OCEAN BUILDERS VS CUBACUB G.
R 150898 BARTOLOME VS SSS
FACTS: Bladimir was employed as maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean Builders
Construction Corp, and was afflicted with chicken pox on April 1995. He was thus advised by
petitioner Hao, companys general manager, to rest for three days which he did at the companys
barracks where he lives free of charge. Three days later, Bladimir went about his usual chores
of manning the gate of the company premises and even cleaned the company vehicles. Later in
the afternoon, he asked a co-worker to accompany him to his house to rest. Informed by Silangga
of Bladimirs intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to instead bring
Bladimir to the nearest hospital but then was not permitted to leave the hospital. He was
confined, with Narding keeping watch over him. Bladimirs parents-respondent spouses
Cubacub, with their friend Dr. Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias), arrived at the Caybiga Hospital and
transferred Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) where he was placed in the
intensive care unit and died the following day. he death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded
Bladimirs immediate cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as
pneumonia.
On the other hand, the death certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of
death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure, septicemia and chicken pox. Bladimirs
parents-herein respondents later filed on August 17, 1995 before the Tarlac Regional Trial Court
(RTC) at Capas a complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of
negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimirs condition leading to his death. The
Tarlac RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that Hao was not negligent. On respondents
appeal, the CA eversed the trial courts decision, holding that by Haos failure to bring Bladimir
to a better-equipped hospital, he violated Article 161 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: Is petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Hao guilty of negligence.
HELD: NO. Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides: ART. 161. Assistance of employer. It shall
be the duty of any employer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and
immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick employee in case
of emergency.
In the present case, there is no allegation that the company premises are hazardous. Neither is
there any allegation on the number of employees the company has. If Haos testimony would
be believed, the company had only seven regular employees and 20 contractual employees
still short of the minimum 50 workers that an establishment must have for it to be required to
have a full-time registered nurse.
The Court can thus only determine whether the actions taken by petitioners when
Bladimir became ill amounted to the necessary assistance to ensure adequate and immediate
medical . . . attendance to Bladimir as required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code. AT ALL
EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the
death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would
not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act,
whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial
part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage
was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.
FACTS: John Colcol, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. on
board the vessel Maersk Danville, and was enrolled under the government's Employees'
Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident on board the vessel whereby steel
plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the following day. John was, at the time of
his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns biological
motherand, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits. SSS denied
the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of John since
the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as Johns
primary beneficiary, not petitioner. According to the records, Cornelio died during Johns
minority.
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the ruling of SSS La Union of lack of
merit. The Court howeer, found ECCs findings not consistent with the evidence on record. it
was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. Based on
Cornelios death certificate, it appears that Johns adoptive father died on October 26, 1987,14 or
only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained
finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the
adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptees minority results to the restoration
of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.
HELD:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. (RA 8552)Section 20. Effects of
Rescission. If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the
adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored
if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the
adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned,
the provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptees biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated.
2. Yes. it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe
estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death
of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent
provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological
parents and those by adoption vis--vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
1
The Court held that Cornelios adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of
the right to receive the benefits stemming from Johns death as a dependent parent given
Cornelios untimely demise during Johns minority. Since the parent by adoption already died,
then the death benefits under the Employees Compensation Program shall accrue solely to
herein petitioner, Johns sole remaining beneficiary.
VALERIANO VS ECC
FACTS: Valeriano was employed as a fire truck driver assigned at the San Juan Fire Station.
Sometime on the evening of July 3, 1985, petitioner was standing along Santolan Road, when
he met a friend, Agawin. They decided to proceed to Bonanza Restaurant for dinner. On their
way home at around 9:30 PM, the owner-type jeepney they were riding in figured in a head-on
collision with another vehicle at the intersection of streets in Quezon City. Due to the strong
impact of the collision, petitioner was thrown out of the vehicle and was severely injured. As a
result of the mishap, petitioner was brought to several hospitals for treatment.
