Vickers, Francis Bacon and The Progress of Knowledge

Francis Bacon and the Progress of Knowledge
Author(s): Brian Vickers

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1992), pp. 495-518
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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Francis Bacon and the
Progressof Knowledge
Brian Vickers
continuously
and denigrations
Glorifications alternate
in thehistoryof Baconianismand of Bacon's fortunes.'
One of the most famousimages in English Renaissance literatureis the

engravedtitlepage to Bacon's InstauratioMagna, showingthe shipof learning
sailingback throughthe "pillarsof Hercules"-the straitsof Gibraltarwhich
markedthe limitsof human knowledgeof the world-returning
traditionally
fromtheopen seas, bringingwithit new ideas and discoveries.Underneaththe
engravingis a quotationfromthe Book of Daniel (12:4) in the Latin Vulgate:
Multipertransibunt et augebiturscientia.Bacon adopted this quotationas his
as he explainedwhenusingit for
own,givingit a ratherpersonalinterpretation,
thefirsttimein chapter1 of ValeriusTerminus,entitled"of the limitsand end
of knowledge."Here he writesthat althoughthe highest"law of nature"is
reservedforGod, the inferiorlevelsof knowledgeare still"manyand noble,"
and are
withinman's sounding.This is a thingwhichI cannottell whetherI may so

plainlyspeak as trulyconceive,thatas all knowledgeappearethto be a plantof
God's ownplanting,so it mayseemthatthespreadingand flourishing, or at least
thebearingand fructifying of thisplant,by a providenceof God, nay not only
bya generalprovidencebutbya specialprophecy, was appointedto thisautumn
oftheworld:forto myunderstanding it is notviolentto theletter,and safenow
aftertheevent,so to interpretthatplacein theprophecyofDaniel wherespeaking
of the lattertimesit is -said,Many shall pass to and fro,and scienceshall be
This is part of a lecturedeliveredat the Francis Bacon Library,Claremont,on 25

January1989,to commemorate the 428thanniversary of Bacon's birth.
1 Paolo Rossi, "Ants,Spiders,Epistemologists," in M. Fattori(ed.), FrancisBacon:
Terminologia e Fortunanel XVII Secolo (Rome, 1984),245-60,at 245.
495
Copyright 1992 by JOURNALOF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, INC.
496 Brian Vickers
increased;
as if the openingof the worldby navigationand commerceand the
discoveryof knowledgeshouldmeetin one timeor age (III, 320-21).2
further
That is, Columbus'sdiscoveryofAmericawas thefulfillment ofDaniel's proph-
ecy,inaugurating a newage oflearning-a typically confident Renaissanceassess-
mentof its own newness.
Indeed,thisidea oftheconstantgrowthofknowledgewasbothnewinBacon's
formulation, and historically significant.Even AnthonyQuinton,3a criticnot
naturallysympathetic to Bacon,juxtaposeshim approvingly withthe medieval
philosophers,who "saw themselves as orderersand preserversofknowledge,not
as itscreators"(29), a staticpositionagainstwhichhe setsBacon's "moreor less
unprecedented notionof knowledgeas cumulative."As Quintonsays,"in order
forknowledgeto be thoughtofin thisway,as something to be constantly added
to,a newconceptionoftrue,basic,paradigmatic knowledgehas to be adopted."
Bacon tookthatstep,Quintonwrites,"by separatingdivineand naturalknowl-
edge," and
in his beliefin the possibilityof largeand continuousgrowthof knowledge,of
finding newknowledgeratherthanretrieving old knowledgebeforeit disappears
irrecoverably, heplayeda crucialpartincreatinga mentalatmosphere orenviron-
mentin whichthenatural-science centeredconceptionofknowledgecould flour-
ish (30).
Not onlyin thenaturalsciencesbut in everyfieldof knowledgetodaywe confi-
dentlyexpectthat new researchwill expand our understanding of a subject,
theframework
enlargeor redefine or conceptualcategorieswithin which we see,
or thinkit.
From timeto timeit is salutaryto take stock,and ask oneselfhow Bacon's

legacyhas been understoodin recentyears,and whetherreal progresshas been
made?.Of the hundredor so books and essaysthat have appearedin the last
twenty years,somehavebeensuccessesand somefailures.We havenewreference-
books:a concordanceto theEssaysfromDavid Davies and ElizabethWrigley,4
a concordanceto theNovumOrganumfromMartaFattori,5 and a usefulbibliog-
raphyof recentEnglish-language studiesby WilliamA. Sessions.6On thedebit
2 All quotationsfromJ. Spedding,D. D. Heath and R. L. Ellis (eds.), The Worksof

FrancisBacon (14 vols; London, 1857-74)are incorporatedinto the textin the form
III,340. Bacon repeatedthisquotation,no longerdiffidentabouthisinterpretation ofit,in
theAdvancement ofLearning(111,340)and itsLatinexpansion,De Augmentis Scientiarum
(Latin, I,514; tr. IV,311-12),and in the NovumOrganum,Book i, aphorism93 (Latin,
I,200; English,IV,92). In the Biblical texta visionrevealsa prophecythat the angel
Michael will deliverIsrael fromtheirtroubles,and that the Kingdomof God will be
established.
I FrancisBacon (Oxford,1980); page-references incorporatedin thetext.
4 David W. Davies and ElizabethS. Wrigley(eds.), A Concordance to theEssays of
FrancisBacon (Detroit,1973); see my reviewin ModernLanguage Review,70 (1975),
601-2.
5 Marta Fattori,Lessicodel "NovumOrganum"di FrancescoBacone (2 vols.; Rome,
1980).
6 "RecentStudiesin FrancisBacon," EnglishLiterary Renaissance,17 (1987), 351-71.
Sessionshas updateditin thevolumehe has edited,FrancisBacon's Legacyof Texts(New
York, 1990), 325-27.
Francis Bacon 497
side,we haveno fundamental alterations to R. W. Gibson'sBibliography ofearly

editionsand no supplement to his listofseventeenth-century allusions,although
thatbadlyneedsupdating.7 We have had an excellenteditionof theEssaysfrom
Michael Kiernan,who is now editingtheAdvancement of Learning.8We have
had French,German,and Italian editions,translations, and scholarlymono-
graphs.9 This enlargement of Bacon studies throughout the world is a most
hearteningdevelopmentof the last decade, and gives a new meaningto that
passage in his will: "For my name and memory,I leave it to men's charitable
speeches,and to foreignnations,and the next ages" (XIV, 539). The most
fundamental contribution,in myopinion,is PeterBeal's accountof Bacon in his
monumentalIndex to EnglishLiteraryManuscriptsof the Renaissance.'0Beal
has located (and in some cases identified forthe firsttime)some 322 separate
manuscripts ofBacon's workfromthesixteenth and seventeenth com-
centuries,
prisingin mycountsome 49 worksin English(prose:45; poetry:2; drama:4)
and 20 in Latin.One ofthesenewly-discovered workshas beeneditedbyGraham
Rees," fromwhoseleadershipa completelynew editionof Bacon's worksis to
be expected,withthe firstvolumeprojectedfor 1992-1993.12
I R. W. Gibson,FrancisBacon: A Bibliography of his Worksand ofBaconiana to the

Year 1750 (Oxford,1950); Supplement(Oxford,1959). Gibson's own inter-leaved and
correctedcopiesoftheseworksare ownedbytheFrancisBacon Library,Claremont,and
it is greatlyto be hoped thatits librarian,ElizabethWrigley,will issue a revisededition,
in particulardrawingon herown extensiveknowledgeof allusionsto Bacon.
8 M. Kiernan (ed.), Sir FrancisBacon. The Essayes or Counsels,Civill and Morall
(Oxford,1985); see myaccountin ModernLanguage Review,83 (1988), 403-5.
9 Restrictingthelistto bookspublishedin thelast decade,see M. Malherbeand J.M.
Pousseur(eds.), FrancisBacon: Scienceet meithode (Paris, 1985); thespecialnumbersof
Les Etudesphilosophiques 1985(No.3) and Revueinternationale dephilosophie, 40 (1986),
dedicatedto Bacon; J. M. Pousseur,Bacon, inventer la science(Paris, 1988); M. Fattori
(ed.), FrancisBacon (op.cit.in note 1); E. De Mas, FrancisBacon (Florence,1978); W.
Krohn,FrancisBacon (Munich,1987);JurgenKlein,FrancisBacon oderdie Modernisier-
ungEnglands(Hildesheim,1990).Notabletranslations includea Frenchversionof Valer-
ius Terminus, tr.M. Le Doeuff(Paris, 1983),and a Germanversion,tr.F. and H. Traeger
(Wurzburg,1984). Most of Bacon's workshave long been available in Italian; France
and Germanyare beginningto catch up. A pioneeringtranslationinto Spanishof two
astronomicalworksunder the title Teoria del Cielo, by A. Elena and M. J. Pascual
(Madrid, 1989), was the subjectof a thoughtful essay-review by AntonioPerez-Ramos,
"FrancisBacon and astronomicalinquiry,"BritishJournalfor theHistoryofScience,23
(1990), 197-205.
10Index ofEnglishLiteraryManuscripts, 1450-1625,(2 vols.; London, 1980).
l l GrahamRees assistedbyChristopher Upton,FrancisBacon'sNaturalPhilosophy: A
NewSource.A transcription ofmanuscriptHardwick72Awithtranslation and commentary
(ChalfontSt Giles, Bucks., 1984),whichI reviewedin BritishJournalfor theHistoryof
Science,21 (1988), 256-57.For otherrecentlydiscoveredmanuscripts see GrahamRees,
"Francis Bacon's BiologicalIdeas: A New ManuscriptSource," in Brian Vickers(ed.),
Occult and ScientificMentalitiesin the Renaissance(Cambridge,1984), 297-314; "An
UnpublishedManuscriptby FrancisBacon: SylvaSylvarumDraftsand OtherWorking
Notes," Annalsof Science,4 (1981), 377-412;"Bacon's Philosophy:Some New Sources
withSpecial Referenceto the AbecedariumNovum Naturae,"in Fattori(op.cit.in note
1), 223-44.
12 See GrahamRees, "A New EditionoftheWorksof FrancisBacon," Bulletinofthe
SocietyforRenaissanceStudies,5 (1988), 14-18.
498 Brian Vickers
In termsofourknowledgeofBacon's lifetherehavebeenno majorrevelations

but some smallerdiscoverieswhichfillin, or correctdetails.David Cressyhas
shown that the traditionalbeliefthat Bacon was not unusual in going up to
TrinityCollege,Cambridge,at the age of 14 is wrong,since the medianage at
admissionthenwas 17.2.13JoelEpsteinestablished(withthehelpoftheresearch-
ers intoparliamentary history)thatBacon firstsat as an M.P. in the House of
Commonsin 1581,not 1585 as hithertothought.14JonathanMarwilfoundevi-
dence missedby otherbiographersthatBacon was on a government committee
forthe reformof the laws in December 1588, at the age of 27.15A German
scholar,WolfgangKrohn,has noticedBacon's nameon a listoffoundersofthe
NewfoundlandCompanyin 1607 and on thatof the foundersof the Virginia
Companyin 1609.16As forhis lastyears,D. R. Woolfhas discoveredin a Dutch
librarya lettershowingthat,whenwritingHenryVII,Bacon did in factborrow
manuscript historiesfromJohnSelden.17
Theseareall heartening and in manybooksandjournalarticles
developments,
othersignsof growthand fruitioncan be discerned.Yet the studyof recent
literatureshowsthatthe growthof knowledgeis neitherautomaticnor steady.
There are, to beginwith,backslidings,in whichinsightsestablishedby earlier
studiesare eithernotknownor ignored.So we are stilltoldthatBacon hatedthe
imagination, distrusteddrama,or fiction,or poetry.'8I fondlyimaginedthatI
had sufficientlyrefutedL. C. Knights'suncriticaluse of T. S. Eliot's notorious
(and largelydiscredited)theoryto makeBacon personally responsible forcreating
the "SeventeenthCenturyDissociationof Sensibility,"that denial of the free
functioning of the imaginationfromwhichapparentlyalso derivedthe evilsof
13 D. Cressy,"FrancisBacon and theAdvancement ofSchooling,"History

