fm3 01x15

ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE
IADS
MULTI-SERVICE
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURES FOR
AN INTEGRATED
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
FM 3-01.15
MCRP 3-25E
NTTP 3-01.8
AFTTP 3-2.31
May 2009
AIR LAND SEA
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to DOD
APPLICATION and DOD contractors only to protect technical or operational
CENTER information from automatic dissemination under the International
Exchange Program or by other means. This protection applies to
publications required solely for official use and to those containing
valuable technical or operational information. This determination
was made on 29 January 2008. Other requests will be referred to:
HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATFC-EJ, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-1067,

HQ MCCDC, ATTN: C116, Quantico, VA 22134-5021;
NWDC, ATTN: N5, Norfolk, VA 23511-2723;
and LeMay Center, ATTN: DDJ, Maxwell AFB, 36112-6112.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must

prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.
MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

FOREWORD
This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective
commands and other commands as appropriate.
JOSEPH E. MARTZ ANDREW W. O’DONNELL, JR.

Brigadier General, US Army Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Deputy Director/Chief of Staff, Director
Army Capabilities Integration Center Capabilities Development Directorate
WENDI B. CARPENTER STEPHEN J. MILLER

Rear Admiral, US Navy Major General, US Air Force
Commander Commander
Navy Warfare Development Command Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine
Development and Education
This publication is available through the ALSA Web site

(www.alsa.mil); through the Army at Army Knowledge Online (AKO)
(www.us.army.mil) and at the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and
Doctrine Digital Library (www.train.army.mil) Web sites; and through
the Air Force at the Air Force Publishing Web site
(www.e-publishing.af.mil).
PREFACE
1. Purpose
The purpose of this publication is to provide guidance for command, control, and
communications-specific planning, coordination, and interoperability for an
integrated air defense system (IADS). It facilitates decisions by highlighting link and
communications architecture and interoperability capabilities to be considered by the
joint force commander (JFC) and subordinate functional and Service component
commanders when developing an IADS. The target audience is JFC/joint task force
staff planners, component and functional commanders, and those unit commanders
participating in and providing assets to a theater or specific area of operations.
Additionally, it provides the warfighter and planner with a single-source reference for
Service-specific air defense capabilities and limitations.
2. Scope
This publication includes considerations for planning, coordinating, integrating, and
employing air defense systems for the JFC and those subordinate commanders
participating in, and providing assets to, theater operations. As a single-source
reference for Service-specific air defense capabilities and limitations, it focuses on
command, control, and communications architectures and interoperability issues to
equip the warfighter with an understanding of each Service’s systems.
3. Applicability
This publication provides commanders and their staff with guidance for IADS
employment and planning. Commanders and staffs can use this publication to aid in
the tactical employment of IADS during exercises and contingencies. The United
States (US) Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force approved this multi-Service
publication for use.
4. Implementation Plan
Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility will review this
publication, validate the information and, where appropriate, reference and
incorporate it in Service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows:
Army. Upon approval and authentication, this publication incorporates the

procedures contained herein into the United States Army Doctrine and Training
Literature Program as directed by the Commander, United States Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Distribution is in accordance with applicable
directives listed on the authentication page.
Marine Corps.1 The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this
publication in US Marine Corps training and doctrine publications as directed by the
Commanding General, US Marine Corps Combat Development Command
(MCCDC). Distribution is in accordance with the Marine Corps Publication
Distribution System.
1
Marine Corps PCN: 144 000104 00
1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 i

Navy. The Navy will incorporate these procedures in US Navy training and
doctrine publications as directed by the Commander, Navy Warfare Development
Command (NWDC). Distribution is in accordance with military standard requisition
and issue procedure Desk Guide (MILSTRIP Desk Guide) Navy Supplement
Publication-409.
Air Force. The Air Force will incorporate the procedures in this publication in
accordance with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance with
Air Force instruction (AFI) 33-360.
5. User Information
a. TRADOC, MCCDC, NWDC, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development
and Education (LeMay Center), and the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center
developed this publication with the joint participation of the approving Service
commands. ALSA will review and update this publication as necessary.
b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and control
organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in
Service protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, will
likewise be incorporated in revisions to this document.
ii FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your
comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each
recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to—
Army
Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command
ATTN: ATFC-EJ
Fort Monroe VA 23651-1067
DSN 680-3951 COMM (757) 788-3951
E-mail: doctrine.monroe@us.army.mil
Marine Corps
Commanding General, US Marine Corps Combat Development Command
ATTN: C116
3300 Russell Road, Suite 204
Quantico VA 22134-5021
E-mail: Publication POC at https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil
Navy
Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command
ATTN: N5
1530 Gilbert Street, Suite 2128
Norfolk VA 23511-2723
DSN 948-1070/4201 COMM (401) 841-1070/4201
E-mail: alsapubs@nwdc.navy.mil
Air Force
Commander, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education
ATTN: DDJ
115 North Twining Street
Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6112
DSN 493-2640/2256 COMM (334)953-2640/2256
E-mail: lemayctr.ddj.workflow@maxwell.af.mil
ALSA
Director, ALSA Center
114 Andrews Street
Langley AFB VA 23665-2785
DSN 575-0902 COMM (757) 225-0902
E-mail: alsa.director@langley.af.mil
1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 iii
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
The following is a summary of changes for FM 3-01.15/MCRP 3-25E/NTTP 3-
01.8/AFTTP 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an
Integrated Air Defense System.
This revision, dated April 2009, presents updated and new material to the reader.
The organization of the publication has been changed to: Chapter I – Overview,
Chapter II – IADS Planning and Execution, Chapter III – Army Air and Missile
Defense, Chapter IV – Air Force Counterair, Chapter V – Marine Corps Air and
Missile Defense, and Chapter VI – Navy Air and Missile Defense.
In addition, this revision:

• Adds new appendices: Appendix A – Joint Link and Communication
Architectures, Appendix B – IADS Planning Considerations Checklist,
Appendix C – National Capital Region IADS (NCR-IADS), Appendix
D – Multinational Considerations, Appendix E – IADS Execution TTP,
Appendix F – Combat Identification Considerations, and Appendix G
– Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Systems and Planning
Considerations Overview. (Appendices E, F, and G are classified
SECRET and available on the ALSA’s classified website.)
• Incorporates information from the former IFF MTTP publication (FM
3-01.61, MCWP 3-25.11, NTTP 6-02.4, AFTTP(I) 3-2.39, Multi-
Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mark XII IFF Mode
4 Security Issues in a Joint Integrated Air Defense System) in
appendix F.
• Adds a list of references and a glossary.
• Removes two outdated appendices covering track
identification/classification considerations and a notional area air
defense plan table of contents. The majority of the information
contained in these two outdated appendices can either be found in
this IADS revision or in Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, Countering Air
and Missile Threats.
iv FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

*FM 3-01.15
MCRP 3-25E
NTTP 3-01.8
AFTTP 3-2.31
FM 3-01.15 US Army Training and Doctrine Command

Fort Monroe, Virginia
MCRP 3-25E Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia
NTTP 3-01.8 Navy Warfare Development Command
Norfolk, Virginia
AFTTP 3-2.31 Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine
Development and Education
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
1 May 2009
IADS
MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR
AN INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................ viii

CHAPTER I OVERVIEW ........................................................................................... 1
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 1
2. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS ............................................................................................................. 3
CHAPTER II IADS PLANNING AND EXECUTION ................................................... 9
1. INTEGRATION AND SERVICE COORDINATION ..................................................................................... 9
2. IADS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS................................................................................................ 11
3. EXECUTION .................................................................................................................................. 21
4. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 27
CHAPTER III ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ............................................... 29
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 29
2. MISSION ....................................................................................................................................... 29
3. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION ...................................................................................................... 29
4. COMMAND AND CONTROL ............................................................................................................. 32
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to DOD and DOD contractors only to protect technical or operational
information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This protection
applies to publications required solely for official use and to those containing valuable technical or operational information. This
determination was made on 29 January 2008. Other requests will be referred to:
HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATFC-EJ, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-1067,

HQ MCCDC, ATTN: C116, Quantico, VA 22134-5021;
NWDC, ATTN: N5, Norfolk, VA 23511-2723;
and LeMay Center, ATTN: DDJ, Maxwell AFB, 36112-6112.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.
* Supersedes FM 3-01.15/MCRP 3.25E/NTTP 3-01.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.31, 12 October 2004 and FM 3-01.61/MCWP 3-

25.11/NTTP 6-02.4/AFTTP(I) 3-2.39, 15 January 2003.
1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 v

5. WEAPON SYSTEMS .......................................................................................................................35
6. PLANNING .....................................................................................................................................36
7. OPERATIONS.................................................................................................................................37
8. SUMMARY .....................................................................................................................................40
CHAPTER IV AIR FORCE COUNTERAIR .............................................................. 41
1. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................41
2. MISSION .......................................................................................................................................41
3. ORGANIZATION .............................................................................................................................41
4. COMMAND AND CONTROL ..............................................................................................................42
5. WEAPON SYSTEMS .......................................................................................................................46
6. PLANNING .....................................................................................................................................47
7. OPERATIONS.................................................................................................................................48
8. SUMMARY .....................................................................................................................................52
CHAPTER V MARINE CORPS AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ............................... 53
1. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................53
2. MISSION .......................................................................................................................................53
3. ORGANIZATION .............................................................................................................................53
5. WEAPON SYSTEMS .......................................................................................................................60
6. PLANNING AND EXECUTION ............................................................................................................62
7. SUMMARY .....................................................................................................................................62
CHAPTER VI NAVY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE................................................ 63
1. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................63
2. MISSION .......................................................................................................................................63
3. ORGANIZATION .............................................................................................................................63
5. WEAPON SYSTEMS .......................................................................................................................67
6. PLANNING .....................................................................................................................................69
7. OPERATIONS.................................................................................................................................70
8. SUMMARY .....................................................................................................................................71
APPENDIX A JOINT LINK AND COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURES .............. 73
APPENDIX B IADS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS CHECKLIST ....................... 79
APPENDIX C NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION-INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE
SYSTEM (NCR-IADS).............................................................................................. 85
APPENDIX D MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS............................................ 89
APPENDIX E (SECRET) IADS EXECUTION TTP (U)............................................. 91
APPENDIX F (SECRET) COMBAT IDENTIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS (U) .... 93
APPENDIX G (SECRET) BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD) SYSTEMS AND
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS OVERVIEW (U) ................................................... 95
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 97
GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................... 101
vi FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

List of Figures
Figure 1. Command Relationships (JP 1) ................................................................. 4
Figure 2. Senior Air Defense Officer Integration ..................................................... 10
Figure 3. TBM and Fixed Wing Defense Assets. .................................................... 23
Figure 4. Link 16 Network ....................................................................................... 24
Figure 5. Notional ID Matrix .................................................................................... 26
Figure 6. Army ADA Command and Control Relationships ..................................... 33
Figure 7. Notional Diagram of the USAF Theater Air Control System..................... 42
Figure 8. Basic Structure of an AOC ....................................................................... 43
Figure 9. Typical Marine Air Control Group Organization ....................................... 54
Figure 10. Notional MACCS Communication .......................................................... 60
Figure 11. Naval C2/CWC ...................................................................................... 64
Figure 12. Engagement Zones ............................................................................... 71
Figure 13. NCR IADS Command Relationships ...................................................... 85
List of Tables
Table 1. Joint Support Categories (JP 1) .................................................................. 4
Table 2. IPOE Considerations Planning Checklist .................................................. 12
Table 3. Detection and Tracking Plans ................................................................... 13
Table 4. Detection and Tracking Considerations Planning Checklist ...................... 14
Table 5. Airspace Considerations Planning Checklist ............................................. 16
Table 6. Identification Considerations Planning Checklist....................................... 18
Table 7. Engagement Considerations Planning Checklist ...................................... 20
Table 8. ADA Support Relationships....................................................................... 39
Table 9. CRC Equipment ........................................................................................ 44
Table 10. Air and Ground Operations Capabilities Matrix. ...................................... 46
Table 11. Voice/Data Capability (E-3 B/C and CRC UTCs) .................................... 47
Table 12. MAGTF IADS Weapons, Sensors, and C2 ............................................. 61
Table 13. Navy Surface Platforms .......................................................................... 68
Table 14. Naval Aviation Air Defense Weapon Systems ........................................ 69
Table 15. Army Communication Architecture .......................................................... 73
Table 16. Army Communication Architecture-Continued ........................................ 74
Table 17. USAF Communication Architecture ........................................................ 75
Table 18. Navy Communication Architecture .......................................................... 76
Table 19. USMC Communication Architecture ....................................................... 77
1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
IADS
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air
Defense System
An IADS is the aggregate of component air defense systems operating in a theater

or specific area of operations and is not a formal system unto itself. It is applicable
anytime the Services’ air defense systems are integrated in order to provide air and
missile defense for friendly forces.
The purpose of this publication is to provide planners with specific considerations for
command, control, and communications of an IADS to ensure interoperability for the
JFC. It assists commanders and their planners in developing an IADS plan by
highlighting link and communications architecture and Service interoperability
capabilities to enhance the level of defense provided to friendly forces. The target
audience is component and functional commanders, JFC/joint task force staff
planners, and those unit commanders participating in and providing assets to theater
operations. Additionally, it provides the warfighter and planner with a single-source
reference for specific Service air defense capabilities and limitations.
Chapter I Overview
Chapter I provides an introduction to general IADS principles and addresses
command and control (C2) relationships as they relate to an IADS.
Chapter II IADS Planning and Execution

Chapter II discusses integration and Service coordination issues used in building an
IADS. Additionally, IADS planning considerations are discussed in detail with
planning checklists incorporated in the discussion. Finally, execution considerations
are discussed using three execution vignettes.
Chapters III-VI Service-specific IADS Capabilities

Chapter III – Army Air and Missile Defense, Chapter IV – Air Force Counterair,
Chapter V – Marine Corps Air and Missile Defense, and Chapter VI – Navy Air
and Missile Defense, provide planners with an overview of Service-specific air
defense C2, weapon systems capabilities/limitations, and employment
considerations.
Appendix A Joint Link and Communication Architectures

Appendix A provides a communications architecture table for each Service which
displays link and communications information for Service-specific IADS platforms.
Appendix B IADS Planning Considerations Checklist

Appendix B provides an IADS development checklist with key planning
considerations for staff planners.
viii FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009
Appendix C National Capital Region IADS (NCR-IADS)
Appendix C discusses the National Capital Region (NCR) IADS which provides C2
and air defense of the National Capital Region against enemy air and missile
threats. Information is provided on the agencies that form this active IADS, and their
responsibilities, command relationships, and interoperability.
Appendix D Multinational Considerations

Appendix D provides considerations for an IADS in a multinational environment.
Included in the discussion are multinational operations planning and air defense
considerations.
Appendix E (SECRET) IADS Execution TTP

Appendix E provides IADS execution tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)
emphasizing tactical employment by facilitating synergistic effects and fratricide
avoidance without limiting individual weapon system employment. Both air-
breathing threats and cruise missiles defense are discussed.
Appendix F (SECRET) Combat Identification Considerations

Appendix F provides combat identification (CID) considerations that can be used by
the warfighter in an operational environment. A breakdown of categorized platform
CID capabilities is provided with CID TTP for friendly identification procedures.
Additionally, consolidated Patriot, Avenger, Aegis, and short-range air defense
(SHORAD) considerations in the CID environment are introduced.
Appendix G (SECRET) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Systems and Planning

Considerations Overview
Appendix G provides planners with an overview of ballistic missile defense (BMD)
systems, capabilities, and considerations for planning/executing BMD mission sets.
1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 ix

PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS
The following commands and agencies participated in the development of this
publication:
Joint
US Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA
JCS J8 JTAMDO, Crystal City, VA
Army
US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Capabilities Integration Center,
Fort Monroe, VA
US Army Air Defense Artillery School, Fort Bliss, TX
31st Air Defense Artillery Brigade, Fort Bliss, TX
32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), Fort Bliss, TX
Marine Corps
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), Yuma, AZ
Navy
Navy Warfare Development Command, N5, Norfolk, VA
US Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, VA
Surface Warfare Development Group, Little Creek, VA
Carrier Strike Force Training Atlantic (CSFTLANT), Norfolk, VA
Center for Surface Combat Systems, Dahlgren, VA
Air Force
Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, Maxwell AFB, AL
Air Combat Command/A3Y, Langley AFB, VA
Air Combat Command/A3T, Langley AFB, VA
1st Fighter Wing, Weapons and Tactics, Langley AFB, VA
USAF Weapons School, Nellis AFB, NV
AFNORTH, AOC Det 1, Bolling AFB, Washington DC
612th Air and Space Operations Center, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ
x FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

Chapter I
OVERVIEW
1. Introduction
a. An integrated air defense system (IADS) is the aggregate of component air
defense systems operating in a theater or specific area of operations. The joint
term IADS encompasses the Service-specific air and missile defense (AMD)
missions of the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, with the Air Force’s counterair
mission. An IADS is comprised of the personnel, sensors, weapons, equipment,
and intelligence systems to command and control (C2) an air defense (AD)
system.
b. An IADS protects critical assets, joint forces, and friendly populations against
air and missile threats through mutual support and economy of force. Given
competing demands for counterair and AMD resources, detailed planning is
required when developing an IADS. The planning and execution of an IADS is
guided by the following principles:
(1) Centralized planning and direction are essential for controlling and
coordinating efforts in support of the joint force commander (JFC). This
maintains unity of effort and optimizes the contributions from all Services.
(2) Decentralized execution enables tactical commanders to take decisive
action without compromising the ability of operational-level commanders.
Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control
the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals.
(3) Planned responses support prompt, decisive tactical action by exploiting
Service doctrine, net setup, courses of action, and force operations.
(4) Effective and efficient communications support timely data and
information exchange while optimizing net effectiveness and maintaining the
operations tempo.
(5) Layered defense provides multiple opportunities to engage attacking
aircraft and missiles, ideally at maximum range from friendly forces.
(6) Total coverage (360-degrees) guards against unpredictable targets, pop-
up targets, and multi-threat/multi-axis attacks.
(7) Early detection, discrimination, classification, and identification (ID) of
targets supports prompt warning of attacks with timely cueing, while also
enabling prompt, informed decision support for engaging time-sensitive
targets.
1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1

c. As air and missile threats continue to advance in speed, range, accuracy,
stealth, lethality, and asymmetry joint forces need to be more responsive,
flexible, and integrated to effectively counter these threats. Clearly established
command relationships and responsibilities are essential for effective and
efficient IADS operations. This chapter lays out these relationships and
responsibilities.
d. Integrating the different Services’ AMD systems is covered in chapter II with
discussion on Service coordination and planning requirements for an IADS. The
guiding principle for planning an IADS is effective C2 of the processes, assets,
and communication/data link architectures. The five primary planning
considerations when creating an IADS are: 1) intelligence preparation of the
operational environment (IPOE), 2) target detection and tracking, 3) airspace
requirements, 4) ID responsibilities, and 5) engagement responsibilities.
Included in the planning discussion is an abbreviated version of the IADS
planning checklist found in appendix B to effectively blend Service capabilities
into a synergistic application of resources. In addition, there are three IADS
execution vignettes discussed in chapter II to highlight IADS implementation
issues.
e. The strength of an IADS is contingent upon the Service resources available
for AD in a joint operation. Capabilities at all classification levels should be
considered and integrated. These should be coordinated through the joint staff
and combatant commander staff to ensure reachback with force providers for
specific capability status. The Army focuses on countering adversary air-
breathing threats, surface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles by providing
weapons system assets and a command structure. Chapter III provides an
overview of Army AMD system capabilities and limitations as well as the C2
structure used to employ them. The primary weapon systems discussed are the
Patriot, Avenger, and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems.
Chapter IV provides information on the Air Force’s primary IADS mission which is
defensive counterair (DCA). The Air Force provides sensor systems, C2
systems, and weapons systems to the IADS which include the F-22, F-15, and F-
16 aircraft. The Marine Corps primarily uses its AMD to protect Marine Corps
forces (MARFOR). Normally, the MARFOR will task organize as a Marine air-
ground task force (MAGTF) with the mission of the MAGTF AD forces being to
reduce the enemy air and missile threat to an acceptable level for the MAGTF to
conduct its mission. Chapter V highlights available Marine resources for an
IADS, which includes F/A-18 Hornets, AV-8B Harriers, Stinger/man-portable air
defense system (MANPADS), C2, and surveillance radars that contribute to the
overall IADS common operational picture (COP). The primary mission of Navy
AMD forces is to provide fleet AMD which is explained in chapter VI as well as a
discussion of the Navy’s overall AMD capability. In addition to air assets, naval
ships provide C2, surveillance platforms, and the Aegis weapon system for air
and missile threats.
2 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

f. An overview of Service-specific platform communication and data link
capabilities is discussed in appendix A. A current example of a unique homeland
defense IADS construct is the National Capital Region (NCR) IADS which can be
found in appendix C. The NCR IADS provides a template for circumstances
where heavy civilian air traffic has priority despite an air or missile threat.
g. Multinational considerations for joint operations are addressed in appendix D.
Political considerations may preclude the establishment of traditional C2
relationships by US forces working with multinational partners, but clearly defined
responsibilities will help facilitate unity of effort for an IADS.
h. An in-depth discussion of IADS execution with air-breathing threats and cruise
missile defense (CMD) is discussed in classified appendix E using detailed IADS
execution tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Additionally, appendix E
provides synergistic employment examples of Patriot/Aegis systems and DCA
fighters while limiting the risk of fratricide. Also included in the appendix is C2
TTP for IADS execution.
i. The ID responsibility section in classified appendix F includes a discussion of
combat identification (CID) procedures. Depending on the resources available
CID can be very simple or overly complex. Platform CID capabilities, CID
techniques/procedures, and friendly ID considerations are discussed in classified
appendix F which can be found on the ALSA SECRET Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNET) website http://www.acc.af.smil.mil/alsa/mttp/iads.html.
j. Finally, there are special considerations in classified appendix G for an IADS
tasked to provide ballistic missile defense (BMD). The BMD mission consists of
limited defensive operations in support of homeland defense and Regional
Ballistic Missile Defense (RBMD) in support of regional defended assets (US
areas, friends, allies, and protection of sea-based forces afloat). Classified
appendix G gives planners an overview of BMD systems, their capabilities, and
some considerations for planning and executing the BMD mission. Classified
appendix G can also be found on the ALSA SIPRNET website
http://www.acc.af.smil.mil/alsa/mttp/iads.html.
2. Command Relationships
This section provides a brief overview of the command relationships and
responsibilities for the IADS mission. Detailed discussion of relationships, agencies
and responsibilities are in Joint Publication (JP)-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of
the United States, and JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. Figure 1 below
displays the specific command relationships that will define the level of authority a
commander (CDR) has over assigned or attached forces, and table 1 describes the
four categories of support.

Figure 1. Command Relationships (JP 1)
Table 1. Joint Support Categories (JP 1)

Category Definition
General support That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not
to any particular subdivision thereof.
Mutual support That support which units render each other against an enemy,
because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other
and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.
Direct support A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and
authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for
assistance.
Close support That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which
are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed
integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire,
movement, or other actions of the supported force.
a. Combatant Commands. Initial IADS planning should begin in peacetime

during the deliberate planning process. The combatant commander (CCDR)
may assign responsibility for IADS planning requirements to subordinate JFCs.

b. Joint Force Commander. Normally, the JFC designates a joint force air
component commander (JFACC) as the supported commander for the counterair
and AMD mission. Additionally, the JFC normally designates an area air defense
commander (AADC) and an airspace control authority (ACA). In most instances
the JFACC is designated as the AADC and ACA because the three functions are
integral to one another. If the JFC decides not to assign the JFACC, AADC, and
ACA as one individual, then close coordination between all three individuals is
essential.
c. Component Commanders. The term component commander may refer to
Service or functional commanders. Each component commander plans and
executes a portion of the total IADS effort, interacts with the other components
and conducts active defense in accordance with (IAW) weapon control
procedures established by the AADC.
d. Joint Force Air Component Commander. Normally, the JFACC is the Service
component commander having the preponderance of air assets and the
capability to plan, task, and control joint air operations.
(1) The JFACC normally has operational control (OPCON) over his own
Service air assets and tactical control (TACON) or direct support (DS) of other
forces/capabilities made available to the JFACC for tasking. The JFACC
generally uses centralized direction and planning with decentralized execution
for counterair operations.
(2) The responsibilities of the JFACC include information operations (IO)
strategies to neutralize enemy air and missile threats while preserving friendly
offensive and defensive capability.
e. Area Air Defense Commander. The JFC designates an AADC (normally the
JFACC) with the authority to plan, coordinate, and integrate overall joint force
DCA operations. The AADC normally is the component commander with the
preponderance of AMD capability, C2, and intelligence capability to plan,
coordinate, and execute integrated AMD operations, to include real time battle
management. Primary responsibilities of the AADC include the following:
(1) Develop, integrate, and distribute a JFC approved area air defense plan
(AADP). The AADP also may be integrated into a larger global missile
defense plan developed by direction of the supported CCDR and in
coordination with United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
(2) Develop and execute a detailed plan to disseminate timely air/missile
warning and cueing information to component forces, allies, coalition
partners, and civil authorities, as appropriate. (Note: Planning for ballistic
missile (BM) defense should include coordination for launch warnings, attack
assessments, and other aspects of missile defense, either through the
supported CCDR or directly with USSTRATCOM, if authorized.)
(3) In coordination with the component commanders and with JFC approval,
develop and implement ID and CID procedures/authorities, as well as
engagement procedures that are appropriate for the IADS.