On September 16, 1985, he filed a claim for income benefits under PD 626, with the Government
Security Insurance Service. His claim for benefits was opposed on the ground that the injuries
he sustained did not directly arise or result from the nature of his work. The ECC and CA
sustained the system, reasoning that the injury resulted not from an accident arising out of and
in the course of employment nor was it work-related.
ISSUE: w/n injuries sustained by Valeriano in the collision was compensable.
HELD: Valerianos injuries were non-compensable. Citing the Hinoguin and Nitura cases, that
the 24-hour doctrine be applied to his case since the exigency of his job demand it to be so was
held untenable by the Court. The Court did not find any reasonable connection between his
injuries and his work as a firetruck driver. Applying the principle laid down in the Alegre case,
the 24-hour doctrine is not meant to embrace all acts and circumstances of an employee though
he be on active on call duty. Valeriano was neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit
of the orders of his superiors when he met the accident. He was also not doing an act within his
duty and authority as a firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained
his injuries. In fact, he was pursuing a purely personal and social function when the accident
happened. The accident now work-connected was, therefore, non-compensable.
BELARMINO VS ECC
FACTS: Petitioners wife , Oania, was a classroom teacher of the Dept. of education, culture
and sports, for eleven years. her husband, herein petitioner, is also a public teacher. On Jan.1982,
while performing her duties as classroom teacher, Mrs. Belarmino, who was 8th month pregnant,
accidentally slipped and fell on the floor. Moments later, she complained of abdominal pain and
stomach cramps. she continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pain for several days, but
despite the advice of her co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she continued to report for work
because there was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, eleven (11) days after her accident,
she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home
Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high fever and headache.
and was eventually brought to the Alino Hospital wherein it was found by Dr. Alino, that she
was suffering from septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina. She was
discharged from the hospital after 5 days but died 3 days later. She was survived by her husband
and 4 children.
Petitioner filed a claim for death benefits but it was denied by the GSIS which held that
septicemia post partum, the cause of death, is not an occupational disease and neither was there
any showing that ailment was contracted by reason of her employment. The alleged accident
mentioned could not have precipitated the death of the wife but rather the result of the infection
of her lacerated wounds as a result of her delivery at home. On appeal to the Employees
Compensation Commission, latter also denied theclaim affirming the denial of the claim by
GSIS.
ISSUE: w/n the cause of death of Mrs. Belarmino is not work related and therefore not
compensable.
HELD: No. The death of Mrs. Belarmino from septicemia post partum is compensable because
an employment accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development.
The condition of the classroom floor cause Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as
a result. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which cause the
development of post partum septicemia which resulted in her death. And therefore, such fall was
the set in motion, an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise.
Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of employment, unless it is the result
of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligence or misconduct.
Mrs. Belarminos fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a
classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it; her recurrent abdominal
pains, the premature delivery of her baby , her septicemia post partum and death are
compensable.
LAZO VS ECC
FACTS: The petitioner, Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned
to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon
to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock
in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve
him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of
19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home
to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice. On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning
of 19 June 1986, the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery
road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for
treatment. He was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined
until 25 July 1986.
He claimed for disability benefits but was denied by GSIS. Employees Compensation
Commission affirmed the decision since the accident which involved the petitioner occurred far
from his work place and while he was attending to a personal matter.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase
'arising out of and in the course of employment?
HELD: IN case of, Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission,
26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that '(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of the work,
but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place
where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or
2
implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or
over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the
employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as
much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its
performance.
In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours
after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go
on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record
that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in
the journey.
ALANO VS CA
FACTS: Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal
of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30
a.m. to 5:30p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza
Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding
Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons
and a daughter. On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed the instant
claim for income benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent's children. The claim
was, however, denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon which compensation
is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law."
On July 19, 1977 appellant requested for a reconsideration of the system's decision, but the same
was denied and the records of the case were elevated to this Commission for review.
ISSUE: whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her
death is compensable under the law as an employment accident.
