Is the Present Ever Present?

Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of

Presence

RUDOLF BERNET
University of Leuven

In Heidegger's appropriation, by way of a retrieval [Wiederholung],

of the tradition of philosophical thought, the question as to what time is
and how it is given occupies a key position. The question regarding the
relationship between Being and time shows itself to be the concealed
vanishing point of the works of Aristotle, Augustine, Leibniz, Kant,
Hegel, Bergson and so forth. The traditional treatment of logical
problems (e.g., the principle of contradiction, the copula in a predicative
sentence), psychological problems (the relationship between the res
cogitans and the res extensa), metaphysical problems (the distinction
between essentia and existentia) and theological problems (the concept
of creation), presupposes a particular conception of time. Heidegger's
endeavor to come to terms with the tradition thus implies, on the one
hand, a particular way of reading the texts of the philosophical tradition
with respect to their (concealed, unthought) presuppositions and, on
the other hand, an attempt to explore the encompassing ground of all
these texts with reference to a determinate (restricted) understanding of
time. Heidegger calls the method of this procedure a destruction of the
philosophical tradition and designates the understanding of Being and
2
time, presupposed by this tradition, as a metaphysics of presence.
The most general framework of the discussion before us will be
determined by the question regarding the essence of the destruction as a
particular way of appropriating traditional philosophical texts and by the
question regarding a metaphysics of presence [Anwesenheit] understood
as the now-existing present [jetzige Gegenwart]. In what follows, this

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general framework, this heuristic principle of thoughtful reading will be

put to the test by means of an interpretation of the concept of the present
presence Lgegenwdrtige Gegenwart] in Husserl's phenomenological
analyses of time. The choice of this starting point for a destructive
retrieval of the metaphysical presuppositions of Husserl's phenomenology
can finally be justified only by the result of the endeavor before us.
Nonetheless, we may fairly anticipate from the outset that the metaphysical
concept of presence [Anwesenheit], in a philosophy which determines
Being as the (possible) being-given for a subject of cognition, must have
undergone an unusually pregnant crystallization. Furthermore, it is the
stated aim of the phenomenological reduction to reconstruct the sense
and validity of all Being with respect to the present presence of an object
for an absolutely present and presencing transcendental spectator.
To be sure, the carrying out of this destructive analysis of the
Husserlian concept of the present presence would bear little fruit
philosophically were it merely to serve the purpose of convicting Husserl
of an error characteristic for the entire pre-Heideggerian philosophical
tradition. If destructive philosophy is necessarily critical, then we may
not become so absorbed in the critique of Husserl as to forget the critique
of Heidegger. In what follows, I should like to show that a critical
interpretation of Husserl's analyses of time, an interpretation inspired by
Heidegger, will at the same time make problematical Heidegger's
concept of a metaphysics of presence as well as his procedure of
retrieving the traditional philosophical texts by giving thought to the
unthought. Husserl's analysis of the present presence can be interpreted
at once (and ultimately indeterminably), on the one hand, as the zenith of
the metaphysics of presence and, on the other hand, as an attempt to
derive the presence of the now-existing present from the absence of the
not-now. Thus, for example, Husserl's determination of the relationship
between primordial impression and retention is by no means unambiguous.
On the one hand, retention may be interpreted in the sense of the
metaphysics of presence as a derivative modification of the consciousness
of the now. On the other hand, however, it may be interpreted as a
differential repetition [Wiederholung] of the primordial impression, a
repetition in which, for the first time and after the fact [nachtrdglich], the
consciousness of the now becomes conscious of itself. The latter
interpretation finds additional confirmation in the circular definition of
the primordial-impressional consciousness of the now, that is, in the
impossibility of defining the now by means of the now. Also, Husserl's
vacillation as to whether retention should be conceived as a perceptive or
a re-presenting [vergegenwdrtigendes] consciousness is an expression of
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the same ambilvalent attitude vis-a-vis the metaphysically inspired

analysis of time. So, too, Husserl's description of the absolute, primordial-
temporal consciousness and his determination of the relationship
between the retentional and the reflexive self-consciousness of the
absolute consciousness, may be interpreted at the same time as a
confirmation and as an overcoming of a metaphysical concept of time.
These ambiguities result from the fact that, while Husserl's reduction to
the present presence begins with the exclusion and thus with the
suppression of absence, yet this excluded element necessarily co-
determines the sense of the reductive residue, that is, the repressed
element returns. Conversely, these ambiguities are no less a sign of the
fact that a thinking which wishes to overcome the metaphysics of
presence destructively, at the same time necessarily presupposes this
metaphysics.
Accordingly, our question regarding the metaphysical presuppositions
of Husserl's concept of the present presence will lead us to a result
analogous to Derrida's critical retrieval of the Heideggerian interpretation
of the analysis of time elaborated by Aristotle and Hegel. Derrida's
careful and exemplary reinterpretation of the pertinent texts from
Aristotle and Hegel shows that, in addition to the metaphysical
conceptions emphasized one-sidely by Heidegger, these texts contain at
the same time essential elements for an overcoming of the metaphysical
concept of time. Heidegger's contrast of Hegel and Kant, as the
respective representatives of the completion and the tentative overcoming
of the understanding of time imprinted by the metaphysical tradition, is
based upon a prejudgement, that is, upon a preliminary decision for
which Heidegger gives no further account. This preliminary decision is
no merely rhetorical and didactical matter. Rather, it is the expression of
a prejudice which is itself still committed to metaphysics. Derrida
himself avoids this prejudice, the character of which is yet to be more
closely determined, by way of a double reading of the so-called
metaphysical texts. On the one hand, such a reading confirms the limits
of a metaphysics of presence; on the other hand, it presses on toward the
displacement as well as toward the delimiting surpassing of these limits
(de-limitation):

... a reading could be worked out which, in its own text,

would repeat both this limitation and its contrary. And which
should show that the de-limitation is still governed by the
same concepts as the limitation. (Ousia ... , p. 70; trans., p.
86)
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1. Deconstruction vs. Destruction

