named accused, did then and there willfully,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONINE B. SALEY
The case before the Court focuses on the practice of some
"illegal recruiters" who would even go to the extent of issuing
forged tourist visas to aspiring overseas contract
workers. These unsuspecting job applicants are made to pay
exorbitant "placement" fees for nothing really since, almost
invariably, they find themselves unable to leave for their
purported country of employment or, if they are able to, soon
find themselves unceremoniously repatriated. This Court once
described their plight in a local proverb as being naghangad ng
kagitna, isang salop ang nawala.[1]
In this appeal from the 3rd March 1995 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch
10,[2] appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a
reversal of the verdict finding her guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable under the Revised
Penal Code and six counts of illegal recruitment, one committed
in large scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.
Appellant was indicted in eleven separate informations
for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(1), of the Revised
Penal Code. The cases (naming the complainants and stating
the amounts therein involved) include: (1) Criminal Case No. 92-
CR-1397[3] (Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00); (2) Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1414 (Victoria Asil P33,000.00); (3) Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1415 (Cherry Pi-ay P18,000.00); (4) Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1426 (Corazon del Rosario P40,000.00); (5)
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 (Arthur Juan P24,200.00); (6)
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644 (Alfredo C. Arcega P25,000.00);
(7) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646 (Brando B.
Salbino P25,000.00); (8) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647
(Mariano DamologP25,000.00); (9) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-
1649 (Lorenzo Belino P25,000.00); (10) Criminal Case No. 93-
CR-1651 (Peter Arcega P25,000.00) and (11) Criminal Case No.
93-CR-1652 (Adeline Tiangge P18,500.00).
Except for the name of the offended party, the amount
involved and the date of the commission of the crime, the
following information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652 typified
the other informations for the crime of estafa:
That in or about the month of December, 1991, and
sometime prior to or subsequent thereto, at
Buyagan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of
Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to defraud ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS
and by means of deceit through false representations
and pretenses made by her prior to or simultaneous
with the commission of the fraud, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud said
ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS, by then and there
representing herself as a duly authorized or licensed
recruiter for overseas employment, when in truth and
in fact she was not, thereby inducing the said
ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS to give and deliver to
her the total amount of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P18,500.00), Philippine Currency,
for placement abroad and after having received it,
she appropriated and misappropriated the same for
her own use and benefit and despite repeated
demands made upon (her) to return the same, she
refused, failed, neglected, and still refuses, fails and
neglects to comply therewith, all to the damage and
prejudice of ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS in the
total sum aforesaid.
"Contrary to law.[4]
For the violation of Article 38, in relation to Article 39, of
the Labor Code, five separate informations were also instituted
against appellant on various dates. These cases (with the names
of the complainants) include: (1) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396
(Francisco T. Labadchan); (2) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413
(Cherry Pi-ay); (3) Criminal Case No. 92- CR-1416 (Victoria Asil);
(4) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 (Corazon del Rosario) and (5)
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 (Arthur Juan).The typical
information in these indictments read:
That sometime in the month of April, 1991 and
subsequent thereto at Buyagan, Municipality of La
Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
unlawfully and knowingly recruit one ARTHUR JUAN
for overseas employment, by then and there ably
misrepresenting herself as a duly authorized or
licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she fully
knew it to be false but by reason of her said
misrepresentations which were completely relied
upon by Arthur Juan, she was able to obtain from the
latter the total amount of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P24,200.00), Philippine
Currency, all to the damage and prejudice of Arthur
Juan in the total sum aforesaid.
"Contrary to Law.[5]
The information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal
recruitment in large scale under Article 38, paragraph 1, of
Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code), as amended, filed on
16 April 1993, read:
That in or about the months of August and
September, 1992, in the Municipality of La Trinidad,
Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly recruit the following: PETER ARCEGA,
LORENZO BELINO, MARIANO DAMOLOG, FIDEL
OPDAS, BRANDO B. SALBINO, DEMBER LEON and
ALFREDO C. ARCEGA for overseas employment, by
then and there misrepresenting herself as a duly
authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in
fact she was not and by reason of her said
misrepresentation which was completely relied upon
by the said complainants whom she recruited, either
individually or as a group amounting to illegal
recruitment in large scale causing economic sabotage,
she was able to obtain and received from them the
aggregate total amount of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P175,000.00), Philippine
Currency, all to the damage and prejudice of the
foregoing complainants in the total sum aforesaid.
"Contrary to law.[6]
Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges of illegal
recruitment and estafa. The criminal cases filed were raffled off
to two (2) branches of the Regional Trial Court of Benguet; later,
however, the cases were consolidated at the instance of the
prosecution.
Parenthetically, appellant jumped bail pending trial but she
was soon arrested by agents of the Criminal Investigation
Service ("CIS").
The Evidence for the Prosecution. -
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 and Criminal Case No.
92-CR-1396
Francisco Labadchan, a 25-year-old employee in the Navy
Base in Pacdal, Baguio City, was introduced to appellant by
Crispin Perez. In September 1991, the two went to the house of
Conchita Tagle at Kilometer 3, La Trinidad, Benguet, who was
known to be recruiting workers for abroad. After Labadchan had
expressed interest in applying for a job in Korea, Tagle told
Labadchan to prepare P45,000.00, P30,000.00 of which was to
be paid that month and the balance of P15,000.00 before his
departure for abroad. Labadchan paid Tagle the amount
of P30,000.00 on 23 September 1991. Appellant, in turn,
received that amount when she went to La Trinidad to "brief"
him. She told Labadchan that his flight would be on the 9th of
October 1991 and that he should have paid by then the balance
of P15,000.00 of the fees. He paid Tagle the P15,000.00
balance on 05 October 1991. When he requested her to make a
receipt, Tagle included the amount in the old receipt for
the P30,000.00 previously given. Appellant handed over to
Labadchan some papers to fill up and gave last-minute
instructions before she boarded a green-colored aircraft.
On 08 October 1991, Labadchan and his wife went to
Manila and stayed, as so instructed by Tagle, at the Prince Hotel
near the terminal of the Dangwa bus company in Dimasalang,
Manila. There, he met other people, among them, his co-
complainant Arthur Juan. In the morning of 09 October 1991,
Labadchan and the others were told to go to the airport with
Tagle, where appellant was supposed to give the travel papers
including passports and plane tickets for Korea. At the airport,
however, appellant told the group that their flight had been re-
scheduled for 11 October 1991. Labadchan returned to Baguio
City.
On 11 October 1991, Labadchan returned to the airport
only to be told this time, however, that his passport was still
with the Department of Foreign Affairs. Appellant told her
husband to accompany Labadchan to the Foreign Affairs
office. When Labadchan received the passport, he saw that
while his picture appeared on it, the passport was made out in
the name of a person from Negros Occidental. Labadchan had
to imitate the signature on the passport just so he could get
it. Back at the airport, he was allowed inside the terminal but
only to be later sent out because the ticket he had was one
intended for passage from Korea and not to Korea. Asserting
that he and company were mere "chance passengers," appellant
sent them all home with a promise that another departure date
would be set. She also took back the show money of
US$1,000.00.
Appellant would repeatedly schedule a departure date but
nothing tangible came out of her assurances. Finally, Labadchan
was able to get appellant to promise that the money he had
given her would be refunded. When this promise neither
materialized, Labadchan finally reported the matter to the
National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"). In that office,
appellant executed a promissory note stating that she would
return the amount of P46,500.00, which included the amount
of P1,500.00 allegedly used for getting a passport, to
Labadchan.[7]
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 and Criminal Case No.
92-CR-1416
Victoria Asil, a 40-year-old housewife from Imelda Village,
Roxas Street, Baguio City, heard from her elder sister, Feling
Derecto, that appellant was recruiting workers for
abroad. During the second week of January 1992, she, along
with her husband Gabriel, went to appellants house in Buyagan,
La Trinidad. Appellant assured her that she could have a job in
a factory in Korea. Appellant asked for an advance fee
of P25,000.00 of the P40,000.00 agreed fee. Victoria gave
appellant the "advance fee" on 13 January 1992 at her
(Victorias) shop in Shoppers Lane, Baguio City which appellant
acknowledged by issuing a receipt for the amount. She told
Victoria to be at appellant's house in Buyagan after three weeks.
When Victoria went to appellants house as so directed,
appellant told her that her flight had been postponed supposedly
because prior applicants had to be accommodated first. Victoria
met appellant seven more times only to be ultimately told that
the latter had been allegedly fooled by the main office in
Manila. Appellant, nevertheless, demanded an
additional P5,000.00 from Victoria so that she could leave on 18
April 1992. Victoria gave appellant the amount of P5,000.00 at
her shop on 31 March 1992 for which appellant gave a
corresponding receipt.
When on 18 April 1992 still nothing happened, Victoria
demanded from appellant a refund. Appellant gave her an
advance of P15,000.00. An acknowledgment receipt with
appellants signature affixed thereon would evidence that
payment. Appellant, however, failed to return the rest of the
promised refund.[8]
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 and Criminal Case No.
92-CR-1415
Cherry Pi-ay, a 26-year-old nursing student from Acop,
Tublay, Benguet, was visited once in March 1991 by appellant
who encouraged Cherry to apply for work in a textile or a plastic
factory in Korea with a monthly salary of US$800.00. Appellant
told Cherry that the moment she would pay the amount
of P45,000.00, she could be deployed in Korea. Cherry prepared
her bio-data and gave it to appellant at the latter's residence
during the first week of April 1991.
Cherry was able to leave the country on 04 July 1991 after
having paid the total amount of P45,000.00. Appellant told her
that a certain Ramil would meet her at the airport in Korea.
When she arrived, a Filipina, named Marlyn, instead met
her.Marlyn introduced herself as appellants friend and
accompanied Cherry to a certain house owned by a
Korean. There, Cherry met, among other compatriots, Corazon
del Rosario and Jane Kipas. Cherry soon realized that she was
not going to have a job in the factory promised by
appellant. Instead, she was made to work for the Korean
applying rugby on and folding leather jackets. About a month
later, men from the Korean Immigration accosted her and the
others. Brought in for questioning by Immigration officials,
Cherry and her companions were informed that they were illegal
workers. After the investigation, Cherry and her group were
allowed to go but on 08 August 1991, all were deported.
Back to the Philippines, the deportees were assured by
appellant that they would get a refund of their money. Cherry
executed a sworn statement narrating her experience in
Korea.[9]
Ayson Acbaya-an, Cherrys "boyfriend" who later was to
become her husband, corroborated Cherrys testimony that
appellant first received P18,000.00 from Cherry. Thereafter,
appellant also received P27,000.00 from Cherry, fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00) of which amount came from
him. In both instances, appellant signed receipts for the
payments. The receipts were among Cherry's papers
confiscated in Korea.[10]
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 and Criminal Case No.
92-CR-1426
Corazon del Rosario, a 34-year-old housemaid from 48
Happy Homes, Baguio City, had known appellant, an
acquaintance, since 1980. One day in December 1990, she
happened to chance upon appellant at a PLDT telephone booth
in Kilometer 4, La Trinidad, Baguio City. Appellant, representing
herself to be an authorized recruiter, tried to persuade Corazon
to work abroad. Corazon showed interest. From then on,
appellant would visit Corazon in her brothers house in Kilometer
4.Ultimately, appellant was able to convince Corazon that, for a
fee of P40,000.00, she could be sent to Korea. Corazon gave
appellant the amount of P15,000.00. She paid the balance
of P25,000.00 in May 1991. The payments were both made in
the presence of Cherry Pi-ay and Jane Kipas. Appellant issued
the corresponding receipts for these amounts.
