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01 FEATI UNIVERSITY v HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, Presiding Judge of the Court of AUTHOR: Enriquez
Industrial Relations and FEATI UNIVERSITY FACULTY CLUB-PAFLU
NOTES: Ang haba. This is a repeated case. I only included the topic on validity of
TOPIC: Labor Disputes; Validity of the Presidential Certification PONENTE: Presidential Certification.
Zaldivar
Section 10 of RA 875 or An Act to Promote Industrial Peace provides:
When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines there exists a labor
dispute in an industry indispensable to the national interest and when such labor
dispute is certified by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations, said
Court may cause to be issued a restraining order forbidding the employees to
strike or the employer to lockout the employees, and if no other solution to the
dispute is found, the Court may issue an order fixing the terms and conditions of
employment.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: RA 875 states that "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment regardless of
whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employees.
To certify a labor dispute to the CIR is the prerogative of the President under the law, and this Court will not interfere in, much less curtail, the exercise of that
prerogative.
FACTS: The Private Respondent FEATI Faculty Club are composed of professors of the Petitioner FEATI University.

On January 14, 1963 the President of the Faculty Club wrote to the President of the University a letter informing the latter of the organization of the Faculty Club as
a labor union, duly registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations.

FEATI University questioned the right of the FEATI Faculty Club to be the exclusive representative of the majority of the employees and asked proof that the Faculty
Club had been designated or selected as exclusive representative by the vote of the majority of said employees.

Eventually, FEATI Faculty Club filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a notice of strike alleging as reason the refusal of FEATI University to bargain collectively with
the representative of the faculty members.

Thereafter, the members of the Faculty Club went on strike and established picket lines in the premises of the University, thereby disrupting the schedule of classes.

This prompted the President Macapagal to certify to the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) the dispute between FEATI University and FEATI Faculty Club pursuant to
the provisions of Section 10 of RA 875.

Hence, 3 cases were filed by FEATI Faculty Club before the CIR presided by Judge Bautista.
to declare in contempt of court FEATI University since it refused to accept them back to work in violation of the return-to-work order of March 30, 1963 and
has employed professors and/or instructors to take their places
Another for petition for certification election praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative. However, this was withdrawn

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since it was absorbed by the first case above

Indirect contempt of court filed against the administrative officials of the FEATI University reiterating the first case

FEATI University filed a MTD. It raised the issue of the validity of the Presidential certification.
that under Sec. 10 of RA 875 the power of the President of the Philippines to certify is subject to the following conditions, namely:
o (1) that there is a labor dispute, and
o (2) that said labor dispute exists in an industry that is vital to the national interest.
FEATI University maintains that these conditions do not exist in the instant case.

Judge Bautista denied the MTD. Hence, this petition for Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that Judge Bautista acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, in taking cognizance of the cases filed by FEATI Faculty Club.
ISSUE(S): Whether Judge Bautista abused its discretion in taking cognizance of the cases? Or pwede din Whether President Garcias certification is valid under Sec.
10 of RA 875

