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Bhabha Stereotype

Stereotyping is an activity that happens through the use of language,


more precisely through the construction of signs. Stereotyping is thus a
semiotic activity. While Homi Bhabha is writing from the viewpoint of
postcolonial studies, which usually deals with such places as India or
Africa (places that used to be colonies and have now become post-
colonial), what Bhabha says is also applicable in a more general sense
about modern societies that, despite increasing individualization, try to
maintain order by defining certain groups as the other. More
specifically, ideas developed in postcolonial studies can be useful to
analyze early American culture, for instance that of the Puritans, which,
as we have discussed in class, relied on a clear separation of the Puritan
self and the savage other.

The starting point of Bhabhas article The Other Question: Stereotype,


discrimination and the discourse of colonialism is the assumption that the
stereotype is an ideological operation. Thus, the stereotype constructs a
group or individuals as the other. However,
this otherness is produced through a paradoxical strategy. On the one
hand, the person or group that is the victim of stereotypization is said to
be essentially or ontologically other, without admitting the possibility of
change or differentiation. This is what Bhabha means when he says that
the stereotype proclaims unchanging order and rigidity. At the same time,
however, the construction of the other as something clearly identifiable
must always be repeated (this is what makes the stereotype a clich: that
the same things are said about certain people over and over again. For
instance, the stereotypes of the Jew have been repeated over and over
for centuries, even though the historical constellations in which Jews
participated in different societies varied greatly). The problem is that this
repetition not only ensures that people perceive the stereotyped group or
individual in a certain way. Repetition also questions this very fixity that
repetition sets out to guarantee. This is because repetition implies that
what the stereotypical construction of the other claims cannot be proven
once and for all. Instead, it must be repeated over and over again.

This paradoxical situation is the first aspect of what Bhabha refers to as


ambivalence. What Bhabha in aiming at is a redefinition of the whole
problem of the stereotype. Whereas for a the most part of critical studies
people were concerned with whether a particular stereotype was
positive of negative (in other words, whether the representation of
groups like blacks in movies and other texts was racist or whether it was
an accurate description of real blacks), Bhabha is interested to show
how the stereotype is basic to the process by which individuals succumb
to the rules of society (i.e., how the stereotype is involved in the process
of subjectivation). To Bhabha, not only the one who is stereotyped in
discourse is affected by the stereotype but also the one who makes use of
the stereotype. The political implication of this view is that the clear
demarcation of oppressor and oppressed is questioned.

We can now look at the meaning of ambivalence in greater


detail. Bhabha speaks of productive ambivalence. What is it that is
produced? First, in trying to define the other (which is the function of the
stereotype), it is necessary to articulate difference, for instance in racial
and sexual terms. Not everyone is the same, is what this discourse
wants to make clear. Blacks are savage brutes, is one of these
differences that are produced by discourse. In other words, through the
discursive production of differences, the other is constructed. It is what
is said about the other that is defines the other.

In this respect, colonial discourse appears to be not ambivalent at all. It is


a discourse that aims to establish cultural and racial hierarchy, and this is
achieved through the articulation and organization of various differences.
Colonial discourse produces the colonized as a social reality, and it seems
to work very smoothly.

Ambivalence enters the game when Bhabha claims that this discourse
depends on the recognition anddisavowal of racial/cultural/historical
differences. The colonized are on the one hand constructed as the other;
(the other, as we have seen in Mary Douglas text, relates to that which
defies our categories); on the other hand, the colonized is something that
is produced through the discourse of the colonizer with the aim of
controlling the other. In this sense, the colonized (the other) is entirely
knowable and visible (71), which means that a fundamental difference of
the other is disavowed (cf. entry on disavowal). The implication of
Bhabhas argument is that you can never fully know another person, let
alone a whole people; there is always something that exceeds what you
think the other is or how you construe the other. This excess is what is
denied in disavowal.

Bhabha uses the term regime of truth (cf. note on regime of truth) to
suggest that the colonizer intends to control the colonized through finding
out everything about him and at the same time using that knowledge to
define the colonized in a certain way. He links this idea to what Edward
Said has called Orientalism in his groundbreaking book of the same title
(1978). Orientalist power is a strategy whereby whatever is known about
the colonized by the colonizer is used to construct an identity of the
colonized in a supposedly coherent way. Thus European discourses
constitute the Orient as a unified racial, geographical, political and
cultural zone of the world (71).

While generally agreeing with Saids work on Orientalism, Bhabha takes


issue with several aspects of Saids theory. First, it is impossible to
specifically point to the source of power that constructs the colonized in
such a coherent way. What can be agreed upon is that it is the colonizer
who is in that power position but the historical starting point of the
discourse that the colonizer makes use of to construct the other is
unclear. This is because in this discourse many aspects come together
(e.g. race and gender) and form an intricate web. Second, not only the
colonized is defined in a specific way through colonial discourse but the
colonizer as well. If discourse fixes peoples identities, this goes for
everyone who is involved in it: those who speak (the colonizer) and those
who are spoken about (the colonized).

