LAHOM VS.

JOSE

G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

FACTS:

A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972,
the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change
the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition
to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and
that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue
to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA
No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to
rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).

These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care
and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the
decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said
petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as
the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that:
"Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after
the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopters
action prescribed.

RULING:

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity
of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972.
By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under
the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of
the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into
force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter
would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The
exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when
the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or
fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the
constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in
right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption
has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the
right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time
before it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for
valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly
exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

35 Phil. 252

Facts: Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were

legally married in the city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San
Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned
to the home of her parents.

The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after they had
contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the
defendant got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable
to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating
her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of
her parents.

The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the
conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the
complaint do not state a cause of action.

Issue: Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile.

Ruling: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights,
duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the
general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the
object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should
be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may
fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own
home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not
permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife
was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical
assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate
maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.

De Asis vs. CA
303 SCRA 176

Facts: Private respondent, in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil
Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against petitioner before
the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that petitioner is the father of subject minor, and the
former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite
repeated demands. Petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor alleged and that he
cannot be required to provide support for him. The mothers child sent in a manifestation
stating that because of petitioners judicial declarations, it was futile and a useless
exercise to claim support from him. Hence, she was withdrawing her complaint against
petitioner subject to the condition that the latter should not pursue his counterclaim. By
virtue of the said manifestation, the parties mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of
the complaint. The motion was granted by the trial court, which then dismissed the case
with prejudice.

Subsequently, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against
petitioner, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal
guardian, herein private respondent. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that res judicata is
inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future
support is prohibited by law. The trial court likewise denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. CA dismissed the
same.

Issue: Whether or not the lower courts acted in grave abuse of discretion after the first
complaint was dismissed and adjudged.

Ruling: The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third
person. Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. The
manifestation sent by private respondent amounted to renunciation as it severed the
vinculum that gives the subject minor, the right to claim support from his putative parent,
the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and
private respondent for the dismissal of the counterclaim was in the nature of a
compromise, which cannot be countenanced. It violated the prohibition against any
compromise of the right to support.
DOLORES MONTEFALCON & LAURENCE MONTEFALCON
vs.
RONNIE S. VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 165016 June 17, 2008

FACTS:
In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment
and support against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging
that her son Laurence (co-petitioner) is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that
Vasquez be obliged to give support to their son, whose certificate of live birth he signed
as father. According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for
Laurence since Laurence was born in 1993, and allegedly refused to give him regular
school allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she and
Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family.
A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Aro-aldao, Nabua,
Camarines Sur. Vasquez's grandfather received them as Vasquez was in Manila.
Vasquez's mother returned the documents to the clerk of court, who informed the court
of the non-service of summons. Petitioners then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in
default. The court denied it for lack of proper service of summons.
An alias summon was served in 2000 at the Taguig address of Vasquez, and was received
by his caretaker Bejer but the sheriff's return incorrectly stated "Lazaro" as Vasquez's
surname. Another alias summon was served this time with the correct name of Vasquez,
received by Bejer and sheriff in turn issued a certificate that summon was duly served.
On petitioners motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure to file an
answer despite the substituted service of summons. Vasquez was furnished with court
orders and notices of the proceedings at his last known address. Noting that Vasquez is
a seafarer and left the country on January 24, 2000 and came back on October 12, 2000
Vasquez filed a petition on appeal contending that the court never acquired jurisdiction
over his person and the awarding of support as excessive. CA granted his appeal ruling
on the service of summons was defective as there was no proof of impossibility in personal
service and an attempt to effect such.
Vasquez countered that because he was abroad; service of summons should have been
personal or by publication as substituted service is proper only if a defendant is in the
country. Vasquez also added that the sheriffs return did not state that he exerted efforts
to personally serve the summons.
In their reply, petitioners insisted that a substituted service is the normal method if
one is temporarily away from the country as personal service abroad or by publication
are not ordinary means of service.

ISSUES:
1) Whether there is a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez to clothe the
trial court with jurisdiction over his person.
2) Whether he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence.
RULING:
1) Yes. To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of
summons must be personal, or if this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then
by substituted service. It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are
contractual employees. They go back to the country once their contracts expire,
and wait for the signing of another contract with the same or new manning
agency and principal if they wish. In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from
Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City when the complaint was
filed. Notice may then be taken that he has established a residence in either
place. Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is living at
the time when the service was made, even though he was temporarily abroad at
the time. As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino resident temporarily out
of the country. Section 16 of Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure is not mandatory in
nature, hence, personal service out of the country was impracticable. The
substituted service of summons was correctly diligently done by the sheriff when
he ascertained first the whereabouts of Vasquez. Adding also that, the person who
received the alias summons was of suitable age and discretion, then residing at
Vasquezs dwelling. However, concluding that Vasquez had sufficient time to
argue and to file a motion for reconsideration, he was silent.
2) Yes. Laurence Montefalcon is entitled for support as provided in Article 175 of
the Civil Code, provided further in Article 172 of the same code. Laurences record
of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to prove
paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with
Dolores. He signed as father in Laurences certificate of live birth, a public
document. He supplied the data entered in it. Thus, it is a competent evidence
of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact, if the child had been
recognized by any of the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no
further need to file any action for acknowledgment because any of said modes is
by itself a consummated act. In addition, Under Article 195 (4) of the Family Code,
a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child and the amount is variable
depending on the needs of the child.

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.
Facts:
On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married at the Church of Our Lady
of Lourdes in Quezon City. After some time, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Two
children were born out of the marriage. Frederick, their son went to his fathers residence.
Filipina filed for legal separation.
The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of
their children to her.
Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked
by him when she started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was
talking to him.
The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal
separation was granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then
filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological
incapacity.
The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she
assailed for the first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2) Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Ruling:
The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by
petitioner and private respondent. The pieces of evidence on record showed that on the
day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a
formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona.
The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the
marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil
Code. those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character, are void ab initio. This is
clearly applicable in this case.
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no
longer detain the Court. It is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to
respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was
solemnized.