Derrida calls this reading procedure deconstruction.4 Such a de-

construction distinguishes itself from Heidegger's destructive interpreta-
tion of metaphysics in that it constitutes a novel reading (lecture) of
metaphysical texts. Those texts are metaphysical whose written production
(ectiture) is distinguished by a particular understanding of the relationship
among thinking, speaking (voix) and writing, as well as by a corresponding
use of lingual signs. Such texts are metaphysical because their
characteristic understanding of language is determined by metaphysical
concepts as well as by metaphysical processes of subordination,
negation, cancellation, eradication, exclusion and like operations upon
these concepts. The metaphysical concepts themselves generally crop
up within the philosophical tradition in the form of pairs of concepts or
conceptual oppositions such as presence and absence, essence and
existence, substance and accident, real and imaginary, eternal and
temporal, and so forth. Metaphysical thinking arranges these pairs of
concepts in a hierarchically structured conceptual system and, within
each of the individual pairs, subordinates one concept to the other. Thus,
for example, Augustine subordinates the temporally existing to the
eternally existing and the temporally absent (the past) to the temporally
present (the present or the present memory of the past). Derrida
continually emphasizes the ethical, valuational component of this
hierarchical proceeding and, on the model of Heidegger's talk about the
"onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics,"5 designates such thinking
as "ethical-ontological" (thico-ontologique).6 Just as did Heidegger
before him, Derrida, too, characterizes metaphysical thinking as a
leveling or a forgetting of the difference. Unlike (certain earlier texts of)
Heidegger, however, Derrida denies the possibility of overtaking this
forgottenness by way of a retrieval and, hence, he denies as well the
possibility of an overcoming of metaphysics. His differing with Heidegger
in this regard results essentially from his interpretation of metaphysics as
text, script, writing. Metaphysical texts cannot be translated ever further
backwards into a forgotten, primordial text. Moreover, every new text
attempting to deal critically with metaphysics, remains nonetheless
indebted to the metaphysical text. Thus, for example, Heidegger's
distinction between an authentic and a vulgar concept of time shows
clear traces of an ethically inspired metaphysical thinking.
Accordingly, the orientation through which Derrida's deconstruction
of the metaphysics of presence distinguishes itself from Heidegger's
destruction of the metaphysics of presence is ambivalent. It has to do, on
the one hand, with a radicalization of the Heideggerian procedure and,
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on the other hand, with a restriction of the possible result of this

procedure. Above all, the radicalization consists in the manner and the
proportion of the encroachment into the metaphysical text. Not only is it
the case that there belongs to every text that which is essentially
unthought and which cannot be overtaken and gathered into some
subsequent interpretation; rather, this necessarily unthought element
lacks every characteristic of primordiality. That which remained un-
thought within metaphysics is not more primordial than that which came
duly into consideration; the forgotten did not remain concealed on
account of its depth; and the memorial [andenkendes] thinking of this
concealed ground is not devoted to what is most difficult for being
nearest. That which has been forgotten in metaphysics is not simply the
shadow cast by thought and covering over the unthought. Much rather,
the boundary, the difference between the thought and the unthought, the
written and the unwritten, is a merely derived and accidentally determined
difference. It is a mere trace. Hence, the reversal (renversement) of
metaphysical values is merely a first and preparatory step in the
deconstruction. The privileging of Being over against the being, difference
over against identity, iteration over against the origin, absence over
against presence, the sign over against the intuition, the past and the
future over against the present, and so forth, requires supplementation by
way of a displacement (deplacement) of the distinction which structures
these metaphysical pairs of opposites.

The destruction... by a double gesture, a double science,

a double script, must practice a reversal of the classical
opposition and a general displacement of the system.
(Signature..., p. 392; trans., p. 195)

Such a displacement consists essentially in the differences (diffgrences)

which structure the metaphysical oppositions being displaced, deferred
(dijJrer). In this way, the metaphysical differences should remain
undecided, the tension between what is said within the text and the
unsaid which has been bracketed out of the text should not be neutralized
but rather accentuated. The deconstructive reading of a metaphysical
text displaces the accents of the text, undermines its express understanding
of itself and attends to the symptomatic traces, which have been left
behind inside the text by that which had been excluded from the text.
Such reading by displacement is a movement without an end (annulment)
[Aujhebung] and without a beginning (origin), a movement without a
rationally and fully comprehensible logic (dialectic). It is the movement
of metaphysical thinking as well as that of the deconstructive exposition
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of metaphysics, for it is the movement of the script (ectiture) as such. It is

the movement of the differance (djffirance) that steadily displaces itself
from trace to trace. The radicalization of the Heideggerian onset consists
in the assertion that there is no primordial form of the difference; it
consists in the fact that the difference left unthought by metaphysics gets
conceived as a movement, a differance diffrance) displacing itself
throughout various differences (diffrences), and that this movement is a
product of the employment of written signs, an employment which can no
more be philosophically mastered (maitrise) than it can ever really be
thought at all. Every difference is a written trace. Every trace is the trace
of a trace, the sign of a sign and not the sign of a designated `thing', not the
derived or possibly the falsified representation of the primordial truth. At
the same time, however, every trace is the trace of a trace. There is no
new and critical philosophical text able fully to loose itself from a
preceding metaphysical text, much less to overcome that text. It is this
which constitutes what we have already alluded to as the restriction of
the result able to be expected from a Heideggerian destruction of
metaphysics. Philosophizing is writing. Every writing necessarily refers
to other texts, while various texts get linked together into a loose network
without a primordial text and without a final text. There is no primordial
text because there is no presence which would precede and determine
such a text and there is no final text because every new text introduces
anew an unsaid and unwritten moment. A text turned against the
tradition of metaphysical texts is, to be sure, a "wholly different text,"
but as a text it is nonetheless prefigured in the metaphysical text.

In order to surpass [excgderl metaphysics, it is necessary that

a trace be inscribed in the metaphysical text, a trace which
points not toward another presence or another form of
presence, but toward another text. Such a trace cannot be
conceived more metaphysico [ ... J. It (is) that which must
elude mastery [maitrise]. (Ousia..., p. 76; trans., p. 91 )

2. The Metaphysical Concept of Time

A formal and empty portrayal, such as this, of Derrida's conception of

a possible deconstruction of metaphysics, will inevitably encounter lack
of understanding and even downright scepticism. For this reason, in the
remainder of this text, our portrayal must be critically tested and vividly
elucidated by means of an interpretation of the Husserlian analysis of
time, an interpretation which, though inspired by Derrida, is itself
displaced in turn. Before we can devote ourselves to the deconstructive
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interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology of internal time-consciousness,

however, we must first call to mind several theses which, according to the
concurring judgements of Heidegger and Derrida, characterize in
general what we would call a metaphysical conception of time. In doing
so, we may confine ourselves to those theses which seem to be applicable
to Husserl's analysis of time and whose concrete application we shall
subsequently want to follow in the Husserlian text itself. This examination
of the metaphysical context of Husserl's phenomenology of time will
then lead us back to the question whether this (like every other)
metaphysical text does not already prefigure a non-metaphysical text, a
non-metaphysical conception of time and of phenomenology.
The traditional philosophical understanding of time probably finds its
most pregnant expression in classical physics, and especially in the
Newtonian image of the world. In consequence of scientific theory
"streaming into" the praxis of the life-world, this traditional concept of
time from philosophy and physics has come also to determine the
everyday, prescientific, "naturalistic-objectivistic" (Husserl) or "vulgar"
(Heidegger) image of time held by modem humanity. In this view, time is
closely associated with space and understood as a reference system
which localizes things. Space-time, as a system of manifold points,
allows diverse things to be distinguished from one another and, at the
same time, placed in relation to one another. In virtue of their occupying
a spatio-temporal point, things are individuated, their movement is
determined as a successive occupation of diverse points in space and the
movement of one body provides the impetus for the movement of another
body. Hence, like space, time is a formal or empty coordinate system that
localizes entities of determinate content but subsists independent of
these entities, that is, in itself or "absolutely" (Newton). This formal
system of possible temporal points is an encompassing, uniform nexus, a
determining container of manifold events absolutely determined in
relation to one another. Events are temporally determined insofar as
they take up a place inside of this encompassing system. They are
present-at-hand [vorhanden] in time, that is, "something intratemporally
present-at-hand [innerzeitig Vorhandenes]" (Heidegger).
As a uniform, encompassing, empty container, time has especial
relation to a particular class of physical facts, namely, those bearing on
the movement of bodies. The famous and to this day instructive
reflections which Aristotle devoted to the connection between time and
movement in Physics 0, yield the insight that time is the measuring and
measured measure of an irreversible elapsation whose elementary
structure is understood as a transition from one point to another. The
analogue which immediately suggests itself, and whose temptation
92

