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c 


  
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à à  ààà plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
©  accused-appellant.

@  
        

       

 è 

ën Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova
was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by
Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its
Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission
of the offense charged.

ën his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General,
relying on the case of .  insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the
purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes
both his criminal and civil penalties. ën support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in .    which held that the civil obligation in a criminal
case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should
die before final judgment is rendered.

Îe are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability?

ën the aforementioned case of . , this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same
issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal
responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?

ët resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. ët reads, in part:

Art. 89. Ô      . ² Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary
penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;

Îith reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction
is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the
term "final judgment." ës it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a
judgment which is final and executory?

Îe go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part,
recites:

La responsabilidad penal se extingue.

1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las
pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido      .

xxx xxx xxx

The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "     ." Îhat is "sentencia firme"
under the old statute?

XX ëëë Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: ët says:

SENTENCëA FëRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no


haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los
terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.

"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment
is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed ² "en condena determinada;" or, in the
words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes ² "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the
accused die, according to iada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad
criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before
judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the
felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party
defendant." (ë Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)

The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72
and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable.
This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a
criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence
has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right
to appeal."

By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive conclusion:
The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as
long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely
guilty of the felony charged against him.

Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to
institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both
the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." .  (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p.
964. See also: .!, 68 Phil., 626, 634; " , Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., ol. ë, pp.
234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony
committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil
liability." ë Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated,  .

Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is
sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal
action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be
called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof ² criminal liability ² does not exist.
And, as was well stated in i  # ..$  # ., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which
solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."

This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the  case was adopted by the Supreme Court in the
cases of     . i   # .,     . è è#
 . Ëand     .   -by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the
accused pending appeal of said cases.

As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the  case:

The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is
as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said
accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal
Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the
case against him should be dismissed.

On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of i   i   . !  
 and ¦  @ %. @ Ô     üruled differently. ën the former,
the issue decided by this court was: Îhether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who
died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore
against his estate. ët was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the
accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense,
in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:

Îe see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the
revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil
action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely          .

Art. 33. ën cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered
instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final
adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.

ën @ %, the Supreme Court held that:

xxx xxx xxx

ët should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under
Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently,
where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the
latter by death,   extinguishes the former, , of course, that death supervenes before final
judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely
nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)

xxx xxx xxx

ën the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was
charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject matter
of the contract of sale. ët therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused
herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of
human relations remains."

Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding
the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following
ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First
ënstance (CFë), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on
appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFë had rendered its judgment. ën such
case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case
as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be
substituted as defendants-appellants."

ët is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that
the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together
with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, .., civil liability .

However, the Supreme Court in .   # . departed from this long-established
principle of law. ën this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower
court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during
the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.

This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent
of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim
thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of
such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal,
passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for
the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. ën doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8,
1977 stating thus:

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his
death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First ënstance of Pangasinan, which
convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify
the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of
express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil
action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs.
Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

Îhen the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of
First ënstance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by
the Court of First ënstance, the action survives him. ët may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of
Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has
no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).

ën view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar
as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over
his possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged
criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his
counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's
heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator.
Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil
liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).

Succeeding cases raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in
  ; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a
civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ) is extinguished upon dismissal of
the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.

But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in
  impels us to revert to the old ruling.

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in   : The resolution of the civil action impliedly
instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

Îhen a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no
criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence
shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.

Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in   . Nowhere in
its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil
liability  when his death supervenes during appeal. Îhat Article 30 recognizes is an
alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense independently of any criminal action. ën the event that no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the
criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the
survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of
whether civil liability survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability is extinguished by the death of
the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this
matter:

Art. 89. Ô      . ² Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxx xxx xxx

However, the ruling in   deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. ët allowed claims
for civil liability to survive by  treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the
criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a
separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on
the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does
not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. One would be hard put to pinpoint the
statutory authority for such a transformation. ët is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability 
, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment
of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable." ën such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. !   .
Death dissolves all things.

ën sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal
liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal
action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action
cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,
would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is
to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is
contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action
that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977,
however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to
authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under
Article 30.