ofEuropean
Ideas, 2 (1981), 65-74,at 73 n5.
14 J. J.Epstein,FrancisBacon. A PoliticalBiography
(Athens,Ohio, 1977),25, 32 n7.
15 J. Marwil,The Trialsof Counsel:FrancisBacon in 1621 (Detroit,1976),65.
16 Krohn, 1987 (op.cit.in note 8 above), 45.
17
D. R. Woolf, "John Seldon [sic], John Borough and Francis Bacon's History of
HenryVII, 1621,"Huntington LibraryQuarterly, 47 (1984), 47-53.
18 See,e.g.,E. P. McCreary,"Bacon's TheoryofImagination Reconsidered," Hunting-
tonLibraryQuarterly, 36 (1973), 317-26,forsuchstatements as "Bacon considersimagina-
tionas a rebeland lawbreaker"(320), and "thehistory ofsciencehas shownjusthowwrong
Bacon was aboutimagination's role" (321)-the authorclaimsthatBacon understoodthe
role neitherof hypothesisnor of "imaginativethinking"in scientific method(322), and
"Perhaps his stronglyCalvinistbackgroundpreventedhim fromfullyacceptingand
accountingforimagination'screativepowerand freedom,not onlyherein poetrybut in
scienceas well" (324). Even worse,L. G. Kelly,in "Medicine,LearnedIgnorance,and
Stylein Seventeenth-Century Translation,"Language and Style,19 (1986), 11-21,de-
scribesBacon as a "positivist"and "materialist,"and breezilyaffirms that "Like most
positivistthinkers Bacon fearedtheimagination, and in an age whenimaginative language
was prized,mistrusted language"(11). See also theextremely imperceptiveessaybyJ.M.
Cocking,"Bacon's viewofimagination," in Fattori(op.cit.in note1),43-58.None ofthese
writersis aware of the studyby JohnL. Harrison,"Bacon's View of Rhetoric,Poetry,
and the Imagination,"Huntington LibraryQuarterly, 20 (1957), 107-25,repr.in Brian
Vickers(ed.), EssentialArticlesfor theStudyof FrancisBacon (Hamden, Conn., 1968;
London, 1972),253-71.This is not ideal,but is at least a start.
FrancisBacon 499
soil erosion,the internalcombustionengine,and America;'9but some criticsof

Bacon's stylehave recently revivedit.20I thoughtthatR. M. Adolphand myself,
publishingindependently of each otherin 1968,had laid to restthe theoriesof
EnglishRenaissanceprosestyleinvented byMorrisCrolland GeorgeWilliamson,
accordingto whichBacon wrotea "Senecan" or "Anti-Ciceronian"style;2' but
thatHydrahas developedmoreheads sincethen.If theseattackson old miscon-
ceptionshave not succeeded,thentheymustbe restatedmoreforcefully, with
further evidence.
I. In chroniclingthemisunderstanding ofBacon's workone majorproblem-

whichhe shareswithotherphilosophers-isthatscholarsdo not pay accurate
attentionto whatthe textsactuallysay. For instance,Bacon discriminated two
waysof doingscience,one (negative)whichhe called theanticipationofnature,
the other(positive)knownas the interpretation of nature(and represented, in
his work,by theNovumOrganum). The formertook a quick look at its subject
and on thebasisofa fewobservations leaptto conclusionsoverhastilyand rested
there,discouragingfurther research.The latteradvanced slowlybut methodi-
cally,evolvingtechniquesof siftingtheevidence,checking,attempting to refute
itin thefamous"negativeinstances"forwhichBacon's inductivesystemremains
justlycelebrated.22 The distinctionbetweenthe two ways of proceedingis per-
fectlyclear,yetsomecritics,includingKarl Popper,havethoughtthatby"antici-
pation" Bacon must have meant hypothesis,a termto which he gave quite
different connotations.23
In approachingBacon's writingswe musttryto understandthe termsthat
he uses and the argumentsthat he developsin specificcontexts,payingclose
attention and discriminations
to thedistinctions thathe makes;and itis necessary
to knowsomething of thehistoricalsetting.A strikingexampleof thefailureto
observeeitherprincipleis providedby thepoliticalhistorianJonathanMarwil,24
whosedeclaredaim was to reconstruct thecauses whichled to Bacon writing his
History ofKingHenryVII in theaftermath ofhisfallfromofficein 1621.In fact,
Marwilbacktracksto the beginningof Bacon's career,givingan undisguisedly
19BrianVickers,FrancisBacon and RenaissanceProse(Cambridge,1988), 142, 151-

201, 290.
20 JohnCarey,"Sixteenth and Seventeenth CenturyProse,"in C. Ricks (ed.), English
Poetryand Prose, 1540-1674 (London, 1970), 339-431,at 396-97; JohnPitcher(ed.),
Bacon's Essays(Harmondsworth, 1985),52. ThesetwojauntydismissalsofBacon,largely
throughthemediumof derogatory metaphors,deservea reply.
21 See R. M. Adolph, The Rise of ModernEnglishProse Style (Cambridge,Mass.,
1968); and Vickers,op.cit.in note 19, 12-14,96, 106-17,134,284, 285-87.
22 See, e.g.,NovumOrganum,i.19-22(IV,50); 104 (IV,97), 125 (IV,1 11-12).
23
For Popper'smisunderstanding of Bacon's theoryof hypothesissee PeterUrbach,
FrancisBacon's Philosophy ofScience(La Salle, Illinois,1987),23, 26, 34, 84; and Mary
Horton, "In Defence of Francis Bacon: A Criticismof the Critics of the Inductive
Method,"Studiesin theHistoryand Philosophy ofScience,4 (1973), 241-78,at 248. For
theclaim(improbableat firstsight,butwelcomedby Rossi,op.cit.in note 1, 257-58)that
Bacon influenced Popper,see Urbach,32-33,49-51,56-58,85-90,122. Otherreadersare
unpersuadedby thisclaim:see, e.g., thereviewby RogerAriewin Archiv fur Geschichte
derPhilosophie,71 (1989), 350-52.
24 Op.cit.in note 15; page-referencesincorporated intotext.
500 Brian Vickers
hostileaccountofwhatever eventorworkhe discusses.Not contentwithdenigrat-

Marwil
legal,historical,and politicalwritings,
ing Bacon's lifeand his literary,
also attacksthe scientificworks.Not, however,the NovumOrganum,nor the
Parasceve,northeNaturaland Experimental History-noneof theworkswhere
Bacon's aims are bothclearlyexpressedand exemplified in practicalterms-but
twominorworks,onlypublishedby Gruterin 1653.The firstwas theDescriptio
GlobiIntellectualis(withthe Thema Coeli). Marwil has consistently psycholo-
gized Bacon, arguingthat his legal trainingdeformedhis mentalprocessesso
much thatit disqualifiedhim forscience.Accordingto Marwil,because legal
modes of interpretation do not constitute"a methodconduciveto discovering
whatis unknown,particularly whenlanguageis eitherunavailableor irrelevant
as a possiblemediumforknowing,Bacon willflounderwhenhe actuallytriesto
do science"(112, my italics).From thispositionMarwil now condescendingly
dismissesthesetwo fragmentary works:
Neitherfragment has meritwhetherconsideredas a documentintendedto ad-

vancescienceor evenas a statement ofwhatwas knownaboutastronomy in its
author'sday. Simpleignorancecannotexplaintheirinadequacy.... somedefect
besidesslothaccountsforBacon's ineptitude. As withall subjects,Bacon comes
to astronomy devil'sadvocate,automatically
as a self-styled challengingwhatever
has been hithertoaccepted(138).
But there is nothing"automatic" or undiscriminating ("whatever") about

Bacon's critique, and Marwil has simply not understood the pointat issue. He
that
quotesBacon's statement astronomy deals with"hypotheses whichare most
for
suitable compendiouscalculations,philosophy [with] thosewhich approach
nearestthetruth of nature"(V, 557), and then declaresthat Bacon's "aversion"
to mathematics"necessarilydisqualifiedhim frommakingany contribution to
at
astronomy"(138). But thepoint issue involves not
physics, mathematics, and
was statedperfectly clearlyby Bacon himself;namely,thatastronomy advances
hypotheses of
whichare intendedto explaintheobservablephenomena planetary
motionbut whichare not necessarilytrue(and in any case, unverifiable at that
time).Naturalphilosophy(or physics,as we shouldcall ithere)alonecan explain
physicalcauses in physicalterms.This is whyBacon wroteof thehypotheses of
astronomy in ThemaCoelithat"it is uselessto refutethem,becausetheyare not
themselvesassertedas true,and theymay be variousand contraryone to the
other,yetso as equallyto save and adjustthe phenomena"(V, 557). Or, as he
the astronomers
put it in DescriptioGlobiIntellectualis, do not claim thattheir
hypotheses"are actuallytrue,but onlythattheyare convenienthypothesesfor
calculationsand theconstruction oftables"(V, 511). Butphysics,Bacon believed,
could studynotonly"theexterioroftheheavenlybodies(I meanthenumberof
the stars,theirpositions,motions,and periods)"but "the interior(namelythe
physicalreasons),"accountingfor,"the substance,motion,and influenceof the
heavenlybodies as theyreallyare" (IV, 348). It is importantto grasp this
distinctionif we are to understandthe sense in which Bacon uses the term
"hypothesis,"and his beliefin thepowerof physicsto discovertruth.
In anycase,as PeterUrbachhas shown,Bacon is merelyapplyinga traditional
distinction betweenthetwo subjectsthatgoes back to Plato and is stillfoundin
Francis Bacon 501
WilliamGilbertin the early 1600s.25Simplicius,forinstance,commenting on