Corazon took the flight for Korea on 28 June 1991.
Appellant had instructed Corazon, upon landing in Korea, to call
up a certain Ramil. At the airport, Corazon, including her
companions among them Jane Kipas, kept on dialing the
number but each time only a Korean woman would answer the
call. Later, that evening, a certain Marlyn, who introduced
herself as appellants friend, took them to a hotel. There, Marlyn
took their show money of US$1,000.00. The group stayed
overnight in the hotel and the following morning, a Korean took
them to a house proximately two hours away by car from the
airport. For about a month, they did nothing but apply rugby on
leather jackets, for which they were not paid, until a policeman
arrived and took all ten of them to the airport. All that the
immigration and airport personnel would tell them was that they
should be thankful they were only being repatriated
home. Immigration and airport authorities confiscated
everything that they had.
At home, appellant promised to return Corazons
money. Not having received the promised refund, Corazon went
to the CIS stationed at Camp Dangwa where, on 28 July 1992,
she executed her sworn statement.[11]
Avelina Velasco Samidan, a friend of Corazon and in whose
house the latter would stay whenever she was in Baguio,
corroborated the testimony of Corazon that she gave to
appellant the amount of P15,000.00, ten thousand pesos of
which amount Corazon borrowed from Avelina, and that some
time in April 1991, Corazon withdrew P25,000.00 from the bank
which she likewise paid to appellant.[12]
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 and Criminal Case No.
92-CR-1428
Arthur Juan, a 30-year-old farmer from Dumulpot, Tublay,
Benguet, first met appellant in her house at Buyagan, La
Trinidad, Benguet, when he, together with Maxima Gomez, Tirso
Gomez and Francisco Labadchan, went to see appellant who
was said to be recruiting workers for Korea. Juan promptly
submitted his bio-data form after being told that he could work
in a factory in Korea at US$400.00 a month. Appellant quoted a
processing fee of P40,000.00. Juan initially paid the amount
of P6,500.00 in April 1991. On 09 October 1991, the scheduled
date of the flight, Juan went to the airport and gave appellant
another P15,000.00; the final balance of the fees were, by their
agreement, to be remitted to appellant on a salary deduction
basis. Appellant then told Juan that he could not leave on that
day (09 October 1991) because the airplane was already
full.Appellant took back Juans passport, telling Juan that he
should be able to depart in a few days. Appellant, however, kept
on rescheduling the flight for about five more times until it
became clear to Juan that he had been deceived. Juan paid out
a total amount of P24,200.00, including the US$100.00 that
would have been his pocket money, to appellant. The latter
executed receipts for the amounts.
Juan executed a sworn statement narrating the
unfortunate incident.[13]
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652
Adeline Tiangge, a 43-year-old housekeeper from Bangao,
Buguias, Benguet, learned that appellant was recruiting workers
for abroad. Adeline, accompanied by her sister, went to see
appellant at her house in Buyagan some time in December
1991. There were others, like her, who also went to see
appellant. When she produced the required identification
pictures and P1,500.00 for passport processing, appellant told
Adeline that she could be a factory worker in Korea with a
monthly salary of US$350.00. Appellant agreed to be paid by
Adeline the additional P35,000.00 balance by installment. The
first installment of P17,000.00 was paid on 15 February 1992,
evidenced by a receipt signed by Antonine Saley, with the
remaining P18,000.00 being payable before getting on her flight
for abroad.
Adeline waited in Baguio City for word on her
departure. Adeline, together with some other applicants, thrice
went to appellants office at the Shoppers Lane to check. She
also went to Dimasalang, Manila, in front of the Dangwa
terminal, for a like purpose. Appellant informed her that she just
had to wait for her flight. Adeline, exasperated, finally
demanded a refund of the amount she had paid but appellant
merely gave her P100.00 for her fare back to Benguet.[14]
-0-
The sum of the evidence, infra., in Criminal Case No.
93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale had been
submitted to likewise constitute the evidence to establish the
People's case, respectively, in -
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644
Alfredo Arcega, a 42-year-old hotel employee from 16 Q.M.
Subdivision, Baguio City, heard from a former co-worker, Fidel
Opdas, that appellant was recruiting workers for overseas
employment. Interested, he, in the company of his nephew,
Peter Arcega, went to appellants house in Buyagan, La
Trinidad. There, he met job applicants Dembert Leon, Mariano
Damolog and Brando Salbino. Appellant assured the group that
they could get employed in Taiwan for a monthly salary
of P12,000.00 to P15,000.00. She told them that the processing
and placement fees would amount to P40,000.00 each. Arcega
and his companions agreed.
On 17 August 1992, Arcega paid appellant P10,000.00 in
Dimasalang, Manila. Appellant issued a cash voucher for the
amount. She told Arcega to just wait for the results. On 30
September 1992, appellant asked Arcega for
another P15,000.00 which amount he paid. With him at the time
were his nephew Peter Arcega, as well as Dembert Leon,
Mariano Damolog, Lorenzo Belino and Brando Salbino. Appellant
issued a receipt and affixed thereon her signature. Appellant
told Arcega that with the payment, his employment abroad was
assured. She stressed, however, that the balance of P15,000.00
should be paid before his departure for Taiwan. After following
up the matter with appellant in October 1992 and then in
December 1992, he finally gave up. Arcega went to the POEA
office in Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, and when he learned
that appellant had pending cases for illegal recruitment, he also
filed his own complaint and executed an affidavit before Atty.
Justinian Licnachan.[15]
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646
Brando Salbino, a 36-year-old resident of East Quirino Hill,
Baguio City, used to be a "forester" of the DENR. In July 1992,
he met appellant at her Buyagan residence after his brother-in-
law, Fidel Opdas, had said that she was recruiting workers for
abroad. Appellant told him that she could help him get employed
in Taiwan with a P12,000.00 monthly salary. Salbino submitted
various documents required by appellant. On 11 August 1992,
Salbino paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her
Dimasalang "temporary office" so that, according to her, his
travel papers could be processed. The payment was
receipted.On 30 September 1992, he paid her
another P15,000.00, for which appellant again issued an
acknowledgment receipt.
Appellant told Salbino to merely wait in Baguio City. When
she failed to show up, he went to appellants house in Buyagan
to verify. She was not there. The following week, he went to
Manila with Fidel Opdas hoping to see her. Appellant's
whereabouts could not be determined. Having failed to locate
her, Salbino and his companions went to the POEA office in
Magsaysay, Baguio City. It was at the POEA office that they
were to learn that appellant was not in the list of licensed
recruiters. He, along with the others, then executed an affidavit-
complaint before Atty. Licnachan.[16]
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647
Mariano Damolog, a 33 year-old farmer from 26 P. Burgos
Street, Baguio City, went to appellants residence in Buyagan in
July 1992 when informed by Fidel Opdas, his co-worker at the
MIDO Restaurant, that appellant was recruiting workers for
Taiwan. Appellant herself later told Damolog that she was
licensed to recruit workers. He forthwith applied for a position
at a factory in Taiwan with a salary of between US$400.00 and
US$500.00 a month. He, after being required to pay a
processing fee, paid the amount of P10,000.00 to appellant at
her Manila office. Appellant gave him a cash voucher. Damolog
was then supposed to just wait in Baguio City for a telegram.
When he did not receive word from appellant, Damolog
went to Manila to see what had happened to his
application.Appellant was again told to simply stand by in Baguio
City. After several days, Opdas, who had meanwhile gone to
Manila, told Damolog to see appellant in Manila. In Manila,
appellant told Damolog to sign a bio-data form for screening
purposes. Like Peter Arcega, Fred Arcega, Brando Salbino and
Lorenzo Belino, he was also asked to pay
another P15,000.00. The group went back to Baguio City to
raise the amount of P15,000.00 each. On 30 September 1992,
he, together with Fred and Peter Arcega, Brando Salbino and
Lorenzo Belino, returned to Manila. Damolog handed over
his P15,000.00 to appellant who issued an acknowledgment
receipt, signed by Annie Saley which, according to appellant,
was her name. Appellant assured him that he would be among
the first to go to Taiwan by December 1992.
December 1992 came but no word was received prompting
Damolog and his companions to repair to appellants house in
Buyagan. She was not home. Damolog proceeded to Manila
where appellant told him to wait a few more days. When still
nothing happened, Damolog and his companions went to the
POEA office where Atty. Licnachan issued a certification stating
that appellant was not authorized to recruit workers. Damolog
and his companions filed a joint affidavit-complaint executed
before Atty. Licnachan[17] against appellant.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649
Lorenzo Belino, a 37-year-old farmer from Tawang, La
Trinidad, Benguet, was in Manila in August 1992 looking for
employment. Fidel Opdas, a companion in his trip to Manila,
mentioned that perhaps appellant could help. Belino saw
appellant who then told him about the prospect of getting
employed in Taiwan. Appellant invited him to see her on 20
September 1992 in Buyagan.
On the appointed date, Belino found Mariano Damolog,
Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon, Alfredo Arcega and
Peter Arcega already in appellants residence in
Buyagan. Appellant asked P10,000.00 from each of them if they
wanted her to be responsible for representing them to get
themselves employed in Taiwan with a monthly income
of P15,000.00. When the group agreed, appellant made them
fill up and sign a bio-data form. Appellant also made them
understand that they would each have to pay her the total
amount of P40,000.00, P10,000.00 of which was to be forthwith
paid and the balance to be paid as and when everything would
have been arranged for their flight to Taiwan.
On 23 September 1992, Belino paid appellant the amount
of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang office. Appellant issued a cash
voucher therefor. Belino returned to Baguio City. Five days later,
Belino went down to Manila after appellant had sent word that
he had to come to Manila. On 30 September 1992, Belino paid
in Manila the amount of P15,000.00 demanded by
appellant.Appellant signed her name as Annie Saley on the
receipt. Appellant informed Belino that he should wait for her
telephone call regarding the schedule of his flight. He waited but
when no calls came, Belino and Opdas decided to visit appellant
in her house in Buyagan. Appellant asked to be given until
January to deploy them in Taiwan. February 1993 came, and
still there was no news from appellant. In March 1993, Belino
and others, namely, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon
and Alfredo Arcega,[18] decided to file a complaint against
appellant with the POEA in Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City,
where their sworn statements were taken.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651
Peter Arcega, a 27-year-old cashier from 317 Magsaysay
Avenue, Baguio City, also paid the amount of P10,000.00 to
appellant for a promised job overseas. A cash voucher was
signed by appellant to acknowledge the payment. Peter,
subsequently, also paid the amount of P15,000.00 to appellant
for which the latter issued a receipt signed by Annie Saley. He
was among those who signed the affidavit-complaint before the
POEA.