But it is only Bhabhas next step that fully explores the impact of
ambivalence. Employing an argument that mixes psychoanalytical with
semiotic aspects (a very typical strategy among poststructuralist and
post-colonialist thinkers), Bhabha aims to show that the discourse that
constructs self and other does, in fact, not work smoothly at all. He
already hinted at this in the beginning of the essay when he said that
repetition actually endangered the stereotype because it shows that what
the stereotype claims cannot be proven and instead must be repeated.
We can look at this is semiotic terms. The stereotype as sign (the signifier
would be, for instance, black, and the signified, for instance, wild,
savage, brutish) depends on its own repetition. If the sign is not
repeated, the connection between signifier and signified becomes
unstable. But on the other hand, what the need for repetition shows is
that the link between signifier and signified is unstable to begin with. This
instability endangers the efficaciousness of colonial discourse in
constructing black as wild and savage.

Bhabha adds a psychoanalytical dimension to this because he notices


that what is despised as brutish is at the same time strangely desired.
Thus, in stereotypical discourse we find both derision and desire, or, to
use a different set of psychoanalytical terms: phobia and fetish (72). To
understand this, we need to explore Freuds definition of the fetish (cf.
below, note on Fetish). Freud argues that the realization of the little boy
that the mother does not have a penis implies for the boy that his own
penis might be in danger. This is meant by anxiety of castration. To
manage that anxiety, the boy disavows the mother not having a penis. He
is, in other words, disavowing difference, namely, sexual difference. This
disavowal is contradictory itself: The boy, according to Freud, retains the
belief that the mother has a penis while at the same time accepting that
she does not. As a compromise, he creates a fetish object that takes the
place of the mothers penis.

We can now see in a clearer light how this relates to the stereotype. The
person or group that is the target of the stereotype and the one who is
making use of the stereotype (i.e., both colonizer and colonized) are said
to beessentially or ontologically coherent, without admitting the possibility
of change or differentiation. But this coherence is nothing but a fantasy of
wholeness. This becomes understandable through an analogy to the
situation of infants. For the infant, any sort of split or difference feels like
a catastrophe because it means that he is separated from his mother. The
fantasy of coherence thus goes back to the infantile whish of being and
remaining one with the mother. Bhabha sometimes refers to this fantasy
of coherence as the Imaginary (cf. note on Imginary), thereby using
the concept of French psychoanalytic Jacques Lacan. To put the whole
matter in a nutshell: It is discourse that first sets up the differentiation
between, e.g., black and white. But it is also because of language that
this differentiation remains unstable (see the semiotic argument above).
More precisely, in Lacans theory it is the entry into language (he refers to
it as the Symbolic order) that forbids the union with the mother. We can
equate this entry into language with the moment that Freud describes
when the little boy sees that his mother does not have a penis. Both
moments are about difference. Language works through differences, and
the boy is confronted with sexual difference. To bring this back to the
stereotype, this is the moment when one realizes that the coherence of
the stereotype is purely imaginary, that within the category of blacks, to
stick to that example, there is difference.

As in the scene of fetishism, this difference needs to be disavowed while


at the same time it needs to be accepted. This is where the fetish object
comes in. For Freud, any object was theoretically capable of replacing the
penis. For Bhabha, a clearly visible part of the other (like the skin) is
used to become a fetish. This fetishnow makes it possible to accept that
there is difference among blacks as the other and, at least as
importantly, that there is difference among the white colonized selves
(even each individual self turns out to be incoherent), while
simultaneously believing that there is unity, coherence etc. on both sides.
What is fetishized is always loved and despised, hence the strange
ambivalence of desire and derision. And because Bhabha points out that
both colonizer and colonized are affected by the stereotype as fetish,
the psychoanalytical analogy gains relevance. Whatever is said about the
identity of the other reflects the identity of the self. Thus, constructing
the other in a stereotypical way has the function of creating the fantasy
of a coherent identity of the colonizers self, an identity that is seemingly
always in control and at the same time proves not to be in control at all.