Aristotlein the6thcenturyAD, said thatthescope of" 'physicaltheory'" was
to study" 'theessenceoftheheavensand thestars,theirpower,theirquality,'"
and to " 'providedemonstrations concerning thesize,shape,and arrangement of
thesebodies.'" All thesetopicslay beyondtheastronomer's powers,who,since
he cannot"'contemplatecauses ... feelsobligedto positcertainhypothetical
modesofbeingwhichare suchthat,once conceded,thephenomenaare saved,'"
thatis, accountedfor.Nine centurieslaterOsiandertold Copernicusthatthe
astronomer'shypothesesare "'not articlesof faithbut the basis of computa-
tion,'" and "'need not be true or even probable,if theyprovidea calculus
consistent withtheobservations.' " We mayregretthatBacon allowedthedistinc-
tionbetweenthetwosciencesto solidify, failingto realizethatastronomy
could
indeedlead to naturalphilosophyin the formation of a worldsystem.But we
mustappreciatethathis distinction betweenthetwo was no personalquirkbut
represented contemporary scientific
belief.
Marwilis equallyoff-target in the otherscientificworkthathe attacks,the
De Fluxu etRefluxuMaris,which,he believes,"underliesthereasonforBacon's
failureas a scientist"(140). Accordingto Marwil,Bacon,
forall his lip serviceto experienceand induction,is restricted

to an essentially
deductivemethodwhenhe does science.Simpleextrapolation fromhastilycon-
ceivedlaws oftenat variancewiththeworkof othermenis at theheartof this
exquisitely verbalscience.And themodeofreasoning,as wellas theexpectation
ofresults,is distinctly ofhis mindwhenit appliesitselfto law. (141)
reminiscent
In fact,as historiansof scienceknow,Bacon did not merelypay lip serviceto

experiments and inductivemethod;he devoteda largepartof his maturework
to layingdowntheconditionswithinwhichtheycould be successfully pursued.
Nor was he ever guiltyof "simple extrapolation,"let alone forming"hastily
conceivedlaws." The biggesterroris the phrase "exquisitelyverbalscience,"
sincea constantthemeof Bacon's polemic-thepars destruens as he called it,to
be complemented by a pars construens-wasthe pointlessnessof all formsof
sciencewhichbased themselveson books,language,or logical methoddealing
withwords,not things.And as forMarwil'scriticismof Bacon as "at variance
withtheworkofothermen" (as ifindependence werea vice),Bacon's theoryof
the tidesattractedseriousattentionfromGalileo. Indeed,as Paolo Rossi26and
AntonioPerez-Ramoshave emphasized,Galileo almostcertainlyknewBacon's
De Fluxu et RefluxuMaris,and "elaboratedhis own theoryof thetidespartly
as a responseto it." Furthermore,and reciprocally,
as it were,"Bacon's instantia
crucisin Nov. Org. ii.36 was also designedto test Galileo's view (explicitly
mentionedin ii. 46)."27
25 Op.cit.in note23, 126-27.See also Perez-Ramos,"FrancisBacon and astronomical
inquiry,"op.cit.in note9.
26 Rossi,"Venti,maree,ipotesiastronomiche in Bacone e Galilei,"Aspettidella rivolu-
zionescientifica(Naples, 1971), 163-91.
27 Perez-Ramos, FrancisBacon's Idea ofScienceand theMaker'sKnowledgeTradition
(Oxford,1988), 248n. On this outstandingstudy,the most importantone to date on
Bacon's naturalphilosophy, see mybriefnoticein the TimesHigherEducationalSupple-
ment,5 May 1989,28.
502 Brian Vickers
in movingintoareas beyondtheircompe-
II. Scholarsoverreachthemselves
tence.The memorableversesthatJonathanSwiftwroteas a mock epitaphfor
himselfincludesthelines:
True genuineDulness mov'd his pity
Unless it offer'dto be witty.28
OthermisunderstandingsofBacon's scientific sincethey
ideasare lesssurprising,
derivein part fromhis own attitudeto terminology. In the Advancementof
Learning,forexample,he drewattentionto thefactthathe was using"theword
sensefromthat[which]is received":
Metaphysicin a differing
it will easily appear to men of judgmentthat in this and otherparticulars,
wheresoevermy conceptionand notionmay differfromthe ancient,yet I am
studiousto keep the ancientterms.For hoping well to delivermyselffrom
mistaking by theorderand perspicuousexpressingof thatI do propound,I am
otherwisezealous and affectionate ... to retainthe ancientterms,thoughI
sometimesaltertheuses and definitions. (III, 352-53;De Augmentis,
IV, 344-45)
Bacon's hope that"theveryorderofthematterand theclearexplanationwhich
I giveofeverything willpreventthewordsI use frombeingmisunderstood" (IV,
344) was too optimistic,forsomereadershavemanagedto misconstrue him.But
beforewe protestthathe oughtto have inventeda new terminology, we should
remember thathe was writingin Latin,whereneologismswould have been far
lesseasythanin English,and thatbothclassicaland Renaissancerhetoric warned
againstneologism.
To take two instancesof misunderstanding, considerthe keyterms"Meta-
physics"and "Form." Bacon's scientific theoryhad as its goal the discoveryof
thelaws ofnatureand physicalcausesbya processthatwouldrisegraduallybut
inevitablyfromthe particularto the general.In developingthisnotion,Bacon
arrangedknowledgeinto a pyramidor hierarchyof increasinggenerality. The
base or primarylevelis "historyand experience,"thatis,observablephenomena,
whichare "infinitein number."Above thatcomes physics;thenmetaphysics;
and finally"summaryphilosophy,"whichbestridesall the othersciencesby
virtueof its generality.Metaphysicsis definedas the discoveryof forms,the
innatestructuralpropertiesof matter(III, 352-59; IV, 126, 344-47). This is
obviouslya highlyidiosyncratic use of the term,but Bacon-as he had prom-
ised-definesit so carefullyin itscontextthatthereis littleexcuseformisunder-
standingit.Yet MichaelHattaway29 managedto misconstrue itas "metaphysics"
28"Verseson the Death of Dr. Swift,"lines 473-4 in Swift,Poetical Works,ed. H.

Davis (Oxford,1967), 512.
29 "Bacon and 'KnowledgeBroken':LimitsforScientific Method,"JHI, 39 (1978),
183-97;page-references incorporated in thetext.Anothercriticwho has not attendedto
Bacon's contextualdefinition is JohnC. Briggs,who writes:"The truelaws of nature,
Bacon explains,are metaphysical-beyondtraditionallaws of physics":FrancisBacon
and theRhetoricofNature(Cambridge,Mass., 1989),42. This disappointingly glibstudy
confirms thetrendto whichI have drawnattention(see note43 below) of criticstrained
in Englishliterature imaginingthattheycan set out as commentatorson Bacon without
anytraining researchinthehistoryofscience.Misunderstandings
or first-hand areinevita-
ble. So JoelFinemandiagnoses"a movementor developmentin RenaissanceHumanist
historiography" to "a more'scientific,'
presumptivelyThucydidean,historicism,"instanc-
FrancisBacon 503
witha smallM, as a formof "ChristianAristotelianism" (184), and so hejudged

Bacon to have been "basically an Aristotelian,"like Richard Hooker (187),
despitethe factthaton innumerableoccasions Bacon attackedthe sterility of
RenaissanceAristotelianism in beingalwaysbound to the same topicsand the
same methods.HattawayredefinesBacon as "a Christianskeptic"but also an
Aristotelian, whilehis notionof scientificlaw is said to be "a developmentof
Aristotle'sformalcausewith,however,a strangemixture ofultimately theological
notionsderivedfromalchemicalorcabbalisticsources"(188-89).Afterthemisun-
derstanding(as so oftenin Bacon studies)comes the dismissiveattack,and
Hattawaygoeson to dismissBacon as "essentially a conservative thinker."Those
passageswhichseemto be "forwardlooking,evenmodernare in factinformed
bymetaphysical paradigms.Like mostmedievaland Renaissancethinkers Bacon
workedlargelybycorrespondences and analogies... ." (184). Havingbrisklybut
superficiallyreviewedBacon's wholeoutput,Hattawayconcludes:"Bacon's old-
fashionedconfusionof essencesand accidents,primaryand secondaryquali-
ties,.. . may make us feelthatmostof Book II of theNovumOrganum is not
worthlogicalanalysis"(189). For thesechargesofconfusionHattawaygivesno
evidencebutsimplyasserts,forinstance,that"Bacon's notionofformis virtually
inseparablefromthe notionof spirit"(190). But it would be hard to findtwo
conceptswhichhad less in commonthanthese.Havingmistakenly linkedBacon
withtheoccultistswhothoughtthrough"correspondences and analogies,"Hatta-
wayerrsfurther by followingFrancesYates30in takingBacon'sjuxtapositionof
the"outercourtsofnature"with"herinnerchambers"-a favorite metaphorof
his to distinguishsuperficialfromprofoundapproaches-as being"a reference
or analogueto themysticalvaultoftheRosicrucians"(193). It is notsurprising
thathe subsequently describesBacon's attitudeto languageas "magical" (194).
A thoroughrefutation ofHattaway'sdismissalwas performed by MaryHor-
ton,whoshowsthathe distorted Bacon byselectivequotationand omission(494,
499) and simplystatesthat"in contradiction to Hattaway'scontention, Bacon
does not blur the distinctions betweenform,cause, and spirit"(492).31Most
valuably,she clearlyuttersa basic principlein the understanding of any text,
that"Bacon's concepts,whichhe claimedwerequitenew,[shouldbe] definedin
ing Bacon's "Catalogue of ParticularHistoriesby Titles," such as the "Historyof the

HeavenlyBodies": Fineman,"The Historyof the Anecdote:Fiction and Fiction,"H.
AramVeeser(ed.), TheNewHistoricism (New York, 1989),49-76,at 70, n.30. But Bacon
uses the termHistoriain its (now obsolete)synchronicsense as "A systematicaccount
(withoutreference to time)of a set of naturalphenomena... [cf.theuse of to-ropia by
Aristotle]"(OED, 4). This non-diachronic sensehas nothingto do withhistoriography.
30 As I showedmanyyearsago, Yates's discussion of Bacon in herbook TheRosicru-
cian Enlightenment (London, 1972), can be faultedin virtuallyeverydetail. See Brian
Vickers,"Frances Yates and the Writingof History,"Journalof ModernHistory,51
(1979), 287-316.For furtheranalysesof the verydifferent occult tradition,whichdid
indeed "thinkin analogies,"see B. Vickers,"Analogy versusidentity:the rejectionof
occultsymbolism," in B. Vickers(ed.), Occultand Scientific
Mentalitiesin theRenaissance
(Cambridge,1984),95-163;and id., "On thefunctionofanalogyin occultscience,"in A.
Debus and I. Merkel(eds.), Hermeticism and theRenaissance(Cranbury,N.J., 1988),
269-92.
II "Bacon and 'KnowledgeBroken':an Answerto MichaelHattaway,"JHI, 43 (1982),
487-504;page-references incorporated in thetext.
504 Brian Vickers
termsofhowheusesthemin thestructure ofhisarguments" (498). Thisprinciple

is especiallyapplicableto Bacon's theoryofForms,oftensaid to be confusedand
inconsistent. In hisbriefstudyofBacon,AnthonyQuintongivesa usefulstarting
definition, writingthat Forms are "the hiddenstatesof the finestructureof
thingsbyreference to whichtheirstraightforwardly observableproperties can be
explained."Formis "a latentstructural property oftheparticlesofwhichmatter
... is composed.... an arrangement or configuration of matter,not a thingin
its own right."32 This seemsto me essentiallycorrect,ifsomewhatundifferenti-
ated.MaryHorton,however,otherwisean able defender ofBacon againstmisun-
derstanding, writesthat "formsare ... no morenor less than the laws of na-
ture."33This is to give the termaltogethertoo abstracta sense: Bacon always
uses it concretely, albeitidiosyncratically.
Yet thereare moresurprising interpretationsto come. Mary Slaughter,ap-
proachingBacon fromthe historyof linguisticsin a usefulstudyof "universal
language"schemesin theseventeenth century,34claimsthatBacon represents a
late stageofAristotelian essentialism.
She statesthatalthoughBacon's "method
beginswithmodem ideas of observationand experimentation, it nevertheless
endswiththeclassicalproceduresofclassification and definition.Bacon's scien-
tificmethodstartswiththe collectionand enumeration of 'instances'and ends
with an accurate definitionof the natureof those instances.This is ... the
paradigmofAristotelian science"(93). For Bacon, as for"Aristotelian science,"
she severaltimesinsists,"classificationand,evenmoreso, definition are theends
of his scientificactivity"(94). But Bacon nowheresays that"classification and
definition"are "the end and means of science" (ibid.):the whole aim of his
sciencewas theproduction ofworks,notwords.The goal ofhisinductivemethod,
he wrote,was "fromworksand experiments to extractcauses and axioms,and
again fromthosecauses and axioms new worksand experiments" (NO, i.117;
32 Quinton,op.cit.in note 3, 45, 63-64.
33 Horton,op.cit.in note 23, 243. Rom Harre,in "A Note on Ms. Horton'sDefence
of Bacon," Studiesin theHistoryand Philosophyof Science,5 (1974), 305-6,findsher