Testifying in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645,[19] as a
corroborative witness, Dembert Leon, a 25-year-old
unemployed from 52-F Tandang Sora Street, Baguio City, said
that he, desiring to get an employment abroad, likewise went to
see appellant at her residence in Buyagan. Accompanied by
Fidel Opdas, Leon was told by appellant to complete the
necessary papers, including his bio-data, barangay clearance,
ID and NBI clearance. Leon applied to be a factory worker in
Taiwan. He was assured a monthly salary of P12,000.00, but
first, appellant told him, he should commit to pay a placement
fee of P40,000.00 of which amount P10,000.00 had to be paid
forthwith. Leon paid and a cash voucher, dated 08 September
1992, was issued by appellant. On 30 September 1992, he paid
appellant another P15,000.00 for which another
acknowledgment receipt was issued. The remaining P15,000.00
was agreed to be paid at the airport before his flight to
Taiwan. No further word came from appellant. Finally, in
December 1992, when he and the others called her up,
appellant informed them to wait until January 1993. January
came and still nothing happened. In March 1993, Leon and the
others went to the POEA office to lodge a complaint against
appellant.[20]
Jose B. Matias, an Attorney II at the POEA Regional Station
Unit in Baguio City, received a request for verification on
whether or not appellant was a licensed recruiter. In response,
he advised that appellant was not authorized to recruit in the
City of Baguio and in the region from 1989 to the present. Atty.
Matias issued a certification to that effect.
-0-
The Case for the Defense. -
The defense posited the theory that appellant merely
assisted the complainants in applying for overseas employment
with duly accredited travel agencies for and from which she
derived a commission.[21]
According to the 37-year-old appellant, she used to be the
liaison officer of the Friendship Recruitment Agency from 1983
to 1986. In that capacity, she would submit to the POEA
contracts for processing job orders for applicants and assist
applicants prior to their departure at the airport. When the
licensed agency closed in 1986, she went to Baguio where she
engaged in the purchase and sale of vegetables and
flowers. Even then, however, she would not hesitate extending
help to applicants for overseas employment by recommending
licensed agencies which could assist said applicants in going
abroad. She named the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the
Mannings International as such licensed agencies. She had, in
the process, been able to help workers, like Cherry Pi-ay,
Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan and Francisco Labadchan to
name some, sent abroad.[22]
Cherry Pi-ay was able to leave for Kuwait. In 1991, Cherry
went to see her again, this time asking for assistance in getting
an employment in Korea. She accompanied Cherry to the
Dynasty Travel and Tours in Manila that enabled her to get a
tourist visa to Korea. Appellant herself later gave Cherry her
tourist visa. For Cherrys visa and plane ticket, appellant
received from Cherry P15,000.00 and US$250.00. Appellant
issued a receipt therefor and delivered the amounts to the
Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn, issued her a
receipt. The CIS men who arrested her in Manila confiscated
that receipt. In August 1991, Cherry came back and asked her
to look for another travel agency saying she did not like the work
she had in Korea.[23]
Norma Bao-idang, a former client of the Friendship
Recruitment Agency, introduced Corazon del Rosario to
appellant. Since the agency had already been closed, appellant
referred Corazon to Mannings International in Kalaw Street,
Ermita, Manila. Corazon was able to leave for Abu Dhabi where
she worked as a domestic helper. In 1991, Corazon again sought
appellant's assistance in getting an employment in
Korea. Appellant introduced her to Dynasty Travel and Tours
which, in turn, helped Corazon get a tourist visa for Korea. She
did ask for P15,000.00 and US$250.00 from Corazon but these
amounts, being for Corazons ticket and hotel accommodation,
were turned over to Dynasty Travel and Tours. She also knew
that Corazon was able to leave for Korea because she herself
handed over to Corazon her tourist visa and ticket. Appellant
received P2,000.00 from Dynasty Travel and Tours by way of
commission. She was also issued a receipt by that travel agency
showing that she had turned over to it the amounts received
from Corazon but the CIS men took the receipts and
otherdocuments from her. When Corazon returned home in
1991 after going to Korea, she again sought appellants help in
looking for a travel agency that could assist her in going back to
that country.[24]
Appellant came to know Arthur Juan through a vegetable
vendor named Maxima Gomez. He asked her for help in securing
a tourist visa. Appellant was able to assist him and others, like
Francisco Labadchan, Tirso Gomez and Romeo Balao, by
referring them to the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant asked
from them the amounts of P15,000.00 and US$250.00 which
she turned over to the travel agency. Again, she was issued a
receipt by that agency but that, too, was confiscated by the CIS
agents who arrested her. Of the men who sought her help in
going abroad, seven "were able to leave. The others had been
re-scheduled to leave but they failed to arrive at the airport.
Labadchan and Juan met appellant during the first week
of January 1993. She gave them back the plane ticket and the
amount of US$250.00 so that they could ask for a refund from
the travel agency. The next time she saw Labadchan was at the
NBI office when NBI Director Limmayog invited her for
questioning. Appellant tried her best to look for a job for
Labadchan but the transaction she had with Fast International
failed to push through.[25]
Appellant helped Victoria Asil secure a tourist visa. The
latters sister was a former client at the Friendship Recruitment
Agency who was able to work in Saudi Arabia in 1985. She
introduced Victoria to the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant
asked Victoria to advance P15,000.00 and US$250.00 for her
ticket and hotel accommodation. Victoria gave appellant the
amount, and the latter issued corresponding receipts. She
turned over the amount to the travel agency which, in turn,
issued a receipt to appellant. The CIS, however, confiscated all
the documents in her attache case.[26] Appellant was able to
process Victorias visa for Korea but when someone informed the
latter that she could have a visa for Taiwan, Victoria opted to
change her destination. Appellant told Victoria that her visa and
ticket for Korea had already been obtained but Victoria insisted
on a refund of her money. Appellant returned to her P15,000.00
that was supposed to be the amount to be exchanged into
dollars for her show money. Victoria issued a receipt for the
amount but appellant entrusted it to her former
lawyer. Appellant handed over the plane ticket to Victoria.[27]
Mercedes Quimson (Kimson) introduced appellant to
Adeline Tiangge. When Adeline said that she was interested in
securing a tourist visa for Korea, appellant took her to the
Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant asked from Adeline the
amount of P17,000.00 for her plane ticket. Appellant was able
to buy a plane ticket and to get a passport for Adeline. The
latter, however, later said that she was no longer interested in
going to Korea and that her passport application should, instead,
be diverted to Hongkong. In fact, Adeline was able to leave for
Hongkong. Adeline filed a case against appellant because when
Adeline sought a refund from Dynasty Travel and Tours, the
agency only gave her P5,000.00 or just a half of the P10,000.00
she wanted.[28]
Fidel Opdas was appellants client at the Friendship Agency
who was able to leave for Saudi Arabia. He asked her if she
could find a job for him in Taiwan. When appellant told him that
she knew someone who could help, Opdas brought along
Mariano Damolog. Appellant introduced them to Marites Tapia
and Carol Cornelio of Dynasty Travel and Tours who told Opdas
and Damolog to submit the necessary documents for their
application for work in Taiwan. In May 1993, Opdas returned
with Brando Salbino who also talked to Marites and Carol. Opdas
submitted to appellant the documents required by Marites and
Carol. Appellant, in turn, gave the papers to Marites and
Carol. When, later, Opdas went to see appellant, he brought
along Dembert Leon and Lorenzo Belino. Appellant requested
Opdas to accompany the two to Marites and Carol with whom
they discussed what would be necessary "for their application
for Taiwan. Still later when Opdas came back with Peter and
Alfredo Arcega to see appellant, she again referred them to
Marites and Carol. The job applicants each gave appellant
P10,000.00 which the latter turned over to Marites and Carol.
The two gave her receipts but these were in the
same attache case that was seized by the CIS agents and never
returned. The group subsequently withdrew their applications
although it was only Opdas who received a P15,000.00
refund.[29]
In a bid to prove that CIS agents indeed took away
her attache case containing documents that could bail her out
of the charges, appellant presented Danilo A. Deladia, one of
the three policemen who arrested her. Equipped with a warrant
of arrest issued by Judge Luis Dictado of Branch 8, the
policemen went to the house of appellants cousin at 2320-B San
Antonio, Sampaloc, Manila at 3:00 p.m. of 25 August 1993.
According to Deladia, however, they did not get anything from
appellant because their mission was only to arrest her. At the
counter intelligence branch of the CIS, he did not even hear
appellant requesting for the return of a brief case.[30] Apparently
because of what had turned out to be Deladias adverse
testimony, the defense presented George Santiago who claimed
to be at the boarding house when appellant was arrested.
Santiago said that he had allowed the CIS agents to enter the
boarding house. Santiago did not see what might have
happened in appellant's room but what he did see was that
when the agents all came out, they had with them
an attache case. Santiago, accompanied by his cousin Atty.
Lomboan, went to the CIS in Camp Crame where one of the
men asked P50,000.00 for the release of appellant. Santiago did
not see any brief case in the office but one of the men told them
that they would "produce" appellant and the attache case if they
could "produce" the amount of P50,000.00.[31]
On cross-examination, however, Santiago admitted that
the P50,000.00 was meant for bonding purposes and that they
did not make a formal request for the release of the brief
case.[32]
The defense next attempted to shift, albeit unsuccessfully,
the responsibility for the crime from appellant to Maritess and
Carol. Presented at the witness stand was Oscar Gaoyen, a 30-
year-old farmer, who testified that appellant had failed to assist
him in going to Korea to work because it was difficult. While
following up his application in Manila, he met Marites and Carol
in front of the Dangwa station in Dimasalang and he was told
that they knew someone who could "transfer his application to
Taiwan." He said that even after he had paid
appellant P50,000.00, nothing happened constraining him to file
charges against her. Appellant returned P15,000.00 of the
money to him.[33]
Appellant filed, before the trial court could promulgate its
decision, a Motion to Reopen Trial with an urgent motion to
defer promulgation on the ground of newly discovered
evidence.[34] In its order of 03 March 1995, the trial court, noting
that the newly discovered evidence consisted of affidavits of
desistance of seven complainants, found no merit in the motion.
It held that presentation of the same does not give valid ground
for possible amendment of the decision as the private
complainants had already testified. It agreed with the
prosecutor that the affidavits of desistance only (had) the effect
of satisfying the civil liability.[35]
The Judgment of the Trial Court. -
On 03 March 1995, the trial court rendered its decision
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged. It found implausible appellants claim that she was
merely an agent of Dynasty Travel and Tours and/or Maritess
Tapia and Carol Cornelio. If what she claimed were true, said
the court, appellant could have presented her principals;
instead, that failure exposed her to the adverse inference and
legal presumption that evidence suppressed would be adverse
if produced. It also found hard to believe, the "self-serving"
claim of appellant that her brief case, supposedly containing
receipts of her remittances to the travel agencies, was
confiscated by the CIS and remained unaccounted for. The trial
court concluded:
In fine, accused gave the distinct assurance, albeit
false, that she had the ability to send the
complainants abroad for work deployment, thereby
employing false pretenses to defraud them. This was
despite her knowing very well that she was not legally
authorized. The complainants willingly parted with
their money in the hope of overseas employment
deceitfully promised them by the accused. What
makes matters worse is that these amounts given to
the accused come from hard-earned money, or
worse, could have been borrowed from money
lenders who have no qualms about collecting usurious
interest rates. Complainants who faithfully relied on
the accused did not hesitate to painstakingly raise or
even beg or borrow money just so they could give a
decent future to their families even to the extent of
leaving them for far-off lands. But now, all their
dreams are gone, their hopes shattered. Some may
not have even been able to pay back what they
borrowed nor recoup their losses. Now, more than
ever, their future appears bleaker. But this time, a
glimmering light appears at the end of the tunnel as
the Court steps in to lay down the iron fist of the law
so as to serve the accused a lesson, a bitter one, with
the hope that those who are trekking or those who
are about to trek the same pilfered path that the
accused took will reconsider their pursuits before it
would be too late, and in the end, this form of fraud
which invariably victimizes the poor will forever be
stopped.[36]
All given, the trial court then decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in all the above-mentioned cases, the
Court finds accused Antonine B. Saley, also known as
Annie B. Saley, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the corresponding crime as charged in the
informations and hereby sentences her in each case,
except in Criminal Case NO. 93-CR-1645 where an
indeterminate sentence is not applicable, to suffer an
indeterminate sentence for the duration hereunder
given, and to pay the costs, as well as the damages
due the private complainants, to wit:
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396
"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as
MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and
to pay Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00
for actual damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397
"Imprisonment from Three (3) Years, Six (6)
Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Seven
(7) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day
of prision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay
Francisco T. LabadchanP45,000.00 for
actual damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413
"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as
MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and
to pay Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 for moral
damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8)
Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five
(5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11)
Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM
and to pay Victoria As-il P15,000.00 for
actual damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8)
Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five
(5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11)
Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM
and to pay Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 for
moral damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416
"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as
MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and
 to pay Victoria As-il P15,000.00 for actual
damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425
"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as
MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and
to pay Corazon del Rosario P20,000.00 for
moral damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Seven (7)
Months and Eleven (11) Days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years,
Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of prision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay
Corazon del Rosario P20,000.00 for moral
damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427
"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as
MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and
to pay the costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8)
Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five
(5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11)
Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM
and to pay the costs.