HELD: it is not disputed that de vera died while going to her place of work. She was at the place
where, as the petitioner puts, her job necessarily required to be if she was to reach her place of
work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principals being at the
place of accident. As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation, we hold that
it is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as a party respondent. As early as the case
of La O v. Employees' Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v.
Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413) and recently, Clemente v. Government
Service Insurance System (G.R. No. L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court has ruled that the
Government Service Insurance System is a proper party in employees' compensation cases as
the ultimate implementing agency of the Employees' Compensation Commission. We held in
the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee
compensation including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules)."
GSIS vs ZARATE
Facts: Zarate was a fireman of the BFP in Quezon City. he visited his ailing mother in
Pangasinan. In order to report to his duty the next day he boarded a Philippine Rabbit Bus headed
to Manila which met an accident. The petitioner was pronounced dead on arrival in the hospital.
His wife filed a claim for death benefits which was denied because he was off at the time of the
accident. The CA however, granted the claim and declared that there was a reasonable work
connection in Zarates death.
ISSUE: w/n the heirs of Zarate may claim death benefits under GSIS Law.
Held: yes. It is undisputed that Zarate visited his mother because she was then ill. Likewise, it
is not also disputed that he did not simply leave Quezon City for his visit; he asked for his
superior permission, which was given on condition that he returned the next day. Hence, on that
fateful Sunday, June 15, 1997, Zarate had his superior authority to travel and knew that he had
to report fresh the following day. Instead of opting to travel to Quezon City on the very same
day he was to report for work, Zarate returned on the very day of his visit so he could properly
report on Monday. In doing this, he did not heed his mothers plea to stay a little longer. These
were the facts that the CA considered and positively appreciated.
GSIS vs CA and Alegre
FACTS: Private respondent Felonila Alegres deceased husband, SPO2 Florencio A. Alegre,
was a police officer assigned to the Philippine National Police station in the town of Vigan. On
December 6, 1994, he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of
Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the
Police Assistance Center, confronted him regarding his tour of duty.SPO2 Alegre allegedly
snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal tussle then
ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of the deceased police officer. On
account of her husbands death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for death benefits
with petitioner GSIS pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626. The GSIS, denied the claim on the
ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegres death, he was performing a personal activity which
was not work-connected which was later on affirmed by the ECC. CA rendered a decision in
favor of private respondent, it ruled that SPO2 Alegres death was work-connected and,
therefore, compensable. Hence; GSIS filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme
Court; reiterating its position that SPO2 Alegres death lacks the requisite element of
compensability which is, that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-
connected.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SPO2 Alegres death is compensable pursuant to the applicable laws
and regulations.
HELD: taking together existing jurisprudence and pertinent guidelines of the ECC
With respect to claims for death benefits, namely: a) that employee must be at the place where
his work requires him to be; b) that employee must have been performing his official functions;
and c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order
for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the
time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and
unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior
officer. That he may be called upon any time to render police work as he is considered to be on
a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the
conclusion arrived at considering he was not placed in a situation where he was required to
exercise his authority or duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out
that he already complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24 hour duty doctrine, as applied
to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them
within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations
that may give rise to their defects.
3

GSIS vs CA 2008
Facts: Abraham Cate joined the military service as a Rifleman of the Philippine Navy and was
eventually absorbed in the PNP with the rank of SPO4 on 1991. In 1993, he complained of a
mass on his left cheek which gradually increased in size. The histopath report revealed that he
was suffering from Osteoblastic Osteosarcoma. He underwent an operation to remove the mass.
After several months, another biopsy revealed the recurrence of the ailment. He underwent
debulking of the recurrent tumor.
Abraham filed a claim for income benefits with Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
But GSIS denied the claim on the ground that Osteosarcoma is not considered an
occupational disease under PD No. 626 and there is no showing that his duties as SPO4 in the
Philippine National Police (PNP) had increased the risk of contracting said ailment.
When Abraham died, his heirs appealed the decision of GSIS to the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC). The ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the ECC.
ISSUE: w/n the ailment of Cate is compensable under the present law on employeees
compensation.