Aristotle sought bravely to withstand, is that of the line produced in the

transition from one point to another point. The points represent the
constantly, newly emergent now, while the line represents the temporal
lapse, conceived as a continuous transition from the now to a new now
following immediately upon it, and so on. The movement of the hands of
the clock sweeping incessantly through the fixed divisions of the dial, was
felt to provide such a happy means of illustrating this conception of time
that the movement of the clock came more and more to count as the
movement of time itself. For Newton, finally, the whole of nature was
none other than a perfectly built clock. Yet even a cursory consideration
of a classical timepiece comes up against the limitations and inadequacies
of a linear image of time. The now, designated by the continually new
positions of the second-hand, is, on the one hand, a constantly different
now and yet, on the other hand, precisely the same, now-existing now. It
thus becomes questionable whether the now flows in and with the
temporal streaming or whether it does not much rather, standing
constant, scan the temporal movement. One then begins to doubt as well
whether the now, conceived as a point, may even be called temporal.
Along the winding paths of his meditation on the mode of Being
and the nature of time, Aristotle, too, had already encountered questions
such as these. One finds in his work the reflection that the presently
existing now, understood as a point, is not temporal, and that the
temporal now is either not-yet or no-longer present, and hence is not at
all. It can be concluded from this either that the now "is" and that time,
accordingly, is not, or that time is not built up out of now-points and "is"
only as the current process of the self-engendering line. The two
conclusions result each from a different determination of the nature of the
relation between point and line and, with a wonderworking application of
the metaphysical distinction between potency and act, Aristotle attacks
head-on the dialectical tension between the two determinations. Here we
are interested in the Aristotelian doctrine of time only insofar as it
operates with a system of theses, concepts and questions, of which
Husserl, too, still makes use. First of all, there is the thesis that Being is
temporally determined and must be understood as being present in the
present. This presently existing presence is structured from the stand-
point of the concept of the now as a maximal givenness on the borderline
between streaming time and stationary eternity. This limiting concept of
the present as a point is referred to a mode of temporality only when the
now-existing present is brought into an insoluble, linear and irreversible
connection with the not-now-existing future and past. In this way, the
temporal absence of the not-now-existing present is grasped as the
potential presence of a now, as a not-yet-now and as a no-longer-now.
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Thus, the now-existing present is at once source, motor and measure of

all that is temporally. What is temporally, is in time; and time is thereby
conceived in analogy with the mathematically determinable continuity
of space. According to Aristotle, the mode of movement that is measured
by time, as well as the measure of this movement, is not present in space at
all but rather in the soul. Both counting and the counted, move within the
inner space of the soul. Time is thus always sensed time and, ultimately,
the sensations themselves, the movements of the soul, are temporally
sensed. It would seem to us, therefore, that this reading of the
Aristotelian analysis of time leads us to the verge of the Kantian concept
of time as the pure self-affection which permits the sequence of self-
succeeding nows to arise. Viewed historically, however, it is not Kant's
concept of temporality as self-affection which follows upon Aristotle's
insertion of time into the soul, but rather Augustine's determination of
temporal Being as the object of a presently actual representation.
Under the obvious influence of Aristotle, Augustine, too, occupies
himself with the question concerning the non-Being of that which is not
now. With him, however, the distinction between Being and non-Being,
eternity and time, comes immediately to be understood theologically and
with reference to ideas concerning the creation. What is important in the
context of our investigation is the thought that-irrespective of the
distinction between the temporal motion and alteration of human
existence and the changeless, eternal Being of God-the human
experience of time can be understood in analogy with the presence of the
creation to its divine creator. Just as the world, in spite of its temporality,
is present [anwesend] to God in constant presence [Gegenwart], so, too,
not only the present, but also the future and the past and hence the whole
movement of time, stretching out of the future by way of the present into
the past, is presently and intuitively given to man. Man has the
representational activity of his consciousness to thank for this wonderful
command of time. Just as the present is comprehended intuitively in
present attention, so the future is comprehended in present anticipation
and the past in present memory. One may fittingly maintain that the
tradition of the metaphysical analysis of time, following Augustine and
on up to Bergson and Husserl, is nothing but a constantly thinking anew
this same thought. Augustine distinguishes himself from Aristotle
primarily by deflecting the ontological problem of the non-Being of past
and future in the direction of the epistemological establishment of the
possibility of a present and perceptive-intuitive representation of the past
and the future. Therewith, the problem of time becomes the problem of
the possible perception of temporally determined objects and the basic
concept structuring the analysis of time comes to be understood as the
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now-existing representation of a now-existing object. It follows from

this that in addition to the time of the object there is, corresponding
representationally with the latter, a time of the subject even such that true
knowledge will be grounded in the concern for the conformity of these
two forms of time with one another. The full coincidence of both forms of
time, a coincidence which in turn is regarded from the standpoint of the
now-existing comprehension of a now-existing object, functions thereby
as the ideal. Insofar as it has now become questionable, however,
whether the isolated now-point is still to be considered a modality of time
at all, the ideal of a true knowledge of time would seem to be reached only
in the overcoming or annulment of time.
The meditation on time inaugurated by Augustine combines the
presuppositions of a natural or "vulgar" understanding of time with a
series of unnatural suspensions or reductions. Thenceforth time came
to be contemplated in analogy with space, namely, as a uniformly
encompassing container and coordinate system of events; as the
measure of a continuous movement scanned by the now-point; as an
irreversible passing away of the future, become present, into the
present, now past. The epistomologically oriented analysis of time
further enlarges upon the natural presupposition of the priority of the
now-existing present. In doing so, however, it makes use of the
unnatural reduction of the bygone present to the present memory of
the past; the reduction of an absence mediated by signs, images,
phantasy and so forth, to a representational and immediately intuitable
presence; the reduction of a steadily changing self-differentiation to
the reflection and scientific statements which mirror this differentiation
in its unvarying structure. Husserl's concept of the reduction of all
Being to its possible givenness for a present and transcendental
consciousness which is absolutely present to itself, would thus seem
to be inextricably intertwined with this metaphysical understanding of
time. On the other hand, Husserl's onsets toward a different under-
standing of time must be appreciated as onsets toward a distancing
from that idea of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction.

