The National Academies Press: Beyond Compliance: Strengthening The Safety Culture of The Offshore Oil and Gas Industry

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Beyond Compliance: Strengthening the Safety Culture of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry
Beyond
Compliance
Strengthening the Safety Culture
of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry
Committee on Offshore Oil and Gas Industry Safety Culture

Transportation Research Board
Marine Board
Board on Human-Systems Integration
Division of Human Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education

Washington, D.C.
2016
www.TRB.org
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marine Board
James C. Card (Vice Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, retired), Independent
Consultant, Chair
Mary R. Brooks, Dalhousie University, Vice Chair
Edward N. Comstock, Independent Consultant (retired from Raytheon and
Naval Sea Systems Command)
Elmer P. Danenberger III, Independent Consultant
Samuel P. De Bow, Jr. (Rear Admiral, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, retired), Lynker Technologies
Thomas J. Eccles (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, retired), USJ-IMECO Holding
Company
Martha R. Grabowski, LeMoyne College
Jeanne M. Grasso, Blank Rome, LLP
Stephan T. Grilli, University of Rhode Island
John M. Holmes (Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, retired), Independent Consultant
Thomas A. Jacobsen (Captain), Jacobsen Pilot Service, Inc.
Donald Liu, NAE, American Bureau of Shipping (retired)
Richard S. Mercier, Texas A&M University
Edmond (Ned) J. Moran, Jr., Moran Towing Corporation
Ali Mosleh, NAE, University of California, Los Angeles
John W. Murray (Captain), Hapag-Lloyd USA, LLC
Karlene H. Roberts, University of California, Berkeley
Richard D. Steinke, Moffatt & Nichol Engineers
Peter K. Velez, Peter Velez Engineering, LLC
Richard D. West (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, retired)

2016 executive Committee officers
James M. Crites, Executive Vice President of Operations,
DallasFort Worth International Airport, Texas, Chair
Paul Trombino III, Director, Iowa Department of Transportation, Ames,
Vice Chair
Susan Hanson, Distinguished University Professor Emerita, Graduate School
of Geography, Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, Division Chair for
NRC Oversight
Neil J. Pedersen, Transportation Research Board, Executive Director

Board on Human-Systems integration

Nancy Cooke, Cognitive Engineering Research Institute, Arizona State
University, Chair
Ellen J. Bass, Department of Systems and Information Engineering, Drexel
University
Sara J. Czaja, Departments of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences and Industrial
Engineering, University of Miami
Francis T. Durso, Department of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology
Andrew S. Imada, Principal, A. S. Imada & Associates, Carmichael, California
Edmond Israelski, Human Factors Program, AbbVie, Abbott Park, Illinois
Elizabeth Loftus, Criminology, Law and Society; Cognitive Sciences; School of
Law, University of California, Irvine
Frederick L. Oswald, Department of Psychology, Rice University
Karl S. Pister, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University
of California, Santa Cruz
David Rempel, Division of Occupational Medicine, University of California, San
Francisco
Emilie M. Roth, Principal, Roth Cognitive Engineering, Menlo Park, California
Barbara Silverstein, Safety and Health Assessment and Research for Prevention
Program, Washington State Department of Labor and Industries
David H. Wegman, School of Health and Environment, University of
Massachusetts, Lowell
Poornima Madhavan, Director


Committee on offshore oil and Gas industry

Safety Culture
Nancy T. Tippins, CEB, Greenville, South Carolina, Chair
Deborah A. Boehm-Davis, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia
John S. Carroll, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge
Elmer P. Danenberger III, Independent Consultant, Reston, Virginia
David A. Hofmann, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
William C. Hoyle, U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
(retired)
Robert Krzywicki, DuPont (retired), Independent Consultant, Ocean Isle Beach,
North Carolina
Todd R. LaPorte, University of California, Berkeley (emeritus)
Karlene H. Roberts, University of California, Berkeley (emerita)
Peter K. Velez, Peter Velez Engineering, LLC, Houston, Texas
Timothy Vogus, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee
James A. Watson IV (Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, retired), American
Bureau of Shipping, Houston, Texas
Warner Williams, Chevron Corporation (retired), Warner M. Williams, LLC,
Covington, Louisiana
Marine Board Liaison

James C. Card, U.S. Coast Guard (retired), Independent Consultant, Houston,
Texas
Transportation Research Board Staff

Stephen Godwin, Director, Studies and Special Programs
Camilla Y. Ables, Study Director
Beverly Huey, Senior Program Officer
Amelia Mathis, Administrative Assistant


Beyond
Compliance
Strengthening the Safety Culture
of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry
The offshore oil and gas industry in the Gulf
of Mexico is among the most developed in
the world. It provides thousands of jobs in
the Gulf Coast region and supplies a sizable
portion of the U.S. energy requirement. Oil
production in the Gulf of Mexico is expect-
ed to account for 18percent and 21 percent
of total forecast U.S. crude oil production in
2016 and 2017, respectively, even as oil prices
remain low.
Drilling offshore for oil and gas can,
however, be a dangerous business. Logistical,
oceanographic, operational, and economic
challenges complicate deepwater exploration
and development. The number and variety
of contractors operating on a single facility
can increase the challenges associated with
sustaining a common safety culture, manag-
ing personnel effectively, and carrying out
the responsibility for maintaining safe work-
ing conditions.
inga spenCe/alamy
2 B e yo n d Co mp l ia nCe
u.s. CoasT guaRD phoTo By peTTy offiCeR 3RD Class ann maRie goRDen
Incidents with extensive repercussions, such as the Macondo well
blowout of 2010, are unlikely. Yet when they do occur, they can have
severe consequences for offshore workers, people in the communities that
support the oil and gas industry, those whose livelihoods are affected, the
assets of the operator and its contractors, the environment, and the indus-
try as a whole. The Macondo well blowout led to an explosion and fire on
the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig that resulted in the deaths of 11 crew
members, injuries to others, and the spilling of an estimated 3.19 million
barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico. In the end, the incident will
cost BP more than $30 billion in fines, penalties, operational response,
and liabilities.1 The magnitude of the disaster and its substantial economic
impacts on the Gulf Coast region as a result of lost revenue, profits, and
wages have led to intense public scrutiny of the safety of offshore drilling
and production.
Prior to the Macondo event, many in the industry found it difficult
to imagine an accident in the United States that would result in a major
oil spill, loss of lives, injuries, and the sinking of the rig. This point is il-
lustrated by the aftermath of the 2009 blowout and fire on the Montara
wellhead platform and subsequent oil spill in the Timor Sea (northwest of
the Western Australia coast). Following this incident, many of the public
1
According to the Wall Street Journal (April 26, 2016), BPs total bill is more than $56 billion to date
and continues to increase.

