THIRD DIVISION Docketed as Civil Case No.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 09-15 of the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac, the quieting of title case was
G.R. No. 210252 June 16, 2014
VILMA QUINTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR.; FLORENCIA I.
DANCEL, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FLOVY I. DANCEL; and CATALINO L.
IBARRA, Petitioners,
vs.
PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, SANTIAGO L. IBARRA, PEDRO L. IBARRA, DAVID L.
IBARRA, GILBERTO L. IBARRA, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO L. IBARRA, namely CONCHITA R.,
IBARRA, APOLONIO IBARRA, and NARCISO IBARRA, and the spouses RECTO CANDELARIO
and ROSEMARIE CANDELARIO,Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 challenging the
Decision1 and Resolution2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98919 dated July 8, 2013
and November 22, 2013, respectively. The challenged rulings affirmed the May 7, 2012 Decision3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac that petitioners and respondents are co-
owners of the subject property, which should be partitioned as per the subdivision plan submitted by
respondent spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario.
The Facts
As culled from the records, the facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and respondents Pelagia Nicolas,
Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra are
siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject property, a
281 sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion C, Camiling, Tarlac, covered by
Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 318717.
By 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica had already passed away, leaving to their ten (10) children
ownership over the subject property. Subsequently, sometime in 2002, respondent siblings brought an
action for partition against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52 and was raffled
to the RTC, Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac. However, in an Order4 dated March 22, 2004, the trial court
dismissed the case disposing as follows:
For failure of the parties, as well as their counsels, to appear despite due notice, this case is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
As neither set of parties appealed, the ruling of the trial court became final, as evidenced by a
Certificate of Finality5it eventually issued on August 22, 2008.
Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition, respondent siblings instead resorted to
executing a Deed of Adjudication6 on September 21, 2004 to transfer the property in favor of the ten
(10) siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 390484 was
issued in its place by the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the names of the ten (10) heirs of the Ibarra
spouses.
Subsequently, respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of their co-
respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale7 dated April 17, 2007 executed in favor of the spouses Candelario and an Agreement of
Subdivision8 purportedly executed by them and petitioners, TCT No. 390484 was partially canceled
and TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name of the Candelarios, covering the 7/10portion.
On June 1, 2009, petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents
wherein they alleged that during their parents lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal
properties in favor of their ten (10) children. Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that they received the
subject property and the house constructed thereon as their share. They likewise averred that they
have been in adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over four (4)
decades and are, thus, entitled to equitable title thereto. They also deny any participation in the
execution of the aforementioned Deed of Adjudication dated September 21, 2004 and the Agreement
of Subdivision. Respondents countered that petitioners cause of action was already barred by estoppel
when sometime in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share of the respondent
siblings. They point out that this is an admission on the part of petitioners that the property is not
entirely theirs. In addition, they claimed that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra mortgaged the property
but because of financial constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem the property in
their behalf. Not having been repaid by Bienvenido and Escolastica, the Candelarios accepted from
their co-respondents their share in the subject property as payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by
way of counterclaim, the partition of the property.
eventually raffled to Branch 68 of the court, the same trial court that dismissed Civil Case No. 02-52.
During pre-trial, respondents, or defendants a quo, admitted having filed an action for partition, that
petitioners did not participate in the Deed of Adjudication that served as the basis for the issuance of
TCT No. 390484, and that the Agreement of Subdivision that led to the issuance of TCT No. 434304 in
favor of respondent spouses Candelario was falsified.9 Despite the admissions of respondents,
however, the RTC, through its May 27, 2012 Decision, dismissed petitioners complaint. The court did
not find merit in petitioners asseverations that they have acquired title over the property through
acquisitive prescription and noted that there was no document evidencing that their parents
bequeathed to them the subject property. Finding that respondent siblings were entitled to their
respective shares in the property as descendants of Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra and as co-heirs
of petitioners, the subsequent transfer of their interest in favor of respondent spouses Candelario was
then upheld by the trial court. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-entitled case is hereby Dismissed.
Also, defendants-spouses Rosemarie Candelario and Recto Candelario are hereby declared as the
absolute owners of the 7/10 portion of the subject lot.
Likewise, the court hereby orders the partition of the subject lots between the herein plaintiffs and the
defendants-spouses Candelarios.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA, pleading the same allegations they
averred in their underlying complaint for quieting of title. However, they added that the partition should
no longer be allowed since it is already barred by res judicata, respondent siblings having already filed
a case for partition that was dismissed with finality, as admitted by respondents themselves during pre-
trial.
On July 8, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Decision denying the appeal. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 7, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in Civil Case No. 09-15, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Similar to the trial court, the court a quo found no evidence on record to support petitioners claim that
the subject property was specifically bequeathed by Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra in their favor as
their share in their parents estate. It also did not consider petitioners possession of the property as
one that is in the concept of an owner. Ultimately, the appellate court upheld the finding that petitioners
and respondent spouses Candelario co-own the property, 30-70 in favor of the respondent spouses.
As regards the issue of partition, the CA added:
x x x Since it was conceded that the subject lot is now co-owned by the plaintiffs-appellants, (with 3/10
undivided interest) and defendants-appellees Spouses Candelarios (with 7/10 undivided interest) and
considering that plaintiffs-appellants had already constructed a 3-storey building at the back portion of
the property, then partition, in accordance with the subdivision plan (records, p. 378) undertaken by
defendants-appellants [sic] spouses, is in order.10
On November 22, 2013, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issues
In the present petition, the following errors were raised:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED RELEVANT AND
UNDISPUTED FACTS WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY
PETITIONERS CLAIM OF EQUITABLE TITLE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE ORDER OF PARTITION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR PARTITION, BASED ON THE
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN 2007, IS BARRED BY LACHES.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS RENDERED A SUBSTANTIALLY FLAWED JUDGMENT
WHEN IT NEGLECTED TO RULE ON PETITIONERS CONTENTION THAT THE
COUNTERCLAIM FOR PARTITION IS ALSO BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT, DESPITE
ITS HAVING BEEN SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED AS ERROR AND PROPERLY ARGUED
IN THEIR BRIEF, AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY THE
DISMISSAL OF THE COUNTERCLAIM.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED PARTITION IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE SUBDIVISION PLAN MENTIONED IN ITS DECISION, IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED IN RULE 69 OF THE RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.11
To simplify, the pertinent issues in this case are as follows:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property;
 2. Whether or not the respondents counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches or
res judicata; and
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as basis for
the partition of the property.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious in part.
Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting
title to real property.12 For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud
on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or efficacy.13 In the case at bar, the CA correctly observed that petitioners cause of action must
necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the determination of whether or not petitioners sufficiently
proved their claim of ownership or equitable title is substantially a factual issue that is generally
improper for Us to delve into. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that the petition
for review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth." In appeals
by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised, because this Court is not a trier of facts
and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial.14 Although there are exceptions15 to this general rule as eloquently enunciated
in jurisprudence, none of the circumstances calling for their application obtains in the case at bar. Thus,
We are constrained to respect and uphold the findings of fact arrived at by both the RTC and the CA.
In any event, a perusal of the records would readily show that petitioners, as aptly observed by the
courts below, indeed, failed to substantiate their claim. Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and
uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied by the fact that respondent siblings, in 2005,
entered into a Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot without any
objection from the petitioners.16 Petitioners inability to offer evidence tending to prove that Bienvenido
and Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership over the property in favor of petitioners is likewise
fatal to the latters claim. On the contrary, on May 28, 1998, Escolastica Ibarra executed a Deed of
Sale covering half of the subject property in favor of all her 10 children, not in favor of petitioners
alone.17
The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence.18 Regrettably, petitioners, as such plaintiff, in
this case failed to discharge the said burden imposed upon them in proving legal or equitable title over
the parcel of land in issue. As such, there is no reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that all 10
siblings inherited the subject property from Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, and after the respondent
siblings sold their aliquot share to the spouses Candelario, petitioners and respondent spouses
became co-owners of the same.
The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment
This brings us to the issue of partition as raised by respondents in their counterclaim. In their answer to
the counterclaim, petitioners countered that the action for partition has already been barred by res
judicata.
The doctrine of res judicata provides that the judgment in a first case is final as to the claim or demand
in controversy, between the parties and those privy with them, not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter
which must have been offered for that purpose and all matters that could have been adjudged in that
case.19 It precludes parties from relitigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final
judgment.20 As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:21
It is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds
embodied in various maxims of the common law; the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it
to the interest of the state that there should be an end to litigation republicae ut sit finis litium; the
other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause nemo debet
bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and
neglect of individuals and prefer the gratitude identification of a litigious disposition on the part of
suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.22
The rationale for this principle is that a party should not be vexed twice concerning the same cause.
Indeed, res judicata is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural society, for not only
does it ward off endless litigation, it ensures the stability of judgment and guards against inconsistent
decisions on the same set of facts.23
There is res judicata when the following requisites are present: (1) the formal judgment or order must
be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration
of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be,
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.24
In the case at bar, respondent siblings admit that they filed an action for partition docketed as Civil
Case No. 02-52, which the RTC dismissed through an Order dated March 22, 2004 for the failure of the
parties to attend the scheduled hearings. Respondents likewise admitted that since they no longer
appealed the dismissal, the ruling attained finality. Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the subject
property in Civil Case No. 02-52 and in the present controversy are one and the same, and that in both
cases, respondents raise the same action for partition. And lastly, although respondent spouses
Candelario were not party-litigants in the earlier case for partition, there is identity of parties not only
when the parties in the case are the same, but also between those in privity with them, such as
between their successors-in-interest.25
With all the other elements present, what is left to be determined now is whether or not the dismissal of
Civil case No. 02-52 operated as a dismissal on the merits that would complete the requirements of res
judicata.
In advancing their claim, petitioners cite Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on
the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may
be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion, without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal
shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
The afore-quoted provision enumerates the instances when a complaint may be dismissed due to the
plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief on the
complaint; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to
comply with the Rules or any order of the court. The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the
effect of adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing of
another action, unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule
is that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits
and with prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only exception is when the order of dismissal
expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice.26 In the case at bar, petitioners
claim that the Order does not in any language say that the dismissal is without prejudice and, thus, the
requirement that the dismissal be on the merits is present.
Truly, We have had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice under the above-cited rule amply
satisfies one of the elements of res judicata.27 It is, thus, understandable why petitioners would allege
res judicata to bolster their claim. However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules
of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no
actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. Pertinent hereto is Article 494 of the Civil Code, which
reads:
Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand
at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten
years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years. Neither shall
there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or
co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership. (emphasis supplied)
From the above-quoted provision, it can be gleaned that the law generally does not favor the retention
of co-ownership as a property relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners specific
shares so as to prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo. Thus, the law provides
that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common.
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art.
494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive
right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is not sanctioned
by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended
by a procedural rule.28 This further finds support in Art. 496 of the New Civil Code, viz:
Article 496.Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings.1wphi1 Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent
with this Code.
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, We hold that Art. 494, as cited, is an
exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for
failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without As correctly appreciated by the lower courts, respondents cannot be said to have neglected to assert
prejudice. their right over the subject property. They cannot be considered to have abandoned their right given
This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred by res judicata. There can that they filed an action for partition sometime in 2002, even though it was later dismissed.
still be res judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same subject matter once Furthermore, the fact that respondent siblings entered into a Contract of Lease with Avico Lending
the respective shares of the co-owners have been determined with finality by a competent court with Investor Co. over the subject property is evidence that they are exercising rights of ownership over the
jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co-ownership does not or no longer same.
exists. The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision
So it was that in Rizal v. Naredo,29 We ruled in the following wise: There is merit, however, in petitioners contention that the CA erred in approving the proposal for
Article 484 of the New Civil Code provides that there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an partition submitted by respondent spouses. Art. 496, as earlier cited, provides that partition shall either
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Thus, on the one hand, a co-owner of an be by agreement of the parties or in accordance with the Rules of Court. In this case, the Agreement of
undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses Candelario and petitioners cannot serve as
dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. On the other hand, basis for partition, for, as stated in the pre-trial order, herein respondents admitted that the agreement
there is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely was a falsity and that petitioners never took part in preparing the same. The "agreement" was crafted
determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described. without any consultation whatsoever or any attempt to arrive at mutually acceptable terms with
Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and his petitioners. It, therefore, lacked the essential requisite of consent. Thus, to approve the agreement in
proper remedy is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which he may bring at spite of this fact would be tantamount to allowing respondent spouses to divide unilaterally the property
anytime in so far as his share is concerned. Article 1079 of the Civil Code defines partition as the among the co-owners based on their own whims and caprices. Such a result could not be
separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. It countenanced.