Held: Article 167 of Chapter 1, Title II, Book 4 of the Labor Code defines sickness as any illness
definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC, or any illness caused by
employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions.
In this case, Osteosarcoma is not listed as an occupational diseasein the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation. Hence, it is supposed to be upon the claimant or private respondent
to prove by substantial evidence that the risk of contracting it was increased by the working
condition of the late Abraham. The records show that Abraham failed to present evidence to
establish that the development of his ailment was traceable to his working condition in the
Philippine Navy, the Philippine Constabulary, and the PNP. Further, private respondents
allegation in their petition for review with the Court of Appeals that Abraham, as a rifleman in
the Philippine Navy, may have been exposed to elements like a virus which could have
contributed to his ailment does not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence. The rule is
that awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions as the claimant must
prove a positive thing.
Before the amendment, the law simply did not allow compensation for the ailment of
respondent. It is under this set-up that the Raro case was decided. However, as the ECC decision
noted, the law was amended and now "the present law on compensation allows certain diseases
to be compensable if it is sufficiently proven that the risk of contracting is increased by the
working conditions."14 It, therefore, now allows compensation subject to requirement of proving
by sufficient evidence that the risk of contracting the ailment is increased by the working
conditions.
However, in this particular case, the requirement is impossible to comply with, given the present
state of scientific knowledge. The obligation to present such as an impossible evidence, must,
therefore be deemed void. Respondent, therefore, is entitled to compensation, consistent with
social legislations intended beneficial purpose.
GSIS vs MEcayer
Facts: Mecayer was previously employed at the Philippine National Police and was absorbed to
the Philippine National Police on January 2, 1991 as Special Police Officer II. He served as such
until his demise. Before his death, he was assigned as a driver at the PNP Administrative
Division and Holding Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City. Records show that on July 12, 1992,
at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, P/Chief Inspector Peralta, along with one Mrs. Bawar,
chanced upon SPO2 Mecayer who, while on duty, was then in the process of consuming one (1)
bottle of beer each with SPO4 Upao, also of said Holding Center, when P/Chief Insp. Peralta
warned them, that drinking while on duty, is prohibited. At this point, Mrs. Bawar butted in,
resulting in a heated argument with SPO2 Mecayer. However, P/Chief Insp. Peralta pacified
them.
After the lapse of a few minutes, SPO1 Timoteo Bawar, husband of Mrs. Bawar, with whom
SPO2 had an earlier altercation, shot the latter. The attending physician rushed SPO2 Mecayer
to the PNP Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The cause of death was
"hemorrhage as a result of the gunshot wound of the trunk." The widow of SPO2 Mecayer,
Luzviminda C. Mecayer (respondent), filed with petitioner a claim for compensation benefits
under the Employees Compensation Law (P.D. No. 626), as amended, believing that her
husbands death arose out of and in the course of employment.
Police Superintendent Manalo of the PNP issued a Certification4 that the death of SPO2
Mecayer was in the line of duty and that all the benefits due should be given to his legal heirs
as provided by law. Respondent filed an appeal with the ECC who dismissed the same and
affirmed petitioner's denial of respondent's claim of compensation benefits. CA found no
substantial evidence on record to support the ECC finding that SPO2 Mecayer was intoxicated
at the time of the contingency. ECC swiftly concluded that SPO2 Mecayer was intoxicated when
he was only in the process of consuming a bottle of beer without any showing that he had drunk
several bottles of beer.
ISSUE: w/n CA disregarded the law and well-settled jurisprudence that for the injury to be
compensable, the same must be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment.
HELD: For death to be compensable under P.D. No. 626, as amended, Section 1 (a), Rule III
of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation provides:
Section 1. Grounds - (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable,
the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following
conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the
employer.