(4) Ensure timely and accurate track reporting among participating units to
enable a robust COP.
(5) Establish air defense sectors (ADSs) or regions, as appropriate, and
designate regional air defense commanders (RADCs)/sector air defense
commanders (SADCs).
(6) Establish appropriate joint, fighter, and missile engagement zones
(JEZ/FEZ/MEZs) in coordination with the RADCs/SADCs and the ACA.
(7) Appoint a deputy area air defense commander for air and missile defense
(DAADC[AMD]) as required, to advise the AADC on how to integrate and
synchronize Service component DCA capabilities/assets for complex DCA
plans and operations.
(8) Ensure all support assets, including surface-based and space-based
early warning systems, are fully coordinated to support DCA operations.
(9) Make DCA recommendations to the JFACC after consultation with DCA
representatives from the joint force components. The AADC should prioritize
desired effects with objectives that may be achieved through defensive
counterair efforts to counter air and missile threats.
f. RADC/SADC. The AADC may elect to divide the joint operations area (JOA)
into regions and/or sectors. If the JOA is divided into regions/sectors, the JFC
will designate commanders for these areas.
g. Airspace Control Authority. The JFC designates an ACA (normally the
JFACC) who has overall responsibility for establishing and operating the airspace
control system. The ACA also develops policies and procedures for airspace
control that are incorporated into an airspace control plan (ACP) and
promulgated throughout the theater. A key responsibility of the ACA is to provide
a flexible airspace control system to meet contingency situations for rapid
employment of forces. The ACA coordinates the use of airspace, including
integration with the host nation (HN) and deconfliction of user requirements,
through the ACP. The ACP is implemented through the airspace control order
(ACO). All forces affecting joint air operations are subject to the ACO.
h. Joint Data Network Operations Officer (JDNO). The JDNO is responsible to
the JFC, through the J-3 (operations) with support from the J-6 (communications
system), for all joint data network (JDN) operations, including the intelligence
network, ground network, sensor network, and multi-tactical data link network
(MTN). Each of those networks has a responsible manager. The JDNO ensures
interoperability and integrates joint force information systems that provide the
input to the common tactical picture (CTP) and the COP. The JDNO may be
located with the JFC or JFACC. For further details regarding JDN operations
refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3115.01B, Joint
Data Network (JDN) Operations.
i. Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO). The challenge of managing the joint
force MTN led to the requirement for a JICO. The JICO cell is responsible for
planning, establishing, and maintaining the MTN and providing a CTP input to the

JDN for integration into the COP. The JFC, with recommendations from the
JICO through the JFACC/AADC, may require a regional interface control officer
(RICO) or sector interface control officer (SICO) for each RADC/SADC. The
RICO/SICO reports to the RADC/SADC to develop and maintain their portion of
the CTP which feeds into the COP. RICOs/SICOs will coordinate and answer to
the JICO for planning and execution functions that cross regional boundaries or
impact the theater-wide JDN. The JICO may recommend resolution of
architectural and data coordination issues between RICO/SICO cells. When the
joint task force (JTF) is formed, there will be only one JICO per JTF. For more
detailed information on the JICO, see CJCSM 6120.01D, Joint Multi-Tactical
Data Link (TDL) Operating Procedures.
j. Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer (ADAFCO). The ADAFCO is the
single Army point of contact (POC) between land-based AMD fire direction
centers and the controlling authority IAW Field Manual (FM) 3-01.85, Patriot
Battalion and Battery Operations. The ADAFCO executes engagement
operations, conducts friendly protection, and is solely responsible for the issuing
of fire control/engagement orders to Army AMD units. For a detailed discussion
of the US Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) ADAFCO, and
brigade ADAFCO elements see chapter III.

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Chapter II
IADS PLANNING AND EXECUTION
1. Integration and Service Coordination

a. IADS integration requires knowledge of Service capabilities and limitations for
each system as they are dispersed across the operational environment, to
include: unit status, location, mission, and connectivity capability for conveying
information to associated units. If a unit brings an engagement capability, then
the ability to direct and control engagements is also required. Within an IADS,
these functions are accomplished through various Service provided liaison and
fire control officers.
b. The Army provides an AAMDC which integrates the operational elements of
active AD, passive AD, attack operations, C2 systems, and intelligence to
synchronize Army contributions to the IADS. Normally, the AAMDC is OPCON to
the joint forces land component commander (JFLCC) and in DS of the JFACC.
The AAMDC conducts split-based operations to provide necessary support with
deployed liaison teams at major theater C2 headquarters to ensure integrated
and synchronized operations. The AAMDC also commands all Army theater-
level AMD forces.
c. The AAMDC and air defense artillery (ADA) brigades deploy ADAFCO
elements to control Army AMD fires. In order for Army AMD capabilities to be
integrated into the IADS, an ADAFCO is required to control the fires of Army
units IAW FM 3-01.85. The AAMDC ADAFCO deploys to the joint air operations
center (JAOC) and is tasked to coordinate and deconflict upper-tier theater
ballistic missile (TBM) engagements. The AAMDC ADAFCO gives fire control
orders to the Army’s THAAD weapon system. ADA brigade ADAFCOs deploy to
the RADC/SADC platform in any region or sector where Army lower-tier
engagement capabilities are employed. The brigade ADAFCO coordinates and
integrates Army lower-tier fires into the IADS by controlling the fires of his/her
subordinate units. The brigade ADAFCO gives all fire control orders to his/her
subordinate units. For a thorough discussion of the AAMDC and brigade
ADAFCO roles and responsibilities, see chapter III.
d. The Army provides a battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) as the
interface for selected battlefield functions between the Army forces
(ARFOR)/JFLCC and the Air Force forces (AFFOR)/JFACC. Typically, a BCD is
located within the JAOC. The BCD assists Army/JFLCC maneuver and fires by
assisting with synchronization of joint air operations and the exchange of
operational intelligence data. Although the BCD has an AD section the senior
ADA commander, normally the commander of the AAMDC, is responsible for
integrating Army AMD assets.

e. The JAOC is normally the JFACC’s principal operations center within the
IADS. Information flows into the JAOC from subordinate tactical units while
information and command guidance flows from the JAOC to subordinate units.
In general, theater air control system (TACS) channels exist to allow the
distribution of information between Air Force platforms. In order to facilitate
information flow between the JAOC and other Services, specific liaison cells and
fire control positions are established at the JAOC and with the JAOC’s
subordinate RADCs/SADCs. The senior air defense officer (SADO) ensures that
air and missile warning defenses are maintained throughout the JOA. Among
other things, the SADO is responsible for AD unit posturing and configuration,
airspace control procedures, and surveillance volume coverage during
operations. The SADO will usually have the following authorities for AD assets
(unless they have been delegated): commit authority, scramble authority, and
engagement authority. In general, unless the tactical situation dictates
otherwise, these authorities are normally retained prior to hostilities through the
initial phases of a conflict. (see figure 2).
Figure 2. Senior Air Defense Officer Integration

f. The Marine air command and control system (MACCS) provides the Marine
aviation combat element (ACE) commander with the capability to C2 Marine
Corps aviation assets. The primary MACCS agencies involved in AMD are the
tactical air command center (TACC) and the tactical air operations center
(TAOC). The TAOC is the primary AD element and it controls all Marine Corps
AMD and antiair warfare assets to include C2, weapons, and sensors. The
MARFOR will generally provide a Marine liaison officer (MARLO) to the JAOC to
serve as the Service conduit to the JFACC.
g. The Navy tactical air control system (NTACS) is the principal air control
system executed by the Navy at sea (it is analogous to the Air Force TACS).
The senior naval control element is the Navy tactical air control center. The Navy
tactical air control center is responsible for planning and conducting naval
operations as well as coordinating operations that affect airspace. The link
between the JFACC and the naval commanders is the naval and amphibious
liaison element (NALE) located in the JAOC. The NALE assists in integrating
naval air capabilities to help the JFACC meet the JFC objectives through the
NTACS.
2. IADS Planning Considerations
AD planning is derived from JFC objectives, guidance, and intent. Other inputs to
the planning process include: threat type, critical/defended asset list (CAL/DAL),
volume of airspace in which air superiority is required, and location of IADS assets.
The guiding principle for planning is effective C2 of the processes, assets, and
communications/data link architectures that constitute the IADS. The five primary
planning considerations are: 1) IPOE, 2) detection and tracking, 3) airspace
requirements, 4) ID responsibilities, and 5) engagement responsibilities. Several
enabling planning considerations include availability of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) assets, space, IO, air refueling requirements, and special
operations forces (SOF). The planning efforts are reflected and codified in the
AADP and the ACP.
a. Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. The purpose of
IPOE is to gain sufficient knowledge of the enemy threat for planners to array
forces which can ID and engage the threat. Successful IPOE lays the foundation
for planning by optimizing the allocation of IADS assets. IPOE planning
considerations are in table 2.

Table 2. IPOE Considerations Planning Checklist
IPOE assists the IADS planner in visualizing the operational environment,
assessing adversary air and missile capabilities, and identifying the adversary’s
probable intent and attack locations. IPOE is more than enumeration of
adversary air and missile systems. The IPOE must describe how adversary air
and missile forces operate.
□ Aircraft operating bases and dispersal sites, location, status, and
disposition to include:
• Number and type of enemy aircraft operating from each base.
• Enemy sortie generation capability from each base.
• Enemy munitions located at each base.
□ Enemy missile systems location, status, and disposition to include:
• Infrastructure, storage and launching locations.
• Enemy concept of employment.
• Launch platforms.
• C2 nodes.
• Missile stocks.
• Terrain and road infrastructure that may limit system employment.
□ Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the capabilities for employing
them; location, status, and disposition.
□ Enemy IADS order of battle to include:

• Aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), airfields, antiaircraft artillery
(AAA).
• C2 systems.
• Communications links.
• Support facilities.
□ Signals intelligence capabilities and electronic warfare assets.
□ Climate, weather, and terrain within the JOA and their effects on friendly
and enemy operations.
□ Overall assessment of the strengths and vulnerabilities of adversary

offensive and defensive air systems, including location and status of all
key nodes and targets that affect their ability to sustain air operations.
□ Enemy most likely and most dangerous courses of action including likely
air avenues of approach.

b. Detection and Tracking Considerations. The array of sensor capabilities and
their placement will determine the detection capability of the IADS. Planning for
detection and tracking should be part of the AADP and ACP to maximize search
area and provide optimal sensor placement. Detection and tracking planning
considerations are listed in table 4. The three most commonly accepted
detection and tracking plans include mutual support (preferred method),
track/report by exception, and track production areas (or a combination) (See
table 3). Each has advantages depending on the mix of platforms and their
degree of interoperability. Regardless of the surveillance plan adopted,
surveillance and data link planners must consider the following factors to
minimize the effects of interoperability gaps:
(1) Track Deconfliction. All C2 participants will NOT always see the same
tracks, with the same identity, and in the same location because platform
sensor differences contribute to miscorrelation and dual tracking. Robust
voice or internet relay chat communication among C2 agencies is critical to
resolve track discrepancies.
(2) Correlation Problems. Correlation problems result from inherent system
uncertainties when measuring and passing track locations. Track correlation
problems lead to ID conflicts which result in loss of situational awareness. All
combat systems introduce a certain amount of ambiguity into the “link”
architecture despite tactical data link (TDL) message standards common to all
Services. Of the seven track classification symbols implemented in Military
Standard 6016C, only three are used across the IADS to produce a common
and unambiguous (unique) track display: friend, hostile, and unknown. The
next closest unique symbol is “neutral,” but there are inconsistencies in how
“neutral” is interpreted and displayed by Service component systems. Proper
and consistent execution of the ID policy is extremely important to minimize
fratricide and prevent hostile tracks from penetrating defenses after being
misidentified as friendly/neutral tracks.
Table 3. Detection and Tracking Plans

Type Definition
Mutual Support Radar assets will track and report all locally held contacts, relying on
(preferred method) the TDL software to manage and prevent track duplication.
Track/Report by Radar assets will track and report all locally held contacts not
Exception currently being tracked or reported by other assets.
Track Production Geographic areas are assigned to a single radar asset to report and
Areas (or a track all air contacts.
combination)

Table 4. Detection and Tracking Considerations Planning Checklist
Detection and tracking considerations ensure that IADS sensor and resource
layouts maximize the effective detection and tracking of all airborne objects
within the JOA.
□ Utilize results of the IPOE process in order to identify sensor coverage
requirements. Factors to consider include:
• Enemy threat systems.
• Threat locations.
• Likely threat avenues of approach.
• Threat altitude, radar cross section, required detection range,
terrain.
□ Develop plan for arraying sensors throughout the operational
environment to maximize IADS’ sensor coverage.
□ Validate sensor coverage plan using joint sensor planning tools to

include Joint Defensive Planner, Falcon View, and Patriot Tactical
Planner.
□ Evaluate other sensor coverage concerns including accessibility,

connectivity, force protection requirements, mutual interference, and
the availability of host nation support.
□ Once sensor placement is planned, the JICO is responsible to ensure

that a JDN achieves the information requirements identified for each
platform. Factors to consider include:
• Platform information and track block requirements.
• Establishment of track production areas (TPAs) and track reporting
responsibilities by platform.
• Establishment of a filter plan.
• Plan to deal with dueling tracks and ID-conflicts.
• Track by exception criteria.
• Net time reference (NTR) procedures and track number
procedures.
• Joint range extension (JRE) requirements.
• Gateway requirements (i.e., situation awareness data link [SADL] to
Link 16).
□ Establish track handover procedures for tracks transiting between AD
regions/sectors.
□ Establishment of required voice circuits and TTP to resolve detection

and tracking issues.

c. Airspace Considerations. Each weapon system within the IADS will require
airspace to operate effectively. The airspace coordinating measures developed
to accommodate operations may limit airspace users with limited notice such as
restricted operations areas (ROAs) or restricted operations zones (ROZs), or
may define areas in which a weapons system is expected to engage threats,
such as a missile engagement zone (MEZ) or fighter engagement zone (FEZ).
These measures may also establish areas such as a joint engagement zone
(JEZ) that require detailed coordination between weapons systems, or provide
warning of the potential for unanticipated launches such as a Patriot operating
area (POA). IADS planners need to ensure that both general and platform
specific airspace requirements are met when developing the ACP and that these
are effectively communicated in the ACO via voice and digital means. Airspace
considerations are listed in table 5.

Table 5. Airspace Considerations Planning Checklist
Airspace considerations include the analysis of platform specific as well as
general airspace requirements to enable effective operations. Airspace
requirements should be identified by platform and airspace coordinating
measures (ACMs) should be established in the ACP. These ACMs and
airspace requirements will be disseminated to airspace users in the ACO.
□ Airspace requirements for C2 and ISR platform orbits, tanker orbits,
and retrograde options.
□ Airspace requirements for DCA combat air patrol (CAP) assets.

□ Air corridor and minimum risk route requirements to allow aircraft to
safely transit the battlespace.
□ Establishment of ROZs/ROA, if necessary.

□ Establishment of tanker orbits to allow effective and efficient aerial
refueling.
□ Establishment of MEZs, JEZs, FEZs for the optimal employment of

surface-to-air platforms and fighter aircraft. (See classified appendix E
for an in depth discussion of MEZ, JEZ, FEZ operations.)
□ Establishment of POAs to give airspace users situational awareness of

Patriot battery locations.
□ Development of procedures to deconflict/clear airspace for Army and

Marine Corps surface-to-surface fires (Army Tactical Missile System
[ATACMS], Multiple Launch Rocket System [MLRS] launches) and any
surface-to-surface fires coming from seabased systems.
□ Creation of procedures to activate and deactivate the various

established ACMs.
□ Airspace requirements change rapidly in a fluid operational

environment. Planners should develop streamlined methods for
requesting supplemental or new ACMs and/or identifying temporary
airspace via voice and digital means.
d. Identification Considerations. Identification is the process of determining the
friendly or hostile character of an unknown contact. An ID requires both ID
authority and criteria. ID authority is the authority to assign an identity of friendly,
hostile, or neutral to an unknown contact. This authority is inherent within the C2
chain, normally beginning with JFC approval and delegated to the AADC, who in
turn delegates authority to capable subordinate commanders. This allows for
appropriate span of control based on the rules of engagement (ROE) as dictated
by the operational situation. ID criteria are the friendly or hostile attributes and

characteristics of a contact that enable the ID authority to determine and assign
an identification. Planners should distribute resources to maximize the ID
process while also including ID authority and criteria into both the AADP and
ACP. As the operational environment evolves, ID authority/criteria may require
modification IAW with ROE. ID planning considerations are listed in table 6.
(1) Combat Identification. CID is the process of attaining an accurate
characterization of detected objects in the operational environment with high
confidence for timely application of tactical military options. Depending on the
situation and the operational decisions that must be made, the
characterization may be limited to “friend,” “enemy,” or “neutral.” Other
situations may require other characterizations, including, but not limited to,
class (TBM, cruise missile, and unmanned aircraft [UA]), type, nationality, and
mission configuration. CID is used for force posturing, C2, situational
awareness, and shoot/no-shoot employment decisions. The use of positive
ID measures (visual observation and/or electronic ID systems) is the
preferred method of operation. In the absence of positive ID, procedural ID
(which employs previously established and promulgated airspace control
measures) is used. Generally, some combination of positive and procedural
ID will be used. However, the risk of fratricide may require positive ID of
hostile to meet the defined CID threshold for “attaining an accurate
characterization” in theater ROE. Technological challenges also make
positive ID the biggest limiting factor to the kill chain. Within tactical timelines,
all attempts to acquire positive CID should be exhausted before engaging
suspected targets. (For more detail on CID see classified appendix F,
“Combat Identification Considerations,” on the SIPRNET at:
http://www.acc.af.smil.mil/alsa/mttp/iads.html).
(2) ID Authority. The AADC establishes and promulgates the JFC’s policy for
ID authority via the AADP, special instructions (SPINS), and/or an operation
task link (OPTASKLINK) supplement. The ID authority is the person who has
the authority and responsibility to declare the identification of an unknown
contact. Execution of the ID policy is normally delegated down to the tactical
level, but planners must ensure tactical commanders have the capability to
perform the required ID mission in real time.
(3) ID Criteria. ID criteria are the attributes and characteristics of a contact
that enable the ID authority to determine its nature and assign identification.
Generally, these attributes are established as a matrix. Some examples of ID
criteria are: point of origin (POO); identification, friend or foe (IFF); selective
identification feature (SIF); threat axis; precise participant location and
identification (PPLI); visual identification; hostile intent; and presence of
enemy. The extent and complexity of the matrix are theater dependent. The
planning goal is to ensure the ID authority has resources available to
effectively accomplish the ID matrix for theater AD.

Table 6. Identification Considerations Planning Checklist
ID considerations must account for the capabilities each system provides to the
ID authority and how their information is brought together systematically to
enable the efficient ID of tracks.
□ Determine ID authority for various platforms (fixed-wing [FW], rotary-wing
[RW], cruise missile [CM], UA, air-to-surface missiles, TBM). These ID
authorities may depend on:
• Information available at various nodes along the kill chain (AADC vs.
RADC/SADC vs. individual platforms [fighter aircraft, Patriot
information coordination central (ICC)]).
• Time available to ID a particular track before action must be taken
(TBMs or CMs vs. FW or RW aircraft).
• Level of air superiority.
• Confidence in ability to positively ID a particular platform with special
consideration given if friendly low observable (LO) platforms are in the
air tasking order (ATO).
• JFACC’s risk decision: weighing the risk of a miss-ID (and therefore a
possible fratricide situation) against the risk of having hostile aircraft
not being identified in a timely manner.
□ Develop ID Criteria. ID criteria generally includes:
• Lack of friendly indications (SPADES, no PPLI, not flying in
accordance with established ACMs).
• Presence of enemy indications (POO, electronic intelligence [ELINT],
signals intelligence [SIGINT], non-cooperative target recognition
[NCTR], hostile act, hostile intent).
• Degree of confidence.
□ Determine and publish the criteria for identification.
At a minimum, criteria
should be stipulated for HOSTILE, FRIEND, and UNKNOWN IDs.
□ Coordinate with the JICO to ensure that the ID authority has access to all
of the information capabilities necessary to evaluate ID criteria.
□ Publish an ID matrix that creates an executable ID process using the ID

criteria (see IADS execution vignette figure 5 this chapter for a sample ID
matrix).
□ In consultation with the JICO, develop and promulgate a system for

resolving miss-IDs and identifying and resolving contact ID-swaps.
e. Engagement. Engagement authority and responsibility is derived from the

ROE. Planners should continuously evaluate the impact of ROE on
accomplishing the IADS mission and ensure that the AADP is consistent with
current theater ROE. Supplemental ROE is normally requested in order to

support the IADS mission and should clearly delineate self-defense criteria in the
AADP and SPINS, down to the specific platform (e.g., Patriot) to ensure all
friendly forces have a thorough understanding of self-defense criteria. Flight
profiles and routes (e.g., minimum risk routes, low level transit routes, and
standard army flight routes) are intricately linked to self defense criteria during
high intensity conflict and when AD threats are present. During stability
operations or when air threats have been minimized the use of publicized flight
routes in the ACO and ACP may not be implemented due to ground surface fires
of small arms weapons over heavy trafficked flight routes. Airspace and AD
planners must consider randomization of flight activities and the lack of
publicized flight routes as an impact to their engagement criteria. Engagement
planning considerations are listed in table 7.
(1) Engagement Authority. The JFC is the engagement authority to
prosecute targets within the theater/JOA consistent with ROE. For IADS AD
engagements, the authority is normally delegated to the AADC who may
further delegate engagement authority to the tactical level (e.g.,
RADC/SADC). The degree of delegation must be consistent with the ROE,
the DAL, and the inherent right of self-defense.
(2) Engagement Responsibilities. In addition to engagement authority, the
responsibilities, process, and means of ordering engagements (shoot/no-
shoot) must be clearly stated in the AADP and SPINS. Planners must match
the appropriate weapons system to the threats (i.e., fighter for air-breathing
targets (ABTs), Patriot/Aegis for TBM threats). A combination of FEZ, MEZ,
and JEZ must be established to maximize engagement effectiveness among
all AD platforms. Additionally, the sequence of events required to transfer
engagement responsibility of a threat from one weapons platform to another,
particularly in a JEZ, must be published in the AADP and SPINS.

