trial, the court a
quo rendered its judgment in favor of the petitioners. CA reversed the decision.

Issue:

The main issue before this Court is whether a co-ownership exists between the petitioners
and the respondents.

Held:

The petition has no merit.

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that no
tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship existed between the parties whether express
or implied since the petitioners have failed to overcome the burden of proving their
affirmative allegation of tenancy. The petitioners however argue that they are the sole
owners of the subject property since they have bought it from TDB after it had been
foreclosed. On the other hand, the respondents insist that they are co-owners of the subject
property which they inherited from their parents.

Essentially, the issues raised center on the core question of whether or not the subject
property pertains to the exclusive ownership of the petitioners. Hence, the pertinent point of
inquiry is whether co-ownership by the petitioners and the respondents over the subject
property continued even after the subject property was purchased by TDB and title thereto
transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the petitioners
from TDB.

While the question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the Court normally abstain
from, yet, considering the divergent positions of the courts below, this Court shall go by the
exception to the general rule and proceed to review the facts of this case and make its own
assessment of the evidence and documents on record. But even if the Court were to re-
evaluate the evidence presented, there is still no reason to depart from the CA's ruling that
the property in dispute is owned in common by the petitioners and the respondents.

In this case, the petitioners' cause of action for recovery of possession is grounded on their
alleged exclusive ownership of the subject property which they merely purchased from TDB.
They contend that TDB's consolidation of ownership over the subject property effectively
ended and terminated the co-ownership. The respondents, however, counter that they are
co-owners of the subject property and their co-ownership was by virtue of their inheritance,
which was registered in the names of the petitioners by way of an agreement. Bayang also
asserted that she never sold her share to the petitioners and Zamora nor was she aware of
any mortgage over the subject property.

Here, records show that the subject property was originally owned by Juliana and Bayang's
father, Cleto Macayanan under Original Certificate of Title No. 1665. "Pursuant to Article
1451 of the Civil Code, when land passes by succession to any person and he causes the
legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for
the benefit of the true owner." Bayang, being an heir and a co-owner, is thus entitled to the
possession of the subject property. This was confirmed by the issuance of TCT No. 58439 in
the names of Spouses Nicolas and Francisca for one-half share, Spouses Cornelio and
Bayang for one-eighth share, Zamora for one-fourth share, and the petitioners for one-
eighth share. Evidently, a co-ownership existed between the parties prior to the foreclosure
and consolidation of title in favor of TDB and the subsequent re-acquisition thereof by the
petitioners.

"Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others." "Before the
partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any
definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota proportionate
share in the entire land or thing." "Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned
property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership." "In case of foreclosure, a sale would result in the transmission only of whatever
rights the seller had over of the thing sold."

Indeed, a co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his share
is mortgaged by another co-owner without the former's knowledge and consent as in the
case at bar. The mortgage of the inherited property is not binding against co-heirs who
never benefited.38 As correctly emphasized by the CA, the petitioners' right in the subject
property is limited only to their share in the co-owned property. When the subject property
was sold to and consolidated in the name of TDB, the latter merely held the subject
property in trust for the respondents. When the petitioners and Spouses Baluyot bought
back the subject property, they merely stepped into the shoes of TDB and acquired
whatever rights and obligations appertain thereto.

Be that as it may, the rights of the respondents as co-owners of the subject property were
never alienated despite TDB's consolidation of ownership over the subject property. Neither
does the fact that the petitioners succeeded in acquiring back the property from TDB and
having a new title issued in their name terminate the existing co-ownership. Besides, it
seems that petitioners knew of the fact that they did not have a title to the entire lot and
could not, therefore, have validly mortgaged the same, because of the respondents'
possession of the subject portion.

The trial court's reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot defeat the right of a
holder of a registered Torrens title over property is misplaced, considering that the
respondents were almost deprived of their dominical rights over the said lot through fraud
and with evident bad faith on the part of the petitioners. Failure and intentional omission to
disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person during registration
proceedings constitutes actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a
fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.

Contrary to the petitioners' argument that the respondents' claim is a collateral attack upon
their title which is impermissible, the Court had categorically ruled that a resolution on the
issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a
collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title itself. "Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name
of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-
ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a
trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to
the issuance of the certificate of title." The alleged incontrovertibility of title cannot be
successfully invoked by the petitioners because certificates of title merely confirm or record
title already existing and cannot be used as a shield for the commission of fraud.

