Sergio Naguiat vs National Labor Relations Commission of her authority.
of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the
269 SCRA 564 Business Organization Corporation Law Close She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for
Corporation Liability for Tort
FACTS Sergio Naguiat was the president of Clark Field Taxi, Inc. (CFTI)
which supplied taxi services to Clark Air Base. At the same time,
Naguiat was a director of the Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. (SFNEI),
their family owned corporation along with CFTI.
In 1991, CFTI had to close due to great financial losses and lost
business opportunity resulting from the phase-out of Clark Air Base
brought about by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the expiration of the
RP-US military bases agreement.
CFTI then came up with an agreement with the drivers that the latter
be entitled to a separation pay in the amount of P500.00 per every year
of service. Most of the drivers accepted this but some drivers did not.
The drivers who refused to accept the separation pay offered by CFTI
instead sued the latter before the labor arbiter.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the taxi drivers. The National Labor
Relations Commission affirmed the labor arbiter. It was established that
when CFTI closed, it was in profitable standing and was not incurring
losses. It ruled that the drivers are entitled to $120.00 per every year of
service subject to exchange rates prevailing that time.
The NLRC likewise ruled that SFNEI as well as CFTIs president and vice
president Sergio Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat should be held jointly
and severally liable to pay the drivers. The NLRC ruled that SFNEI
actively managed CFTI and its business affairs hence it acted as the
employer of the drivers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling of the NLRC is correct.
HELD: It is only partially correct.
1. It is correct when it ruled that the Sergio Naguiat is jointly and
severally liable to pay the drivers the award of separation pay in
the amount so determined. As president of CFTI, Sergio Naguiat is
considered an employer of the dismissed employees who is
therefore liable for the obligations of the corporation to its
dismissed employees. Moreover, CFTI, being a close family
corporation, is liable for corporate torts and stockholders thereof
shall be personally liable for corporate torts unless the corporation
has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance (par. 5,
Section 100, Close Corporations, Corporation Code). Antolin
Naguiat is absolved because there was insufficient evidence as
against him.
2. SFNEI is not liable jointly or severally with CFTI. SFNEI has nothing
to do with CFTI. There is no sufficient evidence to prove that it
actively managed CFTI especially so when even the drivers
testified that their employer is CFTI and that their payroll comes
from CFTI. Further, SFNEI was into trading business while CFTI was
into taxi services.
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO, CORP.
G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007
FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by
Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that
locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed
at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the
maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to
effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying Champion,
Hope, and More (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad
valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands
were already covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that
the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against
deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to
equal protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that
respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC
37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope
Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts.
lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who
dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may
arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her
private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of
the functions of his/her office
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec.
38, Book I, Administrative Code
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance
of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An
officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the
office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have
been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the
Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims
without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune
from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer
protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability
may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the
part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book,
civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a
public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights
of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the
Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly
sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the
performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1)
acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public
officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it
being a special law, which prevails over a general law (the
Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a
wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or
omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives
some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation.
There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the
tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the
defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given
for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged
wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was
wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil
motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of
anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact
that defendant acted without evil intent.
OCEAN BUILDERS and/or HAO vs. SPOUSES CUBACUB
G.R. No. 150898
April 13, 2011
FACTS: Bladimir Cubacub was employed as maintenance man by
petitioner Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan
City.
Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by
petitioner Hao, the companys general manager, to rest for 3 days
which he did at the companys barracks.
3 days later, Bladimir went about his usual chores. Later in the
afternoon, however, he asked a co-worker Silangga, to accompany him
to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of
Bladimirs intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga
to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.
Along with co-workers Narding and Vergado, Silangga thus brought
Bladimir to the nearest Community Hospital, a primary-care
hospital around 1 kilometer away from the office of the company.
The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the hospital. He was then
confined. The next day, Bladimirs parents-respondent spouses
Cubacub, with their friend Dr. Frias, arrived at the Hospital and
transferred Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital where he was
placed in the ICU and died the following day.
Bladimirs parents-herein respondents later filed before the Tarlac RTC
at Capas a complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that
Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in the deterioration of
Bladimirs condition leading to his death.
The Tarlac RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that Hao was not
negligent. On respondents appeal, the CA eversed the trial courts
decision, holding that by Haos failure to bring Bladimir to a better-
equipped hospital, he violated Article 161 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: Is petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Hao guilty
of negligence.