HELD: No, Judge Bautista did not abuse its discretion. Yes, President Garcias certification was valid.
RATIO: On the issue of whether FEATI University is an industrial establishment and not an educational institution, hence within the jurisdiction of the CIR? Yes.
FEATI University itself admits that it has declared dividends. It is not for strictly educational purposes and that "It realizes profits and parts of such earning is
distributed as dividends to private stockholders or individuals. Under this circumstance, and in consonance with the rulings in the decisions of this Court, above
cited, it is obvious that Republic Act No. 875 is applicable to herein petitioner Feati University. Hence, it is within the jurisdiction of the CIR.
Was there a labor dispute? Yes.
RA 875 states that "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment regardless of whether the disputants stand in
proximate relation of employer and employees.
In this case, all the facts mentioned above show that the controversy between the FEATI University and the FEATI Faculty Club involved terms and conditions of
employment, and the question of representation. Hence, there was a labor dispute between the them, as contemplated by RA 875. It having been shown that the
University is an institution operated for profit, that is an employer, and that there is an employer-employee relationship (this was discussed sa digest ni Joana),
between the University and the members of the Faculty Club, and it having been shown that a labor dispute existed between the University and the Faculty Club, the
contention of the University, that the certification made by the President is not authorized by Sec. 10 of RA 875 but is groundless.
On whether the labor dispute exists in an industry that is vital to the national interest? Yes.
To certify a labor dispute to the CIR is the prerogative of the President under the law, and this Court will not interfere in, much less curtail, the exercise of that
prerogative. The jurisdiction of the CIR in a certified case is exclusive. Once the jurisdiction is acquired pursuant to the presidential certification, the CIR may exercise
its broad powers as provided in CA 103 (An Act which created the CIR). All phases of the labor dispute and the employer-employee relationship may be threshed out
before the CIR, and the CIR may issue such order or orders as may be necessary to make effective the exercise of its jurisdiction. The parties involved in the case may
appeal to the Supreme Court from the order or orders thus issued by the CIR.
In this case, when President Innoe Garcia took into consideration that the University "has some 18,000 students and employed approximately 500 faculty members",
that `the continued disruption in the operation of FEATI University will necessarily prejudice the thousand of students", and that "the dispute affects the national
interest", and certified the dispute to the CIR, it is not for the CIR nor this Court to pass upon the correctness of the reasons of the President in certifying the labor
dispute to the CIR.

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2 San Miguel Corp. Employees Union - PTWGO v. Bersamira AUTHOR: Garcia

[G.R. No. 87700 June 13, 1990] NOTES:
TOPIC: Labor Disputes
PONENTE: Melencio-Herrera, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Labor dispute exists when the controversy concerns the terms and conditions of employment
FACTS:
1983 and 1984 SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and DRite to maintain its competitive position and keeping with the
imperatives of efficiency, business expansion and diversity of its operation.
o The workers employed by the contractors were to be paid by the later and that none of them were to be deemed employees or agents of
SanMig.
o No employer-employee relation between the contractors and/or its workers, on the one hand, and SanMig on the other.
Union is the duly authorized representative of the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of SanMig with whom the latter executed a CBA (7/1/1986
6/30/1989).
o Section 1 temporary, probationary, or contract employees and workers are excluded from the bargaining unit and, therefore, outside the
scope of this Agreement.
11/20/1988 (letter) the Union advised SanMig that some Lipercon and DRite workers had signd up for union membership and sought the regularization of
their employment with SMC.
o Have been continuously working for SanMig for a period ranging from 6 months to 15 years and that their work is neither causal nor seasonal as
they are performing work or activities necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of SanMig.
1/12/1989 Union filed a notice of trike for unfair labor practice (failed to receive favorable response).
1/30/1989 Union filed a second notice
Two notices of strike were consolidated and several conciliation conference were held to settle the dispute before the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) of Dole.
2/114/1989 3/2/1989 series of pickets were staged by Lipercon and DRite workers in various SMC plants and offices.
3/6/1989 SMC filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and Damages before the RTC.
RTC: issued a TRO
3/13/1989 Union filed a Motion to Dismiss SanMigs Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the case/nature of the action. Denied in an Order
dated 4/11/1989.
3/25/1989 RTC issued the questioned Order granting the application and enjoining the Union from Committing the acts complained of (reason: absence of
employer-employee relationship).
Union brought the case to the SC grave abused of discretion
SC issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the Injucntion issued by the RTC. The Union construed this to mean that we can strike.
Union went on strike some contractual workers (30) had been laid off.
5/3/1989 NCMB called the parties to conciliation.
o MOA the laid-off individuals xxx shall be recalled effective 5/8/1989 to their former jobs or equivalent positions under the same terms and

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conditions prior to lay-off. In turn, the Union would immediately lift the pickets and return to work