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8)
Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five
(5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11)
Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM
and to pay Alfredo C. Arcega P25,000.00 for
actual damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645
"To suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs. She shall also pay Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) each to Peter
Arcega, Lorenzo Belino, Mariano Damolog,
Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon and Alfredo
Arcega for actual damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8)
Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five
(5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11)
Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM
and to pay Brando B. Salbino P25,000.00 for
actual damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8)
Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five
(5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11)
Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM
and to pay Mariano Damolog P25,000.00 for
actual damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8)
Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five
(5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11)
Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM
and to pay Lorenzo Belino P25,000.00 for
actual damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8)
Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five
(5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11)
Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM
and to pay Peter Arcega P25,000.00 for
actual damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8)
Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five
(5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11)
Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM
and to pay Adeline Tiangge y
Marcos P17,000.00 for actual damages, plus
costs.
"With respect to accused Conchita Tagle in Criminal
Cases Nos. 92-CR-1396 and 92-CR-1397, let these
cases be sent to the files without prejudice to their
revival as soon as she shall have been arrested and
brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.
"In order that Conchita Tagle may not escape the
clutches of the law, let Alias Warrants of Arrest issue
addressed to the PNP Chief of Police, La Trinidad,
Benguet and the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) in Manila and in Baguio City. Further, the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID),
Manila is ordered to include her name in the its Hold-
Departure List.
"SO ORDERED.[37]
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
asserting that the trial court had erred in giving credence to the
testimonies of the complaining witnesses and in finding her
guilty of the crimes charged despite the "failure" of the
prosecution to fully establish the elements of the crimes beyond
reasonable doubt.[38] Finding no merit in the motion, the trial
court, on 03 April 1995, denied a reconsideration of its
decision.[39] The following day, appellant filed a notice of
appeal.[40] The trial court gave due course to the appeal on 17
April 1995.[41]
The Instant Appeal. -
Appellant continues to profess before this Court her
innocence of the accusation. She reiterates her assertion that
the trial court has erred in giving credence to the testimonies of
the complaining witnesses and in finding her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the various offenses she has been charged
with by the prosecution.[42] She avers that her transactions with
the complainants have been limited to her assisting them secure
their respective travel visa specifically for tourist and that her
assistance to them (has been) only to refer them to travel
agencies such as the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the
Mannings International. She insists that she has remitted the
amounts solicited from the complainants to the travel agencies,
or to Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio, earning only the
commissions for bringing in clients interested in getting
tourist visas.[43]
At the outset, it might be explained that this appeal
involves the conviction of appellant not only for the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale for which the penalty of life
imprisonment is imposed but also for other offenses for which
lesser penalties have been meted by the trial court upon
appellant. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over ordinary
appeals in criminal cases directly from the Regional Trial Courts
when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.[44] The Rules of Court, allows,
however, the appeal of criminal cases involving penalties lower
than reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment under the
circumstances stated in Section 3, Rule 122, of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus -
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where
the penalty imposed is life imprisonment, or where a
lesser penalty is imposed but involving offenses
committed on the same occasion or arising out of the
same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious
offense for which the penalty of death or life
imprisonment is imposed shall be by filing a notice of
appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this
Section.
In giving due course to the notice of appeal filed by appellant,
the trial court has directed that the entire records of the
seventeen cases should be forwarded to this Court.[45] It might
be observed that this appeal, which has been assigned only one
docket number, involves cases, although spawned under
different circumstances could be said to somehow be linked to
the incident giving rise to the case for illegal recruitment in large
scale. The cases have thus been correctly consolidated and
heard jointly below. The appeal made directly to this Court of
the seventeen cases, each of which incidentally should have
been assigned a separate docket number in this Court, is
properly taken.
Article 38(a) of the Labor Code considers illegal any
recruitment activity undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders
of authority. Recruitment is defined by Article 13, paragraph (b),
of the same Code as referring -
x x x to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person
or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur:
1) That the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable one
to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; and
2) That the offender undertakes either any
activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement defined
under Article 13(b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article
34.[46]
Any person who commits the prohibited acts enumerated in
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code shall be liable under Article 38(a)
thereof.[47] The proviso in Article 13(b) lays down a rule of
evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a
promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective
workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be
deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and
placement.[48] The article also provides that recruitment includes
the act of referral or the act of passing along or forwarding of
an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a
selected applicant for employment to a selected employer,
placement officer or bureau.[49]
The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant,
indeed, violated the law against illegal recruitment.
The prosecution was able to prove by overwhelming
evidence that appellant did represent herself as being in a
position to get for the aspiring overseas contract workers good-
paying jobs abroad. Appellant was thus able to demand and
receive various amounts from the applicants. The latter would
then be briefed by appellant on the requirements for
employment overseas. Appellant herself testified, thus:
Q From 1986 when separated from Friendship Recruitment
Agency and before you were put to jail did you have
any occupation?
"A Yes, sometimes we brought vegetables and flowers to
Manila for resale.
"Q Aside from buying and selling vegetables down in
Manila did you have any other source of income?
"A Sometimes I helped some applicants who are interested
to go abroad and asked if I know some agencies who
can assist them to go abroad.
"Q Were you able to assist some people to look for an
agency to assist them to go abroad?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Were you being paid when you assist these people
applying for overseas employment?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q By whom?
"A The travel agencies give me some amount of
commission.
"Q What are the names of these agencies which you
know?
"A Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"Q Do you know also if this Dynasty Travel and Tours and
Mannings International is duly licensed by the
government to recruit applicants abroad?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Do you have any document to prove that it is
registered?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Where is that?
"A Mannings International is a licensed agency and
Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to issue tickets
for applicants to go abroad.
"Q You said that Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to
issue tickets for applicants going abroad what do you
mean by applicants going abroad?
"A Those applicants to work as a contract worker and who
are ready to leave for abroad and they are being
issued tickets.
"Q Were you actually able to help or assist some overseas
worker-applicants?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Do you remember some of them?
"A Cherry Piay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan,
Francisco Labadchan and others. (Underscoring
supplied.)[50]
Appellant at one point claimed that she had helped complainants
only in acquiring for them plane tickets and tourist visas. On
cross-examination, however, she admitted that she had made
referrals of job applicants to recruitment agencies.[51] She
evidently knew all along that the persons she was dealing with
were applicants for employment abroad.
The law requires that the above activities of appellant
should have first been authorized by the POEA.[52] Rule II, Book
II, of the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas
Employment provides:
SEC. 11. Appointment of Representatives. Every
appointment of representatives or agents of licensed
agency shall be subject to prior approval or authority
of the Administration.
"The approval may be issued upon submission of or
compliance with the following requirements:
"a. Proposed appointment or special power of
attorney;
"b. Clearances of the proposed representative or
agent from NBI;
"c. A sworn or verified statement by the designating
or appointing person or company assuming
full responsibility for all acts of the agent or
representative done in connection with the
recruitment and placement of workers.
"Approval by the Administration of the appointment
or designation does not authorize the agent or
representative to establish a branch or extension
office of the licensed agency represented.
"Any revocation or amendment in the appointment
should be communicated to the Administration.
Otherwise, the designation or appointment shall be
deemed as not revoked or amended.
The claim that appellant did not categorically represent
herself as a licensed recruiter, or that she merely helped the
complainants secure tourist visas, could not make her less guilty
of illegal recruitment,[53] it being enough that he or she gave the
impression of having had the authority to recruit workers for
deployment abroad.[54]
The fact that, with the exception of the cases involving
Cherry Pi-ay and Corazon del Rosario, only the complainant in
each of the cases, have testified against appellant in the illegal
recruitment cases does not thereby make the case for the
prosecution weak. The rule has always been that the testimony
of witnesses is to be weighed, not that the witnesses be
numbered, and it is not an uncommon experience to have a
conclusion of guilt reached on the basis of the testimony of a
single witness.[55] Corroborative evidence is necessary only
when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the
witness has perjured himself or that his observations have
veered from the truth.[56]
The absence of receipts to evidence payment to an
indictee in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not
warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily
fatal to the prosecution's cause. As long as the prosecution is
able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that the
accused has involved himself in an act of illegal recruitment, a
conviction for the offense can very well be justified.[57]
Altogether, the evidence against appellant has established
beyond any discernible shadow of doubt that appellant is indeed
guilty of illegal recruitment on various counts. Being neither a
licensee nor a holder of authority to recruit, appellant must
suffer under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight
years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more
than P100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the
discretion of the court. In imposing the penalty, the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on the application of the
circumstances that could modify the criminal liability of an
accused cannot be considered, these provisions being
inapplicable to special laws.[58]
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[59] whenever the
offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall impose on
the accused an indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed
by the same."[60] Accordingly, in imposing the penalty of four (4)
years to six (6) years on appellant for each of the five cases of
illegal recruitment, the trial court has acted correctly.
Illegal recruitment is committed in large scale if it is
perpetrated against three or more persons "individually or as a
group."Its requisites are that: (1) the person charged with the
crime must have undertaken recruitment activities as so defined
by law, (2) the same person does not have a license or authority
to do that, and (3) the questioned act is committed against three
or more persons.[61] The prosecution has been able to
successfully show that, for a fee, appellant, not being authorized
to recruit workers for abroad, did so in Criminal Case No. 93-
CR-1645 against seven complainants. For this offense, Article
39(a) of the Labor Code imposes the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00). This penalty was thus likewise aptly meted out
upon appellant by the trial court.
Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code
does not bar the punishment of the offender for estafa. Illegal
recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where criminal intent
of the accused is not necessary for conviction
while estafa is malum in se which requires criminal intent to
warrant conviction.[62] Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a),[63] of
the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the offense (estafa) are
that (1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party
or third person.[64]Clearly, these elements have sufficiently been
shown in the cases under review.
The penalty for the crime is prescribed by Article 315, first
to fourth paragraphs, of the Revised Penal Code as follows:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided
in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions
of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the
fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos;
"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period if
such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed
6,000 pesos; and
"4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such
amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in
the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by
any of the following means: x x x."
