CASE: TECSON V COMELEC 424 SCRA 277 (2004) - CITIZENSHIP

Consolidated Petitions for Disqualification against Fernando Poe, Jr.

Facts of the case:

Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) (Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, born Aug 20, 1939) submits his certificate of
candidacy for the office of the President on May 10, 2004

Petitioners Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., as well as Zoilo Antonio Velez, filed
separate petitions, seeking the disqualification of respondent FPJ from the presidential elections on the
grounds that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Contention: (1) respondent FPJ is an illegitimate child as he was born out of wedlock, i.e., he was born
before the marriage of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelly; (2) as an illegitimate child, he follows the American
citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelly; therefore, (3) he is not a natural-born citizen. Petitioners cite the
marriage certificate of FPJs parents which shows that they were married in 1940, while FPJ was born in
1939. They contend that it does not appear that FPJ has been legitimated by the subsequent marriage of
his parents as he had not been acknowledged by his father. The same arguments were advanced by
petitioner Velez.

Petitioner Victorino Fornier also files for the disqualification of FPJ, claiming that his mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou,
a Spanish subject.

Petitioner Fornier also provides evidence (1) the alleged birth certificate of Allan Fernando Poe; (2) the
alleged marriage certificate between Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez; and (3) the alleged bigamy
charge filed by Paulita Gomez against Allan Fernando Poe. Respondent FPJ submits Senate Committee
Report No. 517, indicating the falsification of said documents. COMELEC later dismisses Forniers
petition for disqualification for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, so to be allowed to
run for the Office of the President.

Held: YES

While not conclusively established by evidence, the principle of Jus Sanguinis qualifies Fernando Poe, Jr. as a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, recognized as the son of Allan F. Poe, Sr., a citizen of the Philippines.

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, where the term "natural-born citizens" is defined to include "those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship."
At the time of FPJs birth, under the regime of the 1935 Constitution, the principle of Jus Sanguinis confers
Filipino citizenship to all children born from Filipino fathers, without distinction for legitimate or illegitimate
children. Allan F. Poe (father) would have been a Filipino citizen at this time, as Lorenzo Pou (grandfather,
1870-1954) was granted Filipino citizenship under the Philippine Bill of 1902.

Additionally:

SC maintains that Forniers petition is denied for lack of merit. The documents presented as evidence
appear to be manufactured, and fails to prove that FPJ deliberately misrepresented his status as a
natural-born citizen. Forniers evidence does show that FPJ has always conducted himself as a Filipino
citizen.

Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By revolving his case around the
illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a nonissue.

Petitioner Tecsons contention which stresses FPJs status as an illegitimate child is a nonissue under the
1935 Constitution, and also runs contrary to the trend in civil law equalizing the rights of illegitimate and
legitimate children (Convention on the Rights of the Child), referring to FPJs right to run for office. (by
SALVADOR)

GO, SR VS. RAMOS (2009)

FACTS: These petitions stemmed from the complaint affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien. To prove his contention, Luis argued that birth certificate of Jimmy was tampered, which
indicated Jimmys citizenship as "FChinese." Ramos argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate
that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered since all the other
entries were typewritten except the entry on his citizenship which was handwritten as FChinese.

Go contented that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine
citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution and CA 625. Jimmy added that he
had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an
undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in the complaint
affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and
Tagalog. As to erroneous entry, he attributed it to the employees of the LCR.

According to Carlos, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916 deemed all inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands as well as their children born after the passage of said laws to be citizens of the Philippines. Because his
father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the Jones Law of 1916, he
(Carlos) undoubtedly acquired his fathers citizenship.

Even assuming that his father remained as a Chinese, Carlos also claims that he followed the citizenship of his
Filipina mother, being an illegitimate son, and that he even validly elected Philippine citizenship when he complied
with all the requirements of Common Wealth Act No. 625. He submits that what is being disputed is not whether
he complied with Com. Act No. 625, but rather, the timeliness of his compliance. He stresses that the 3-year
compliance period following the interpretation given by Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice46 to Article IV, Section 1(4)
of the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 when election must be made, is not an inflexible rule. He reasoned
that the same decision held that such period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino, like in his case.

ISSUE: whether Jimmy is a Filipino citizen = NO

HELD:

1. However, the SC ruled that his bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the
time of the passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice.

2. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children
are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an
illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to
citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, absent any evidence proving that
Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him.

3. As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino citizenship, the
SC found that it did not. The 1935 Constitution and CA 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be
made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. The
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was within "reasonable time (within 3 years)" after attaining the
age of majority. It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be
extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our
considered view that not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period.

4. The fact that Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such belief,
considering that the acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, the mere fact that
he was able to vote does not validate his irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a
voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real
citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and
privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent
himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country.

It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really
a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.

As to the application of the doctrine of jus soli (citizenship by place of birth): The doctrine was never extended to
the Philippines. It was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of ones citizenship but it was abandoned in
the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. Since then, said doctrine only benefited those who were individually
declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli.

***Before 1989, the age of majority was 1989

*** election of PH citizenship must be express, not implied.
CASE: Gonzalez v. Pennisi

Principle involved: Though it was not mentioned in the SC ruling, Section 1(2), Article III of the 1973 Constitution
and Section 1(2), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution were highlighted in the 2nd Indorsement by the DOJ, regarding
the issue. Both articles say the same thing
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
Thus, the basis for the approval of his petition for recognition as a Filipino citizen is hinged on his mothers
citizenship as a Filipino. That is why he was really proving the validity of the documents indicating his mothers
citizenship, during the proceedings.

**The discussion on the respondents citizenship is centered on the requirements and evidences that he had to
submit, and prove, for his citizenship to be recognized.**

Facts: Michael Alfio Pennisi was born on March 13, 1975 in Queensland, Australia to Alfio Pennisi, an Australian
national, and Anita T. Quintos, allegedly a Filipino citizen. In March 1999, the respondent filed a petition for
recognition as a Filipino citizen before the Bureau of Immigration (BI). He submitted documents, which all
indicated that his mother was born in the Philippines and is a Filipino, and that his mother has not been granted
with Australian citizenship.

The petition was granted by the BI Associate Commissioner. It was, however, disapproved by the DOJ Secretary.
Then, when the respondent was able to submit the additional requirements required from him, the BI
Commissioner granted the petition, pursuant to Sec 1(2), Article III of the 1973 Constitution, in relation to Section
1(2), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.

Thereafter, the respondent was drafted and played for the Red Bull basketball team in the PBA. On August 2003,
the Senate Committees on Games, Amusement and Sports and on Constitutional Amendments jointly submitted a
Committee Report, which recommended that the BI conduct summary deportation proceedings against several
Filipino-foreign PBA players, and that the DOJ Secretary conduct an immediate review of all orders of recognition.

The Respondent was included in the list because the findings of the Senate Committees revealed that the alleged
mother and relatives of Respondents mother are not known and have never existed in Nueva Ecija. Additionally,
the affidavits of the Barangay Captain and the Barangay Treasurer of the place affirmed that there are no
Quintoses or Tomedas that have lived or have resided in the said barangay. They also claimed that both family
names do not exist in the census, or master list of voters.

The Birth certificate of the respondents mother was also questioned because the registration was done ten years
after the date of birth. Due to the mentioned inconsistencies, the DOJ issued a resolution revoking respondents
certificate of recognition and directing the BI to begin summary deportation proceedings against respondent and
other Filipino-foreign PBA players.

The respondent filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the BI and
the DOJ to retain the respondents status as a Filipino. Hence, this petition by the DOJ Secretary Raul M.
Gonzalez.
Issue: WoN Pennisi is a Filipino Citizen.

Ruling: Yes. The filing of the petitions before the Court of Appeals and before the Supreme Court showed his
intention to prove his Filipino lineage and citizenship, as well as the error committed by petitioners in causing his
deportation from the country.
Even though the testimonies of Soliman and Peralta run in contrary to the documents presented by the
respondent, the documents the respondents had submitted must prevail, and have more probative value.

While the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta might have cast doubt on the validity of the certificate of live birth of the
respondents mother, such certificate remains valid unless declared invalid by competent authority. The rule
stands that documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

Also, there could be reasons why the Quintoses and Tomedas were not included in the census, such as they
could have been mere transients in the place.

As for their absence in the masters list of voters, they could have failed to register themselves as voters.

