GLORY PHILIPPINES, INC.

vs VERGARA
(Recognition and Types)
By: Aldrin De Guzman
FACTS:

Petitioner Glory Philippines, Inc. manufactures money-counting machines.

In June 1998, it created a Parts Inspection Section (PIS) tasked to inspect the machine parts
for exportation to its exclusive buyer, Glory Limited Japan (Glory Japan).

Petitioner hired respondents on 7/6/1998, as members of the PIS.

However, the employment contracts which they signed only on 8/18/1998, indicated them as
Production Operators in the Production Section with a daily wage of Php188.00.

The contracts covered the period from July 31 to August 30, 1998. Thereafter, respondents
employment contracts were extended on a monthly basis.

On 4/27/1999, however, they were each made to sign employment contracts covering the
period from February 28 to April 30, 1999.

On 4/26/1999, Mr. Takeo Oshima (President) informed the Assistant Manager that the
contractual employees in the PIS would no longer be needed by the company as Glory Japan
had cancelled its orders.
Nevertheless, petitioner extended respondents employment due to their insistent pleas and for
the period from May 1 to May 15, 1999, respondents signed employment contracts with a
higher wage of Php200.00 a day.

Respondents claimed that they continued to work until 5/25/1999 when, at the close of working
hours, petitioners security guard advised them that their employment had been terminated
and that they would no longer be allowed to enter the premises.

Consequently, on May 27, 1999, they filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal with the
DOLE. T

he cases were subsequently referred to the NLRC.

On 10/29/1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding that respondents were regular
employees because they performed activities desirable to the usual business or trade of
petitioner for almost 11 months and that they were illegally dismissed for lack of just cause
and non-observance of due process.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter.

However, upon motion for reconsideration, the NLRC reversed and set aside its earlier decision
and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

o The NLRC ruled that respondents were project employees and that their employment
was terminated upon expiration of their employment contracts.
Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied hence, they filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA.

On 9/18/2006, the appellate court granted the petition.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were regular employees.
Held: YES.
 The Court notes that there are three kinds of employees as provided under Article 280 of the
Labor Code, thus:
(1) Regular employees or those who have been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer;
(2) Project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season; and
(3) Casual employees or those who are neither regular nor project employees

There is no merit in petitioners claim that respondents were project employees whose
employment was coterminous with the transaction with Glory Japan.
Respondents employment contracts failed to state the specific project or undertaking
for which they were allegedly engaged.
While petitioner claims that respondents were hired for the transaction with Glory Japan, the
same was not indicated in the contracts.
As observed by the CA, nothing therein suggested that their employment was dependent on
the continuous patronage of Glory Japan.
Further, the employment contracts did not indicate the duration and scope of the project or
undertaking as required by law.
It is not enough that an employee is hired for a specific project or phase of work to qualify as
a project employee.
There must also be a determination of, or a clear agreement on, the completion or
termination of the project at the time the employee was engaged, which is absent in
this case.
The factual circumstances negate petitioners claim that respondents were project employees.
Employment contracts of respondents were repeatedly renewed and extended by petitioner. It
bears stressing that from 12/1/1998 to 4/27/1999, respondents reported for work despite the
absence of employment contracts.
Although petitioners transaction with Glory Japan was terminated sometime in April 1999, yet
respondents were allowed to work without interruption until 5/25/1999.
In fact, petitioner even paid them higher salaries of Php200.00 a day.
Likewise, we cannot give credence to petitioners claim that respondents were fixed term
employees.
Petitioners reliance on our ruling in Philippine Village Hotel v. National Labor Relations
Commission is misplaced because the facts in the said case are not in all fours with the case at
bar.
In said case, the employees were hired only for a one-month period and their employment
contracts were never renewed.
In the instant case, respondents original employment contracts were renewed four times.
In the last instance, their contracts were extended despite the cessation of petitioners alleged
transaction with Glory Japan.
Thus, respondents were continuously under the employ of petitioner, performing the
same duties and responsibilities.
 In Philips Semiconductors (Phils.), Inc. v. Fadriquela, we held that such a continuing need
for respondents services is sufficient evidence of the necessity and indispensability
of their services to petitioners business.
Consequently, we find that respondents were regular employees defined under Article 280 of
the Labor Code as those who have been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of petitioner.