has been held that the fact that the agreement of partition lacks the technical description of the parties To rectify this with dispatch, the case must be remanded to the court of origin, which shall proceed to
respective portions or that the subject property was then still embraced by the same certificate of title partition the property in accordance with the procedure outlined in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
could not legally prevent a partition, where the different portions allotted to each were determined and WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
became separately identifiable. Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98919 dated July 8, 2013 and
The partition of Lot No. 252 was the result of the approved Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. November 22, 2013, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is hereby
36-C, which was immediately final and executory. Absent any showing that said Compromise REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac for purposes of partitioning the subject
Agreement was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, the court cannot set aside a judgment based on property in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
compromise. It is axiomatic that a compromise agreement once approved by the court settles the rights SO ORDERED.
of the parties and has the force of res judicata. It cannot be disturbed except on the ground of vice of
consent or forgery.
Of equal significance is the fact that the compromise judgment in Civil Case No. 36-C settled as well
the question of which specific portions of Lot No. 252 accrued to the parties separately as their
proportionate shares therein. Through their subdivision survey plan, marked as Annex "A" of the
Compromise Agreement and made an integral part thereof, the parties segregated and separately
assigned to themselves distinct portions of Lot No. 252. The partition was immediately executory,
having been accomplished and completed on December 1, 1971 when judgment was rendered
approving the same. The CA was correct when it stated that no co-ownership exist when the different
portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even
if not yet technically described. (emphasis supplied)
In the quoted case, We have held that res judicata applied because after the parties executed a
compromise agreement that was duly approved by the court, the different portions of the owners have
already been ascertained. Thus, there was no longer a co-ownership and there was nothing left to
partition. This is in contrast with the case at bar wherein the co-ownership, as determined by the trial
court, is still subsisting 30-70 in favor of respondent spouses Candelario. Consequently, there is no
legal bar preventing herein respondents from praying for the partition of the property through
counterclaim.
The counterclaim for partition is not barred by laches
We now proceed to petitioners second line of attack. According to petitioners, the claim for partition is
already barred by laches since by 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra had already died and
yet the respondent siblings only belatedly filed the action for partition, Civil Case No. 02-52, in 2002.
And since laches has allegedly already set in against respondent siblings, so too should respondent
spouses Candelario be barred from claiming the same for they could not have acquired a better right
than their predecessors-in-interest.
The argument fails to persuade.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which
by the exercise of due diligencecould or should have been done earlier. It is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable period, warranting the presumption that the party entitled
to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.30 The principle is a creation of equity which,
as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon ones right, but rather to avoid
recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable
defense, laches does not concern itself with the character of the petitioners title, but only with whether
or not by reason of the respondents long inaction or inexcusable neglect, they should be barred from
asserting this claim at all, because to allow them to do so would be inequitable and unjust to
petitioners.31
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152195. January 31, 2005]
PEDRO SEPULVEDA, SR., substituted by SOCORRO S. LAWAS, Administratrix of His Estate, petitioner, vs. ATTY.
PACIFICO S. PELAEZ, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 43758 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Danao City,
Branch 25, in Civil Case No. SF-175.
On December 6, 1972, private respondent Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint against his granduncle, Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr., with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, for the recovery of possession and ownership
of his one-half (1/2) undivided share of several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration (T.D.) Nos. 28199,
18197, 18193 and 28316; his undivided one-third (1/3) share in several other lots covered by T.D. Nos. 28304,
35090, 18228, 28310, 26308, 28714, 28311, 28312 and 28299 (all located in Danao, Cebu); and for the partition
thereof among the co-owners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SF-175.
The eleven (11) lots were among the twenty-five (25) parcels of land which the private respondents mother,
Dulce Sepulveda, inherited from her grandmother, Dionisia Sepulveda under the Project of Partition[2] dated
April 16, 1937 submitted by Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. as the administrator of the formers estate, duly approved by
the then CFI of Cebu in Special Proceeding No. 778-0. Under the said deed, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. appeared to be
the owner of an undivided portion of Lot No. 28199, while his brother and Dulces uncle Santiago Sepulveda,
was the undivided owner of one-half (1/2) of the parcels of land covered by T.D. Nos. 18197, 18193 and 28316.
Dulce and her uncles, Pedro and Santiago, were likewise indicated therein as the co-owners of the eleven other
parcels of land, each with an undivided one-third (1/3) share thereof.
In his complaint, the private respondent alleged that his mother Dulce died intestate on March 2, 1944, and
aside from himself, was survived by her husband Rodolfo Pelaez and her mother Carlota Sepulveda. Dulces
grandfather Vicente Sepulveda died intestate on October 25, 1920,[3] and Dulce was then only about four years
old. According to the private respondent, his grandmother Carlota repeatedly demanded the delivery of her
mothers share in the eleven (11) parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. who by then was the Municipal
Mayor of Tudela, refused to do so. Dulce, likewise, later demanded the delivery of her share in the eleven
parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. still refused, claiming that he needed to continue to possess the
property to reap the produce therefrom which he used for the payment of the realty taxes on the subject
properties. The private respondent alleged that he himself demanded the delivery of his mothers share in the
subject properties on so many occasions, the last of which was in 1972, to no avail.
The private respondent further narrated that his granduncle executed an affidavit[4] on November 28, 1961,
stating that he was the sole heir of Dionisia when she died intestate on June 5, 1921, when, in fact, the latter
was survived by her three sons, Santiago, Pedro and Vicente. Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. also executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale[5] on July 24, 1968 over the property covered by T.D. No. 19804 (T.D. No. 35090) in favor of the
City of Danao for P7,492.00. According to the private respondent, his granduncle received this amount without
his (private respondents) knowledge.