Table 7. Engagement Considerations Planning Checklist
When an IADS fails to deter the enemy from taking action, the commander must
facilitate the engagement or neutralization of all enemy air threats. The following
considerations should be made when planning the engagement capability of an
IADS.
□ ROE will be driven by political factors but friendly platform engagement
capabilities and friendly platform detectability must also be considered.
ROE development, by platform, should take into account the following
factors:
• Engagement priorities/responsibilities for each friendly platform. These
priorities and responsibilities can be assigned by: geographic area (i.e.,
a defended asset), ACMs using a JEZ/FEZ/MEZ construct, or by threat
platform (i.e., Patriot engages TBMs while DCA aircraft engage threat
FW aircraft).
• The authority that can authorize friendly platforms to engage threats (by
threat platform) – this is the engagement authority or weapons release
authority.
• The series of actions/orders that must be delivered for weapon release
to be authorized.
□ ROE and engagement authorities must be documented and disseminated
to all airspace users and platforms operating within the JOA.
□ Planners should ensure data link and voice communications infrastructure

exists to efficiently and effectively execute the ROE and engagement chain.
Contingency plans should be developed to ensure that engagements can
be effectively processed in the event of communications loss.
□ In depth threat analysis must be conducted to determine self-defense

criteria for each friendly platform. The self-defense criteria should consider:
• The results of the IPOE. Self-defense criteria should be constructed to
counter perceived or likely threats.
• Friendly platform capability to analyze and evaluate threat radar
contacts (see classified appendix E for an example of the analysis that
must be conducted when determining Patriot self-defense criteria).
□ ROE, engagement responsibilities, and self-defense criteria should be
published in the AADP and SPINS to ensure the widest possible
dissemination. All weapons release requirements for friendly platforms
should be published in order to minimize the risk of fratricide.
□ IADS planners should encourage aircrew to include the IADS ROE during
flight briefings. Understanding the conditions under which weapons will be
released will significantly mitigate the risk of fratricide.

f. Planning Enabling Capabilities.
(1) ISR. Situational awareness depends on joint force ISR capabilities, and
these capabilities are provided by air, land, sea, and space based platforms.
Air and space platforms provide the majority of ISR support for the IADS
mission.
(2) Space. Space forces provide BM launch warnings, attack assessments,
launch locations, predicted headings, impact areas, global communications,
ISR, and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) information. The JFC normally
appoints a space coordinating authority as the focal point for collecting all
user requirements.
(3) Information Operations. IO can provide significant capabilities against
DCA targets via C2 systems, AD nodes, missile sites, and airfields/operating
bases. Adversary IO vulnerabilities related to their offensive and defensive
air and missile systems should be identified in the IPOE as early as possible
in the planning process. Denying the adversary knowledge of friendly
counterair/AMD capabilities and their locations is integral to effective IADS
operations and is achieved via the full range of IO measures, such as
operations security, military deception, and electronic warfare.
(4) Air Refueling (AR). AR is a force multiplier for counterair operations by
increasing the range and endurance of aircraft conducting counterair
missions.
(5) Special Operations Forces. SOF forces may be used for AD operations,
but are not a recognized DCA asset. There are many SOF core tasks that
can be considered when planning AD operations. SOF forces can assist by
providing information as well as destroying or disrupting air and missile
assets, bases, logistic sites, and C2 facilities. For example, SOF can locate
enemy assets (especially those being concealed / camouflaged) and provide
terminal guidance (e.g., laser target designation) for joint air attacks, or
provide post-attack assessment.
3. Execution
In addition to ID and engagement authority, the AADC has certain systems and
authorities to control execution of the battle. These include air defense warning
conditions (ADWCs), weapons control status (WCS), and commit authority. The
JFC may divide the operational area into AD regions and ADSs, as appropriate.
Each region and sector will have respective RADCs and SADCs. The following are
tools used in AD battle management:

a. Air Defense Warnings (ADW). ADW are the degree of air attack probability
based on the threat assessment IAW JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile
Threats. The AADC establishes the baseline ADW for the joint force, which may
be different for an air-breathing threat and a missile threat. Subordinate air
defense commanders (ADCs) may issue higher, but not lower ADW for their
region or sector. ADW are disseminated though C2 channels to all AMD
elements and fire units ADWCs. There are three categories of ADWCs:
(1) ADWC White: an attack by hostile aircraft or missile is improbable.
(2) ADWC Yellow: an attack by hostile aircraft or missile is probable.
(3) ADWC Red: an attack by hostile aircraft or missile is imminent or in
progress.
b. Weapons Control Status. WCS categories includes free, tight, and hold/safe.
They describe the relative degree of control on AD fires. The AADC establishes
the WCS for the joint force, which may be different for an air-breathing threat and
a missile threat. This authority originates with the AADC and can be delegated to
any subordinate commander. Different weapons control statuses may be applied
simultaneously to different weapons systems, and/or volumes of airspace. The
three statuses mentioned here are:
(1) Weapons Hold: fire only in self defense or in response to a formal order.
(2) Weapons Tight: fire only on targets positively identified as hostile in
accordance with current ROE.
(3) Weapons Free: fire at targets not positively identified as friendly in
accordance with current ROE.
c. Commit Authority. Commit authority describes the AD command level that
can dedicate an asset to engage an entity (e.g., position a DCA fighter to
intercept or direct an AD unit to track and target). Commit authority does not
imply engagement authority. The engagement decision will be separate and
unique from the commit decision even if the unit has been delegated both
authorities. Depending on the phase of operations, the JFC may approve
delegation of commit and/or engagement authority to lower echelons.
d. IADS Execution Example. The following is a simple IADS used to illustrate
the seams in IADS execution. Platform specific planning is transparent in this
example in order to focus on joint planning concerns. Figure 3 displays TBM
launch areas (LAs) in country RED, fixed-wing defense assets available for
country BLUE, and illustrates the track production areas for the JOA.

Figure 3. TBM and Fixed Wing Defense Assets.
(1) Country RED poses a significant TBM and FW aircraft threat to country
BLUE.
(a) TBM Threat.
• Country RED conducts TBM operations from LAs 1 and 2. The TBM
threats from LAs 1 and 2 can reach country BLUE’s three defended
assets.
• Patriot and Aegis are positioned in a layered TBM defense. Aegis is
assigned the mission to defend assets A and C from TBM launches.
Patriot is tasked to defend assets B and C from TBM launches. The
Patriot ICC is collocated with the battery defending asset C. The
Patriot ADAFCO is collocated with the control and reporting center
(CRC). The Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite is available for
country BLUE to provide theater early warning of TBM launches.
(b) Fixed-wing Aircraft Threat.
• Country RED operates FW aircraft out of three airbases: (ABs) 1, 2, 3
[shown in the figure as runways]. Country RED has ten operational
SU-27 aircraft located at AB 3. AB 2 is home to 30 MiG-23s and AB
1 contains 4 bombers as well as multiple transport aircraft.

• Country BLUE employs DCA CAPs A and B manned by 4-ship flights
of fighter assets as the first layer of a layered defense. LEAKERS will
be engaged on order by the Patriot units. Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS) controls the DCA CAPs while the CRC
provides CID, manages tanker assets, conducts check-in and check-
out, and is the Patriot units’ engagement authority (EA) for FW
aircraft. The CRC and AWACS conduct C2 functions while the Rivet
Joint offers electronic ID capabilities.
(c) Joint Data Network: The primary data link for this operation will be the
Link 16 or fighter data link (FDL) network. Figure 4 is a graphic depicting
the Link 16 Network.
Figure 4. Link 16 Network

(d) TBM Launch Vignette.
• When a TBM is launched from LA 1 or 2, it will most likely be
detected first by a satellite which will transfer the launch data to the
joint tactical ground station (JTAGS). JTAGS verifies the missile
launch and broadcasts early warning through the Link 16 network via
a J3.6 Space Track message and through the integrated broadcast
service network. Systems that support the J3.6 Space Track
message will display it and receive their first indication of a TBM
launch this way. In addition, space operators will give early warning
over the appropriate voice circuit.
• The next sensor to acquire the TBM will be the Aegis since it is
properly positioned and has been tasked to defend assets A and C
from TBM launches. The actions of the Aegis crew will depend on
which asset that the TBM is threatening.
• If the TBM is threatening asset A, the Aegis is responsible for the
engagement. Aegis will inform the combined air operations center
(CAOC) that it is going to engage the TBM and will process the
engagement at the optimal time.
• In the event that asset B is threatened by the TBM, Patriot will be
responsible for the engagement. The Patriot sensor will be cued by
the Aegis sensor via the J3.6 Space Track message transmitted over
Link 16 and the integrated broadcast service-interactive (IBS-I)
broadcast. The Patriot battery will eventually track the TBM with its
organic radar and process the TBM for engagement. In the CRC, the
ADAFCO will notify the senior director (SD) of the impending launch
and the SD will attempt to clear the airspace. The ADAFCO will
monitor and inform the SD of the engagement status.
• When a TBM threatens asset C, Aegis and Patriot are both
responsible for the engagement. Aegis is tasked as the initial
shooter. If the Aegis engagement is evaluated as a “NO KILL,” then
the Patriot battery will engage in the terminal phase of the TBM flight.
(e) Fixed-wing Engagement Vignette.
• ID Matrix. The CRC and AWACS are responsible for identification of
tracks in their reporting areas. In order to execute this responsibility
in the vignette, the C2 agencies use the notional ID Matrix found in
figure 5.

Figure 5. Notional ID Matrix
• First Fixed-wing Vignette. AWACS has radar contact at a range of 3

nautical mile (nm) from enemy AB 3 flying at 3,000 feet and initiates a
track. The track satisfies the lack of friendly (LOF) criteria SPADES.
Due to its POO, the track meets the presence of enemy indication
(PEI) requirement OUTLAW. At this point the track is classified as
HOSTILE. Rivet Joint amplifies the ID with electronic intelligence that
indicates the track is a single Su-27. As the HOSTILE contact travels
east, the AWACS commits a flight (2-ship) from CAP B to engage the
track.
• Second Fixed-wing Vignette. AWACS has a radar contact ingressing
towards country BLUE between CAP A and CAP B. The radar
contact satisfies the LOF criteria but has not met the PEI requirement
to be made HOSTILE according to the ID matrix. The contact
remains BOGEY. The AWACS commits fighters to visually identify
(VID) the BOGEY. The contact’s flight path results in tracking
responsibility hand over from the fighter and AWACS to the CRC.
The fighter VIDs the contact as a country RED MiG-23. The evolving
tactical situation requires the fighter to be redirected. The CRC
determines that Patriot will take the engagement. The SD at the CRC
will contact the fighters to clear the airspace surrounding the southern
Patriot battery and direct the ADAFCO to engage the HOSTILE track.
The ADAFCO orders the ICC to engage the track using the southern
Patriot battery and the engagement is processed. The ADAFCO will
monitor and inform the SD of the engagement status.

For more information on IADS execution TTP refer to classified
appendix E on ALSA’s SIPRNET website
4. Conclusion
An IADS is the sum of component AD systems and not a formal system. For each of
the component systems to operate within an integrated whole, it is imperative that
everyone working within the system understands the capabilities and limitations of
the various components. A key to operational success is for coordinated planning
between the AADC and component commanders’ planning staffs. During execution,
fratricide can be best avoided with situational awareness of friendly air operations
(via ATO, ACO, and SPINS) and increased knowledge of aircraft/missile flight
profiles/characteristics. Chapters III-VI provide an overview of each Service’s AD
systems, capabilities, and limitations. Each Service chapter provides detailed
information on mission, organization, C2, weapon systems, planning, and
operations. For more information on IADS execution TTP refer to classified
appendix E, and for CID considerations classified appendix F, both on ALSA’s
SIPRNET website http://www.acc.af.smil.mil/alsa/mttp/iads.html.

Chapter III
ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
1. Introduction
Synchronizing and integrating Army capabilities in joint AMD operations is a complex
process involving the coordination of C2 organizations with specific data links,
communications, intelligence, weapon systems, and data architectures. (Note: AMD
is an air defense mission that should not be confused with the ADA branch, units, or
personnel.)
2. Mission
The Army ADA mission is: Army AMD forces, fighting interdependently with other
elements of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) team
at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, will provide AMD and contribute to
situational awareness and understanding, airspace management, and operational
force protection in order to deter or defeat enemy aerial threats, protect the force
and high-value assets, enable freedom to operate, and contribute to victory (FM 3-
01.85). This mission is normally executed within a combined theater and requires
integration and close coordination of Army ADA with other joint forces.
3. Organization and Function

Within a theater or area of operations (AO), all elements of the Army AD structure
are not required for Army elements to interface in a joint operation. In place, Army
AD forces are organized as follows:
a. US Army Air and Missile Defense Command.
(1) AAMDC Role. The AAMDC is normally under the OPCON of the ARFOR
commander or JFLCC. When directed by the JFC, AAMDC assets may be
placed in direct support of the AADC as appropriate. The roles of the
commanding general of the AAMDC are senior Army ADA commander,
theater Army air and missile defense coordinator (TAAMDCOORD), and
DAADC(AMD). The AAMDC and JAOC intelligence personnel build a
collaborative theater air and missile defense (TAMD) IPOE, which serves as
the basis for theater air and missile defense strategies and plans. The
AAMDC (via the attack operations section in coordination with the intelligence
section) submits theater missile target nominations directly to the JAOC for
inclusion as JFACC-nominated targets. The AAMDC also sends a robust
liaison officer (LNO) team (active defense, intelligence, and attack operations
personnel) to support the JFACC, AADC, and DAADC(AMD) and may deploy
the AAMDC tactical operations center (TOC) (main) to the JFACC, AADC
location. As the senior Army AD element at the AADC’s location, the AAMDC
LNO team serves as the primary interface at the JAOC for all land-based
active ADs.

(2) AAMDC Functions.
(a) Deputy Area Air Defense Commander for Air and Missile Defense.
The DAADC(AMD) advises the AADC on the best distribution of Army
AMD capabilities between the requirements for the theater level DAL and
maneuver forces of the ARFOR/JFLCC. As a DAADC(AMD), the AAMDC
commander will deploy personnel and equipment to the JAOC, to ensure
a fully integrated and synchronized air and missile defense operation. The
functions of the DAADC(AMD) include:
• Integrate land-based AMD into theater DCA operations.
• Advise the AADC regarding ROE [weapon control status, weapon
control procedures, states of readiness/radar emission, fire control
orders], ACMs, weapon control measures, and ADW.
• Assist the AADC with AD plan development.
• Advise the AADC on matters regarding land-based AMD operations
and capabilities.
(b) Senior Army ADA Commander. The senior Army ADA commander is
the Army proponent for air and missile defense combat functions and has
the responsibility for active air and missile defense planning within the
Army forces. When assigned for the entire land force, the senior Army
ADA commander provides the following functions:
• Single POC for Army AMD in theater.
• Responsible for active AMD planning within the ARFOR and the land
force when assigned.
• Develops the AMD annex to the ARFOR operation plan (OPLAN) for
protection of the JFC and ARFOR commander’s priorities.
• Ensures organic, assigned, and supporting ADA units accomplish
AMD objectives in support of the JFC and ARFOR commander’s
concept of operations.
• Recommends AMD missions for other members of the combined
arms team and integrates these missions with the AADC and other
components.
(c) TAAMDCOORD. The TAAMDCOORD is an integral member of the
ARFOR or JFLCC’s planning team and provides the following:
• Develops and maintains TAMD IPOE/situation template.
• Recommends air and missile threats for deep attack.
• Recommends active, passive, and other combined arms measures in
the AMD estimate.

• Recommends air and missile threats as offensive counterair (OCA)
and DCA priorities to the ARFOR commander for forwarding to the
JFACC/AADC.
• Develops the AMD annex to the ARFOR OPLAN.
• Coordinates with higher and lower AMD elements as well as with
adjacent units.
• Coordinates with the JFC, component commanders, and AADC at the
theater level.
b. ADA Brigade (BDE). The ADA BDE mission is to protect forces and selected
geopolitical assets from air and missile attacks and to provide surveillance. This
mission may require the brigade to deploy into theater with tactical lift assets or
strategic lift assets. Elements of the brigade may deploy early to protect
lodgment or early entry operations. The brigade may operate initially under
OPCON to the JFLCC or in direct support of the JFACC as forces flow into
theater. During all phases of the operation, the brigade must be integrated into
the IADS to provide early warning and defense against TBMs and ABTs.
(1) ADA Brigade Commander.
(a) The ADA BDE will provide AMD protection for assigned assets from
the theater DAL. The ADA BDE commander is responsible for the
planning and execution of ADA plans and missions at the tactical level and
ensures that the brigade is integrated and synchronized with adjacent,
higher, and lower ADA operations. The ADA BDE commander may also
function as the air and missile defense coordinator (AMDCOORD) until the
AAMDC commander arrives in theater.
(b) Active defense at the theater level normally consists of one or more
ADA brigades providing command and control over assigned units. The
brigade commander is tasked to protect designated assets identified on
the DAL.
c. The ADA battalion is the basic operational ADA unit. There are currently two
organizational structures in use for ADA battalions:
(1) ADA battalion (P) has four Patriot firing batteries assigned at brigade level
to defend against TBM and ABT threats.
(2) ADA battalion (P/A) consist of four Patriot firing batteries and one
Avenger firing battery. The composite ADA battalion has six Sentinel radars,
with two Sentinels in headquarters and headquarters battery and four
Sentinels in the Avenger battery. The Avenger battery also has 24 Avenger
fire units. The firing batteries are controlled by a fire control center to provide
360-degree coverage for seamless air and missile defense.
d. Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer Element. The ADAFCO is the single
Army POC between land-based AMD fire direction centers and the controlling
authority. The ADAFCO is responsible for coordinating Army AMD fires for

designated assets/areas on the DAL in the JOA/region/sector and for
coordinating and monitoring the tracking and engagement activities of individual
Army AMD fire units. The ADAFCO element is the single POC between the AMD
fire direction centers and JAOC/RADC/SADC, and should be capable of
continuous (24-hour) operations. The ADFACO element is normally placed
under the direct control of the SADO, senior weapons director, or mission crew
commander.
(1) AAMDC ADAFCO. The AAMDC ADAFCO is responsible for the
coordination and deconfliction of upper-tier TBM engagements. Such upper-
tier engagements can only currently be prosecuted by Aegis and THAAD.
The AAMDC ADAFCO will generally be located at the JAOC with the SADO.
In conjunction with a naval liaison, the AAMDC ADAFCO coordinates and
deconflicts upper-tier engagements between Aegis and THAAD. If the SADO
determines that THAAD is the appropriate system for an upper-tier
engagement, it is the AAMDC ADAFCO who gives the engagement order to
the THAAD tactical control officer (TCO). Furthermore, the AAMDC ADAFCO
maintains communications with the BDE ADAFCOs at the RADC/SADC in
order to share situational awareness. To accomplish the mission, the
AAMDC ADAFCO requires voice communications with the Aegis, THAAD
battery TCO, and the BDE ADAFCO. The AAMDC ADAFCO also requires a
joint air picture in close proximity to the SADO.
(2) BDE ADAFCO. The BDE ADAFCO is responsible for lower-tier
engagements within a particular region or sector. Lower tier engagements
include terminal phase engagements of ballistic missiles as well as air-
breathing threat engagements (FW, RW, air-to-surface missiles, UA, and
CM). The BDE ADAFCO is normally located at the RADC or SADC with the
mission crew commander or senior weapons director. The BDE ADAFCO is
the Army link between Patriot units and the joint controlling agency.
Furthermore, the BDE ADAFCO issues all fire control orders to their
subordinate units. The BDE ADAFCO requires voice and data
communications with the tactical directors at the battalion’s ICC as well as a
joint air picture feed from the RADC/SADC or engagement authority. Due to
the requirement to collocate with a RADC/SADC, BDE ADAFCOs are usually
located with a US Air Force CRC, US Navy Aegis, Marine Corps TAOC, or, in
very specific circumstances, a US Air Force AWACS.
4. Command and Control
a. Command and Control. The AAMDC commands all ADA forces defending
theater level-units/assets. These ADA forces are organized into brigades. The
AAMDC may also have other forces assigned or attached. ADA units defending
Corps units/assets remain under the command of the Corps commander.
Execution of AD engagement operations are the responsibility of the
engagement authority. The EA will be designated in the SPINS.
(1) Airspace control requires close coordination between components and
must be clearly articulated in the AADP (to include engagement priorities and

communications channels). Airspace control should maximize the
effectiveness of combat operations without adding undue restrictions or
adverse impact on the capabilities of any Service or functional component.
The AAMDC and ADA brigades deploy ADAFCO elements to the AADC and
RADC/SADC to act as a single POC for Army AMD units to coordinate
airspace control, ID, battle management, and friendly protection issues. The
ADAFCO works with the AADC/RADC/SADC to deconflict the airspace in
order to execute AD engagement operations. The ADAFCO advises the
AADC/RADC/SADC on ground-based AD capabilities and limitations. Finally,
the ADAFCO issues all engagement commands to their subordinate units.
Refer to figure 6 for US Army ADA command and control relationships.
Figure 6. Army ADA Command and Control Relationships

(2) Army AD C2 is enabled through the use of a TOC. TOCs exist at each
command level/echelon-AAMDC, theater, corps, ADA BDEs, and ADA
battalions (tactical command system and Patriot battery command post).
ADA TOCs provide a C2 and intelligence capability that automates and
integrates the performance of force operations (FO) functions for AMD and
allows the commander to monitor engagement operations (EO). Contained
within the TOC is an integrated system of hardware and software known as
the air and missile defense planning and control system (AMDPCS). The
AMDPCS contains the computers, communications, and ancillary equipment
required to plan and execute AMD operations. The AMDPCS systems are
tailored to each echelon and can perform the following functions:
(a) Monitor combat operations of supported, adjacent, and higher echelon
organizations.
(b) Maintain situational awareness and provide inputs to higher
headquarters.
(c) Provide a focal point for the receipt and development of intelligence.
(d) Plan future operations.
(3) Air Defense Airspace Management (ADAM). The ADAM cell deploys with
the brigade combat team (BCT) and with the brigade aviation element (BAE).
The ADAM/BAE plans, coordinates, and establishes connectivity with JIIM
sensors as well as C2/controller networks to provide situational awareness
and early warning for airspace users. The ADAM/BAE conducts continuous
planning and execution of airspace management requirements for the
supported unit/echelon. ADAM/BAE also conducts AMD and aviation
planning/coordination to determine requirements across the full spectrum of
operations. ADAM/BAE functions include:
(a) Conduct AMD augmentation planning and coordination.
(b) The BAE conducts army aviation augmentation planning and
coordination.
(c) Conduct risk management to minimize the potential for fratricide
(air/ground positive/procedural identification criteria) for the BCT.
(d) Provide early warning of enemy aerial attack.
(e) Develop, display, and disseminate the COP and single integrated air
picture to the BCT.
(f) Contribute to airspace command and control (AC2) planning and
execution.
(g) Contribute to joint/local airspace deconfliction.
(h) Contribute to operational protection.
(i) Advise and update the commander on adjacent AMD unit location,
plans, and intent.