Strengthening the Safety Culture of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry 3
statements from the U.S. oil and gas industry focused on explaining why a
Montara-like blowout could not happen in the United States, rather than
expressing the industrys intent to learn more about the Montara incident
and its causes and share that knowledge industry-wide. As it happened,
the root causes of the Macondo and Montara blowouts were similar: both
involved failures of management systems and processes. Had industry
made a greater effort to understand the causes of the Montara event, the
suspension of the Macondo well might have been managed better, with
less damage.
Multiple investigations of the Macondo well blowout, rig explosion,
and oil spill attributed the cause of the blowout to a series of mistakes
made by the operating company, the drilling contractor, and the contractor
for the cementing job. Ultimately, those mistakes are indicative of system-
atic failures in risk management, and call into question the safety culture
of the offshore oil and gas industry. Indeed, the various investigations led
to a common conclusion: that a lack of process safety and deficient safety
culture were primary causes of the accident. This consensus conclusion
signaled a significant change in how the causes of such catastrophic ac-
cidents are understood.
philip goulD/geTTy

dreampictures/getty
Government, industry organizations, and individual companies have

taken many actions to improve safety over the past several years. None-
theless, more work remains to be done to effect safety improvements
throughout the U.S. offshore oil and gas industry. To help respond to that
need, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
convened an expert committee to identify ways in which the offshore oil
and gas industry, government, and other stakeholders
can strengthen the industrys safety culture.2
The committees full report,3 issued in 2016, outlines
what government, industry, and other organizations can
do to strengthen safety culture. This companion publica-
tion summarizes those portions of the full report that
are directly relevant to offshore industry leaders, the off-
shore workforce, and salient professional organizations.
After briefly reviewing actions taken by companies,
industry associations, and regulators that serve as the
foundations for future safety efforts, the report argues
for the need for a new approach based on building a
strong safety culture, whose essential characteristics are
then defined. Next is a discussion of recommended ac-
tions for improving safety culture, including developing
a vision for appropriate regulatory oversight and a stra- niColas Russell/geTTy
tegic plan for achieving safety and environmental objectives, and creating
an independent industry safety organization. The report then describes
the challenges entailed in implementing change in offshore safety culture,
along with strategies for overcoming those challenges. The final section
addresses assessment of progress in safety culture to facilitate improve-
ment. The discussion herein is based on the main findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the National Academies committee. Readers
interested in additional information on these topics should refer to the full
report.
2
The committees work was supported with funds designated for the National Academy of Sciences
as a community service payment arising out of a plea agreement entered into between the United
States Attorneys Office for the Eastern District of Louisiana and Helmerich & Payne International
Drilling Company.
3
Strengthening the Safety Culture of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry, available at http://www.nap.
edu/catalog/23524/strengthening-the-safety-culture-of-the-offshore-oil-and-gas-industry.

6 B eyo n d C o m p lia n Ce
Foundations for Future Safety efforts
In the many decades since the oil and gas industry began working along
the coastline and, ultimately, moved offshore to explore for and produce oil
and gas, occupational safety appears to have improved through the efforts
of companies, industry associations, and regula-
tors. The offshore environment did not start out
as a safe one in which to work. Initial ad hoc and
experimental designs for drilling from vessels and
platforms in shallow water resulted in overturned
vessels, fires, explosions, blowouts, and extensive
loss of life in the 1950s and 1960s. Inconsisten-
cies in reporting and reporting requirements
DoD phoTo By spC 2nD Class JonaThen e. Davis make it impossible to assess accident rates during
the early years as companies moved farther offshore, but a series of di-
sasters during this period illustrated the risks and motivated action by
industry and government.
From the mid-1960s through the 1990s, the industry began to work
collectively to solve design and equipment problems. Industry associations
such as the American Petroleum Institute (API) and the Offshore Opera-
tors Committee (OOC) advised the federal government on changes that
would improve safety, developed and issued a series of recommended prac- DoD phoTo By spC 2nD Class JusTin sTumBeRg

DoD phoTo By peTTy offiCeR 3RD Class paTRiCk kelley
tices and standards, and instituted changes in required training programs

for offshore personnel. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and U.S. Geologi-
cal Survey (USGS) (which served as a safety regulator during this period)
also began enforcing new occupational safety and other regulations to
enhance safety, which expanded over time.
Government regulators and industry officials did not always agree
on how to address safety concerns. During the 1990s, API developed a
recommended practice for safe operations (API Recommended Practice
[RP] 75), which began as a voluntary standard. As the number of compa-
nies following RP 75 subsequently declined, industry resisted the efforts
of federal regulators to require all companies to comply with it.
The three government departments currently responsible for regulat-
ing the offshore industrythe U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI),
USCG, and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)imple-
ment safety and environmental regulations according to their capabilities
and expertise. USCG regulates nearly all maritime activities, and DOTs
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
regulates all pipelines onshore and some offshore. The capabilities and
expertise for permitting and inspecting oil and gas wells and production
(including producer pipelines) on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf reside
in DOIs Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). In
October 2010, 3 months after flow from the Macondo well was stopped,
DOI (through a predecessor bureau to BSEE) published a final Safety

8 B e yo n d Co mp l ia nCe
and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS)

rule in an effort to improve offshore operations. The
rule required operators to implement a SEMS pro-
gram addressing all elements of APIs RP 75. BSEE
subsequently revised the SEMS rule, and a new rule,
called SEMS II, became effective in June 2013. SEMS
II promotes employee participation and the empow-
erment of field-level personnel.
The need for a new approach:

Building a Strong Safety Culture
Prior to 2010, the U.S. offshore industry had not ex-

perienced a catastrophic accident in many years. That
trend ended in 2010. The Deepwater HorizonMa-
condo blowout, explosion, and spill illustrated that
the focus of industry and government regulators on
improving equipment, design, and occupational safety
and attributing accidents to human error was insuf-
ficient to prevent such incidents. Several reports4 on
safety in the offshore oil and gas industry issued in the
aftermath of this disaster emphasized that compli-
ance with government regulations alone is inadequate
to create and maintain a safe working environment
offshore. Rather, a fundamental transformation of the
offshore oil and gas industrys safety culture is needed
to reduce the risk of accidents offshore.
Characteristics of a Strong
Safety Culture
The term safety culture was coined by the Interna-

tional Nuclear Safety Advisory Group during its
4
Reports issued by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling; the National Academy of
Engineering and the National Research Council; the U.S. Coast Guard;
and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforce-
ment Joint Investigation Team.
enDosToCk/DReamsTime

investigation of the Chernobyl power plant accident in 1986. Since then,

the definition of safety culture and the identification of the factors that
strengthen such a culture have evolved. At its core, however, safety culture
remains an aspect of the larger organizational culture, encompassing the
organizations values, beliefs, attitudes, norms, practices, competencies,
and behaviors regarding safety. Safety management systems such as SEMS
are necessary, but not sufficient, to foster a robust safety culture. In many
respects, SEMS provides a framework, or set of processes, for moving
beyond compliance with specific safety regulations. A strong safety culture
embodies the commitment of the organization and of each individual em-
ployee to working in a manner that truly enhances safetya need height-
ened by the technical challenges posed by the offshore environment, which
are exacerbated as activities move into harsher conditions, such as those
associated with deeper water.
In May 2013, BSEE issued a policy statement defining safety culture as
the core values and behaviors of all members of an organization that re-
flect a commitment to conduct business in a manner that protects people
and the environment. In issuing this policy statement, BSEE noted its
commitment to a regulatory approach that would lead the offshore oil and
gas industry beyond checklist inspections toward a systematic, compre-
hensive safety regime. The statement identifies nine characteristics of a
robust safety culture (described on page 11):
Joel saRToRe/naTional geogRaphiC

10 B eyo n d C om p lia n Ce
Leadership commitment to safety values and actions,

A respectful work environment,
An environment for raising concerns,
Effective safety and environmental communication,
Personal accountability,
An inquiring attitude,
Hazard identification and risk management,
Work processes, and
Continuous improvement.
In developing its list of characteristics, BSEE relied heavily on the

safety culture attributes defined by the nuclear power industry. BSEEs
list mirrors leading scholarly reviews of safety culture research and frame-
works in other industries, and is grounded in empirical research.
ReCommendaTion: The offshore industry and government regula-

tors should adopt the Bsee definition of safety culture and its essential
elements as a guide for assessment and practice.
Although the offshore industry would benefit from adopting BSEEs

nine characteristics of an effective safety culture, the list is not well known
in the industry. Nor does BSEE have the means to move the entire off-
shore industry closer to these desired characteristics.
ReCommendaTion: The secretary of the interior, in cooperation

with the Commandant of usCg, should seek prominent leaders in the off-
shore industry to champion the nine characteristics of an effective safety
culture identified by Bsee, develop guidance for safety culture assess-
ment and improvement, and facilitate information exchange and sharing
of experiences in promoting safety culture.
ReCommendaTion: The industry as a whole should create addi-

tional guidance for establishing safety culture expectations and responsi-
bilities among operators, contractors, and subcontractors.
Once the industry has agreed upon steps to take to achieve safety and
environmental objectives, each organization involved in the offshore oil

nine Characteristics
of a Strong Safety Culture
leadership commitment to safety values and actionslead-
ers demonstrate a commitment to safety and environmental stewardship in
their decisions and behaviors. leaders visibly demonstrate this commitment
through how they allocate resources within the organization and prioritize
safety relative to production.
Respectful work environmentTrust and respect permeate the

organization, with a focus on teamwork and collaboration.
environment for raising concernsa work environment is main-

tained in which personnel feel free to raise safety and environmental con-
cerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or discrimination.
effective safety and environmental communicationCom-

munications maintain a focus on safety and environmental stewardship.
knowledge and experience are shared throughout the organization.
personal accountabilityall individuals take personal responsibility

for process and personal safety, as well as environmental stewardship.
inquiring attitudeindividuals avoid complacency and continuously

consider and review existing conditions and activities in order to identify
discrepancies that might result in error or inappropriate action. Workers
are expected to question work practices as part of everyday conversations
without hesitation.
Hazard identification and risk managementissues potentially

impacting safety and environmental stewardship are promptly identified,
fully evaluated, and promptly addressed or corrected commensurate with
their significance.
Work processesThe process of planning and controlling work activi-

ties is implemented in a manner that maintains safety and environmental
stewardship while ensuring use of the correct equipment, used in the correct
way, for the correct work.
Continuous improvementopportunities to learn about ways to en-

sure safety and environmental stewardship are sought out and implemented.
source: Bsee, 2013.
anTaRTis/DReamsTime
helix eneRgy soluTions gRoup

and gas industryoperators, contractors, and subcontractorswill be
responsible for developing its own strategies for executing this overall plan.
Although the regulators set the minimum requirements for operating
offshore, the industry needs to go further to decide which safety guidelines
should be made mandatory for participants in offshore oil and gas explora-
tion and production.
Recommended actions to improve Safety Culture

A Vision for Appropriate Regulatory Oversight and a Strategic Plan
The offshore industry as a whole needs to develop a vision for appropriate
regulatory oversight that delineates the respective roles of operators and
regulators, as well as a strategic plan for achieving its safety and environ-
mental objectives. The vision should include a description of the regula-
tory system that can best enable the accomplishment of these objectives,
encourage continuous improvement, and enhance safety culture. His-
torically, the industry has opposed many regulatory initiatives designed
to enhance safety but has not offered a vision for the type of regulatory
system it would support. The regulators also have been inconsistent and
unclear regarding their regulatory philosophy and strategy, sometimes
issuing highly prescriptive requirements and sometimes supporting a more
performance-based approach.
The offshore industry needs to demonstrate that it can address fun-
damental and long-standing concerns related to managing safety offshore.

For example, a technologically advanced industry might be expected to

have sophisticated incident data collection and analysis capabilities, which
still is not the case in the offshore industry. Other concerns, such as the
consistency and rigor of industry standards for safe operating practices,
also need to be addressed. The industry needs to develop a strategy for
safety leadership. While each company is responsible for its own safety
performance, the industry as a whole needs to be committed collec-
tively to a culture that provides the best opportunity for a safe working
environment.
ReCommendaTion: industry leaders should encourage collective

and collaborative actions to effect change in an industry as fragmented as
the offshore oil and gas industry.
Although a fundamental responsibility of the regulators is to imple-

ment laws, influencing safety culture in positive ways will require them to
Bsee

14 B e yo n d Co m p lia n Ce
undertake new and different initiatives. Goals for offshore safety culture
shared between the industry and regulators would help define new safety
culture activities, such as coaching, sharing of lessons learned, and inde-
pendent safety culture assessment. Currently, a considerable imbalance
favors traditional compliance activities by regulators over activities intend-
ed to help strengthen safety culture, and the existing offshore compliance
culture reflects this imbalance. If the offshore oil and gas industry is to go
beyond compliance, changes in the regulators policies will be necessary.
The industry sees its regulators collectively as the government, but when
introducing safety culture initiatives, regulators will need also to assume
the role of participants in the effort to establish and maintain a strong
safety culture across the industry. Ideally, the overall role of the regulators
is to ensure that the operating companies have systems in place to opti-
mize safety performance.
ReCommendaTion: The offshore oil and gas industry, in concert

with federal regulators, should take steps to define the optimal mix of
regulations and voluntary activities needed to foster a strong safety cul-
ture throughout the industry.
The offshore industry should collaborate on a design for a safety sys-

tem for all levels of all organizations in the industry and adopt an evi-
noaa (3)

niColas Russell/geTTy
dence-based decision-making process that involves reporting of accurate
and complete data, analysis of causes and trends, and sharing of the data
across the industry and with the regulators. More important, the industry
and the regulators should go beyond ideas and possibilities and develop
concrete plans for execution.
An Independent Industry Safety Organization