It had been established that respondents husband, a driver at the PNP Administration Division
and Holding Center, Camp Crame, was in the place where his work required him to be and in
the course of performing his official function when he was shot to death. As a driver, SPO2
Mecayer may not be doing anything the whole day while he was on duty except to wait for his
4
superior's instructions and yet he was still considered as performing his official function. This
is so because drivers are required to remain on call and subject to orders by his superiors during
his duty and could not use his time effectively and gainfully for his own purposes. Thus, even
if SPO2 Mecayer was just waiting around and in the process of consuming a bottle of beer would
not preclude the work-connected character of his death because he was still performing his
official function at the time of his death. The PNP issued a certificate which showed that SPO2
Mecayers death was in the line of duty, hence, his death is compensable as it happened in the
place where he was required to be and while he was on duty notwithstanding the fact that the
killing was personal in nature.
Raro vs ECC
Facts: Petitioner Raro was in perfect health when she was employed as clerk by Bureau of Mines
and Geo-Sciences. 4 yrs later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled
with blurring vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical
treatment. She was then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau. The petitioner was diagnosed with
brain tumor, which by that time, her memory, sense of time, vision and reasoning had been lost.
Her husband claimed for disability benefits with GSIS but was denied. ECC likewise denied the
appeal.
Issue:
1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is
compensable under the present compensation laws.
2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the present
compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease.
Held:
1. No. The list of occupational diseases prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as
compensable, namely
Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment
16. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers, wood products lymphatic
and blood forming vessels; industry carpenters, nasal cavity and sinuses and
employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills.
17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, and brain plastic
workers. (Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation)
It does not fall under Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment under the Amended Rules
on Employees Compensation. What the law requires is proof that the illness caused by the
employment.
2. Yes. The Court saw no arbitrariness in the Commissions allowing vinyl chloride workers
or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer. What the law requires for others is
proof. The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing- the illness
was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has
the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The
existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed. The Court has recogni2ed the
validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims according to its provisions. We
find in it no infringement of the workers constitutional rights.
The presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation is espoused under the
Workmens Compensation Act, is now abandoned under the New Labor Code.
GSIS vs Vicencio
Facts: Judge Vicencio was a Legal Researcher of DBP. After passing the bar examinations, he
became an Asst. Atty until he was promoted t Senior Bank Atty which position he held until his
retirement. In 1987, he re-entered government service as Asst. Fiscal for the City of Manila and
was then appointed as RTC Judge of Branch 17, Manila until his death in 2001.
Records show that on November 30, 2000, Judge Vicencio suffered loss of consciousness due
to pericardial effusion. He was admitted at the Makati Medical Center where he was diagnosed
with Adenocarcinoma of the Left Lung with Metastases to Pedicardium. Per his Death
Certificate,5 the immediate cause of his death was Cardiopulmonary Arrest, and the antecedent
cause was T/C Fatal Arrythmia. Respondent Mrs. Vicencio applied for the death benefits of her
late husband with GSIS but was denied on the ground that the illness which caused Judge
Vicencios death is not considered an occupational disease and there is no showing that his work
as RTC Judge has increased his risk of contracting said ailment. ECC dismissed the appeal. CA
reversed and set aside the decision of ECC.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent Mrs. Vicencios claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626,
as amended, is compensable.
HELD: YES. P.D. No. 626, as amended, defines compensable sickness as any illness definitely
accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased
by the working conditions. For sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be
compensable, the claimant must show either: (i) that it is a result of an occupational disease
listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions
set therein satisfied; or (ii) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by
the working conditions.
5
The Death Certificate of Judge Vicencio clearly indicates that the cause of his death is
Cardiopulmonary Arrest T/C Fatal Arrythmia. Whether, however, the same was a mere
complication of his lung cancer as contended by petitioner GSIS or related to an underlying
cardiovascular disease is not established by the records of this case and, thus, remains uncertain.
It must be remembered that P.D. No. 626, as amended, is a social legislation whose primordial
purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working class against the hazards of
disability, illness and other contingencies resulting in the loss of income. Guided by this policy,
we therefore hold that Cardiopulmonary Arrest T/C Fatal Arrythmia, the cause of death stated
in Judge Vicencios Death Certificate, should be considered as a cardiovascular disease - a listed
disease under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. It is true that
under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, lung cancer is
occupational only with respect to vinyl chloride workers and plastic workers. However, this will
not bar a claim for benefits under the law if the complainant can adduce substantial evidence
that the risk of contracting the illness is increased or aggravated by the working conditions to
which the employee is exposed to.