The private respondent prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in his favor, thus:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of ONE-HALF (1/2) portion of the TWO (2) parcels of land described
in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
2. Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of the ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion of the NINE (9) parcels of land
described in paragraph 3 of the complaint;
3. Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latters ONE-THIRD (1/3) share of the SEVEN THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-TWO PESOS (P7,492.00) representing the purchase price of the parcel of land
described in paragraph 3(a) of the complaint with interest thereon until the amount is fully paid;
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Ordering the partition and segregation of the ONE-HALF (1/2) portion belonging to the plaintiff of the TWO
(2) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
2. Ordering the partition and segregation of the ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion belonging to the plaintiff of the
remaining EIGHT (8) parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint;
COMMON TO THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION:
1. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral
damages;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff exemplary damages the amount of which is left to the discretion
of this Honorable Court;
3. Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latters share of the fruits of the ELEVEN (11) parcels of
land subject-matter of this complaint, the value of which will be proven during the trial;
4. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff actual litigation expenses, the value of which will be proven during
the trial;
5. Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fee in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00);
6. Granting to the plaintiff such other reliefs and remedies as he may be entitled to in accordance with law and
equity.[6]
In his answer to the complaint, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. admitted having executed a deed of sale over the parcel of
land covered by T.D. No. 19804 in favor of Danao City, but averred that the latter failed to pay the purchase
price thereof; besides, the private respondent had no right to share in the proceeds of the said sale. He likewise
denied having received any demand for the delivery of Dulces share of the subject properties from the latters
mother Carlota, or from the private respondent.
During the trial, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. died intestate. A petition for the settlement of his estate was filed on May
8, 1975 with the RTC of Cebu, docketed as Special Proceeding No. SF-37. His daughter, petitioner Socorro
Sepulveda Lawas, was appointed administratrix of his estate in July 1976. In compliance with the decision of this
Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals,[7] docketed as G.R. No. L-45809 and promulgated on December 12, 1986, the
deceased was substituted by the petitioner.
To prove the delivery of Dulces share under the project of partition, the petitioner presented the Affidavit of
Consolidation she executed in October 1940 covering thirteen (13) of the twenty-five (25) parcels of land which
were deeded to her under the Project of Partition,[8] as well as the Order[9] dated March 24, 1962 of the then CFI
in Special Proceeding No. 778-R, denying Carlotas motion for the reconstitution of the records of the said case,
and for the delivery of Dulces share in the eleven parcels of land. The court likewise declared therein that Dulce,
through her grandchildren and her mother, Carlota, had already received her share of the estate from Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. as early as January 10, 1938.
According to the petitioner, Dulce and Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. had a verbal agreement wherein the eleven parcels
of land covered by the complaint would serve as the latters compensation for his services as administrator of
Dionisias estate. Thus, upon the termination of Special Proceeding No. 778-0, and subsequent to the
distribution of the shares of Dionisias heirs, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. then became the sole owner of Dulces shares.
The petitioner likewise adduced evidence that Santiago Sepulveda died intestate and was survived by his wife,
Paz Velez Sepulveda and their then minor children.[10] It was pointed out that the private respondent failed to
implead Paz Sepulveda and her minor children as parties-defendants in the complaint.
It was further claimed that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. declared the property covered by T.D. No. 18199[11] under his
name for taxation purposes since the beginning of 1948.[12] It was likewise alleged that the eleven (11) parcels
of land deeded to Dulce under the Project of Partition had been declared for taxation purposes under the name
of Pedro Sepulveda since 1974, and that he and his heirs paid the realty taxes thereon.[13]
On June 7, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment[14] in favor of the private respondent. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant
by declaring that the plaintiff is legally and rightfully entitled to the one half (1/2) portion of the two (2) parcels
of land described in paragraph 2 of the Complaint and to the one third (1/3) portion of the nine (9) parcels of
land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint as co-owner thereof, and ordering the partition and segregation
of the said one half (1/2) portion of the said two (2) parcels of land and of the said one third (1/3) portion of the
nine (9) parcels of land, and in the partition thereof, the mechanics of partition outlined in Rule 69 of the
Revised Rules of Court must be followed (Magallon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282); ordering the defendant Socorro
Lawas, as administratrix of the Estate of Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., to deliver to plaintiff the latters one third (1/3)
share of the P7,492.00 representing the purchase price of the parcel of land sold to Danao City with interest of
twelve [per] centum (12%) per annum (Reformina vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260) from the date of filing of the
Complaint until the amount due to plaintiff is fully paid, to pay attorneys fees to plaintiffs attorney in the sum
of P10,000.00, and to pay the costs. The counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The trial court ruled that the private respondents action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not
yet prescribed when the complaint was filed; that he was entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale of the
property to Danao City; and that the partition of the subject property among the adjudicatees thereof was in
order.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on January 31, 2002, affirming the
appealed decision with modification.
The petitioner now comes to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari, contending that the appellate
court erred as follows:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE INCORRECT APPLICATION OF ART. 494 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND IN recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits of the real estate in
UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT A TRUST RELATIONSHIP WAS CREATED BETWEEN question.[23]
HEREIN RESPONDENT AND PEDRO SEPULVEDA [SR.]. In the present action, the private respondent, as the plaintiff in the trial court, failed to implead the following
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE LAWS ON PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES TO THE FACTS indispensable parties: his father, Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz Sepulveda and
AS PROVEN IN THE CASE AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENT. their children; and the City of Danao which purchased the property covered by T.D. 19804 (T.D. No. 35090) from
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FINDING OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 25 IN Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. and maintained that it had failed to pay for the purchase price of the property.
DANAO CITY THAT PAYMENT WAS MADE BY DANAO CITY FOR ONE (1) OF THE ELEVEN (11) PARCELS INVOLVED Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct, equal to the share of the
IN THE CASE AND OF WHICH HEREIN RESPONDENT SHOULD BE PAID BY PETITIONER ONE THIRD (1/3) OF THE respondent in the subject properties. There is no showing that Rodolfo Pelaez had waived his right to usufruct.