In 2011, in the aftermath of the Macondo incident, the offshore industry
established the Center for Offshore Safety (COS), an industry-sponsored
organization affiliated with API and created to focus exclusively on safety
on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf. The mission of COS is to promote
the highest level of safety for offshore drilling, completions, and opera-
tions through leadership and effective management systems addressing
communication, teamwork, and independent third-party auditing and
certification.
Initially, COS membership was limited to deepwater operators, with
contractors and other service providers (such as consultants and engineer-
ing firms) as associate members. In early 2015, COS opened its member-
ship to all companies operating on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf. As
of May 2016, COS members included 14 operators, 6 drilling contractors,
and 10 service or equipment providers.

RiCk loomis/geTTy
COS could be even more effective in encouraging safety management

practices across the industry if its members and associate members rep-
resented a larger cross-section of the industry. Barriers preventing other
companies from joining COS may include the annual cost of membership
or the requirement to undergo regular safety management system audits
and make the resulting data available.
Moreover, while COS is making important contributions to offshore
safety, its affiliation with API, which is known for its public advocacy
on behalf of the industry, raises questions about COSs objectivity. API
has safety goals in its charter and has developed many standards used in
offshore drilling around the world; yet the public perceives its primary
mission as supporting and promoting its members interests, not identify-
ing weakness and concerns related to safety. As a result, conflicts can be
perceived when advocacy and safety issues diverge. In addition, the public
does not always trust the sincerity of such industry associations when they
state that safety is their first priority in assessing the performance of their
members. If COS were independent of API, it would more likely be recog-
nized as a safety leader more broadly.
In 2011, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill and Offshore Drilling commented that to be credible, an oil and

gas industry institute would need to be entirely free from other interests
and agendas and separate from API. The institute would also need to
secure an industry-wide commitment to rigorous auditing and continuous
improvement. In effect, all companies operating on the Outer Continental
Shelf would participate in the safety institute.
ReCommendaTion: The u.s. offshore industry should implement

the national Commissions recommendation for an independent organiza-
tion whose sole focus would be safety and protection against pollution,
with no advocacy role. Cos, although a strong, positive step in this direc-
tion, is nonetheless organized within api and therefore not independent of
that organizations industry-advocacy role. moreover, the current cost of
membership in Cos limits participation. membership in a single indepen-
dent safety organization should be a key element of the fitness-to-operate
criteria for all organizations, including operators, contractors, and subcon-
tractors, working in the offshore industry.
In addition, the regulatory agencies should support the requirement

for participation in the single industry-wide safety organization. This
would be one way for this independent organization to expand its finan-
cial base and engage the entire offshore industry. The details of who would
make membership in the single safety organization mandatory and how
that might be accomplished would need to be worked out. For example,
would a regulator establish this requirement, or would industry be ac-
countable for making membership a condition for participating in offshore
work? Would an operator make
membership a requirement for
its contractors?
overcoming the
Challenges to Change
An organizations primary goals

(e.g., production, profit) may
compete with or be perceived as
competing with safety. Produc-
tion is seen as an acute problem
niColas Russell/geTTy

that needs to be addressed immediately. On the other hand, safety is seen

as a chronic concern, and it is easy for complacency to set in and resources
to be diverted to more pressing matters. Moreover, safety is often encour-
aged by outsiders (e.g., regulators, citizens groups, news media) or safety
specialists who may be seen as interfering with (and not understanding)
the legitimate service and production work of the organization. In practi-
cal terms, organizations often wrestle with the inevitable (at least in the
short term) tension between safety and production goals. A strong safety
culture, of necessity, accentuates technological and economic feasibility
while promoting continuous improvement.
The culture change process is more like a journey than a project: even
highly successful and respected organizations can behave in ways that
bring the strength of their safety culture into question. In a fragmented,
competitive, heterogeneous, and ever-changing offshore oil and gas
industry, supported by multiple regulators and industry associations, this
journey will not be short or straightforward, but rather full of challenging
twists and turns. Any change has intended and unintended consequences

and reverberations, some of

which reinforce the desired
change, but some of which
interfere with the change or
raise new challenges. Thus
the change process is iterative,
uneven, and not fully predict-
able. The primary challenges
to implementing change in
the offshore industrys safety noaa
culture are discussed below, along with approaches for overcoming them.
Each Company Needs to Determine How to Strengthen

Its Safety Culture
Each industry segment and each company needs to consider what safety
culture means; what behaviors are critical for it to sustain such a culture;
and how it should implement an effective assessment system,
which takes more thought and resources than simply adopting
standard tools (see the discussion of assessment in the final sec-
tion of this report). Change tactics need to be appropriate to the
context. The same change plan may work in one setting (e.g., a
large integrated operator) and not another (e.g., a small indepen-
dent operator).
Overcoming the Challenge

It is evident that many companies in the offshore industry are well
under way on their safety culture journey and can serve as instruc-
tive examples to others. The nuclear power and airline industries
also provide helpful role models and have exhibited a notable
willingness to share information within their own industry as well
as with others. In the offshore industry, each company need not in-
vent its own safety culture policies, practices, and assessment tools,
but each will have to decide how to apply the knowledge and tools
derived from the experiences of other companies in addressing its
own specific needs and goals. The offshore industry can continue
to develop resources and guidance by sharing information through
Bsee

20 B e yo n d Co m p l ia nCe
existing collective institutions, such as trade associations, working groups,

the Society of Petroleum Engineers, and COS.
Leadership Commitment to Building and Sustaining Safety Culture

Varies Among Organizations
Senior leaders and owners of companies in the offshore industry vary in
their understanding of, commitment to, and engagement with develop-
ing and sustaining a strong safety culture. Although pockets of excellence
exist, there remain the leadership challenges of setting strategy, deploying
initiatives, and meeting business goals while modeling safety as a value.
Leaders create an environment in which safety culture (and safety) erodes
when they reward productivity but do not consistently recognize safety
performance, or send intentional or unintentional messages that safety
is less important than productivity, too expensive, or something pursued
merely to comply with regulations. Leadership transitions can derail an
organizations safety culture if new leaders are not prepared to take full
ownership of the culture, even when a good system is in place.