ëronically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8,
1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the
basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 

ën other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as the   of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article
30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of
the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. Îe
reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability is  extinguished, grounded as it is on
the criminal.

Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the
  resolution of July 8, 1977. ën citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court
made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in    consist of money claims, the
recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by
holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:

"Îhen the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the court
of First ënstance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by
the Court of First ënstance, the action survives him. ët may be continued on appeal.

Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this
course taken in   cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:

xxx xxx xxx

ë do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both @ %and   which, relying
on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that
where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the
judgment of the then Court of First ënstance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can
continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal
liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court's judgments
subsequent and consonant to @ %and   , should be set aside and abandoned as being
clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.

Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor
justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of
criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of
an ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability 
can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21,
Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.

Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in   was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "Îhat are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of
Rule 86, are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability may
include even the restitution of personal or real property." ËSection 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses
for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. ët is
clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence,
there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action as an ordinary contractual money
claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a
claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon
extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his
conviction.

Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability  desires
to recover damages from the        #he must subject to Section 1, Rule
111 -(1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of
obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall
be enforced.

ëf the same act or omission complained of also arises from   or may, by provision of law,
result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court:

Sec. 1.                     . ² No action
upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the
executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and          %      #
    #may be commenced against him.

This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala üwhere we held that, in recovering damages for
injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must
be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the
estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses,
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract,
express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to     
other than those which have their source in delict or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and  the civil liability  arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, .., civil liability in    ."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:

a) Law 

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Îhere the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. ën such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, .., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

ÎHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DëSMëSSED with costs  .

SO ORDERED.





  
      


 
    

   
  
 
     
    
  
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Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eighth day of July, two thousand and three.
&

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SECTëON 1. Short Title.- This Act shall be known as the "Anti- iolence Against Îomen and Their Children Act of 2004".

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.- ët is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with
the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against Îomen, Convention on the Rights of the
Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) " iolence against women and their children" refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harrasment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. ët includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

 "Physical iolence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;


 "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. ët
includes, but is not limited to:
 rap, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object,
making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the
victim¶s body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the
woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
 acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
 Prostituting the woman or child.
 "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property,
public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. ët includes causing or allowing
the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the
victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or
unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
+ "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which
includes, but is not limited to the following:
" withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
% deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
( destroying household property;
' controlling the victims¶ own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money
or properties.

(b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to the physical and
psychological or emotional distress. 

(c) "Battered Îoman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found
in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.

(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and without lawful justification follows the
woman or her child or places the woman or her child under surveillance directly or indirectly or a combination thereof.
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual
acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.

(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child.

(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or institution maintained or managed by the Department of Social Îelfare
and Development (DSÎD) or by any other agency or voluntary organization accredited by the DSÎD for the purposes of
this Act or any other suitable place the resident of which is willing temporarily to receive the victim.

(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable of taking care of themselves as
defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it includes the biological children of the victim and other children
under her care.

SEC. 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and their children.

SEC. 5. Acts of iolence Against Îomen and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:

 Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;


 Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
 Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
. Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
 Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman¶s or her child¶s freedom of movement or
conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman¶s or her child¶s movement or
conduct:
" Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his family;
% Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her
or her family, or deliberately providing the woman¶s children insufficient financial support;
( Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
' Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity
or controlling the victim¶s own mon4ey or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common
money, or properties;
 ënflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or
decisions;
 Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not
constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the
woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
 Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:
" Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
% Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
( Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his
will;
' Destroying the property and personal belongingness or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the
woman or her child; and
# Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
 Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including,
but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of
minor children of access to the woman¶s child/children.

SEC. 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished
according to the following rules:

 Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or consummated parricide or murder or homicide
shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
ëf these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance with the Revised Penal Code; those
constituting serious physical injuries shall have the penalty of prison mayor; those constituting less serious
physical injuries shall be punished by prision correccional; and those constituting slight physical injuries shall be
punished by arresto mayor.

Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two degrees lower than the prescribed
penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower than
arresto mayor.

 Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
 Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision correccional;
. Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
 Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision mayor;
 Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.