(j) Take responsibility for the continuous assessment of AMD
augmentation requirements.
(k) Identify the sensor requirements for the commander during
development of the ISR collection plan.
(l) Integrate operations using the Army Battle Command System (ABCS)
(Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System [AFATDS], air and missile
defense workstation [AMDWS], All Source Analysis System [ASAS], Force
XXI battle command—brigade and below [FBCB2], Global Command and
Control System-Army [GCCS-A], maneuver control system [MCS], and
Tactical Airspace Integration System [TAIS]) with JIIM units/organizations.
(m) Request, maintain, and disseminate AC2 measures and restrictions.
b. Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD). FAAD C2 provides AD weapons and C2
centers with digital automated target information from Sentinel and joint sensors.
Along with the AMDWS, it provides automated EO and FO capabilities in AD
battalions. FAAD EO capabilities include near-real-time early warning and
cueing information for short-range air defense (SHORAD) weapon systems,
friendly aircraft identification, and air battle management. AMDWS FO
capabilities include automated mission and staff planning for interoperability with
other Army battlefield control system components.
c. Joint Tactical Ground Station. JTAGS is a national level information
processing system that receives direct down-linked data from DSP satellites and
processes the information in-theater. JTAGS disseminates warning, alerting, and
cueing information on TBMs and other tactical events of interest throughout the
theater using existing communications networks. The in-theater location
provides the earliest possible warning for deployed troops, and AD units can link
the system to theater-unique terrestrial C2 systems.
d. Command and Control Battle Management Center (C2BMC). The ballistic
missile defense system (BMDS) is comprised of various sensor and engagement
capabilities including Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot weapon systems to include
ground-based interceptors and stand alone sensors. The C2BMC integrates
these BMDS elements into a system-of-systems with a common battlespace view
allowing combatant commanders, government agencies, and national command
centers to coordinate defenses.
5. Weapon Systems
a. Avenger. The Avenger is a lightweight, day/night, limited adverse weather
weapon system. The fire unit consists of two turret-mounted Stinger/MANPADS
missile pods, a .50-caliber machine gun, a forward-looking infrared (FLIR)
system, a laser rangefinder, and an IFF system. The FAAD C2 provides
targeting information to assist in target acquisition. The fully rotating turret is
mounted on a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). The
sensor components and armament system are gyro-stabilized for shoot-on-the-
move capability and can slew-to-cue in response to early warning (EW)
information. The gunner operates the system from inside the turret or from a

remote control unit away from the HMMWV when static. On-board
communications equipment provides for radio and intercom operations. The
Avenger weapon system can be cued by the Sentinel radar.
b. Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM). The mission of the C-RAM
battery is to provide rocket, artillery, and mortar (RAM) intercept, EW, and
situational awareness to the supported commander. To accomplish these tasks,
the EO section uses organic sensors collocated within the unit’s operational
environment at the base defense operations center. The C-RAM battery
assesses the RAM threat in conjunction with ABTs and friendly force flight paths
to ensure friendly protection. C-RAM consists of several functions: shape,
sense, warn, intercept, protect, respond, and C2. C-RAM engagements are
prosecuted using a land-based version of the Phalanx weapon system with a
trailer mounted MK-15 close-in weapon system (CIWS). The CIWS is a 310
degree, 20-mm gun system with a FLIR and separate search and track radars.
The gun system is capable of firing 4,500 rounds per minute with a magazine
storage capacity of 1,580 rounds.
c. Patriot. The Patriot weapon system is a mobile, medium-to-high altitude air
and missile defense system that protects critical assets and maneuver forces
from TBMs, rotary-and fixed-wing aircraft, antiradiation missiles (ARMs), UA, and
cruise missiles. Patriot is the centerpiece of the Army’s TAMD force. The Patriot
system currently has five fielded missile variants: Patriot Advanced Capability - 3
(PAC-3), Patriot Advanced Capability - 2 (PAC-2), the Guidance Enhanced
Missile (GEM), Guidance Enhanced Missile-T (GEMT), and the Guidance
Enhanced Missile-C (GEMC). The PAC-3 missiles are kinetic hit-to-kill, whereas
the PAC-2, GEM, GEMC, and GEMT missiles are proximity fuse-burst-kill. When
employed with THAAD, Patriot forms the lower-tier of a 2-tier TBM defense.
d. THAAD Battery. The mission of the THAAD battery is to protect forward-
deployed military forces, friends, and allies from short-range, medium-range, and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles. As the upper tier of a 2-tiered defense, the
THAAD system provides protection against TBMs but has no capability or self
protection against air-breathing threats, ARMs or CMs. The THAAD battery is
normally assigned to the AAMDC and attached to the brigade relying on Patriot
for defense of the battery.
e. Sentinel Radar. The Sentinel radar is an X-Band, range-gated, pulse doppler
radar. The radar automatically detects, tracks, classifies, identifies, and reports
targets, including cruise missiles, UA, and rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. The
high scan rate, 30 revolutions per minute (rpm), offers effective coverage out to
40 kilometer (km) and the radar is resistant to electronic countermeasures.
6. Planning
The AAMDC commander and other representatives in the Service component
headquarters are responsible for active AMD planning. The AAMDC assists in
integrating AD and TAMD priorities into the forces defended-asset prioritization
process. Active, passive, and other combined arms AD measures are included in
the AD estimate. The AAMDC also ensures coordination between higher and lower

AMD echelons, as well as adjacent units for vertical and horizontal integration of
AMD coverage. In force-projection operations, this will include integration with joint
or multinational counterair and AMD participants. If the AAMDC commander is the
senior ADC in theater, then the AAMDC commander is designated as the
TAAMDCOORD, which may expand the theater coordinator’s role and scope.
a. Operational Planning.
(1) The focus of AMD planning at the operational level is protection of forces
and assets IAW the commander’s intent.
(2) In the AADP, the JFC using economy of force will task the AAMDC and
theater ADA brigades to protect theater assets.
b. Operational Planning Process.
(1) AMD planning at the operational level is an iterative process. Once the
AADC develops the AD concept for the theater, the AAMDC cell within the
JAOC provides an AD estimate to the AADC. Once the AADC develops the
DCA portion of the plan and allocates air assets for various missions, the
AAMDC determines whether theater or corps has sufficient AMD coverage.
Based on the CAL/DAL. The AAMDC recommends which assets Army ADA
units can protect and integrates that coverage into the AADC/DCA planning
process. Coordination between AAMDC and corps brigades helps deconflict
asset coverage prioritization.
(2) The ARFOR allocates resources and assigns tasks to the corps which
then can sub-allocate corps assets and assign air and missile defense
missions to divisions. In each corps and division main command post (CP)
the AMDCOORD incorporates the AD mission requirements into the
maneuver plan with input from the G-2, the AC2 cell, and fire support
element.
(3) The TAAMDCOORD develops and recommends AMD priorities to the
commander (JFACC/AADC) for approval. Part of the TAAMDCOORD
responsibility involves coordinating input from TBM defense planning into the
OCA and interdiction targeting process. The TAAMDCOORD works with the
fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) to incorporate the approved priorities
into the fire support annexes of the maneuver plan. Coordination between
TAAMDCOORD and FSCOORD ensures that the Army TAMD portions of the
IADS complement theater OCA plans. The integration and synchronization of
OCA and TAMD attack operations by the TAAMDCOORD and FSCOORD
prevent mutual interference and maximize unity and economy of effort.
7. Operations
Army ADA forces are either organic to the echelon or are task organized for the
mission. ADA units remain under OPCON of their component commander, assigned
headquarters, or as directed by the JFC. They conduct operations IAW the JFC,
AADC, and ACA approved and promulgated priorities, plans, and ROE. The

AADC/RADC/SADC executes AD operations through subordinate C2 nodes, such
as the CRC, AEGIS, TAOC, or AWACS. The ADAFCO collocates with the
appropriate controlling authority and serves as the single Army POC executing
ground-based AMD engagement operations. To do this, the ADAFCO requires
functional voice and data links with his subordinate AMD units. It is imperative that
contingency ROE exist to cover situations in which either the voice link, data link, or
both are inoperable between the ADAFCO and his subordinate units.
a. C2 Relationships. The ARFOR commander, AAMDC commander, and
corps/division commanders establish C2 relationships for ADA units. At the
theater level, ADA forces are under the ARFOR or AAMDC.
b. Attachment. Attachment is the temporary placement of a unit within another
organization. The commander of the organization receiving the ADA element will
exercise the same degree of C2 over organic and attached units subject to the
limitations imposed by the attachment order. This includes administrative and
logistical support. The parent ADA unit commander retains the responsibility for
administrative functions.
c. Control Chain. Regardless of defense mission, all THAAD and Patriot units
are data linked to the established AADC/RADC/SADC control networks. Patriot
units are typically data linked to their higher echelon for ID authority and ABT
engagement. TBM engagement authority is normally decentralized to the fire
unit level. THAAD and Patriot units conduct all IADS operations IAW the
JFC/AADC/ACA established plans, procedures, and ROE. The Avenger weapon
system and Sentinel radar are data-linked into the IADS through the battalion air
battle management operations center (ABMOC). The C-RAM batteries conduct
engagements through an integrated base defense command and control system
consisting of proactive, defensive, and reactive engagement C2 activities.
d. Support Relationships. Support relationships define specific arrangements
and responsibilities between supporting and supported units (see table 8). There
are four ADA support relationships.
(1) General Support (GS). An ADA unit in GS provides support for the force
as a whole. It is not committed to any specific element of the supported force.
(2) General Support-reinforcing (GS-R). An ADA unit with a GS-R mission
provides support for the force as a whole and secondarily augments the
support provided by another ADA unit. ADA units with a GS-R mission must
coordinate with the supported ADA unit to reinforce the coverage of assets in
the AO.
(3) Reinforcing. A reinforcing ADA unit augments the coverage of another
ADA unit. A reinforcing ADA unit is positioned to protect one or more of the
reinforced unit’s priorities as specified by the supported ADA unit commander.
(4) Direct Support. A DS ADA unit provides dedicated AD for a specific
element of the force that has no organic AD. The supporting ADA unit
coordinates its movement and positioning with the supported unit.

Table 8. ADA Support Relationships
ISSUE DIRECT SUPPORT GENERAL REINFORCING GENERAL
SUPPORT SUPPORT
REINFORCING
Who establishes The supported The ADA commander The supported ADA commander
priorities? commander. who established the commander. who established the
support relationship. support
relationship.
Who positions* ADA The ADA commander The ADA commander The ADA commander The ADA
fire units? with the approval of in coordination with with approval of commander in
the supported local ground reinforced ADA coordination with
commander. commander. commander. reinforced ADA
commander.
Who coordinates for The supported The ADA commander The reinforced ADA The ADA
terrain used by ADA commander. who established the commander. commander who
fire units? support relationship. established the
support
relationship.
With whom should The supported unit. As required. As required and the As required and the
liaison be established? reinforced ADA unit. reinforced ADA
unit.
With whom should The supported unit. As required. As required and the As required and the
communications be reinforced ADA unit. reinforced ADA
established? unit.
*The term “positions” specifies the selection of the exact placement of individual fire units with the AO. The parent ADA
commander retains responsibility for administration and logistics.
e. ADA Coordination. ADA forces at every level coordinate with their higher
echelon and adjacent ADA elements in order to provide appropriate C2 to
subordinate units. Examples of where coordination must take place include the
ATO, ACO, SPINS, theater AD/airspace management plans, real-time alerts,
ADW, WCS, and control data. Coordination synchronizes the commander’s
priorities, resolves conflicts of intent, and ensures proper integration of Army
capabilities into joint AMD efforts. For the ARFOR, this coordination is
accomplished by the BCD, which collocates part of its staff with the AADC. If the
AFFOR or Navy forces are designated as AADC, the TAAMDCOORD plans and
conducts operations from the JAOC. If the MARFOR is designated as AADC,
the Marine Corps TACC conducts the joint AMD activities.
f. Detect-to-engage (DTE) Sequence. The DTE sequence is divided into
detection, acquisition, identification, engagement, and destruction. The DTE
sequence may be different for the various ADA weapon systems. During the
operation, DTE must have the flexibility to respond to changes in mission,
enemy, terrain, weather, troops, civilian considerations and support available-
time available.
(1) Detection. ADA systems must discern the presence of TBMs and ABTs
that are a factor to defended assets. Early detection demands continuous
surveillance. Detection of TBMs by Patriot is dependent on reliable
intelligence of enemy launch locations. TAMD weapon systems can detect
the threat while in the active radar surveillance mode and in the passive
mode, they may require external cueing. In the case of the Avenger weapon
system, the threat is normally detected visually, or is cued by surveillance
radar, or passed from a TAMD unit.

(2) Acquisition. ADA systems must detect early and obtain fire control quality
data defining the position of the enemy TBM, ABT, or enemy air element.
(3) Classification and ID. For theater missile threats, Patriot units use
classification in lieu of ID. This enables Patriot units to classify targets as
ARMs or TBMs and to engage targets threatening defended assets consistent
with theater ROE. Threats classified as aircraft are addressed separately and
are identified in accordance with specifically defined theater identification
procedures. Cruise missiles are treated as aircraft by the Patriot system.
Due to their low radar cross section and flight altitudes, the Patriot radar
typically detects cruise missiles at very close range leaving little time for the
operator to engage the threat. Rapid classification/ID of possible cruise
missiles is critical for effective engagement of these threats by the Patriot
system. In order to prevent fratricide, friendly aircraft must conform to ACMs
and supplemental procedures established by the AADC and the ACA.
(4) Engagement and Destruction. The ADAFCO is responsible to prioritize
each threat for engagement and destruction with the help of AD elements.
FW, RW, CM, TBM, UA, and ARM targets each have an associated
engagement authority. As a general rule, these engagement authorities are
based on the threat, level of air superiority, confidence in positive ID
capabilities, and operator reaction time between detection and time to last
launch. Although these engagement authorities are mission dependent, TBM
ID engagement authority usually resides at the battery or battalion level while
fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft engagement authorities are usually retained at
the RADC/SADC or higher echelon. The ADAFCO communicates ID and
engagement authorities for each target to Army TAMD weapon system
operators using a format called the surface-to-air missile tactical order. The
orders are communicated using SIPRNET, chat, or voice communications.
g. Avenger units conduct decentralized engagement in accordance with
established ROE and AADC weapon control measures.
8. Summary
Patriot, THAAD, Avenger, and associated C2 provide primary defenses against
TBMs and ABTs. These systems can integrate into a joint data network using a
variety of tactical data links and voice communications. The radar systems provide
high fidelity sensor data on friendly, hostile, and neutral tracks. The integration of
weapon and sensor systems is a key enabler for the AMD mission.

Chapter IV
AIR FORCE COUNTERAIR
1. Introduction
The Commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR), exercises command authority as
defined by the JFC. The COMAFFOR may be assigned responsibilities as a
JFACC, ACA, and/or AADC. The COMAFFOR and his staff plan, coordinate, and
execute AFFOR air operations along with other assigned responsibilities through the
component TACS. The TACS is the backbone of the AFFOR’s contribution to the
joint theater air ground system (TAGS) and consists of units specifically trained and
equipped to support the C2 process by providing centralized planning and control
while facilitating decentralized execution. The Air Force specific elements that form
the TACS are the air and space operations center (AOC), air support operations
center (ASOC), tactical air control party (TACP), AWACS, CRC, and the Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). If another component has
JFACC responsibility, the COMAFFOR retains Service component responsibilities
through the TACS.
2. Mission
The counterair mission utilizes air superiority to integrate offensive and defensive
operations against both aircraft and missile threats. Generally, OCA operations
seek to dominate enemy airspace and prevent the launch of threats, while DCA
operations defeat enemy air and missile threats attempting to penetrate or attack
through friendly airspace. Theater missile defense (TMD) is integral to the success
of counterair operations and planners may use aircraft with weapons and/or sensors,
surface-to-surface missiles, SAMs, ADA, air-to-surface missiles, SOF, and/or IO to
destroy/negate enemy aircraft and missiles that are a factor to defended assets.
3. Organization
The TACS is the organization responsible for planning and executing AD. The AOC
is the senior element of the TACS providing a focal point for the AFFOR’s
centralized planning, direction, control, coordination, and assessment of air and
space operations. The AOC translates guidance and directives into actionable
tasking (e.g., the ATO/ACO) and is also responsible for overall direction of AD/TMD
forces when the COMAFFOR is designated AADC. Subordinate elements such as
the CRC, the E-3, and the AD sectors (for AD within the continental United States
(CONUS), Alaska, and Hawaii) function as the TACS C2 execution nodes. Figure 7
is a notional picture of the TACS.

Figure 7. Notional Diagram of the USAF Theater Air Control System

The COMAFFOR plans, coordinates, executes, and assesses AFFOR air operations
through the component TACS via centralized control and decentralized execution.
a. Air Force Air and Space Operations Center. When the AOC is supported by
joint and coalition forces the naming convention changes to a joint air operations
center (JAOC) or a combined air operations center (CAOC). The AOC is led by
an AOC director with five divisions (strategy, combat plans, combat operations,
air mobility, and ISR) to include several core, specialty, and support teams. The
AOC team concept represents a wide range of systems and capabilities. The
teams are organized and integrated within the AOC to support the COMAFFOR
and the JFACC (if appointed from the Air Force). The basic structure of an AOC
is illustrated in figure 8. Specialty team members move into core teams as
required.

Figure 8. Basic Structure of an AOC
(1) The AOC commander is charged with maintaining the effectiveness of

AFFOR air and space operations while implementing commander’s guidance
in planning, coordinating, allocating, tasking, executing, and assessing air
power operations in the area of responsibility (AOR).
(2) Defensive specialists in the strategy and plans divisions produce AD
planning and guidance documents with inputs from the ISR division, liaison
elements and other components. Additionally, they provide inputs to airspace
control, communications, sensor, and C2 architectures which are common to
defensive and offensive operations.
(3) The defensive operations team within the combat operations division
(COD) monitors and directs ATO execution of the defensive portions and
performs air and missile defense duties, including alerts and warnings.
(4) The COMAFFOR may designate alternate command elements, stationed
at surface facilities or onboard airborne platforms, to assume part or all of the
COD duties.

(5) The specialty teams provide an AOC with subject matter expertise to help
orchestrate theater air power. The specialty team leader ensures that team
members are used efficiently and effectively throughout the AOC.
(6) The COMAFFOR may also be designated as the AADC. The area air
defense team integrates the AD operations of all defensive systems to include
TMD.
b. Control and Reporting Center. The CRC is a ground-based mobile element of
the TACS. As an integrated C2 weapon system, the CRC allows for flexibility in
the decentralization and delegation of battle management capability and
authority. The CRC is capable of effective integration vertically with the AOC and
horizontally with other tactical battle management command and control (BMC2)
elements, ISR platforms, and attack/support aircraft. The CRC is directly
subordinate to the AOC in execution and data link responsibilities. It may be
employed alone, in combination with other elements of the TACS, or integrated
with elements of the joint TAGS. The CRC can accept delegated responsibility
for planned, dynamic, functional, and/or geographic missions and tasks. The
CRC can facilitate ATO execution, airspace management, surveillance and
combat identification, tactical data link management, and theater AD.
c. CRC Unit Type Codes (UTCs). The CRC is normally a designated sector
interface control unit and can be assigned responsibility as a SADC. When
directed by the JAOC, the CRC may be used to exchange airspace management
and AD data from C2 systems via tactical data links with Service components
and multinational forces. Through the use of TDL, the CRC is capable of
receiving and transmitting battle management data from various C2 platforms in
the MTN. The CRC is composed of core and follow-on UTCs, which may be
deployed incrementally or simultaneously. Each UTC is tailored to meet theater
specific objectives and provides flexibility to support various contingencies. A
CRC consists of three core UTCs (refer to table 9 for typical CRC equipment):
Table 9. CRC Equipment
Major Equipment Description Function
TYQ-23 Operations Modules (OM) C2 Operator Consoles ATO Execution Data Links
(4 per OM) Management, Surveillance, CID
AN/TPS-75 Radar Mobile Radar Local or Remote Mode Radar Application
Equipment
AN/TSC-147 JTIDS Module JTIDS Connectivity
AN/TSC-100A SHF SATCOM Tactical Data Links
AN/TRC-170 Communications Data/Voice Nets/Links, BLOS with Relay
AN/TER-170 Line-of-sight Remote Sighting of Radios
Microwave
AN/TTC-42 Automatic Telephone Telephone Switch
Central
AN/TRC-175 Remote Radio Secure Remote Operations of Radar and Radios
Voice System
AN/TSQ-146 Multiplexer Terminal Communications Switching Node
Note: See AFTTP 3-1.26 or AFTTP 3-2.17 for further details.
ATO – air tasking order JTIDS – Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
BLOS – beyond line of sight OM – operations modules
C2 – command and control SATCOM – satellite communications
CID – combat identification SHF – super-high frequency

(1) Deployable Radar (DR). The DR consists of a radar and associated
communications and support equipment. It can be collocated with the CRC
or operate from a remote location.
(2) Wide Area Surveillance and Identification (WASID). The WASID provides
the JFACC with wide area detection, tracking, identification, reporting, and
warning of air-breathing and non air-breathing threats. The WASID consists
of at least two operations modules (OM), two radar sets, and associated
support equipment. The WASID also provides the JFACC with tactical data
link information (Link 11/11B/16, ATDL-1, NATO Link 1, and SADL).
(3) Air Battle Execution (ABE). The ABE consists of at least four OM, two
radar sets, and associated support equipment. The UTC provides the JFACC
with a decentralized BMC2 capability. An ADAFCO within the ABE is
essential for the integration of airborne and ground-based AD systems and
prevention of fratricide.
d. Air Defense Sector. An ADS is a fixed facility that provides BMC2, airspace
control, and aircraft identification using Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
and Department of Defense (DOD) radars linked to an automated computer
processor. The battle control center (BCC) is equipped with tactical data links
and limited secure communications. The ADS is responsible for tactical
execution of North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) missions through
detection, identification and tactical response within the CONUS, Alaska, and
Hawaii.
e. Airborne Warning and Control System. AWACS is an integrated Air Force
BMC2 aircraft providing early warning, surveillance, battle management, target
detection, tracking, and weapons control functions. It can detect threats and
control assets below and beyond the coverage of ground-based BMC2 systems
and can exchange air picture data with other BMC2 systems and shooters via
various tactical data link systems. AWACS provides the theater with the ability to
find, fix, track, and target airborne or maritime threats and to detect, locate, and
identify airborne and ground-based emitters with an integrated radio frequency
passive detection system. It is vertically integrated with the AOC and may be
employed alone or horizontally integrated with BMC2 and
surveillance/reconnaissance elements of the joint theater air-ground system.
(1) AWACS task planning should consider the limits of crew size and
communications capability to ensure an appropriate span of control. AOC
planners should coordinate with the AWACS unit on all mission areas
requiring AWACS support to prioritize duties and ensure adequate coverage
is provided.
(2) Changes to AWACS orbits or taskings during execution should account
for all current tasked missions to mitigate impact.
f. Theater ISR. Defensive planners coordinate the services of various ISR
platforms for combat identification to include: Rivet Joint, Senior Scout,
unmanned aircraft system (UAS) and other joint assets. ISR capabilities are

usually in short supply and tasked to perform diverse duties supporting various
missions and agencies within the theater. As with AWACS, careful coordination
during planning and awareness of the greater mission during execution is
required.
5. Weapon Systems
Table 10 is a matrix illustrating air and ground operations capabilities, while table 11
highlights additional capabilities for AWACS and CRC.
Table 10. Air and Ground Operations Capabilities Matrix

Platform COMM/Secure Data Link Aircraft Radar On-board References
Armament ID
Systems
F-22 UHF/VHF/Yes Link 16 AIM-120/9 A/A yes AFTTP 3-1.F22
Receive
only/IFDL
F-15C/D UHF/VHF/Yes Link 16 AIM-120/9 A/A yes AFTTP 3-1.F15
F-15E UHF/VHF/Yes Link 16 AIM-120/9 A/A yes AFTTP 3-1.F15E
F-16C UHF/VHF/Yes Link 16/ AIM-120/9 A/A no AFTTP 3-1.F16

Block 30
F-16 SADL
equipped
F-16CJ UHF/VHF/Yes Link 16 AIM-120/9 A/A yes AFTTP 3-1.F16
HARM
F-16ADF UHF/VHF/HF/Yes n/a AIM-120/9 A/A no AFTTP 3-1.F16
E-3 UHF/VHF/HF/ Link 11, n/a A/A yes AFTTP 3-

SATCOM/Yes Link 4, 1.AWACS
Link 16
AOC UHF/VHF/HF/ Link 11, n/a n/a n/a AFTTP 3-1.TACS
SATCOM/Yes Link B,
Link 16
CRC UHF/VHF/HF/ Link 11, n/a G/A yes AFTTP 3-1.TACS
SATCOM/Yes Link B,
Link 4,
Link 16,
ATDL-1
SADL
BCC UHF/VHF/ Link 11, n/a G/A yes AFTTP 3-2.50
SATCOM/Yes Link B,
Link 16
Notes:
(1) DCA weapons systems assigned to the particular AOC may include a variety of defensive
and dual mission capable aircraft as well as airborne C2 platforms.
(2) Operational planners must contact deployed unit to determine fighter aircraft suitability for
cruise missile defense mission.

