G.R. No.
L-35933 June 29, 1984 Upon appeal by the petitioners, however, the Court of Appeals modified the lower court's decision. The
SUSANA DE LA CERNA LAINGO, TEODORO DACUYAN, ELENA DACUYAN and SAMSON
DACUYAN, petitioners,
vs.
DAMIAN CAMILO and/or TUAN MAGALLANES, respondents.
Isidro M. Ampig for petitioners.
Gonzalo G. Latorilla, Kimpo & Kimpo for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The issue raised in this petition is whether or not the execution ordered by the respondent court conforms to
the final judgment embodied in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43920-R.
The petitioners filed a complaint as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5438 of the Court of First Instance of Davao
to recover a seven hectare portion of a twenty-two hectare parcel of land in Malita, Davao.
The disputed property is part of a homestead applied for by Gaudencio Dacuyan married to Susana de la
Cerna and awarded in 1934 to the "heirs of Gaudencio Dacuyan" because the applicant had died in the
meantime. The title was registered in October, 1934. In 1942, the widow Susana de la Cerna describing
herself as "half owner of the conjugal property" sold seven (7) hectares of the land to Damian Camilo,
respondent in this case. Camilo, in turn, sold the land in 1966 to the other respondent, Juan Magallanes.
The dispositive portion of the decision in the reivindicacion case states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint;
2. Divesting the plaintiffs of ownership over seven hectares of the southern side of the land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 1175 of the Register of Deeds of Davao, more particularly, the portion
described in the deed of sale executed by Susana Cerna de Laingo on November 20, 1972, in the presence of
Jorge Agonias and Juan Magailanes and acknowledged before Atty. Ramon M. Kimpo, and the
accompanying sketch marked as Exhibits 1 and 1-A, respectively and vesting the same in Juan A.
Magallanes, Filipino, married to Fedilina Neri, Filipino, and residing at Malita, Davao;
3. Directing the plaintiffs to allow Juan Magallanes to have the aforesaid land surveyed; and,
4. Sentencing the plaintiffs jointly and severally to pay the defendants P3,000.00 as attorney's fees, with
costs.
dispositive portion of the appellate decision reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, this Court is constrained to modify as it now modifies the judgment appealed from:
the sale to appellees is held to be valid only as to an undivided seven (7) hectares not of the specific portion
now litigated; appellants are entitled to co-possession thereof with appellees until the undivided seven (7)
hectares to which appellees are entitled are definitely segregated thru partition; the adjudication of attorney's
fee is set aside; no more pronouncement as to cost.
After the judgment of the Court of Appeals had become final and executory, the petitonerrs filed the
necessary motion with the Court of First Instance of Davao to issue a writ of execution placing them in co-
possession with the private respondents of the seven (7) hectares being litigated.
The private respondents filed a counter motion for the issuance of a writ of excution praying that the
petitioners be ordered to execute a project of partition among the heirs and while doing so, segregate the
seven (7) hectares purchased and possessed by them from the date of the document of sale. The petitioners,
however, opposed the counter motion emphasizing that the execution of judgment referred to an action for
recovery of possession of a specific seven (7) hectares of land and not to an action for partition of property.
The respondent countered with a rejoinder which admitted that the judgment, while ambiguous, confirmed
their rights over seven (7) hectares of land sold to them. Since they have been in possession of a specific
seven (7) hectares of land on which they planted coconuts already bearing fruits, the most equitable execution
according to them was for those seven (7) hectares to be the seven hectares adjudged in the decision.
The Court of First Instance decided the matter by issuing a writ of execution allowing the respondents to
enjoy possession over the entire twenty-two (22) hectares with the petitioners. The questioned order, the
second paragraph of which is assailed in this petition reads:
On motion of the plaintiffs, through Aty. Ampig, and without objection of Atty. Latorilla, counsel for the
defendant, let a writ of possession issue with respect to the seven (7) hectares, subject matter of the suit, by
allowing the plaintiffs to enjoy with the defendants possession of the same.
On oral motion of Atty. Latorilla, let a writ of possession issue with respect to the remainder of the twenty-
two (22) hectares by allowing the defendants to enjoy with the plaintiffs possession of the rest of the twnety-
two (22) hectares.
SO ORDERED.