DISPOSITION: The petition is DENIED. The CAs decisions are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Pangilinan vs General Miling Corp 434 SCRA 159
By: Patricia Loise Del Rosario
FACTS:

Respondent General Milling Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the production

and sale of livestock and poultry. It is, likewise, the distributor of dressed chicken to various
restaurants and establishments nationwide.
Petitioners were employed by the respondent as emergency workers under separate
"temporary/casual contracts of employment" for a period of five months.
Upon the expiration of their respective contracts, their services were terminated.

They later filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal and non-payment of holiday pay, 13th
month pay, night-shift differential and service incentive leave pay against the respondent
before the Arbitration Branch of NLRC.

Petitioners alleged that their work as chicken dressers was necessary and desirable in the usual
business of the respondent, and added that although they worked from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00
a.m., they were not paid night-shift differential.
They stressed that based on the nature of their work, they were regular employees of the
respondent; hence, could not be dismissed from their employment unless for just cause and
after due notice.
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners declaring that they were regular
employees.
Finding that the termination of their employment was not based on any of the just causes
provided for in the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter declared that they were allegedly illegally
dismissed.
NLRC rendered a decision reversing that of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC held that the
petitioners, who were temporary or contractual employees of the respondent, were legally
terminated upon the expiration of their respective contracts.
Citing the case of Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, the NLRC explained that while the petitioners'
work was necessary and desirable in the usual business of GMC, they cannot be considered as
regular employees since they agreed to a fixed term.

The petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the NLRC,
they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The CA rendered a decision affirming decision of the NLRC.

The CA ruled that where the duties of the employee consist of activities usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business of the employer, it does not necessarily follow that the parties
are forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the performance of such activities.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were regular employees of the respondent GMC when their
employment was terminated.

HELD: NO.

The petitioners were employees with a fixed period, and, as such, were not regular employees.

Article 280 of the Labor Code comprehends three kinds of employees:

 (a) regular employees or those whose work is necessary or desirable to the
usual business of the employer;
(b) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment
is for the duration of the season; and,
(c) casual employees or those who are neither regular nor project employees.

A regular employee is one who is engaged to perform activities which are necessary and
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer as against those which are undertaken
for a specific project or are seasonal.

There are two separate instances whereby it can be determined that an employment is regular:
(1) if the particular activity performed by the employee is necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer; and,
(2) if the employee has been performing the job for at least a year.
Indeed, in the leading case of Brent School Inc. v. Zamora, we laid down the guideline before
a contract of employment may be held as valid, to wit:
[S]tipulations in employment contracts providing for term employment or
fixed period employment are valid when the period were agreed upon
knowingly and voluntarily by the parties without force, duress or improper
pressure, being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other
circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the
employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with
no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter.

An examination of the contracts entered into by the petitioners showed that their employment
was limited to a fixed period, usually five or six months, and did not go beyond such period.
The records reveal that the stipulations in the employment contracts were knowingly and
voluntarily agreed to by the petitioners without force, duress or improper pressure, or any
circumstances that vitiated their consent.

Similarly, nothing therein shows that these contracts were used as a subterfuge by the
respondent GMC to evade the provisions of Articles 279 and 280 of the Labor Code.

Article 280 of the Labor Code does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a
fixed period.

We furthered that it does not necessarily follow that where the duties of the employee consist
of activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties
are forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the performance of such activities.

There is thus nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of employment and
the nature of the employee's duties.
The petitioners were hired as "emergency workers" and assigned as chicken dressers, packers
and helpers at the Cainta Processing Plant.

