SANDIGANBAYAN

Suppose a Commissioner of the COMELEC is charged before the Sandiganbayan for

allegedly olerating violation of the election laws against proliferation of prohibited billboards
and election propaganda with the end in view of removing him from office. Will the action
prosper?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the action will not prosper. Under Section 8 Article Xl of the Constitution. the
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections are removable by impeachment. As held in
the case of In re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771,774-775, a public officer who is removable by
impeachment cannot be charged before the Sandiganbayan with an offense which carries
with it the penalty of removal from office unless he is first impeached. Otherwise, he will be
removed from office by a method other than impeachment.

EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino created the
Presidential commission on Good Government (PCGG) and empowered it to sequester any
property shown prima facie to be ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives
and cronies. Executive Order No. 14 vests on the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction to try hidden
wealth cases. On April 14, 1986, after an
investigation, the PCGG sequestered the assets of X Corporation, Inc. (1) X Corporation,
Inc, claimed that President Aquino as President, could not lawfully issue Executive Orders
Nos. 1, 2, 14, which have the force of law, on the ground that legislation is a function of
Congress. Decide.

(2) Said corporation also questioned the validity of the three executive orders on the ground
that they are bills of attainder and, therefore, unconstitutional. Decide

Suggested Answer:
(1) The contention of X Corporation should be rejected. Executive orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14
were issued in 1986. At that time President Corazon Aquino exercised legislative power
Section 1, Article II of
the Provisional Constitution established by Proclamation No. 3, provided:
"Until a legislature is elected and convened under a new constitution, the President shall
continue to exercise legislative power."
In case of Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan, 163 SCRA
371, the Supreme Court ruled that the Provisional Constitution and the 1987 Constitution,
both recognized
the power of the President to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress created
under the 1987 Constitution was convened on June 27, 1987.
(2) Executive Orders Nos. 1,2 and 14 are not bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a
legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. On the contrary, the expressly provide
that any judgment that the property sequestered is ill-gotten wealth is to be made by a
court (the Sandiganbayan) only after trial

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

In 1986, F, then the officer-in-charge of Botolan, Zambales, was accused of having violated
the ANTI-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandigan Bayan. Before he could be
arraigned, he was
elected Governor of Zambales. After his arraignment, he put under preventive suspension
by the Sandiganbayan " for the duration of the trial".
(1) Can F successfully challenge the legality of his preventive
suspension on the ground that the criminal case against him involved acts committed during
his term as officer-in-charge and not during his term as Governor?
(2) Can F validly object to the aforestated duration of his suspension?

Suggested Answer:
(1) No, F cannot successfully challenge the legality of his preventive suspension on the
ground that the criminal case against him involve acts committed during his term as OIC
and not during his
term as governor because suspension from office under Republic Act 3019 refers to any
office that the respondent is presently holding and not necessarily to the one which he hold
when he committed the crime with which he is charged. This was the ruling in Deloso vs.
Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409
(2) Yes, F Can validly object to the duration of the suspension. In Deloso vs.
Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409, it was held that the imposition of preventive suspension for
an indefinite period of time
is unreasonable and violates the right of the accused to due process.
The people who elected the governor to office would be deprived of his services for an
indefinite period, and his right to hold office would be nullified. Moreover, since under
Section 42 of the Civil
Service Decree the duration of preventive suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days,
equal protection demands that the duration of preventive suspension under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt
Practices Act be also limited to ninety (90) days only.

REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011
GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking)
FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in
1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the
assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the
contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the
disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee
because the essential elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1)
entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and
(2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and
occupied the property as lesse.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in
1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than
a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the
property under a contract of lease.
Republic v lim
Non-payment of just compensation
General rule: non-payment by government does not entitle private owners to recover possession of the
expropriated property
(because expropriation is an in rem proceeding, not an ordinary sale), but only to demand payment of the fair
market value of
the property (Republic v. CA, G.R. 146587; Reyes v. National Housing Authority, G.R.
147511)
Exception: deliberate refusal to pay just compensation entitles the owners to recover the property
5-year rule: the non-payment of the compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the
expropriated lots; however, in cases where the government failed to pay the compensation within 5 years from
the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owner concerned shall have the right to recover possession of
their property. This is in
connection with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment. To be
sure, the 5-year
period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. (Republic vs. Lim, 2005)

City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation ofestablishment of
private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private
memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of
property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives
the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of
police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the
benefit of the public.

Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property

Ruling:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's
exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance
without benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due process, would amount to
unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's
benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the state.

PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA [95 PHIL 46; NO.L-4817; 26 MAY 1954]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together
with the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The
ordinance imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in
the city and penalizes non-payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance
empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons
engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under
section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest as imposed
by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the
validity of the law authorizing it.

Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and
authorize what amounts to double taxation.

Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in
its discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others
untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered
to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National Government. That
matter is within the domain of political departments. The argument against double taxation
may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city.
It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes
be exacted with respect to the same occupation by both the state and the political
subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is reversed with regards to the ordinance
and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.

Binay vs. Domingo

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which
extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not
exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available
funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution.
Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the
implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said
resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following
reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare,
safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public
purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few
individuals.

Issues:

1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general
welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which

was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et
ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing
the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may
exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature
which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto
they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may
be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and
such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and
convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and
general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of
property therein.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people
in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private
rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation
and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects,
and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals,
and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal
with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by
promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the
preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable
to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As
correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social
welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the
promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for
human rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support
for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the
common good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified.
Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators,
down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed
giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the
bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under
Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of
our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of
pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience,
and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No.
60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in
life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or
as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of
inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389,
September 11, 1991)

Yrasuegi v PAL
Petitioner was a former international flight steward of PAL, herein respondent. Petitioner was dismissed
because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company. Petitioner claims that he
was illegally dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was discriminated against when he was dismissed.

Held: Petition denied. To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause
guaranty of the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be
invoked against acts of privateindividuals. Indeed, the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the 14th
Amendment, which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal
protection erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions,
no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.