The motions for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners raised the case to us directly on a pure
legal issue which they state as follows:
THE COURT A QUO OR THE RESPONDENTN JUDGE ERRED IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A
WRIT OF POSSESSION WITH RESPECT TO THE REMAINDER OF THE TWENTY TWO (22)
HECTARES BY ALLOWING THE DEFENDANTS TO ENJOY WITH THE PLAINTIFFS POSSESSION
OF THE REST OF THE TWENTY TWO (22) HECTARES AND IN DENYING THE TWO (2) MOTIONS
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE SAID ORDER.
The reason given by the Court of Appeals for not granting undisputed ownership of the seven (7) hectares
already possessed by the respondents are:
xxx xxx xxx
3. CONSIDERING: Now, as to this that while it is true that the Land Tax Declaration in the name of the heirs
of Gaudencio Dacuyan Exh. 3 was afterwards cancelled and reduced from its area of 22 hectares to 15
hectares under Exh. 3-A the remaining seven (7) hectares coming to be declared in the name of the buyer
Camilo Damian under Exh. 5-A, 5-B, 5-C and 5-D, yet a scrutiny of these documents would not show any
participation of the other children of Gaundencio and Susana namely Teodoro, Elena and Samson the co-
plaintiffs in this case not even any proof that they were informed of the sale; neither is there any evidenc34
present in the rcord positive in character that they had ever consented to a physical segregation of the seven
(7) hectare portion sold by Susana unto Camilo so that the point of laches is without any basis; it is true that
Camilo and afterwards in 1966 his successor-in-interest Juan Magallanes had beein in possession apparently
exclusive since the sale to Camilo in 1942 under Exh. 1 but the trouble is that exclusive possession by a co-
owner cannot give riose to prescription; the law has always been to the effect that between co-owners
prescription cannot run, Cortez v. Oliva, 33 Phil. 480 and in order for prescription to run between themselves
the repudiation of co-ownership must be clearly manifested which is not at all the case here bearing in mind
the undisputed fact that Camilo Damian did not even attempt to register Exh. 1 nor notify said other children
of Gaudencio Dacuyan and tell them he was claiming the seven (7) hectare portion as solely his own; and
neither should it be overlooked that the title being a Torrens title it cannot be the subject matter of
prescription; this will mean that notwithstanding the possession apparently exclusive of Camilo Damian for
more than twenty (20) years over the seven (7) hectare portion, he cannot under the law be permitted to claim
absolute ownership therein; and as a corollary neither can his successor-in-interest Juan Magallanes but since
Susana was entitled to at least 11 hectares; therefore her sale ov seven (7) hectares is undivided would have
been valid, but a sale by her of this specific portion litigated could not bvind her co-plaintiffs; and this being
the final result the adjudication of attorney's fees must have to be discarded;
xxx xxx xxx
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, with the foregoing reasons for seemingly ambigtous judgment calling
for a future segregation of seven (7) hectares out of the twenty-two (22) hectares, has long become final and
executory.
We agree with the petitioners that the execution ordered by the court of first instance did not conform to the
final judgment being executed.
We stated in Phil-American Accident Insurance Co., Inc. (97 SCRA 811)
not in keeping with the disposition really ordained by the Court of Appeals. As stated in Macabuhay v.
Manuel (101 SCRA 835) where we cited Padua v. Robles (66 SCRA 485):
... that the meaning, operation and consequences of a judgment must be ascertained like any other written
instrument and that a judgment rests on the intention of the Court oas gathered from every part thereof
including the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances.
A reading of the decision and its background facts shows that the controversy litigated and passed upon by
the Court of Appeals was confined to the ownership of seven (7) hectares of land which forms part of the
twenty two (22) hectares parcel of land covered by a torrens title in the name of the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the respondents are entitled to seven (7) hectares of the property but not
necessarily the seven (7) hectares possessed by them. They are entitled to co-possession with appellees untill
the undivided seven (7) hectares are definitely segregated through partition.
For us to now rule that the respondents will enjoy co-possession with the petitioners over seven (7) hectares
which belongs to the former would be inequitous even as actual co-possession over twenty two (22) hectares
would not conform to the final judgment. There is the other consideration that segregation of the definite
seven (7) hectares must await the partition among the heirs, a procedure outside the control of the
respondents.