While the petitioners' employment as chicken dressers is necessary and desirable in the usual
business of the respondent, they were employed on a mere temporary basis, since their
employment was limited to a fixed period.

As such, they cannot be said to be regular employees, but are merely "contractual employees."

There was no illegal dismissal when the petitioners' services were terminated by reason of the
expiration of their contracts.
 Lack of notice of termination is of no consequence, because when the contract specifies the
period of its duration, it terminates on the expiration of such period.

A contract for employment for a definite period terminates by its own term at the end of such
period.
UNIVERSAL ROBINA etc. vs. CABALLEDA
By: Vin Orteza

FACTS:

Respondent Agripino Caballeda (Agripino) worked as welder for Universal Robina from March
1989 until June 23, 1997 with a salary of P124.00 per day, while respondent Alejandro Cadalin
(Alejandro) worked as crane operator from 1976 up to June 15, 1997 with a salary of P209.30
per day.
In 1991, the President of Universal Robina, issued a Memorandum establishing the company
policy on "Compulsory Retirement" (Memorandum) of its employees.
It provides that any employee of Universal Robina shall be considered retired 30 days after he
attains age 60.
Subsequently, in 1992, RA No. 7641 was enacted into law, and it took effect in 1993, amending
Article 287 of the Labor Code, to read:

Art. 287. Retirement. -- Any employee may be retired upon reaching the
retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other
applicable employment contract.

In April 1993, Univeral Robina and the National Federation of Labor (NFL), a legitimate labor
organization and exclusive bargaining representative of Universal Robina, of which Alejandro
was a member, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Article XV of the said CBA particularly provided that the retirement benefits of the members of
the collective bargaining unit shall be in accordance with law.
Agripino and Alejandro, having reached the age of 60, were allegedly forced to retire by
Univeral Robina.
Agripino and Alejandro filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal.
The LA rendered a Decision declaring the Universal Robina guilty of illegal dismissal.
The NLRC held that Alejandro voluntarily retired and with respect to Agripino, the NLRC held
that Agripino was not a mere casual employee.
The CA declared that Universal Robina illegally dismissed the respondents.
The CA found that there is no existing CBA or employment contract between the parties that
provides for early compulsory retirement.
Petitioners submit that there is a need to review the records and evidence in this case since
the factual findings of the LA and the CA are in conflict with those of the NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether Agripino is a seasonal or project employee.

HELD:

It is a well-established rule that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court should raise only questions of law, subject to certain exceptions.
Whether or not Agripino was a seasonal/project employee or a regular employee is
a question of fact.
 As such, this Court is not at liberty to review the said factual issue because our
jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing errors of law that the CA may have
committed.
Time and again, we have held that this Court is not a trial of facts, and it is not for us to
re-examine and re-evaluate the probative value of evidence presented before the LA,
the NLRC and the CA, which formed the basis of the assailed decision.
Indeed, when their findings are in absolute agreement, the same are accorded not
only respect but even finality as long as they are amply supported by substantial
evidence.
In this case, it is noteworthy that the LA, the NLRC and the CA are one in ruling that Agripino
was not a casual employee much less a seasonal or project employee.

In their findings, Agripino was considered a regular employee of URSUMCO.

Consequently, such uniform finding of the LA, the NLRC, and the CA binds this Court.

We find no cogent reason to depart from this ruling.

SAN MIGUEL CORP V. NLRC 297 SCRA 277 (1998)

By: Mayr Teruel
FACTS:

In November 1990, Francisco De Guzman Jr. was hired by SMC as helper/bricklayer for a
specific project, the repair and upgrading of furnace C at its Manila Glass Plant.

His contract of employment provided that said temporary employment was for a specific period
of approximately 4 months.