The CA was also on point when it upheld the respondents' claim of forgery with respect to
the signatures of Spouses Cornelio and Bayang as appearing in the REM. The CA explained
that:

The evidence on record tends to corroborate [the respondents'] claim that [the petitioners]
succeeded in mortgaging the co-owned property to [TDB] without their consent. The
signature on the [REM] Contract, which purports to be that of Cornelio Nool, is undoubtedly
a forgery considering that Cornelio Nool died on December 21, 1979 prior to the execution
of said mortgage on April 16, 1980. Bayang's claim that her signature in the mortgage was
forged was never rebutted by [the petitioners]. Also, the manifest disparities between
[Bayang's] purported signature on the [REM] Contract and her signature as appearing on
the Marriage Contract, which public document was admitted as genuine writing, supports
[sic] a finding that her signature on the mortgage contract was also forged. The trial court
failed to consider the evidence and to make its own comparison of the disputed handwriting
with writings that are proved to be genuine as explicitly authorized by Section 22, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court.

The Court disbelieves the petitioners' argument that the respondents started occupying the
subject property only after the petitioners have bought back the subject property from TDB.
Obviously, the respondents have been the owners and in possession of the subject property
even before May 3, 1965 when they sold portions of their original share to the petitioners.
The subject property presently in the respondents' possession covers an area of not more
than 2 ha, which corresponds, more or less, to the one-eighth aliquot share (1.8930 ha) in
the co-owned property which the Spouses Cornelio and Bayang had retained for themselves
in the co-ownership. It must be noted that since the mortgage and sale of the subject
property to the petitioners, the latter had allowed the respondents to occupy that portion
allotted to them. Clearly, the petitioners were in possession of the subject property for more
than 35 years. However, at no instance during this time did the petitioners, for that matter,
question the respondents' right over the subject property.

From the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that the CA did not err in declaring that the
petitioners have no legal basis to recover possession of the subject property. Except for
their claim that they merely purchased the subject property from TDB, the petitioners
presented no other j ustification to disprove co-ownership. Since the mortgage of the co-
owned property was done without the respondents' consent, they cannot be deemed to
have lost their share as a consequence of the subsequent foreclosure and sale of the co-
owned property. In the same way, the petitioners, as mere co-owners, had no right to
mortgage the entire property for their right to do so is limited only to that portion that may
be allotted to them upon termination of the co-ownership.

G.R. No. 194260

HEIRS OF FELICIANO YAMBAO, namely: CHONA YAMBAO, JOEL YAMBAO, WILLY
YAMBAO, LENNIE YAMBAO and RICHARD YAMBAO, and all other persons acting
under their authority, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HERMOGENES YAMBAO, namely: ELEANOR YAMBAO, ALBERTO YAMBAO,
DOMINIC YAMBAO, ASESCLO YAMBAO, GERALD DANTIC and MARIA PILAR
YAMBAO, who are all represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA PILAR
YAMBAO, Respondents.

Facts:

The subject of this case is a parcel of land located in Barangay Bangan, Botolan, Zambales,
which was originally possessed by Macaria De Ocampo (Macaria). Macaria's nephew,
Hermogenes Yambao (Hermogenes ), acted as the administrator of the property and paid
realty taxes therefor. Hermogenes has eight children, namely: Ulpiano, Dominic, Teofilo,
Feliciano, Asesclo, Delia, Amelia, and Melinda, all surnamed Yambao.
After Hermogenes died, it was claimed that all of his heirs were free to pick and harvest
from the fruit-bearing trees planted on the subject property. Eleanor Yambao (Eleanor),
Ulpiano's daughter, even constructed a house on the subject property. However, sometime
in 2005, the communal and mutual use of the subject property by the heirs of Hermogenes
ceased when the heirs of Feliciano, herein petitioners, prohibited them from entering the
property. The heirs of Feliciano even ejected Eleanor from the subject property.
This prompted the heirs of Hermogenes, herein respondents, to file with the RTC a
complaint for partition, declaration of nullity of title/documents, and damages against the
heirs of Feliciano. The heirs of Hermogenes alleged that they and the heirs of Feliciano are
co-owners of the subject property, having inherited the right thereto from Hermogenes.
The heirs of Feliciano denied the allegations of the heirs of Hermogenes and claimed that
their father, Feliciano, was in possession of the subject property in the concept of owner
since time immemorial. Accordingly, Feliciano was awarded a free patent thereon for which
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-10737 was issued. They also averred that the cause
of action in the complaint filed by the heirs of Hermogenes, which questioned the validity of
OCT No. P-10737, prescribed after the lapse of one year from its issuance on November 29,
1989.
Ruling of the RTC
On December 23, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint filed by the
heirs of Hermogenes. The RTC opined that the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that the
subject property is owned by Macaria, stating that tax declarations and receipts in Macaria's
name are not conclusive evidence of ownership. The RTC further held that even if Macaria
owned the subject property, the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that Hermogenes had
the right to succeed over the estate of Macaria.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal,. the CA, in its Decision 7 dated October 22, 2010, reversed and set aside the
RTC's Decision dated December 23, 2008. The CA found that the RTC, in hastily dismissing
the complaint for partition, failed to determine first whether the subject property is indeed
co-owned by the heirs of Hermogenes and the heirs of Feliciano. The CA pointed out that:
[A] review of the records of the case shows that in Feliciano's application for free patent, he
acknowledged that the source of his claim of possession over the subject property was
Hermogenes's possession of the real property in peaceful, open, continuous, and adverse
manner and more importantly, in the concept of an owner, since 1944. Feliciano's claim of
sole possession in his application for free patent did not therefore extinguish the fact of co-
ownership as claimed by the children of Hermogenes.
Accordingly, the CA, considering that the parties are co-owners of the subject property,
ruled that the RTC should have conducted the appropriate proceedings for partition.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is coowned by the heirs of Hermogenes

Held:
A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere
actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession was adverse
because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. Thus, as a rule,
prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of
the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. An action to demand
partition among co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time
the partition of the common property.
Prescription may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open, continuous
and exclusive possession of the co-owned property by the other co-owner/s.1wphi1 In
order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other
co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal
acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners; (2)
that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or
other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
Although OCT No. P-10737 was registered in the name of Feliciano on November 29, 1989,
the prescriptive period within which to demand partition of the subject property, contrary to
the claim of the heirs of Feliciano, did not begin to run. At that time, the heirs of
Hermogenes were still in possession of the property. It was only in 2005 that the heirs of
Feliciano expressly prohibited the heirs of Hermogenes from entering the property. Thus, as
aptly ruled by the CA, the right of the heirs of Hermogenes to demand the partition of the
property had not yet prescribed. Accordingly, the RTC committed a reversible error when it
dismissed the complaint for partition that was filed by the heirs of Hermogenes.
There is likewise no merit to the claim that the action for partition filed by the heirs of
Hermogenes amounted to a collateral attack on the validity of OCT No. P-10737. The
complaint for partition filed by the heirs of Hermogenes seeks first, a declaration that they
are a co-owners of the subject property, and second, the conveyance of their lawful shares.
The heirs of Hermogenes do not attack the title of Feliciano; they alleged no fraud, mistake,
or any other irregularity that would justify a review of the registration decree in their favor.
Their theory is that although the subject property was registered solely in Feliciano's name,
they are co-owners of the property and as such is entitled to the conveyance of their
shares. On the premise that they are co-owners, they can validly seek the partition of the
property in co-ownership and the conveyance to them of their respective shares.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 205705, August 05, 2015
DOMINADOR M. APIQUE, Petitioner, v. EVANGELINE APIQUE FAHNENSTICH,
Respondent.