It is undisputed that throughout his noble career from Fiscal to Metropolitan Trial Court Judge,
and, finally, to RTC Judge, his work dealt with stressful daily work hours, and constant and
long-term contact with voluminous and dusty records. We also take judicial notice that Judge
Vicencios workplace at the Manila City Hall had long been a place with sub-standard offices
of judges and prosecutors overflowing with records of cases covered up in dust and are poorly
ventilated. All these, taken together, necessarily contributed to the development of his lung
illness.
Petitioner GSIS should not lose sight of the fact that the constitutional guarantee of social justice
towards labor demands a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability.
GSIS VS VILLAMAYOR
FACTS: The late Dionisia Villamayor, wife of respondent was a public school teacher. Upon
her retirement, Villamayor was already a Public School District Supervisor. However, before
she retired, Villamayor was diagnosed two years earlier with breast cancer (invasive ductal
carcinoma), after which she underwent a series of treatments and surgeries. On July 1998,
Villamayor succumbed to her illness. Her immediate cause of death was respiratory arrest, with
pneumonia as antecedent cause, and breast carcinoma as underlying cause.
Respondent filed a claim for compensation with GSIS who denied the same on the ground that
it is not a work-related illness. The ECC affirmed the denial and dismissed the case for lack of
merit. CA granted the petition and declared respondent entitled to death benefits of his wife.
ISSUE: w/n GSIS and ECC were correct in denying claims for compensation .
Held: yes. In the present case, absent any substantial evidence that will positively establish the
link between Villamayors working conditions and her breast cancer or that such working
conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment, the claim for death benefits should
have been denied by the CA, as was done by petitioner GSIS and the Employees Compensation
Commission.
Indeed, Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation lists pneumonia and
pulmonary tuberculosis as occupational diseases. Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow
that any resulting disability or death from such occupational diseases are compensable. For the
disability or resulting death to be compensable, the same should have been contracted under
certain working conditions.
In the case of tuberculosis and pulmonary tuberculosis, the same should involve "any occupation
involving close and frequent contact with a source or sources of tuberculosis infection by reason
of employment: (a) in the medical treatment or nursing of a person or persons suffering from
tuberculosis (b) as laboratory worker, pathologist or postmortem worker, where occupation
involves working with material which is a source of tuberculosis infection;"16 or "in addition to
working conditions already listed under P.D. No. 626, as amended, any occupation involving
constant exposure to harmful substances in the working environment, in the form of gases,
fumes, vapors, and dust, as in chemical and textile factories; overwork or fatigue; and exposure
to rapid variations in temperature, high degree of humidity and bad weather conditions."17
For pneumonia, the same must be contracted under the following conditions: (a) there must be
an honest and definite history of wetting and chilling during the course of employment, also
industrial injury to the chest wall with or without rib fracture, or inhalation of noxious gases,
fumes and other deleterious [sic] substances in the place of work; (b) there must be a direct
connection between the offending agent or event and the workers illness; (c) the signs of
consolidation should appear soon (within a few hours) and the symptoms of initial chilling and
fever should be at least twenty-four (24) hours after the injury; (d) the patient must present one
of the following findings within a few days of the accident: (1) severe chill and fever; (2)
headache and pain, agonizing in character in the side; (3) short, dry, painful cough with blood-
tinged expectoration; (4) physical signs of consolidation with fine rales.
Clearly, Villamayors pulmonary tuberculosis and pneumonia were not the result of her
exposure to any of the foregoing conditions. That these diseases were the result of complications
from her breast cancer, as submitted by petitioner GSIS.
