The Role of Philosophy in the Theological Method

Fisseha Tadesse Feleke

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to examine the role of philosophy in theology. Situated as it was within the liturgical

life of the Church, theology in its origin was doxological. In the modern age, however, Christian scholarship in

the West has changed course and theology sought to secure a place within the academy; it became scientific.

Thus, like experts in other disciplines, theologians have ever since been pressed hard to follow certain methods

of inquiry that are dominant in the modern university; otherwise it would have been impossible for them to

converse with, and be accepted as scientists or scholars by, other members of the academy. Or so did they feel.

Underlying the modern scientific method, there have actually been certain principles that were meant to keep

the unity of all sciences inasmuch as they seemed to be accepted across disciplines, though not without debate

and always subject to revision. Such principles were supplied by philosophy.

One may ask, why should theology seek a place within the academy and be entangled with philosophy?

Moreover, besides this seemingly extraneous influence, philosophy has also played a role much more pertinent

to theology, namely, in defining and justifying the principles of its internal organization, the method it follows

and the presuppositions it should accept. However, there is no denying the fact that not a few theologians have

been wary of this.

In this paper, I want to touch upon the reason why theology needs philosophy in regard to its situation within

the broader academic community. More specifically, I would like to examine if and to what extent philosophy

can be intrinsically useful to (a genuinely theological) theology.

The Scientific Status of Theology

The status of theology as science has not been incontrovertible. Indeed few theological issues have been

debated with as much academic and, more than occasionally ideological, fervour as the status of theology as

science or Wissenschaft (Zachhuber, 1). Some advocates of theologys status as science thought that it would
grant theologians, and their work, admission into intellectually respectable places of learning while opponents

considered the adoption of modern ideas of science as a grave danger to the proper pursuit of the discipline

(ibid.). In his study of nineteenth century German scholars who were particularly associated with the project of

a science of theology, Johannes Zachhuber notes that their perception as scientific theologians is more than

the product of clever self-promotion but hints at their strong commitment to a programme aimed at the

integration of theology into the broader paradigms of contemporary academic work and, concurrently, at the

internal integration of historical and systematic disciplines within theology (ibid.). Zachhuber further describes

this nineteenth-century project of theology as the intersection of two problems of very different provenance.

The first, he says, is the justification of modern theology as a critical discourse whose parameters are not

automatically set by church doctrine or ecclesial tradition, while the second he holds to be the need to classify

theology within an overall system of knowledge institutionalized in the university (2).

In order to see the problem with parameters automatically set by church doctrine or ecclesial tradition, I think

it suffices to recall the most destructive religious war that raged 17th Century Europe. Who would in his/her

right mind want that dreadful event to repeat itself, after all? Ever since the dawn of Enlightenment, there seems

to be an inscription engraved at the entrance of the temple of reason: No more religious war! And if there

needs to be no more religious war, so did Enlightenment thinkers supposed, there needs to be no element of

Schwrmerei in any religion; theology then should become a rational enterprise to be done critically. One of the

most influential exponents of the Enlightenment and the highly esteemed father of critical philosophy, Kant,

dared thus to limit religion within the bounds of reason.

Although most important theologians like Schleiermacher resisted the total reliance on reason and gave a

prominent place for non-rational sources of theology, they still can be considered rationalists in the broader

sense of the term. This is not to deny Schleiermachers rejection of the enlightened ideal of a rational religion

in favor of historical positive religions (Zachhuber 11). It means only that modern theologians like

Schleiermacher took the challenge to engage in rational reflection about the beliefs and practices posited by the

historical religions they did as well as did not happen to be part of. Indeed, without surrendering to rationalism

in the narrow sense, they understood theology as a critical discourse that can be communicated between
scholars of various confessional stances--and this sits well with their conception of science as a social pursuit

that can thrive only under the condition of freedom.