The late registration of Quintos certificate of live birth was made 10 years after her birth and not anytime near the
filing of respondents petition for recognition as Filipino citizen. As such, it could not be presumed that the
certificates late filing was meant to use it fraudulently.

Finally, the Australian department of immigration and multicultural affairs itself attested that as of 14 July 1999,
Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship. Respondent submitted a certified true copy of Quintos
Australian certificate of registration of alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino.

In toto ruling -

In this case, respondent, prior to his deportation, was recognized as a Filipino citizen. He manifested his intent to
return to the country because his Filipino wife and children are residing in the Philippines. The filing of the
petitions before the court of appeals and before this court showed his intention to prove his Filipino lineage and
citizenship, as well as the error committed by petitioners in causing his deportation from the country. He was
precisely questioning the DOJs revocation of his certificate of recognition and his summary deportation by the BI.

We agree with petitioners that the issuance of certificate of recognition to respondent has not attained finality. In
Go v. Ramos, the court ruled that citizenship proceedings are a class of its own and can be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following
concur:

1. A persons citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
2. The solicitor general or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and
3. The finding or citizenship is affirmed by this court.

However, the courts are not precluded from reviewing the findings of the BI. Judicial review is permitted if the
courts believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are
reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. When the evidence submitted by a deportee is
conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should be recognized and the courts should promptly
enjoin the deportation proceedings. Courts may review the actions of the administrative offices authorized to
deport aliens and reverse their rulings when there is no evidence to sustain the rulings.

In this case, we sustain the court of appeals that the evidence presented before the BI and the DOJ, i.e., (1)
certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Quintos, and a certification issued by the local civil registrar of San
Antonio, Nueva Ecija stating that Quintos was born on 14 august 1949 of Filipino parents, Felipe M. Quintos and
Celina G. Tomeda, in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; (2) certified true copy of the certificate of marriage
of respondents parents dated 9 January 1971, indicating the Philippines as Quintos BIrthplace; (3) certified true
copy of Quintos Australian certificate of registration of alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino; (4) certified true
copy of respondents birth certificate stating that he was born on 13 march 1975 and indicating the Philippines as
his mothers birthplace; and (5) certified true copy of the letter dated 14 July 1999 of the Australian Department of
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, stating that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian
citizenship, have more probative value and must prevail over the statements of Soliman and Peralta before the
senate committees.

We agree with the court of appeals that while the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta might have cast doubt on the
validity of Quintos certificate of live birth, such certificate remains valid unless declared invalid by competent
authority. The rule stands that documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

We further sustain the court of appeals that there could be reasons why the Quintoes and Tomedas were not
included in the census, such as they could have been mere transients in the place. As for their absence in the
masters list of voters, they could have failed to register themselves as voters. The late registration of Quintos
certificate of live birth was made 10 years after her birth and not anytime near the filing of respondents petition for
recognition as Filipino citizen. As such, it could not be presumed that the certificates late filing was meant to use it
fraudulently. Finally, the Australian department of immigration and multicultural affairs itself attested that as of 14
July 1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship. Respondent submitted a certified true copy of
Quintos Australian certificate of registration of alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino. These pieces of
evidence should prevail over the affidavits submitted by Soliman and Peralta to the senate committees. (by
SINSUAT)

CASE: REPUBLIC VS. SAGUN

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
Respondent: Nora Fe Sagun

FACTS: -Nora Fe Sagun was the legitimate child of Albert Chan (a Chinese national) and Marta Borromeo
(Filipino citizen) and was born on Aug. 8, 1959.
She did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines.
This document, however, was notarized but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar
of Baguio City.
 Problem arose when in September 2005 Nora Fe applied for a Philippine passport but her application was
denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate
that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
So, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the
Local Civil Registrar of Baguio be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate
Respondents contentions: Nora Fe contended that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively
elected Philippine citizenship, and contended that she was raised as a Filipino and was a registered voter.
(the RTC granted her petition)
Petitioners contentions: Petitioner contended that Nora Fes petition before the RTC was improper
because (1) law and jurisprudence clearly contemplate no judicial action or proceeding for the
declaration of Philippine citizenship and (2) the pleaded registration of the oath of allegiance and its
annotation on respondents birth certificate are duties of the local civil registrar and they require no court
order.