GSIS VS VALLAR
FACTS: From 1991 to 1996, former Judge Teotimo Vallar presided over the MCTC, of
Catarman-Sagay, Camiguin Province. During his tenure, Judge Vallar suffered COPD. From
December 12, 1995 to January 6, 1996, he was confined at the Cebu Doctors Hospital, Cebu
City due to "neuromyelitis optica: pneumothorax" secondary to "bullous emphysema." From
January 8 to January 24, 1996, Judge Vallar was hospitalized anew, this time as he was afflicted
with "ascending traverse myelitis" and COPD. On July 4, 1996, Judge Vallar passed away at
the age of sixty-six (66). The cause of death was "bronchopneumonia secondary to paraplegia:
neuromyelitis."
His surviving spouse, Victoriousa Vallar, filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS pursuant
to PD No. 626 as amended. However, GSIS denied her claim. ECC affirmed GSISdecision. CA
granted the petition.
ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the diseases which caused the demise
of Judge Vallar are compensable under the law.
Held: We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals. ection 1 of P.D. No. 626, as amended,
defines a compensable sickness as any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the
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employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by his working conditions." t is true
that "neuromyelitis optica" or "Davics disease," a disorder of the spinal cord, is not listed as an
occupational disease in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation.
However, this will not bar a claim for benefits under the law if the complainant can adduce
substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the illness is increased or aggravated by the
working conditions to which the employee is exposed to.
As visible representations of the law and the justice system, trial judges, like Judge Vallar, are
bound to dispose of the courts business and to decide cases within the required period. In order
to achieve this, they are expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. udge
Vallar evidently did his best to live up to these exacting standards. He worked long hours and
burned the midnight oil reading records of cases, transcripts of stenographic notes, law books,
legal periodicals and other legal materials. Often, he had to work at home and even during
weekends. His daily routine certainly subjected him to visual fatigue, stress and strain. These
severely strenuous working conditions contributed to the weakening of his immune system and
caused him to contract neuromyelitis. Thus, his health failed and eventually, he died.
GATUS vs SSS
Facts: Gatus worked at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac for a period of 30 years. Duringhis
employment, he contracted disease and was diagnosed to be suffering from Coronary
ArteryDisease (CAD): Triple Vessel and Unstable Angina. His medical records showed him to
behypertensive for 10 years and a smoker. He was given by the SSS the following
EC/SSSPermanent Partial Disability (PPD) benefits: (a) 8 monthly pensions effective
September 1, 1994and (b) 4 monthly pensions effective January 3, 1997. He became an SSS
retirement pensioneron February 1, 2002. However, an SSS audit revealed the need to recover
the EC benefitsalready paid to him on the ground that his CAD, being attributed to his chronic
smoking, was notwork-related. He was notified thereof through a letter dated July
31, 2003. Petitioner, believinghe was entitled to such benefits, assailed the decision of the
SSS. SSS denied the petition. Hethen elevated to the ECC ruled against the Petitioner. Further,
CA ruled that the Petitioner is notentitled to the benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626.
Hence, this Petition
ISSUE: Whether or Not the Petitioner is entitled to the Benefits under Presidential Decree
No.626
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the Petitioner is not entitled to the benefits
underPresidential Decree No. 626 and upheld the ruling of the CA. In its decision, the Court
mentioned of Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation states
that the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed thereon otherwise proof
must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
Gatus did not discharge the burden of proof imposed under the Labor Code to show that his
ailment was work-related. While he might have been exposed to various smoke emissions at
work for 30 years, he did not submit satisfactory evidence proving that the exposure had
contributed to the development of his disease or had increased the risk of contracting the illness.
Neither did he show that the disease had progressed due to conditions in his job as a factory
worker.
In fact, he did not present any physicians report in order to substantiate his allegation that the
working conditions had increased the risk of acquiring the cardiovascular disease.
RIO VS SSS
FACTS: Virgilio T. Rio Sr., was a stevedore at Allied Port Services since July 1982. In 1992,
he died of Uremia secondary to chronic renal failure three days after he was rushed to the
hospital after collapsing at work. Virgilios widow claimed for death benefits from the SSS. The
claim was denied by the system and, subsequently, by the ECC for failure to present proof of
causal connection between the decedents illness and his work as a stevedore.