According to Zachhuber, the very question of theologys character as an academic discipline, scientia, or

science has historically been a by-product of this institutional setting, that is, of the university. George Pattison

nicely captures the consequences of theologys institutional dependency on the university, when he says:

Christian theologys truth-claims must be brought into some kind of relation to what is sought and

studied as truth elsewhere in the manifold intellectual life of the contemporary university And if

theology attempts to reinvigorate claims to be some kind of Queen of all sciences without engaging in

such workmeeting historians on the ground of historical research or moral theorists on the ground of

moral theorythen they are likely to be regarded with derision by colleagues in this other disciplines,

and rightly so (63).

That may be so, historically. But, on the other hand, it is important to note that the main reason for theology to

situate itself within the overall system of knowledge may not necessarily come from without, it lies in its own

very nature, namely, in its answerability! For, already in the beginning of Christianity, the Apostle Peter

instructs believers to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in you (1Peter

3:15).

Reason as Tool in the Theological Method

Theology relies on rational and critical reflection not merely in its interaction with other academic disciplines,

but also in dealing with its own subject matter. Rationality is extremely significant in theological method as

such. In an article entitled The Problem of Theological Method, Paul Tillich lists three elements of theology: the

positive, the rational and the element of immediacy. Elaborating on the rational element, he asserts:

Theology is the rational word about God; it is the methodical interpretation of our ultimate concern.

The rational element is not a source of theology. It does not give the content. But it gives the form

(23).

The rational element gives theology, as the methodical interpretation of our ultimate concern, its form; while the

content is posited by faith. To be sure, Tillich admits that the relation between form and content is extremely
complex. In his careful analysis of this complex relation, he makes a distinction between two types of theology:

the kerygmatic and the apologetic. In the apologetic type, Tillich says, the kerygma is related to the pre-

philosophical and the philosophical interpretations of reality (24). Maintaining that theology as an apology

makes answer, that it answers the questions asked of, and the criticisms directed against, a concrete

religion, he further explains that such an answering is possible only if there is a common ground between the

one who asks and the one who answers (ibid.). Tillich claims thus: Apologetic theology presupposes the idea

of universal revelation, to which reference can be made because it is acknowledged by both sides (ibid.).

Tillich sees here an intimate connection between the positive and the rational elements, upon which he builds

the method of correlation. For Tillich, The method of correlation is especially the method of apologetic

theology. Question and answer must be correlated in such a way that the religious symbol is interpreted as the

adequate answer to a question, implied in mans existence, and asked in primitive, pre-philosophical, or

elaborated philosophical terms (25). Whether this would create a conflict with philosophy, and how so, if it

does, becomes clear from the following pages.

More now on the use of reason in theology. Not unlike Tillich, A.N. Williams, in his The Architecture of

Theology: Structure, System and Ratio, claims that as long as theology remains a form of discourse, it must

employ human reason (7). Williams takes reason to be more akin to operating system than a databank; reasons

role is portrayed not so much as a source as an interpretative tool (89). Having examined a range of works

from early Church Fathers to modern theologians, he observes, Theological arguments have rarely, if ever,

appealed to reason as a warrant; rather, reason functions as a tool in the interpretation of scripture and tradition

(79). One of the merits of his study, I think, is the acknowledgement of theology as a form of double mimesis

in its rationality and relationality, mirroring the qualities of its two chief subjects, God and humanity (1). Also

equally important is the fact that, instead of confirming to the opposition often made between reason and grace,

he depicts reason itself as a gift. This is nicely summed up in his analysis of Gregory of Nazianzens position:

the tool with which we think theologically, preach, and contemplate is human, genuinely ours, and

divine in its origin. The element of human nature that resembles God is the mind (nous, 28.17), and this

likeness is therefore itself a divine gift. Nazianzen's theology does not turn on the opposition of nature
 and grace, as much later theology does, so for him there is no tension in speaking of a natural gift

(134).

So reason for Williams is nothing but gift, and grace too is gift, an additional gift. However, there indeed is a

distinction between the two.

Question of Foundation

A question arises, however, as to how far human reason may reach and to what extent the knowledge it acquires

can be certain. What supports the whole edifice of theology? In what is theological knowledge, or human

knowledge of any kind for that matter, grounded? On the one hand, if theology is possible, it means human

knowledge of God is possible. On the other hand, theology cannot aspire to certitude, for, as Williams rightly

observes, even if God's existence were demonstrable on purely rational grounds (and is not merely rationally

plausible), most of the remainder of Christian theology is not (13).