PURCHASE PRICE. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND A SHARE IN THE SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determination can
RENTS AND PROFITS OF THE ELEVEN (11) PARCELS TO HEREIN RESPONDENT. be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT ATTORNEYS Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It
FEES ARE TO BE AWARDED AND EVEN INCREASING THE AMOUNT THEREOF.[16] is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed. Thus, the
The petition is granted for the sole reason that the respondent failed to implead as parties, all the indispensable plaintiff is mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such party
parties in his complaint. renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
As gleaned from the material averments of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for therein, the private parties but even as to those present.[24] One who is a party to a case is not bound by any decision of the court,
respondent, as plaintiff therein, sought the recovery of the ownership and possession of the ten (10) parcels of otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process. Without the presence of all the other heirs as
land and the partition thereof; and for the payment of his share in the proceeds of the sale of the property plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of the private respondent.
which Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. sold to Danao City amounting to P7,492.00, which Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. claimed was The failure of the private respondent to implead the other heirs as parties-plaintiffs constituted a legal obstacle
left unpaid. It appears that when the private respondent filed the complaint, his father, Rodolfo Pelaez, was still to the trial court and the appellate courts exercise of judicial power over the said case, and rendered any orders
alive. Thus, when his mother Dulce Pelaez died intestate on March 2, 1944, she was survived by her husband or judgments rendered therein a nullity.[25]
Rodolfo and their son, the private respondent. Under Article 996 of the New Civil Code,[17] Rodolfo Pelaez, as To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
surviving spouse, is entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[26] Hence, the trial court
the legitimate children who has not received any betterment. The rights of the usufructuary are provided in should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.[27]
Articles 471 to 490 of the old Civil Code.[18] In Gamis v. Court of Appeals,[19] we held that: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the surviving spouse is a forced heir and entitled to a share in No. 43758 and of the Regional Trial Court are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to dismiss the
usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse equal to that which by way of legitime corresponds or belongs to complaint without prejudice. No pronouncement as to costs.
each of the legitimate children or descendants who have not been bettered or have not received any share in SO ORDERED.
the one-third share destined for betterment. The right of the surviving spouse to have a share in usufruct in the
estate of the deceased spouse is provided by law of which such spouse cannot be deprived and which cannot be
ignored. Of course, the spouse may waive it but the waiver must be express.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all persons interested in the
property shall be joined as defendants.
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.- A person having the right to compel the partition of
real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title
and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the
other persons interested in the property.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action
for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.[20] The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has
repudiated the co-ownership between him and the respondent does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a
declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance of his lawful
shares.[21] As the Court ruled in De Mesa v. Court of Appeals:[22]
The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of
whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally
proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase
may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either because a co-ownership
does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a
co-ownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents and
profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may,
if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court
shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties. In either case, whether the action is dismissed or
partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby.
The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the partition ordered by the court. In
that event, partition shall be effected for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by
the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the
SECOND DIVISION
ULPIANO BALO, LYDIA BALO-LUMPAS, EUGENIO G.R. No. 129704
BALO, ULPIANO BALO, JR., NIDA BALO-
MORALETA, NORA BALO-CATANO, ZAIDA BALO, Private respondent filed her comment/opposition to the motion to dismiss.[4]
JUDITH BALO-MANDREZA, DANILO BALO and Present:
RONILO BALO, In an Order dated 12 September 1996, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.[5] The trial court
P e t i t i o n e r s, PUNO, held:
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, The complaint clearly states that the late Eugenio Balo, Sr., and Maria Pasagui Balo had two (2) children,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., namely: Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino. The plaintiff is the daughter of the late Maximino Balo and Salvacion
TINGA, and Sabulao; while the defendants are children of the late Ulpiano Balo, Sr. and Felicidad Superio.
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE The complaint enumerates/annexes 13 tax declarations in the name of Eugenio Balo, Sr. marked as Annexes A
ENRIQUE ASIS and JOSEFINA GARRIDO, to M. The plaintiff as an heir prays that these parcels of land be partitioned in accordance with Article 982 of the
R e s p o n d e n t s. Civil Code which states:

Promulgated: The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should
have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal
portions.
September 30, 2005
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x No evidence may be alleged or considered to test the sufficiency of the complaint except the very facts pleaded
therein. It would be improper to inject into the allegation, facts not alleged and use them as basis for the
DECISION decision on the motion.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
A complaint for Judicial Partition of Real Properties and Accounting with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
279, was filed by private respondent Josefina Garrido against petitioners Ulpiano Balo, Lydia Balo-Lumpas,
Eugenio Balo, Ulpiano Balo, Jr., Nida Balo-Moraleta, Nora Balo-Catano, Zaida Balo, Judith Balo-Mandreza, Danilo
Balo and Ronilo Balo, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Abuyog, Leyte, Branch 10, alleging that she
(private respondent) and petitioners are the co-owners of undivided parcels of land located at Mayorga, Leyte.
According to her, these lands were originally owned by the spouses Eugenio Balo, Sr. and Ma. Pasagui-Balo,
who, at the time of the filing of the complaint, were already deceased. The Balo spouses were survived by their
two (2) children, Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino, the latter likewise deceased. Private respondent is the daughter of
Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao. Petitioner Ulpiano Balo is the son of Eugenio Balo, Sr., while the other
petitioners, the children of Ulpiano, are Eugenios grandchildren.
Private respondent further alleged in her complaint that immediately upon the death of her grandfather,
Eugenio Sr., the petitioners took possession of the said real properties without her knowledge and consent. The
petitioners being her uncle and cousins, private respondent earnestly requested them that they come up with a
fair and equal partition of the properties left by her grandparents. The petitioners having outrightly refused her
proposal, private respondent filed the complaint.[1]
In lieu of an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss[2] on the following grounds:
1. Failure to state a cause of action - plaintiff, though she claims to be a daughter of Maximino who died
sometime in 1946, failed to allege whether or not she is a legitimate child. Plaintiffs failure to allege legitimacy is
fatal considering the provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code.[3] To allow Plaintiff to inherit from the estate of
the spouses Eugenio and Maria Balo in representation of her father Maximino Balo would be to permit intestate
succession by an illegitimate child from the legitimate parent of his father, assuming that she is the child of
Maximino Balo.
The Court is not permitted to go beyond and outside of the allegations in the complaint for data or facts.