Issue: Whether or not Rios Death was compensable under PD626 by virtue of the increased
risk theory.
Ruling: The Court held that the decedents death was non-compensable.
The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Rios death are not listed as occupational
diseases. Hence, petitioner should have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing
that the nature of her husbands employment or working conditions increased the risk of uremia,
chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis. Bare allegations do not ipso facto make the
death compensable. Since the petitioner failed to must adduce evidence to prove work-
connection, the denial of claim was held proper.
GSIS VS ANGEL
Facts: The late Sgt. Angel started military training on 1972 and was admitted into active service
on 1977. He was later promoted to the rank of Corporal on 1982 and eventually to Sergeant in
1986. He was in active service until his death on 1998. On 3 March 1998, Sgt. Angel was
"fetched/invited" from his post by a certain Capt. Lamerez of the Intelligence Service Group of
the Philippine Army to shed light on his alleged involvement in a "pilferage/gunrunning" case
being investigated by the Philippine Army. On or about 2 p.m. of the same day, he was placed
inside a detention cell to await further investigation.
The following day, the lifeless body of Sgt. Angel was found hanging inside his cell with an
electric cord tied around his neck. According to the Autopsy Report conducted by the Crime
Laboratory of the Philippine National Police (PNP), the cause of death was asphyxia by
strangulation.
Respondent, the wife of the late Sgt. Angel, filed a complaint before the PNP Criminal
Investigation Command, alleging that her husband was murdered and named the "elements of
Intelligence Service Group" led by Capt. Lamerez as suspects. upon investigation, the Office of
the Provost Marshal reported that Sgt. Angel died under suspicious circumstance while in line
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of duty. The Provost Marshal concluded that foul play may have been committed against Sgt.
Angel and recommended that the case be tried by a court martial. the Inspector General, upon
referral of the case, held that there is no evidence suggesting foul play in the death of Sgt. Angel
and maintained that the detention of Sgt. Angel could have triggered a mental block that caused
him to hang himself. Judge Advocate General Honorio Capulong in his report recommended
that Sgt. Angel be declared to have died in line of duty.
Respondent filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS under Presidential Decree No. 626,
as amended. GSIS denied the claim on the ground that SGt. Angels death did not arise out of
and in the course of employment. ECC likewise denied the claim. CA reversed ECCs ruling.
ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals disregarded the law and jurisprudence when it set
aside the ECC Decision that for the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of
employment.
HELD: We rule in favor of petitioner GSIS. Implementing Rules of P.D. 626,13 RULE III
COMPENSABILITY, Section 1. Grounds.
(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be
the result of accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.
FACTS: At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9,
1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint
for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among
other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After
trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in
toto. D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection
or choice of action between availing themselves of the workers right under the Workmens
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages from
the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers.
HELD: The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could
be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims
under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmens
Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived theirknown right of the remedies
provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under
exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her
claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she
wouldve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had.

Pertinent jurisprudence outline that the injury must be the result of an employment accident
satisfying all of the following: 1) the employee must have been injured at the place where his
work requires him to be; 2) the employee must have been performing his official functions; and
3) if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the
employer.

Art. 172. Limitation of liability The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for compensation to
the employee or his dependents, except when the disability or death was occasioned by the
employees intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or another, notorious
negligence or otherwise provided under this title. (Underscoring supplied)

The factual foundation of respondents claim is that on the day following Sgt. Angels detention
for investigation of his alleged involvement in a pilferage/gunrunning case, his lifeless body was
found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck. The autopsy report
stated that the cause of death as asphyxia by strangulation.

With the law upon the facts, we conclude that the death of Sgt. Angel did not result from an
accident which is compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626. It was on the contrary
occasioned by an intentional or designed act which removes the resulting death from the
coverage of the State Insurance Fund. Clearly the deceased was not performing his official duties
at the time of the incident. On the contrary, he was being investigated regarding his alleged
involvement on a pilferage/gunrunning case when he was found dead in his cell, an activity
which is foreign and unrelated to his employment as a soldier.

CONSUNJI VS CA

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