We, therefore, rule that the co-possession mentioned in the Court of Appeals judgment refers to the right of
the respondents, already certain and vested but not yet specific, over any seven (7) hectares not spelled out,
the respondents shall continue to possess the seven (7) hectares thy have held since the litigated sale and
enjoy all its furits. Theuy will have no share of the fruits of the other fifteen (15) hectares nor its enjoyment
but neither shall the petitioners have any share in the fruits or enjoyment of the seven 97) hectares held by the
respondents. It would be in the interests of all concerned if the partition of the property among the heirs is
effected immediately and the respondents are finally given their definite seven (7) hectares as provided in the
appellate judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The second paragraph of the questioned order is
DELETED. The respondents shall continue to exclusively possess and enjoy the seven (7) hectares actually
held by them in accordance with the terms of this decision until a partition is effected and their share is
definitely segregated.
SO ORDERED.

The questioned Order cannot be sustained. The judgment which was sought to be executed ordered the
payment of simple "legal interest" only. It said nothing about the payment of compound interes. Accordingly,
when the respondent judge ordered the payment of compound interest he went beyond the confines of his
own judgment which had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and which had become final. Fundamental
is the rule that execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision.
Likewise, a court cannot, except for clerical errors or omissions, amend a judgment that has become final.
(Jaob, et al. v. Alo, et al., 91 Phil. 750 [1952]; Robles v. Timario, et al., 107 Phil. 809 [1960]; Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Gutierrez, et al., 108 Phil. 215 [1960]; Ablaza v. Sycip, et al., 110 Phil. 4 [1960].)
(emphasis supplied)

At the same time, the mode of execution desireed by the petitioners would be unfair to the respondents and

G.R. No. 77976 November 24, 1988
MAXIMO GABRITO, ROGER LIBUT, CARMELITA UY, LIZA DE VERA, thru her Attorney-in-
Fact, JESUS DE LOS SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NINTH DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. NICIAS O. MENDOZA,
Presiding Judge Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, ET AL., respondents.
Cornelio C. Cardenas and Valeriano S. Peralta for petitioners.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with preliminary injunction and restraining order of the decision of
the Court of Appeals * dated March 4, 1987 in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 08710, "Maximo Gabrito et al. vs. Hon.
Nicias O. Mendoza and Roberto Tan et al.," affirming the April 2, 1986 decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo City ** which also affirmed the decision of MTCC, Branch V, Olongapo City, and the
Resolution of respondent court dated March 30, 1987 denying herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The appeal originated as an unlawful detainer complaint filed by herein private respondents with the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch V, Olongapo City.
The antecedent facts as summarized by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
The spouses Roberto Tan and Benita Ching-Tan filed a complaint in the Municipal Trial Court against
defendants Maximo Gabrito, et al., alleging that they are the possessors and legal owners of the property
situated at No. 107 Gordon Ave., New Kalalake, Olongapo City as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 4-
2046. The defendants are leasing portions of this parcel of land, each paying the corresponding monthly
rentals due thereon.
On the leased portion, the defendants constructed buildings and have allowed other persons to sublease the
same for commercial purposes.
As the spouses Tan have no other property where they could construct their residential house, the spouses
Tan notified the defendants (in January 1984) that they intend to personally use the land to build their house
thereon and gave defendants three (3) months to vacate the premises and remove the structures and
improvements which defendants had constructed thereon.
In April 1984, defendants requested for an extension of time within which to vacate, which was granted by
the spouses Tan. However, from that time on, defendants also stopped paying monthly rentals due on the land
they leased.
In view of this, in July 1984, defendants were told to leave the premises and to pay rentals in arrears. As
defendants refused to comply with both demands, the matter was brought to the Barangay Council for
settlement. As no agreement was reached, a certification to file action was issued to the spouses Tan. Hence,
the Tans filed an action for unlawful detainer with damages against Gabrito, et al.
In answer to the complaint, defendants Gabrito, et al. denied the material allegations of the complaint and
alleged that: they are builders in good faith over the land as provided in Article 448 of the Civil Code; the
land where the houses of defendants were built is a public land, not yet awarded nor titled to anybody;
plaintiffs's alleged predecessor-in-interest not being the owner thereof could not have passed nor transferred
ownership thereof to them (plaintiffs) considering that Gloria Carillo's Miscellaneous Sales Application No.
(X-4-4320) has not yet been acted upon by the Bureau of Lands; plaintiffs and their predessors-in-interest are
absentee applicants over the land, hence, are disqualified to own the same; plaintiffs have never been in
possession of the land while the defendants are in actual physical possession thereof; the sale of plaintiffs'
alleged predecessor-in-interest in favor of plaintiffs is null and void for being in violation of P.D. No. 1517 as
defendants being lessees of the land have the right of first refusal thereof.