Table 11. Voice/Data Capability (E-3 B/C and CRC UTCs)
Frequency Equipment E-3 B/C DR WASID ABE BCC
Number 13 4 8-12 16-20 15 (6)
Have 4 4 8-12 12-16 4
UHF
Quick
Secure 10 4 8-12 16-20 -
Number 3 3(2) 6-9(3) 12-15(4) 4
AM 2 -- -- -- 2
VHF Frequency 1 3(2)(5) 6-9(3) 12-15(4) 2
Modulation
Secure -- 3 6-9 12-15 -
Number 3 2 4-6 8-10 2
HF
Secure 1 2 4-6 8-10 -
UHF Number 3 3(2) 6-9(3) 12-15(4) 2
SATCOM
2 3 2
6-9 12-15
Secure
1 2
1 1 1
LINK 11 KG-40
16
KG-84 -- 7 9 9
LINK 11B
20
-- 1 1 1
LINK 16
NATO LINK 1 KG-84 -- 1 1 1 -
ATDL-1 KG-84 -- 7 14 14 -
Notes:
(1) Radios internal to CRC operations modules (OM). CRC possesses capability to add multiple
UHF/VHF/UHF station radios externally.
(2) DR: 1 OM
(3) WASID: 2-3 OM/1 TPS-75
(4) ABE: 4-5 OM/2 TPS-75
(5) Each OM has 3 positions for VHF radios; SINCGARS and UHF SATCOM use VHF positions;
for each SINCGARS and UHF SATCOM added internally, one VHF Frequency Modulation must be
removed
(6) The number of UHF at the BCC varies by sector. The BCC has connectivity to all ground-to-air
transmitter/receiver (GATR). At a minimum each BCC has 15 available UHF radios at each GATR
site.
6. Planning
a. The AADC is responsible to the ACA for the AADP which outlines the theater
IADS plan. The planning should integrate the capabilities and airspace
requirements of participating components. The detailed plan will establish:
(1) AD sectors/regions with RADCs/SADCs–as appropriate.
(2) Air and missile warning/cueing information.

(3) Combat ID procedures and criteria.
(4) Engagement authority-MEZ/JEZ as required.
b. AOC personnel accomplish the actual development, execution, and
assessment of the plan via the ATO, ACO, ACP, and operations task link
(OPTASKLINK)/tactical operational data link.
c. RADC/SADC. The core of a RADC/SADC is a Service component air control
organization with radar and necessary C2 links upward to the JFC/JFACC/AADC
downward to tactical unit operation centers and lateral to other RADCs/SADCs.
During complex operations the AADC may recommend the JFC divide the JOA
into separate AD regions, each with a RADC/SADC who could be delegated
responsibilities and decision making authority for DCA operations within the
region. Generally, the regions/sectors are based on geographic size and
overland obstacles. If the RADC/SADC is afloat the AADC will ensure IADS
coverage is seamless. See JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, for
further detail on the specific responsibilities of the AADC
7. Operations
The COD is responsible for monitoring ATO execution and directing/responding to
changes. It is also responsible for coordinating and deconflicting changes with the
appropriate components and control agencies. While the authority to redirect
missions may be delegated to ground or airborne C2 platform mission commanders
it is essential to notify the COD section of all redirected missions.
a. Defensive Counterair Operations.
(1) The primary objective of DCA is to protect key air and ground assets from
enemy air operations.
(2) Mission commanders must consult the SPINS for the commander’s intent
and acceptable risk level as risk level will vary on DCA missions. There are
two different types of DCA missions:
(a) Point Defense. This is defense of a single position, critical asset, or
specific area (e.g., airfields, C2 facilities, storage facilities, key LOC points
or combat search and rescue) against enemy air attack
(b) Area Defense. This is the defense of several target sites within a
designated area or the defense of specified airspace within an area of
interest. Area defense is normally implemented through the establishment
of a lane CAP defined with latitude and longitude boundaries.
b. Defensive Counterair Considerations. The following factors apply to DCA
mission planning.
(1) Identification Procedures/Criteria. Refer to the identification matrix
located in the SPINS. Review asset availability in the ATO/integrated tasking
order (ITO) for identification capability.
(2) Rules of Engagement. All personnel must know and understand the
standing and theater ROE.

(3) Threat. The threat is the single most important factor in planning a DCA
mission. The threat will impact desired engagement zone (DEZ), intercept
tactics, lock ranges, fighter weapons capability, threat weapons capability,
and mission level of risk. Give consideration to threat aircraft capabilities,
pilot training, avionics, training doctrine, shot doctrine, and displayed tactics.
(4) Area of Interest (AOI) Characteristics. AOI factors heavily influencing
DCA force employment and tactics include the size and shape of the area
(including political and military borders), terrain, radar shadows, low-level
detection, and likely target locations within the area, ACMs, MEZ/FEZ/JEZ
locations and altitudes, as well as likely enemy attack axis. Mission
commanders must reference the ACO for their AO to locate any friendly
transit corridors or transition levels that may be in effect. The layout of the
designated AOI will influence CAP positioning, pattern, and leg lengths.
(5) Airspace Structure. Review and understand the ACP/ACM/ACO.
(6) Target Area Tasked to Defend. These are either points that are tasked to
be defended or vulnerable areas in the AOI.
(7) Friendly MEZ. An IADS is the most efficient means of defending the AO.
The support of any SAM/SHORAD/antiaircraft artillery site may allow air
superiority assets to decrease mission risk level due to additional layers of
defense capability. Proper integration of air superiority assets with
SAM/SHORAD assets should provide weapons deconfliction, prevent
fratricide, and permit a clear field of fire. Coordination with the ADAFCO is
required to determine/understand capabilities and limitations of all defense
assets involved. Ensure all players understand weapons
engagement/employment criteria.
c. MEZ/JEZ Integration. For more detailed information see classified appendix E
“IADS Execution TTP,” on SIPRNET
(1) Fuel Requirements. The most important factors when considering fuel
requirements are number of tankers available, tanker offload, AO proximity to
tanker track, and boom time required. Long boom times and extended range
from the tanker require the use of additional aircraft to cover a DCA FEZ/JEZ.
Fuel limitations and tanker boom cycle times are major planning issues for
long vulnerability periods.
(2) Environmental Considerations. Review forecast weather, terrain
characteristics, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear factors.
(3) Desired Engagement Zone. The DEZ is defined as the position in the
AOR where the flight lead wants the theoretical visual merge to occur, enemy
aircraft wreckage to fall, or enemy combat search and rescue efforts to begin.
The actual engagement zone will be a point halfway between the commit line
and the position in the CAP where the fighter aircraft begins his target
commit. In theory the engagement zone should fall within the DEZ.

(4) Acceptable Level of Risk. There are two separate risk levels to consider
when planning a DCA mission: the operational mission risk level (dictated via
the SPINS) and the tactical mission risk level for the actual aircraft.
(a) Operational Mission Risk Level. The operational mission risk level in
the SPINS dictates the importance of mission accomplishment.
(b) Tactical Mission Risk Level. . The tactical mission risk level is derived
from the operational mission risk level, and provides guidance for the
fighter pilot to transition from beyond visual range (BVR) to accepting a
visual merge. The transition from BVR to visual range may be roughly
equated to a ground unit's decision to transition from indirect to direct fire.
The risk levels are decided pre-engagement due to closure speeds with
the enemy of approximately 16 miles/min.
(5) Aircraft Configurations. The TACS/ADS must know the configuration
(e.g., weapons status, and fuel status/configuration) of every aircraft under its
control.
(6) Location of Target Band. This is the location of assets that fighters have
been asked to defend.
(7) Combat Air Patrol. CAP is an aircraft patrol provided for the purpose of
intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their targets.
DCA missions can be preplanned missions or can be driven by the tactical
situation starting from an alert scramble.
(8) Combat Air Patrol Command and Control. The TACS/ADS will provide
CAP C2 while evaluating enemy actions to provide identification and commit
fighters IAW the CAP management plan. Critical considerations for CAP
management include commit criteria, weapons state, fuel state, target
pairings, follow on commits, mixed force fighter operations, CAP manning
priorities, and commit authority (AWACS/CRC/ADS/fighters). All sensors
should be utilized to ensure beyond visual range weapons employment.
(9) Fighter Armament. Armament states can drive CAP placement, element
pairing, and target employment. Fighters with the best armament should be
placed on the leading edge or along the most likely ingress route to ensure
engagement within the DEZ.
(10) Fuel States. Understanding a fighter’s fuel state is vital to CAP
sustainability. The timing for air refueling should be synchronized to ensure
CAP C2 is accomplished by adjusting on station CAPs to handle the threat or
by adjusting the CAP to fill any forward vacant CAP locations. When
considering air refueling options, theater SPINS will dictate whether the option
exists for elements to go to the tanker as single ships due to reduced mutual
support.
(11) Composite Force (CF) Operations. DCA forces can include mixed
formations of fighter types to optimize available aircraft. C2 must understand
the assigned fighter’s capabilities and limitations when executing CF counter-
air operations to sustain a defensive posture.

d. Combat Air Patrol Types.
(1) Roving CAP. The roving CAP can be used in force protection or
point/area defense mission. For AD, employ the CAP near the attacker’s
suspected ingress routes and/or to protect a target area.
(2) Point CAP. A point CAP is tied to a specific location to support
operations with protection of the geographical point being the primary
objective. Potential candidates include: defense of airfields; command,
control, and communication facilities; combat search and rescue;
airlift/airdrop; and friendly attack missions. The TACS/ADS will detect
hostiles and coordinate commits with the threat dictating how many flights are
required. Additional aircraft should be left behind to maintain the CAP, if
possible.
(3) Barrier Combat Air Patrol (BARCAP). A BARCAP protects against a
threat from a known direction by putting a screen between the enemy threat
and the friendly aircraft/position.
(4) Reset/Goalie CAP. A reset/goalie CAP should be positioned between the
forward CAPs and the target. The purpose of the reserve is to mitigate
vacated forward CAPs with reinforcements and where necessary intercept
leakers that pass through forward CAPs. The number of reset/goalie CAPs
necessary follows the same criteria as that used for forward CAPs. Available
forces should allow a minimum of one element (2 aircraft) per commit.
e. Commit Considerations.
(1) Commit Authority. Commit authority may be held at the AOC or it can be
delegated down to AWACS/CRC/ADS or the flight lead. DCA forces will be
committed to a target when the target meets commit criteria (e.g., high fast
flyer profile or crossing a political border). AWACS/CRC/ADS will provide
CAP C2 to the flight.
(2) Geometry. When committing fighters on a target, consider the target’s
heading, speed, altitude, aspect, and location of the DEZ.
f. Aircraft Weapons Systems. The following are DCA aircraft weapons systems:
(1) For the F-22, see AFTTP 3-1.F22, Tactical Employment F22, for DCA
procedures.
(2) For the F-15, see AFTTP 3-1.F15, Tactical Employment F15, for DCA
procedures.
(3) For the F-15E, see AFTTP 3-1.F-15E, Tactical Employment F15E, for
DCA procedures.

(4) For the F-16, see AFTTP 3-1.F-16, Tactical Employment F16C/D, for
DCA procedures.
(5) For the F/A-18, see Top Gun Manual, F/A-18 EMP, Part 1 and Top Gun
Manual, F/A18A-D Part 2, NTTP 3-22.1, F/A18AD and F/A18E/F.
8. Summary
The counterair mission is normally integrated under a single commander in order to
integrate functions and provide unity of effort for air operations. These functions
include developing, coordinating, and publishing airspace control procedures,
operating the airspace control system, and integrating the joint force AD effort. The
AOC is structured to operate as a fully integrated facility and staffed to fulfill all the
air power responsibilities required for an IADS.

Chapter V
MARINE CORPS AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
1. Introduction
This chapter focuses on how the Marine Corps conducts active air and missile
defense and the relevant aspects for the control of aircraft and missiles. AD
combines active and passive measures to protect deployed forces against attack
from enemy aircraft and missiles. The Marine Corps conducts air and missile
defense as part of antiair warfare (AAW). AAW is a Marine Corps term used to
indicate the actions required to destroy, or reduce to an acceptable level, the enemy
air and missile threat. The Marine Corps ACE is task organized to conduct air
operations, project combat power, and contribute to dominance of the operational
environment in support of the MAGTF’s mission by performing some or all of the six
functions of Marine aviation: AAW, assault support, electronic warfare, offensive air
support, air reconnaissance, and control of aircraft and missiles. The ACE is formed
around an aviation unit headquarters with air control agencies, aircraft squadrons or
groups, and logistics combat units. It can vary in size and composition from a small
aviation detachment of aircraft to one or more Marine aircraft wings. The ACE may
be employed from ships or forward expeditionary land bases and can readily
transition between sea bases and land bases without loss of capability.
2. Mission
The mission of MAGTF AD is to reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air and
missile threat to deployed MAGTF forces. MAGTF AD assets are employed based
on the commander’s guidance for supporting the ground scheme of maneuver and
the intelligence estimate of the threat to MAGTF critical assets.
3. Organization
a. Marine Air Ground Task Force. The Marine Corps employs its forces as a
task-organized MAGTF. The three basic MAGTFs for deployment (largest to
smallest) are the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), Marine expeditionary
brigade, and Marine expeditionary unit. The composition and size of the MAGTF
may vary, but the organizational structure will always be a single command
element, a ground combat element, an ACE, and a logistics combat element.
(1) The MAGTF commander normally delegates the authority for air
operations to the ACE commander. The ACE commander exercises authority
through MACCS agencies, which are resident in the Marine air control group
(MACG). The MACCS provides the ACE commander with the means for
effective command, coordination, and control of all MAGTF air operations and
the MAGTF contribution to the IADS.

(2) With all MAGTF operations, the MACG task-organizes its resources
based on a mission analysis and various planning factors. Figure 9 shows
the structure of the MACG (does not reflect all tactical command
relationships).
Figure 9. Typical Marine Air Control Group Organization
b. Tactical Air Command Center.

(1) The TACC is the senior MACCS agency and the focal point for C2 of
MAGTF aviation. The Marine tactical air command squadron fields the
equipment for the TACC which is the ACE commander’s operational CP. The
TACC serves as a facility for the ACE commander and staff to plan and
execute MAGTF aviation operations. (Note: The airspace C2 functions
performed by the TACC are analogous to the Navy tactical air control center
and the Air Force air and space operations center.)
(2) The TACC consists of three mutually supporting, cross-functional
operational sections supported by a centralized intelligence organization. The
operational sections are:
(a) Current Operations. Current operations executes the daily ATO and
assesses its effectiveness with reports going to future operations. Current
operations are organized by cells to promote the rapid distribution of
relevant information necessary to make sound decisions. The cells within
current operations which are most relevant for AD include: airspace
control, interface coordination/track data, and AD.
• The airspace control cell is responsible for all airspace issues. It
monitors changes to the ACP/ACO/SPINS, informing the rest of
current operations of changes as they occur. Additionally, the
airspace control cell coordinates with external agencies for immediate
changes to the current ATO that impact airspace.
• The interface coordination/track data cell is responsible for ensuring
an accurate situational display, data link connectivity, and track data

coordination for the MACCS. The interface coordination/track data
cell includes the interface coordination officer who may be assigned
the RICO or SICO function.
• The AD cell is responsible for coordinating AD within the MAGTF AO.
This cell monitors, supervises, and directs the control of aircraft and
missiles (for AD) by subordinate MACCS agencies. It also
coordinates AD operations within the MACCS and with external
agencies.
(b) Future Operations. Future operations develops the ATO and prepares
orders for the following day’s ACE missions. It ensures assets are
available for the execution of the ATO matching available missions to
prioritized targets, and performs detailed analysis of the enemy order of
battle.
(c) Future Plans. Future plans is responsible for developing plans and
orders for operations 48 hours or more in advance and is responsible for
producing the MAGTF’s input to the AADP.
(3) Air Combat Intelligence. The three operational sections of the TACC are
supported by air combat intelligence, which is the focal point for all aviation
intelligence activities supporting the ACE. It produces and disseminates
aviation-specific all-source intelligence to assist in making changes to the
current ATO. The assessments include: adversary capabilities/vulnerabilities,
target analysis, battle damage assessment, and the current status of targets.
c. Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC).
(1) The commander, landing force (CLF) can establish a TADC while phasing
control ashore. The purpose of the TADC is to coordinate between the
MACCS agencies ashore and the commander, amphibious task force’s
(CATF) Navy tactical air control center afloat. Once the CLF is ashore and
ready to assume control of air operations and airspace management
functions, the CATF transfers control of all air operations within the
amphibious objective area to the CLF. The CLF Marine TADC then becomes
the TACC ashore, and the Navy tactical air control center reverts to a TADC.
The Marine TADC normally mirrors the TACC in organization, with limited
facilities and capabilities.
(2) The essential difference between the TACC and TADC is the volume of
responsible airspace and the scope of assigned tasks. A Marine TADC is
typically assigned specific tasks pertaining to air operations in the landward
sector of the amphibious objective area. In the case of AAW, a TADC may be
delegated the authority to coordinate landward sector AD, offensive antiair
warfare (OAAW), or both.
(3) The TADC does not have any organic sensors and is dependent on other
elements of the IADS for situational awareness.

d. Tactical Air Operations Center.
(1) The TAOC is part of the Marine air control squadron (MACS). The TAOC
is subordinate to the TACC and is the primary AAW agency within its
assigned sector. When necessary, the TAOC may perform alternate TACC
functions (designated functions of the current operations section only) for the
remainder of the current ATO.
(2) The TAOC provides task-organized agencies to perform airspace
surveillance, air direction and control, coordination, information exchange,
and weapons systems integration for the six functions of Marine aviation in
support of MAGTF and joint/multinational operations. As the primary AAW
agency within the MAGTF, the TAOC can perform as a SADC when
designated by the AADC during joint IADS operations. The Marine TAOC is
similar to the US Air Force CRC. A baseline TAOC capability set (CAPSET)
is designed to support a MEF and is comprised of the following major end
items: AN/TYQ-23(V4) tactical air operations module (TAOM), AN/TYQ-87
(V1) sector antiair warfare facility (SAAWF), AN/TPS-59(V)3 long range
surveillance radar, AN/TPS-63 mid-range surveillance radar, and the
AN/MSQ-124 air defense communications platform (ADCP). The exact
quantity and configuration of personnel and equipment will be determined
during mission planning.
(3) A TAOC utilizes organic surveillance radars, located up to 2 km from the
main TAOC site, or at a remote site.
(a) The AN/TPS-59(V)3 radar provides long-range, three dimensional
(3D), air surveillance, and TBM detection. It has an IFF interrogation
capability and is capable of operating in three modes:
• TBM Mode: In this mode, the radar rotates at 12 rpm with the
capability of detecting and tracking TBMs at ranges to 400 nm and at
altitudes over 500,000 feet without external cueing. In the TBM
mode, the AN/TPS-59 also provides launch and impact circular
probability ellipses, projected missile trajectory, and missile time to
impact.
• ABT Mode: In this mode, the radar rotates at 6 rpm or 12 rpm with
the capability of tracking ABTs at distances out to 300 nm, up to
100,000 feet.
• Combined Mode: The combined mode offers tracking of both air-
breathing and ballistic missile targets, ABTs at distances to 230 nm
and altitudes to 100,000 feet, and ballistic missile targets at distances
to 350 nm and altitudes to 100,000 feet. In this mode, the radar
rotates at 12 rpm.
(b) The AN/TPS-63 is a two dimensional (2D) radar, providing mid-range
(up to 160 nm) detection up to 40,000 feet. The AN/TPS-63 radar is
ordinarily used as an EW or gap-filler radar.

(4) The TAOC can send a subordinate unit to provide early warning/control
(EW/C) CAPSET during the initial stage of an operation, or cover/supplement
the sensor picture provided by the AN/TPS 59(V)3. Task organized by the
TAOC, an EW/C provides specific TAOC functions (primarily air surveillance
to augment the MAGTF surveillance picture) and serves as an extension of
the TAOC. A typical EW/C CAPSET has two organic TAOMs, one AN/TPS-
59(V)3 and one ADCP, but may deploy with as little as an AN/TPS-63 and
one TAOM.
(5) The TAOC shares the air picture built by its organic radars with data link-
equipped aircraft, missile units, other MACCS agencies, joint AD agencies
and facilities. The TAOC is capable of forwarding data link information
between link participants. For units not capable of receiving information via
data link, the TAOC can provide voice reports (manual cross tell) for EW and
situational awareness.
(6) To effectively integrate into the MAGTF and the joint IADS, TAOC
directors should conduct liaison and develop habitual working relationships
with their counterparts at external agencies. For example, the TAOC senior
air director would coordinate closely with the mission crew commander (MCC)
at the CRC, the MCC on AWACS, and the AD cell at the Marine TACC. The
surveillance/identification director would do the same with the CRC air
surveillance officer, the interface control officer at the TACC, and the JICO at
the JAOC. Developing these relationships allows for a nearly seamless
integration of air control agencies and command agencies into an effective
IADS.
(7) The sector antiair warfare coordinator (SAAWC) is responsible for the
coordination and management of all active air defense weapons (aircraft and
surface-to-air weapons) within his assigned sector. The AN/TYQ-87(V1)
SAAWF provides operator console unit workstations for the SAAWC. The
SAAWF also normally contains theater battle management core system
(TBMCS) remote workstations and the AN/TSC-125 commander’s tactical
terminal (CTT) which receives near-real-time tactical intelligence and
targeting information. The SAAWF workstations do not have to remain in the
TAOC shelter and can be remoted out to a temporary location through a
network gateway. This capability provides flexible employment options for the
TAOC.
(8) When performing as the SADC, the TAOC is responsible for the
coordination and planning of all active air and missile defense operations
within the assigned sector. Representatives from units within the MACG and
the ACE battlestaff may augment the TAOC to assist with performance of the
SADC duties. SADC functions in AAW operations typically include:
(a) Managing AD resources, including aircraft and surface-to-air weapons
within the SADC-assigned sector.
(b) Managing airborne tankers.

(c) Recommending AD control measures to the TACC, ACA, and
RADC/AADC as appropriate.
(d) Recommending the employment of AAW resources to support future
operations.
(e) Recommending AD warning condition and WCS changes to the TACC
or RADC/AADC.
(f) Recommending changes to the DAL via the ACE commander to the
MAGTF commander.
(g) Launching alert aircraft or diverting airborne aircraft to engage time
critical targets, when delegated.
(9) SADC communications and TDL capabilities are dependent on the
TAOC, or Marine wing communications squadron (MWCS) support (i.e., high
frequency [HF] and satellite communications [SATCOM] radios). (Note:
Reference the TAOC communication and TDL capabilities in table 12 for the
SADC.)
e. Marine Air Traffic Control Detachment (MATCD).
(1) The MATCD, like the TAOC, is a detachment of the MACS and supports
the TAOC surveillance plan. Each MACS may have multiple MATCDs. The
MATCD is the principal MACCS organization responsible for terminal air
traffic control. The MATCD’s organic radar is used to provide airspace
control, management, and surveillance within the MATCD’s sector.
(2) The MATCD contributes to the IADS by exchanging air traffic information
to air C2 units via TDL (Link 11B) and voice reports. The MATCD normally
conducts Link 11B with the TAOC. The MATCD is also normally responsible
for activating a designated base defense zone (BDZ) and providing early
warning and cueing to surface-to-air weapons units within the BDZ.
(a) The MATCD air surveillance radar is the AN/TPS-73 air traffic control
subsystem. The TPS-73 is a 2D radar with a detection range of 60 nm for
radar and 120 nm for IFF, to a maximum altitude of 60,000 feet.
(b) The complimentary air traffic control echelon radar is the AN/TPN-31
Air Traffic Navigation, Integration, and Communication System
(ATNAVICS) with a detection range of 25 nm for radar and 40 nm for IFF,
to a maximum altitude of 10,000 feet.
f. Low-altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Battalion.
(1) The LAAD battalion consists of a headquarters and service battery and
two LAAD firing batteries. The LAAD battalion uses the Stinger missile to
provide close-in, low-altitude AD of forward combat areas, installations, and
vital areas. It also provides surface-to-air weapons support for units engaged
in special operations and independent operations. The LAAD battalion may
establish a combat operations center collocated with the TAOC and assign a
LNO to the TAOC crew.