On April 30, 1991, De Guzman was able to complete the repair and upgrading of furnace C.
Thus, his services were terminated on that same day as there was no more work to be done.
His employment contract also ended that day.
On May 10, 1991, De Guzman was again hired for a specific job which involved the
draining/cooling down of furnace F and the emergency repair of furnace E.
This project was for a specific period of approximately 3 months. After the completion of this
task, at the end of July 1991, De Guzman's services were terminated.
On Aug.1, 1991, complainant saw his name in a Memorandum posted at the Company's Bulletin
Board as among those who were considered dismissed.
On Aug.12, 1994, or after the lapse of more than 3 years from the completion of the last
undertaking for which De Guzman was hired, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
SMC.
On June 30, 1995, LA rendered the decision dismissing said complaint for lack of merit,
sustaining SMC's argument that De Guzman was a project employee.
o The position of a helper does not fall within the classification of regular employees.
Hence, complainant never attained regular employment status. Moreover, his silence for more
than three (3) years without any reasonable explanation tended to weaken his claim.
Upon appeal, NLRC reversed LA decision.
o In its ruling, NLRC stated that SMCs scheme of subsequently re-hiring complainant
after only 10 days from the last day of the expiration of his contract of employment for
a specific period, and giving him again another contract of employment for another
specific period cannot be countenanced.
 o This is one way of doing violence to the employee's constitutional right to security of
tenure under which even employees under probationary status are amply protected.

ISSUES: WON DE GUZMAN WAS A REGULAR EMPLOYEE OF SMC.

HELD: No. Art. 280 of the Labor Code defines regular, project and casual employment.

The above mentioned provision reinforces the Constitutional mandate to protect the interest of
labor as it sets the legal framework for ascertaining one's nature of employment, and
distinguishing different kinds of employees.
Its language manifests the intent to safeguard the tenurial interest of worker who may be
denied the enjoyment of the rights and benefits due to an employee, regardless of the nature
of his employment, by virtue of lopsided agreements which the economically powerful employer
who can maneuver to keep an employee on a casual or contractual status for as long as it is
convenient to the employer.
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the
working class, it should not be supposed that every dispute will be automatically decided in
favor of labor.
Management has also rights, which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of fair play.
Although the Supreme Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and has
upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer, such favoritism has not blinded the Court
to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.

The nature of ones employment does not depend on the will or word of the employer nor on
the procedure of hiring and the manner of designating the employee, but on the nature of the
activities to be performed by the employee, considering the employers nature of business and
the duration and scope of the work to be done.

Private respondent was hired for a specific project that was not within the regular business of
the corporation.
For petitioner is not engaged in the business of repairing furnaces.

Although the activity was necessary to enable petitioner to continue manufacturing glass, the
necessity therefor arose only when a particular furnace reached the end of its life or operating
cycle.
Or, as in the second undertaking, when a particular furnace required an emergency repair. In
other words, the undertakings where private respondent was hired primarily as
helper/bricklayer have specified goals and purposes, which are fulfilled once the designated
work was completed.
Moreover, such undertakings were also identifiably separate and distinct from the usual,
ordinary or regular business operations of petitioner, which is glass manufacturing.
These undertakings, the duration and scope of which had been determined and made known
to private respondent at the time of his employment, clearly indicated the nature of his
employment as a project employee.
Thus, his services were terminated legally after the completion of the project.

Public respondent NLRCs decision (that Private respondent is a regular employee), if upheld,
would amount to negating the distinctions made in Article 280 Labor Code.

It would shunt aside the rule that since a project employees work depends on the availability
of a project, necessarily, the duration of his employment is coterminous with the project to
 which he is assigned. It would become a burden for an employer to retain an employee and
pay him his corresponding wages if there was no project for him to work on.

TABAS vs CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CO. and NLRC

By: Carole Clarin

FACTS:

On 7/21/1986, 7/23/1986, and 7/28/1986, the petitioners petitioned the NLRC for
reinstatement and payment of various benefits against the respondent, the California
Manufacturing Company.