"simplywrong"on this issue, havingreliedon the old Basil Montagutranslation.As
Harrepointsout,in theNovumOrganumdiscussion,ii.4 (not i.4, as Harrehas it),Bacon
uses theworddeducereto explainhow a "trueForm ... deducesthegivennaturefrom
somesourceofbeingwhichis inherent in morenatures"(IV, 121),and Harrerightly notes
thatdeducerehad,at thistime,"thephysicalsenseof'leads out' or 'produces'ratherthan
... thelogicalsenseof'implies'or 'entails.'" HarreshowsthatBacon's discussionclearly
"puts Form among the physicalpropertiesof things,substancesand phenomena,not
amongstpropositions concerning such properties."As Perez-Ramoshas shown,thismis-
conceptionthatBacon's "forms"are "scientific laws" has somedistinguished predecessors,
namelyWhewell,C. D. Broad,F. Anderson,et al. (65-67, 116). For thewholeissue see
N. E. Emerton,The ScientificReinterpretation of Form(Ithaca, N.Y., 1984).
34 Slaughter,Universal languagesand scientifictaxonomyin theseventeenth century
(Cambridge,1982); page-references incorporatedin thetext.This author'stendencyto fit
Bacon intopre-prepared slotswithoutreallyregistering his difference
is seen also in her
descriptionof the Advancement of Learningas "a typicalRenaissancecompilationof
information relatedto theencyclopediatradition"(89, 230-31,n.23). ButtheAdvancement
is a criticalsurveyofknowledgedesignedto exposedeficiencies and gaps;itis an "encyclo-
pedia" of workneeded,of not yetexistingknowledge,an encyclopediaof lacunae,as it
were,whicha new philosophywould fillin.
FrancisBacon 505
IV,104). The aim ofnaturalphilosophyis "theInquiryofCauses and theProduc-

tionof Effects"(IV, 346). Aristotelianand scholasticlogic are repeatedlycriti-
cized for theirinabilityto go beyond the manipulationof concepts,the re-
arrangement of whatis alreadyknown,helplessin makingany new discoveries
whichwillbenefitmankind(e.g., IV, 24-26,51, 97-98). Bacon's majorclaimfor
his sciencewas thatit would be a scientiaoperativa(IV, 22, 32, etc.), thatis,
productiveof works.
Slaughterseemsto have arrivedat thisstrangemisunderstanding of Bacon
byrelyingon someantiquatedsecondarysources(231, n.32),who encourageher
to believethatBacon impliedby "Forms" what she calls "abstractsimplena-
tures."Accordingto Slaughter, Bacon-like Aristotle-believedthat"a concrete
substancecan be definedby the enumerationof thesesimplenatures"(95), so
that"whathe is leftwithin theend are Aristotelianstatements of essence,i.e.,
definitionsby genus and difference" (96). But thereis nothingabstractabout
Bacon's conceptof Form:indeed,he explicitlydenouncedPlato's conceptionof
Formsas being"absolutelyabstractedfrommatter,and not"-as it shouldbe-
"confinedand determined by matter"(III, 355; IV, 66). Similarlyhe attacked
Aristotelian-scholasticnotionsof Form as beinghypostatizedabstractions(IV,
58-59,64-65, 119-20).As he explainsin the NovumOrganum,"the formof a
natureis such,thatgiventhe Form thenatureinfallibly follows.Thereforeit is
always presentwhen the natureis present,and universallyimpliesit, and is
constantly inherentin it" (ii.4; IV, 121). It followsthat"the Form of a thingis
the verythingitself"(ii.13; IV, 137), and the goal of scientificenquiryis to
investigatethe structureof matter.Slaughter'simage of Bacon as an original
Aristotelian,contentto remaina scholasticessentialist, resemblesR. E. Larsen's
attemptto writeBacon offas an Aristotelian and is opento thesamedevastating
critiquethatPerez-Ramoshas made of thatposition.35
An even strangeraccount of Bacon's conceptof Forms has recentlybeen
givenbyBrianCopenhaverin termsofRenaissancemagic.36 Copenhaverreviews
some(butonlysome)ofBacon's critiquesoftheoccultarts(296-97),yetdescribes
Bacon as merelymaking"certainphysicaland metaphysical departuresfromthe
post-Ficiniantheoryofmagic"-takingas demonstrated, thatis,Bacon's identity
withthis school of thought.These "departures,"Copenhaverclaims,include
Bacon's "reformulation on physicalgroundsof a magicaltheoryof formsand
occultqualities"(297). As to whatBacon meantby Form,Copenhaverdeclares:
Obviously,the Baconian formis not the Peripateticabstraction,but its exact

contoursareobscure-a generative essence,a taxonomicdistinc-
force,a defining
tion,a naturallaw, a materialquality,an alchemicaladditive,any of thesewill
answerto Bacon's descriptionwhich,however,seemsmostakinto thefixedand
materialproperties
distinguishing ofan object.This becomescleareras one leafs
of forms,a long listof 'instances'(298-99).
throughBacon's illustration
expositionofinductive
But this"longlist"ofinstancesis in facta tightly-argued
method.Whatis magicalaboutthis,thereadermaynowbe asking?Copenhaver
35 See Larsen, "The Aristotelianismof Bacon's NovumOrganum,"JHI, 23 (1962),

435-50,and Perez-Ramos(op.cit.in note 27), 115-32.
36 "Astrology ofRenaissance
and magic,"in C.B. Schmitt(ed.), TheCambridgeHistory
Philosophy (Cambridge,1988),264-300,at 296ff;page-references in thetext.
incorporated
506 Brian Vickers
runstogether severalpassagesin theNovumOrganumto arguethatBacon "did

not denythe existenceof occultvirtuesand sympathies, but he tracedthemto
imperceptible physicalstructuresin bodiescalled 'latentconfigurations' (latentes
schematismi)"(299). But the latterquotationcomes fromBook 2, aphorism6,
Bacon's firstoutlineof his theoryof Forms(IV, 124-26),wherethe "configura-
tions"are said to applyto matterin general,notto occultsympathies. (Inciden-
tally,Bacon uses the terms"occult and, as theyare called, specificproperties
and virtues"as standardconceptsin theAristotelian scientifictradition,withno
"magical"connotations.37)
The secondpassagequotedbyCopenhavercomesfromBook 2, aphorism50,
discussing"PolychrestInstances,or Instancesof GeneralUse," and itemizing
sevenwaysin which"man operatesupon naturalbodies" (IV, 233ff).The sixth
kind,Bacon writes,"oftenliesdeeplyhid.For whatare calledoccultand specific
properties,or sympathiesand antipathies,arein greatpartcorruptions ofphiloso-
phy" (IV, 242). Bacon professeshimself"almostwearyof thewordssympathy
and antipathy on accountofthesuperstitionsand vanitiesassociatedwiththem,"
and rejectsmany supposed "friendshipsand enmitiesof bodies" as false or
fabulous(IV, 244). Yet he makesone exceptionto therule,admitting thatsome
consentscan be found"in certainmedicines,whichby theiroccult(as theyare
called) and specificpropertieshave relationeitherto limbs,or humours,or
diseases,or sometimesto individualnatures"(ibid.). Accordingto Copenhaver,
thisbriefremarkis enoughto showthat"Bacon confirmed a traditionofpharma-
ceuticalmagicreachingback two millenniaand more." However,he observes,
"in adoptingthe termschematismus, Bacon may not have knownthe kindred
languageinPlotinus";and ina listoftraditional sympathies "he maynothavehad
in mind"a passagein Proclus(thisis therhetorical figureinsinuatio,smuggling in
a pointwhileappearingto denyit). But,he asserts,Bacon had read Ficino,who
used Proclusand Plotinus-"and in any event,"Copenhaverdismissively adds,
"whateverthe mannerof theirmediation,the resemblanceof Bacon's magical
ideasto theirNeoplatonicancestorsis apparent-as are thedifferences." Bacon's
conceptof Forms,he concludes,is "morephysical"thanhis Greekanalogues,
"butstillmoremagicalthanthequantitative conceptionsofforceand structure"
in thenew science(299-300).
Such a slendercase needs no greatrefutation. We may wonderhow many
otherwritersbeforePlotinus,or betweenPlotinusand Bacon, used the word
schematismus and in what rangeof contexts.We may wonderhow manylists
of "chains" of sympathetic correspondences existin classical and Renaissance
and whatthechancesare thatBacon maybe referring
literature, to such a rare
textas Proclus'sDe sacrificio-which, apartfroma fragment discoveredbyBidez,
is knownonly fromFicino's translation.38 (It would be hard to finda more
obscuretextin lateclassicalphilosophy.)And in thefaceofBacon's oft-repeated
criticismsof theocculttradition-magic,astrology, alchemy,"signatures,"and
so on-for its delusoryquality,its dishonesty, its appeal to thehumanappetite
3' See, e.g., Keith Hutchinson,"What happenedto occult qualitiesin the Scientific
Revolution?," Isis,73 (1982), 233-53;and AugustBuck(ed.), Die okkultenWissenschaften
in der Renaissance(Wiesbaden,1989).
38 See D. Pingree,"Some of the Sources of the Ghayat al-Hakim,"Journalof the
Warburgand CourtauldInstitutes, 43 (1980), 1-15,at 13.
FrancisBacon 507
forspeedyprofitswithouteffort,39 we may wonderwhyCopenhaverwantsto

link Bacon withthe magicaltradition.(Does the occult gain respectability by
beingassociatedwithscience?Or does sciencelose it?)
A less question-begging readingof thispassagein Bacon, such as theone by
GrahamRees citedin Copenhaver'sfootnote (299 n68)-presumablyas somehow
supportinghis thesis-concludes that the schematismus or "configuration" of
a body "is its internalconformation, structure,or constitution which can be
investigated by experimental techniquesdetailedin the NovumOrganumand
elsewhere.... Bacon's conceptof conformity is not veryclear but apparentlyif
theconfiguration oftwobodies'match'thensomekindofsympathetic effect can
be expected."' Throughouthis developingtheoryof Forms(some twentyyears
of thinking,at least) Bacon always insistedthat the discoveryof underlying
structures wouldreveal"thetruedifferences ofthings"(e.g., IV, 360). It is only
fittingthat,at the end of this fullestdiscussionof the subject,in the Novum
Organum,he shouldhave allowedforthepossibility ofidentityas wellas differ-
ence. If he explainedit in termsof sympathy,that is an ancientand widely
diffusedidea, not properlymagical.Given thewholecontextof Bacon's theory
of Forms,he seemsto have drawnnothingfromwhat Copenhaverdefines,in
suchproprietary terms,as theNeoplatonicmagicaltradition.The antecedents of
his conceptofForm,as Perez-Ramoshas shown(74-82),developingtheworkof
P. Reifand others,41lie ratherintheuniversity
text-book tradition,an Aristotelian
backgroundwhich Bacon decisivelyreinterpreted for his own, new vision of
science.
III. If theprecedingdiscussionhas seemedrathernegative,we drawcomfort