Defendants brought a counterclaim for damages against the plaintiffs. (Rollo, Annex "C", pp. 39-40).
Respondent Municipal Trial Judge applied the rule on summary procedure in this case, rendered its decision
dated November 22, 1985, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for all the defendants to vacate the parcel of land described in
par. 3 of the complaint, removing therefrom the buildings and any other improvements respectively owned by
them; and to pay plaintiffs the following as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises:
Maximo Gabritoat
P250.00 per month from April 1984 until he vacates the premises;
Roger Libutat
P150.00 per month from May 1984 until he vacates the premises;
Liza de Veraat:
P150.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates the premises; Carmelita Uyat
Pl 70.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates the premises.
for all defendants to pay, in equal shares, damages by way of attorney's fees in the amount of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS ( P1,000.00 ) as well as costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35).
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (Civil Case No. 450-08-5), the decision of the Municipal Trial Court
was affirmed in its decision dated April 2, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premised on all the foregoing consideration and finding no prejudicial and reversible error
was ever committed by the lower Court, the Court affirms in toto the decision being appealed, with costs
against the defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex 'B' p. 38).
On review, herein respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
Branch LXXIV, and ruled;
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review herein is DISMISSED for lack of merit. (Rollo, Annex "C", p. 44).
On March 16, 1987, the petitioner filed their "Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition to the Motion for
Immediate Execution Pending Further Proceedings" which was denied by the Ninth Division of respondent
Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated March 30, 1987 and granted the Motion for Immediate Issuance of a
Writ of Execution filed by private respondents (Annex "F", Rollo, pp. 57-58).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed on April 13, 1987.
On April 21, 1987, Acting Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, authorized the grant of Temporary Restraining
Order in this case which was confirmed by the Second Division of this Court in its Resolution dated April 27,
1987 (Rollo, pp. 86, 87, 88).
In a Resolution dated June 8, 1987, petitioners were required to comment on the motion dated April 26, 1987
(Rollo, p. 94) of counsel for respondents, praying to set aside the temporary restraining order issued on April
21, 1987 and to issue a writ of execution pending appeal or to allow the Court of Appeals to proceed with the
execution of the decision pending appeal (Rollo, p. 115), which was complied with by petitioners on July 22,
1987 (Rollo, p. 143).
In the resolution of October 5, 1987 (Rollo, p. 187) the petition was given due course and the parties were
required to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days from notice. Petitioners'
memorandum was submitted on December 3, 1987 (Rollo, p. 196). Respondents submitted their
memorandum on April 12, 1988 (Rollo, p. 235). Petitioners raised the following issues:
1. That a Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case for Unlawful Detainer under
Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, where the plaintiffs are merely the legal possessors and recent
transferees of a public land, and the defendants are the absolute owners of the building existing on the same
land, for a number of years already.
2. That the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXIV, Olongapo City, ought to have dismissed the
action for Unlawful Detainer and as the same was also heard on appeal by the said Court on this jurisdictional
challenge.
3. The market value of the residential houses or buildings of the defendants on the said land is approximately
P170,000.00, and it was with plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest, one Gloria Carillo-Potente that defendants
caused said structures to be erected on said land plaintiffs having only acquired from said predecessor, by
means of a Deed of Sale of such rights sometime on January 5, 1984.
4. Upon this frame of facts which are admitted in the Decision of both Courts, only a Court of General
Jurisdiction, a Regional Trial Court, can have the competence to try and decide the same: the Court of Special
Limited Jurisdiction, cannot take cognizance of such facts as an action for Unlawful Detainer.
5. Arguendo, that the Court of Origin has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause of action for Unlawful
Detainer, it should have not heard the case in accordance with the Rules of Summary Proceedings, and based
its Decision on an Affidavit hearing, as the question of ownership was being contested between plaintiffs and
defendants, with respect to whom was the preferred grantee to the same land, and which falls under the
complete administration and control of the Bureau of Lands.
6. In fact, the Court of Origin, Branch V, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Olongapo, should have suspended
the proceedings, as there was an Administrative Protest being heard by the District Land Office of Olongapo
City.