On 10/7/1986, after the cases had been consolidated, the California filed a motion to dismiss
as well as a position paper denying the existence of an employer-employee relation between
the petitioners and the company. On motion of the petitioners, Livi Manpower Services, Inc.
was impleaded as a party-respondent.

Petitioners were employees of Livi which assigned them to work as "promotional

merchandisers" for California pursuant to a manpower supply agreement.

Portions of the contract expressly stipulated the following: assignment of workers to California
shall be on a "seasonal and contractual basis" and that "cost of living allowance and the 10
legal holidays will be charged directly to California at cost."

Thereafter, petitioners signed employment contracts with durations of six months and upon
expiration, they signed new agreements with the same period.

Unlike regular California employees, who received not less than P2,823.00 a month in addition
to a host of fringe benefits and bonuses, they received P38.56 plus P15.00 in allowance daily.

Petitioners allege that upon the renewal of the contract, they had become regular California
employee entitled similar benefits.

However, during the pendency of the proceedings, they were notified by California that they
would not be rehired.

As a result, they filed an amended complaint charging California with illegal dismissal.

For Californias defense, they deny liability because Livi is the petitioners' employer and that
the retrenchment was due to business losses and expiration of contracts.

It appears that thereafter, Livi re-absorbed them into its labor pool on a "wait-in or standby"
status.

The labor arbiter's decision, a decision affirmed on appeal, ruled against the existence of any
employer-employee relation between the petitioners and California ostensibly in the light of
the manpower supply contract.

However, the labor arbiter absolved Livi from any obligation because the retrenchment in
question was allegedly "beyond its control."

He assessed against the firm, nevertheless, separation pay and attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are California's or Livi's employees.

Held: YES.
 Petitioners are employees of California. Records show that the petitioners signed an initial six-
month contract, but it was renewed for another six months.
They had become regular employees of California and had acquired a secure tenure.
The fact that the petitioners have been hired on a "temporary or seasonal" basis is no argument.
As we held in Philippine Bank of Communications v. NLRC, a temporary or casual employee,
under ARTICLE 218 of the Labor Code, becomes regular after service of one year, unless
he has been contracted for a specific project.
Merchandising is not a specific project, but is an undertaking that is related to the day-to-day
operations of California.
Livi, as a placement agency, supplied the manpower necessary to carry out California's
merchandising activities, using California's premises and equipment.
Petitioners have been made to perform merchandizing promotion or sale of Californias
products, an activity that is an integral part of California's manufacturing business.
The existence of an employer-employees relation is a question of law and being such, it cannot
be made the subject of agreement.
The designation of Livi as the petitioners employer and the absolution of California from any
liability as an employer in the supply agreement will not erase either party's obligations
as an employer.
At any rate, since the agreement was between Livi and California, they alone are bound by it,
and the petitioners cannot be made to suffer from its adverse consequences.
Further, the Court notes that neither Livi nor California can escape liability, because based on
Article 106, in spite the absence of a direct employer-employee relationship between
the employer in whose favor work had been contracted out by a "labor-only" contractor and
the employees, the former has the responsibility, together with the "labor-only"
contractor, for any valid labor claims, by operation of law.
The reason is that the "labor-only" contractor is considered "merely an agent of the employer,"
and liability must be shouldered by either one or shared by both.
The fact that the petitioners have allegedly admitted being Livi's "direct employees" in their
complaints is nothing conclusive.
For one thing, the fact that the petitioners were, will not absolve California since liability has
been imposed by legal operation.
For another, and as we indicated, the relations of parties must be judged from case to
case and the decree of law, and not by declarations of parties.
It is not that by dismissing the terms and conditions of the manpower supply agreement, we
have, hence, considered it illegal.
Under the Labor Code, genuine job contracts are permissible, provided they are
genuine job contracts.
But, as we held in Philippine Bank of Communications, supra, when such arrangements are
resorted to "in anticipation of, and for the very purpose of making possible, the secondment of
the employees from the true employer, the Court will be justified in expressing its concern.
For then that would compromise the rights of the workers, especially their right to security of
tenure.
DISPOSITION: Petition is GRANTED. Petitioners were REINSTATED with full status and rights of regular
employees. Respondents were ORDERED to pay costs of the suit and other awards.