HELD: NO
Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 161. Assistance of employer. It shall be the duty of any
employer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the
adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment
to an injured or sick employee in case of emergency.
The Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten what the phrase
adequate and immediate medical attendance means in relation to an
emergency. It would thus appear that the determination of what it
means is left to the employer, except when a full-time registered nurse
or physician are available on-site as required, also under the Labor
Code, specifically Art. 157 which provides:
Article 157. Emergency Medical and Dental Services. It shall be the
duty of every employer to furnish his employees in any locality with
free medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of:
(a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of
employees exceeds fifty (50) but not more than two hundred
(200) except when the employer does not maintain hazardous
workplaces, in which case, the services of a graduate first-aider shall be
provided for the protection of workers, where no registered nurse is
available. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall provide by
appropriate regulations, the services that shall be required where the
number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by
appropriate order, hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article;
(b) The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician
and dentist, and an emergency clinic, when the number of employees
exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than three hundred (300);
and
(c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-time
registered nurse as well as a dental clinic and an infirmary or
emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one hundred (100)
employees when the number of employees exceeds three hundred
(300).
In the present case, there is no allegation that the company premises
are hazardous. Neither is there any allegation on the number of
employees the company has. If Haos testimony would be believed,
the company had only seven regular employees and 20
contractual employees still short of the minimum 50 workers that
an establishment must have for it to be required to have a full-time
registered nurse.
The Court can thus only determine whether the actions taken by
petitioners when Bladimir became ill amounted to the necessary
assistance to ensure adequate and immediate medical . . .
attendance to Bladimir as required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code.
As found by the trial court and borne by the records, petitioner Haos
advice for Bladimir to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have
him brought to the nearest hospital constituted adequate and
immediate medical attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161, to
provide to a sick employee in an emergency.
AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be
considered as the proximate cause of the death of
Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury,
and without which, the result would not have occurred. An injury or
damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it
appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a
substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a
reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.
Barredo vs Garcia and Almario
FACTS At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with
a kalesa thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustinos
parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right
to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the
criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of the
taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the
civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their
employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only
subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed
against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate
civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights
in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and
this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment
Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was
also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it
was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already
before he hired him something he failed to overcome during hearing.
Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo
would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being
sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence)
but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article
1903).
Jose Cangco vs Manila Railroad Co
FACTS:
On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co
(MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so
that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his
destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train
was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which
was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of
watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim.
This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm
was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was
dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling
the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that
Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting
from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a
common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without
suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood,
and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was
yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble
person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons
were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was
dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of
employers under Article 2180 and their liability for breach of contract
[of carriage]:

NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence
whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable
for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his
employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not
amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person
injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a
voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere
negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the
mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not
relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under
such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an
extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the
parties.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the
performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself the source of an
extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics
are identical.
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means an obligation of law, or the right of
the obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of law.
Elcano vs Hill
FACTS Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of
Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was
acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a
civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages
based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action
is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his
civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son
is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under
Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar
the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation
of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation
by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer
his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or
alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is
applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since at the time of
the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be
subsidiary only as a matter of equity.
Andamo, Et Al., V. Intermediate Appellate Court Et Al. (1990)
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
Lessons Applicable: Elements of Quasi-Delict (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious
corporation, built through its agents, waterpaths, water
conductors and contrivances including an artificial lake within its
land
inundated and eroded the spouses Emmanuel and Natividad
Andamo's land, caused a young man to drown, damaged
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences,
endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy
and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements
to destruction
July 1982:spouses instituted a criminal action
February 22, 1983: spouses filed a civil case for damages
CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further
hearings in Civil Case until after judgment in the related Criminal
Case
spouses contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred
in dismissing Civil Case since it is predicated on a quasi-delict
ISSUE: W/N there is quasi-delict even if done in private propety
HELD: YES. REVERSED and SET ASIDE
All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the
public domain and the property subject of the instant case is
privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint
sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will
continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner
of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure
the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and
 reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in
a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner
to build structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they
cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand
the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause
injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the
latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless
the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals
FACTS In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City,
Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat
Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was studying
medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and intimate. On
Marilous account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at
the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her
parents where they expressed their intention to get married. Marilous
parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding.