fromthe remarkmade by Darwin in one of his lettersthatit is just as valuable
to correcta mistakenfactas to discovera new one. But thereare also more
positivegroundsforhope in recentBacon studies,in particularthe two book-
lengthstudiesby PeterUrbach and AntonioPerez-Ramos.Althoughdiffering
in scope and detailtheybothchallengethe receivedviewof Bacon by applying
whatare surelythetwoessentialprocessesin intellectual history:reconstructing
thesituationin whicha writerworked,and attendingcloselyto themeaningof
his texts.As Perez-Ramosputs it, "the explorationof old meaningsconsists,
largely,in the reconstructionof the 'problemsituation'a givenauthorwas fac-
ing,"considering, thatis, notjust thestatementsor answersthathe gave," 'but
of thesetogetherwiththe questiontheyare meantto answer'" (45). The only
wayto avoid "grossdistortion ofpasttexts... [is] to reconstruct
theconceptual
grammarin whichtheywereoriginallyembedded"(ibid.). The receivedimage
of Bacon as a "positivistinductivist,"applyingan unsuitablelogical method
exhaustivelyand unimaginatively-asgivenby such commentators as Morris
oftheoccultsee,e.g.,B. Vickers,"Analogyversusidentity,"
3 For Bacon's criticisms
op.cit.in note30, 133-34,and "On thegoal oftheoccultsciencesin theRenaissance,"in
G. Kauffmann(ed.), Die Renaissanceim Blickder NationenEuropas(Wiesbaden,1991),
51-93,at 90-92.
cosmology,"Ambix,22 (1975), 81-101,
40 G. Rees, "FrancisBacon's semi-Paracelsian
at 97-98.
41 Reif, "The TextbookTraditionin Natural Philosophy,"JHI, 30 (1969), 17-32;
Emerton,op.cit.in note 33 above.
508 Brian Vickers
Cohen, J. H. Randall, AlexandreKoyre, Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, P. B.

Medawarand others-is a productofan anachronistic twentieth-century history
of science (40, 271-75). Peter Urbach reachedthe same conclusion(indepen-
dently,and a bitearlier),thatthereceivedimageofBacon theinductivist-what
he calls the "Infallible-Mechanical Thesis," as argued by the commentators
R. L. Ellis, Karl Popper,L. J. Cohen, and others(17-24)-is false.Although
neitheras methodologically rigorousnor as historically wide-ranging as Perez-
Ramos, Urbachperforms a similaract of rehabilitation.
Reconstructing the contemporary climateof knowledgeis less important to
UrbachthananalyzingBacon's ideas,buthe makessomevaluablepoints.As we
have seen,he provesthatBacon's distinction betweenthehypothetical natureof
astronomyand the promisedcertaintiesof physicsreflectedclassical ideas still
acceptedduringtheRenaissance.He also showsthatBacon's conceptof "proof"
or "demonstration" did not thenhave the categoricalimplicationsthosewords
have in modemEnglishbutdescribed"theprocesswherebyfavourableevidence
graduallyraisesa theory'sacceptability or plausibility"(44). This connotation
was generallyacceptedin the period 1560 to 1680 and certainlydid not imply
claimsof infallibility.In 1676 JosephGlanvilldistinguished two sensesof "cer-
tainty.""InfallibleCertainty," or "an absoluteAssurance,thatthingsare as we
conceiveand affirm, and not possibleto be otherwise"may be knownto God
butit is deniedhumanbeings,sinceour facultiesmayalwaysdeceiveus. We are
capable,however,of "Indubitable Certainty,"or "a firmassentto any thingof
which thereis no reason of doubt," and men may therefore"propose their
Opinionsas Hypothesis, thatmayprobably be thetrueaccounts,withoutperemp-
torilyaffirming thattheyare." Significantly, Glanvillstatedthisto be Bacon's
way of proceeding(44-45).
Urbachrecreatesanothercontemporary contextin clarifyingBacon's critical
commentson WilliamGilbert(passages that oftenpuzzle modem readers,to
whomDe Magnete represents one ofthekeyworksofthenew science).Bacon's
remarkscan now be seen to reflecta generalcontemporary distrustof Gilbert's
more speculativecosmology.While Bacon acceptedthe demonstration of the
earth'smagneticproperties(V, 454), he rejectedthe claimsmade by Gilbertin
the sixthand finalpartof his book, that "the magneticcharacterof the earth
makes it 'fittedforcircularmovement'" and that magnetism"'endowed the
earthwitha purposeand a soul,' due to its 'astralmagneticmind'" (115-18).As
Urbach shows,WilliamBarlow and Edward Wright-two of Gilbert'sclosest
scientificacquaintances-independently criticizedhis theoryascribinga diurnal
motionto theearth,supposedlyderivedfromits "magneticalforceand virtue,"
as "themerest[total]theorizing"(120-21). Bacon rejectedastrologyon similarly
"scientificand experimental grounds"(121-22).
AnalyzingBacon's orientation in naturalphilosophy, Urbachbringsout well
theimportance ofphysicsas whatwe mightcall the"normscience"in hissystem,
based on the convictionthat"everynaturalactiondependson thingsinfinitely
small,"in "a processperfectly continuous,whichforthe mostpartescapes the
sense" (IV, 124). For this reason the main task of Bacon's physicswas the
investigation,as Urbachputsit,"ofthelatentprocessesand latentconfigurations
ofordinarybodies."Since"objectswith'a specificcharacter'.. . havea 'uniform
structure,'" the goal of science,particularly in its operativerole,is to discover
FrancisBacon 509
thisunderlying structure, for,as Baconputit,"no onecanendowa givenbody

witha newnature, or ... transform itintoa newbody,unlesshe hasattained a
competent knowledge ofthebodyso tobe altered ortransformed" (61; IV, 122-
26).Itisimportant tograsptheextent ofBacon'sinvolvement withmatter-theory
(74-81),sinceitlargely conditioned hisconceptofFormsas "thenecessary and
sufficientconditions forthemanifestation of[natural] phenomena" (65). Bacon
also talkedofa formas beinga "law" (e.g.,IV, 120),or a "law ofactionor
motion" (IV, 58);andUrbachhelpfully suggeststhatinso doing"hepresumably
meantto conveythatthereis somekindofcompulsion, analogousto thecivil
law,binding theformanditsmanifestation, thatis tosay,thetwoarerelated as
causeandeffect" (62). Butthisdoesnotmeanthatwecan identify Formswith
"naturallaws,"as somecommentators do, sinceforBacon thetermalways
impliessomeconcrete, materialstructure, "theconfigurations of minuteand
invisibleparticles" (190).
Urbachdescribes Bacon'smethodology, outlined intheNovumOrganum, as
a "hypothetico-inductive method"whichwas "bothgoodand original," consti-
tutinga properly "unified philosophy ofscience"(15). He goeson toarguethat
"Bacon welcomedhypotheses (in thesenseof theories goingbeyondwhatis
immediately givenin perception) fromtheverybeginning, and thattheywere
alwaystheintended product oftheinterpretative method" (34). Thispointonce
seen,manycommoncriticisms ofBaconcan be rejected as ill-founded. Rather
thanmechanically collecting observationswithout anycontrolling theory, Urbach
pointsout,Baconexplicitly rejected "theindiscriminate, ant-like accumulation
offacts,whichhe associated withthe'empiric' " (153).In a famousanalogy,42
Baconcontrasted twofalsepathsinscience:thoseoftheempirics (whoare"like
theant;theyonlycollectand use"),andthereasoners (who"resemble spiders,
whomakecobwebs outoftheir ownsubstance"). Theproponents ofa truenatural
philosophy resemble thebee,whichgathers itsmaterial from variousplaces,but
"transforms anddigests itbya powerofitsown."So a truephilosophy willrely
neither on "thepowersofthemind"unsullied bycontactwithmatter, noron
"matter... fromnaturalhistory and mechanical experiments" recorded and
untransformed, butwilllayupobservations andexperiments "intheunderstand-
ing,altered anddigested" (IV,92-93).Sincethisinsistence onuniting therational
andempirical facultiesis "oneofthemoststriking features ofhisphilosophy,"
Urbachdescribes thepersistence ofthismythofBacontheindiscriminate fact-
collectoras "a mystery." Far fromadvocating an exhaustive enumeration of
instances, Baconwarned a
that"tonoteall thesewouldbeendless," process both
"infinite,and foreign to thepurpose"(IV, 129,384-85).His planwas "notto
noteeverysingleinstance, forsome-theso-calledprerogative instances-have
a greater inductive forcethanothers."Nordidhe want to collect onlysimilar
instances butrather "a variety ofinstances, which would share the character in
questionbutwhichwouldotherwise very be different." As Urbach says,"this
perceptive requirement is absolutely centraltotheBaconianprinciples ofnatural
history" (154).
See the admirableessay by Paolo Rossi cited in note 1, whichtakes issue witha
42
numberofcontemporary interpretersofBacon as an unimaginative notably

fact-collector,
Agassi,Popper,and Lakatos.
510 Brian Vickers
The factthatso manymodernhistoriansof sciencehave acceptedtheimage

of Bacon as a fact-collector who separatedthat processfroman unworkable
systemof inductionmerelyshows,I think,thatreceivedideas constantly repro-
ducethemselves ifuncheckedbyrecourseto thetextorchallengedbyindependent
thought.Bacon insistedtimeand again on a reciprocal,symbioticmovement
from"worksand experiments" to "causes and axioms"and back again(e.g.,IV,
80-81,104-5).As Urbachpointsout, "the secondbook of theNovumOrganum
containsnumerouspredictions derivedfromtheorieswhichBacon advanced,and
whichhe intendedshouldbe checkedin experiment" (155-56).He did notclaim
forhis naturalhistories,
infallibility sincehe explicitlystatedthattheformation
of axioms will correctexperiments shownto be false (157-59). The inductive
methodwas neithermechanicalnor unthinking, furthermore, but was readyto
use analogyand conjecture.Amongthe "Instancesof the Lamp" Bacon listed
"thosewhichsupplyinformation whenthe sensesentirelyfailus ... eitherby
gradualapproximation or by analogy"(IV, 202-3). Similarities-thatis, analo-
gies-"may also provideinformation aboutinvisibleprocesses,"butbythesame
token,Bacon warned,theyare "less certain"(165). Bacon's "mostfamouscontri-
butionto thedescription and classification of experiments,"Urbachwrites,was
his notionof theinstantiaecrucis,instancesof thefingerpost, forwhereasother
instances'just refutea hypothesis ... theyalso establishone" (IV,180-90; 169).
In contrastto a recentcategoricaldenialof Bacon's originality in any sphere,43
Urbachjudges Bacon's classification of thevarioustypesof experiment and the
information theyprovide,to be "an almostentirelyoriginalcontribution to the
philosophyof science." Indeed, Ian Hacking"4has called him "the first,and
almostlast philosopherof experiments" (171). Urbach agreesthatBacon "well
deservesthetitleof 'Fatherof Experimental Philosophy'" (185). Bacon's belief
that"thegenerality ofone's assumptionsshouldbe increasedonlygraduallyand
shouldbe proportioned at everystageto theavailableevidence,"and his related
beliefthat"the role of observationand experiment was both to suggestappro-
priateaxiomsand to examinethoseaxioms,eitherconfirming or disconfirming
them"-these beliefs,Urbachjudges,form"an essentiallycorrectdescription of
themethodof science"(192).
IV. This highevaluationof Bacon's achievement in naturalphilosophymay