(2) Each firing battery has two platoons with each firing platoon consisting of
three firing sections. Each firing section includes five firing teams. Each
battalion has 60 advanced MANPADS vehicles, one for each team, that are
capable of carrying up to four shoulder—fired Stinger missiles and one crew-
served weapon.
(3) Unlike Army SHORAD units, the LAAD battalion has no organic radar
system and is reliant on external radar sources for early warning and cueing.
(4) LAAD units are normally assigned either in GS of the MAGTF or in DS of
a specific unit. Depending on its size, a LAAD unit can provide both GS and
DS close-in AD by task organizing its assets. When operating in a GS role,
LAAD units are positioned to provide close-in, point defense of MAGTF vital
areas, BDZ, surveillance, and weapons gap-filler missions. When operating
in DS, LAAD units provide defense of those resources designated by the
supported unit commander, which generally encompass defense of maneuver
units and convoy defense.
g. Marine Wing Communications Squadron. The MWCS provides
communications support and coordination for the ACE and the MACCS. MWCS
is responsible for providing the communications backbone which ties together the
MAGTF IADS nodes. The MWCS also enables the MACCS to tie into the joint
communications architecture.
C2 coordinates and integrates the execution and employment of AMD assets after
the AADP and ACP/ACO are promulgated and the MAGTF ATO is issued. This ties
individual missions and engagements into an IADS by providing ground-controlled
intercept, target assignment, surveillance, and coordination for CAP and surface-to-
air weapons. MACCS agencies provide elements necessary for C2 of AD via
positive and procedural control measures, and communications. Non-organic
assets, including airborne EW and special information systems aircraft, can enhance
or augment C2 of MAGTF AMD assets.
a. Command. The ACE commander executes command of all MAGTF aviation.
As the tactical air commander from the TACC, he exercises centralized
command and decentralized control authority of MAGTF AMD assets. The
tactical air commander typically delegates the authority for management of AMD
assets in the MAGTF ADSs to the TAOC for execution of AMD operations.
b. Control. The ACE commander normally delegates the authority for real time
control of AMD assets to the TAOC. The TACC commands and the TAOC
executes control of the MAGTF IADS. Control of AMD operations can be
decentralized or centralized. The maximum degree of decentralized control is
achieved through the establishment of effective procedural control measures,
including weapons engagement zones, ROE, and return to force procedures.
When operating under a decentralized control mode, weapons platforms conduct
engagements based on the established WCS and ROE. In a centralized control
mode, weapons platforms evaluate targets based on the established WCS and

ROE, then request permission to engage the target from the TAOC.
Engagements are conducted only upon direction from the controlling authority
unless the target meets the criteria for self-defense.
c. Communications. Communications provide the means to execute C2 of AD
operations. Figure 10 illustrates the complexity of the voice and data paths
required to successfully employ the MAGTF IADS system.
Figure 10. Notional MACCS Communication
5. Weapon Systems
The weapons, sensors, and C2 agencies listed in table 12 represent the key
elements that contribute to the overall IADS. Additional information can be obtained
from the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron one (MAWTS-1) website
https://www.intranet.tecom.usmc.mil/sites/mawts1/default.aspx. Contact the
MAWTS-1 C3 Department at DSN 269-5773/Commercial (928) 269-5773.

Table 12. MAGTF IADS Weapons, Sensors, and C2
Platform Employment Air-to-Air/ Data Link Radar COMM/SEC
Surface-to-Air
F/A-18A/C/D AAW- OAAW AIM-120 Link 4A APG-73 1 AN/ARC-210,
Hornet FAC (A) AIM-7 Link 16 AN/AAS-38 UHF, VHF
TAC (A) AIM-9 Litening AT (AM/Frequency
SEAD (w/HARM) 20 mm gun AT FLIR Modulation),
OAS-CAS/DAS Nighthawk SINCGARS,
W Interdiction Have Quick II,
E Night Attack KY-58,
Escort MIDS.
A
P AV-8B Harrier II OAAW AIM-120 N/A APG-65 2 AN/ARC-210,
O SEAD (w/A-G ordinance) AIM-9 Litening AT UHF, VHF
N OAS 25 mm gun Targeting (AM/Frequency
CAS (external) Navigation FLIR Modulation),
S SINCGARS,
DAS
Have-Quick II,
Interdiction
KY-58.
Night Attack
Assault Support Escort
Stinger LAAD FIM-92D Stinger Ground-based NA Section level
(MANPAD) Missile Data Link and higher.
(GBDL) HF and
SINCGARS.
Team level:
SINCGARS.
Platform Mission Type Band Range Altitude
AN/TPS-59(V)3 Long-range surveillance 3D w/IFF L 300/400 nm 100,000/

(ABT/TBM) 500,000feet
S
AN/TPS-63 Medium-range surveillance 2D w/IFF L 160 nm 60,000 feet
E (ABT)
N Gap-filler/EW
S AN/TPS-73 ATC surveillance radar 2D w/IFF S 60 nm primary 60,000 feet
O 120 nm secondary
R AN/TPN-31 ATC surveillance radar 3D w/IFF S 25 nm primary 10,000 feet
(ATNAVICS) 60 nm secondary
S
Agency Mission C2 System Data Link Comm Reference
TACC Senior agency of MACCS Common Data Link Link 11 HF, UHF, VHF, MCWP 3-25.4
ACE commander CP. System (CDLS), Link 11B SATCOM, Have
AN/TSQ-124 ADCP, LINK 16- Quick.
C C TBMCS, JRE, CTT- (receive only)
O O 3 NATO LINK 1
M N
M & T TAOC Surveillance and ID, AN/TYQ-23(v)4, LINK 11 HF, UHF, Have MCWP 3-25.7
Intercept control, AN/TSQ-124 ADCP, LINK 11B Quick.
A R
CTT-3.
Itinerant air traffic control. LINK 16 LINK
N O 4A, ATDL-1,
D L NATO Link 1,
MATCD Terminal area air traffic AN/TSQ-131 LINK 11B HF, UHF, VHF. MCWP 3-25.8
control, control and LINK 4A
Cueing and control for BDZ. communication
subsystem.

6. Planning and Execution
a. Within the MAGTF, AAW planning supports deep operations to shape the
battlespace and achieve battlespace dominance. It supports close operations to
engage in decisive combat, and supports rear operations to provide force
sustainment. The effective conduct of AAW operations requires integrated
planning at all levels and with each element of the MAGTF. The MAGTF
commander must clearly outline AAW planning responsibilities within the
MAGTF. (Commanders at all levels are responsible for planning and executing
appropriate passive AD measures.)
b. The ACE commander directs the ACE staff and subordinate
commanders/staffs to plan AD in support of the MAGTF deep, close, and rear
operations. AD planning is based on the MAGTF mission, commander’s intent,
designation of the main effort, AD priorities, and other guidance. The MAGTF
commander may designate the ACE as the main effort to conduct AAW
operations, especially during the initial stages of a conflict. This could include
offensive AAW and AD or other shaping efforts during which AAW could play a
significant role.
c. During AAW planning, the TAOC staff will normally augment the ACE with
several AD specialists to assist in preparing the MAGTF operations order.
Critical decisions, including AD apportionment and planning to achieve air
superiority, must be addressed and answered during this phase. The site
selections for AD agencies (TAOC, LAAD, etc.) are also finalized.
7. Summary
The MACCS exercises command and control of MAGTF air and missile defense
assets. The TACC is the senior agency of the MACCS responsible for planning and
coordinating MAGTF air and missile defense operations with the AADC. The TAOC
is the MAGTF’s principal AAW agency responsible for the real-time execution of air
and missile defense operations. They assist in near-term coordination and
management of all air and missile defense resources supporting the MAGTF. The
TAOC coordinates its activities with adjacent sector and regional IADS nodes and
shares track data via TDL and voice communications.

Chapter VI
NAVY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
1. Introduction
Naval forces provide aircraft carrier-based tactical/C2 aircraft, surface combatants,
and land-based aircraft that are capable of integrating with other Services’ AD
systems in order to defend JTF commander assets.
2. Mission
The Navy conducts warfare in five distinct environments: exoatmospheric, air,
surface, overland, and sub-surface. The goal is battlespace dominance in all
warfare environments. This includes providing an AD umbrella for friendly assets
while simultaneously conducting offensive operations.
3. Organization
a. Navy Strike Groups. The unique nature of maritime operations shapes the
organization of Navy assets and affects how these forces fit into the overall
military structure. Maritime operations/warfare is characterized by vast distances
with widely dispersed forces and multiple C2 challenges. Navy strike groups can
be notionally configured in one of three ways:
(1) Carrier Strike Group:
(a) Aircraft carrier, nuclear (CVN).
(b) Two guided missile cruisers (CG).
(c) A combination of three guided missile destroyers (DDG) and/or guided
missile frigates (FFG).
(d) Fast attack submarine.
(e) Carrier air wing (CVW).
(2) Expeditionary Strike Group:
(a) Amphibious assault ship (dock) (LHD)/Amphibious assault ship
(general purpose) (LHA).
(b) CG.
(c) DDG/FFG.
(d) Landing platform dock.
(3) Surface Strike Group:
(a) CG.
(b) Combination of two DDG and/or FFG.

b. Chain of Command. The operational chain of command flows from the unified
or specified commander through the naval component commander, to the
numbered fleet commanders. Subordinate to the numbered fleet commander are
commands organized by operational tasks (task force, task group, and task unit)
to conduct the naval warfare tasks. The task commands are the basic operating
units of naval warfare.
c. Officer in Tactical Command (OTC). Under the composite warfare
commander (CWC) concept, the officer in tactical command is the senior naval
commander with overall C2 of assigned forces. He is responsible for
accomplishing the mission, allocating assigned forces, and providing for the
safety of the force.
d. Principal Warfare Commanders. In accordance with the CWC (figure 11),
there are normally five principal warfare commanders that are assigned
responsibility for directing actions in each of the naval warfare tasks. They are:
(1) Air Defense Commander. In cases where the Navy will be the first AD C2
asset to arrive on scene, the ADC may assume the role of AADC. Typically,
in an established theater, the JFC assigns the role of either a RADC or SADC
to the ADC for an over water sector.
(2) Antisubmarine warfare commander (ASWC).
(3) Surface warfare commander (SUWC).
(4) Strike warfare commander (STWC).
(5) Information warfare commander (IWC).
(6) The SUWC and ASWC may be combined under a single commander
referred to as the sea combat commander (SCC). Additional information on
the organization and doctrinal employment schemes of Navy forces can be
found in Naval warfare publication (NWP) 3-56, CWC Manual.
Figure 11. Naval C2/CWC

Navy CWC doctrine is predicated on the concept that individual warfare
commanders are trained and equipped to recognize and effectively counter rapidly
developing threats, especially in a multi-threat environment with respect to their

assigned warfare task. A wide range of options are available to the CWC in
delegating command authority to the subordinate warfare commanders. These
options range from full delegation of authority to no delegation at all, depending on
the threat and tactical situation. Regardless of the authority delegated, the CWC
always retains the option of control by negation. Control by negation is a C2
philosophy in which a subordinate commander has the freedom of action to direct
and execute those operations necessary to accomplish assigned and implied
missions unless overridden by the superior commander.
a. Command Considerations. Individual combatants will conduct simultaneous,
multi-warfare missions. For instance, a cruiser, while assigned duties as ADC,
may also be actively engaged in Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) strike
operations, while simultaneously conducting anti-submarine warfare operations.
Because of the C2 complexities created as a result of this multi-mission
capability, planners must be acutely aware of Navy asset command relationships
and operational constraints when developing task assignments. For example,
unit stationing that supports TLAM operations may not be optimal for AD.
Additionally special consideration must be given to units conducting maritime
ballistic missile defense (MBMD). While these units will be tasked with multi-
warfare missions, the intense surface radar surveillance and control (SPY) radar
resource requirements for MBMD must be considered in the asset management
plan.
b. Navy Air Defense Precepts. Navy AD is focused on the protection of high
value assets (HVA) to include the strike group (SG) and assigned
joint/multinational forces, against hostile air platforms and weapons (i.e., BMs,
CMs, and ABTs). These functions are controlled by the ADC. Some of the
responsibilities of the ADC are to:
(1) Plan the protection of assigned forces against the air threat.
(2) Execute TACON of assigned assets.
(3) Collect and disseminate tactical information and intelligence pertinent to
AD operations.
(4) Coordinate AD plans and actions with the AADC, RADC, SADC, CWC,
and other warfare commanders and coordinators.
(5) Assist in coordinating and promulgating ROE and airspace control zones
and areas.
(6) Assist in establishing, publishing, and implementing ACM.
(7) Manage all SG TDL architectures, as directed/assigned.

c. ADC Control Process.
(1) Under the CWC construct when a specific mission has been assigned the
CWC will promulgate general duties, functional assignments, and command
guidance using an operation order (OPORD). Subordinate warfare
commanders, in turn, use either operation general message, or OPTASKs
and associated supplements to deal with specific instructions for their warfare
areas. The Navy collaboration at sea website http://205.0.132.75 can be
found on the SIPRNET, and is a repository of information supporting
numbered fleet commanders, carrier/expeditionary strike groups, staffs, and
training exercises.
(2) The Navy-wide air defense plan (OPTASK Air Defense) is the primary
reference for guidance in conducting SG air defense. Joint and multinational
operations are conducted in accordance with the appropriate theater
guidance. The Navy-wide AD plan describes the following:
(a) The maritime AD role.
(b) Missions for SG and independently deployed ships and aircraft.
(c) FEZ/MEZ/JEZ guidance.
(d) Specific air control procedures.
(e) Weapons employment procedures.
(f) Air surveillance schemes.
(g) Targeting priorities.
(h) ID criteria.
(3) Specific SG AD plan supplementary messages or annexes are
promulgated to provide more detailed guidance on such items as SG ID
policy; TBM operations; cooperative engagement capability (CEC) operations,
and TDL employment procedures that can be found on the Navy collaboration
at sea website.
d. Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense Control Process. MBMD assets will be
apportioned to support a specific combatant commander; however, due to the
limited numbers of MBMD assets, C2 reporting requirements may shift based on
the calculated BM impact point (e.g., an MBMD asset apportioned to United
States Pacific Command [USPACOM] may detect a BM that will impact in United
States Northern Command [USNORTHCOM] AOR).
e. Practical Integration. Each major surface AD asset is equipped with a combat
system that consolidates the input of its shipboard sensors (radar, IFF, sonar,
electronic signal intercept) and displays the information to decision-makers for
action. Most naval surface combatants are capable of Link 11 and Link 16
information exchange. Some naval assets have an additional capability to
extend the range of operations using satellite based Link 11 or Link 16 systems.

(1) In a joint environment, the ADC may be assigned the role of RADC or
SADC by the AADC, coordinating with Navy or joint assets to provide a CTP
to the AADC. The ADC optimizes asset employment to maintain track
integrity, correctly identify friendly aircraft operating in the AD region, and
positively identify all aircraft operating in the classification, identification, and
engagement area (CIEA) before they enter the vital area. The ADC also has
authority to assign capable assets to perform duties as an air control unit
(ACU). Aegis cruisers, Aegis destroyers, and airborne early warning aircraft
are typically assigned ACU duties. Carriers and LHD/LHA platforms are also
ACU-capable.
(2) Link 16 is the Navy’s primary data link, however several naval platforms
are not equipped for Link 16 operations. For example, Oliver Hazard Perry-
class frigates continue to rely on Link 11. Another planning consideration is
to determine whether the platform is a Model 4 or 5 combat system as there
are significant differences which may impact the overall TDL architecture.
(3) Model 4 Combat systems only recognize “M” series messages (Link 11).
(4) Model 5 Combat systems only recognize “J” series messages (Link 16).
5. Weapon Systems
Navy surface platform capabilities are listed in table 13. Navy aviation platform
capabilities are listed in table 14. See SIPRNET websites
http://cnl.phdnswc.navy.smil.mil/ and http://bmd.phdnswc.navy.smil.mil/ (Naval
Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division) for detailed Navy AD systems
capabilities and limitations.

Table 13. Navy Surface Platforms
Ship Type Primary Air Search Weapon ID Data Link Comm AD
Role Radar Systems Capabilities Capabilities Capabilities Capabilities/
Systems Air Assets
Amphibious C2 N/A CIWS IFF Link 11 HF/EHF AADCS
Command Satellite UHF/VHF Module*
Ship (LCC) Link 11 HAVEQUICK JAOC
Numbered Link 16 UHF- (TBMCS)
Fleet SATCOM
Satellite
Command
Link 16 SHF
TCP/IP
Aircraft Fixed-wing AN/SPS- NSSMS IFF Link 11 HF/EHF 48 x Fighters

Carrier (CV), Aircraft 48E (3D) CIWS CV Auto ID Satellite UHF/VHF (F/A-18)
Aircraft Operations AN/SPS-49 Rolling CEC* Link 11 HAVEQUICK 4 x E-2
Carrier, (2D) Airframe SSES Link 4 UHF- ACU
Nuclear MK23 Missile SATCOM (TBMCS)
SLQ-32 Link 16
(CVN) TAS* SLQ-20 Satellite SHF
SPQ-9B* Link 16 TCP/IP
ADSI
Guided SG AD SPY-1B TLAM IFF Link 11 HF/EHF ACU
Missile CM Missile (3D) SM2 BLK CEC* Satellite UHF/VHF
Cruiser Defense SPQ-9A* ¾ SSES Link 11 HAVEQUICK
(CG) BM SPS-49 SM3 Aegis Auto ID Link 4 UHF-
Defense* MK-86 2 x 5 in 54 NCTR Link 16 SATCOM
GFCS CIWS SLQ-32 Satellite SHF
SLQ-20 Link 16 TCP/IP
Guided AD SPY-1D TLAM IFF Link 11 HF/EHF ACU
Missile CM Missile (3D) SM2 BLK CEC* Satellite UHF/VHF
Destroyer Defense ¾ SSES Link 11 HAVEQUICK
(DDG) BM SM3 Aegis Auto ID Link 4 UHF-
Defense* 2 x 5 in 54 SLQ-32 Link 16 SATCOM
CIWS SLQ-20 Satellite SHF
Link 16 TCP/IP
Guided Surveillance AN/SPS-49 1 x 76 mm IFF Link 11 HF/UHF/VHF
Missile (2D) Gun SLQ-32 Satellite HAVEQUICK
Frigate MK-92 CIWS Link 11 UHF-
(FFG) SATCOM
TCP/IP
Spruance Anti-Sub / AN/SPS-40 TLAM IFF Link 11 HF/EHF
Destroyer Surface (2D) NSSMS SLQ-32 Satellite UHF/VHF
(DD) MK-23 TAS Rolling Link 11 HAVEQUICK
Airframe UHF-
Missile SATCOM
2 x 5 in 54 TCP/IP
CIWS
Amphibious Sea/Air AN/SPS- Rolling IFF Link 11 HF/EHF ACU
Assault Landing 48E (3D) Airframe SLQ-32 Satellite Link UHF/VHF 6 x AV-8B
Ship Force Missile 11 HAVEQUICK (TBMCS)
(general Assault CIWS Link 4 UHF-
purpose) Link 16 SATCOM
(LHA)
Satellite Link SHF
16 TCP/IP
Amphibious Sea/Air AN/SPS NSSMS IFF Link 11 HF/EHF ACU
Assault Landing 48E (3D) Rolling CEC* Satellite UHF/VHF 6 x AV-8B
Ship (Dock) Force AN/SPS-49 Airframe Link 11 HAVEQUICK (TBMCS)
(LHD) Assault MK-23 TAS Missile SLQ-32 Link 4 UHF-
SPQ-9B* CIWS Link 16 SATCOM
Satellite SHF
Link 16 TCP/IP
* Only some assets have this capability

Table 14. Naval Aviation Air Defense Weapon Systems
Platform Primary Air Search Weapon ID Data Link Comm In-flight
Type Role Radar Systems Capabilities Capabilities Capabilities Refueling
Systems Capable
(Drogue)
E-2C Air APS-145 None IFF Link 11 HF/HF No
Group II / Surveillance ES-capability Link 4 SIPRNET*
E-2D and Aircraft CEC Link 16 UHF/VHF
Control UHF-
SATCOM
Link 16 FTM
HAVEQUICK
F/A-18C/D Air APG- AIM-120 IFF * Link 4 UHF/VHF Yes
Intercept, 65/73 AIM-7 NCTR Link 16 HAVEQUICK
Strike AIM-9 AT FLIR
20mm
F/A-18E/F Air APG-73 AIM-120 IFF Link 4 UHF/VHF Yes
Intercept, AIM-7 NCTR Link 16 HAVEQUICK
Strike, AIM-9 AT FLIR
Tanking 20mm
AGM-165
E/A-6B EW None AGM-165 ES Link 4 UHF/VHF Yes
Communicat Link 16 HAVEQUICK
ions
EP-3E ES / None N/A IFF Link 11 HF No
Communicat ES Link 16 UHF/ VHF
ions Comm-ID HAVEQUICK
UHF-
SATCOM
SHF
AV-8B CAS, Air APG-65 AIM-9 FLIR None UHF/ VHF Yes
Intercept 25 mm HAVEQUICK
(Limited),
Strike
* Only some assets have this capability
6. Planning
a. Air Defense Commander. The ADC will conduct primary AD planning afloat in
coordination with the strike group and air wing staff. Aircraft carriers (CV)/CVN,
LHD/LHA, and amphibious command ships (LCCs) will provide and host liaison
officers to/from the AADC as well as contribute a significant planning capability to
include robust intelligence and cryptographic collection capability. The CV/CVN
and LHD/LHA are all equipped with TBMCS and other tools for collaborative
planning.
b. Air Command and Control Functions. The CV/CVN and LCC have a
capability to perform air C2 functions. As the complexity and scale of the
operation expands, these functions will most likely be transferred to a more
robust command organization such as an air operations center. However, the
CV/CVN, CGs, and destroyers can continue to provide considerable support as
RADC/SADC and as RICO/SICO.

c. Planning Considerations.
(1) CVW planning is typically accomplished on a 72-hour timeline that
coincides with the ATO production cycle. Aircraft operations are usually
conducted in a cyclic manner, with launches and recoveries on a 1+15 (75-
minute) or 1+30 (90-minute) schedule. A typical 1+30 cycle consists of 15-20
sorties exclusive of aircraft whose endurance allows them to fly double
cycles. Shorter cycles limit the number of aircraft that can be launched and
recovered. Longer cycles allow for larger launches but increase requirements
for airborne refueling. The principal constraint in sustained carrier flight
operations is flight deck personnel manning. Units can sustain 14-16 hour
flying windows with careful management; 24-hour carrier operations are not
possible with only one CV/CVN. Sustained operations will require at least two
CV/CVNs.
(2) Fighter aircraft remaining airborne for more than a single cycle require
AR. Units can accomplish AR either organically, using limited air wing assets
such as the F/A-18 E/F, or inorganically, utilizing drogue-configured
joint/coalition tanker assets (i.e., KC-10/KC-130/KC-135/VC-10).
d. Planning Considerations for Surface Ship Stationing. Air defense unit (ADU)
platforms may be used in area, point, or self-defense roles. Aegis platforms have
limited TBM-tracking, reporting, and cueing capability but a TBM engagement-
capability is under development. Coordinate with Navy LNOs to determine
operational limitations when conducting TBM related missions.
e. Area Air Defense. Dependent on the threat, an ADU will be stationed along
the expected threat axis to conduct engagements against airborne targets. Aegis
platforms are the only ships capable of performing the ADU mission.
(1) Point Defense (“SHOTGUN”). This unit is tasked with guarding an HVA.
Typically, the shotgun unit will remain in close proximity to the HVA.
(2) Self-defense. Most naval ships have some type of self-defense
capability.
f. REDCROWN/GREENCROWN. Air assets approaching carrier strike groups
(CSGs) or expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) must establish contact with the
initial controlling agency responsible for detection and identification as soon as
they are within radio range. REDCROWN supports the maritime AD commander
and GREENCROWN is responsible to the ESG for detection and identification.
Check in frequencies can be found in the ACO.
7. Operations
a. The Naval SG operates everywhere from open-ocean or “blue-water” to the
littorals. In the open-ocean, the Navy’s primary AD mission is to protect SG
assets, utilizing defense-in-depth. The Navy will typically operate with a JEZ,
versus the traditional MEZ/FEZ. When operating in the littorals, the Navy SG
may take on additional AD responsibilities, to include the protection of units
ashore.

b. To illustrate the defense-in-depth concept, a typical DTE sequence begins
with long-range sensor detection of a threat from an asset such as an E-2 or
CG/DDG. Track information is passed to interceptor aircraft under E-2 or
CG/DDG control to confirm identification and engage, if warranted (air
engagement zone). If fighter assets are not available, the next weapon system
of choice would be a long-range standard missile (dual engagement zone). Final
engagement opportunities include self-defense weapons such as 5-in/76 mm
gun, the CIWS, rolling airframe missile, NATO SeaSparrow missile system
(NSSMS), or evolved SeaSparrow missile system (ship engagement zone).
Refer to figure 12 for a basic illustration of the three engagement zones.
Figure 12. Engagement Zones
8. Summary
The Navy brings a robust AD capability to the fight. Most naval air assets are
allocated to the JFACC and very few are retained for direct support of the SG at sea.
Navy surface combatants are multi-mission capable and provide self-protection,
HVA protection, and a host of other warfare functions. TDL-capable ships and
aircraft can provide information on overland tracks while maintaining the over water
picture. Although specific capabilities vary, all naval SGs arrive in theater prepared
to conduct integrated AD operations.