As discussed earlier, successful transition to an effective safety culture
requires a compelling vision and a practical plan for moving forward that
will motivate stakeholders. Leaders can create and communicate a vi-
sion that describes safety as a fundamental value of the organization, not
just a transient priority. Priorities change, but values endure and become
embedded in the culture. If leaders are to be committed to maintaining
an effective safety culture, they must first believe that the tangible and
intangible benefits of doing so far outweigh the costs, as illustrated by the
case examples of the U.S. Navys SUBSAFE program and an international
oil and gas company discussed at the end of this section. Then, they must
convince others to commit to and provide support for their efforts as well.
People need to envision a compelling future state of safe operations and
understand how their own behavior relates to achieving that vision if they
are to have a clear sense of where they are going and why. People through-
out the organization need to enact safety processes and practices, exhib-
iting behaviors that often go beyond written requirements. A clear and
engaging picture of leaderships commitment to sustaining a strong safety

CaRolyn Cole/geTTy

culture will invite people to action. They will see a future desirable enough
to change the present to achieve it.
Leaders who successfully implement an effective safety culture are
highly visible role models who live safety as a value, consistently demon-
strate the importance of safety-related behaviors, and instill the courage to
change in others. They focus not only on getting results but also on getting
results in the right way and behaving in accordance with the value of a
strong safety culture. Workers, supervisors, and managers will not speak
up about safety issues or be willing to stop work unless they believe their
leadership will support them. Senior leaders may believe they are willing
to support such actions, but if there is no precedent (or, worse, a history
of negative reactions) and employees are afraid to even try, there is no
opportunity to reinforce safe behaviors. Leaders need to be proactive with
their messages and actions and ensure that no learning opportunity goes
to waste.
The Industry Is Fragmented and Diverse

Drilling and production take place under many different organizational
arrangements, from huge deepwater rigs with a large on-board staff (e.g.,
well over 100, including a diverse set of
contractors and subcontractors) to small
platforms that are unmanned or have just
one or two crewmembers. Persuading each
entity in such a fragmented industry to em-
brace safety culture is challenging. Both the
heterogeneity of organizations and people
and competition make it difficult to set
uniform rules that apply to all settings, reach
industry-level agreements, or even share
information. Efforts are under way through
COS and BSEE to address this challenge by
developing toolkits and guidance documents,
but these efforts have not yet engaged the
entire offshore industry.
The economic costs and benefits and the
cultural values around safety vary across the
Bill vaRie/geTTy

aRnulf husmo/geTTy
range of offshore operations, such as seismic, drilling, production, con-

struction, and logistics (air and marine). Moreover, most larger operators
and contractors recognize the benefit of investing in safety in light of the
long-term risks to their operations and their corporate reputation of fail-
ing to do so. Smaller operators and smaller contractors, on the other hand,
are more varied in their approach to safety. Some have excellent internal
communication and a focused and innovative approach with respect to
safety, while others may maintain a mind-set and practices aligned with a
minimum level of safety (e.g., less safety training, selection of contractors
based on low cost without consideration for their safety records). Those
who believe they cannot afford the near-term costs of investments in safety
may withhold information about unsafe practices and accidents to mini-
mize further costs (in terms of dollars and reputation). Even the most con-
scientious organizations can be subject to greater pressure to deemphasize
safety when projects run late and financial incentives are in jeopardy.
Cultural issues also come into play. Many parts of the industry have
a dispersed and multicultural workforce, which creates challenges either
within a workplace, among contractors, or between contractors and their
customers. Some cultural issues have ethnic or national origins. Some
skilled craft workers in the Gulf of Mexico, for example, come from vari-

john barratt/getty
ous national cultures whose languages are not English and whose safety
attitudes and practices may differ both from each other and from U.S.
approaches. Some foreign-flag drilling rigs move around the world with
long-term, non-American crews. These crews may have consistent exper-
tise and a coherent rig culture (which may be very safe), but this culture
may vary from that of the operator. Even within a single national culture,
such as that of the United States, cultural and status differences exist
among professional groups (e.g., engineers versus operators versus manag-
ers), hierarchical levels, generations of workers, and local sites.

Senior leaders in each company involved in offshore operations and lead-
ers of industry associations need to demonstrate consistently their com-
mitment to safety, aligning their actions with their words. The industry as
a whole, led by the more progressive operators, contractors, and industry
associations, needs to be thoughtful about extending safety culture to the
heterogeneous organizations and workers in the offshore industry.
Given the many groups that are stakeholders in the offshore industry,
a coalition of informed, interested, and respected parties will be needed
to influence others to participate. Culture cannot easily be imposed by
one organization on another, whether it be large operators telling con-
tractors or regulators telling operators how to think and act. A better
strategy is collaborative engagement in which organizations with strong
safety cultures persuade others to work together to improve safety culture
industry-wide.
The Industrys Safety Culture Is Still Developing

The heritage of the offshore oil and gas industry reflects the early risk-
taking traditions of the onshore oil and gas companies, as well as the tradi-
tions of the mining industry, which celebrated individual heroics rather
than teamwork, discipline, rules, and protection of people and the envi-
ronment. Like many other industries, the offshore industry has changed
significantly since its earlier years. There are signs that the number of
incidents is decreasing, and evidence indicates continual improvements
in the industrys safety efforts. It is more common today, for example, for
anyone to report safety concerns or to stop a job. Variation in this regard

persists, however, as
a result of both the
industrys heritage
and the rapid growth
in new operators and
contractors.
In this industry,
moreover, as in many
others, there is an
existing culture of
individual blame for
philip goulD/geTTy noncompliance with
rules. Unfortunately, a blaming culture often works against a reporting cul-
ture. Thus workers are reluctant to report near misses or small accidents,
which can be precursors of larger problems. In addition, problems may
be hidden to avoid paperwork; please the boss; receive bonuses; or avoid
management attention, peer annoyance, and regulatory enforcement. Even
when reported, the incidents that garner attention are often those involv-
ing minor personal injuries, transportation incidents, and spills (because
they occur most frequently) rather than gaps in process safety that could
be precursors of major accidents.
Like most industries, the oil and gas industry as a whole does not
consistently engage in systems thinking in which the interrelationships
among events and practices are considered. Problems may be seen as one-
off and each installation as unique. An operator may share lessons learned
internally but be less inclined to share them with another operator. The
tendency is to focus on immediate, proximal causes (such as human error)
rather than systemic causes, including culture. Historically, fixes have been
devised with little understanding of how they will be implemented and
validated or what unintended consequences they might have.