We have now reached the final step of Bhabhas argument. In his opinion,
in the stereotype the multiple belief structure of fetishism (I believe that
the mother has no penis but I also do not believe it) is actually embraced
and made use of. Bhabha summarizes the ambivalence articulated in
stereotypical discourse: The black is both savage (cannibal) and yet the
most obedient and dignified of servants (the bearer of food); he is the
embodiment of rampant sexuality and yet innocent as a child; he is
mystical, primitive, simple-minded and yet the most worldly and
accomplished liar, and manipulator of social forces. In each case, what is
being dramatized is a separation (82).
Bhabhas evaluation of stereotypical discourse thus ends up on an
ambivalent note itself. On the one hand, stereotypical discourse is a
means of wielding power. On the other hand, it turns out that this
discourse allows for the expression of two beliefs at once. It goes beyond
the misrecognition that is taking place in Lacans imaginary (cf. note on
imaginary) in that here knowledge emerges as non-repressive one is
almost tempted to think that Bhabha means non-oppressive here. The
fact that Bhabha is re-enacting the ambivalence that he is writing about
can be attributed to a fashionable (though often disconcerting) trend in
cultural criticism whereby what is written is reflected in how it is written.

disavowal: Bhabha is using the term in a psychoanalytical sense (Freud


introduced it as Verleugnung). Cf. the entry in J. Laplanche/J.-B.
Pontalis: Das Vokabular der Psychoanalyse: Verleugung: Von Freud in
einem spezifischen Sinne verwendeter Ausdruck: Abwehrform, die in einer
Weigerung des Subjekts besteht, die Realitt einer traumatisierenden
Wahrnehmung anzuerkennen, insbesondere die Penislosigkeit der Frau.
Dieser Mechanismus wird von Freud besonders dazu angefhrt, um den
Fetischismus und die Psychosen zu erklren (595).

regime of truth: A term introduced by the French philosopher Michel


Foucault (1926-84). His idea was that power is exerted through the
process in which things are defined to be true. Knowledge in this sense is
an instrument of power. Knowledge not only means that you know things
about things that exist. More importantly, it means that those things only
come into existence through the fact that people define them in certain
ways. For instance, psychology is not only about analyzing people. It also
created (in the sense of defined) certain abnormalities, like hysteria, in
grouping together a number of behavior patterns that did not necessarily
belong together as one disease. Thus, only by giving a name to
something this something comes into existence. Knowledge produces
truth and both knowledge and truth are means of discursive power.

fetishism: Freud defines fetishism as follows: Um es klarer zu sagen, der


Fetisch ist der Ersatz fr den Phallus des Weibes (der Mutter), an den das
Knblein geglaubt hatte und auf den es wir wissen warum nicht
verzichten will. Der Hergang war also der, dass der Knabe sich geweigert
hat, die Tatsache seiner Wahrnehmung, dass das Weib keinen Penis
besitzt, zur Kenntnis zu nehmen. Nein, das kann nicht wahr sein, denn
wenn das Weib kastriert ist, ist sein eigener Penisbesitz bedroht Es ist
nicht richtig, dass das Kind sich nach seiner Beobachtung am Weibe den
Glauben an den Phallus des Weibes unverndert gerettet hat. Es hat ihn
bewahrt, aber auch aufgegeben; im Konflikt zwischen dem Gewicht der
unerwnschten Wahrnehmnung und der Strke des Gegenwunsches ist es
zu einem Kompromiss gekommen Ja, das Weib hat im Psychischen
dennoch einen Penis, aber dieser Penis ist nicht mehr dasselbe, das er
frher war. Etwas anderes ist an seine Stelle getreten, ist sozusagen zu
seinem Ersatz ernannt worden und ist nun der Erbe des Interesses, das
sich dem frheren zugewendet hatte (Freud, Sigmund: Gesammelte
Werke, Band XIV, 312-313).

Imaginary and Mirror Stage: According to the theory of French


psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, there are three different orders that
structure our life. Pertinent for our discussion are the Imaginary and
the Symbolic. The Symbolic is the order in which individuals have
become part of society, basically by entering language. Before that, they
are part of the Imaginary. They imagine that the world is one big
entity, that they, in fact, are the world. The borders between self and
other have not yet been drawn. They imagine they are one with their
mother and, since they cannot conceptualize difference between
themselves and others, they feel they are in control. Lacan uses the
Imaginary in two senses, first in the sense of to imagine, second as
the order of the image (vs. the order of language, namely the
Symbolic). He makes the concept of the Imaginary clear in his analysis of
the Mirror Stage. In his article The Mirror Stage he describes what
happens when infants for the first time look into a mirror and recognize
themselves. The image in the mirror produces a cheerful feeling in the
infant. For the first time, he sees himself as an individual human being.
He feels in control. He sees an image of himself and thereby realizes that
his body possesses a distinct shape. In this sense, the mirror stage marks
a change in the development of the human begin he begins to negotiate
the borders of himself. However, the mirror stage is marked by the same
ambivalence that Bhabha talks about. The feeling of power is followed by
frustration in the moment that the infant realizes that while he sees
himself in the mirror, he is still dependent on an elder who holds him so
he can actually see the mirror image (the implication being that the infant
at that point cant stand up by himself). Thus the image in the mirror not
only enables a feeling of mastery, but simultaneously a feeling of
helplessness and dependency. When Bhabha talks about the
necessary visibility of the fetish, he has in mind the mirror image of
Lacans mirror stage, because it is the function of the fetish to invoke a
feeling of coherence and mastery while at the same time hinting at the
opposite.

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