In the case of People vs. Gabres,[65] the Court has had
occasion to so state that -
"Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum term of the penalty shall be `that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed' under the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum shall be `within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed' for the offense. The
penalty next lower should be based on the penalty
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to
the commission of the crime. The determination of
the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound
discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within
the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum
term of the indeterminate sentence.
"The fact that the amounts involved in the instant
case exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in
the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty;
instead, the matter should be so taken as analogous
to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence.
This interpretation of the law accords with the rule
that penal laws should be construed in favor of the
accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for
the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum,
the penalty next lower would then be prision
correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should
be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day
to four (4) years and two (2) months x x x."[66]
The Court reiterates the above rule; however, in fixing the
maximum term, the prescribed penalty of prision
correccionalmaximum period to prision mayor minimum period
should be divided into "three equal portions of time," each of
which portion shall be deemed to form one period; hence -
Minimum Period Medium Period Maximum Period
From 4 years, 2 months From 5 years, 5 months From 6
years, 8 months
and 1 day to 5 years, and 11 days to 6 years, and 21 days
to 8 years
5 months and 10 days 8 months and 20 days -
in consonance with Article 65,[67] in relation to Article 64,[68] of
the Revised Penal Code.
When the amount involved in the offense
exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the
Code "shall be imposed in its maximum period," adding one year
for each additional P10,000.00 although the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years. The maximum
penalty should then be termed as prision mayor or reclusion
temporal as the case may be. In fine, the one year period,
whenever applicable, shall be added to the maximum period of
the principal penalty of anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and
21 days to 8 years.
Accordingly, with respect to the cases of estafa filed by the
complainants who individually charged appellant with illegal
recruitment, the applicable penalties would, respectively, be, as
follows:
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 where appellant
defrauded Francisco T. Labadchan in the amount of P45,000.00,
two years for the additional amount of P23,000.00 in excess
of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (or added to
anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years). As
such, aside from paying Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00
by way of actual damages, the Court deems it proper to
sentence appellant to the indeterminate penalty of three (3)
years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional medium to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor medium.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, appellant defrauded
Victoria Asil in the amount of P15,000.00. Hence, aside from
paying Victoria Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual
damages, appellant shall also suffer the indeterminate penalty
of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional medium to five (5) years, five (5) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 where appellant
defrauded Cherry Pi-ay in the amount of P18,000.00, appellant,
besides paying Cherry Pi-ay that amount by way of actual
damages, shall also suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum.
 In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 where appellant
defrauded Corazon del Rosario in the amount of P40,000.00,
appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium
to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision mayor minimum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 where appellant
fraudulently solicited the amount of P24,200.00 from Arthur
Juan, appellant shall pay him actual damages in that amount
and shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days (imposed by the
court a quo) of prision correccional minimum period to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652 where appellant
defrauded Adeline Tiangge the amount of P18,500.00, appellant
shall pay her the same amount as actual damages and shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645, the prosecution has
successfully established its case against appellant for illegal
recruitment in large scale. Evidently banking on her reputation
in the community as a job recruiter, appellant was able to make
the seven complainants believe that they could land various jobs
in Taiwan. Confident of her assurances, each complainant
parted with P25,000.00 for supposed processing and placement
fees.
It would appear that of the seven complainants for illegal
recruitment in large scale, only five[69] of them filed separate
charges of estafa against appellant. Accordingly, appellant was
only and could only be held liable for five counts of estafaarising
from the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale. Since
appellant collected the amount of P25,000.00 from each of the
five (5) victims, she must be held subject to the penalty in its
maximum period or prision mayor in its minimum period (not
any higher on account of the fact that the amount in excess
of P22,000.00 provided for by Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code is less than P10,000.00).[70] Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and there being no attending circumstances,
appellant shall bear, the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional medium as minimum penalty to six (6) years, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayorminimum
as maximum penalty for each offense. In addition, appellant
should pay the five (5) victims the amount of P25,000.00 each
as actual damages.
The actual damages awarded here shall be subject to
diminution or cancellation should it be shown that appellant had
already paid the complainants.
WHEREFORE, the Decision finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment,
illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED
subject to the modifications hereunder specified, and only to the
extent thereof, in the following cases:
1) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from
three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional medium period as MINIMUM, to eight (8)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor medium period as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T.
Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00 by way of actual
damages.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five
(5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria
Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual damages.
3) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five
(5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM.
4) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional medium period as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM.
5) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM.
6) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo Arcega
the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
7) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando Salbino
the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
8) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano
Damolog the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
9) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo Belino
the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
10) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega
the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
11) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five
(5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline
Tiangge the amount of P17,000.00 by way of actual damages.
The awards of damages in Criminal Cases No. 92-CR-1396,
No. 92-CR-1413, No. 92-CR-1416, No. 92-CR-1425, and No. 92-
CR-1427, all for illegal recruitment, as well as No. 93-CR-1645
for illegal recruitment in large scale, except for the award
of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages to Dember Leon
(no estafa case having been instituted), are DELETED, either
because similar awards have already been provided for by the
trial court, or for insufficiency of proof, in the estafa cases
aforenumbered.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
EOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on
November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on or about
October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga,
he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00,
which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were
found positive for marijuana.1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2,
1989, after his rearrest following his escape from Camp Olivas,
San Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily
detained,2 he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily waived his right
to a pre-trial conference,3 after which trial on the merits ensued
and was duly concluded.
I fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant,
later identified as a NARCOM operative, informed the police unit
at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug
activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo, Guagua,
Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer of
the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-
bust team composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio
Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After
securing marked money from Bustamante, the team, together
with their informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had
coordinated with the police authorities and barangay officers
thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential informer
pointed out appellant to Lopez who consequently approached
appellant and asked him if he had marijuana. Appellant
answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea
bags. Appellant then left and, upon returning shortly thereafter,
handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him
the marked money amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez
then scratched his head as a declared that she treated appellant for three days due to
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed
around ten to fifteen meters away, and the team closed in on
them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up
team, arrested appellant. The latter was then brought by the
team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board
a jeep and he was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt.
Pejoro as the investigator.4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw
the deal that transpired between Lopez and the appellant. He
also averred that he was the one who confiscated the marijuana
and took the marked money from appellant.5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was
part of the buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest from the
rest of the other members, that is, around two hundred meters
away from his companions. He did not actually see the sale that
transpired between Lopez and appellant but he saw his
teammates accosting appellant after the latter's arrest. He was
likewise the one who conducted the custodial investigation of
appellant wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to remain
silent, to information and to counsel. Appellant, however, orally
waived his right to counsel.6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of
Property Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed, admitting
therein the confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise informed the court
below that, originally, what he placed on the receipt was that
only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for P20.00.
However, Lopez and Villaruz corrected his entry by telling him
to put "two", instead of "one" and "40", instead of "20". He
agreed to the correction since they were the ones who were
personally and directly involved in the purchase of the marijuana
and the arrest of appellant.7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined
appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the day after the latter's apprehension,
and the results were practically normal except for his relatively
high blood pressure. The doctor also did not find any trace of
physical injury on the person of appellant. The next day, he
again examined appellant due to the latter's complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr.
Calara discovered that appellant has a history of peptic ulcer,
which causes him to experience abdominal pain and
consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant came
back with the same complaint but, except for the gastro-
intestinal pain, his physical condition remained normal.8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the
attendant facts, claiming that on the day in question, at around
4:30 p.m., he was watching television with the members of his
family in their house when three persons, whom he had never
met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that they
would just inquire about something from him at their
detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was told
that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that
they were taking a different route. While on board, he was told
that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep
but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the
camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he
refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by
Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and
knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and
insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of
Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was
because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He
admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but claimed
that he did so since he could no longer endure the maltreatment
to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he proceeded
to the house of his uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias,
Guagua, reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There,
he consulted a quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied by
his sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at
Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined for three
days.9
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that
appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga after
undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He likewise
confirmed that appellant had been suffering from peptic ulcer
even before the latter's arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas,
a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital,
abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for
this ailment was appellant's peptic ulcer. She did not see any
sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on
his body.11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented,
the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant for a
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to
pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were
likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the Government.12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned
judgment of the lower court, contending in his assignment of
errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of
"frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting
him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real
theory and evidence is to the effect the appellant actually sold
only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves, while the other two
tea bags were merely confiscated subsequently from his
possession,14 the latter not being in any way connected with the
sale, the information alleges that he sold and delivered four tea
bags of marijuana dried leaves.15 In view thereof, the issue
presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of selling
the two tea bags allegedly committed by appellant, and does
not include the disparate and distinct issue of illegal possession
of the other two tea bags which separate offense is not charged
herein.16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale
must be clearly and unmistakably established.17 To sell means
to give, whether for money or any other material
consideration.18 It must, therefore, be established beyond doubt
that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-
buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence
adduced by both parties, we are morally certain that appellant
was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of
prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a
scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell
two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter
himself creditably testified as to how the sale took place and his
testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As
between the straightforward, positive and corroborated
testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative testimony
of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight and
is more entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers
through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to
mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse.19 Nonetheless, such
causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the
case at bar. Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not effected
in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the
team before the
buy-bust operation was effected.20 No ill motive was or could be
attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are presumed
to have regularly performed their official duty.21 Such lack of
dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the
self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having
been framed,22 erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of
an alibi. To top it all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a
delimited chance for him to controvert the charge, he does not
appear to have plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory
Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National
Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn
Salangad, a forensic chemist therein,23confirmed in her
Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four
tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and had a
total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana.24 Thus, the corpus
delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and
conclusiveness.25
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged
inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is the
matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags from
him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that he had nothing to
do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the
aforementioned "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated," he
signed it as the one who seized the same.26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who
confiscated the marijuana will not really matter since such is not
an element of the offense with which appellant is charged. What
is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was confiscated from
the possession of appellant. Even, assuming arguendo that the
prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the
marijuana from appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers
only to a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the
essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor
reflects on the witnesses' honesty.27 Besides, there was clearly
a mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant
that he did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from
the person of appellant, but he participated in the legalseizure
or confiscation thereof as the investigator of their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills
allegedly confiscated from him were not powdered for finger-
printing purposes contrary to the normal procedure in buy-bust
operations.28 This omission has been satisfactorily explained by
Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:
Q: Is it the standard
operating procedure of
your unit that in conducting
such operation you do not
anymore provide a powder
(sic) on the object so as to
determine the thumbmark
or identity of the persons
taking hold of the object?
A: We were not able to put
powder on these
denominations because we
are lacking that kind of
material in our office since
that item can be purchased
only in Manila and only few
are producing that, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Is it not a fact that your
office is within (the) P.C.
Crime Laboratory, CIS, as
well as the office of NICA?
A: Our office is only
adjacent to those offices
but we cannot make a
request for that powder
because they, themselves,
are using that in their own
work, sir.29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to
mark the money bills used for entrapment purposes can under
no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case of the prosecution
because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions."30 The dusting of said bills with phosphorescent
powder is only an evidentiary technique for identification
purposes, which identification can be supplied by other species
of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of
his nor any barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure.