3. Basic Metaphysical Concepts in Husserl's Analysis of Time

It is primarily because of their onset and development within the

compass of the problematic of perception that Husserl's analyses of
time remain metaphysically inspired. Time is introduced as a determina-
tion of perceptual objects which is analoguous to space, and phe-
nomenology investigates the intuitive givenness of these objects in
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intentional consciousness. Just as transcendent spatiality can be

perceived only by a preempirical, spatial consciousness, so, too, the
perception of objective time requires the assumption of an immanent
temporality of time-consciousness itself. Furthermore, since perceptual
givenness is understood as a mirroring representation of its object,
the phenomenological analysis of the perception of temporal duration
naturally leads to a description of the temporal duration of perception.
Perception itself thus becomes an (immanent), temporal object whose
temporal determinateness is comprehended by a new and deeper-
seated perception. This is the setting in which Husserl's early analyses
of time unfold and with which the Bemauer manuscripts of 1917
continue to attempt to come to terms. In what follows we want
briefly to elucidate the metaphysical schema of the Husserlian analysis
of time and in doing so to pay particular attention to the determination
of the present consciousness of a temporally enduring object.
Husserl defines perception as an intentional act distinguished from
all other intentional acts by the eminent form of the intuitive givenness
of its object. In perceptual consciousness, the object is not represented,
for example, by means of signs, but rather is given itself in originary
presence. The presence of the perceptual object distinguishes itself as
well from that of the remembered object in that it manifests an
immediate unity of the act with its corporeally given object. Accordingly,
the perceptual presence is determined as the now-existing, intuitive
comprehension of a now-existing, corporeally present object. Both
determinations of this presence, its corporeality as well as its instan-
taneousness in the moment, are explored within the framework of a
representationalistic concept of consciousness. Perceptual conscious-
ness is an inner stage upon which only conscious shapes can perform,
but shapes which are themselves the reality being enacted as it
appears. This paradoxical determination results from the fact that
Husserl's concept of perception both presupposes and negates the
distinction between immanent and transcendent Being. The double
movement constituting this paradox is mirrored again in the way that
perceptual consciousness itself is built up, consisting as it does of
representational data of sensation as well as intentional acts. On the
one hand, therefore, perception is determined empiricistically as an
imprinted trace of reality while, on the other hand, it is determined
intellectualistically as an intentional, doxical activity of consciousness.
Husserl mediates this opposition by way of the thesis that sensations
portray reality only insofar as they are intentionally apprehended and
that intentional acts perceive reality only insofar as they are ap-
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prehensions of sensations. We cannot now enter into a discussion of

the descent of this model of perception from linguistic philosophy;
nor can we take up the matter of the ambiguity of this model's
concept of sensation, an ambiguity which was rather more sharply
accentuated than overcome by Husserl. What is of great importance
for Husserl's analysis of time, however, is the fact that the described
process of perceptual representation is defined as a process of objective
constitution. The intuitional interconnection of manifold perceptual
acts or appearances, synthetically unified by way of fulfillment, deter-
mines the sense and validity of the perceptual object. The reality of
the perceptual object is not the cause of the perceptual representation.
On the contrary, this representation first of all builds up the real
object step by step. The phenomenological determination of the
perceptual object thus converges with the epistemological and there-
fore intuitively demonstrative experiential (re-)construction of this
object.
The unity between the content of sensation and its intentional
apprehension must therefore be constituted in such a way that it can
account for the material determination, for the spatial localization and
extension, as well as for the temporal localization and, if need be,
extension of the perceptual object. If the perceptual presence is a now-
existing, intuitive comprehension of a now-existing object, then the
question poses itself for the phenomenologist as to how the now of the
object is to be constituted in the now of the act, this act consisting of the
apprehension and its content. Husserl's answer to this question leads
from the apprehension of the objective now, back to the analysis of the
characteristic "temporal form of the <now-existing> sensation," the
sensation which gets apprehended (cf., Hu X. 3 1).' This "impression
of temporal position [Zeitstellenimpression]" is distinguished above all
other forms of representational contents by its primordiality. It "is the
absolutely unmodified, the primordial source of all further consciousness
and Being." For this reason, Husserl calls it the "primordial impression
[ Urimpression]". The primordial impression, constituting, as it does, the
objective now, is the temporal form of the sensation which emerges in
consciousness for the first time and with the character of absolute novelty
and singularity. The apprehension of the primordial impression, that is,
the perception of the objective "now-point", is, however, like every
pointlike givenness "only an ideal limit" in the "continuum" of the
process of perception (Hu X. 16). Unlike Brentano and Meinong,
Husserl does not permit himself to be seduced by the metaphysically
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motivated priority of the now into excluding the possible perception of a

not-now-existing object. He cannot shut himself off from the insight that
even enduring objects like tones or melodies are perceived in their
duration and not merely phantasized or reconstructed through the
subsequent synopsis of isolated now-moments. To be sure, perceptual
givenness is centered in the now, but it is surrounded by a horizon marked
off by the retentional consciousness of past now-points and the protentional
consciousness of future now-points. Examined more closely, the perceptual
consciousness of the continuous succession of now-points is possible
only because, taken for itself as future, present, past and still further
past..., every now-point remains continuously within consciousness;
because its coming-to-be and passing-away are perceived in the continuum
of the steadily varying modes of appearance. We now want to see how
Husserl attempts to determine this phenomenological finding within the
boundaries of his metaphysical starting point.
Husserl conceives the alteration of the mode of temporal givenness of
a selfsame, objective tone-point, in analogy with the diverse, perspectival
modes of appearance or "adumbrations" of a spatial object. Diverse
perspectives refer to a system of spatial orientation centered in a "null-
point of orientation" and structured from the standpoint of this center.
The changing modes of appearance of the tone-point, which is given as
future, present, past and still further past..., are diverse modes of the
temporal orientation of a selfsame object. These modes of the temporal
orientation of an object refer to a null-point in the orientation of a
perceptual act, a point situated in the now-existing present. This
centering in the null-point must be understood in such a way as to make
clear that both the protentional givenness of the tone appearing as future
and the retentional givenness of the tone appearing as past, are variations
or "modifications" of the primordial-impressional givenness of the
selfsame tone appearing as now-existent. The precise determination of
the essence of this protentional or retentional modification of primordial-
impressional givenness is the nucleus of Husserl's analysis of time and
hence constitutes the site where the question must be posed, whether
Husserl does not at the same time turn away from the metaphysical
understanding of time. We shall later return to this question in detail. If
for the time being, however, we continue to adhere to the metaphysical
understanding of time which dominates the Husserlian texts, then
"modification" means that retentional (as also protentional) givenness
presupposes primordial-impressional givenness both genetically and
logically.
98

It is precisely this primordial consciousness which passes

over into the retentional modification[ ... ]: were it not
present, then retention would be unthinkable. (Hu X. App.
IX)