Facts
Dominador and Evangeline are siblings who used to live with their parents at Babak, Island
Garden City of Samal, Davao, until Evangeline left for Germany to work sometime in 1979.
On August 2, 1995, Evangeline executed General and Special Powers of Attorney7
constituting Dominador as her attorney-in-fact to purchase real property for her, and to
manage or supervise her business affairs in the Philippines.
As Evangeline was always in Germany, she opened a joint savings account on January 18,
1999 with Dominador at the Claveria Branch of the Philippine Commercial International
Bank (PCI Bank) in Davao City, which later became Equitable PCI Bank (EPCIB), and now
Banco de Oro, under Savings Account No. 1189-02819-5 (subject account).
On February 11, 2002, Dominador withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject
account and, thereafter, deposited the money to his own savings account with the same
bank, under Savings Account No. 1189-00781-3. It was only on February 23, 2003 that
Evangeline learned of such withdrawal from the manager of EPCIB. Evangeline then had the
passbook updated, which reflected the said withdrawal. She likewise discovered that
Dominador had deposited the amount withdrawn to his own account with the same bank
and that he had withdrawn various amounts from the said account.
Evangeline demanded the return of the amount withdrawn from the joint account, but to no
avail. Hence, she filed a complaint for sum of money, damages, and attorney's fees, with
prayer for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order
(TRO) against Dominador before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 29,122-02, impleading
EPCIB as a party defendant.
In her complaint, Evangeline claimed to be the sole owner of the money deposited in the
subject account, and that Dominador has no authority to withdraw the same. On the other
hand, she alleged that EPCIB violated its banking rules when it allowed the withdrawal
without the presentation of the passbook. She also prayed for a TRO to enjoin EPCIB from
allowing any withdrawal from the subject account, which was granted by the Executive
Judge on May 7, 2002.

Issue:
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Evangeline is entitled to the
return of the amount of P980,000.00 Dominador withdrew from their joint savings account
with EPCIB, plus legal interest thereon

Held:
A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or by two or more
juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners or co-owners
of the said account, and their share in the deposits shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proved, pursuant to Article 485 of the Civil Code, which provides:c
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be
proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall
be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proved.
The common banking practice is that regardless of who puts the money into the account,
each of the named account holder has an undivided right to the entire balance, and any of
them may deposit and/or withdraw, partially or wholly, the funds without the need or
consent of the other, during their lifetime Nevertheless, as between the account holders,
their right against each other may depend on what they have agreed upon, and the purpose
for which the account was opened and how it will be operated.
In this case, there is no dispute that the account opened by Evangeline and Dominador
under Savings Account No. 1189-02819-5 with EPCIB was a joint "OR" account. It is also
admitted that: (a) the account was opened for a specific purpose, i.e., to facilitate the
transfer of needed funds for Evangeline's business projects; and (b) Dominador may
withdraw funds therefrom "if" there is a need to meet Evangeline's financial obligations
arising from said projects. Hence, while Dominador is a co-owner of the subject account as
far as the bank is concerned and may, thus, validly deposit and/or withdraw funds
without the consent of his co-depositor, Evangeline as between him and Evangeline, his
authority to withdraw, as well as the amount to be withdrawn, is circumscribed by the
purpose for which the subject account was opened.
Under the foregoing circumstances, Dominador's right to obtain funds from the subject
account was, thus, conditioned on the necessity of funds for Evangeline's projects.
Admittedly, at the time he withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject account,
there was no project being undertaken for Evangeline. Moreover, his claim that the said
amount belonged to him, as part of the compensation promised by Holgar for his services as
administrator of the business affairs of Evangeline, was correctly rejected by the CA,
considering the dearth of competent evidence showing that Holgar: (a) undertook to pay
Dominador the amount of P1,000,000.00 for his services as administrator of Evangeline's
various projects; and (b) remitted such amount to the subject account for the benefit of
Dominador. Having failed to justify his right over the amount withdrawn, Dominador is liable
for its return, as correctly adjudged by the CA.
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Thus, the party who asserts the
affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable
judgment. For the plaintiff, the burden to prove its positive assertions never parts. For the
defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in
the plaintiffs cause of action, but one which, if established, will be a Rood defense, i.e. an
avoidance of the claim. Dominador miserably failed in this respect.