Therefore, the allegation of illegitimacy and claim of absolute ownership are modifications and unreasonable
inferences. If there is doubt to the truth of the facts averred in the complaint, the Court does not dismiss the
complaint but requires an answer and proceeds to hear the case on the merit.[6]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[7] which the RTC denied in its Order[8] dated 07 November 1996.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari[9] before the Court of Appeals. After the filing of Comment and other
pleadings, the case was deemed submitted for decision. In a resolution dated 16 April 1997, the Court of
Appeals denied due course to the petition and accordingly dismissed the same. The Court of Appeals justified
the dismissal in the following manner:
It is an established rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is basically interlocutory in character and
cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. When a motion to dismiss is denied, the proper
procedure is to proceed with the trial and if the decision be adverse to the movant, the remedy is to take an
appeal from said decision, assigning as one of the errors therefore the denial of the motion to dismiss.[10]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[11] which the Court of Appeals denied in a resolution dated 30
June 1997.[12] Hence this petition for review[13] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners cite the following grounds for the allowance of their petition, to wit:

2. The complaint does not show that the estate of the spouses Eugenio and Maria Balo have been
settled and its obligations have been paid. I
WHETHER OR NOT THE FAILURE TO ALLEGE THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF PLAINTIFFS TITLE IN A PETITION FOR
3. The properties enumerated in the Complaint were proceeded against by way of execution to satisfy a PARTITION IS FATAL TO ITS CAUSE OF ACTION.
judgment against Eugenio and Maria Balo. Subsequently, defendant Ulpiano repurchased the said properties
and has been, together with his children, openly, exclusively and adversely in possession of the real estate II
properties in question.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR JUDICIAL PARTITION AND ACCOUNTING HAS PRESCRIBED, WAS WAIVED,
OR WAS OTHERWISE ABANDONED.[14]
At the threshold of the instant petition for review is the correctness of the appellate courts dismissal of the
petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners.
In resolving to deny the petition, the Court of Appeals relied on the long established jurisprudence that an order
denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari.
The general rule regarding denial of a motion to dismiss as a basis of a resort to the extraordinary writ
of certiorari is that:
. . . [A]n order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the
merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil
action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, therefore, the denial of the motion to dismiss
must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.[15]
Specific instances whereby the rule admits certain exceptions are provided as follows:
. . . Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, i.e., (a) when the
trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of
discretion by the trial court; or (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an
appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order
maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted
trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case.[16]
Applying the foregoing, the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed the petition outright as the same
alleges grave abuse of discretion. Instead, it should have proceeded to determine whether or not the trial court
did commit grave abuse of discretion as alleged by the petitioners. The Court of Appeals having failed in this
regard, it behooves upon this Court to discuss the merits of the petition to put to rest the issues raised by the
petitioners.
Contrary to petitioners contention, allegations sufficient to support a cause of action for partition may be found
in private respondents complaint.[17]
Nothing is more settled than the rule that in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the inquiry
is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.[18] Moreover, the inquiry is confined to the
four corners of the complaint, and no other.[19]
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for
determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not
whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint.
The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged,
the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. (Garcon
vs. Redemptorist Fathers, 17 SCRA 341)
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and correctness are
assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer and
go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the trial of the
case on the merits. (Galeon vs. Galeon, 49 SCRA 516-521)[20]
Section 1, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the complaint needs only to allege the
ultimate facts upon which private respondent bases her claim.
The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the
essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without
leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action only when it has
its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violate of the right of plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action
for recovery of damages.[21]
In her Complaint, the private respondent made the following assertions:
. . . That the afore-described parcels of lands were originally owned by Eugenio Balo, Sr. and Ma. Pasagui-Balo,
who are now both deceased and after their death, were inherited into two (2) equal shares by their two (2)
children, namely: Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino, both surnamed Balo, the later (sic) being already dead.
That plaintiff is the daughter of the late Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao, who after her fathers death, had
inherited her fathers share of the inheritance.
That defendant Ulpiano Balo, Sr. aside from being the son of Eugenio Balo, Sr., is married to Felicidad Superio,
and is the father of all the other defendants in this case.
The defendants took possession of the above-described real properties immediately after the death of plaintiffs
grandfather Eugenio Balo, Sr. without her knowledge and consent.
That plaintiff is desirous that the above-described real properties be partitioned between her and defendants.
That plaintiff has proposed to the defendants that the above-described real properties be amicably partitioned
between them by mutual agreement in a very fair and practical division of the same, but said defendants
refused and continue to do so without any justifiable cause or reason to accede to the partition of the said
properties.[22]
The foregoing allegations show substantial compliance with the formal and substantial requirements of a
Complaint for Partition as required under Section 1, Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[23]
On the insistence of petitioners that private respondent first prove her legitimacy before an action for partition
may be maintained, this Court, in the case of Briz v. Briz,[24] pronounced that proof of legal acknowledgment is
not a prerequisite before an action for partition may be filed. We said:[25]
. . . In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should
have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff
seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in
other cases. For instance, if the plaintiff had in this action impleaded all of the persons who would be necessary
parties defendant to an action to compel acknowledgement, and had asked for relief of that character, it would
have been permissible for the court to make the judicial pronouncement declaring that the plaintiff is entitled
to be recognized as the natural child of Maximo Briz, and at the same time to grant the additional relief sought
in this case against the present defendants; that is, a decree compelling them to surrender to the plaintiff the
parcel of land sued for and to pay her the damages awarded in the appealed decision.

The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some
extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be
considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in
fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition (proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his
coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil. 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil 62); and the same person may intervene in
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8
Phil. 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil 855). In neither of these situations has it been
thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is
that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before
the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.

To further reiterate that in partition proceedings, dismissal prior to answer is premature, this Court has held:

In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject
properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. As the Court of Appeals correctly held, an action
for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determine portion of the properties involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the
action for partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is
unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong
remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit to partition. If, on the
other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and
should order the partition of the properties in the same action.[26]

The case of Vda. De Daffon v. Court of Appeals[27] is almost most appropriate. In said case, the action for
partition filed by the plaintiffs was met by a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants based on the grounds of
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, waiver, abandonment and extinguishment of the obligation.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the denial was affirmed by the appellate court and by this
Court. We held there that the trial court and the Court of Appeals were correct in dismissing the petition
for certiorari absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. We
further expressed our dismay over the delay in the resolution of the said case due to the fact that the issue of
the denial of the Motion to Dismiss was elevated to this Court by petitioner and counsel instead of just filing an
Answer and meeting the issues head-on.