7. On the question of suspension of proceedings denied by the Court of Origin, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch V, Olongapo City, an action for certiorari was filed before Branch LXXIII of Regional Trial
Court, Olongapo City, Civil Case No. 399-0-85, and although a Restraining Order against Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch V, City of Olongapo, was issued, the same was already academic as by that time said
Municipal Trial Court, Branch V, Olongapo City, has already rendered its Decision in favor of private
respondent hereat, plaintiff therein.
8. Branch LXXIV, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo, in its Decision rendered on appeal, did not pass upon
such matters, specified supra, so as to reverse the Decision of the Court of Origin: the subject Decisions,
have not considered the due process rights of petitioners toward their residences and structures, the same are
facing the risk of condemnation and destruction without fair hearing, and such improvements have an
aggregate value of Pl70,000.00, more or less.
9. Respondent Honorable Judge Mendoza of Branch LXXIV, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo, may have
been misled by the citation of authority, case of Vda. de Bocaling vs. Laguna, et al., 54 SCRA, 243, relied
upon by appellees, said case being totally inapplicable to the facts of this case.
10. Respondent Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Lumanlan, without regard to the fif'teen (15) days period finality of
the Order and/or Writ of Demolition, harrassed herein petitioners, notwithstanding the pendency of matters
involved to their extreme discomfort and anxiety.
11. The Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Annex "C", sustained the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court and ignored the vital issues posed for resolution: A Motion For Reconsideration, copy is hereto
attached as Annex "D", was presented, precisely to stress the same but, a pointed or precise ruling upon such
issues was avoided in the Resolution dated 30th of March, 1987, true copy attached herein as Annex "E".
12. On the other (sic) upon Motion of private respondents, the Tans, despite Opposition thereto, Writ of
Execution pending appeal was issued and respondent Deputy Sheriff Lumanlan enforced the same, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "F": true copy of Notice to Vacate served by said respondent Deputy
Sheriff to petitioners is attached as Annex "G" herein.
13. Per Annex "D" Motion For Reconsideration a constitutional point, was reared forth, on first impression,
per proviso of Sec. 10, Art. XIII-new, 1986 Constitution, relevant to demolition and resettlement, and,
Resolution, dated 30th March, 1987, Annex "E", of the Honorable Appellate Authority, avoided said
constitutional question, without passing upon the same.
14. Of Jurisdictional matters: Decision dated March 4, 1987, of the Honorable Court of Appeals was,
received on March 6, 1987, Motion For Reconsideration was filed on March 16, 1987, and Resolution dated
30th of March, 1987, denying Motion for Reconsideration was received on April 1, 1987: thus, this Petition
is filed within the 15 day period. (Rollo, pp. 4-8).
All of which boil down to the main issue of whether or not an action for unlawful detainer is the proper
action to oust petitioners from their occupation of the land in dispute.
There is no question as to the ownership of the land in litigation as both petitioners and private respondents
admit that the same is a public land and owned by the government. The bone of contention is, who has a
better right to possess the land which definitely falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court and
the rule of summary procedure may properly be applied.
In a preliminary conference held pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, defendants
admitted that they entered the premises as lessees and had been paying rentals for the use of the land to
Gloria Carillo, private respondents' predecessor-in-interest (Order dated May 15, 1985 in Civil Case No.
2511, MTC, Olongapo City, Branch V; Rollo, pp. 72-73).<re||an1w> When requested to vacate the
premises, petitioners asked for an extension of time which request was granted. However, petitioners failed to
vacate the premises and also stopped paying rentals. In view of said admissions, petitioners had
unquestionably recognized private respondents' prior right of possession over the questioned property.
Petitioners' allegation in their answer that they are builders in good faith over the land as provided for in
Article 448 of the Civil Code is untenable. As ruled by this Court, Article 448 of the Civil Code, applies only
where one builds on land in the belief that he is the owner of the land, but does not apply where one's interest
in the land is that of a lessee under a rental contract (Balucanag v. Francisco, 122 SCRA 498 [1983]). More
than that, it has been settled that the mere fact that, in his answer, defendant claims to be the exclusive owner
of the property from which plaintiff seeks to eject him is not sufficient to divest the Municipal Trial Court of
jurisdiction (Vivar v. Vivar, 8 SCRA 847, 849 [1963]; De Santa vs. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 52 [1985]).
In addition, this Court held in Bocaling v. Laguna, et al (54 SCRA 243, 250 [1973]) that:
The rule is well-settled that lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good faith because he knew that their
occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the lease, and they cannot as a matter of right,
recover the value of their improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are
reimbursed. Their rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement of
lessees up to one-half of the value of their improvements if the lessor so elects.
