IN RE EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the
Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name
of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment
of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that
as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the
IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of
as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of
the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules
of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote
in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program
the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation
and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary.
Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment,
and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their
annual dues
CSC VS ANDAL
FACTS:

Herminigildo L. Andal, respondent, holds the position of Security Guard II in the

Sandiganbayan. He filed an application to take the Career Service Professional Examination-
Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT), was admitted to take the examination, and the result
showed that he passed with the rate of 81.03%. However, when Arlene S. Vito who claimed
to have been authorized by respondent to secure the results of the examination went to do
so, verification and comparison of the pictures attached to the Picture Seat Plan and the
identification card of Andal brought by Vito showed dissimilarity in the facial features. Civil
Service Commission National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) rendered judgment finding the
respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the
service. Aggrieved, the respondent appealed, however, it was denied. He then elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), in which the CA ruled in favor of the respondent. The
CSC filed a motion for reconsideration in the CA but was denied. Hence, the present petition
for reversal of the decision of the CA.

ISSUE: Does the CSC's disciplinary jurisdiction extend to court personnel?

HELD:

The Court recognizes the CSC's administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. Section 3,
Article IX-B of the Constitution declares the CSC as the central personnel agency of the
Government shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. But the
CA ruled that the CSC encroached upon the Supreme Courts power of administrative
supervision over court personnel. In reversing the CSC resolutions, the CA cited Section 6,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the SC shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. The CA further stated that what the
CSC should have done was to refer the administrative case for dishonesty against
respondent to the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate action instead of
resolving the case. The CSC's authority and power to hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases are not in dispute. In the present case, it cannot be said that Andal was
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CSC. This notwithstanding, the Court reiterates
that it will not and cannot tolerate dishonesty for the judiciary expects the highest standard
of integrity from all its employees. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with
an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden or
responsibility. The Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables. The instant petition is
DENIED. The Court orders CSC to refer the case of Andal to the Office of the Court
Administrator, for the filing of the appropriate administrative case against him.

JUDGE MASEDA VS OMBUDSMAN

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera
alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil
and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been
determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner
Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have
been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his
certificates of service for 17 months.

Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an

encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State
under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches
into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal
trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court
personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them
if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this
power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the
scope of their administrative duties.

DE GUZMAN VS PEOPLE
CHAVEZ VS JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

Facts:

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then,
the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously
sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase
a representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House
of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of Congress, such that the
absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses
exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate.
Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from
Congress, it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the
entire Congress.

Issue:

1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
met in this case?

2. Is the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives
making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional?

Held:

1. Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are
present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government
is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue
because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only
official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC
composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other
members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all
limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to
judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the
legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an
object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the
right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and
places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the
regular members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law,
a retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second
part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members
of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice
and a representative of Congress.

The use of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is unequivocal and
leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative
from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that
the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they
say. Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress
used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being
referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the
JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose,
that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads
the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBCs
voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be
rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile
it would be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is
sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a
voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word Congress
in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and
the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the
said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress.
Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress,
the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction
of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be
said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no

duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed
at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous
to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is
essential in the interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter
of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the
accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance
upon a law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No.
202242, July 17, 2012)

JARDELEZA VS SERENO

Facts:
Following Justice Abads compulsory retirement, the JBC announced the application or
recommendations for the position left by the Associate Justice. Jardeleza, the incumbent
Sol-Gen at the time, was included in the list of candidates. However, he was informed
through telephone call from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself CJ Sereno, will be
invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the so-called unanimity rule against him. Generally,
the rule is that an applicant is included in the shortlist when s/he obtains affirmative vote of
at least a majority of all the members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,
however, is invoked because an applicants integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is
required. Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available on June 30, 2014 before
the JBC during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.

Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to exercise its supervisory power and direct
the JBC to, among others, give Jardeleza a written notice and sworn written statements of
his oppositors or any documents in the JBC hearings, and to disallow CJ Sereno from
participating in the voting process for nominees on June 30, 2014.

During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio appeared and disclosed a
confidential information which, to CJ Sereno, characterized Jardelezas integrity as
dubious. Jardeleza demanded that CJ Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying her
objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He
also requested deferment of the JBC proceedings, as the SC en banc has yet to decide in
his letter-petition.

However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be
included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist of 4 nominees. It was
revealed later that there were actually 5 nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but 1
nominee could not be included because of the invocation of the unanimity rule..

Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65 with prayer for TRO to compel the
JBC to include him in the list of nominees on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted
with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number
of votes to qualify for the position.

Political Law
Issue: W/N the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in JBC proceedings
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not mean that an
applicants access to the rights afforded under the due process clause is discretionary on
the part of JBC.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC
proceedings. Notwithstanding being a class of its own, the right to be heard and to
explain ones self is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicants qualifications is
raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBCs duty to
recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process.
Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of
its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is
afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the
situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious
assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules
of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear
the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only
test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in
the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad.
This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 per
se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of
due process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the unanimity rule as it
reflects the JBCs policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the
Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the
ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no
vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to
observe the minimum requirements of due process. ##

Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case
Yes. Jardelezas allegations in his petitions merits the exercise of the Courts supervisory
authority over the JBC. Under Sec 8, Art VIII of the Constitution, the JBC shall function under
the supervision of the SC. It follows that such supervisory authority covers the overseeing of
whether the JBC complies with its own rules or not.

Issue 2: W/N a writ of mandamus is available against the JBC

No. The JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do
something.

Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to
compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or
review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public
officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.

Issue 3: W/N a writ of certiorari under Sec 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is available against
the JBC (which is not exercising quasi-judicial functions)
Yes. Under the expanded jurisdiction or expanded power of judicial review vested to the SC
by the 1987 Constitution, a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of
any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. ##

AGUINALDO VS PRESIDENT B AQUINO III

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DISMISSES the instant Petition for Quo Warranto
and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit. The Court DECLARES the clustering of
nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the appointments of
respondents Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine Faith A. Econg,
together with the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, as
VALID. The Court further DENIES the Motion for Intervention of the Judicial and Bar Council in
the present Petition, but ORDERS the Clerk of Court En Banc to docket as a separate
administrative matter the new rules and practices of the Judicial and Bar Council which the
Court took cognizance of in the preceding discussion as Item No. 2: the deletion or non-
inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8,
Section 1 of JBC-009; and Item No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court as consultants of the Judicial and Bar Council, referred to in pages 35 to
40 of this Decision. The Court finally DIRECTS the Judicial and Bar Council to file its comment
on said Item Nos. 2 and 3 within thirty (30) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

Without notice, warning, or explanation to the Supreme Court En Banc, Chief Justice Sereno
recently unceremoniously relieved Supreme Court Associate Justices Presbiterio J. Velasco,
Jr. and Teresita J. LeonardoDe Castro as JBC consultants, and in their stead, the Chief Justice
appointed retired Chief Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Artemio V. Panganiban, and Reynato
S. Puno as JBC consultants. The experience and wisdom of the three retired Chief Justices are
undisputed. However, practicality and prudence also dictate that incumbent Associate
Justices of the Court should be retained as JBC consultants since their interest in the Judiciary
is real, actual, and direct. Incumbent Associate Justices of the Court are aware of the
present state, needs, and concerns of the Judiciary, and consultants from the Court, even if
they have no right to vote, have served, from the organization of the JBC, as the only link to
the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC under the 1987 Constitution. . . . . .
..

These changes in settled rules and practices recently adopted by the JBC under Chief
Justice Sereno are disconcerting. There appears to be a systematic move by the JBC, under
Chief Justice Sereno to arrogate to itself more power and influence than it is actually granted
by the Constitution and this Court, and at the same time, to ease out the Court from any
legitimate participation in the nomination process for vacancies in the Judiciary, specifically,
in the Supreme Court. This behooves the Court, through the exercise of its power of
supervision over the JBC, to take a closer look into the new rules and practices of the JBC
and ensure that these are in accord with the 1987 Constitution, the pertinent laws, and the
governmental policies of transparency and accountability in the nomination process for
vacancies in the Judiciary.

..

The Court had recognized that [ s ]upervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active
power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts
and conditions in order to render the power real and effective.

In the exercise of its power of supervision over the JBC, the Court shall take up the
aforementioned Item Nos. 2 and 3 as a separate administrative matter and direct the JBC to
file its comment on the same.
NITAFAN VS COMMISSIONER

152 SCRA 284 Political Law Constitutional Law The Judicial Department Judicial
Autonomy Income Tax Payment By The Judiciary
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to
prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a
diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the
Court en banc had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice which directs the
continued withholding of taxes of the justices and the judges of the judiciary but the SC
decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue once and for all.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income
tax.
HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations, was
NOT to exempt justices and judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just like
members of the other branches of the government, are subject to income taxation. What is
provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their
continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and
caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax
as well as other members of the judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased?
Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the judiciary and
such increase will immediately take effect thus the incumbent members of the judiciary (at
the time of the passing of the law increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary but such
will only be applicable to members of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER the effectivity
of such law.
Note: This case abandoned the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and in Endencia vs David.

PERFECTO VS MEER

FACT
In April 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay
income tax upon his salary as member of the Court during the year 1946. After paying the
amount, he instituted an action in Manila Court of First Instance contending that the
assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes
thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. It provides in its Article VIII, Section 9
that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office.

ISSUE
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a
diminution.
 HELD
Yes, the imposition of the income tax upon the salary of Justice Perfecto amount to a
diminution thereof. The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to
be directed against all diminution, whether for one purpose or another. The fathers of the
Constitution intended to prohibit diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that they
regarded the independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue
that could come from taxing their salaries. Thus, taxing the salary of a judge as a part of his
income is a violation of the Constitution.

ENDENCIA VS DAVID

93 Phil. 699 Political Law The Judiciary Te Legislature Separation of Powers

Statutory Construction Who May Interpret Laws
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor
Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos (and other judges) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of
Republic Act No. 590 which provides that
No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from
taxation this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the executive,
to which the Internal Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that under the
Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the salaries of judges may not be diminished by
the other branches of government; that taxing their salaries is already a diminution of their
benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII, Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer
was rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts have the
power to interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590,
Congress is already encroaching upon the functions of the courts when it inserted the phrase:
payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed
by the Constitution or by law.
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution of their
salary. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, found in Section 9, Article
VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the
Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and
established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with
the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning
as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining
a term.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive
province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature
may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting
said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs
counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

OCAMPO VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

DE LA LLANA VS ALBA

112 SCRA 294 Political law Constitutional Law Political Question if there is no question
of law involved BP 129
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in
Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that
would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the
courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature
by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it
possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President
who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination
by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After
the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of
strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for
the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no
distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed
legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does
not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly
this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments.
Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions
created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly
belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power.
Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility
to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts,
the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one
not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is
to be preferred.