Many in the industry recognize the importance of engaging in systems
thinking and deliberately managing the development of effective safety
processes organization-wide. Even before the advent of SEMS, most in
the industry had adopted a management system process that promotes

goal setting and drives progress toward operations free of incident (includ-
ing personal and process safety accidents, near misses, and nonconfor-
mances). Plans are developed to close identified gaps, actions are taken,
and results are reviewed for validation and learning purposes. Developing
and sustaining a strong safety culture requires that all members of the
workforce be competent relative to their assignments and accountable for
established safety processes.
Although senior leadership support is essential, positive safety changes
also require the involvement of field supervisors and workers who are
dedicated to safety improvement and equipped to achieve it with both
authority and resources. The very concept of safety culture implies com-
mitment and participation throughout the organization.
Given the demonstrable progress being made toward strengthening
safety culture in many parts of the industry, it is desirable to leverage indi-
vidual successes to help accelerate progress industry-wide. Industry groups
and regulators can help disseminate success stories and lessons learned.
Operators can encourage and advise their contractors, contractors can
encourage and advise their subcontractors, and vice versa. This industry
u.s. CoasT guaRD phoTo By peTTy offiCeR 3RD Class paTRiCk kelley

28 B eyo n d C om p l ia nCe
can look to the success of the nuclear power industry in creating a strong
industry-led organization (the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations) to
set standards and facilitate knowledge sharing.
Case Examples of Safety Culture Change

Although there is no single recipe for developing and sustaining a strong
safety culture, examples can be found in organizations that have been suc-
cessful in a number of industries. The full report describes two examples
of safety culture changeone from the U.S. Navy and one from a large
offshore operatorboth of which demonstrate dramatic improvements
in safety that have been sustained over time. These examples highlight
effective principles and processes rather than specific actions to be copied
directly. The lessons illustrated by these examples include the following:
The structure of a safety program in terms of requirements and roles

and responsibilities needs to be aligned with the balance of powers
auRoRa open/geTTy

keiTh WooD/geTTy
among managers responsible for various programs and fairness among

stakeholders, with engaged leadership, and with shared cultural experi-
ences and assumptions.
Engagement of stakeholders is facilitated by clear leadership, a sense of
urgency, measurable success that people care about, recognition of when
performance is falling short, and programs being embedded in manage-
ment structures and cultural practices.
The goal is to keep the organization moving forward on the safety cul-
ture journey rather than to be satisfied with reaching an acceptable level
of safety.
ReCommendaTion: Company senior leadership needs to commit to

and be personally engaged in a long and uncertain safety culture journey.
senior leaders should ensure that their organizations take advantage of
resources available from other companies, industry groups, and regulators
in strengthening their own safety cultures.
assessment of progress to Facilitate improvement
Safety in the offshore industry is a strategic issue that needs to be managed

along with operations, costs, human resources, and innovation. Safety

management requires assessment of safety outcomes and processes that

enable safety, including the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of everyone in
the organization. Safety culture is not a perfect concept, but its assessment
directs attention to how people think, feel, and act, from top leadership
to front-line workers. Whether the assessment process actually focuses
on culture or on such factors as communication, management, leadership,
work design, respect, and teamwork probably is not as important as the
fact that the people involved are working on these interrelated factors.
Many organizations, howeverespecially smaller oneswill find it chal-
lenging to build the capabilities needed to assess safety culture and use the
results to draw actionable conclusions consistent with the organizations
overall strategy. Given the complexity of the oil and gas industry, the safety
culture concept extends to both companies of various sizes (including
business units, divisions, and departments that act like organized entities)
and settings or workplaces that demand interdependent activities from
individuals working for owners, operators, or service providers.
As discussed earlier, although safety culture is routinely considered
to be a shared property of a company or workplace, all organizations are

characterized by some degree of cultural variability. The culture of explo-

ration and the culture of production may have different approaches to risk,
even within the same company. An engineering group, for example, may
share more cultural elements with other engineering professionals in their
country than with operators, managers, and others in their own company.
The culture on a rig or platform may have more to do with the workers
and the contractors who own the rig than with the multinational oil com-
pany that commissioned the drilling.
Across hierarchical levels, moreover, senior executives, middle manag-
ers, supervisors, and workers may have very distinct cultures, including
their views on safety. As one moves higher up the organizational hierarchy,
views on the existing safety culture become more positively biased, because
bad news does not readily travel upward.
Although some companies have already begun the safety culture jour-
ney and have the resources to invest in assessment, it will be challenging
for many organizations (especially smaller ones) to build the capabilities
needed to assess safety culture and derive actionable implications consis-
tent with their overall strategy.
Jay DiCkman/geTTy

Why Is It Important to
Bsee
Measure Safety Culture?
It is important for organiza-
tions to conduct periodic
assessments of their safety
culture for the following
reasons:
Moves conversation from

the vague to the specific
An assessment moves conversation from vague, general perceptions, or
a sense of how the organization is doing with respect to safety, toward a
more focused exploration of what lies behind specific and quantifiable
metrics, such as accident rates and injuries.
Allows for the tracking of progressRegular assessments allow man-
agement (and others) to detect and reinforce slow changes in an orga-
nizations culture that may be beneficial to safety, and to identify and
address slow changes that may produce a drift into failure.
Provides motivation and feedbackOngoing assessment allows individ-
uals throughout the organization to receive feedback, set goals, and seek
to improve the organizations safety management. If its results are suf-
ficiently communicated, moreover, it can help close the communication
loop when front-line employees have raised safety concerns (or concerns
about work and managerial practices that are not specified as safety).
Identifies strengths, weak spots, gaps, and potential improvementsAn
assessment spanning different subgroups, functions, and operational
areas of the organization can provide an opportunity to examine the
consistency of the culture and tailor improvement efforts to specific
concerns.
Can produce leading indicatorsResults of assessments of safety cul-
ture hold promise as leading indicators of safety issues that can trigger
proactive interventions and serve as complements to lagging indicators
such as incident rates.
ReCommendaTion: operators and contractors should assess their

safety cultures regularly as part of a safety management system.

What Approaches to Safety Culture Assessment Can Be Taken?