come as a surpriseto thosewho have longaccepteda lowerrating,butit is more
thanborneoutbythefullerstudyofAntonioPerez-Ramos.This is a thoroughly
researched,well-written book, conceptuallyfullyat ease withthe demanding
criteriaof contemporary methodology in thehistoryand philosophyof science.
All the more impressive,then,is the author'scriticismof many nineteenth-
and twentieth-century historians'accountofBacon. His openingsectionsurveys
Bacon's reputationfromthe mid-seventeenth to the mid-twentieth centuries,
43 For insistentdismissalsofanyclaimto originality in Bacon as "falsityand incongru-

see CharlesWhitney,
ity,"a "bluff'thatis also meaningless, FrancisBacon and Modernity
(New Haven,Conn.,1986),10-11,60, 88, 121-22,127,137,151,152,154.I havediscussed
the deficienciesof thisbook's treatment of sciencein "Bacon amongtheliterati:science
and language,"ComparativeCriticism,13 (1991), 249-71.
"4"Experimentation and ScientificRealism," in J. Leplin (ed.), ScientificRealism
(Berkeley,Cal., 1984), 159.
FrancisBacon 511
showinghow differing aspectsofBacon's legacyhavebeeninfluential at different

periods.The generationassociatedwiththe Royal Societyvalued his emphasis
on the collectionof data and the evolutionof experimental methods,withless
concernfor induction(althoughBacon's conceptof the instantiacruciswas
importantforHooke and Newton).4"For the Enlightenment Bacon became a
generalizedculture-hero, hailed as a founderof the new sciencebut not drawn
on in any detail.46In the revivalof interestin the historyof Englishsciencein
the Victorianperiod (Herschel,Whewell),Bacon became the philosopherof
inductivism, assimilatedto J. S. Mill's conceptof induction,an anachronism
that-in a stillcruderversion-formedthedominanttwentieth-century imageof
Bacon as "positivist,""utilitarian,"and "materialistic."
Perez-Ramosproducesa devastatingexposureof thehollownessofso many
judgmentson Bacon made by contemporary historiansof science,such as Imre
Lakatos's dismissalof him as "a confusedand inconsistent thinker"who only
appealsto "provincialand illiterate"scholars(29). A majorprincipleinvolvedis
theanachronistic natureof muchcontemporary historiography, whichseemsto
move"in one wayonly:fromthepresentto thepast,generallywithgenealogical
overtones"(240). This present-orientated attitudeignoresthehistoryoflanguage
and thevastchangesin philosophicalterminology, falselyassuminga "semantic
continuity" in the meaningsof such termsas "scientia"or "methodus"(which
led to theCassirer-Randall mistakenevaluationofPaduan Aristotelianism as the
source of modernscientificmethod[224-25]).The veryconceptof "science,"
indeed,"is formosthistorians and sociologistsviciouslyuncriticaland ahistorical,
no less thantheirindiscriminate use oftheterm'scientist'" (40). Karl Popperis
unrepentantly confidentin claimingan "identityof aims, interests,activities,
arguments and methods"between"Galileo and Archimedes,or Copernicusand
Plato, or Kepler and Aristarchus,"whereas,Perez-Ramosobserves,in these
thinkers"methodsand aims differed greatly,"while"activities,arguments, and
above all, interestswereworldsapart" (42-43). This fundamentally ahistorical
approachmayaccountforPopper'sviolentanti-Baconianism, a once influential
4s Almosttheonlypointon whichone can findPerez-Ramoslackingconcernsseven-

teenth-century knowledgeof Bacon's inductivesystem.He saysthat"the real coiner"of
the "celebrated"phraseexperimentum cruciswas Hooke (27n.), and that"the felicitous
phraseexperimentum crucisis not Bacon's but Hooke's in his Micrographia(1665)." In
fact,the coinagewas made by RobertBoyle,in his Defenceof theDoctrinetouchingthe
Springand Weight oftheAir(1662), referring to Pascal's experimenton thePuy-de-Dome
as "an experimentum crucis(to speak withour illustriousVerulam)":Boyle's Works,ed.
T. Birch,(6 vols;London,1772),1,151.Perez-Ramosalso writesthat"theterm'induction'
... does notevenappearin Boyle" (195), butthisis to relyon thenotoriously unreliable
Index to Birch'sedition.Boyle was certainlyfamiliarwithinductivetechniques,indeed
Perez-Ramoshimselfquoteshis reference to "thethreetablesofBacon's induction"(176-
77), and moreevidencecouldbe cited.As forNewton'sinheritance ofBaconianinduction,
forwhichthearguments forand againstare cited(19n.), I findit hardto acceptthecited
claimby M. Blay thatNewtonuses "the proposalsofNov.Org.as figuresde rhetorique or
modesofpresentation." Newton'suse ofthetermexperimentum crucisin theearlyoptical
writingsseemsto me thoroughly Baconian in function, not a mereornament:see Brian
Vickers(ed.), EnglishScience,Bacon to Newton(Cambridge,1987), 198-203,237.
46 See also M. Malherbe,"Bacon, l'Encyclopedie et la Revolution,"Les Etudesphilo-
sophiques,3 (1985), 387-404.
512 Brian Vickers
readingthatis comprehensively demolishedhere("Criticismof the 'Popperian

Bacon,' " 270-85) as "historicallyhollow,"a "grosstravesty"of Bacon's mode
of sciencewhich"missesthewholepoint."
As againstsuch misreadings Perez-Ramosdeploystheessentialtwo-handed
methodof intellectualhistory,diachronicand synchronic: both reconstructing
"the 'problem-situation' a given authorwas facing"(45-47) and expounding
the major ideas and theirinter-relations withinhis work.As he rightlysays,
"philosophicalhistoriography" involves"unearthingsome leadingmotivesor
highlysignificant patternsofthought"(179), attempting "to assemblesomepieces
of a hugehistoriographic puzzle" (216). In Bacon's case thepiecesinvolvedare
whatPerez-Ramosdefinesas his "keyconcepts:forma,opus,inductio"(40-41).
The firstand thirdofthesearefamiliar in Baconianstudies,albeiton veryvariable
levelsofunderstanding, butthesecond,as theauthormodestlydeclares,"aspires
to strikea novelinterpretative noteencompassingBacon's overallconceptionof
humanknowledge"(41). This is whathe calls the"Maker'sknowledge"tradition
(48-62, 150-66),a traditionwhich"postulatesan intimaterelationship between
objectsof cognitionand objectsof construction, and regardsknowingas a kind
of makingor as a capacityto make (verumfactum)" (48). Readers unfamiliar
withthisconceptwillbe comforted to see it describedas "one ofthose'subterra-
nean' currentsin Westernthoughtwhichare only made explicitfromtimeto
time"(150), mostnotablyby Vico (189-95). The distinction is between"knowl-
edge derivedfromits object(user's or beholder's),such as themusician'sor the
astronomer's, and knowledgewhichdetermines its objectin theway in whicha
cobbler'sknowledgeof a shoe determines his activityin producingone: maker's
knowledge"(150). Plato emphatically rejectedthenotion,declaringthat"knowl-
edge properbelongsto the user and not to the maker,"a preference sharedby
Aristotle,who also foundit unsuitableto thebios theoretikos whichformedthe
philosopher'shighestgood (50, 55-56, 150-51).
In traditionalpost-Aristotelianterminology scientiadesignates"knowledge
foritsown sake,"thusBacon's "much-repeated phrase'scientiaoperativa'" (IV,
22, 32, 102,252), and thelink47he makesbetweenscientiaandpotentia(IV, 47)
is a completely novelcollocationofwordsand ideas."NowhereintheAristotelian
tradition is thetermscientiaso expresslylinkedwitha purposiveattemptto alter
thecourseofNature'sprocessesso as to denotethefieldofoperativeknowledge.
Man is or can becomesapiensor 'knower'as a self-perfecting beholder,notas a
47 It shouldbe notedthattheascription to Bacon's philosophicalworksofthegeneral-

ized statement that"knowledgeis power"is erroneous.The NovumOrganum,i.3, states
that"Human knowledgeand humanpowermeetin one; forwherethecause is notknown
the effectcannotbe produced"(IV, 47), where"knowledge"clearlymeans "knowledge
ofcauses" as a precondition towards"theeffecting ofworks"(i.4). The phrasedoes occur,
as quoted,once in Bacon,butin theessayon "Heresies"in theearlyMeditationes Sacrae
(publishedwiththe 1597 Essays),whereBacon distinguishes threekindsof heresies,the
thirdbeing"of thosewho ... give a widerrangeto the knowledgeof God thanto his
power(forknowledgeitselfis power)wherebyhe knows,thanto thatwherebyhe works
and acts." (tr.Spedding;VII, 253). Bacon's Latin reads,forthekeyphrase:"statuuntque
latioresterminosscientiaeDei quam potestatis, vel potiusejus partispotestatisDei (nam
et ipsa scientiapotestasest) qua scit" (VII, 241). The ratherspecificcontextagain makes
it impossibleto extractthe expression"knowledgeis power"as some Baconian axiom.
Francis Bacon 513
self-debased maker"(84-85). As Perez-Ramosshows,Bacon effects "a complete

breakwiththetradition"inmakingthediscoveryofFormsthegoal ofhisscience,
not as unitsforcontemplation (as theScholasticswould) but as a stagetowards
operatio(86). Whoeveris "acquaintedwithForms,"Bacon writesin theNovum
Organum,can "detectand bringto lightthingsneveryetdone," and achieve
both"truthinspeculationand freedom inoperation(operatio)"(IV, 120).Bacon's
definitionof naturalphilosophyas "the Inquiryof Causes" begins froman
Aristotelianposition,but the continuation-"and the Productionof Effects"
(IV, 346)-is radicallynew (106), a "mostun-Aristotelian criterionof physical
productionof 'effects'" (108). Thus Bacon graftsa newnotionof "theoperative
or manipulative aspectofman'scognitiveenterprise" on to "notionalanalysisof
the physicalworld"(110-11).
The precisemeaningthat Bacon gave to the termsopera and operatiois
wellbroughtoutbyPerez-Ramos.Nineteenth-century utilitariansinevitablysaw
operaas referring to "artefactsor tools,"those"technicalachievements" suchas
theinventions ofgunpowder, theprinting-press,and themariner'scompassthat
Bacon oftencelebrated(136). Macaulay sneeringly dismissedBacon as a utilitar-
ian, but as Perez-Ramosobserves,Bacon distinguished "experiments of light"
(yieldingvaluableinformation) from"experiments of fruit"(yieldingimmediate
profit),and explicitlyattackedtheutilitariandesireforan earlyreturnon invest-
mentsas an over-hasty demandthatwouldin factdefeattheprogressof knowl-
edge (137-39). Bacon's science is directedtowardsopera not in the sense of
makingartefacts butin searchingfor"Nature's'effects,' phenomenasuchas heat,
colour,or motion"(142). These are thegoals to be investigated by theinductive
method,not "utensils;Bacon's modelof thetrueobjectof knowledgeis not the
machine"(143). If the "utilitarian"readingis anachronistic,48 equallyso is the
proto-Marxist view of BenjaminFarringtonand othersthatwould turnBacon
into"thephilosopher oftheindustrial revolution."49
Bacon's goal was to produce
"new worksand activedirections,"as he firstput it in the ValeriusTerminus
(III, 242), developinga naturalphilosophythatwillbe "operativeto relievethe
inconveniences of man's estate"(IV, 297). WhereAristotlesaw the mechanical
artsas stagnant,unchanging sincetheirfirstdiscovery, Bacon reversedhisjudg-
ment,holdingup themechanicalarts"againstphilosophyas exhibiting themarks
oftrueprogress"(144, 164). Indeed,Bacon affirmed that"it is onlybyimitating
thewaysof artisansand mechanics"-by makingand doing-"that thenatural
philosophercan come to gripswithNatureand her mysteries"(145). Bacon's
formulation of a scientiaoperativameantthatman shouldbe able not onlyto
knowbut "to altertheoccurrenceof naturalphenomenain variousways,"a re-
directionof goals whichassuredhim an importantplace in the new scientific
movement(163-64).Perez-Ramossees Bacon's historicalsignificance as residing
in "the astonishingdegreeof awarenesswithwhichhe articulateda conceptof
knowledgehithertoaliento philosophicaldiscourse.... Bacon providedcatego-
rieswherewith to thinkofoperatio;otherswereto translateBacon's insightsinto
concreteresults"(169).
sourcesand influences,"in
48 See Brian Vickers,"Bacon's so-called'Utilitarianism':
Fattori(op.cit.in note 1), 281-314.