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not RTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the present controversy and properly issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
HELD:
No. The case at bar involves labor dispute.
RATIO:
It is beyond dispute that the controversy in the court a quo involves or arose out of a labor dispute and is directly connected or interwoven with the cases
pending with the NCMB-DOLE, and is thus beyond the ambit of the public respondents jurisdiction. That the acts complained of are within the competence
of labor tribunals, is beyond question.
Labor dispute as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment of the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
A labor dispute can nevertheless exist regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee. The existence of
labor dispute is not negative by the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee
Terms, tenure and conditions of employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labor
dispute.
Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers including 1. Unfair labor practice cases; 2.
Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; xxx and 5. Cases arising from any violation of
Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of striker and lockouts. Xxx.
To allow the action filed below to prosper would bring about split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
The contending interest (propriety right and rights of workers) must be placed in proper perspective and equilibrium.

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03 Halaguena vs. PAL AUTHOR: Tristan

[G.R. No.172013, October 2, 2009] NOTES:
TOPIC: Labor Disputes PONENTE: Peralta
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the
exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to
disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship, which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective
bargaining agreement.

Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions
between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of
obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court.

FACTS:
Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) prior to November 22, 1996. They are members of the
Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), a labor organization certified as the sole and exclusive certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the flight attendants, flight stewards and pursers of respondent.

PAL and FASAP entered into a CBA incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005, hereinafter referred to as
PAL-FASAP CBA. Section 144 Part A of the CBA provides: Compulsory Retirement:, compulsory retirement shall be fifty-five (55) for females and sixty
(60) for males. x x x.

Petitioners filed case in RTC against respondent for the invalidity of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA on the ground that the provision is
discriminatory, and demanded for an equal treatment with their male counterparts.

The RTC issued a TRO on August 10, 2004, enjoining the respondent for implementing Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA. PAL appealed to
CA. CA: granted PALs petition and ruled that RTC HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. Thus this appeal by the herein petitioners.

Petitioner FAs contentions: As the issue involved is constitutional in character, the labor arbiter or the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) has no jurisdiction over the case and, thus, RTC had jurisdiction. The petitioners pray that judgment be rendered on the merits declaring
Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA null and void.

PAL Defense: Alleges that the labor tribunals have jurisdiction, as the controversy partakes of a labor dispute. The dispute concerns the terms and
conditions of petitioners' employment in PAL, specifically their retirement age. The RTC has no jurisdiction because the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel
of Voluntary Arbitrators have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA. Regular courts have no power to set and fix the terms and conditions of employment.

ISSUE (S): WoN RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioners' action challenging the legality or constitutionality of the provisions on the compulsory retirement
age contained in the CBA between respondent PAL and FASAP.

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HELD: YES. Petition is Partially Granted. Court ruled that RTC had jurisdiction but remanded the case back to resolve a question of fact (SEE RATIO).

RATIO:
Jurisdiction of RTC:
The petitioners' primary relief is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, which allegedly discriminates against them for being BP 129, as
amended. Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals. The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor
Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general
jurisdiction.

Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-
employee relationship, which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement.

Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions
between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of
obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court.

Here, the employer-employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of
obligation, i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW. Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor
relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and
not to the labor arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage
structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of
competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies
disappears.

The change in the terms and conditions of employment, should Section 144 of the CBA be held invalid, is but a necessary and unavoidable consequence of the
principal relief sought, i.e., nullification of the alleged discriminatory provision in the CBA. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that a resolution of controversy
that would bring about a change in the terms and conditions of employment is a labor dispute, cognizable by labor tribunals. It is unfair to preclude
petitioners from invoking the trial court's jurisdiction merely because it may eventually result into a change of the terms and conditions of employment.

RE: Question of Fact:

The question as to whether said Section 114, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA is discriminatory or not is a question of fact. This would require the presentation
and reception of evidence by the parties in order for the trial court to ascertain the facts of the case and whether said provision violates the Constitution,
statutes and treaties. A full-blown trial is necessary, which jurisdiction to hear the same is properly lodged with the RTC. Therefore, a remand of this case to
the RTC for the proper determination of the merits of the petition for declaratory relief is just and proper.