He decries the lack of pictures taken before, during and after his
arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the
custody of any barangay official or police authorities.31 These
are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that
an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative,
a barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by
the taking of pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers
having caught appellant in flagrante delicto, they were not only
authorized but were also under the obligation to effect a
warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest
report prepared by the police in connection with his
apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for selling
two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the
confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana
dried leaves." Below these remarks was affixed appellant's
signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized
property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant
wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills
from him.33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned
exhibits inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's conformance to
these documents are declarations against interest and tacit
admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in
violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation
for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the
records to show that he was assisted by counsel.34 Although
appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he
waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing
and in the presence of counsel,35 hence whatever incriminatory
admission or confession may be extracted from him, either
verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence.36 Besides, the
arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be
concocted to implicate a suspect.
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits,
appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament
since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana
has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of
illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction37 which happens the
moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller.38 In the
present case, and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale
has been ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would
sell marijuana to a total stranger.39 We take this opportunity to
once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when
done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that class of
crimes that may be committed at any time and in any place.40 It
is not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to
a total stranger,41 for what matters is not an existing familiarity
between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts
constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana
leaves.42 While there may be instances where such sale could
be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse
circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the
incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted on that
occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional particulars
are not present in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical
and mental torture by the arresting officers which caused him
to escape from Camp Olivas the night he was placed under
custody.43 This he asserts to support his explanation as to how
his signatures on the documents earlier discussed were
supposedly obtained by force and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that
for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances.44 The evidence
on record is bereft of any support for appellant's allegation of
maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the prosecution45 and the
other for the defense,46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale
sign or indication of bodily injury, abrasions or contusions on the
person of appellant. What is evident is that the cause of his
abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had been
suffering even before his arrest.47 His own brother even
corroborated that fact, saying that appellant has had a history
of bleeding peptic ulcer.48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp
Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for not divulging the same
to his brother who went to see him at the camp after his arrest
and during his detention there.49Significantly, he also did not
even report the matter to the authorities nor file appropriate
charges against the alleged malefactors despite the opportunity
to do so50 and with the legal services of counsel being available
to him. Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion that
appellant's story is a pure fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his
allegations that his arrest was baseless and premeditated for the
NARCOM agents were determined to arrest him at all
costs.51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest was only the
culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from society
and it was providential that it came about after he was caught
in the very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly,
this opinion could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the
judgment of the trial court. However, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, was further amended by Republic Act No. 7659
effective December 31, 1993,52 which supervenience necessarily
affects the original disposition of this case and entails additional
questions of law which we shall now resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the
adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are
hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Sale,
Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and
Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs. The
penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to
another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such
transactions.
xxx xxx xx
x necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of
Penalties, Confiscation and
Forfeiture of the Proceeds
or Instrument of the Crime.
The penalties for
offenses under Sections 3,
4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II
and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
and 16 of Article III of this
Act shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved
is in any of the following
quantities:
xxx xxx xx
x
5. 750 grams or
more of indian
hemp or
marijuana
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity
involved is less than the
foregoing quantities, the
penalty shall range
from prision
correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon
the quantity.
1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the
sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8
grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the sale of only
two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the
patently favorable provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the
lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law,
albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of the previous
Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code,53 it has long been
settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient
provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given
retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws.54 The
execution in said article would not apply to those convicted of
drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to convictions
for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious
physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification.55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No.
7659 could neither have then been involved nor invoked in the
present case, a corollary question would be whether this court,
at the present stage, can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the
penalty to be imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been
resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al.,
ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22
of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity
of penal laws in so far as they are favorable
to persons accused of a felony, would be
useless and nugatory if the courts of justice
were not under obligation to fulfill such duty,
irrespective of whether or not the accused has
applied for it, just as would also all provisions
relating to the prescription of the crime and
the penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the
reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already
become final and executory or the accused is serving sentence
thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic
considerations would warrant and necessitate the matter being
brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ
of habeas corpus.56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of
imposable penalties appears to have been committed in the
drafting of the aforesaid law; thereby calling for and
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425, as now further amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully sell,
administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the
amendment to Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is
involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;
otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the penalty shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon
the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the
provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its
dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where
the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum
of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or
more. The same error has been committed with respect to the
other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section
20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give
effect to the whole law,57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be
imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than
the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and
not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the
fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be
construed in a manner favorable to the accused.
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is
only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable range of
penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now
modified, the law provides that the penalty shall be taken from
said range "depending upon the quantity" of the drug involved
in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a
complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that
is, prision correccional,prision mayor, and reclusion temporal.
In such a situation, the Code provides that each one shall form
a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next
as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum period.58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances determine which period of such
complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second
paragraph of Section 20, however, is its specific mandate, above
quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend upon the
quantity of the drug subject of the criminal
transaction.59 Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of
the Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic
Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall
be considered as a principal imposable penalty depending on
the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the modifying
circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each
component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be
imposed separately as determined by the quantity of the drug
involved, then the modifying circumstances can be used to fix
the proper period of that component penalty, as shall hereafter
be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20
in the context of our aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless
there are compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities of
the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into
three, with the resulting quotient, and double or treble the
same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty
proportionately among the three aforesaid periods according to
the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana involved is below
250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision
correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed
as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua
to death.60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject
of the case at bar, the penalty of prision correccional is
consequently indicated but, again, another preliminary and
cognate issue has first to be resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to
6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods
as provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided
by Article 76 of the Code. The question is whether or not in
determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be
taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or
absence of mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances
modifying criminal liability should be taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held
that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws,
the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the
Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review
of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that
the reason therefor was because the special laws involved
provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished
thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with
reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties
then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for
the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would
consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated
modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine
the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article
64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that
the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by
degrees could not be given supplementary application to special
laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of
or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71
of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code
to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot
be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or
a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary
application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense
is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the
penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code
in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration,
correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native
to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks
of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it
would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit
otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable
penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the
medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating
circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the
developmental changes in the penalties imposed for offenses
under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional
practice in the United States but differently from the penalties
provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins,
provided for one specific penalty or a range of penalties with
definitive durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for
one to five years but without division into periods or any
technical statutory cognomen. This is the special law
contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the
Indeterminate Sentence Law61 were passed during the
American regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special
law would direct that an offense thereunder shall be punished
under the Revised Penal Code and in the same manner provided
therein. Inceptively, for instance, Commonwealth Act No.
30362 penalizing non-payment of salaries and wages with the
periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his
employee or laborer as required by section
one of this Act, shall prima facie be
considered a fraud committed by such
employer against his employee or laborer by
means of false pretenses similar to those
mentioned in article three hundred and
fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two
(a) of the Revised Penal Code and shall
be punished in the same manner as therein
provided.63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses
defined therein were specifically punished by the penalties as
technically named and understood in the Revised Penal Code.
These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-
Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto
mayor to
death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree)
where the penalties run from arresto mayor to prision mayor;
and Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving
firearms), the penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor,
reclusion temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is
imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not
more than 17 years and 4 months, when committed without
violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things; not less
than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when
committed with violence against or intimidation of any person,
or force upon things; and life imprisonment to death, when the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the
special law are different from and are without reference or
relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no
suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties
under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based
on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code.
In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given
example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the penalty
of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the
duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal,such
technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that
penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for
carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in
the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on
penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to
Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and
the correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as
well as other statutory enactments founded upon and applicable
to such provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the
penalties under the former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees
Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special laws, the fact that
the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in
the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to
give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the
Code the corresponding application to said special laws, in the
absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special
laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible
judicial truncation of an integrated system of penalties under
the Code and its allied legislation, which could never have been
the intendment of Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a special law
(Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-
Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the
prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal
Code should not apply to said special law. We said therein that
imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree
We do not agree with the Solicitor General
that P.D. 533 is a special law entirely distinct
from and unrelated to the Revised Penal
Code. From the nature of the penalty
imposed which is in terms of the classification
and duration of penalties as prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties
as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the
intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be
deemed as an amendment of the Revised
Penal Code, with respect to the offense of
theft of large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to
be subject to applicable provisions thereof
such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code
. . . . Article 64 of the same Code should,
likewise, be applicable, . . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules
on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425,
in this case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we have this
more recent pronouncement:
. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall
be "supplementary" to special laws, this Court
held that where the special law expressly
grants to the court discretion in applying the
penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no
room for the application of the provisions of
the Code . . . .
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains no
explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the
application of the penalty prescribed by the
law. In such case, the court must be guided
by the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code concerning the application of
penalties which distill the "deep legal thought
and centuries of experience in the
administration of criminal laws." (Emphasis
ours.)66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the
Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659
by the incorporation and prescription therein of the technical
penalties defined in and constituting integral parts of the three
scales of penalties in the Code, 67 with much more reason
should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation and
effects of all attendant modifying circumstances apply in fixing
the penalty. Likewise, the different kinds or classifications of
penalties and the rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on
Republic Act No. 6425, except if they would result in absurdities
as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect
is involved in the discussion on the role of modifying
circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the caveat that
mitigating circumstances should be considered and applied only
if they affect the periods and the degrees of the penalties within
rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and
consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in
accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to
the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of
the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused.
However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two
or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also,
the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided
in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two
degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67
and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the
proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of
section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results
which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law
prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially provided for
in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall
proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty
prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be
shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the
former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied,
and since the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that
is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then
one degree lower would be arresto
menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be
no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must
each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties
of fine and public censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances
may be appreciated to determine the periods of the
corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty
by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be
considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the
lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in
order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may
continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial
solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse
should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to
Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it does,
since drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant
committed any act which would put him within the exceptions
to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not
involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of course, that
the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of
imprisonment.68 The more important aspect, however, is how
the indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for
indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal
Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any other law,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same." We hold that
this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an
offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was
not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal
Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it
may be said that the "offense is punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on
indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws was
necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties
under said laws which were not included or contemplated in the
scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there could
be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule for
felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties in
special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule applied, and would
still apply, only to the first and last examples. Furthermore,
considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this
holding is but an application and is justified under the rule
of contemporanea expositio.69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the
Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their
technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of
determining the maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said
law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code
to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense,
although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished
by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to
determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the
aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or
its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposedunder the rules of said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." (Emphasis
ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of
context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim that qui
haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has
never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act. No. 4103
by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard
to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage
"persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty
or life imprisonment," we have held that what is considered is
the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty imposable
under the law,70and that reclusion perpetua is likewise
embraced therein although what the law states is "life
imprisonment".
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition,
therefore, is that under the concurrence of the principles of
literal interpretation, which have been rationalized by
comparative decisions of this Court; of historical interpretation,
as explicated by the antecedents of the law and related
contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation,
considering the interrelation of the penalties in the Code as
supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated scheme of
penalties, it follows that the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to that
prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted
the seeming ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a
way as to harmonize laws with laws, which is the best mode of
interpretation.71
The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure
of compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the
accused.72 The "minimum" sentence is merely a period at which,
and not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the
prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his
sentence outside of his confinement.73 It does not constitute the
totality of the penalty since thereafter he still has to continue
serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions. That
minimum is only the period when the convict's eligibility for
parole may be considered. In fact, his release on parole may
readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his
reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has
served the minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar,
appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum
sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next
lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range we
have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the
Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may
set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto
mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional.