They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where
they had sexual intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour
as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his
promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married
to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued
Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral
damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to
Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino
customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with
Filipino customs and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not
really because of his breach of promise to marry her but based on
Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this
case, it is the deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a
violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying
Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As
found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She
was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered
herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashems
blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the
reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public
policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and
even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected
to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable under
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to
expand the concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover
situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not
strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books
such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of promise to
marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the
promise to marry was made and there was carnal knowledge because
of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or
criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were
made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual
damages may be recovered.
Porfirio P. Cinco V. Hon. Mateo Canonoy Et Al. (1979)
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
Laws Applicable: Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, Art. 31
and Article 2176 of the Civil Code
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by
Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito
for a vehicular accident
At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents
moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination
of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules
of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action
arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same
shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered
City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case
CFI by certiorari: dismissed
ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to
property during the pendency of the criminal action
HELD: YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for
nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated
principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant
primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also
clearly recognized in section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same
act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should
be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based
on quasi-delict
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes
not only injuries to persons but also damage to property
word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. LYDIA
GERONIMOG.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
Petition for review on certiorari (under Rule45) the decision of the CA
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten
Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan City. In August 1989, some parents of
the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks
sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances.
She brought the said bottles for examination to DOH and it was found
out that the soft drinks are adulterated. As a result, her per day sales
of soft drinks severely plummeted that she had to close her shop on 12
December 1989 for losses. She demanded damages from petitioner
before the RTC which dismissed the same on motion by petitioner
based on the ground of Prescription. On appeal, the CA annulled the
orders of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the
soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of
implied warranty under article 1561 of the CC which prescribes after six
months from delivery of the thing sold.
RULING: Petition Denied.
The SC agrees with the CAs conclusion that the cause of action in the
case at bar is found on quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which
prescribes in four years and not on breach of warranty under article
1562 of the same code. This is supported by the allegations in the
complaint which makes reference to the reckless and negligent
manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public
consumption."
LG Foods v. Agraviador (2006)
The Case Review on certiorari of a decision of the CA on 25 April 2003
affirming an order of Bacolod RTC, which in turn denied the petitioners
motion to dismiss an action for damages arising from a vehicular
accident instituted by the Vallejera spouses.
The Facts On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of
the Vallejera spouses, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by LG Foods
Corporation (LG Foods) and driven by their employee, Vincent Norman
Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident. An information
for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide was filed against the
driver before the Bacolod MTCC. Before the trial could be concluded,
however, the accused driver committed suicide. The case was then
dismissed. On June 23, 1999, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for
damages against LG Foods alleging that as employers, they failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. In their defense, LG Foods denied liability by claiming to
have exercised such diligence and prayed for dismissal for lack of cause
of action. Also in their motion to dismiss, they argued that the
complaint was a claim for subsidiary liability against an employer under
A1035, RPC and, as such, there must first be a judgment of conviction
against their driver to hold them liable. Since such condition was not
fulfilled due to the latters death, they argued, the spouses had no
cause of action. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit.
Also, it denied the motion for reconsideration of the matter. LG Foods
then went on certiorari to the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion of
the part of the trial judge. The CA, however, affirmed the RTC decision
ruling that the complaint by the spouses does not purport to be based
on subsidiary liability since the basic elements of such liability, such as
conviction and insolvency of the accused employee, were not even
alleged in said complaint. It then said that the complaint purports to
exact responsibility for fault or negligence under A2176, CC, which is
entirely separate and distinct from civil liability arising from negligence
under the A103, RPC. Liability under A2180, CC is direct and immediate,
and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee or showing of insolvency.
The Issue Whether the cause of action of the Vallejera spouses is
founded on CC or RPC.