Retention is thereby not only the retention of the preceding primordial

impression but is moreover an interconnection of retentional givenness
constantly modified and enriched by the continuous emergence of new
primordial impressions. We have a 'first' primordial impression (= P.)
and a subsequent primordial impression (= P1). Associated with the
latter is a first retention (= Ro) of Po. Already with the further ensuing
primordial impression (= P2), however, there is a second retention (=
Tri) of the preceding primordial impression (= P, ) and of its concomitant
retention (= Ro): P2 - Ri <P, - Ro (Po)>. Hence, in the thus constantly
modified, intentional datum, there appears not only a selfsame, primordial-
impressional now in diverse manner, that is, as sinking steadily further
into the past; rather, there appears at the same time the past succession of
diverse primordial impressions. Retentional and protentional data
thereby surround the primordial-impressional perception of a now-
existing tone much as in 'outer' perception the object standing in the
center of attention is surrounded by a horizon of other objects or other
appearances of the same object.
As long as we fail to make problematic this assimilation of the
experience of temporal objects to the perception of spatial objects,
nothing would seem to stand in the way of transferring the schema
'apprehension and content-of-apprehension' from the outer perception
of the thing to the inner perception of the tone. For the sake of simplicity,
let us confine ourselves to the "cross-sectional perception" of the tonal
duration, that is, to the duration of the temporal object just as it gets
investigated, in the present, in the now-phase of perception, surrounded
by protention and retention! If this present perceptual phase is analyzed
within the framework of the schema, then it must be built up out of
diverse apprehensions which, respectively, are related intentionally to
the objective now as also to the past and the future of the tonal duration.
Husserl brings the diverse directions or the diverse temporal dimensions
of these apprehensions into connection with the diversity of the contents
of the latter. Only the primordial impression apperceived in the
apprehension of the now is an impressional datum of sensation, while the
retentional and protentional apprehensions are related to modified
primordial impressions which Husserl often calls "phantasms" (Hu X.
19). Only if it exists now, however, can such a phantasm be
apperceived by a now-existing retentional apprehension as a datum of an
 99

objective past. But how is a now-existing apprehension of a now-existing

phantasm supposed to make possible the perception of the past of a tone?
This assertation becomes all the more incomprehensible if one recalls
the argument adduced against Brentano right at the beginning of the
lecture of 1905. According to this argument, the "idea of the past" could
never spring from a content of consciousness that were characterized as
'past' but were present now (Hu X. 6). More than three years were
required for Husserl to realize that, in consequence of this, the now-
existing interconnection between the "coexistent primary contents" and
the likewise coexistent apprehensions "simultaneously" related to these
contents, is never able to explain the perception of an objective duration
(Hu X. No. 49). At the time this lecture was presented, however, Husserl
was of the contrary opinion that the difficulty pointed out in Brentano's s
doctrine could be overcome by way of a clearer distinction between
apprehension and the content of apprehension. The reader can scarcely
help ascribing this hope in a hopeless affair to a metaphysical belief.
Husserl continued to preserve this hopeless belief even when he had
already taken clearly into account the distinction between the perception
of transcendent, temporal objects, and the experiences of immanent,
temporal objects, as well as the consequence of this distinction for the
systematics of the phenomenological analysis of time (cf., Hu X. No.
39). The appearances of transcendent objects no less than the purely
temporally determined objects (e.g., tones, irrespective of their appercep-
tive integration into physical, spatial reality) are immanent objects which
are comprehended in a deeper-seated, "absolute," temporal conscious-
ness. Thus, there are two stages of immanence or two stages of
consciousness constitutive of temporal objects and Husserl does not
hesitate to designate as "perception" or "representation" even the
absolute "flow of consciousness" which "constitutes" immanent,
temporal objects. Moreover, like the perception of spatio-temporal
objects, the perception of immanent, temporal objects is supposed to be
built up out of "apprehensions" and corresponding contents of
apprehension. The most elementary form of the constitution of the
temporal continuity of an immanent tone is consummated in a now-
phase of the absolute consciousness, a phase of consciousness which,-
as the uniform interconnection of retentional, primordial-impressional
and protentional apprehensions, or of their corresponding contents,-
perceives momentarily and simultaneously the past moments, the now-
existing moments and the future moments in the succession of tones. In
this case, of course, it can be objected that a now-existing, retentional
apprehension of a now-existing content would never be able to perceive
the past of an immanent temporal object. Also in this case, it is more
100

difficult than ever to see why the perception of objective, temporal

forms, no less than the essentially merely partial perception of three
dimensional spatiality, must be supported by intermediate terms in the
form of representational contents. If Husserl believes it necessary to
mediate the interconnection of two dimensions of consciousness,
namely, the connection between absolute consciousness and immanent,
temporal objects (such as acts of transcending perception or sequences
of tones), by way of such representational intermediaries as we have
described, then he once again falls victim to the metaphysical under-
standing of time inspired by the model of spatial perception. By contrast
with this, it is important to establish that the retentionally experienced
past of immanent, temporal objects is never represented in now-existing,
really immanent [reell] contents of consciousness; and that the constitution
of a spatio-temporal, identical-objective past, is not the affair of a
perceptual apprehension but rather an achievement of consciousness
qua memory. This insight was granted Husserl only after his labors had
won him a new understanding of the connection between present and
past, an understanding which deviated from that of the metaphysical
tradition.
Before beginning to analyze these onsets toward a new understanding
of time, we want to cast a final glance at the metaphysical determination
of absolute consciousness. Intentional acts, but also tones and the like,
are temporal processes whose temporality is "constituted" in the
"absolute Being" of the "flow of consciousness." Without this "possible
possessing and apprehending of the tone" by consciousness, the tone
would be nothing (Hu X. No. 39). It is not only the determination of the
absolute consciousness as "immanent perception" which is metaphysically
inspired. Likewise metaphysical in its conception is the related determina-
tion of immanent time as a time belonging to objects which, as inner
temporal objects, are regarded as being analogous with outer, temporal
objects. The thesis that all objects are in time and are given in another
time is also metaphysically inspired: Things are in objective time and
appear in immanent time; their appearances are in immanent time and
are given in the flow of absolute consciousness. But what of the flow of
absolute consciousness itself? Does it not, as a flow, consist of temporal
phases existing within absolute time and hence given within a still deeper
consciousness (etc)? Both the metaphysical understanding of temporal
experience as perception mediated by representational contents and
the double structure of the metaphysical concept of intratemporality
become entangled in the classical difficulty of an infinite regress. The
transcendental-philosophical ideal of catching one's own tail issues in
Achilles' unavailing hunt for the turtle. We shall see further on, that the
 101