ëf the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to be
applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.

ën addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos (300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory
psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.

SEC. 7. enue.- The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases of violence against women and their children under this law. ën the absence of such court in the place where the
offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was
committed at the option of the compliant.

SEC. 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of preventing further acts
of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief
granted under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any
disruption in the victim¶s daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control
over her life. The provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement agencies. The protection orders
that may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection order (BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) and
permanent protection order (PPO). The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all
of the following reliefs:

 Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any of the
acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
 Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with
the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
 Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights
are violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from the
residence;
. Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated family or household member at a distance
specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any specified place
frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member;
 Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential personal effects,
regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the
residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and
other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner¶s or respondent¶s removal of personal
belongingness;
 Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;

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 Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order him to
surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of license and
disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a firearm. ëf the offender is a law enforcement agent, the
court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate on
the offender and take appropriate action on matter;
 Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property damage,
medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income;
@ Directing the DSÎD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner may need; and
/ Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide for the safety of the
petitioner and any designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any designated family or
household member consents to such relief.

Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even in the absence of a decree of legal separation or
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.

The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not preclude a petitioner from applying for, or the
court from granting a TPO or PPO.

SEC. 9. Îho may file Petition for Protection Orders. ± A petition for protection order may be filed by any of the following:

 the offended party;


 parents or guardians of the offended party;
 ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity;
. officers or social workers of the DSÎD or social workers of local government units (LGUs);
 police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children¶s desks; 
 Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad; 
 lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner;
 At least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of the city or municipality where the violence against women and
their children occurred and who has personal knowledge of the offense committed.

SEC. 10. Îhere to Apply for a Protection Order. ± Applications for BPOs shall follow the rules on venue under Section
409 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its implementing rules and regulations. An application for a TPO or PPO
may be filed in the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court with
territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of the petitioner: Provided, however, That if a family court exists in the
place of residence of the petitioner, the application shall be filed with that court.

SEC. 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order. ± The application for a protection order must be in writing, signed and
verified under oath by the applicant. ët may be filed as an independent action or as incidental relief in any civil or criminal
case the subject matter or issues thereof partakes of a violence as described in this Act. A standard protection order
application form, written in English with translation to the major local languages, shall be made available to facilitate
applications for protections order, and shall contain, among other, the following information:

 names and addresses of petitioner and respondent;


 description of relationships between petitioner and respondent;
 a statement of the circumstances of the abuse;
. description of the reliefs requested by petitioner as specified in Section 8 herein;
 request for counsel and reasons for such;
 request for waiver of application fees until hearing; and
 an attestation that there is no pending application for a protection order in another court.

ëf the applicants is not the victim, the application must be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting to (a) the
circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim and (b) the circumstances of consent given by the victim for the filling of
the application. Îhen disclosure of the address of the victim will pose danger to her life, it shall be so stated in the
application. ën such a case, the applicant shall attest that the victim is residing in the municipality or city over which court
has territorial jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing address for purpose of service processing.

An application for protection order filed with a court shall be considered an application for both a TPO and PPO.

Barangay officials and court personnel shall assist applicants in the preparation of the application. Law enforcement
agents shall also extend assistance in the application for protection orders in cases brought to their attention.

SEC. 12. Enforceability of Protection Orders. ± All TPOs and PPOs issued under this Act shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippines and a violation thereof shall be punishable with a fine ranging from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.
SEC. 13. Legal Representation of Petitioners for Protection Order. ± ëf the woman or her child requests in the applications
for a protection order for the appointment of counsel because of lack of economic means to hire a counsel de parte, the
court shall immediately direct the Public Attorney¶s Office (PAO) to represent the petitioner in the hearing on the
application. ëf the PAO determines that the applicant can afford to hire the services of a counsel de parte, it shall facilitate
the legal representation of the petitioner by a counsel de parte. The lack of access to family or conjugal resources by the
applicant, such as when the same are controlled by the perpetrator, shall qualify the petitioner to legal representation by
the PAO.

However, a private counsel offering free legal service is not barred from representing the petitioner.