A safety culture assessment starts with a clear concept and then builds a
set of assessment procedures that are suited to that concept. Given their
wide range of sizes, resources, and work activities involved with safety
culture, organizations can be expected to use a great variety of assessment
approaches.
Unfortunately, moreover, there is no one agreed-upon best approach
for assessing organizational or safety culture. None of the established
methods for assessing culture, including safety culture (see pages 3435),
is perfect; each has strengths and weaknesses. Use of multiple methods
helps build on the strengths and compensate for the weaknesses of indi-
vidual approaches.
ReCommendaTion: Companies should use multiple assessment

methods, including, in particular, both leading and lagging indicators
and both quantitative and qualitative indicators of safety culture. Compa-
nies should also apply a mix of indicators, including some that are more
standard across the industry to facilitate ease of use and comparison
across organizations and some that are tailored to the specific needs and
concerns of their organization.
Bsee

Safety Culture assessment methods

ethnography document Review
The emphasis of this method is typically inquiries or governmental investigations
on understanding a novel culture, particu- into an accident can serve as a source of
larly with respect to deriving meanings, vicarious learning for other organizations
as insiders understand them. ethnogra- throughout the industry. however, waiting
phers observe organizations, often for an for an accident to occur misses the oppor-
extended period, and ask questions of tunity to find weaknesses in organizational
key individuals who are willing to share defenses. leading indicators of accidents
insights and mentor the researcher. in the (i.e., near misses) can provide a more
hands of a skilled ethnographer, levels comprehensive picture and facilitate learn-
of accuracy and insight (even wisdom) ing from a wider range of events. Docu-
are high, but reliance on a highly skilled ment reviews can also include incident
outsider to conduct the ethnography can reports and investigations, maintenance
require considerable time and resources backlogs, corrective action program activi-
and yield uncertain benefits, which can be ties, training processes, human resources
frustrating and even prohibitive for manag- and employee health records, notes from
ers and regulators. management walkarounds, and any other
information that would provide insight into
episodic Fieldwork
the functioning of the organization.
less intensive than ethnography is a set
of field-based methods, referred to as epi- Culture and Climate Surveys
sodic fieldwork, that includes combinations The term safety climate denotes shared
of direct observation of work practices by perceptions of safety-relevant policies,
individuals or teams of visitors, interviews procedures, and practices regarding what
of individuals or groups, and analysis of the organization rewards, supports, and
documentation. episodic fieldwork takes expects. Culture and climate surveys are
less time than the work of an ethnographer relatively quick and inexpensive (espe-
who enters a completely strange new cially if an off-the-shelf survey is chosen,
culture, and the involvement of a team or modified in minor ways to make it more
provides diverse viewpoints and enables specific to the organizational context and
testing of assumptions, observations, and needs), can be kept anonymous to encour-
conclusions. at the same time, however, an age candor (although not everyone trusts
ethnographer who resides in a culture for anonymous surveys), provide quantita-
many months may have a greater oppor- tive scores, and can readily be compared
tunity to observe the underlying culture, across multiple dimensionstime,
especially those aspects that are taken for organizations, departments, locations, or
granted and invisible to episodic visitors. hierarchical levels. such surveys also can
raise awareness and create opportunities
for productive conversations about safety.

however, standard questions may be multiple methods

interpreted in different ways by different The use of multiple methods combines the
respondents, who may or may not be able strengths and mitigates the weaknesses of
(or willing) to report on deeper levels of individual methods to achieve a practical
culture. in smaller organizations, where mix of benefits without crippling costs. for
anonymity is difficult to maintain, or in example, a safety climate survey could be
those with very low levels of trust, it may be used to provide broad background informa-
difficult to obtain candid replies or a good tion and raise questions about dimensions,
response rate. Culture and climate surveys departments, or hierarchical levels with
also can sometimes be treated as the end- higher or lower scores. Typically, attention
point of the assessment (our scores are focuses on the lower scores as areas for
good enough) as opposed to a mechanism improvement, but it may be useful to think
for guiding a substantive conversation about the organizations strengths and
about safety. attempt to learn from its successes. The or-
ganization then could follow up with other
Guided Self-analysis
methods to gain a deeper understanding of
guided self-analysis is not as time- and the problems and opportunities. interpreta-
labor-intensive as ethnography or as tion of the meaning of the scores needs
broad-brush or distant as surveys. This to go beyond numerical averages or the
method relies primarily on cultural insiders intuitions of a few people preparing the
to analyze their own culture through one report. many organizations use focus group
or more workshops or meetings (hence, interviews following a survey to discuss
self-analysis), but it recognizes the need the results and to obtain specific examples
for skilled facilitation by either an internal and details as to what the responses mean
specialist or external consultant (hence, to workers, supervisors, and managers.
guided). This process engages a cross some organizations include work observa-
section of participants who are knowledge- tions (as in episodic fieldwork) conducted
able about the culture but also have the around the time of the climate survey to
curiosity and critical thinking skills to step add further richness to the data. Then,
outside their own culture. having a diverse diverse teams can begin to assemble ideas
group for these discussions is desirable, about how to intervene and how to evalu-
but if the existing culture is low on trust ate whether progress is being made. This
(low psychological safety; high conflict), it process helps elevate concerns so they
may be necessary to have more homoge- receive the attention and resources needed
neous groups within a single hierarchical to address them and ensure that steps are
level and even a single department so as to taken to gather further information and en-
encourage candid conversation. gage broad participation in sense-making
and change initiatives.
eRiC hinson/DReamsTime
Who Should Assess Safety Culture?

As with any aspect of safety, assessment of safety culture requires objectiv-
ity, expertise, and sensitivity to context. Some organizations already have
the right capabilities and motivation to conduct a safety culture assess-
ment, but many others need assistance from outside auditors, corporate
experts, consultants, peer organizations, or industry groups. In some cir-
cumstances, external organizations may be more trusted by respondents
and therefore elicit more candid responses, and they also may have better
access to benchmarking data. The long-term goal should be to bring the
self-assessment and self-reflection capabilities as close to the work as pos-
sible, involving everyone in the safety culture assessment process. Tailoring
safety culture assessment to each organization is especially important in
the offshore industry because of the great variation, discussed earlier, in
the size, resources, risks, and sophistication of offshore organizations.
As discussed above, given that surveys provide only a partial view of
the safety culture of an organization, a more comprehensive assessment
often engages a team of specialists who use a combination of tools, such
as interviews, document reviews, observations, and focus groups. The
size and makeup of assessment teams need to flow from the scope and
John RoWley/geTTy