Petitioners contend that the above cited case is "completely inapplicable to the case at bar, because the
genesis case of Ejectment therein was subjected to a compromise Agreement" (Rollo, p. 18). Such contention
is, however, untenable. One of the issues raised in the above-cited case was whether or not lessees are
builders and/or possessors in good faith entitled to reimbursement for the value of their improvements. The
Court categorically resolved the issue in the negative without qualification nor even a reference to the
compromise agreement alluded to by the petitioner.
In a later development, petitioners filed a supplemental memorandum submitting the decision of the Bureau
of Lands dated June 7, 1987, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Miscellaneous Sales Application No. 4320 of Benita Ching Tan
should be, as hereby as it is rejected forfeiting to the government whatever amount had been paid on account
thereof. The miscellaneous sales application of Maximo Gabrito, Carmelita Uy, Roger Libut and Liza de
Vera shall continue to be given due course after a subdivision survey of the portion occupied by them shall
have been made at their pro-rata expense.
SO ORDERED.
In view thereof, petitioners maintain that they are the lawful owners of the buildings and the legal possessors
of subject land and that the records of the court proceedings show the pendency of the administrative protest
before the Bureau of Lands between the same litigating parties (Rollo, pp. 166-167).
Respondents countered that the decision of the Bureau of Lands granting preferential right to the petitioners
to apply for the subject parcel of land is still on appeal before the Department of Natural Resources.1 Hence,
said decision which is not yet final, cannot affect the outcome of this case because the authority given to the
land department over the disposition of public land does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over
possessory actions, the character of the land notwithstanding (Rollo, pp. 246-247).
The contention of private respondents is well taken.
This issue has long been laid to rest by this Court. As early as the case of Pitarque v. Sorilla (92 Phil. 55
[1952]), this Court ruled that:
The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose of, and alienate public lands must
not be understood as depriving the other branches of the Government of the exercise of their respective
functions of powers thereon, such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of peace by the police
and the authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions arising therefrom not
involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition.
Said ruling was reiterated in Bahayang v. Maceren, 96 Phil 390 (1955); in Molina v. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 56
(1967) and in Rallon v. Ruiz, Jr., 28 SCRA 331 (1969). In the latter case, the Court specifically ruled on the
jurisdictional question, as follows:
Courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public lands to determine the issue of physical
possession (in forcible entry cases before the inferior court) on the better right of possession (in accion
publiciana cases before court of first instance). And this is because the issue of physical possession raised
before the courts is independent of the question of disposition and alienation of public lands which should be
threshed out in the Bureau of Lands.
The above ruling was further reiterated in Francisco v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (121
SCRA 380 [1983]) and in a recent case of National Development Co., et al. v. Hervilla, G.R. No. 65718, June
30, 1987 (151 SCRA 520), where it was held that:
It is now well settled that the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the
Director of Lands primarily, and ultimately to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants
of public lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public lands. The jurisdiction of courts
is limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in
question (in forcible entry cases, before municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion
publiciana, in cases before the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court).

And even more recently in the case of Guerrero v. Amores, et al., G.R. No.

L-34492 promulgated on March 28, 1988, the Court clearly stated that "pending final adjudication of
ownership by the Bureau of Lands, the Court has jurisdiction to determine in the meantime the right of
possession over the land." Corollary thereto, the power to order the sheriff to remove improvements and turn
over the possession of the land to the party adjudged entitled thereto, belongs only to the courts of justice and
not to the Bureau of Lands.

In the same case, the application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies with reference to
public lands, was further clarified by this Court as follows:

On the other hand, the application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition
precedent to the filing of a juridical action is confined to controversies arising out of the disposition of public
lands (Geukoko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706 (1957); Marukot vs. Jacinto, 98 Phil. 128 (1957), alienation of
public lands (Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra) or to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to
public lands (Pitarque vs. Sorilla, supra) and not to possessory actions involving public lands which are
limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question
(Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra).<re||an1w>

In fact, the Bureau of Lands in its decision of June 7, 1987, admitted the jurisdiction of the courts to decide
the case on the question of physical possession, although not on the question of ownership (Rollo, p. 179).

Under the circumstances, a careful study of the records failed to show any cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities and of the Regional Trial Court, both of Olongapo City, and
finally of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the temporary restraining
order is lifted. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.