new description of the self-appearance of the absolute flow, even though

it turns away from the metaphysical model of self-reflection, does not yet
succeed thereby in freeing Husserl from the bane of an infinite regress.
Even in the Bemauer manuscripts (L I21, 1917), Husserl seems still to
be tempted to put up with this inconvenience and, against all his
principles, to grant the existence of an "unconscious" consciousness of
time. He is willing to do so for the sole sake of salvaging the possibility of
an immediately actual presence to itself on the part of the flow of absolute
consciousness.
In all of its aspects, and without exception, Husserl's appropriation of
the tradition of the metaphysical analysis of time appears to be aligned
toward the ideal of the now-existing consciousness becoming absolutely
present for itself. The current self-presence of consciousness is at once
the source and the culmination of all perceptual givenness of intratemporal
objects. The distinction between the temporality of perception and that
of the perceived as well as their representationally conceived connection;
the divergence of objective, temporal positions, as well as their mediation
by means of the linear movement of the temporal flow; the difference
between the now-existing present and the past as well as their annulment
in memory in its identical re-presentation of the bygone now, and so
forth; are, as different configurations of consciousness, at the same time,
indices of that identity of subject and object by which the essence of
Being-conscious {Bewusst-Sein} is ultimately determined. This identity
of now-existing self-consciousness is at once the origin, the measure and
the annulment of temporal and spatial distance. All of this is true and
Husserl's analyses of time can properly be appreciated as a highpoint of
what we have described as the metaphysical tradition. Nevertheless,
Husserl's assertions regarding time are not always metaphysical. On the
contrary, they are at times quite unmetaphysical. His unmetaphysical
assertions are not somehow better than his metaphysical assertions,
however, and their saying what they say always points to something
metaphysically unsaid, as it were. Moreover, Husserl's texts are not only
cleft into a metaphysical and an unmetaphysical side; they also unfold on
different levels. The difference among levels of primary concern to us
here is that between the phenomenological description as such and the
methodological reflection related to this description, that is, the arrange-
ment of the phenomena described into an integrated, philosophical
system. Let us state the matter somewhat schematically: Very few of
Husserl's phenomenological analyses actually proffer what Husserl
expected from them and Husserl's texts usually accomplish something
quite different from what Husserl pretends to accomplish. What Husserl
pretends to accomplish is usually metaphysically determined, whereas
102

what he describes often runs counter to his metaphysical understanding

of himself. In order to eludicate this assertion, we want to have another
look at Husserl's decisive statements regarding the connection between
primordial impression and retention as well as that between absolute
consciousness and the self-givenness of this consciousness.

4. Primordial-impressional and Retentional Consciousness of the Now

Husserl defines retention as "a momentary consciousness of the

elapsed phase" (Hu X. App. IX; cf. also, 11-13, No. 47). Retention
is a rather peculiar form of intentional consciousness, for it is neither an
independent, intentional act, nor is it directed toward an intentional
object. Retentional consciousness is the appendage of a currently
present, primordial impression, which holds both the preceding,
primordial impression and the concomitant, preceding retention firmly
within consciousness.

Inasmuch as every phase is retentionally conscious of the

preceding phase, it encloses within itself, in a chain of
mediate intentions, the entire series of elapsed retentions.
(Hu X. App. IX)

The succession of elapsed retentions, that is, of elapsed but retained

primordial impressions, is not, however, "really-immanently" [reell]
enclosed within the retentional consciousness. Nevertheless, the
primordial impression retained in retention is not merely represented as
if by an image. Rather, it itself is given in intuition. Retention,
accordingly, is an intentional, present and intuitive consciousness of a
past presence of consciousness which is presently maintained even
though it is not experienced as an intentional object. However finely
balanced and carefully elaborated this definition of retention may seem
to be, it nonetheless occasions the greatest embarrassment for the
experienced reader of the Husserlian texts. What is an intentional
consciousness without an intentional object? How can Husserl continue
to designate retention as perception if retention is the present conscious-
ness of a bygone present-consciousness? And how can retention be in
turn designated as "sensation," if it is supposed to refer intentionally to a
moment of consciousness which does not really-immanently inhabit it
(Ms. L / 75; 6a, 1917)? All of these questions are warranted and
necessitate a more precise determination of that which Husserl calls
 103

retentional consciousness. What suggests itself immediately is that we

search for possible answers to these questions by way of clarifying the
foundational relationship that holds sway between the primordial-
impressional and the retentional modes of consciousness of the now.
Most of Husserl's statements leave little doubt that he regarded
retention as a mere appendage of the primordial-impressional conscious-
ness of the now. He compares the flowing consciousness of the now with
the shining path of a comet and the steadily self-modifying retentional
consciousness with a "comet's tail" (Hu X. No. 54). The "retentional
tail" (Hu X. 16) is thus not a fixed existence which the primordial
impression would drag along behind it like the tail of a paper kite. It is
much rather the trace left behind in consciousness by the flow of the now-
point. According to the common understanding, a trace is a temporally
displaced indication of the existence and movement of some entity,
whether known or unknown. So, too, one can leave traces behind or
subsequently detect traces. Now according to Husserl, retention should
be a trace left behind by a primordial impression: Were the incipient
phase of a mental process [Erlebnis] "experienced only by retention,
then it would remain unintelligible what it is that confers upon it its
"
distinction as a 'now' at all (Hu X. App. IX). But how does the
definition run regarding this consciousness of the now, this consciousness
which is "characterized thoroughly positively," which is not "experienced
only post-factually [nachtrdglichl" but rather primordially and pre-
liminarily ? Husserl's answer, as honest as it is astonishing, runs as
follows:

The primordial impression is the primordial temporal form of

sensation, [...] the temporal form [...] of the sensation of the
momentary now-point, and it is only this. But actually the
now-point must itself be defined by the primordial sensation,
so that the proposition just uttered need hold only as a hint of
what is supposed to be meant. (Hu X. 31 )

The primordial impression distinguishes itself over against other sensations

as a sensation of the now-point, and the now-point distinguishes itself
over against other temporal positions as a primordially-impressionally
experienced point of time. This circular definition of the connection
between the primordial impression and the now, as well as Husserl's
concession that there can be no question here of a proper definition, is an
expression of philosophical embarrassment. This embarrassment results
from the fact that it is perhaps not at all possible to speak in a proper
104

fashion about the now-existing present and, in any event, not without
referring to a not-now. Husserl himself concedes this in the sequel to the
passage just cited.

The whole now-point, the whole originary impression under-

goes a modification by the past, and only by means of this
modification have we exhausted the concept of the now,
insofar as it is a relative concept and points to a `past', just as
'past' points to a 'now'.

If the now cannot be phenomenologically defined in exclusive relation

to its unmodified, perceptually intuitive mode of givenness, neither can it
function any longer as the "primordial-source-point" of the consciousness
of time. One is even tempted to reverse the foundational relationship and
derive the possibility of the consciousness of the present now from the
possibility of the post-factually, retentionally experienced consciousness
of the past now.8 Some of Husserl's texts point in this direction. Thus, for
example, in a vein reminiscent of Aristotle, Husserl writes that "the
consciousness of primordial sensation [...] Gis> a boundary point for
two continua, the not-yet and the no-longer" (Hu X. No. 54). Since,
however, in the case of retention, the boundary runs between the now of
retention and the retained now, the now will be found at the same time
both inside and outside the primordial-impressional boundary. The no-
longer-now, which bounds the now-point, is a different now. The real
question now is whether not only the concept but as well the consciousness
of the now does not presuppose the no-longer-Being-now, and presuppose
it necessarily.9 Certain utterances of Husserl admit of such an under-
standing. Thus, for example, he says that "[...] consciousness of the
continually new primordial present [...] is only possible owing to the
sinking of each phase [...] into the past" (Ms. L / 75: 4b, 1917). In the
same breath, however, and brooking no exception, Husserl seeks to ward
off the consequence enclosed in this insight, namely, that a newly
emergent now will be experienced in its individuality as a newly
emergent now only post-factually in the form of a past now which is
retained by retention.