SEC. 14. i      -i.,/ ! 0 ÔBarangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to
the protection order issued by the   i  ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section
5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A   i  who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after  determination of the basis of the application. ëf the   i  is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any availablei  1   
ëf the BPO is issued by a i  1   the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the i  1   
that the   i  was unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15)
days. ëmmediately after the issuance of an  BPO, the   i   i  1   shall personally
serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect is personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the   i  

SEC. 15. @     2Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by
the court on the date of filing of the application after  determination that such order should be issued. A court may
grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court
shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall
order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of
law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the
issuance of a PPO.

SEC. 16. Permanent Protection Orders. ± Permanent Protection Order (PPO) refers to protection order issued by the
court after notice and hearing.

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The court shall, to the extent possible, conduct the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO in one (1) day. Îhere
the court is unable to conduct the hearing within one (1) day and the TPO issued is due to expire, the court shall
continuously extend or renew the TPO for a period of thirty (30) days at each particular time until final judgment is issued.
The extended or renewed TPO may be modified 

by the court as may be necessary or applicable to address the needs of the applicant.

The court may grant any, some or all of the reliefs specified in Section 8 hereof in a PPO. A PPO shall be effective until
revoked by a court upon application of the person in whose favor the order was issued. The court shall ensure immediate
personal service of the PPO on respondent.

The court shall not deny the issuance of protection order on the basis of the lapse of time between the act of violence and
the filing of the application.

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Sec. 17. *        . ± The following statement must be printed in bold-faced type or in capital
letters on the protection order issued by the   i   or court:

" iolation of this order is punishable by law."


Sec. 18. !    "     "     ± Failure to act on an application for a
protection order within the reglementary period specified in the previous section without justifiable cause shall render the
official or judge administratively liable.

Sec 19. ¦    . ± ën cases of legal separation, where violence as specified in this Act is alleged, Article
58 of the Family Code shall not apply. The court shall proceed on the main case and other incidents of the case as soon
as possible. The hearing on any application for a protection order filed by the petitioner must be conducted within the
mandatory period specified in this Act.

Sec. 20.              ± Ex parte and adversarial hearings to determine the basis of
applications for a protection order under this Act shall have priority over all other proceedings. Barangay officials and the
courts shall schedule and conduct hearings on applications for a protection order under this Act above all other business
and, if necessary, suspend other proceedings in order to hear applications for a protection order.

Sec. 21. u       . ± A complaint for a violation of a BPO issued under this Act must be filed directly
with any municipal trial court, metropolitan trial court, or municipal circuit trial court that has territorial jurisdiction over the
barangay that issued the BPO. iolation of a BPO shall be punishable by imprisonment of thirty (30) days without
prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.

A judgement of violation of a BPO ma be appealed according to the Rules of Court. During trial and upon judgment, the
trial court may motu proprio issue a protection order as it deems necessary without need of an application. 

iolation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute contempt of court punishable under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of
the acts committed.

Sec. 22.           ± The foregoing provisions on protection orders shall be
applicable in impliedly instituted with the criminal actions involving violence against women and their children.

Sec. 23. i 1  . ± The Court may order any person against whom a protection order is issued to give a
bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit the
violence sought to be prevented.

Should the respondent fail to give the bond as required, he shall be detained for a period which shall in no case exceed
six (6) months, if he shall have been prosecuted for acts punishable under Section 5(a) to 5(f) and not exceeding thirty
(30) days, if for acts punishable under Section 5(g) to 5(ë).

The protection orders referred to in this section are the TPOs and the PPOs issued only by the courts.

Sect. 24.      ± Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling
under Sections 5(g) to 5(ë) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

Sec. 25.  . ± iolence against women and their children shall be considered a public offense which may be
prosecuted upon the filing of a complaint by any citizen having personal knowledge of the circumstances involving the
commission of the crime.

Sec. 26. i  /     ^  . ± ictim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from
battered woman syndrome do not incure any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements
for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.

ën the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of
the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.

Sec. 27.   ^  . ± Being under the influence of alcohol, any illicit drug, or any other mind-altering substance
shall not be a defense under this Act.