The difference, which could thereby even involve only one day,
is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the
judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment
of conviction rendered by the court a quo against accused-
appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the
MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is, sentenced
to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as the maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the
Decision,[1] dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24,
1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in
Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing
Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
7068 - 7070. The Information in Criminal Case No. 7068 alleges
as follows:
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and
mutually helping with one another, knowing fully well that they
did not have sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check
No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE
THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS
(P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without
informing the latter that they did not have sufficient funds
deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the check,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on,
indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam by
way of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however,
upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank for
encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the
account of the accused with the United Coconut Planters Bank,
Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22.[2]
The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal
Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly worded, except for the
allegations concerning the number, date and amount of each
check, that is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744
dated July 22, 1990 in the amount
of P12,730.00;[3]
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 UCPB Check No. 106136
dated July 22, 1990 in the amount
of P8,496.55.[4]
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When
arraigned on June 26, 1991, the two accused pleaded not guilty
to the crimes charged.[5]
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant
Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in 1989, spouses
Adronico[6]and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular
customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City,
Bohol;[7] sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained
a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated
July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico;[8] sometime in the last week of
April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga
spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed
by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990
issued by Adronico;[9] between May and June 1990, the Ladonga
spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22,
1990 issued by Adronico;[10] the three checks bounced upon
presentment for the reason CLOSED ACCOUNT;[11] when the
Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated
demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.[12]
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico
bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account
was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were
issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that
Oculam should not encash the checks when they
mature;[13] and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks
and had no participation in the issuance thereof.[14]
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision
finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment
finding accused Adronico Ladonga, alias Ronie, and Evangeline
Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three
(3) criminal cases, for which they stand charged before this
Court, and accordingly, sentences them to imprisonment and
fine, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one
(1) year for each of them, and a fine in the amount
of P9,075.55, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No.
284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each
of them to one (1) year and a fine of P12, 730.00, equivalent to
the amount of UCPB Check No. 284744; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one
year for each of them and a fine of P8,496.55 equivalent to the
amount of UCPB Check No. 106136;
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily
pay and reimburse the complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the
sum of P15,000.00 representing actual expenses incurred in
prosecuting the instant cases; P10,000.00 as attorneys fee; and
the amount of P30,302.10 which is the total value of the three
(3) subject checks which bounced; but without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Adronico applied for probation which was granted.[16] On
the other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally
liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of
conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law;
moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no
participation in the issuance thereof.[17]
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction of petitioner.[18] It held that the provisions of the
penal code were made applicable to special penal laws in the
decisions of this Court in People vs. Parel, [19] U.S. vs.
Ponte, [20] and U.S. vs. Bruhez.[21] It noted that Article 10 of the
Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be
supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the
contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P.
Blg. 22 does not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory
character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the
principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving
violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact that
petitioner did not make and issue or sign the checks did not
exculpate her from criminal liability as it is not indispensable that
a co-conspirator takes a direct part in every act and knows the
part which everyone performed. The Court of Appeals
underscored that in conspiracy the act of one conspirator could
be held to be the act of the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the
Court of Appeals denied the same in a Resolution dated
November 16, 1999.[22]
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for
resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE
DRAWER OR ISSUER OF THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED
BUT HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE LATTERS
ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING
ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN
VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING
THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE WHICH STATES:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code.
Offenses which are or in the future may be punished under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION
OF PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE
SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO
SPECIAL LAWS LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.[23]
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held
criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because she had no
participation in the drawing and issuance of the three checks
subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks
themselves. She contends that the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under
the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the
application of the principle of conspiracy would enlarge the
scope of the statute and include situations not provided for or
intended by the lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like
petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or issuance
of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner
and echoes the declaration of the Court of Appeals that some
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the
addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to
special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any
prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character
of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code.
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides
that offenses which in the future are made punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while
the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While
it seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible
interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that
the special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses
therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the
elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal
provisions prevail over general ones.[24] Lex specialis derogant
generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity,
and could have been eliminated altogether. The second clause
contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of
the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be
supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should
specifically provide the contrary.
The appellate courts reliance on the cases of People vs.
Parel,[25] U.S. vs. Ponte,[26] and U.S. vs. Bruhez[27] rests on a
firm basis. These cases involved the suppletory application of
principles under the then Penal Code to special laws. People vs.
Parel is concerned with the application of Article 22[28] of the
Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with
reference to the retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the
accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of Article
17[29] of the same Penal Code, with reference to the
participation of principals in the commission of the crime of
misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act
No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 45[30] of the same
Code, with reference to the confiscation of the instruments used
in violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory
application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of
contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the
RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs.
People,[31] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39[32] of the RPC to B.P.
Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in
this case is analogous to the application of the provision on
principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy
or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the
act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.[33]
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner
must be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To be held guilty
as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.[34] The overt act or acts of the
accused may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance
to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement
the criminal plan.[35]
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that
petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness,
complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present
when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of
Criminal Case No. 7068.[36] With respect to Criminal Case Nos.
7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe the details of
petitioners participation. He did not specify the nature of
petitioners involvement in the commission of the crime, either
by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-
conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be
attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first
check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched
to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but
by positive and conclusive evidence.[37] Conspiracy transcends
mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.[38] Even
knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[39]
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent
vintage, People vs. Mandao:[40]
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken
lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that
imputes culpability under specific circumstances; as such, it
must be established as clearly as any element of the crime.
Evidence to prove it must be positive and convincing,
considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which
the accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of
conspiracy, and a judgment of conviction must always be
founded on the strength of the prosecutions evidence. The Court
ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:
At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence
against accused-appellant Franco, merely relied and pegged the
latters criminal liability on its sweeping theory of conspiracy,
which to us, was not attendant in the commission of the crime.
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must
be predicated on the strength of the evidence for the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. The proof against him must survive the test of reason;
the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defense
could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not
only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime.
What is required then is moral certainty.
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere possibility --
determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when
the evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must be
acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the
requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal
cases. (Citations omitted)[41]
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the
petitioner with moral certainty. Its evidence falls short of the
quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the
constitutional presumption of the petitioners innocence must be
upheld and she must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated August
24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in
Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting the
petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the
charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LUISITO D.
BUSTINERA, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
217, Quezon City finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft[2] for the unlawful
taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court on
appeal.
In an information[3] dated June 17, 1997, appellant was
indicted as follows:
The undersigned accuses LUISITO D. BUSTINERA of the crime
of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of December up to the 9th day of
January, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
being then employed as one [of] the taxi Drivers of Elias S.
Cipriano, an Operator of several taxi cabs with business address
at corner 44 Commonwealth Avenue, iliman (sic), this City, and
as such has free access to the taxi he being driven, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain,
with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by his
employer and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, take, steal and carry away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi
with Plate No. PWH-266 worth P303,000.00, Philippine
Currency, belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in the amount
of P303,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
 Upon arraignment[4] on March 27, 2000, appellant,
assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not
guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following
version is established.
Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who
manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business of his father, hired
appellant as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo
Racer with plate number PWH-266. It was agreed that appellant
would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which
he would return it to ESC Transports garage and remit the
boundary fee in the amount of P780.00 per day.[5]
On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for
work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the same
day as he was supposed to.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, on December 25, 1996, did you
report for work?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, since you reported for work, what are your
duties and responsibilities as taxi driver of the
taxi company?
A: That we have to bring back the taxi at night
with the boundary.
Q: How much is your boundary?
A: P780.00, sir.
Q: On December 25, 1996, did you bring out
any taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when ever (sic) you bring out a taxi, what
procedure [do] you follow with that company?
A: That we have to bring back the taxi to the
company and before we leave we also sign
something, sir.
Q: What is that something you mentioned?
A: On the record book and on the daily trip ticket, sir.
Q: You said that you have to return your taxi at the
end of the day, what is then the procedure
reflect (sic) by your company when you return
a taxi?
A: To remit the boundary and to sign the record book
and daily trip ticket.
Q: So, when you return the taxi, you sign the record
book?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You mentioned that on December 25, 1996,
you brought out a taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of taxi?
A: Daewoo taxi, sir.
Q: Now did you return the taxi on December
25, 1996?
A: I was not able to bring back the taxi
because I was short of my boundary, sir.[6]
The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to
appellants house to ascertain why the taxi was not
returned.[7]Arriving at appellants house, he did not find the taxi
there, appellants wife telling him that her husband had not yet
arrived.[8]Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went to the
Commonwealth Avenue police station and reported that his taxi
was missing.[9]
On January 9, 1997, appellants wife went to the garage of
ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had been abandoned
in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City.[10] Cipriano lost no time
in repairing to Regalado Street where he recovered the taxi.[11]
Upon the other hand, while appellant does not deny that
he did not return the taxi on December 25, 1996 as he was short
of the boundary fee, he claims that he did not abandon the taxi
but actually returned it on January 5, 1997;[12] and that on
December 27, 1996, he gave the amount of P2,000.00[13] to his
wife whom he instructed to remit the same to Cipriano as
payment of the boundary fee[14] and to tell the latter that he
could not return the taxi as he still had a balance thereof.[15]
Appellant, however, admits that his wife informed him that
when she went to the garage to remit the boundary fee on the
very same day (December 27, 1996),[16] Cipriano was already
demanding the return of the taxi.[17]
Appellant maintains though that he returned the taxi on
January 5, 1997 and signed the record book,[18] which was
company procedure, to show that he indeed returned it and
gave his employer P2,500.00[19] as partial payment for the
boundary fee covering the period from December 25, 1996 to
January 5, 1997.
Continuing, appellant claims that as he still had a balance
in the boundary fee, he left his drivers license with
Cipriano;[20]that as he could not drive, which was the only work
he had ever known, without his drivers license, and with the
obligation to pay the balance of the boundary fee still lingering,
his wife started working on February 18, 1997 as a stay-in maid
for Cipriano, with a monthly salary of P1,300.00,[21] until March
26, 1997 when Cipriano told her that she had worked off the
balance of his obligation;[22] and that with his obligation
extinguished, his drivers license was returned to him.[23]
Brushing aside appellants claim that he returned the taxi
on January 5, 1997 and that he had in fact paid the total amount
of P4,500.00, the trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified theft by Decision of May 17, 2001, the
dispositive portion of which is quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged, and he is
accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, accused is ordered credited with
four-fifths (4/5) of the preventive imprisonment undergone by
him there being no showing that he agreed in writing to abide
by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners.
SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Hence, the present appeal anchored on the following
assigned errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING
WITHOUT CONCRETE BASIS THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
HAS INTENT TO GAIN WHEN HE FAILED TO RETURN THE TAXI
TO ITS GARAGE.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT.[25]
It is settled that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws
the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the
judgment even if they have not been specifically assigned.[26]
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful taking
of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified,
with respect to certain vehicles,[27] by Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND
PENALIZING CARNAPPING.
When statutes are in pari materia[28] or when they relate
to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or
things, or cover the same specific or particular subject
matter,[29] or have the same purpose or object,[30] the rule
dictates that they should be construed together interpretare et
concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi
modus.[31] Every statute must be so construed and harmonized
with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence,[32] as this Court explained in City of Naga v.
Agna,[33] viz:
. . . When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory
construction dictates that they should be construed together.