GR NO 196750
Divinagracia v Parilla
Facts:

Conrado Nobleza, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) owned a 313-square meter parcel of land located at
Cor. Fuentes-Delgado Streets, Iloilo City denominated as Lot 133-B-1-A and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12255 (subject land). During his lifetime, he
contracted two marriages: (a) the first was with Lolita Palermo with whom he had two (2)
children, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.; and (b) the second was with Eusela Niangar
with whom he had seven (7) children, namely, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial,
Celedonio, Ceruleo, and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado, Sr. also begot three (3) illegitimate children,
namely, Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. Mateo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and was
survived by his children Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord.
Cebeleo, Sr. also pre-deceased his father and was survived by his wife, Maude, and children
Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.
According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.s death, Cresencio, Conrado, Jr., Felcon (in
representation of his father, Mateo, Sr., and his siblings), Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia,
Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo sold their respective interests over the subject land to
Santiago for a consideration of P447,695.66, as embodied in a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale dated November 22, 1989 (subject
document), which was, however, not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their
respective shares, namely, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in representation of his
husband, Cebeleo, Sr., and their children). On December 22, 1989, the same parties
executed a Supplemental Contract whereby the vendors-heirs and Santiago agreed that out
of the aforesaid consideration, only P109,807.93 will be paid up front, and that Santiago will
only pay the remaining balance of P337,887.73 upon the partition of the subject land.
However, Santiago was not able to have TCT No. T-12255 cancelled and the subject
document registered because of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maudes refusal to surrender the
said title. This fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maudes failure to partition the
subject land, prompted Santiago to file a Complaint dated January 3, 1990 for judicial
partition and for receivership.
For their part, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude maintained that Santiago had no legal right to
file an action for judicial partition nor compel them to surrender TCT No. T-12255 because,
inter alia: (a) Santiago did not pay the full purchase price of the shares sold to him; and (b)
the subject land is a conjugal asset of Conrado Sr. and Eusela Niangar and, thus, only their
legitimate issues may validly inherit the same.
Issue:
The issues for the Courts resolution are whether or not the CA correctly: (a) ruled that
Felcons siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maudes children are indispensable parties to
Santiagos complaint for judicial partition; and (b) dismissed Santiagos complaint for his
failure to implead said omitted heirs.
Held:
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The partys
interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an
absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties
before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.Thus, the absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all
persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants, viz.:
SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to
compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his
complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of
which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the
property. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable
parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs, legitimate and
illegitimate, who are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the subject land, namely: Conrado,
Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr.,
Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. However, both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased
Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the rules on representation under the Civil Code, their
respective interests shall be represented by their children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.:
Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.:
Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.
The aforementioned heirs whether in their own capacity or in representation of their direct
ascendant have vested rights over the subject land and, as such, should be impleaded as
indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof. However, a reading of Santiagos
complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.s interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding
therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.s
interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when pursuant to
Article 97235 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest should have been
his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiagos omission of the aforesaid heirs
renders his complaint for partition defective.
Santiagos contention that he had already bought the interests of the majority of the heirs
and, thus, they should no longer be regarded as indispensable parties deserves no merit. As
correctly noted by the CA, in actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order
to divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-
ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, which is the first stage in
an action for partition. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is
definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed
properties.
In this case, while it is conceded that Santiago bought the interests of majority of the heirs
of Conrado, Sr. as evidenced by the subject document, as a vendee, he merely steps into
the shoes of the vendors-heirs. Since his interest over the subject land is merely derived
from that of the vendors-heirs, the latter should first be determined as co-owners thereof,
thus necessitating the joinder of all those who have vested interests in such land, i.e., the
aforesaid heirs of Conrado, Sr., in Santiagos complaint.