<Does> [...] the incipient phase of a self-constituting

mental process [Erlebnis] [...] attain to givenness only on
. the basis of retention, and would it be 'unconscious' if no
retention were joined to it? To this it must be said: [...] were
it experienced only by retention, then it would remain
unintelligible what it is that confers upon it its distinction as a
 105

'now'. [... It is plain nonsense to speak of a content of which

we are 'unconscious' and of which we would become
conscious only post-factually. (Hu X. App. IX; emphasis
mine, R.B.)

If we survey Husserl's remarks on the foundational relationship

between primordial-impressional and retentional consciousness of the
now, we stand before a paradoxical result. On the one hand, the
retentional consciousness of the now always presupposes the primordial-
impressional consciousness of the now. The latter is the source of the
concept as well as of the "positive" "distinction" of the phenomenon of
now-existing, intuitive (self )givenness. On the other hand, from the very
beginning, this positive, phenomenological definition of the primordial-
impressional consciousness of the now gets caught up in a circular
movement. It would seem that this circular movement could be
interrupted only by someone stepping out of the closed circle of the
immediate self-reference of the now and grasping the now with respect to
retentional consciousness as a consciousness of the now affecting itself
by means of another now.' Husserl shrank from this consequence not
out of what would be the perfectly understandable alarm at the
methodologically, wholly unmediated introduction of an unconscious,
but primarily because he was not able to extract himself from his
fascination with notions of absolute and ultimately fulfilled self-
presence. This fascination can also be recognized in Husserl's insistence
upon understanding retention as a perceptual consciousness, even
despite his phenomenological descriptions.

Being-just-past is [ ... ] a given matter of fact, self-given,

hence 'perceived'. In opposition to this, in recollection the
temporal present [ ... ] is a re-presented [vergegenwartigt]
presence. (HU X. 14; cf. also, 17). 11

It is to be objected to this, that retention is not a recollection, to be sure,

but that it is nonetheless a re-presentation in which, at least implicitly,
two different presents diverge from one another. Retentional consciousness
is "consciousness springing forth" and, as such, it is, "to be sure, the
present, but the present characterized as the modification of another
consciousness, and what it makes conscious is characterized as the
modification of something else already made conscious. Thus, it is a
present which makes another present, a primordial present, conscious"
(Ms. L. / 75; 4a, 1917). Retention "does not 're-present' in the manner
of a recollection, but [...] re-presents or holds back what was previously
106

consciously experienced as a now in a primordial sensation" (Hu X. p.

376; cf. also, pp. 312 and 382). As long as the principal distinction
between retentional, originary self-givenness and reproduction in memory
is not endangered, the question of whether to define retention as
perception or re-presentation seems to be for Husserl an essentially
terminological concern. The readiness with which Husserl concedes the
designation of retention as a special kind of re-presentation, and the
decisiveness with which he rejects the post-factuality of the consciousness
of the now, cause one to sit up and take notice. His attitude can be
explained by the fact that in the one case he sees endangered the
possibility of the perceptual self-givenness of now-existing presence,
whereas in the other case he does not. Should the retentional conscious-
ness of the immediately bygone now prove to be a re-presentation rather
than a perception, according to Husserl's conviction it would nevertheless
remain an originarily self-giving re-presentation of a bygone now which
had already been primordially self-given as a present now.
We thus find ourselves referred back to the undecided question
regarding the possibility of a now-existing perception of a now-point.
This question, with which we began our investigation, has now been
sharpened into the question whether the now is, for itself and absolutely,
present now. This question, too, must be made more precise, for do the
now-existing primordial-impressional consciousness and its now-existing
object really belong to the same consciousness or the same stage of
consciousness? And may one really say that the primordial-impressional
consciousness is not only the consciousness of a now but also a now-
existing consciousness? Is this primordial-impressional consciousness
itself given for consciousness and how is one to understand this
appearance of consciousness to itself ? Finally, how is this self-appearance
of the primordial impression to be distinguished from the givenness of the
now which appears within the primordial impression?

5. The Reflective and Retentional Self-Presence of the Flow of

Absolute Time

The experiencing of immanent, temporal objects is an affair of what we

earlier called, following Husserl, the "flow of absolute consciousness."
We now ask how this flow of consciousness can function, on the one
hand, as consciousness of a sequence of tones and, on the other hand, as
consciousness of the flowing experience of a sequence of tones, that is, as
consciousness of the flow of absolute consciousness itself. Husserl's
answer to this question is staggeringly simple. He tells us that both forms
of consciousness are "inseparable" achievements of the selfsame
 107

process of consciousness, namely, the constant modification of retentional

consciousness (Hu X. 39, No. 50). As we have seen, this modification
is so structured that, with the emergence of a new, primordial impression,
the entire retentional consciousness is articulated anew and the entire
(moment-within-a-moment [verschachtelt]) sequence of the retentional
consciousness recapitulated. Every retention "is in itself [in sich selbst]
a continuous modification which bears within itself the legacy of the
entire preceding development" (Hu X.' No. 50). This present inheritance
of a retained past concerns, on the one hand, the retention of a tone-point
(or sequence of tones) which sinks away further and further into the past
along with its temporal position and, on the other hand, the retention of
the temporal lapse during which this tone-point was retained, that is,
given differently again and again. Thus, the present retention retains the
individual tone by means of its constantly modified modes of givenness.
Husserl speaks either of retentional "transverse intentionality" or of
retentional "longitudinal intentionality" according to whether attention
is being devoted to the tone retained or to the flowing consciousness
retaining the tone. Retentional, longitudinal intentionality is the absolute
consciousness of that 'segment' of the flow of absolute consciousness
which is bound up with the sinking away of this tone-point. It is the post
factual "appearance of the flow to itself [ ... ]. What is brought forth
to appear in the momentary currency [Momentan-Aktuellen] of the flow
of consciousness is nothing else than the bygone phases of that flow of
consciousness appearing through the series of retentional moments" (Hu
X. 39).
Before we enter into a more detailed discussion of this remarkable
phenomenon, this essentially post-factual self-consciousness belonging
to the flow of absolute consciousness, we shall have to determine more
precisely the character of the temporality of this "flow." May one say
that the flow of absolute consciousness itself, in which the duration of an
immanent, temporal object is experienced, elapses "parallel" with the
lapse of this duration? And is it correct to maintain that the primordial
impression and the retention occur "simultaneously" within a determinate
phase of the absolute flow, that is, that both are consummated "now"?
Husserl's answer to these questions did not come until 1908/09 but then
left nothing to be desired in the way of clarity.