49 See Farrington,FrancisBacon. Philosopher ofIndustrialScience(New York, 1949;
London, 1951).
514 Brian Vickers
This emphasison operativeknowledgeclearlybreaksdown the Greeks'dis-

tinctionbetweena bios theoretikos and a bios praktikos.Perez-Ramosaligns
Bacon witha traditionof "practicalreason,"that is, "reason as portrayedin
humanpurposiveaction(doing/ making)"(32). This attitudeundoubtedly re-
flectsthattendency in Renaissancethoughtto emphasizethepowerofthehuman
willand to makethevitaactivathedominantmodelforman as a social animal,
sometimessubordinating to it the vitacontemplativa(seen in seculartermsas
"pure intellectualenquiry"ratherthan the Christianmonasticor meditative
CertainlyBacon's maturephilosophyunitedthediscoveryofaxioms
tradition).50
(by whichhe meantnotthe"mathematico-deductive" modeloffirsttruthsfrom
whichothertruthsdescendbut "any statementdescribingthe successivesteps
throughwhich researchproceeds" [254]) with the effecting of works.In the
NovumOrganumBacon describesthe reciprocalinteraction of theoreticaland
practicalenquiries,commenting that "thesetwo directions,the one activeand
theothercontemplative, are one and thesamething;and thatwhichin operation
is mostuseful,thatin knowledgeis mosttrue"(IV, 121). It followsthatBacon
regardedpure scienceand technologynot as two distinctpursuitsbut "as one
singleand indivisibleenterprise" (112), indeedPerez-Ramoscontendsthat"the
epistemicand notonly'ideological'coreofBacon's idea ofsciencewas precisely
an attemptat integrating" the two notionsof "pure" and "applied" sciencein
themaker'sknowledgetradition(135, 156-57,238). For thesame reasonsBacon
rejectedthetraditional"chasmbetweennaturaland artificial things,"the"whole
thrustoftheBaconianproject"denyinganyrealdifference betweentheproducts
of art and thoseof nature(175-76).
This newdirectionin Bacon's thinking marksa decisivebreakwithscientific

methodas derivedfromAristotle,in particularthe conceptof inductionas set
out in the Prior and PosteriorAnalyticsand in the Topics,and survivingin
RenaissanceAristotelianism (allbeitcontaminated by rhetoric).Bacon's concept
of induction,Perez-Ramoswarns,mustbe "sharplydistinguished" both from
the Aristoteliantraditionand fromthe Victorian-modern notion(199), neither
of whichhas the explicitly"constructivist goal" thatBacon givesit (241). For
all its rigorousrules,Aristotelianepagoge(inductio)belongs-as Bacon so often
objected-to thecommunication ratherthanto thediscoveryofknowledge.It is
an essentiallyverbaloperation,proceedingfrom"words to words,"not from
"wordsto things,"and nowhere"remotelyresemblesa methodology fornatural
enquiries"(215). Having reconstructed the medievaland Renaissanceback-
ground,Perez-Ramoscan onlysupport"Bacon's claimsto originality as regards
his 'logical machine'" (216). In the Middle Ages Aristotelianinductionwas
reduced"to a meredialecto-rhetorical device"(219), a traditionthatpersistedin
the Renaissance,in line withthe generalrhetoricization of logic,51so much so
thatin suchhumanistlogiciansas Agricolaand Melanchthoninductiois merely
soOn thetendenciesin Renaissancethoughtto unitetheactiveand contemplative lives

see my "Introduction'? to Arbeit,Musse,Meditation.Betrachtungen zur Vitaactivaund
Vitacontemplativa, ed. BrianVickers(Zurich,1985; 1991), 13-15;and theessaysbyP. 0.
Kristeller,VictoriaKahn, and Letizia Panizza.
dell' Umanesimo."Invenzione"e
51 See, e.g.,Cesare Vasoli,La dialecticae la retorica
"Metodo"nella culturadel XV e XVI secolo(Milan, 1968).
Francis Bacon 515
"a device for presentingor impartingknowledgewhich the speakeralready

possesses"(223). This recreationof sixteenth-century practiceentirelyvalidates
Bacon's oftenrepeatedjudgmentthat"theinductionofwhichthelogiciansspeak,
whichproceedsby simpleenumeration, is a puerilething;concludesat hazard;
is alwaysliable to be upsetby a contradictory instance,takesintoaccountonly
whatis knownand ordinary;and leads to no result"(IV, 25; also III, 387; IV, 70,
428-29). As Perez-Ramossumsup his historicalreconstruction, "pre-Baconian
induction... findsitsscope in thefieldoflanguage.Inventioand invenire do not
denotethediscoveryof somethingnew by theknower/agent in the provinceof
empiricaldata,and henceoperatio, whichis a distinctiveconnotation ofBaconian
induction,is conspicuouslyabsent"(231-32). Aristotle'sflexiblemethodof epa-
gogehad become"fossilizedintoa rigidmouldofargument," and all theversions
ofitcirculatingin thesixteenth and seventeenth centuries"weresimplyirrelevant
formodem science"(232-33).
His recreationof the intellectualcontextgives Perez-Ramosthe authority
withwhichto definethedistinctive natureof Bacon's inductioas derivingfrom
''a clusterofconceptsradicallydifferent" to thoseinvolvedwiththeAristotelian
type.It startsfromexperientia literataand aimsat thediscoveryofForms,which
in turninvolvesthenaturalphilosophernotmerelyobservingbutintervening in
naturalprocesses:
Bacon's induction... is not confinedto the realm of languageas a putative

vehicleforknowledge.It ratherresortsto checksplacedoutsidehumandiscourse
andbelongingto humanmaterialagency,suchas theinspection ofcertainunusual
or normallyunexaminedphenomena,the devisingof experiments, and the use
and/orconstruction of artefacts.(239-40)
Baconianinductionbeginswiththecollectionof particularsbut soon moveson

by "a processof eliminationthrougha seriesof deductivesteps,"not-despite
the widespreadmyth-via an exhaustive"enumerationof cases" (243). The
crucialprinciple, cannot
accordingto a historianoflogic,is that"a generalization
be validatedby any numberof favourableinstances,but can be invalidatedby a
singleunfavourable instance"(243-44):as Bacon putit,"thenegativeinstanceis
themoreforcible"(IV,56).
Perez-Ramosgoes on to argue that "Bacon's inductioexclusivacan be re-
gardedas a batteryofdeductivetests"whichare laterdeployed"in a strategy of
gradual hypothetical inference"(244). The methodis neithermechanicalnor
monistbutinvolvesbothdeductionand hypothesis. The fullaccountsetout here
(244-66) is rathertechnicalbutentirely convincing.Of particularinterest,given
thestandardbutmythical pictureofan absolutehiatusbetweenBacon'scollection
of data and his inducti've
model,is thedemonstration thatBacon resortsto new
experimental evidenceto testor correcta theoryin whatcan onlybe described
as a "hypothetico-deductive method"(251, 256). As Perez-Ramosarguedearlier,
"theBaconianexperimentum designedto decidebetweencom-
was teleologically
petingexplanations, eitherin thespontaneouscourseofNatureor in a contrived
situationdesignedby the inquirer,i.e. by creatingnew experience"(130).
Two further characteristicsof Bacon's inductionneed emphasizing.Firstits
use of analogy in makinga "leap fromthe observableto the unobservable"
(259): thisessentially"analogicalprocedure"involvesmakinga "leap" thatis
516 Brian Vickers
" 'intuitive'or hypothetical and onlyin thelightof subsequentevidence... can

it be justified"(260). As Bacon put it, "thereis no proceedingin inventionof
knowledgebut by similitude"(III,218). In Bacon's ars inveniendianalogyis
"indispensable"(261) and "a crucialand definingtraitof Baconian induction"
is "the patternsof reasoningwherebyhypotheses are reached"(262). Induction
is forBacon a hypothetical procedure"becauseeach Formis tentative: an opinab-
ile" as he putsit in theNovumOrganum(244n.). Inductionis an "open-ended
and self-correcting" process(263), because "the material(re-)instatiation of the
effectsdoes not precludethe successivereformulation of the veryaxiomsthat
pointto and are directionsforsuch effects"(267). Bacon's methodhas a built-
in flexibility thatmakesit open to correctionin the lightof experience,a two-
waymovement responsive to theprocessofdiscovery. In thecourseofelimination
Baconianinductiouses "deductivesteps,mostlyfalsificationist," givingit a char-
acterwhichis simultaneously inductive,deductive,and intuitiveor analogical
(268). Credit is due to J. M. Keynes as one of the few modernstudentsto
have recognizedthe "all-important analogicalcomponentin Bacon's theoryof
knowledge"(293).
Secondly,we should remindourselvesof the largercontextwithinwhich
Baconian inductiois placed. As a resultof Bacon's constructivist stance,"the
semanticfieldof opus is no longerconnectedwithinductionor deductionbut
withproduction, thatis to say,the(re-)enactmentor (re-)instantiation
ofNature's
'effects' " (238). As Bacon stated,"axiomsestablished
or 'affections' byargumen-
tation"alone cannot"avail us forthediscoveryof new works"(opera);whereas
"axiomsdulyand orderlyformedfromparticulars easilydiscoverthewayto new
particularsand thus rendersciencesactive" (IV,51). The termopera,Perez-
Ramos shows,is "functionally synonymous withparticularia"in Bacon's usage,
for "what are 'particulars'in the firststage of enquiry(i.e. thingsor effects
observed)become'works'(opera)as theenquiryproceeds:theknowerwillthen
be in a positionto (re)producesuch particularsby his own industry as knower/
agent"(257). For Bacon,then,scienceis notconcernedwith"observableanteced-
ents of events(beholder'sknowledge)but ratherwiththe unveilingof latent
structures and processeswhichcould enablemanto (re)produceNature'seffects
(maker'sknowledge)"(265). Thus the truth-claims methodde-
in his scientific
pend on "the materialre-instantiation of thosenatural'effects'whichBacon's
scientiainvestigates" (291), thatis, a scientiaoperativa.
ofthischallenging
The overalleffect is to rehabilitate
reinterpretation Bacon
as a founderofand contributerto thenewscience-settingaside thefruitlessuse
revolution"(47). Agreeingwiththearguments
of theconceptof a "scientific of
Thomas Kuhn,52Perez-Ramosnotesthatin the seventeenth century"a whole
clusterof now attainable'objectsof knowledge'-heat,electricity,magnetism,
lifephenomena-was actuallycreatedand sanctionedby theBaconiantradition
as properlybelongingto the cognitivescope of naturalphilosophy"(35). This
constitutedan enormousexpansionand legitimizationofthestudyofnature,and
Bacon's influencecan be tracednot onlyon the thinkersmentionedhere(such
52 "MathematicalversusExperimental Traditionsin the Developmentof Physical