On the matter of prescription cited by the petitioners as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint, it is
noteworthy that the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners did not ipso facto establish prescription. An
allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face
shows that indeed the action has already prescribed;[28] otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving
evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to
dismiss.[29]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 42803, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 12 September 1996,
is AFFIRMED. This case is ordered remanded to the court of origin which is directed to resolve the case with
dispatch. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 172367 June 5, 2009
FELICIDAD DADIZON, ILUMINADA B. MURGIA, PERLA B. MATIGA, DOMINADOR M. BERNADAS, CIRILO B.
DELIS, and HEIRS OF MARCELINO BERNADAS, Namely: FE BERNADAS-PICARDAL and CARMELITO
BERNADAS, Petitioners,
vs.
SOCORRO BERNADAS, substituted by JEANETTE B. ALFAJARDO, FELY BERNADAS, JULIET BERNADAS,
GODOFREDO BERNADAS, JR. and SOFIA C. BERNADAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
Decision2 dated December 7, 2005 and the Resolution3 dated March 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
which affirmed the Order4 dated September 5, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16 of the 8th
Judicial Region in Naval, Biliran in Civil Case No. B-1066.
Petitioners and respondents are the children and representatives of the deceased children of the late Diosdado
Bernadas, Sr. who died intestate on February 1, 1977, leaving in co-ownership with his then surviving spouse,
Eustaquia Bernadas (who died on May 26, 2000), several parcels of agricultural and residential land situated in
Naval, Biliran.
On May 14, 1999, respondents filed a Complaint5 against petitioners to compel the partition of the one-half
(1/2) conjugal share of the properties left by their late father (subject properties) based on the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition6 dated February 24, 1996. Respondents alleged that petitioner Felicidad Dadizon was in
possession of the subject properties and refused to heed their demands to cause the partition of the same.
In their Answer,7 petitioners averred that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated February 24, 1996, which
respondents sought to enforce, was revoked by the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition8 dated February 10, 1999.
They argued that certain parcels of land included in respondents complaint had long been disposed of or
extrajudicially partitioned by them. They further claimed that certain parcels of land listed in the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition dated February 24, 1996 as sold to respondent Socorro Bernadas could not go to the
latter, since the alleged sales were under annulment in Civil Case No. B-1091 pending before the RTC, Branch
16, Naval, Biliran, a case filed by their mother, Eustaquia Bernadas, to revoke the sales of her one-half (1/2)
conjugal share on the grounds of lack of consideration, fraud and lack of consent.9
In their Reply,10 respondents contended that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated February 10, 1999 was a
product of malice directed against respondent Socorro Bernadas, for not all of the heirs of their late father
participated in the execution of the alleged subsequent deed of partition. The sales executed between their
mother, Eustaquia Bernadas, and respondent Soccorro Bernadas have not been annulled by the court; hence,
they remain valid and subsisting.
During trial, on June 13, 2000,11 both parties manifested that in view of the death of their mother, Eustaquia
Bernadas, they have an ongoing negotiation for the extrajudicial partition of the subject properties to end their
differences once and for all.
In the next scheduled hearing, on November 15, 2000,12 the counsel of respondents asked for postponement on
the ground that he was in the process of soliciting the signatures of other heirs to complete a compromise
agreement.
On January 30, 2001, the counsel of respondents filed a Project of Partition13 dated October 23, 2000. However,
the same was not signed by all of the heirs.
On the hearing of February 6, 2001,14 the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000 was discussed by both
parties, and the RTC ordered petitioners to submit their comment thereon within 15 days. Petitioners did not
file any comment.
In its Order15 dated March 22, 2001, the RTC noted that at the last pre-trial conference, both parties informed
the court that they already have an extrajudicial partition of the subject properties and ordered both parties to
submit the extrajudicial partition for its approval.
On May 31, 2001, the RTC issued another Order16 reiterating its Order dated March 22, 2001, directing both
parties to submit the signed extrajudicial partition.
On July 16, 2001, respondents filed a Compliance17 submitting the following documents: (1) Project of Partition
dated October 23, 2000; (2) Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated February 24, 1996; and (3) Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition18 dated August 1, 1997 (involving one parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No.
00181). Respondents prayed that the submitted documents be considered by the RTC relative to the subdivision
of the estate left by their late father.
On July 23, 2001, the RTC issued an Order19 approving the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 of the said Order, but the same was denied by the RTC in its
assailed Order21 dated September 5, 2001. The RTC noted that petitioners had failed to file any comment on or
objection to the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000 despite previously being ordered to do so.
Moreover, the parties had already agreed to ask the court for its approval during pre-trial.
Hence, petitioners filed an appeal before the CA alleging, among others, that the RTC erred in finding that their
counsel agreed to the approved Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000, and that it should be noted that
the said document does not bear the signature of their counsel.22
On December 7, 2005, the CA rendered its assailed decision finding the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed
in this case and AFFIRMING the order dated September 5, 2001 issued by the RTC, Branch 16, of the 8th Judicial
Region in Naval, Biliran in Civil Case No. B-1066.23
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 of the assailed decision, but the same was denied by the CA in
its Resolution dated March 15, 2006.
Hence, this Petition.
Respondent Soccorro Bernadas, as substituted by Jeanette B. Alfajardo et al., and respondent Sofia C. Bernadas
filed separate comments on the petition.1awphil
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we shall first address a procedural issue raised by respondent Sofia
C. Bernadas.
Respondent Sofia C. Bernadas argues that there is a necessity to implead all indispensable parties who were
parties to the original case who do not appear either as petitioners or as respondents in the case before us.
Respondent Sofia C. Bernadas interpretation of the requirement to implead all indispensable parties under Rule
7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. There is no necessity for impleading all the parties in Civil Case
No. B-1066 in this petition.
While it is true that not all the parties in the original case below appear as petitioners or respondents in the
case before us, suffice it to say that the mandatory requirement of impleading all indispensable parties applies
only to the filing of an original action, but not to an appeal, since it is the partys choice whether to appeal or
not, and he or she cannot be compelled to do so.