Appendix A
JOINT LINK AND COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURES
Table 15. Army Communication Architecture

INTERFACE ABMOC (FAAD ADAM Cell / AAMDC and THAAD Fire
CHARACTERISTICS C2I EO) BAE ADA Brigades Control Center
Surveillance,
1. Missions Threat Detection, Threat Detection, Threat Warning, Acquisition,
Threat Typing, Tracking, Airspace Tracking,
Identification, Coordination Discrimination,
Tracking, Identification,
Identification, Airspace
Typing,
Coordination TBM management
SAM Control, ABM
Network
2. Technical PPLI, Air PPLI, Air PPLI, Air Management,
Functions (Includes Surveillance, Surveillance, Surveillance, PPLI,
mission categories Weapons Weapons Weapons Air Surveillance,
Information
for weapons Coordination and Coordination and Coordination and
Management,
coordination and Management, Management Management, Weapon
management and Information Information Coordination and
control.) Management,
Management, Management,
Platform and
Mission System Status,
Point Surveillance
Management Round Trip Timing
3. Types of tracks Air Tracks Air Tracks, Space Air Tracks, Space Space Tracks
maintained and Tracks Tracks, Ground
reported to Tracks
interface.
4. Interface Data Link 11, Link 11B, Link 11B, Link 16, Link 11, Link 11B, Link 16,SAT-J,
Link Capabilities Link 16, FAAD Data ATDL-1, FDL Link 16, FDL, IBS- JREAP-B,
Link (FDL) S, IBS-I, JREAP A, JREAP-C
B, and C
5. Track Position 200 km from Center ADSI: 1,024 km² ADSI: 1,024 km² CLASSIFIED
and Data Base FAAD: 400 km² FAAD: 400 km²
Limits
6. Maximum # of 210 ASDI: 2000 ASDI: 2000 CLASSIFIED
tracks displayed. FAAD: 210 FAAD: 210
7. Maximum Display 400 km x 400km ADSI: 1,024 km² ADSI: 1,024 km² CLASSIFIED
Area FAAD: 400 km² FAAD: 400 km²
PSC-5D
8. Voice HF SCS, UHF, HF SCS, UHF, HF SINCGARS
Communication VOIP
Capabilities Tactical Satellite
9. Correlation Manual Automatic

Table 16. Army Communication Architecture-Continued
INTERFACE PDB 5.5.2 PDB 6.1 PDB 5.5.2 and PDB 5.5.2 and
CHARACTERISTICS PATRIOT ICC PATRIOT ICC 6.1 PATRIOT 6.1 Battery
ECS Command Post
1. Missions Threat Detection, Threat Detection, Threat Detection, Situational

Tracking, Threat Typing, Threat Typing (PDB Awareness,
Identification, Tracking, 6.1 only), Identification
SAM Control, Air Identification, Tracking,

Battle Management SAM Control, ABM Identification,
(ABM) SAM Control, ABM
2. Technical PPLI, Air PPLI, Air Air Surveillance, PPLI, Information

Functions (Includes Surveillance, Surveillance, Weapons Management,
mission categories Weapons Weapons Coordination and Situational
for weapons Coordination and Coordination and Management, Awareness
coordination and Management, Management, Information
management and Information Information Management,
control.) Management, Management, Point Surveillance
Point Surveillance Point Surveillance
3. Types of tracks Air Tracks, Space Air Tracks, Space Air Tracks, Space Air Tracks, Space
maintained and Tracks, Ground Tracks, Ground Tracks, Ground Tracks, Ground
reported to Tracks Tracks Tracks (Own Tracks (Own
interface. (Subordinate Units) (Subordinate Units) Location) Location)
4. Interface Data Link 11, Link 11B, Link 11, Link 11B, PADIL Link 16 (PDB 5.5.2
Link Capabilities Link 16, ATDL-1, Link 16, ATDL-1, Receive Only),
PADIL, IBS-I PADIL, IBS-I, SAT- PADIL
J, JREAP B and C
5. Track Position For unit locations: For unit locations: For unit locations: 1,024 data miles.
and Data Base +/- 1,023.5 data +/- 1,023.5 data +/- 1,023.5 data
Limits miles from own miles from own miles from own
SCC. The other SCC. The other SCC. The other
track positional data track positional data track positional data
+/- 511.75 data +/- 511.75 data +/- 511.75 data
miles from own miles from own miles from own
SCC. SCC. SCC.
6. Maximum # of Classified Classified Classified Classified

tracks displayed.
7. Maximum Display 1,024 km x 768 km 1,024 km x 768 km 1,024 km x 768 km 1,024 km x 768 km
Area
8. Voice Single Channel SCS, UHF (PADIL SCS, UHF (PADIL SCS, VHF
Communication Satellite (SCS), only), VHF only), VHF
Capabilities UHF (PADIL only),
VHF
Automatic Automatic Automatic NA
9. Correlation
(correlation block (correlation block (correlation block
size is variable as a size is variable as a size is variable as a
function of aircraft function of aircraft function of aircraft
position). position). position).

Table 17. USAF Communication Architecture
INTERFACE AWACS CRC BCC
CHARACTERISTICS
1. Missions ATO/ACO Execution ATO/ACO Execution ATO/ACO Execution
2. Technical Tactical Data Links, Tactical Data Links, Tactical Data Links,
Functions (Includes Management, Management, Management,
mission categories Surveillance, Surveillance, Surveillance,
Identification/CID Identification/CID Identification/CID
for weapons
Weapons Control, Weapons Control, Weapons Control,
coordination and
BMC2 BMC2 BMC2
management and
control.)
3. Types of tracks Air, Points, and PPLI Air, Points, and PPLI Air, Points, and PPLI
maintained and
reported to
interface.
4. Interface Data Link 11, Link 11B, Link 11, Link 11B, Link 11, Link 11B,
Link Capabilities Link 16 Link 16, ATDL-1, Link 16, SADL
NATO-Link 1, SADL
5. Track Position System Coordinate System Coordinate System Coordinate

and Data Base Plane Limit Plane Limit Plane Limit
Limits
6. Maximum Classified Classified 10,000+
number of tracks
displayed.
7. Maximum Display 2048 x 2048 nm 1024 x 1024 nm 4k mi x 4k mi
Area
8. Voice UHF/VHF/HF/ UHF/VHF/HF/ UHF/VHF/HF/
Communication SATCOM SATCOM SATCOM
Capabilities
9. Correlation Yes Yes Yes

Table 18. Navy Communication Architecture
INTERFACE Amphibious Aircraft Carrier Guided Missile Guided Missile
CHARACTERISTICS Command Ship (CV), Aircraft Cruiser (CG) Destroyer (DDG)
(LCC) Carrier Nuclear
(CVN)
1. Missions Command and Fixed-Wing SG AD. CM- AD, CM Missile

Control Aircraft Missile Defense Defense, BM
Operations BM Defense Defense
2. Technical C2, C2, Surveillance, C2, Surveillance, C2, Surveillance,
Functions Surveillance, Tactical Data Tactical Data Tactical Data
(Includes mission Tactical Data Links, Links, Links,
categories for Links, Identification Identification Identification
weapons Identification
coordination and
management and
control.)
3. Types of tracks Air Tracks, Air Tracks, Air Tracks, Air Tracks,
maintained and Surface Tracks, Surface Tracks, Surface Tracks, Surface Tracks,
reported to Undersea Undersea Undersea Tracks, Undersea Tracks,
interface. Tracks, Space Tracks, Space Space Tracks, Space Tracks,
Tracks, Ground Tracks, Ground Ground Tracks, Ground Tracks,
Tracks, Tracks, Emitters/Acoustic Emitters/Acoustic
Emitters/Acoust Emitters/Acoustic Tracks Tracks
ic Tracks Tracks
4. Interface Data Link 11 Link 11Satellite, Link 11Satellite, Link 11Satellite,
Link Capabilities Satellite, Link Link 11, Link 4, Link 11, Link 4, Link 11, Link 4,
11, Link 16 Link 16 Satellite, Link 16 Satellite, Link 16 Satellite,
Satellite, Link Link 16, ADSI Link 16 Link 16
16,
5. Track Position Link 11–CDS Link 11–CDS Link 11–CDS Link 11–CDS
and Data Base Pads Pads Pads Pads
Limits Link 16- Link 16-Geodetic Link 16-Geodetic Link 16-Geodetic
Geodetic
6. Maximum # of Classified Classified Classified Classified
tracks displayed.
7. Maximum 2 – 2056nm 2 – 2056nm 2 – 2056nm 2 – 2056nm
Display Area
8. Voice HF, EHF, HF, EHF, HF, EHF, HF, EHF,
Communication UHF/VHF, UHF/VHF, UHF/VHF, UHF/VHF,
Capabilities HAVEQUICK, HAVEQUICK, HAVEQUICK, HAVEQUICK,
UHF-SATCOM, UHF-SATCOM, UHF-SATCOM, UHF-SATCOM,
SHF, TCP/IP SHF, TCP/IP SHF, TCP/IP SHF, TCP/IP
9. Correlation Manual/Auto Manual/Auto Manual/Auto Manual/Auto
Note: This table contains general information. Information on these different platforms will change based on specific
modifications. Detailed information for each platform can be obtained from the following classified website-
http://cnl.phdnswc.navy.smil.mil.

Table 19. USMC Communication Architecture
INTERFACE TACC TAOC MATC LAAD
CHARACTERISTICS
Senior MACCS Airspace Provides all Provide close-in,
1. Missions agency, surveillance, weather low altitude
Exercises Air direction/control radar/non-radar surface-to-air
command, Coordination, approach, weapons fires in
Plans, supervises, Information departure, en defense of
coordinates and exchange, route, and tower forward combat
executes MAGTF Weapons system ATC services areas, vital areas
air operations integration and installations
Develops MAGTF Surveillance Surveillance, Point defense,
2. Technical air operations (detection, BDZ cueing and Surveillance,
Functions (Includes plans and orders, identification and control, Weapons gap-
mission categories Manages aircraft / classification), Interfaces with the filler,
surface-to-air Early warning MACCS, other Defense of
for weapons missile systems dissemination, service C2 convoys,
coordination and within AO, Intercept control, agencies and Defense of
management and Monitors status of Perform as a Sector civilian agencies maneuver forces
control.) MAGTF air/GBAD AD Commander
assets and (SADC),
ground/airborne Coordinate/control
sensors within AO, surface-to-air
Operational point weapons
of contact between
MACCS and
external air control
agencies,
Establish AD
control measures
in MAGTF AO
Air Air Air Air
3. Types of tracks Space Land Points
maintained and Points Surface
reported to Points
Space
interface.
Link 11 (HF/UHF), Link 11 (HF/UHF), Link 11B GBDL (Ground
4. Interface Data Link 11B, Link 11B, Based Data Link)
Link Capabilities NATO Link 1, Link 16,
Link 16, Link 4A,
JREAP A/B/C ATDL-1,
NATO Link 1,
JREAP A/B/C
C2PC limitations +/- 1,023.5 data +/- 240 nm from +/- 240 nm from
5. Track Position miles from own SCC own SCC own SCC
and Data Base
Limits
5000+ 500+ 600+ 90
6. Maximum
number of tracks
displayed.
C2PC limitations 1,024 X 1,024 240 nm X 240 nm 240 x 120 km
7. Maximum Display
Area
HF, UHF, VHF, UHF, HF, UHF, VHF, HF, UHF, VHF, HF
8. Voice SATCOM External radios SATCOM
Communication (SATCOM, VHF)
Capabilities
Automatic / Automatic / Manual Automatic / Automatic /
9. Correlation Manual Manual Manual

Appendix B
IADS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS CHECKLIST
1. Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE)
□ Aircraft operating bases and dispersal sites, location, status, and disposition
to include:
• Number and type of enemy aircraft operating from each base.
• Enemy sortie generation capability from each base.
• Enemy munitions located at each base.
□ Enemy missile systems location, status, and disposition to include:
• Infrastructure, storage, and launching locations.
• Enemy concept of employment.
• Launch platforms.
• C2 nodes.
• Missile stocks.
• Terrain and road infrastructure that may limit system employment.
□ Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the capabilities for employing
them: location, status, and disposition.
□ Enemy IADS order of battle to include:
• Aircraft, SAMs, airfields, antiaircraft artillery (AAA).
• C2 Systems.
• Communications links.
• Support facilities.
□ Signals intelligence capabilities and electronic warfare assets.
□ Climate, weather, and terrain within the JOA and their effects on friendly and
enemy operations.
□ Overall assessment of the strengths and vulnerabilities of adversary offensive
and defensive air systems, including location and status of all key nodes and
targets that affect their ability to sustain air operations.
□ Enemy most likely and most dangerous courses of action including likely air
avenues of approach.

2. Detection and Tracking Considerations
□ Utilize results of the IPOE process in order to identify sensor coverage

requirements. Factors to consider include:
• Enemy threat systems.
• Threat locations.
• Likely threat avenues of approach.
• Threat altitude, radar cross section, required detection range, terrain.
□ Develop plan for arraying sensors throughout the operational environment to
maximize IADS’ sensor coverage.
□ Validate sensor coverage plan using joint sensor planning tools to include
Joint Defensive Planner, Falcon View, and Patriot Tactical Planner.
□ Evaluate other sensor coverage concerns including accessibility, connectivity,
force protection requirements, mutual interference, and the availability of host
nation support.
□ Once sensor placement is planned, the joint interface control officer’s (JICO)
is responsible to ensure that a joint data network (JDN) achieves the
information requirements identified for each platform. Factors to consider
include:
• Platform information and track block requirements.
• Establishment of track production areas (TPAs) and track reporting
responsibilities by platform.
• Establishment of a filter plan.
• Plan to deal with dueling tracks and ID-conflicts.
• Track by exception criteria.
• NTR procedures and track number procedures.
• Joint range extension (JRE) requirements.
• Gateway requirements (i.e., SADL to Link 16).
□ Establish track handover procedures for tracks transiting between AD
regions/sectors.
□ Establishment of required voice circuits and TTPs to resolve detection and
tracking issues.
3. Airspace Considerations
□ Airspace requirements for C2 and ISR platform orbits, tanker orbits, and
retrograde options.
□ Airspace requirements for DCA combat air patrol (CAP) assets.
□ Air corridor and minimum risk route requirements to allow aircraft to safely
transit the battlespace.

□ Establishment of restricted operations zones (ROZ)/ROA, if necessary.
□ Establishment of tanker orbits to allow effective and efficient aerial refueling.
□ Establishment of missile, joint, and fighter engagement zones (MEZ/JEZ/FEZ)
for the optimal employment of surface-to-air platforms and fighter aircraft.
(See classified appendix E for an in depth discussion of MEZ, JEZ, FEZ
operations.)
□ Establishment of Patriot operations areas (POAs) to give airspace users
situational awareness of Patriot battery locations.
□ Development of procedures to deconflict/clear airspace for Army and Marine
Corps surface-to-surface fires (ATACMS, MLRS launches) and any surface-
to-surface fires coming from seabased systems.
□ Creation of procedures to activate and deactivate the various established
ACMs.
□ Air space requirements change rapidly in a fluid operational environment.
Planners should develop streamlined methods for requesting supplemental or
new ACMs and/or identifying temporary airspace via voice and digital means.
4. Identification Considerations
□ Determine ID authority for various platforms (fixed-wing [FW], rotary-wing

[RW], cruise missile [CM], UA, air-to-surface missiles, TBM). These ID
authorities may depend on:
• Information available at various nodes along the kill chain (AADC vs.
RADC/SADC vs. individual platforms [fighter aircraft, Patriot ICC]).
• Time available to ID a particular track before action must be taken (TBMs
or CMs vs. FW or RW aircraft).
• Level of air superiority.
• Confidence in ability to positively ID a particular platform with special
consideration given if friendly LO platforms are in the ATO.
• JFACC’s risk decision: weighing the risk of a miss-ID (and therefore a
possible fratricide situation) against the risk of having hostile aircraft not
being identified in a timely manner.
□ Develop ID Criteria. ID criteria generally includes:
• Lack of friendly indications (SPADES, no PPLI, not flying in accordance
with established ACMs).
• Presence of enemy indications (POO, ELINT, SIGINT, NCTR, hostile act,
hostile intent).
• Degree of confidence.
□ Determine and publish the criteria for identification.
At a minimum, criteria
should be stipulated for HOSTILE, FRIEND, and UNKNOWN IDs.

□ Coordinate with the JICO to ensure that the ID authority has access to all
information capabilities necessary to evaluate ID criteria.
□ Publish an ID Matrix that creates an executable ID process using the ID
criteria).
□ In consultation with the JICO, develop and promulgate a system for resolving
miss-IDs and identifying and resolving contact ID-swaps.
□
5. Engagement Considerations
□ Rules of engagement (ROE) will be driven by political factors but friendly

platform engagement capabilities and friendly platform detectability must also
be considered. ROE development, by platform, should take into account the
following factors:
• Engagement priorities/responsibilities for each friendly platform. These
priorities and responsibilities can be assigned by: geographic area (i.e., a
defended asset), ACMs using a JEZ/FEZ/MEZ construct, or by threat
platform (i.e., Patriot engages TBMs while DCA aircraft engage threat FW
aircraft).
• The authority that can authorize friendly platforms to engage threats (by
threat platform)–this is the engagement authority or weapons release
authority.
• The series of actions/orders that must be delivered for weapon release to
be authorized.
□ ROE and engagement authorities must be documented and disseminated to
all airspace users and platforms operating within the JOA.
□ Planners should ensure data link and voice communications infrastructure
exists to efficiently and effectively execute the ROE and engagement chain.
Contingency plans should be developed to ensure that engagements can be
effectively processed in the event of communications loss.
□ In depth threat analysis must be conducted to determine self-defense criteria
for each friendly platform. The self-defense criteria should consider:
• The results of the IPOE. Self-defense criteria should be constructed to
counter perceived or likely threats.
• Friendly platform capability to analyze and evaluate threat radar contacts
(see classified appendix E for an example of the analysis that must be
conducted when determining Patriot self-defense criteria).

□ ROE, engagement responsibilities, and self-defense criteria should be
published in the AADP and SPINS to ensure the widest possible
dissemination. All weapons release requirements for friendly platforms
should be published in order to minimize the risk of fratricide.
□ IADS planners should encourage aircrew to include the IADS ROE during
flight briefings. Understanding the conditions under which weapons will be
released will significantly mitigate the risk of fratricide.

Appendix C
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION-INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE

SYSTEM (NCR-IADS)
1. Introduction
Currently the joint force provides an integrated AD of the National Capital Region
(NCR). The NCR encompasses a roughly 2500-square mile area and is described
in the National Capital Planning Act [Title 40, USC, Sec. 71 (b)] and Interservice
Support Installation Area Coordination (AR 5-9). The NCR JOA is comprised of
regions in the District of Columbia, Virginia and Maryland. The mission of the NCR-
IADS is to provide command, control, and AD in the National Capital Region to deter
and, if necessary, destroy enemy air threats thereby allowing freedom of action for
national senior leadership.
2. Command Relationship
Multiple agencies are active within the NCR IADS and their responsibilities and
relationships are shown below in figure 13.
Figure 13. NCR IADS Command Relationships

a. Secretary of Defense (SecDef). The SecDef or President is ultimately
responsible for the defense of the NCR. He executes combatant command
(command authority) (COCOM) over NORAD in order to command and control
the NCR-IADS.
b. NORAD. Located at Peterson AFB, Colorado, NORAD executes COCOM
over continental United States North American Aerospace Defense Command
Region (CONR) through which it executes C2 of the NCR IADS.
c. CONR. Located at Tyndall AFB, Florida, CONR operates assigned
command, control, and communications assets associated with the operational
deterrence and aerospace defense missions on a daily basis. CONR has the
responsibility for C2 of the NCR-IADS. CONR directs ground-based air defense
(GBAD) engagements when authorized by the appropriate authority.
d. Joint Air Defense Operations Center (JADOC). The JADOC is a uniquely
combined military capability located at Bolling AFB, DC. The JADOC is
comprised of the US Air Force joint battlefield expeditionary communications
center (JBECC) and the US Army ABMOC collocated in a combined operations
center. The JADOC provides engagement C2 for GBAD weapon systems and
other ground based sensors and warning systems in the NCR. The JADOC will
be in direct communications with Eastern Air Defense Sector (EADS) for
airspace control matters and with CONR for engagement authorities.
e. GBAD. The GBAD systems are made up of Avengers and MANPADs and
are controlled by the ADAFCO.
f. Eastern Air Defense Sector. EADS provides BMC2 over the NCR JOA. This
includes air traffic detection, tracking, identification, scramble, and airborne
orders as well as data link management and control of airborne AD within its
sector. EADS directs fighter aircraft and recommends to CONR, who directs
GBAD engagements, the use of AD artillery assets necessary to defend its
assigned area. EADS is responsible for the generation of the COP for the NCR.
g. Tasked Fighter-wings. Aircraft and personnel will be provided by tasked
fighter wing(s) as specified in the Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE) Deployment
Order. The tasked fighter wing(s) assets will be OPCON to CONR, TACON to
ADSs. Engagement procedures are described in ADUSCAN, CONR monthly
SPINS, NORAD ONE ROE, and NORAD CONPLAN 3310-02. It is desirable that
fighter/rotary wing aircraft tasked to support the NCR IADS be equipped with
SADL or Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) or LINK 16.
Airborne patrols and alert taskings will be specified in the CONR ATO.
h. National Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC). The NCRCC aids in
the coordination of the NCR IADS with representatives from the United States
Secret Service (USSS), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FAA,
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Federal Emergency Management
Administration (FEMA), and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Both
Air Force and Army LNOs are located at the NCRCC.

3. Data Link Architecture
The primary NCR IADS data link architecture is Link 16. EADS regional interface
control coordinator (RICC) is responsible for the execution and management of the
data links for the EADS AO IAW the CONR JICO guidance.
4. NCR Specifications
a. In order to execute the AD of the NCR, the NCR IADS maintains an AD
identification zone (ADIZ) surrounding the Capital. The ADIZ consists of a
roughly 30 nautical mile radius around Reagan International Airport and extends
from sea level to 18,000 MSL. To fly in the ADIZ an aircraft must:
(1) File a flight plan with the FAA.
(2) Communicate with air traffic control.
(3) Squawk an assigned Mode III Code.
b. The NCR IADS is a unique IADS construct due to the continental United
States location, peacetime employment, and heavy civilian air traffic. These
considerations create a very permissive air environment while driving a very
restrictive ROE for the NCR. The NCR IADS should be viewed as a template for
situations where warfighters are tasked to allow maximum air traffic while still
providing AD against potential air or missile threats.

Appendix D
MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. Multinational Force Commander
The multinational force (MNF) commander may designate an AADC to ensure an

integrated defense effort by the MNF. Because of the interrelationship between
airspace control, AD, and other air operations, the ACA, AADC, and air component
commander duties are normally performed by the same person.
2. Multinational Operations Planning Considerations
a. Host nation (HN) Training Levels and Air Defense Order of Battle. When
required to operate as part of a MNF, understanding the capabilities and
limitations of a participating nation’s AD systems is important. Operations may or
may not include integration with HN air defense systems, ATC, and C2
architecture.
b. Interoperability. Always consider integrating US and foreign nation weapon
systems in order to optimize defense design. Several countries own and operate
US-designed weapons systems such as Patriot and Hawk AD systems.
However, just as US systems must upgrade so must foreign government
systems. Based on foreign military sales case agreements, US forces going into
a multinational theater may find incompatibilities with like systems. Therefore,
planning and conducting interoperability training with foreign governments
becomes even more critical.
c. Disclosure of Critical Air Defense Information. When operating as part of a
MNF, US forces rely on classified intelligence and operations databases.
Although sharing the information is critical to mission success much of the
information is not usually releasable to foreign governments. For AD, this critical
information includes accessibility to data links. The US forces commander must
carefully consider national disclosure policy guidance, along with intent and
concept of the operation when determining whether to request release of
additional source information to specific countries. In some instances, during the
execution of combat operations, the commander may have to make a
determination to release previously non-disclosed information if release of the
information serves to protect the interests or safety of US forces.
d. CID. The Mark XII IFF/SIF system is used by US forces (Modes 1-4). When
conducting multinational operations, the MNF will usually only be equipped with
some of these modes. US forces must work closely with the MNF to establish a
combination of procedural and positive means for effective combat identification
when MNF forces are not equipped for the full range of Mark XII Modes.