History,7 (1976), 1-31; repr.in The Essential
Science," Journalfor Interdisciplinary
Tension(Chicago, 1977), 31-66.
FrancisBacon 517
as Mersenne,Descartes,Hobbes, Locke53),but in a great range of scientific

pursuits,includinggeology,topography, statistics,medicine,and much else.54
Bacon's originalityis sometimesdisguisedby whatthe authorcalls his "lexical
conservatism"(232) in retainingsuch termsas formaor inductio whilegiving
thema radicallynew interpretation." Bacon mayborrowAristotelian terminol-
ogy forForm,but the notionis "immediatelybrokenup into certaindiscrete
partsembryonically mirroring a particulatematter-theory" (87). In otherwords,
Bacon shiftsthediscussionfromtheconceptof "entity"to thenewidea that"it
is solelythe motionand arrangement of the minutestpartsof bodies thatcan
accountfortheirmacroscopicappearance"(92). By conceivingFormsas "combi-
nationsof materialunitsand simplemotions"whichacted as "intrinsicagents"
in the constitutionof matter,Bacon openedthe door "fora purelymechanistic
or materialistictypeof explanationin naturalphilosophy"(91). This "shiftin
the understanding of matter"came at an opportunemomentin seventeenth-
centuryscience,which"requireda fundamental changein underlying matter-
theoryin orderto renderpossiblealternative modesofphysicalresearch,"some
new "definition of matter,thesubstanceof the corpuscles"(97-98).
Bacon's ownsolutionto thisproblem,his"idiosyncratic versionofCorpuscul-
arianism"(146), has beenvariouslydescribed.To L. Landau "Bacon's approach
to physicalscience was that of a biologistpre-eminently bent on classifying
disparatecreatureswhileperfecting histaxonomy, ratherthan,as Galileanphysi-
cist,tryingto unearthsomeunderlying mathematical inthebehaviour
regularities
ofthebodiesstudiedin orderto predictfutureoccurrences"(105). Whileagreeing
thatBacon does not conformto the latter,and so fardominantmodel in the
twentieth-century historiography of the "ScientificRevolution,"I feelthatthe
formermodel of a classifying biologistis too static.Perez-Ramossubsequently
notesthatBacon's conceptof maker'sknowledgeenvisages"a fieldof research
in whichphenomenaresembling chemicalreactionsplay a farmoresignificant
role than,say,purelymechanicalrulesof impact"(129). That concernwiththe
dynamicprocesseswithinmatterseemsmoreappropriate,givenBacon's great
interestin such vitalistnotionsas "spirits."
As it turnedout, that whole vitalisttradition-so strongin Renaissance
naturalphilosophy-wasamongthemajorcasualtiesofthenewscience'sinterest
in matterand motion(stimulatedby Bacon's thinking), whichled to itsresolute
separationofanimateand inanimatedomains.If thehistoryofsciencewereonly
writtenfromtheviewpointof astronomy or mathematics Bacon mightcontinue
to be dismissedas outsidethe selectfoldof "foundingfathers."It is the great
meritof AntonioPerez-Ramosto have exposedthe limitations of thatmode of
historiography and to havesucceededin hisprojectformaking"a freshexamina-
tion of Bacon's thoughtas lyingat the root of one of the main trendsof our
philosophicallegacy"(38).
S For suggestive linksbetweenBacon and otherseventeenth-century see 154

thinkers
on Mersenne;152-53on Descartes; 187non Hobbes; 181-82,185 on Locke; 16-18,27n,
195,246n on Newton;and 169, 171, 195 on Boyle.
54 See CharlesWebster, Science,Medicine,and Reform,1620-
The GreatInstauration:
1660 (London, 1975).
ssPerez-Ramosis rightly terminology:
awareofwhathe calls Bacon's "idiosyncratic"
see 101, 108, 124, 146.
518 Brian Vickers
V. In summarizing thesetwobooksI havehad tocondensesomefivehundred

pagesofcloselyarguedand copiouslydocumentedhistoricalanalysis.I havetried
to bringout faithfullythemainlinesofargumentand to evaluatetheircontribu-
tionto Bacon studies.The resultmaybe too longforsomereaders,too shortfor
others(who can at least referto thebooks themselves).It seemedto me worth
doing since theyjointlyrepresenta major turning-point in the studyof this
philosopher.Bacon remainsone of the key figuresin the transitionfromthe
Renaissanceto themodernworld,and theamountofcommentary he attractsis
so greatthatwe are all in dangerof missingthe trulysubstantialcontributions
by the normalaccidentsaffecting the disseminationof knowledgeand by the
fatiguethat sets in as we contemplatethe annual list of publications,always
assumingthattheyare completeand reliable.Bacon, as usual,fallsbetweentwo
stools,neitherthe literarynor the historyof sciencebibliographies catchingall
theimportant workin theirown field,let alone the other.
The evaluationof Bacon's work,furthermore, is a necessityto anyoneinter-
ested in intellectualhistory,since it can act as a barometerof the state of
knowledgeat any one time.Since credithas traditionally been givento himfor
beingamongthe firstto formulatethe idea of progress,56 it is appropriatethat
his workcan serveas a markerforthesuccesses,and failures,of contemporary
historiography in achievinga properlycontextualand properlyanalyticalunder-
standingof a thinkerfromthepast. His workremains,as it has alwaysbeen,a
challenge.Those who resistthatchallengeare perpetuating a stateof mindthat
JamesMill diagnosedas long ago as 1818. Writingto the Scottishphilosopher
Macvey Napier and thankinghim forhavingrevalidatedBacon as the "Father
ofExperimental Philosophy,"Mill notedthat"His is a battlewhichI oftenhave
to fightin conversation, at least; forEnglish-educated people are all hostileto
him,as they... are hostileto everybodywho seeksto advance theboundaries
of humanknowledge,whichtheyhave swornto keep wheretheyare."57
CentreforRenaissanceStudies,
Eidgen6ssischeTechnischeHochschuleZurich.
56 SeeJ. B. Bury,The Idea of Progress(London, 1920), 50-63.

S Letterof 30 April 1818,in M. Napier (ed.), Selectionsfromthecorrespondenceof
thelate MacveyNapier(London, 1879), 18-19;quotedby RichardYeo, "An idol of the
market-place: Baconianismin nineteenth-centuryBritain,"HistoryofScience,23 (1985),
251-98,at 263.

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Francis Bacon and the Progress of Knowledge

Author(s): Brian Vickers

One of the most famousimages in English Renaissance literatureis the

withinman's sounding.This is a thingwhichI cannottell whetherI may so

This is part of a lecturedeliveredat the Francis Bacon Library,Claremont,on 25

Copyright 1992 by JOURNALOF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, INC.

From timeto timeit is salutaryto take stock,and ask oneselfhow Bacon's

2 All quotationsfromJ. Spedding,D. D. Heath and R. L. Ellis (eds.), The Worksof

side,we haveno fundamental alterations to R. W. Gibson'sBibliography ofearly

I R. W. Gibson,FrancisBacon: A Bibliography of his Worksand ofBaconiana to the

In termsofourknowledgeofBacon's lifetherehavebeenno majorrevelations

13 D. Cressy,"FrancisBacon and theAdvancement ofSchooling,"History

soil erosion,the internalcombustionengine,and America;'9but some criticsof

I. In chroniclingthemisunderstanding ofBacon's workone majorproblem-

19BrianVickers,FrancisBacon and RenaissanceProse(Cambridge,1988), 142, 151-

hostileaccountofwhatever eventorworkhe discusses.Not contentwithdenigrat-

Neitherfragment has meritwhetherconsideredas a documentintendedto ad-

But there is nothing"automatic" or undiscriminating ("whatever") about

WilliamGilbertin the early 1600s.25Simplicius,forinstance,commenting on

forall his lip serviceto experienceand induction,is restricted

In fact,as historiansof scienceknow,Bacon did not merelypay lip serviceto

25 Op.cit.in note23, 126-27.See also Perez-Ramos,"FrancisBacon and astronomical

28"Verseson the Death of Dr. Swift,"lines 473-4 in Swift,Poetical Works,ed. H.

witha smallM, as a formof "ChristianAristotelianism" (184), and so hejudged

ing Bacon's "Catalogue of ParticularHistoriesby Titles," such as the "Historyof the

termsofhowheusesthemin thestructure ofhisarguments" (498). Thisprinciple

32 Quinton,op.cit.in note 3, 45, 63-64.

of Bacon," Studiesin theHistoryand Philosophyof Science,5 (1974), 305-6,findsher

IV,104). The aim ofnaturalphilosophyis "theInquiryofCauses and theProduc-

Obviously,the Baconian formis not the Peripateticabstraction,but its exact

35 See Larsen, "The Aristotelianismof Bacon's NovumOrganum,"JHI, 23 (1962),

runstogether severalpassagesin theNovumOrganumto arguethatBacon "did

forspeedyprofitswithouteffort,39 we may wonderwhyCopenhaverwantsto

III. If theprecedingdiscussionhas seemedrathernegative,we drawcomfort

Emerton,op.cit.in note 33 above.

Cohen, J. H. Randall, AlexandreKoyre, Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, P. B.

thisunderlying structure, for,as Baconputit,"no onecanendowa givenbody

numberofcontemporary interpretersofBacon as an unimaginative notably

The factthatso manymodernhistoriansof sciencehave acceptedtheimage

IV. This highevaluationof Bacon's achievement in naturalphilosophymay

43 For insistentdismissalsofanyclaimto originality in Bacon as "falsityand incongru-

showinghow differing aspectsofBacon's legacyhavebeeninfluential at different

4s Almosttheonlypointon whichone can findPerez-Ramoslackingconcernsseven-

readingthatis comprehensively demolishedhere("Criticismof the 'Popperian

47 It shouldbe notedthattheascription to Bacon's philosophicalworksofthegeneral-

self-debased maker"(84-85). As Perez-Ramosshows,Bacon effects "a complete

Fattori(op.cit.in note 1), 281-314.

This emphasison operativeknowledgeclearlybreaksdown the Greeks'dis-

This newdirectionin Bacon's thinking marksa decisivebreakwithscientific

soOn thetendenciesin Renaissancethoughtto unitetheactiveand contemplative lives

"a device for presentingor impartingknowledgewhich the speakeralready

Bacon's induction... is not confinedto the realm of languageas a putative

Baconianinductionbeginswiththecollectionof particularsbut soon moveson

" 'intuitive'or hypothetical and onlyin thelightof subsequentevidence... can

52 "MathematicalversusExperimental Traditionsin the Developmentof Physical

as Mersenne,Descartes,Hobbes, Locke53),but in a great range of scientific

S For suggestive linksbetweenBacon and otherseventeenth-century see 154

V. In summarizing thesetwobooksI havehad tocondensesomefivehundred

56 SeeJ. B. Bury,The Idea of Progress(London, 1920), 50-63.

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