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4.

5. Nestl v. NLRC AUTHOR: Mendoza

[G.R. No. Date] NOTES:
TOPIC: Labor Dispute Private Respondents- Eugenia Nunez, Liza Villanueva, Emmanuel Villena, Rudolph
PONENTE: Armas, Rodolfo Kua and Rodolfo Solidum.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

Article 212 of the Labor Code defines Labor disputes includes any controversy or matters concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

The power of the NLRC to enjoin or restrain the commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts as provided in Art. 218 of the Labor Code, can only be exercised
in a labor dispute.

FACTS:
The private respondents were employed by Petitioner-Nestl either as sales representatives or medical representatives. By reason of the nature of their work they
were each allowed to avail of the companys car loan policy. Under that policy, the company advances the purchase price of a car to be paid back by the employee
through monthly deductions from his salary, the company retaining the ownership of the motor vehicle until it shall have been fully paid for. All of the private
respondents availed of the petitioners car loan policy.

On September 14, 1987, the private respondents were dismissed from service for having participated in an illegal strike. They filed complaints for illegal dismissal in
the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The LA dismissed their complaints so they appealed to the NLRC where their appeals are still pending.

Also, in their Notice Dismissal from Nestl, they had been given the choice to either settle the remaining balance of the cost of their respective cars, or return them
to the company. The private respondents refused to avail of either option prompting Nestl to file a civil suit to recover possession with the RTC of the cars that was
put into custody by the Court.

Private respondents filed a TRO in the NLRC to stop Nestl from cancelling their car loans and collecting their monthly amortizations pending the final resolution of
their appeal in the illegal dismissal case.

The NLRC granted the private respondents petition. Nestl filed a MR but was denied for tardiness. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it issued a labor injunction (TRO) without legal basis and in the absence of any labor dispute related to the same.

According to the NLRC, 1.There is a labor dispute between the Nestl and the private respondents; 2. That their default in paying the amortizations for their cars
was brought about by their illegal dismissal from work by the petitioner as punishment for their participation in the illegal strike of the Union of Filipro Employees of
which they are members. So, if they had not participated in the strike, they would not have been dismissed from work and they would not have defaulted in the
payment of their amortizations. Private respondents admitted their civil obligation to the petitioner; and 3. That as the illegal dismissal case is a labor dispute which

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is still pending resolution before it, it is clothed with authority to issue the contested resolutions because under the law, PD 442, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines as amended, it is vested with the authority to resolve labor disputes and in Article 218 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the NLRC was correct in stating that there is a labor dispute between Nestl and the private respondents.
HELD:
No, there was no labor dispute between Nestl and the private respondents. Petition Granted.
RATIO:
Nestls demand for payment of the private respondents amortizations on their car loans or in the alternative, the return of the cars to the company, is not a labor,
but a civil dispute. It involves debtor-creditor relations, rather than employee-employer relations.

As correctly pointed out by Nestl in the options they gave to the private respondents in their Notice of Dismissal,

It is not dependent on or related to any labor aspect under which a labor injunction can be issued. Whether or not the private respondents remain as employees
Nestl, there is no escape from their obligation to pay their outstanding accountabilities to it; and if they cannot afford it, to return the cars assigned to them. As
noted, the options given to the private respondents are civil in nature arising from contractual obligations. There is no lab or aspect involved in the enforcement
of those obligations.

Lastly, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing the writ of injunction to stop the Nestl from enforcing the civil obligation of
the private respondents under the car loan agreements and from protecting its interest in the cars which, by the terms of those agreements, belong to it (Nestl)
until their purchase price shall have been fully paid by the employee. The terms of the car loan agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The rights and
obligations of the parties under those contracts may be enforced by a separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):