This is because enactments of the same legislature on the same
subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform
system; that later statutes are supplementary or complimentary
to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the
legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislation
on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with
reference thereto. Having thus in mind the previous statutes
relating to the same subject matter, whenever the legislature
enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the new
provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in
those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old
and they all should be construed together. In construing
them the old statutes relating to the same subject
matter should be compared with the new provisions and
if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so
construed that effect may be given to every provision of
each. However, when the new provision and the old
relating to the same subject cannot be reconciled the
former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the
legislative will . . . [34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3)
that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking
be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.[35]
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances
is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2)
the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the
property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from
the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken
from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on
the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.[36]
On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things. The elements of
carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which
belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the
owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons
or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with
intent to gain.[37]
Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a
motorized vehicle,[38] the concept of unlawful taking in theft,
robbery and carnapping being the same.[39]
In the 2000 case of People v. Tan[40] where the accused
took a Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later case of People v.
Lobitania[41] which involved the taking of a Yamaha motorized
tricycle, this Court held that the unlawful taking of motor
vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by
the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a
special law, different from the crime of robbery and theft
included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly
addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law with
the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common
features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to
gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken
without the latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping
law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of
motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been
carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without
the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or
without the use of force upon things. Without the anti-
carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle
would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery
which was certainly the case before the enactment of
said statute.[42] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted.)
It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping
law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles, it excepts
from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys,
street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and
cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only
on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and tractor engines of
all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. By
implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would
be covered by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended and the provisions on robbery, respectively.[43]
From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the
unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-carnapping law
and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as
the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions
mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.
The designation in the information of the offense
committed by appellant as one for qualified theft
notwithstanding, appellant may still be convicted of the crime of
carnapping. For while it is necessary that the statutory
designation be stated in the information, a mistake in the
caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the
offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is
controlling but the facts alleged in the information which
determines the real nature of the crime.[44]
In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant,
with intent to gain, took the taxi owned by Cipriano without the
latters consent.[45] Thus, the indictment alleges every element
of the crime of carnapping,[46] and the prosecution proved the
same.
Appellants appeal is thus bereft of merit.
That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996
and did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to is
admitted.[47]
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the
motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same.[48]
While the nature of appellants possession of the taxi was
initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver and was entrusted
possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which
is contrary to company practice and against the owners consent
transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful
one.[49] Appellant himself admits that he was aware that his
possession of the taxi was no longer with Ciprianos consent as
the latter was already demanding its return.
Q: Also you said that during your direct testimony
that when you gave your wife the P2,500.00,
you also told her to go to the company to ask
the company for permission for you to use the
taxi since you were then still short of the
boundary. Alright, after telling that to your wife
and after seeing your wife between December
27, 1996 and January 5, 1997, did you ask your
wife what was the answer of the company to
that request of yours?
A: He did not allow me, sir, and he even [got] angry
with me.
Q: So, when did you learn that the company was not
agreeable to your making use of the taxicab
without first returning it to the company?
A: Before the new year, sir.
Q: When you said new year, you were referring to
January 1, 1997?
A: Either December 29 or December 30, 1996, sir.
Q: So, are you telling us that even if you knew
already that the company was not
agreeable to your making use of the
taxicab continually (sic) without
returning the same to the company, you
still went ahead and make (sic) use of it
and returned it only on January 5, 1997.
A: Yes, sir.[50] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Appellant assails the trial courts conclusion that there was
intent to gain with the mere taking of the taxi without the
owners consent. He maintains that his reason for failing to
return the taxi was his inability to remit the boundary fee, his
earnings that day not having permitted it; and that there was
no intent to gain since the taking of the taxi was not permanent
in character, he having returned it.
Appellants position does not persuade.
 Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act,
presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor
vehicle.[51] Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain.[52] The term gain is not
merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit
which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the
act which is performed.[53] Thus, the mere use of the thing
which was taken without the owners consent constitutes
gain.[54]
In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission[55] which was
reiterated in Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc.
v. Fieldmens Insurance Co, Inc.,[56] Justice Claudio Teehankee
(later Chief Justice), interpreting the theft clause of an insurance
policy, explained that, when one takes the motor vehicle of
another without the latters consent even if the motor vehicle
is later returned, there is theft, there being intent to gain as
the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain:
Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the
taking was temporary and for a joy ride, the Court sustains
as the better view[57] that which holds that when a person,
either with the object of going to a certain place, or learning
how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a
vehicle belonging to another, without the consent of its
owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking possession of
the personal property belonging to another and using it, his
intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom
utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. Justice
Ramon C. Aquino cites in his work Groizard who holds
that the use of a thing constitutes gain and Cuello Calon
who calls it hurt de uso.[58] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citation omitted)
Besides, the trial court did not believe appellants claim that
he in fact returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.
The Court can not (sic) believe accuseds assertion that he
returned the subject vehicle on January 5, 1997 to the garage
and that he had in fact paid the amount of P4,500.00 in partial
payment of his unremitted boundary for ten (10) days. He could
not even be certain of the exact amount he allegedly paid the
taxicab owner. On direct-examination, he claimed that he paid
Edwin Cipriano on December 27, 1996 the amount of P2,000.00
and it was his wife who handed said amount to Cipriano, yet on
cross-examination, he claimed that he gave P2,500.00 to his
wife on that date for payment to the taxicab owner.[59]
The rule is well-entrenched that findings of fact of the trial
court are accorded the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that the trial court
had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and significance which, if considered,
would alter the result of the case.[60] The reason for the rule
being that trial courts have the distinct advantage of having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying or their conduct and behavior during
the trial.[61]
Other than his bare and self-serving allegations, appellant
has not shown any scintilla of evidence that he indeed returned
the taxi on January 5, 1997.
Q: You said that you returned the taxi on January 5,
1997, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, did you sign any record
when you returned the taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you have any copy of that record?
A: They were the one (sic) in-charge of the
record book and I even voluntarily left my
drivers license with them, sir.
Q: You said that you did not return the taxi because
you were short of (sic) boundary, did you turn
over any money to your employer when you
returned the taxi?
A: I gave them [an] additional P2,500.00, sir.
Q: At the time when you returned the taxi, how much
was your short indebtedness (sic) or short
boundary (sic)?
A: I was short for ten (10) days, and I was able to
pay P4,500.00.
Q: Do you have any receipt to show receipt of
payment for this P4,500.00?
A: They were the ones having the record of my
payment, and our agreement was that I
have to pay the balance in
installment.[62] (Emphasis supplied)
While appellant maintains that he signed on January 5,
1997 the record book indicating that he returned the taxi on the
said date and paid Cipriano the amount of P4,500.00 as partial
payment for the boundary fee, appellant did not produce the
documentary evidence alluded to, to substantiate his
claim. That such alleged record book is in the possession of
Cipriano did not prevent him from producing it as appellant has
the right to have compulsory process issued to secure the
production of evidence on his behalf.[63]
The trial court having convicted appellant of qualified theft
instead of carnapping, it erred in the imposition of the penalty.
While the information alleges that the crime was attended with
grave abuse of confidence, the same cannot be appreciated as
the suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws,
as provided in Article 10 of said Code, cannot be invoked when
there is a legal impossibility of application, either by express
provision or by necessary implication.[64]
Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are
different from and are without reference or relation to those
under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect
of the rules, for the application of penalties under the said Code
or by other relevant statutory provisions are based on or
applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code.[65]
Thus, in People v. Panida[66] which involved the crime of
carnapping and the penalty imposed was the indeterminate
sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years
and 4 months, as maximum, this Court did not apply the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily as the anti-
carnapping law provides for its own penalties which are distinct
and without reference to the said Code.
The charge being simple carnapping, the imposable penalty is
imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not
more than 17 years and 4 months. There can be no
suppletory effect of the rules for the application of
penalties under the Revised Penal Code or by other
relevant statutory provisions based on, or applicable
only to, the rules for felonies under the Code. While it is
true that the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17
years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the
duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal,
such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not
given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other
penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to
those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code,
therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539
and special laws of the same formulation. For this reason, we
hold that the proper penalty to be imposed on each of accused-
appellants is an indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8
months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as
maximum.[67] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)
Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under the
first clause of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended,
the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years
and 8 months, not more than 17 years and 4 months,[68] for, as
discussed above, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
cannot be applied suppletorily and, therefore, the alleged
aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence cannot
be appreciated.
Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103,[69] as amended,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the
offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term
of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and
the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum
prescribed by the same the penalty imposed being a range.[70]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Crim Case No. Q-97-71956,
finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified theft, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another judgment entered in its place, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping under Republic Act
No. 6539, as amended and sentencing him to an indeterminate
penalty of Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8) Months, as
minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
GO-TAN vs TAN
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution[1] dated March 7, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-
05-54536 and the RTC Resolution[2] dated July 11, 2005 which denied
petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan
(Steven) were married.[3] Out of this union, two female children were
born, Kyra Danielle[4] and Kristen Denise.[5] On January 12, 2005, barely
six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)[6] against Steven and
her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy
with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic
abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5),
and (i)[7] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,[8] otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice[9] granting
petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with
Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection
Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,[10] contending that the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition[11] to
respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered
by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at
promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution[12] dismissing the case as
to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A.
No. 9262 under the well-known rule of
law expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[13]
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for
Reconsideration[14] contending that the doctrine of necessary implication
should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due
process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion
for Reconsideration[15] arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly
broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between
the offender and the alleged victim was an essential condition for the
application of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution[16] denying petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include
respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained
interpretation of the provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES
PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF
SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF
2004.[17]
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of
the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for
the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and,
accordingly, the provision on conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC can
be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents
had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her
insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected
from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally,
emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be
included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of
the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A.
No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender
should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a
dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of
respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by
this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be
characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence
in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the
non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their
children'' as any act or a series of acts committed by any person against
a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he
has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or
dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for
the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For
purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and
other applicable laws, shall
have suppletory application. (Emphasis
supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the
provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the
contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in
a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as
R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,[18] the Court applied suppletorily the provision
on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of
Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noting
that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant could
be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,[19] the Court applied suppletorily the rules on
the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the
accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, considering the
lack of similar rules under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury,[20] the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18
and 19 of the RPC to define the words principal, accomplices and
accessories under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, because said words were
not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same terms
in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,[21] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC
to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as
the Bouncing Checks Law, noting the absence of an express provision on
subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,[22] the Court applied suppletorily the
principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the
absence of a contrary provision therein.
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the
law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally
construed to promote the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and their
children. (Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law[24] and that this
intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express
language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal
construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law
according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety
of victims of violence against women and children.

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8
of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the
express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to
said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For
once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown,
the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all
the conspirators are principals.[23]
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly
recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children
may be committed by an offender through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children. - The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the
following acts:
xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another,
that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her
child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in
public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the
residence of the woman or her child;
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the
maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius finds no application here. It
must be remembered that this maxim is only an ancillary rule of statutory
construction. It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It
should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which
is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the
plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.[25]
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on
the attendance of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance
of Steven and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic
abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which
should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be
determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of
facts.[26] It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters
since this controversy is centered only on the determination of whether
respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The
presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial
on the merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy
may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer
delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable or
necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-
54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar
as the dismissal of the petition against respondents is
concerned.
SO ORDERED.

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the

property of the woman or her child against her/his
will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings

or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman
or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her
child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection
orders that may be issued under this Act shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening

to commit or committing, personally or through
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of
this Act;

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing,

annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly
or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)