3. Air Defense Considerations
a. Ground ROE. Ground ROE in a foreign country can differ significantly if the
HN insists on providing some type of ground security or force protection. When
required, a typical arrangement is for the HN to provide overall base or facility
security, and for US forces to provide local or perimeter security for each of their
units. In any case, language and cultural barriers can prove to be a hindrance.
Establish standard operating procedures (SOPs) that closely coordinate security
and force protection measures.
b. Air ROE. Usually, US forces will provide AD protection for their defended
assets using a separate DAL. This is the preferred method of providing AD as it
reduces conflicts that arise from differences in ROE among multinational
partners. In cases where US forces and HN forces are providing mutual
protection to a defended asset, it must be clear who is controlling engagements.
Where differences in ROE for either ABT or TBM exists, it is important to
establish detailed procedural control measures for friendly airspace users to
reduce the possibility of fratricide. One technique is to prepare an SOP of
mutually agreed-upon ROE for each weapon system in theater. TBM ROE
should be less complicated as classification of the threat is better defined. In any
case, US forces must not be denied the right to self-defense.
c. Passive Defense/Early Warning. Most nations have an EW system to alert
military and civilian populations of impending attacks. It is important to determine
what indications and warnings are available and to use them as necessary to
maximize force protection. Commanders should not rely on host nation systems,
but should deploy with their own EW capability. One technique is to establish
voice and data TBM early warning systems and publish them in the operations
order. Establish voice early warning nets and radios at each C2 node.
d. Liaison. Depending on level of operations security, conducting early liaison
with the HN to establish an AD C2 structure is critical to a successful
multinational IADS. Establish an SOP to provide for liaisons at critical C2 nodes
within the JOA. Liaison duties will include deconfliction of ROE and procedural
control measures at critical levels in the chain of command.
e. Language and Cultural Barriers. Depending on the country and language,
cultural practices can impose significant hardships on commanders who must
communicate their military plans. This is especially important when operating
under OPCON or TACON to foreign military leadership. Work out SOPs for
communicating prior to the execution phase of any operation to ensure continuity
and clarity as well as an agreement on “orders” vice inputs. For example in
some countries cultural bias precludes officer/enlisted interface. Make every
effort to deploy with adequate linguists who understand military terminology to
ensure clear communications. In cases where the language barrier is less
significant, exchanging liaison officers and positioning them at critical C2 nodes
may be adequate.

Appendix E
(SECRET) IADS EXECUTION TTP (U)
For Appendix E, “IADS Execution TTP,” see ALSA classified website

https://www.acc.af.smil.mil/alsa/mttp/iads.html.

Appendix F
(SECRET) COMBAT IDENTIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS (U)
For Appendix F, “Combat Identification Considerations,” see ALSA classified website


Appendix G
(SECRET) BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD) SYSTEMS AND PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS OVERVIEW (U)
For Appendix G, “Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Systems and Planning

Considerations Overview,” see ALSA classified website

REFERENCES
Joint Publications
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 2 May 2007.
JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
12 April 2001.
JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 17 September 2006.
JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 5 February 2007.
JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction. 3 May 2007.
JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 7 March 2007.
JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 5 June 2003.
JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 16 February 2007.
JP 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. 30 August 2004.
JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 13 April 2007.
Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR) CONOPS for Integrated Air
Defense (IAD) of the National Capital Region (NCR), SECRET/RELCAN.
25 September 06.
Multi-Service
FM 1-02.1; MCRP 3-25B; NTTP 6-02.1; AFTTP 3-2.5, Multi-Service Brevity Codes.
30 October 2007.
FM 3-01.15; MCRP 3-25E; NTTP 3-01.8; AFTTP 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System.
12 October 2004.
FM 3-52.2; NTTP 3-56.2; AFTTP 3-2.17, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for the Theater Air Ground System. 10 April 2007.
FM 3-52.3, MCRP 3-25A, NTTP 3-56.3, AFTTP 3-2.23, Multi-Service Procedures
for Joint Air Traffic Control. 17 July 2003.
Army
FM 3-0, Operations. 27 February 2008.
FM 3-01.11, Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook. 23 October 2007.
FM 3-01.7, Air Defense Artillery Brigade Operations. 31 October 2000.
FM 3-01.85, Patriot Battalion and Battery Operations. 28 April 2006.
FM 3-01.87, Patriot Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 14 August 2006.
FM 3-01.94, Army Air and Missile Defense Command Operations. 8 April 2005.
FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
28 November 2003.
FM 3-52, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone. 1 August 2002.
FM 34-8-2, Intelligence Officer’s Handbook. 1 May 1998.
FM 44-100, US Army Air Defense Operations. 15 Jun 2000.
FM 100-13, Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD). 5 Sep 1996.

Navy
NWP 3-01.01, (Confidential) Fleet Air Defense. June 2006.
NWP 3-01.5, (S/NF) Aegis Core Tactics. March 2007.
NWP 3-03.4, (S/NF) Naval Strike and Air Warfare. August 2000.
NWP 3-56 Rev A, Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual. August 2001.
Marine Corps
MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations. 27 September 2001.
MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations. 16 April 1998.
MCRP 3-25.10A, Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Gunner’s Handbook.
6 November 2000.
MCWP 3-2, Aviation Operations. 9 May 2000.
MCWP 3-22, Antiair Warfare. 23 June 2000.
MCWP 3-25, Control of Aircraft and Missiles. 26 February 1998.
MCWP 3-25.3, Marine Air Command and Control System Handbook. 2 December
1997.
MCWP 3-25.4, Marine Tactical Air Command Center Handbook. 6 May 2008.
MCWP 3-25.5, Direct Air Support Center Handbook. 17 February 2009.
MCWP 3-25.7, Tactical Air Operations Center Handbook. 13 September 1996.
MCWP 3-25.8, Marine Air Traffic Control Detachment Handbook. 11 November
2004.
MCWP 3-25.10, Low Altitude Air Defense Handbook. 12 June 1998.
MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process. 5 January 2000.
Air Force
AFI 13-1AOC, Volume 3, Operational Procedures—Air and Space Operations
Center. 1 August 2005.
AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine. 17 November 2003.
AFDD 2, Operations and Organization. 3 April 2007.
AFDD 2-1.1, Counterair Operations. 1 October 2008.
AFDD 2-8, Command and Control. 1 June 2007.
AFTTP 3-3.AOC, Operational Employment-Air and Space Operations Center.
1 November 2007.
AFTTP 3-1.15, (S/NF) Tactical Employment F-15. 1 November 2007.
AFTTP 3-1.15E, (S/NF) Tactical Employment F-15E. 18 March 2008.
AFTTP 3-1.16, (S/NF) Tactical Employment F-16C/D. 5 May 2008.

Other
ACP 160, IFF/SIF Operational Procedures, Allied Communications
Publication. August 2007.
CJCSM 3115.01B, Joint Data Network (JDN) Operations. 3 December 2008.
CJCSM 6120.01D, Joint Multi-Tactical Data Link (TDL) Operating Procedures.
7 November 2005.
Joint Tactical Air Operations (JTAO) Procedural Handbook, US Army
Forces Command. 1 October 2004.

GLOSSARY
PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
A
AAA antiaircraft artillery
AADC area air defense commander
AADCS area air defense commander system
AADP area air defense plan
AAMDC US Army Air and Missile Defense Command
AAW antiair warfare
AB airbase
ABCS Army Battle Command System
ABE air battle execution
ABMOC air battle management operations center
ABT air-breathing target
AC2 airspace command and control
ACA airspace control authority
ACE aviation combat element
ACM airspace coordinating measure
ACO airspace control order
ACP airspace control plan
ACU air control unit
AD air defense
ADA air defense artillery
ADAFCO air defense artillery fire control officer
ADAM air defense airspace management
ADC air defense commander
ADCP air defense communications platform
ADIZ air defense identification zone
ADS air defense sector
ADSI Air Defense Systems Integrator
ADU air defense unit
ADW air defense warnings
ADWC air defense warning condition
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
AFFOR Air Force forces
AFI Air Force instruction
AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (interservice)
ALSA Air Land Sea Application Center
AM amplitude modulation
AMD air and missile defense
AMDCOORD air and missile defense coordinator
AMDPCS air and missile defense planning and control system
AMDWS air and missile defense workstation
AO area of operations
AOC air and space operations center (Air Force specific)
AOI area of interest
AOR area of responsibility
APZ asset protection zone
AR air refueling
ARFOR Army forces
ARM antiradiation missile
ASAS All Source Analysis System
ASCM anti-ship cruise missile
ASOC air support operations center
ASWC antisubmarine warfare commander
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
ATC air traffic control
AT FLIR advanced targeting forward looking infrared
ATNAVICS Air Traffic Navigation, Integration, and Communication
System
ATO air tasking order
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
AWS Aegis weapon system
B
BAE brigade aviation element
BARCAP barrier combat air patrol
BCC battle control center
BCD battlefield coordination detachment
BCT brigade combat team
BDE brigade
BDZ base defense zone
BLOS beyond line of sight
BM ballistic missile
BMC2 battle management command and control
BMD ballistic missile defense
BMDS ballistic missile defense system
BMOA ballistic missile operating area
BVR beyond visual range
C
C&D command and decision
C2 command and control
C2BMC command and control battle management center
CAL critical asset list
CAOC combined air operations center
CAP combat air patrol
CAPSET capability set
CAS close air support
CATF commander, amphibious task force
CCDR combatant commander
CDR commander
CEC cooperative engagement capability
CF composite force
CG guided missile cruiser
CID combat identification
CIEA classification, identification, and engagement area
CIWS close-in weapon system
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CLF commander, landing force
CM cruise missile
CMD cruise missile defense
COCOM combatant command (command authority)
COD combat operations division
COMAFFOR Commander, Air Force forces
CONR continental United States North American Aerospace
Defense Command Region
CONUS continental United States
COP common operational picture
CP command post
C-RAM Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar
CRC control and reporting center
CSG carrier strike group
CTP common tactical picture
CTT commander’s tactical terminal
CV aircraft carrier
CVN aircraft carrier, nuclear
CVW carrier air wing
CWC composite warfare commander
D
2D two dimensional
3D three dimensional
DAADC(AMD) deputy area air defense commander for air and missile
defense
DAL defended asset list
DAS deep air support
DASC direct air support center
DCA defensive counterair
DD Spruance Destroyer
DDG guided missile destroyer
DEZ desired engagement zone
DOD Department of Defense
DR deployable radar
DS direct support
DSP Defense Support Program
DTE detect-to-engage
DTT dynamic test target
E
EA engagement authority
EADS Eastern Air Defense Sector
ECS Expeditionary combat support
EIFF enemy identification, friend or foe
ELINT electronic intelligence
EO engagement operations
ESG expeditionary strike group
ESM electronic support measures
EW early warning
EW/C early warning/control
F
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAAD forward area air defense
FBCB2 Force XXI battle command-brigade and below
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBX-T Forward-Based X-Band Radar-Transportable
FDL fighter data link
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Administration
FEZ fighter engagement zone
FFG guided missile frigate
FLIR forward-looking infrared
FM field manual
FO force operations
FSCOORD fire support coordinator
FW fixed-wing
G
GATR ground-to-air transmitter/receiver
GBAD ground-based air defense
GBDL ground-based data links
GBI ground based interceptor
GCCS-A Global Command and Control System-Army
GCCS-M Global Command and Control System-Maritime
GCN ground communications network
GEM Guidance Enhanced Missile
GEMC Guidance Enhanced Missile-C
GEMT Guidance Enhanced Missile-T
GEOINT geospatial intelligence
GFC GMD Fire Control
GMD ground-based midcourse defense
GS general support
GS-R general support-reinforcing
H
HARM high speed antiradiation missile
HF high frequency
HLD Homeland Defense
HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HN host nation
HQ headquarters
HS horizon search
HVA high value asset
HVU high value unit
I
IADS integrated air defense system
IAW in accordance with
IBS Integrated broadcast service
IBS-I integrated broadcast service-interactive
IBS-S integrated broadcast service-simplex
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
ICC information coordination central
ICE Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
ID identification
IFF identification, friend or foe
INT intelligence
IO information operations
IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
ITO integrated tasking order
ITW/AA integrated tactical warning and attack assessment
IWC information warfare commander
J
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff
JADOC joint air defense operations center
JAOC joint air operations center
JBECC Joint Battlefield Expeditionary Operations Center
JDN joint data network
JDNO joint data network operations officer
JEZ joint engagement zone
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFLCC joint forces land component commander
JFMCC Joint force maritime component commander
JICO joint interface control officer
JIIM joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
JOA joint operations area
JP joint publication
JRE joint range extension
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTAGS joint tactical ground station
JTF joint task force
JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
JTT joint tactical terminal
K-L
km kilometer
LA launch area
LAAD low-altitude air defense
LAD launch area denied
LCC amphibious command ship
LDO limited defensive operations
LEAP Light ExoAtmospheric Projectile
LeMay Center Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and
Education
LHA amphibious assault ship (general purpose)
LHD amphibious assault ship (dock)
LNO liaison officer
LO low observable
LOF lack of friendly
LRS&T long-range surveillance and track
M
MACCS Marine air command and control system
MACG Marine air control group
MACS Marine air control squadron
MAGTF Marine air-ground task force
MANPADS man-portable air defense system
MAOA multi-AOR operations area
MARFOR Marine Corps forces
MARLO Marine liaison officer
MASS Marine air support squadron
MATCD Marine air traffic control detachment
MAWTS-1 Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One
MBMD maritime ballistic missile defense
MCC mission crew commander
MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
MCS maneuver control system
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
MEF Marine expeditionary force
MEZ missile engagement zone
MIDS miniature intrusion detection system
MILSTRIP military standard requisition and issue procedure
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
mm millimeter
MNF multinational force
MP mission planner
MRBM medium range ballistic missile
MRR minimum-risk route
MTACS Marine tactical air command squadron
MTI moving target indicator
MTN multi-tactical data link network
MWCS Marine wing communications squadron
N
NALE naval and amphibious liaison element
NASIC National Air and Space Intelligence Center
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCR National Capital Region (US)
NCRCC National Capital Region Coordination Center
NCR-IADS National Capital Region - Integrated Air Defense System
NCTI non-cooperative target identification
NCTR non-cooperative target recognition
nm nautical mile
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
NORTHCOM United States Northern Command
NSSMS NATO Seasparrow missile system
NTACS Navy tactical air control system
NTR net time reference
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
NWDC Navy Warfare Development Command
NWP Naval warfare publication
O
OAAW offensive antiair warfare
OAS offensive air support
OCA offensive counterair
OM operations modules
ONE Operation NOBLE EAGLE
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
OPTASK operation task
OPTASKLINK operations task link
OTC officer in tactical command
P
PAC-2 Patriot Advance Capability - 2
PAC-3 Patriot Advance Capability - 3
PD probability of detection
PDB post deployment build
PDS passive detection system
PEI presence of enemy indication
POA Patriot operating area
POC point of contact
POO point of origin
PPLI precise participant location and identification
PTL primary target line
Q-R
RADC regional air defense commander
RAM rocket, artillery, and mortar
RBM regional ballistic missile
RBMD Regional Ballistic Missile Defense
RICC regional interface control coordinator
RICO regional interface control officer
rpm revolutions per minute
ROA restricted operations area
ROE rules of engagement
ROZ restricted operations zone
RTF return to force
RW rotary-wing
S
SA surveillance area
SAAWC sector antiair warfare coordinator
SAAWF sector antiair warfare facility
SADC sector air defense commander
SADL situation awareness data link
SADO senior air defense officer
SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SATCAP satellite capability
SATCOM satellite communications
SBIRS space-based infrared system
SBX Sea-Based X-Band Radar
SBX-1 SBX vessel
SCC sea combat commander
SD senior director
SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SG strike group
SHORAD short-range air defense
SHF super-high frequency
SICO sector interface control officer
SIF selective identification feature
SIGINT signals intelligence
SINCGARS single-channel ground and airborne radio system
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SM standard missile
SOF special operations forces
SOLE special operations liaison element
SOP standard operating procedure
SPINS special instructions
SPY surface radar surveillance and control
SPZ self protection zone
SRBM short range ballistic missile
STP sensor task plan
STWC strike warfare commander
SUWC surface warfare commander
SWC ship’s weapon coordinator
T
TAAMDCOORD theater Army air and missile defense coordinator
TACC tactical air command center
TACON tactical control
TACP tactical air control party
TACS theater air control system
TADC tactical air direction center
TAGS theater air ground system
TAIS tactical airspace integration system
TAMD theater air and missile defense
TAOC tactical air operations center
TAOM tactical air operations module
TBM theater ballistic missile
TBMCS theater battle management core system
TCD target centered deconfliction
TCO tactical control officer
TDL tactical data link
THAAD Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
TLAM Tomahawk land attack missile
TMD theater missile defense
TOC tactical operations center
TPA track production area
TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
TVM track via missile
U-V
UA unmanned aircraft
UAS unmanned aircraft system
UEWR upgraded early warning radar
UHF ultrahigh frequency
US United States
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command
USPACOM United States Pacific Command
USSS United States Secret Service (TREAS)
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
UTC unit type code
VA vital area
VHF very high frequency
VID visual identification
VLS vertical launch system
W-Z
WASID wide area surveillance and identification
WCS weapons control status
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WRA weapons release authority
XBR X-Band Radar
PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
airspace control order — An order implementing the airspace control plan that provides
the details of the approved requests for airspace coordinating
measures. It is published either as part of the air tasking order or as a
separate document. Also called ACO. (JP 3-52)
air tasking order — A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate
units, and command and control agencies projected sorties,
capabilities and/or forces to targets and specific missions. Normally
provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling
agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. Also called ATO. (JP
3-30)
battlefield coordination detachment — An Army liaison that provides selected operational
functions between the Army forces and the air component
commander. Battlefield coordination detachment located in the air
operations center interface includes exchanging current intelligence
and operational data, support requirements, coordinating the
integration of Army forces requirements for airspace coordinating
measures, fire support coordination measures, and theater airlift.
Also called BCD. (JP 3-03)
combat identification — The process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected
objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an
engagement decision. Also called CID. (JP 1-02)
command and control — The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment
of the mission. Command and control functions are performed
through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications,
facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the
accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)
common operational picture — A single identical display of relevant information shared by
more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates
collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational
awareness. Also called COP. (JP 1-02)
common tactical picture — An accurate and complete display of relevant tactical data that
integrates tactical information from the multi-tactical data link network,
ground network, intelligence network, and sensor networks. Also
called CTP. (JP 3-01)
counterair — A mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and
maintain a desired degree of air superiority. Counterair missions are
designed to destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both
before and after launch. (JP 1-02)
fighter engagement zone — In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within
which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests
with fighter aircraft. Also called FEZ. (JP 3-52)
identification — 1. The process of determining the friendly or hostile character of an
unknown detected contact. 2. In arms control, the process of
determining which nation is responsible for the detected violations of
any arms control measure. 3. In ground combat operations,
discrimination between recognizable objects as being friendly or
enemy, or the name that belongs to the object as a member of a
class. Also called ID. (JP 1-02)
joint engagement zone — In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which
multiple air defense systems (surface-to-air missiles and aircraft) are
simultaneously employed to engage air threats. Also called JEZ. (JP
3-52)
LEAKER(S) — Airborne threat has passed through a defensive layer. Call should include
amplifying information. (FM 1-02.1, MCRP 3-25B, NTTP 6-02.1,
AFTTP 3-2.5, Multi-Service Brevity Codes)
OUTLAW — CONTACT has met point of origin criteria for ROE. (FM 1-02.1, MCRP 3-25B,
NTTP 6-02.1, AFTTP 3-2.5, Multi-Service Brevity Codes)
PAINT(S) – An interrogated group/radar contact that is responding with any of the specified
IFF/SIF modes and correct codes established for the ID criteria. (FM
1-02.1, MCRP 3-25B, NTTP 6-02.1, AFTTP 3-2.5, Multi-Service
Brevity Codes)
rules of engagement — Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will
initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces
encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)
SPADES — An interrogated group/radar contact that lacks all of the ATO (or equivalent)
IFF/SIF modes and codes required for the ID criteria. (FM 1-02.1,
MCRP 3-25B, NTTP 6-02.1, AFTTP 3-2.5, Multi-Service Brevity
Codes)
theater missile — A missile, which may be a ballistic missile, a cruise missile, or an air-to-
surface missile (not including short-range, non-nuclear, direct fire
missiles, bombs, or rockets such as Maverick or wire-guided
missiles), whose target is within a given theater of operation. Also
called TM. (JP 1-02)
unmanned aircraft system — That system, whose components include the necessary
equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft.
Also called UAS. (JP 3-01)
FM 3-01.15
MCRP 3-25E
NTTP 3-01.8
AFTTP 3-2.31
1 May 2009
By Order of the Secretary of the Army
Official: GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.

General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to
the Secretary of the Army
0912701
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: Not to be distributed;
electronic media only.
By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force
STEPHEN J. MILLER
Major General, USAF
Commander
Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education
ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing

website at www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading or ordering.
RELEASABILITY: Distribution authorized to DOD and DOD contractors only to

protect technical or operational information from automatic
dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by
other means. This protection applies to publications required
solely for official use and to those containing valuable technical
or operational information. This determination was made on 29
January 2008.
Supersedes AFTTP(I) 3-2.31, 12 October 2004 and AFTTP(I) 3-2.39, 15 January
2003.
MARINE CORPS PCN: 144 000104 00 PIN: 079137-000

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ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE

HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATFC-EJ, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-1067,

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

JOSEPH E. MARTZ ANDREW W. O’DONNELL, JR.

WENDI B. CARPENTER STEPHEN J. MILLER

This publication is available through the ALSA Web site

Army. Upon approval and authentication, this publication incorporates the

1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 i

ii FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

In addition, this revision:

iv FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

FM 3-01.15 US Army Training and Doctrine Command

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................ viii

HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATFC-EJ, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-1067,

* Supersedes FM 3-01.15/MCRP 3.25E/NTTP 3-01.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.31, 12 October 2004 and FM 3-01.61/MCWP 3-

1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 v

vi FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

An IADS is the aggregate of component air defense systems operating in a theater

Chapter II IADS Planning and Execution

Chapters III-VI Service-specific IADS Capabilities

Appendix A Joint Link and Communication Architectures

Appendix B IADS Planning Considerations Checklist

Appendix D Multinational Considerations

Appendix E (SECRET) IADS Execution TTP

Appendix F (SECRET) Combat Identification Considerations

Appendix G (SECRET) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Systems and Planning

1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 ix

x FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1

2 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 3

Table 1. Joint Support Categories (JP 1)

a. Combatant Commands. Initial IADS planning should begin in peacetime

4 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 5

6 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 7

IADS PLANNING AND EXECUTION

1. Integration and Service Coordination

1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 9

Figure 2. Senior Air Defense Officer Integration

10 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 11

□ Enemy IADS order of battle to include:

□ Overall assessment of the strengths and vulnerabilities of adversary

12 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

Table 3. Detection and Tracking Plans

1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 13

□ Validate sensor coverage plan using joint sensor planning tools to

□ Evaluate other sensor coverage concerns including accessibility,

□ Once sensor placement is planned, the JICO is responsible to ensure

□ Establishment of required voice circuits and TTP to resolve detection

14 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 1 May 2009

1 May 2009 FM 3-01.15 / MCRP 3-25E / NTTP 3-01.8 / AFTTP 3-2.31 15

□ Airspace requirements for DCA combat air patrol (CAP) assets.

□ Establishment of ROZs/ROA, if necessary.

□ Establishment of MEZs, JEZs, FEZs for the optimal employment of

□ Establishment of POAs to give airspace users situational awareness of

□ Development of procedures to deconflict/clear airspace for Army and

□ Creation of procedures to activate and deactivate the various

□ Airspace requirements change rapidly in a fluid operational