Sec. 28.     . ± The woman victim of violence shall be entitled to the custody and support of her
child/children. Children below seven (7) years old older but with mental or physical disabilities shall automatically be given
to the mother, with right to support, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall not be disqualified from having custody of her children. ën
no case shall custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator of a woman who is suffering from Battered woman
syndrome.
Sec. 29. ^   )   . ± Prosecutors and court personnel should observe the following duties
when dealing with victims under this Act:

 communicate with the victim in a language understood by the woman or her child; and
 inform the victim of her/his rights including legal remedies available and procedure, and privileges for
indigent litigants.

Sec. 30. ^ i     ¦ $   . ± Barangay officials and law enforcers shall have the following
duties:

 respond immediately to a call for help or request for assistance or protection of the victim by entering the
necessary whether or not a protection order has been issued and ensure the safety of the victim/s;
 confiscate any deadly weapon in the possession of the perpetrator or within plain view;
 transport or escort the victim/s to a safe place of their choice or to a clinic or hospital;
. assist the victim in removing personal belongs from the house;
 assist the barangay officials and other government officers and employees who respond to a call for help;
 ensure the enforcement of the Protection Orders issued by the   i  or the courts;
 arrest the suspected perpetrator wiithout a warrant when any of the acts of violence defined by this Act is
occurring, or when he/she has personal knowledge that any act of abuse has just been committed, and
there is imminent danger to the life or limb of the victim as defined in this Act; and
 immediately report the call for assessment or assistance of the DSÎD, social Îelfare Department of
LGUs or accredited non-government organizations (NGOs).

Any barangay official or law enforcer who fails to report the incident shall be liable for a fine not exceeding Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) or whenever applicable criminal, civil or administrative liability.

Sec. 31. Ô     '  ± Any healthcare provider, including, but not limited to, an attending
physician, nurse, clinician, barangay health worker, therapist or counselor who suspects abuse or has been informed by
the victim of violence shall:

 properly document any of the victim¶s physical, emotional or psychological injuries;


 properly record any of victim¶s suspicions, observations and circumstances of the examination or visit;
 automatically provide the victim free of charge a medical certificate concerning the examination or visit;
. safeguard the records and make them available to the victim upon request at actual cost; and
 provide the victim immediate and adequate notice of rights and remedies provided under this Act, and
services available to them.

Sec. 32. ^   


    ¦
4 ± Other government agencies and LGUs shall establish
programs such as, but not limited to, education and information campaign and seminars or symposia on the nature,
causes, incidence and consequences of such violence particularly towards educating the public on its social impacts.

ët shall be the duty of the concerned government agencies and LGU¶s to ensure the sustained education and training of
their officers and personnel on the prevention of violence against women and their children under the Act.

SEC. 33.   2A   i  #i  1   or the court hearing an application for a protection
order shall not order, direct, force or in any way unduly influence he applicant for a protection order to compromise or
abandon any of the reliefs sought in the application for protection under this Act. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act of
1997 and Sections 410, 411, 412 and 413 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall not apply in proceedings where
relief is sought under this Act.

Failure to comply with this Section shall render the official or judge administratively liable.

SEC 34.   0    $ ¦ 2ën every case of violence against women and their children as
herein defined, any person, private individual or police authority or barangay official who, acting in accordance with law,
responds or intervenes without using violence or restraint greater than necessary to ensure the safety of the victim, shall
not be liable for any criminal, civil or administrative liability resulting therefrom.

SEC. 35. '  u2ën addition to their rights under existing laws, victims of violence against women and their
children shall have the following rights:

 to be treated with respect and dignity;


 to avail of legal assistance form the PAO of the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any public legal assistance office;
 To be entitled to support services form the DSÎD and LGUs¶
. To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under the Family Code; and
 To be informed of their rights and the services available to them including their right to apply for a protection
order.

SEC. 36. ^  2Any victim of violence under this Act shall be entitled to actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages.

SEC. 37. Ô^    2The court shall expedite the process of issuance of a hold departure order in cases
prosecuted under this Act.

SEC. 38. $     ^3"   $ 2ëf the victim is an indigent or there is an
immediate necessity due to imminent danger or threat of danger to act on an application for a protection order, the court
shall accept the application without payment of the filing fee and other fees and of transcript of stenographic notes.