purpose of the undertaking and the complexity of

the methods used. Consistent with the awareness
that multiple cultures exist within organizations, a
broad, comprehensive understanding of an orga-
nizations safety culture (or cultures) will require a
range of assessment tools and a diverse assessment
team. In a larger organization, this means gather-
ing data from multiple levels (executives, managers,
front-line employees) and across functional areas
(e.g., drilling, engineering). A more focused investi-
gation of one particular aspect of safety culture (e.g.,
issues with lock-out, tag-out procedures) likely will
require a much smaller team (or even an individual)
using a more focused set of tools.
Regardless of the final composition of the as-
TeD hoRoWiTz/alamy
sessment team, it is important for the host organiza-
tion to retain ownership of both the process and follow-up actions on the
recommendations resulting from the assessment. This is useful for several
reasons. First, if employees perceive that management has outsourced the
safety culture assessment (and perhaps the broader problem) to an outside
agency or contractor, they may conclude that the organization is not really
serious about the issue. Second, the safety culture assessment ultimately
will lead to awareness of the need for some actions and changes within
the organization. One of the key factors predicting the success of change
initiatives is management commitment. Staying involved and retaining
ownership of the assessment process will increase managements engage-
ment in and commitment to the process and any resulting recommended
changes. Third, assessments that are conducted and evaluated closer to
work processes typically result in more timely and appropriate responses
and learning.
How Can Employees Be Encouraged to Participate

in the Assessment Process?
Effective employee participation is a key element of the safety culture as-
sessment process and successful follow-up actions. Yet despite this critical
role, workers may be hesitant to participate because their opinion has not

always been valued. In addition, workers may fear that reporting safety
issues or making negative comments could jeopardize their job, create con-
flict in the workplace, increase workload for themselves or their coworkers,
and fail to result in improvements. Front-line employees need a feeling of
psychological safety to be willing to disclose difficult conditions or events
without fear of being embarrassed by their peers or punished by their man-
agers. This feeling is the foundation of a reporting culture and the starting
point for improvement. Psychological safety can be enhanced by messages
from legitimate leaders, as well as by an open, fair, and participative process.
Companies need to build trust in management and provide positive incen-
tives to encourage reporting and participation in the learning process.
Front-line employees and all key stakeholders also need to stay in-
volved, or at least be informed on an ongoing basis, after the safety culture
assessment has been completed. Many organizations fail to communicate
the results of the assessment back to employees, who are likely to conclude
that the assessment was a ceremonial exercise carried out to comply with
external demands and that no meaningful changes will result. Psychologi-
TeRRy mooRe/alamy

Bsee
cal safety is important not just for front-line employees but for all partici-
pants, including senior management. Companies are understandably cau-
tious about producing reports that expose them to regulatory sanctions
or to legal actions asserting negligence. Making safety a priority entails
executives showing leadership by supporting the flow of information
necessary for organizational learning, because the cost of hiding problems
is likely to be higher in the long run than the cost of facing them as early
on as possible.
Monitoring of safety culture requires more than an assessment every
2 years through a survey. Periodic surveys and audits are most helpful
when paired with other, more regular (monthly or quarterly) assessments.
Larger organizations often have a dashboard of indicators that are used
for various management concerns, including productivity, cost, environ-
ment, human relations, and safety. Increasingly, safety culture is a part
of such a dashboard, with multiple indicators being examined regularly.
These indicators may include codes for safety outcomes, near misses,
problem reports, incident investigation results, employee concerns and
suggestions, management walkarounds, observations of prejob briefings
and after-action reviews, and union concerns.
The safety culture assessment process also serves as an opportunity
to engage the organization in a set of conversations and change activities
that could have a major beneficial impact on the culture itself. An effective

unlisTeD images/alamy
assessment process engages a wide range of people in talking about their

concerns and opportunities for improvement, and thereby begins to break
down the vertical silos and horizontal barriers in large organizations.
The Safety Culture Journey
Assessment of company and industry culture is part of a process of learn-

ing and continuously improving. The safety culture journey can be long,
complex, and uncertain, but can also avert catastrophe and reduce inju-
ries and loss of life among those working offshore while also protecting
the environment. Companies and employees working offshore, and the
associations that represent them, can begin this journey by building on
the successes of offshore companies that are farther along the path and by
learning from the experiences of other industries. This is an opportunity
not to be squandered, but to be seized by the offshore industry.

Acknowledgments
This publication is an abridgment of Strengthening the Safety Culture of the
Offshore Oil and Gas Industry, a report released in 2016 from the National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Raymond A. Wassel,
Stephen R. Godwin, and Camilla Y. Ables of the National Academies staff
prepared the abridgment, which was reviewed for consistency with the main
report by John S. Carroll, Elmer P. Danenberger III, Nancy T. Tippins,
and Peter K. Velez, members of the authoring committee. The review was
overseen by Susan Hanson (NAS), Clark University (emerita).

42 b eyo n d c o m p l ia n c e
ISBN 978-0-309-44129-2
90000
9 780309 441292

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Committee on Offshore Oil and Gas Industry Safety Culture

Transportation Research Board

Transportation Research Board Miscellaneous Publication

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Transportation Research Board

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Board on Human-Systems integration

Poornima Madhavan, Director

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Committee on offshore oil and Gas industry

Marine Board Liaison

Transportation Research Board Staff

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Government, industry organizations, and individual companies have

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Foundations for Future Safety efforts

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DoD phoTo By peTTy offiCeR 3RD Class paTRiCk kelley

tices and standards, and instituted changes in required training programs

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and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS)

The need for a new approach:

Prior to 2010, the U.S. offshore industry had not ex-

The term safety culture was coined by the Interna-

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investigation of the Chernobyl power plant accident in 1986. Since then,

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Leadership commitment to safety values and actions,

In developing its list of characteristics, BSEE relied heavily on the

ReCommendaTion: The offshore industry and government regula-

Although the offshore industry would benefit from adopting BSEEs

ReCommendaTion: The secretary of the interior, in cooperation

ReCommendaTion: The industry as a whole should create addi-

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Respectful work environmentTrust and respect permeate the

environment for raising concernsa work environment is main-

effective safety and environmental communicationCom-

personal accountabilityall individuals take personal responsibility

inquiring attitudeindividuals avoid complacency and continuously

Hazard identification and risk managementissues potentially

Work processesThe process of planning and controlling work activi-

Continuous improvementopportunities to learn about ways to en-

source: Bsee, 2013.

helix eneRgy soluTions gRoup

Recommended actions to improve Safety Culture

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For example, a technologically advanced industry might be expected to

ReCommendaTion: industry leaders should encourage collective