This tangled situation leads precisely to what Kevin Diller describes as theologys epistemological dilemma.

The dilemma, as Diller puts it, is this: Defending theological knowledge by providing a noncircular

demonstration of its grounds is not a human possibility. Nevertheless, Christian theology confesses that the

knowledge of Godas God really isis a human possibility (167). Diller is not convinced by the arguments

of natural theology that seek to meet the skeptics burden of proof. Christian theology, he says, (and every

other discipline for that matter) should readily and without anxiety concede that the skeptics burden of proof

cannot be met (168). Nevertheless, the acknowledgement of human epistemic limitations does not force Diller

to go all the way down with the skeptics and reduce or remove the commitment to knowledge altogether.

Neither is he compelled to follow some form of non-realism to adjust what is meant by the truth of such

knowledge. Instead, Diller claims to have advanced a better proposal that he develops in light of the thoughts of

two intellectual giants, one in Christian theology and the other in Christian philosophyAlvin Plantinga and

Karl Barth. The central theme of the Barth/Plantinga proposal is, as Diller develops it, its theo-foundational

epistemology, in which the triune God is the ground of the warrant for our knowledge of him (294).

The whole question of ground is in fact tied up with a form of philosophy, namely with metaphysics. No doubt,

part of what enabled metaphysics to be a legitimate science has been the notion of grounding. In metaphysics,
God has been assimilated into the function of final ground. And, as Marion rightly observes, through all the

stations of the history of philosophy this ground has been interpreted from the stand point of effectivity or

actuality: in the words of Aristotle, purus actus non habens aliquid de potentialitatae for

St Thomas Aquinas, causa sui according to Descartes, sufficient reason of the universe in Leibniz (284). The

question that has brought metaphysics to life and has sustained it ever since is best expressed by Leibniz: why is

there something rather than nothing? Now what knocks down this famous question is the question that asks in

return Why ask why? As thinking about universal grounding, Marion asserts, metaphysics cannot but

collapse, when the obvious necessity of there being a grounding of being turns out to be thrown into question

(283). With it, then, a theology that is built upon such a metaphysical grounding must also fall. The end of

metaphysics brings about the death of God conceived as effective ground. But whether the overthrow of

such metaphysics which is also the overthrow of secularity, amounts to an announcement of the project of

postmodernism (xxiv), as Graham Ward wishes to argue, is doubtful. Acknowledging the absolutely

dominating effect of such a state of affairs even as an overwhelming event, Marion speaks nonetheless of the

transitivity of metaphysics, which does not solely lead to its end but also to its transcendence, that is, a

transcendence of onto-theology [which] becomes the condition for going beyond the naming, in philosophy, of

God as the effective ground (283).

Marion is making here a move from one form of philosophy to another, namely, from metaphysics to

phenomenology, which he praises for its transparent method and naked thought (289). Specifically, the

replacement of metaphysica specialis (to which theology belongs) by phenomenology is, for Marion, a

handing-over: returning to things themselves, and possibly to the same things, in order to reveal them no longer

according to the aspect of the ground, but according to that of the donation (ibid. emphasis mine). If things are

to be revealed according to the aspect of donation, where will then the place of God be, if ever he will have

one? Given the phenomenological reduction, which is the suspension of all transcendence, Marion observes,

God, transcendent in every sense, would not therefore appear (290). At this point some would think that

they are left only with a choice between philosophical silence (291) and unreasoning faith (290). Yet, Marion

believes that phenomenology can go further than this, he thinks namely, that God in his very dazzlingness
shines by his absence. God becomes invisible not in spite of his donation, but by virtue of this donation.

a donation by abandonment (292).