The Ruling The case is a negligence suit brought under A2176, CC to
recover damages primarily from LG Foods as employers responsible for
their negligent driver pursuant to A2180, CC. The obligation imposed
by A2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus, the
employer is liable for damages caused by his employees. The Ratio
First. Nothing in the allegations in the complaint suggests that the LG
Foods are being made to account for their subsidiary liability under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Plus, the complaint did not even
aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under
said provision. Second. While not explicitly stated that the suit was for
damages based on quasi-delict, it alleged gross fault and negligence
on the part of the driver and the failure of LG Foods, as employers, to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. It was further alleged that LG Foods is civilly liable for the
negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the
necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if
exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to
the death of their 7-year old son. Third. Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the "act or omission
by which a party violates the right of another." Such act or omission
gives rise to an obligation which may come from law, contracts, quasi
contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts. Corollarily, an act or omission
causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities
on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto, and 2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations
arising from law; the intentional torts;14 and culpa aquiliana15); or (b)
where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent
and distinct from the criminal action. Either of these two possible
liabilities may be enforced against the offender. Stated otherwise,
victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana)
under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. This is illustrated in
A1161, CC providing that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses
shall be governed by penal laws subject to the provision of A2177 and
of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human
Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. This
means that A2177 provides an alternative remedy for the plaintiff. The
choice is with the plaintiff. Fourth. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
the liability of the employer is direct or immediate, not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of insolvency. This was the recourse of the spouses since there
was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver. Fifth. LG
Foods has been alleging that "they had exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of [their] employees." This defense is an
admission that indeed the petitioners acknowledged the private
respondents' cause of action as one for quasi-delict under A2180, CC.
Sixth. Since it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of due to its
premature termination, the fact that there was no prior reservation
made to institute a separate civil action is of no moment.\
FGU INSURANCE CORP. VS. G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORP. (GPS)
G.R. No. 141910. August 6, 2002
Facts: GPS is an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion
Industries, Inc. One day, it was to deliver certain goods of Concepcion
Industries, Inc. aboard one of its trucks. On its way, the truck collided
with an unidentified truck, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU, insurer of the shipment paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc. the
amount of the damage and filed a suit against GPS. GPS filed a motion
to dismiss for failure to prove that it was a common carrier.
Issue: Whether or not GPS falls under the category of a common
carrier.
Held: Note that GPS is an exclusive contractor and hauler of
Concepcion Industries, Inc. offering its service to no other individual or
entity.
A common carrier is one which offers its services whether to the public
in general or to a limited clientele in particular but never on an
exclusive basis. Therefore, GPS does not fit the category of a common
carrier although it is not freed from its liability based on culpa
contractual.
Calalas v. CA
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney
owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was
already full, Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the
rear end of the vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck
owned by Francisco Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the
jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against
Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party
complaint against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and absolved
Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case for quasi-delict wherein
Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for violation of
contract of carriage.
Issues:
(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on
one hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to
the issue in this case
(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in PICART vs SMITH
the contract of carriage
37 Phil 809 Civil Law Torts and Damages Doctrine of Last Clear
(3) Whether moral damages should be awarded Chance

Held:
(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-
delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and,
therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Nor are the
issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The
issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena
were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's
jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner
is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known
as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. Thesecond, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or
fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action,
whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in
this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to
his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of
the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of
the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the
burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the
truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in
actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation
is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created.
FACTS: In December 1912, Amado Picart was riding his horse and while
they were on a 75 meter long bridge, he saw Frank Smith Jr.s car
approaching. Smith blew his horn thrice while he was still at a distance
away because Picart and his horse were on Smiths lane. But Picart did
not move his horse to the other lane, instead he moved his horse
closer to the railing. Smith continued driving towards Picart without
slowing down and when he was already so near the horse he swerved
to the other lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body across
the bridge; the horse struck the car and its limb got broken. Picart
suffered injuries which required several days of medical attention while
the horse eventually died.
ISSUE: Whether or not Smith is negligent.
HELD: Yes. And so was Picart for planting himself on the wrong side of
the road. But Smiths negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith saw at
a distance when he blew his horn that Picart and his horse did not
move to the other lane so he should have steered his car to the other
lane at that point instead of swerving at the last minute. He therefore
had the last clear chance to avoid the unfortunate incident. When
Smiths car has approached the horse at such proximity it left no
chance for Picart extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not
avert injury. Picart can therefore recover damages from Smith but such
should be proportioned by reason of his contributory negligence.

(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its
rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad
shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a
diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in
more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The
fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril
greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed.
Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to
petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat"
amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that
the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not
be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater
risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of
petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was
improperly parked constitutescaso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event
which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable.
This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause
of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner,
and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the
creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his
jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.

(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the
items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception,
such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results
in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art.
2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is
guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there
is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no
factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith
in the performance of the contract of carriage.