As to the effect of a reversal of the assailed decision on the parties who did not appeal, the rule is:
We have always recognized the general rule that in appellate proceedings, the reversal of the judgment on
appeal is binding only on the parties in the appealed case and does not affect or inure to the benefit of those
who did not join or were not made parties to the appeal. An exception to the rule exists, however, where a
judgment cannot be reversed as to the party appealing without affecting the rights of his co-debtor, or where
the rights and liabilities of the parties appealing are so interwoven and dependent on each other as to be
inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one operates as a reversal as to all. This exception which is based on
a communality of interest of said parties is recognized in this jurisdiction.25 (emphasis supplied)
The instant case is such an exception, since the rights and liabilities of all the parties concerned as the heirs of
the late Diosdado Bernadas, Sr. are inseparable. Hence, any reversal of the assailed decision will inure to the
benefit of those who did not join or were not made parties to the instant case. Consequently, there is no basis
for the fear expressed by respondent Sofia C. Bernadas that the respective rights to their inheritance of the
persons who were not made parties to the case before us might be forfeited by technicality.
Nonetheless, we note that a review of the records below reveals that the requirement of joining all
indispensable parties to the proceedings below has been satisfied.
Now, on the merits.
The issue for our consideration is whether or not the CA erred when it affirmed the Order dated September 5,
2001 of the RTC.
We answer in the affirmative.
There are two stages in every action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
The first stage is the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper (i.e.,
not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the
property.26
The second stage commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition"
directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners.27
There are, thus, two ways in which a partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2, and
through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached under Sections 3 to 6.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 69 provide:
SECTION 2. Order for partition, and partition by agreement thereunder. If after the trial the court finds that In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the instant petition should be dismissed. Petitioners should not be
the plaintiff has the right thereto, it shall order the partition of the real estate among all the parties in interest. rewarded for disregarding the orders of respondent judge.
Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to agree, make the partition among themselves by proper In Honorio v. Dunuan,38 we struck down the order of the trial court approving a project of partition filed by
instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties, and such respondent upon the mere failure of petitioner and his counsel to appear at the hearing and over his
partition, together with the order of the court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of subsequent objection and directed the trial court to immediately constitute and appoint commissioners.
the place in which the property is situated. (2a) In this case, that petitioners insist on a manner of partition contrary to the approved Project of Partition dated
xxx October 23, 2000 that was filed and prepared solely by respondents all the way to this Court makes it more
SECTION 3. Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree. If the parties are unable to agree manifest that the parties to this case are unable to agree on a partition.
upon the partition, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated December 7, 2005 and the
commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest Resolution dated March 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73326 and the Orders dated July 23,
such part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct. (3a) (emphasis supplied) 2001 and September 5, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. B-1066 are hereby REVERSED and SET
A careful study of the records of this case reveals that the RTC departed from the foregoing procedure ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16 of the 8th Judicial Region in Naval, Biliran,
mandated by Rule 69. which is hereby directed to immediately constitute and appoint the commissioners as provided by Section 3,
In its Order dated July 23, 2001, the RTC noted that both parties filed the Project of Partition dated October 23, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, to effect the partition in accordance with the other provisions of the same rule.
2000 that it approved.28 In its Order dated September 5, 2001 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, No pronouncement as to costs.
the RTC reiterated that both parties filed the same.29 However, the records show that the Project of Partition SO ORDERED.
dated October 23, 2000 was filed only by respondents counsel,30 and that the same was not signed by the
respondents or all of the parties.31
In its Order dated March 22, 2001, the RTC noted that both parties have already agreed on the manner of
partition of the subject properties, and that they are seeking for the courts approval.32 On the issue of whether
the RTC erred in finding that petitioners acceded to the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000, the CA
sustained the RTCs finding and noted that both parties manifested to the RTC that they already have an
extrajudicial partition, and that petitioners did not file any comment or suggestion on the manner of
distribution of the subject properties despite being required by the RTC.33
Even if petitioners did manifest in open court to the RTC that they have already agreed with the respondents on
the manner of partition of the subject properties, what is material is that only the respondents filed the Project
of Partition dated October 23, 2000 and that the same did not bear the signatures of petitioners because only a
document signed by all of the parties can signify that they agree on a partition. Hence, the RTC had no authority
to approve the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000, which did not bear all of the signatures of the
parties, on the premise that they had all agreed to the same. Likewise, the failure to file any comment or
suggestion as to manner of distribution of the subject properties does not justify the RTCs non-observance of
the procedure mandated by Rule 69. When the parties were unable to submit the signed Project of Partition
despite being ordered to do so, the RTC should have ordered the appointment of commissioners to make the
partition as mandated by Section 3, Rule 69.
In partition proceedings, reference to commissioners is required as a procedural step in the action and is not
discretionary on the part of the court.34 We have held in a number of cases that if the parties are unable to
agree on a partition, the trial court should order the appointment of commissioners.
In De Mesa v. Court of Appeals,35 we held that the trial court cannot compel petitioner to sign the extrajudicial
deed of partition prepared solely by private respondents for the reason that if the parties are unable to agree
on a partition, the trial court must order the appointment of commissioners.
In Patricio v. Dario III,36 we invalidated the order of the trial court ordering the sale by public auction of the
property subject of partition on the ground that since the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the trial
court should have ordered a partition by commissioners pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. It
is only after it is made to appear to the latter that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided
without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, and one of the parties interested asks that the property
be sold instead of being assigned to one of the parties, may the court order the commissioners to sell the real
estate at public sale.
In Heirs of Zoilo Llido v. Marquez,37 we sustained the trial courts order appointing commissioners to effect the
partition in view of the failure of the parties to submit a project of partition as follows:
It will be recalled that respondent judge, in his decision of January 31, 1973 ordered the partition of the
enumerated properties and gave the parties thirty (30) days from notice thereof within which to submit a
project of partition.
Having failed to submit said project, the parties were given another twenty (20) days to submit the same,
otherwise, commissioners would be appointed to effect the partition.lawphi1
Again the parties failed to submit a project of partition. Consequently, respondent judge issued his questioned
order of April 27, 1973, appointing the commissioners.
Likewise, the records show that the parties were unable to submit a project of partition because the petitioners
were unwilling to submit themselves to a partition (Telegrams, Rollo, pp. 105 and 106).