As is well known, it was Heidegger who showed that metaphysics as onto-theology reached its positive

conclusion in Hegel and its negative in Nietzsche. Apparently, he is the one who announced the end of

metaphysics, which end actually seem to cause many to jump in happiness but hardly any to mourn. Yet what

this end amounts to is far from obvious. In fact, it is important to observe with Pattison, that the end of

metaphysics is not a datable historical event and that Metaphysicians continue to exist (65). Be that as it

may, however, that Heidegger came to a naked thought through a transparent method of phenomenology is

certain. He indeed is one of the two founders of phenomenology, the other one being his teacher Husserl. It is

thus important to examine what use, if any, he has assigned to philosophy in theology.

Wege nicht Werke (Ways, not works!)this was the motto Heidegger wanted to be used as a principle of

editing his Gesammtausgabe, i.e., his Complete Works (GA 1). What is to be learnt from this is that when

studying Heideggers view on any topic, one should not get into the habit of looking for a fixed Heideggerian

concept but rather always pay attention to the change of perspectives in the various stages of his thought

development and also to the provisionary character of the categories he employs.

In regards to the topic at hand, Heidegger views the relation between theology and philosophy as one between

two sciences. He specifies two basic possibilities of science: ontological and ontic. An ontic science is a science

that deals with beings (entities) whereas an ontological science is a science that is concerned with being (in

general/as such). Heidegger considers philosophy as the only ontological science while he holds theology to be

one of the many ontic sciences. The difference between ontic sciences on the one hand and the ontological

science, that is, philosophy on the other lies in this: ontic sciences direct themselves to something given but do

not ask about their very givenness; they just presuppose the givenness of their objects--that beings are disclosed

in one way or another enables a pre-scientific or scientific reference to beings. But the ontological science, the

science of being, that is, philosophy, is possible only through a changeover of attitude; it involves transposition.

And so there exists an absolute difference between philosophy and non-philosophical sciences.
In a lecture entitled Phenomenologie und Theologie and was given in 1927, Heidegger asserts that theology

is a positive science and as such absolutely different from philosophy (die Theologie ist eine positive

Wissenschaft und als solche daher von der Philosophie absolut verschieden) (GA 9, 49). In fact it is a positive

theology of a unique kind. What theology is presented with, its positum, is Christianity; the being that somehow

already disclosed to it is Christ, the crucified God (Christus, der gekreuzigte Gott) (GA 9, 52).

The pre-theological disclosedness of this being distinguishes itself basically from all other pre-scientific

availability of beings in that it takes the form of revelation that happens only in belief. The Crucifixion is a

historical event, the specific historicity of which is testified only for belief in the Scriptures (ibid.). And belief

for Heidegger is not merely taking sentences as true on the authority of others, it is rather to be understood as a

way of existence of human beings (eine Existenzweise des menschlichen Daseins) (ibid.). Moreover, it is not

possible for human beings to attain to such a way of existence on their own, such way of existence is rather a

gift. Oriented to the cross, human existence is put before God by God. And the orientation of belief towards

God as a way of existence is in essence a becoming changed over of existence (Und so ist seinem Sinn nach

das Gestelltwerden vor Gott ein Umgestelltwerden der Existenz in und durch die glaubig ergriffene

Barmherzigkeit Gottes) (ibid. 53).

It is important to note also that it is not the business of theology to ground and justify belief, because belief can

be won only through belief (einsig nur durch den Glauben gewonnen werden kann) (ibid. 56). According to

Heidegger, theology, which literally means discourse about God, has in no way God as its object. In fact

theology is knowledge of God, and yet theological (revealed) theology is not a speculative knowledge of God

(ibid. 59, emphasis mine). A speculative knowledge of God does not stem from the basic religious experience

but rather attains its goal by way of explicating the idea of being. In one of his early Freiburg lectures,

Heidegger gives an example: For Aristotle, the idea of the divine does not grow out of the explication of what

was accessed in the basic religious experience, but is rather the expression for the highest character of

being that emerges from the ontological radicalization of the idea of being-moved (GA 62, 389). Again, in

another lecture of the same era, Heidegger thus points out: There is the necessity of a fundamental

confrontation with Greek philosophy and its disfiguration of Christian existence (GA 59, 40). Furthermore, he
speaks of The true idea of Christian philosophy; Christian not a label for a bad and epigonal Greek one. The

way to a primordial Christian Greek-free [griechentum-freien] theology (ibid.). At this point, the only

problem Heidegger had was with that which was wrongly called Christian philosophy, in which God plays a

role merely as epistemological auxiliary saint [Nothelfer] (ibid. 43) and not with Christian philosophy as such.