ISSUES: (1) Whether respondents petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is sanction by the
Rules of Court and jurisprudence,
(2) Whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law

RULING: NO

-The Court held that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of
the citizenship of an individual.
-There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person
is part of our citizenry.
-Take note, Nora Fe was born on Aug. 8, 1959 and the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which
declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority (Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution) Under this article, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of
the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
-The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that those born before January 17, 1987 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Philippine citizens.
-In Nora Fes case, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
-Note: Commonwealth Act No. 625 prescribes the procedure that should be fousllowed in order to make a valid
election of Philippine citizenship:
1. A statement of election under oath
2. An oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines
3. Registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry

It should be stressed however that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the
direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts.
Nora Fe failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election
She had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship.
The only documentary evidence she presented was her oath of allegiance executed 12 years after she
reached the age of majority, which was unregistered.
 And, its execution of the oath was not within reasonable time after the respondent reached the age
of majority.
The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally
within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
Petition Granted and Nora Fes petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is
DISMISSED. (by VIDAL)

MA v. FERNANDEZ

Facts:
Felix Ma ( Taiwanese) Dolores Sillona Cabiling (Filipino) has seven children. Balgamelo, Felix Jr, Valeriano, Lechi
Ann, Arceli, Nicolas and Isidro Ma. All children were born and raised in the Philippines. During age of minority they
secured Alien Certificate Registration.

Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section
1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that "(t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship" are citizens of the Philippines.

Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of
allegiance before then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte.6 On 14 January
1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary Public, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte.7
In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Salvador C. Sering, City Court of Surigao City,
the fact of which the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7 March 2005.

Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary
documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act
Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose
Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine
citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so.9 On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied
with the registration requirement.

The Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit received a complaint from a certain Mat G. Catral
that they are illegal aliens and overstaying aliens through the Bureau of Immigration. Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 625, providing that the election of Philippine citizenship embodied in a statement sworn before any officer
authorized to administer oaths and the oath of allegiance shall be filed with the nearest civil registry; and
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration]) Circular dated 12 April 1954, detailing
the procedural requirements in the registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.

Issue: W/N the petitioners are illegal and aliens based on the Commonwealth Act No. 625?

Ruling: NO
In Cuenco v. Sec of Justice and Go v. Ramos, the SC ruled against the petitioners because they belatedly
complied with all the requirements. The acts of election and their registration with the nearest civil registry were all
done beyond the reasonable period of three years upon reaching the age of majority.
The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied with the 1st and 2nd requirements upon
reaching the age of majority. Registration of the documents with Civil Registry was belatedly done. The right to
elect Philippine Citizenship has not been lost and that they be allowed to complete the statutory requirement for
such election. (Jurisprudence on: Co vs Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives)

Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship.
Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil
registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother.
The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative
penalties, if any. The documents they submitted supporting their allegations that they have already registered with
the civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this
case, the Bureau of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances
of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be complied with within a reasonable time.(90
days)

Kilosbayan v Ermita
Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would fill up the vacancy in the Supreme
Court. His appointment was questioned to be patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction citing Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
Citizenship.

Arguments raised by the petitioners to disprove Ong being a natural born citizen:
his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. Ongs birth on May 25, 1953, his father was
Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth his father was finally granted Filipino
citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
the entry in Ongs birth certificate indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of the
fact that Ongs citizenship at birth is Chinese
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order." Thus, as long as Ongs
birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the Judicial & Bar Council, as well as the whole
world, is bound by what is stated in his birth certificate.

Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an
identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution,
since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.

Summarizing, his arguments are as follows:

ii. respondent Ong is, in truth and in fact, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, considering that:
a. Dy Guiok Santos (mother of Ong) was a Filipino citizen at the time of her marriage to Eugenio;
and
 b. having been born before January 17, 1973 of a Filipino mother and who elected Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, respondent Ong meets the requirements under
article iv, sections 1 and 2 of the 1987 constitution.

v. the Bureau of Immigration has preemptive legal authority or primary administrative jurisdiction to make
a determination as regards the citizenship of respondent Ong, and upon subsequent confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice as required by the rules, issue a declaration (i.e., identification certificate no. 113878)
recognizing that respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino, thereby rendering nonexistent any constitutional
impediment for him to assume the position of associate justice of the supreme court.7

In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the
Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was
a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in
support of his petition, he submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth
certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese
citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.