JUAN P. CABRERA vs. HENRY YSAACG.R. No. 166790 NOVEMBER 19, 2014
FACTS: Henry Ysaac is one of the co-owners of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. 506
with an area of 5,517 square meters. He leased out a portion of the property to several
lessees including Juan Cabrera who leased a 95-squaremeter portion of the land. In need of
money, Henry oered to sell the 95 sq.meter lot but Juan demurred because the lot was too
small for his needs since there was no parking space for his vehicle. To deal with Juans
need, Henry expanded his oer to include two adjoining lands which was then leased by two
families but warned that the sale could only proceed if the two families would agree. The
deal was almost closed with the agreed price of P 250/sq.m but Juan stated that he could
only pay the full price after his retirement. Henry agreed but demanded for an initial
payment of P1, 500.00 which Juan paid.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid contract of sale between petitioner and
respondent.
Held: We nd that there was no contract of sale. It was null and ab initio.
As dened by the Civil Code, [a] contract is a meeting of minds between two persons
whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service. For there to be a valid contract, there must be consent of the contracting parties,
an object certain which is the subject matter of the contract, and cause of the obligation
which is established.
Sale is a special contract. The seller obligates himself to deliver a determinate thing and to
transfer its ownership to the buyer. In turn, the buyer pays for a price certain in money or
its equivalent. A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. The seller and buyer
must agree as to the certain thing that will be subject of the sale as well as the price in
which the thing will be sold. The thing to be sold is the object of the contract, while the
price is the cause or consideration. The object of the sales contract between petitioner and
respondent was a denite portion of a co-owned parcel of land. At the time of the alleged
sale between petitioner and respondent, the entire property was still held in common. This
is evidenced by the original certicate of title, which was undert he names of Matilde Ysaac,
Priscilla Ysaac, Walter Ysaac, respondent Henry Ysaac, Elizabeth Ysaac, Norma Ysaac, Luis
Ysaac, Jr., George Ysaac, Franklin Ysaac, Marison Ysaac, Helen Ysaac, Erlinda Ysaac, and
Maridel Ysaac.85 The rules allow respondent to sell his undivided interest in the
coownership.However, this was not the object of the sale between him and petitioner.
Theobject of the sale was a denite portion. Even if it was respondent who was beneting
from the fruits of the lease contract to petitioner, respondent has no right to sell or alienate
a concrete, specic or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because his right
over the thing is represented by quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
VILMA QUINTOS, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACTS FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR., ET
AL. VS. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 210252. June 16, 2014

FACTS: Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and respondents
Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra,
and the late Augusto Ibarra are siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra,
were the owners of the subject property, a 281 sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon
Ave., Poblacion C, Camiling, Tarlac, covered by TCT No. 318717.

The deceased parents left their 10 children ownership over the subject property. In 2002,
respondent siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52 and was raffled to the RTC at Camiling, Tarlac but was
later on dismissed as neither of the parties appeared and appealed.

Respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the

property in favor of the 10 siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and TCT No.
390484 was issued in the names of the 10 heirs of the Ibarra spouses. The siblings sold
their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of their co-respondents, the spouses
Recto and Rosemarie Candelario by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale and Agreement of
Subdivision, and the title was partially cancelled as a result.

Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents wherein
they alleged that during their parents lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal
properties in favor of their 10 children. Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that they
received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their share. They had
been in adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over 4
decades and are allegedly entitled to equitable title. Participation in the execution of the
aforementioned Deeds was denied.

Respondents, on the other hand, countered that petitioners cause of action was already
barred by estoppel when in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided
share, which is an admission petitioners part that the property is not entirely theirs. The
Ibarras allegedly mortgaged the property but because of financial constraints, respondent
spouses Candelario had to redeem the property. Not having been repaid, the Candelarios
accepted their share in the subject property as payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by
way of counterclaim, the partition of the property.

RTC: dismissed petitioners complaint, as it did not find merit in petitioners asseverations
that they have acquired title over the property through acquisitive prescription and noted
there was no document evidencing that their parents bequeathed the property. Subsequent
transfer of the siblings interest in favor of respondent spouses Candelario was upheld.

CA: upheld lower court decision and held that since the property is co-owned by the
plaintiffs- appellants, ( 3/10 undivided interest) and defendants-appellees Spouses
Candelarios (7/10 undivided interest) and considering that plaintiffs-appellants had already
constructed a 3-storey building at the back portion of the property, partition is in order, in
accord with the subdivision plan.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property;
2. Whether or not the respondents counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches
or res judicata; and
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as basis for
the partition of the property.

HELD: PETITION IS PARTLY MERITORIOUS.

Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property. Quieting of
title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting
title to real property.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or efficacy.

In the case at bar, the CA correctly observed that petitioners cause of action must
necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the determination of whether or not petitioners
sufficiently proved their claim of ownership or equitable title is substantially a factual issue
that is generally improper for Us to delve into.In any event, a perusal of the records would
readily show that petitioners, as aptly observed by the courts below, indeed, failed to
substantiate their claim. Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted
possession of the subject property is belied by the fact that respondent siblings, in 2005,
entered into a Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot
without any objection from the petitioners. Petitioners inability to offer evidence tending to
prove that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership over the property in
favor of petitioners is likewise fatal to the latters claim.