It is not the belief then, but the conceptual-scientific appropriation in the form of theology, that needs

philosophy. In fact theology needs philosophy, Heidegger reminds us, but it needs philosophy not for

grounding and primary disclosure of its positivity, its Christianity but only in regards to its scientificity, and

that again, only in an in fact fundamental, but again uniquely restricted way nur in einer zwar

grundstzlichen, aber doch eigenartig eingeschrnkten Weise (GA 9, 61).

Heidegger later came to believe that the religious way of existence was incompatible with that of the

philosophical. In fact he considered the two ways of existence as deadly enemies to each other. Whereas the

religious way of existence has no power of its own but is rather a donated way of existence, the way of

existence dedicated to philosophy is characterized as existence turned solely on its own. And this for him

precludes the possibility of Christian philosophy. Christian philosophy, Heidegger now thinks, would be a

wooden iron pure and simple(ein hlzernes Eisen schlechthin) (GA 9, 66). Philosophy is free questioning of

human existence left entirely to itself; which questioning Heidegger holds is not possible for a believer.

Why not? We may ask though with Gunther Polzner. Polzner believes that the religiously existing theologian

can indeednay, mustquestion radically; he/she must be able to combine what according to Heidegger

cannot be combined, namely, radical questioning and religious existence (etwas in sich vereinen, was sich nach

Heidegger nicht vereinen last: radikales Fragen und glaubigs Existieren) (84). When it is so, philosophy can

exercise a corrective (co-directive) function over against theology, and this it does only as a Christian

philosophy (Die Philosophie kann ihre korrektive (mitleitende) Funktion der Theologie gegenuber nur als

christliche Philosophie ausuben) (ibid.).

Concluding Remark: Safeguarding Mystery

By way of conclusion, let me give a perfect example of questioning that is compatible with the religious way of

existence. Recall that part of the problem with the metaphysical form of philosophy was its obsession with

specific conceptions purported to correspond to certain permanent order of reality, and what went wrong with

Christian philosophy was its assimilation of God merely as a guarantor of such an order of reality, as

epistemological auxiliary saint (Nothilfer), as causa sui. Recall also that the content of theology comes from

belief in Scripture. Now the language used by theologians to express, or rather to obscure, the assimilation of

metaphysical concepts may sound, of course, biblical; they speak of creation order. However, in an article

where he takes issue of doing theology along certain lines, along Western metaphysical lines, Nicholas Ansell

ably shows how such a thinking would foreclose a genuine sense of the phenomenon and bring about the loss of

the enigmatic quality of experience attested to in the wisdom literature as well as other parts of the Scripture

(5). He therefore calls the whole creation order thinking to question, thereby advancing a Greek-free Christian

thinking that would safeguard what is inherently mysterious, wondrous, and in that sense enigmatic (6).

Ansells is not a total rejection of order, his is rather a radical questioning, a corrective resistance, of The

tendency of creation order thinking to see the creational and the normative as virtually synonymous (16).

Ansell admires reformational philosophy for seeking to counter the inflation of reason by saying that the

normative order we need is more than-rational and that rational-conceptual knowing does not have the

privileged access we think it has (17)1. But he goes on his part even further to relativize both reason and

creation order. However, Ansell is quick also to point out that his (ante-nomian) relativisation is not (anti-

nomian) eradication (ibid.). As he has succinctly concludes, No longer separated by the dubious, two-realm

split between facts and values, our celebration of the enigmatic gift and promise of existence and our academic

insight into the order of and for creation may enrich one another (19). What needs to be sought is thus not an

outright rejection of philosophy but a recognition of the limit of its use.

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