In connection with his Petition for Admission to the 1979 Bar Examinations, he has to submit: 1) A certified clear
copy of his Birth Certificate; and 2) A certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from the Office of the Solicitor
General. Which Respondent Ong complied.

ISSUE: WON respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen? (Based on the Decision of administrative body-
Bureau of Immigration)

HELD: No
It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that this
Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer. It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this
Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his
natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial
court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

As to petitioners point that: no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without
a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change. In Labayo-Rowe v.
this Court held that:
Republic,14
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be
threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all
the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to
prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.15

Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical or
typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the
nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a petition
filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.16

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ongs ancestors, by
various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial
proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to
show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ongs mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the
records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his
citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions.17 Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be
prevented by injunction from doing so.

CASE : REPUBLIC VS BATUIGAS 706 SCRA 746 (2013)

TOPIC: Judicial Naturalization

FACTS:
Petitioner Azucena Saavedra Batuigas, filed for petition for judicial naturalization on December 2,2002 before
RTC of Zamboanga del Sur alleging that she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
required under C.A. 473.

Azucena was born of Chinese parents in Zamboanga on September 28,1941 and has never departed the
Philippines thereafter. Azucena, can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan and Chavacano and had taken her primary,
secondary and tertiary education in Philippine Schools, and eventually graduated with a degree of Bachelor of
Science in Education from Ateneo de Zamboanga. And practiced her teaching profession thereafter.

In 1968, Petitioner Azucena married Santiago Batuigas, a natural-born Filipino citizen and had five children, all of
whom are professionals. Then, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of
and later on in milling/ distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted their joint
annual tax returns and balance sheets. The business name and the business permits are registered in Santiago's
name.

On January 31, 2005, the RTC found that Azucena has amply supported the allegations in her Petition. Among
these are her lack of a derogatory record, her support for an organized government, that she is in perfect health,
that she has mingled with Filipinos since birth and can speak their language, that she has never had any
transgressions and has been a law abiding citizen, that she has complied with her obligations to the government
involving her business operations, and that the business and real properties she and Santiago own provide
sufficient income for her and her family. Thus, the RTC granted her petition.

The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA, contending that Azucena failed to comply with the income
requirement under CA 473.
No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a Philippine citizen:
1. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency,
or must have known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.

Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate indicating therein that he and his parents are
Filipinos. He also submitted voter's registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of which are
public records. An operative fact that should have enabled Azucena to avail of Section 15 of CA 473.
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of
the same law.

But this case however, is not a petition for judicial declaration of Philippine Citizenship but rather a petition for
judicial naturalization under CA 473.

ISSUE:
WON Petitioner Azucena an alien, married to a Filipino citizen could acquire Philippine citizenship through judicial
naturalization under CA 473.

HELD:
YES, The court ruled that the Petition for Naturalization, is AFFIRMED. And that a Certificate of Naturalization be
issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of Registration should be cancelled.

Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473
or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000").

On the submitted evidence, nothing would show that Azucena suffers from any of the disqualifications under
Section 4 of CA 473. Because she is a teacher by profession and has actually practiced as such before she quit
and helped her husband with their business to raise their children. And as the records showed, Santiago's Filipino
citizenship has been adequately proven.

Hence, Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege.

SOBEJANA-CONDON V COMELEC 678 SCRA 267

FACTS: The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents in 1944. On 1984,
she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.

On 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra,
Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.

On September 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before
the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated
September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.

She sought elective office during the 2010 elections for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest
numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate and took her oath of office.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Picar, Pagaduan and Bautista, all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed
separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner's eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly
sought the petitioner's disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and
that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an
Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in
Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225. The trial decision ordered by the trial court
declaring Condon disqualified and ineligible to hold office of vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified her
proclamation as the winning candidate. The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen
on September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her
certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to
her.

ISSUE: WoN petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to renounce her Australian
Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225

RULING: R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and political
rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5. Section 5,
paragraph 2 provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of
Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the
exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath.

The Supreme Court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was invalid because it was not made
before any public officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon void.