The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is on
the plaintiff to establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence. Regrettably,
petitioners failed to discharge the said burden. There is no reason to disturb the finding of
the RTC that all 10 siblings inherited the subject property from Bienvenido and Escolastica
Ibarra, and after the respondent siblings sold their aliquot share to the spouses Candelario,
petitioners and respondent spouses became co-owners of the same.

The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment.

As to the issue of partition as raised by respondents in their counterclaim, the petitioners

countered that the action for partition has already been barred by res judicata.
The Court had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice satisfies one of the
elements of res judicata. It is understandable why petitioners would allege res judicata to
bolster their claim. However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that
there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. This is pertinent to Article 494 of
the Civil Code which discusses how the law generally does not favor the retention of co-
ownership as a property relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-
ownersspecific shares so as to prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in
limbo. Thus, the law provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common.

Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners
under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would
diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules.
Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require
citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Art. 494 is an
exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of
dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be
deemed to be without prejudice.

This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred by res judicata.
There can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same
subject matter once the respective shares of the co-owners have been determined with
finality by a competent court with jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is
improper for co- ownership does not or no longer exists.

The counterclaim for partition is not barred by laches. We now proceed to petitionerssecond
line of attack. According to petitioners, the claim for partition is already barred by laches
since by 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra had already died and yet the
respondent siblings only belatedly filed the action for partition, Civil Case No. 02-52, in
2002. And since laches has allegedly already set in against respondent siblings, so too
should respondent spouses Candelario be barred from claiming the same for they could not
have acquired a better right than their predecessors-in-interest.

Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that whichby the exercise of due diligencecould or should have been done earlier. It is
the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable period, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert
it. The principle is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize
neglect or sleeping upon ones right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so
would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable defense, laches does not
concern itself with the character of the petitioners title, but only with whether or not by
reason of the respondents long inaction or inexcusable neglect, they should be barred from
asserting this claim at all, because to allow them to do so would be inequitable and unjust
to petitioners.

As correctly appreciated by the lower courts, respondents cannot be said to have neglected
to assert their right over the subject property. They cannot be considered to have
abandoned their right given that they filed an action for partition. The fact that respondent
siblings entered into a Contract of Lease with Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject
property is evidence that they are exercising rights of ownership over the same.
The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision. There is merit, however, in
petitioners contention that the CA erred in approving the proposal for partition submitted
by respondent spouses. Art. 496, as earlier cited, provides that partition shall either be by
agreement of the parties or in accordance with the Rules of Court. In this case, the
Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses Candelario and
petitioners cannot serve as basis for partition for respondents admitted that the agreement
was a falsity and that petitioners never took part in preparing the same. The "agreement"
was crafted without any consultation whatsoever or any attempt to arrive at mutually
acceptable terms with petitioners. It, therefore, lacked the essential requisite of consent.
Thus, to approve the agreement in spite of this fact would be tantamount to allowing
respondent spouses to divide unilaterally the property among the co-owners based on their
own whims and caprices.

Cruz v. Villasor

G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973

Facts:

The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz.
However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed
through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the
instrument was executed without the testator having been informed of its contents and
finally, that it was not executed in accordance with law.

One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was
acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the
ground that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3
witnesses even if the notary public was one of them.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC

HELD: NO.

The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental
witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An
acknowledging officer cannot serve as witness at the same time.

To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before'
means in front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality
into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he
making of the will. To permit such situation would be absurd.
Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements, a function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental
witnesses. He would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves
himself and the validity of his own act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting
the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.

Abangan v. Abangan, 40 Phil 476, GR 134431

Facts

On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangans will executed July,
1916. From this decision the opponents appealed.

The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains all the disposition of the testatrix, duly
signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the
testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause
duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is
signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters.
These omissions, according to appellants contention, are defects whereby the probate of
the will should have been denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the will was duly admitted to probate.

Held:

YES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the left margin by the
testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for
its object the avoidance of substitution of any of said sheets which may change the
disposition of the testatrix. But when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet
(as in the instant case) signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses, their
signatures on the left margin of said sheet are not anymore necessary as such will be
purposeless.

In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is
to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts
of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the
removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.