The flow of the modes of consciousness is not a process. The

consciousness of the now is not itself now. The retention
which exists 'together' with the consciousness of the now is
not 'now' either, it is not simultaneous with the now. (Hu X
No. 50; cf. also, 36, 38, 39)
108

This nontemporality of the flow is, on the one hand, a merely negative
determination which is supposed to ward off the threat of an infinite
regress in the constitutively determinate interconnection of the different
stages in the consciousness of time (Hu X. No. 50). On the other hand,
Husserl already hints at a positive determination of the flow when he
writes that it is "nontemporal, that is to say, not something within
immanent time" (Hu X. No. 50, p. 334; cf. also, No. 54, p. 369). Hence,
the temporality of the flow of absolute consciousness cannot be grasped
by means of concepts which are oriented toward that which is intra-
temporally present-at-hand. Between the flow of consciousness and the
occurrences falling within immanent time, there lies a radical difference.
In the description of the retentional appearance of the flow to itself, that
is, in the definition of the retentional, longitudinal intentionality, this
difference meets with a treatment suited to its demands. With Husserl,
however, the recognition of the difference goes hand in hand with its
bridging, leveling and misconstruing. The misconstrual appears to be
essentially connected with Husserl's concept of constitution, the meta-
physical presuppositions of which we have already pointed to. Of course,
the flow is not an immanent, temporal object, not an object within
immanent time. Instead, according to Husserl's conception of the
matter, the immanent, temporal object is indeed constituted and
experienced within the flow. This constitutive connection allows us after
all, guided by the immanent temporal objects constituted within the flow,
to describe that constituting flow as a quasi-intratemporal object.

We can say nothing else than: This flow is something which

we so name after that which is constituted [...]. For all of
that we are wanting in names. (Hu X. 36)

Retentional, longitudinal intentionality offers a well-suited (and non-

metaphysical) description of the appearance of the flow to itself,
primarily because it neither transforms the flow into a perceptual object
nor besets the flow with forms of objective identity. As we have seen,
retention is not directed toward an object in the true sense and,
accordingly, the 'bygone' flow does not appear in retentional, longitudinal
intentionality, as an objective duration. So, too, the flow always appears
in this retentional, longitudinal intentionality, as 'past'. Thus, the
originary self-appearance is surely not a perceptual givenness of the
flow. Retentional self-appearance alters with every new 'phase' of the
flow and does so in such manner that every new 'phase' recapitulates the
whole 'elapsed' flow in an ever new way. The flow thus appears
exclusively as past and this mode of appearance is itself constantly
 109

altering. We called this mode of appearance 'post-factuality'12 and

distinguished it from all primordial, immediately-now present, perceptual
givenness. The retentional appearance of the flow to itself is distinguished
from a possible memory which would return to the 'bygone' flow and
repeat it as identical. As a nonobjective, post-factual and differentially
iterative appearance of the flow, retentional, longitudinal intentionality
also points the way to a suitable, unmetaphysical description of the
temporality of the flow itself. It also points the way to a new
understanding of self-consciousness as well as of consciousness as such.
It demands a new style of phenomenological description oriented not
toward perception or recollection of mental processes but toward
retention and its structure of differential repetition. The task is, in place
of an objectifying mirroring of the visible, to search for the "wanting
names" of those phenomena which cannot be named in the language of
reflective phenomenology.
Though he prefigured it, Husserl himself never walked this path
consistently. The thing which primarily hindered him from doing so was
his demand for a reflective objectification of the phenomena constituting
time-consciousness, a demand which characterizes those texts from the
years 1905 through 1917 which we have drawn on. According to
Husserl's opinion, the phenomenon of the retentional self-appearance of
the retained flow first becomes a fulfilled object of scientific research
when it has been subjected to a reflective vision directed upon it.

But because I have a grip on it <sc. the elapsed phase>, I can

steer my glance toward it in a new act which we [...] call a
reflection (immanent perception) or recollection. These acts
are related to retention by way of fulfillment. (Hu X. App.
IX)

This is a metaphysical assertion, for it defines the retentional self-

appearance of the flow privatively as a merely provisional datum,
teleologically aligned toward the reflective perception of the retained
flow. If the retentional givenness of the flow is converted into a
perceptual givenness, it does not thereby become more clearly "visible";
rather, paradoxically, it completely vanishes from sight. In perception,
the "nontemporal," non-objective structure of the flow, as well as its
differential movement, is objectified and thereby transformed into an
immanent, identical, temporal object. Moreover, as an act of conscious-
ness, such perception is an immanent, temporal object that can be
understood only on the basis of the absolute flow and its retentional,
transverse intentionality. Thus, the flow does not come into view in
110

perception at all, precisely because the intratemporal domain `constituted'

by the flow may not serve as the guiding thread for the phenomenological
analysis of the nontemporality of the 'constituting', absolute flow.
The essence and the primordial appearance of this absolute flow can
be understood only from the standpoint of the structure of retentional,
longitudinal intentionality. Husserl screens this insight from his own
view when, under the influence of metaphysical prejudices, he reinter-
prets the retentional, non-objective, constantly changing and only
mediately intuitable self-givenness of the flow, in such a way as to make
of it a reflective-perceptual datum. The same metaphysical prejudices
also hinder Husserl from acquiescing in the post-factuality of the
retentional self-appearance of the flow. For Husserl, only that can be
post-factual which was initially given in present actuality. Husserl is thus
on the lookout for a phenomenon in which the flow is presently and
immediately present to itself. This current self-presence may not,
however, be understood as perceptual consciousness, since perception
always refers to temporal objects. We thus come upon "primordial
processes which were not perceived but which must in principle be
perceptible" (Ms. L I21: 10a, 1917). If Husserl wishes to uphold the
belief in the possibility of an immediate and present self-possession or
self-consciousness of the flow, he finds himself forced paradoxically to
appeal to "unconscious presentations [Vorstellungen]" (Ms. L 21:
16b, 1917).

The question now, however, is whether we must not say that,

over and above all consciousness within the flow, there yet
rules the ultimate consciousness. In accordance with this, the
momentarily present phase of inner consciousness would be
something of which the ultimate consciousness were conscious.
[...] It is to be seriously pondered, however, whether one
must assume an ultimte consciousness such as would be a
necessarily 'unconscious' consciousness. (Hu X. No. 54)

Upon closer reading, all those utterances of Husserl which we have

drawn upon concerning the phenomenon of time-consciousness, prove to
be ambivalent. Therewith, it is precisely Husserl's careful analyses of
time-consciousness which would seem to afford the compelling arguments
for a modification of the metaphysically determined self-understanding
which ostensibly guides these analyses. Husserl's texts unfold thoroughly
within the field of tension which pervades the opposition between the
ideal of an absolute, perceptual presence of the flow to itself, and the
impossibility, evinced in the phenomenological analysis of the flow, of
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ever realizing this ideal. This tension marks the relationship between
perception and re-presentation, between primordial impression and
retention, between reflective and longitudinally intentional self-givenness
of the flow; that is to say, it marks the whole of Husserl's relationship to
the metaphysics of presence. Pondering these oppositions in the course
of retrieving them and enduring the tension that binds them together
proved to be a fruitful way to think through anew the presupposition of
the traditional understanding of time. Fruitful as it may have been,
however, it did not yield a wholly new understanding of time which might
take root and flourish free of all nourishment from the soil of metaphysical
conceptuality. Yet we had not counted on such a result either, for from
the very beginning such an overcoming of metaphysics appeared to us to
be an impossible and still metaphysically determined task. This impos-
sibility lies in the fact that the recognition of the fascination exerted by
the concept of the present presence does not suffice to enable one to
extract oneself from the spell of this fascination.

How would the desire for presence ever permit of being

It is desire itself.'3
destroyed?

(translated by Wilson Brown)

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