SEC. 39. 0     u   /  @     -0u/.ën pursuance of the
abovementioned policy, there is hereby established an ënter-Agency Council on iolence Against Îomen and their
children, hereinafter known as the Council, which shall be composed of the following agencies:

 Department of Social Îelfare and Development (DSÎD);


 National Commission on the Role of Filipino Îomen (NCRFÎ);
 Civil Service Commission (CSC);
. Council for the Îelfare of Children (CÎC);
 Department of Justice (DOJ);
 Department of the ënterior and Local Government (DëLG);
 Philippine National Police (PNP);
 Department of Health (DOH);
 Department of Education (DepEd);
@ Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE); and
/ National Bureau of ënvestigation (NBë).

These agencies are tasked to formulate programs and projects to eliminate AÎ based on their mandates as well as
develop capability programs for their employees to become more sensitive to the needs of their clients. The Council will
also serve as the monitoring body as regards to AÎ initiatives.

The Council members may designate their duly authorized representative who shall have a rank not lower than an
assistant secretary or its equivalent. These representatives shall attend Council meetings in their behalf, and shall receive
emoluments as may be determined by the Council in accordance with existing budget and accounting rules and
regulations.

SEC. 40. !         u2The DSÎD, and LGU¶s shall provide the victims temporary
shelters, provide counseling, psycho-social services and /or, recovery, rehabilitation programs and livelihood assistance.

The DOH shall provide medical assistance to victims.

SEC. 41.    @       2The DSÎD shall provide rehabilitative counseling and treatment to
perpetrators towards learning constructive ways of coping with anger and emotional outbursts and reforming their ways.
Îhen necessary, the offender shall be ordered by the Court to submit to psychiatric treatment or confinement.

SEC. 42. @      0  '  u   /        2All
agencies involved in responding to violence against women and their children cases shall be required to undergo
education and training to acquaint them with:

 the nature, extend and causes of violence against women and their children;
 the legal rights of, and remedies available to, victims of violence against women and their children;
 the services and facilities available to victims or survivors;
. the legal duties imposed on police officers to make arrest and to offer protection and assistance; and
 techniques for handling incidents of violence against women and their children that minimize the likelihood of
injury to the officer and promote the safety of the victim or survivor.

The PNP, in coordination with LGU¶s shall establish an education and training program for police officers and barangay
officials to enable them to properly handle cases of violence against women and their children.
SEC. 43. $ ¦ 2 ictims under this Act shall be entitled to take a paid leave of absence up to ten (10) days in
addition to other paid leaves under the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations, extendible when the
necessity arises as specified in the protection order.

Any employer who shall prejudice the right of the person under this section shall be penalized in accordance with the
provisions of the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Likewise, an employer who shall prejudice any
person for assisting a co-employee who is a victim under this Act shall likewise be liable for discrimination.

SEC. 44.    2All records pertaining to cases of violence against women and their children including those in
the barangay shall be confidential and all public officers and employees and public or private clinics to hospitals shall
respect the right to privacy of the victim. Îhoever publishes or causes to be published, in any format, the name, address,
telephone number, school, business address, employer, or other identifying information of a victim or an immediate family
member, without the latter¶s consent, shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.

Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and a fine of not more than
Five Hundred Thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

SEC. 45. ±"  2The amount necessary to implement the provisions of this Act shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act (GAA).

The Gender and Development (GAD) Budget of the mandated agencies and LGU¶s shall be used to implement services
for victim of violence against women and their children.

SEC. 46. 0  ' '  ± Îithin six (6) months from the approval of this Act, the DOJ, the
NCRFÎ, the DSÎD, the DëLG, the DOH, and the PNP, and three (3) representatives from NGOs to be identified by the
NCRFÎ, shall promulgate the ëmplementing Rules and Regulations (ëRR) of this Act.

SEC. 47.    2For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have
suppletory application.

SEC. 48.   2ëf any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections
or provisions shall not be affected.

SEC. 49. '   2All laws, Presidential decrees, executive orders and rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

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