In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions
and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains
only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not
necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the
witnesses, or be paged.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against
bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth
and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as
to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the
fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely
unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testators last will, must be disregarded.

Garcia v. Vasquez

G.R. No. L-26808 March 28, 1969

Facts:

Gliceria del Rosario executed 2 wills, one in June 1956, written in Spanish, a language she
knew an spoke. The other will was executed in December 1960 consisting of only one page,
and written in Tagalog. The witnesses to the 1960 will declared that the will was first read
'silently' by the testatrix before signing it. The probate court admitted the will.

The oppositors alleged that the as of December 1960, the eyesight of the deceased was so
poor and defective that she could not have read the provisions contrary to the testimony of
the witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

RULING: The will is not valid. If the testator is blind, Art. 808 of the New Civil Code (NCC)
should apply.If the testator is blind or incapable of reading, he must be apprised of the
contents of the will for him to be able to have the opportunityto object if the provisions
therein are not in accordance with his wishes.

The testimony of her opthalmologist established that notwithstanding an operation to

remove her cataract and being fitted with the lenses, this did not improve her vision. Her
vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading. There was no
evidence that her vision improved at the time of the execution of the 2nd will. Hence, she
was incapable of reading her own will. The admission of the will to probate is therefor
erroneous.

Maloto vs CA GR No. 76464

Facts: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina
Maloto- Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and
Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament,
these four heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunts
estate. While the case was still in progress, they executed an extrajudicial settlement of
Adrianas estate dividing it into four equal parts among themselves. They presented the
same and successfully gained court approval. Three years later, a document was discovered
entitled KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento), purporting to be the last will
and testament of Adriana. Malotos oppposed the probate of the Will stating among others
that the said will was revoked. Two witnesses were presented to prove that the will was
burned by Adriana herself.

Issue: Whether or not the will was validly revoked.

Held: No, the will was not validly revoked. A valid revocation must be done with animus
revocandi or the intention to revoke coupled with an overt physical act of burning, tearing,
obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his
presence and under his express direction. The document or papers burned by Adrianas
maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily establishedthat such was the will of Adriana
Maloto. And that the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction
of Adriana. Also the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses stated that they were
the only ones present at the place where papers were burned. The act done by the
witnesses could not have constituted a valid revocation of Adrianas Will.

You are here: Home 2013 July Case Digest: Gago v. Mamuyac (49 P 902)

Gago v. Mamuyac L-26317

FACTS:

Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922. It appears from the record that Miguel executed
a last will and testament on July 27, 1918. Gago presented such will for probate which was
opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac et. al. Said petition for probate was denied on the ground
that the deceased executed another will on April 16, 1919. Gago presented the April 16 will
for probate which was again opposed by Cornelio et. al. alleging that the will presented by
Gago is a carbon copy of the original April 16 will; such will was cancelled during the lifetime
of the deceased; and that said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased. The
RTC found that the deceased executed another will on December 30, 1920.

ISSUE:

W/N the April 16 will was cancelled.

HELD:

YES. With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof,
not denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled
in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to
be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation
of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain
unproved of be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot
be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of
the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent
evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it
is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his
death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person
without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of
cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong
according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the
will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.

In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the
testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been
cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in
accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of
proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence.
Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show
that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for
the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction
and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be
admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony
that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities
and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is
made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the
testator.

Molo vs. Molo G.R. No. L-2538

Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation

Facts:

Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will
contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any
forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the
probate were his nephews and nieces.

Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate
of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the
petitioner failed to prove its due execution.

As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time.
Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will.
They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid
and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the
subsequent disallowed 1939 will

RULING:

Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent
will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that
it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the
previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory
clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the
principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or
destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to
make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails
of effect for some reason.
Diaz v. De Leon G.R. No. 17714 May 31, 1922

Facts:

Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to the
requirements under the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately
returned to him. As it was returned, he instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in
the testator's presence and his nurse. After sometime, he was asked by his physician about
the incident wherein he replied that the will has already been destroyed.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING:

Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to withdraw or
change the provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own
statements to the witnesses and the mother superior of the hospital where he was
subsequently confined. The original will which was presented for probate is deemed
destroyed hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and testament of testator.