Philips Semiconductors etc. vs Fadriquela 427 SCRA 408

By: Aldrin De Guzman
FACTS:

On May 8, 1992, respondent Eloisa Fadriquela executed a Contract of Employment with

petitioner Philips Semiconductors as a production operator, initially for 3 months.
Because her performance constantly met petitioners ratings requirements, her contract was
renewed several times, extending to 12 months.
However, over the last few months, respondent incurred several absences for which she offered
no valid justification despite a prompting to do so by the line supervisor.
As a consequence, her performance rating dropped, and respondents contract was no longer
renewed.

Respondent filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal, claiming she had not been
duly notified; she was already a regular employee and could not be terminated without just
cause.
Petitioner contended that respondent had not been dismissed; rather, her contract merely
expired and was not renewed.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but awarded her severance of 1
months pay.
He stated that petitioner and its unions CBA required one to render 17 months of service to be
considered regular.

He also added that respondent could not complain of being deprived of notice and hearing as
the line supervisor had asked her to explain her absences.
An appeal with the NLRC yielded the same results.

It was pointed out that as a contractual employee respondent was bound by the stipulations of
her contract of employment, which in this case was a satisfactory performance rating.
Dissatisfied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which reversed the
decisions of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter.
o The appellate court argued that the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter employed inappropriate
bases for their decisions, since the CBA did not apply to contractual employees like
Fadriquela.
o The CA cited Art. 280 of the Labor Code which states that regardless of any written or
oral agreements between employer and employee, an employment shall be deemed
to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
o Petitioners contention that employment was obtained as the need arose was illogical,
as this would mean the employee would never attain regular status. The CA further
held that a less punitive penalty would suffice for absenteeism.
o Finally, it held that the dialogue between the respondent and line supervisor was
insufficient as to amount to notice, and thus the former was deprived of due process.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in which petitioner claimed that its hiring policy
was neither new nor prohibited and that it was a valid exercise of its management prerogative
since demand for its semiconductors is cyclical in nature.
It added that it had the prerogative to set reasonable standards of employment qualification as
provided by law.
 The motion was denied, hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was still a contractual employee of the petitioner as of June 4,
1993.

HELD: The respondent is a regular employee.

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral argument of the parties, an employment
shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer,
except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of
the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph;
Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the
activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.

There are two kinds of regular employees under the law:(1) those engaged to perform activities
which are necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and (2) those
casual employees who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or
broken, with respect to the activities in which they are employed.

The primary standard to determine a regular employment is the reasonable connection

between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade
of the employer.

The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer.

If the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is
not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its
performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of that activity to
the business of the employer.

Hence, the employment is also considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and
while such activity exists.

The law does not provide the qualification that the employee must first be issued a regular
appointment or must be declared as such before he can acquire a regular employee status.

The respondent was employed by the petitioner on May 8, 1992 as production operator. She
was assigned to wirebuilding at the transistor division.

There is no dispute that the work of the respondent was necessary or desirable in the business
or trade of the petitioner.

She remained under the employ of the petitioner without any interruption since May 8, 1992
to June 4, 1993 or for one (1) year and twenty-eight (28) days.

The original contract of employment had been extended or renewed for four times, to the same
position, with the same chores.

Such a continuing need for the services of the respondent is sufficient evidence of the necessity
and indispensability of her services to the petitioners business.
 By operation of law, then, the respondent had attained the regular status of her employment
with the petitioner, and is thus entitled to security of tenure as provided for in Article 279 of
the Labor Code which reads:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

Article 280 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was emplaced in our statute books to prevent
the circumvention by unscrupulous employers of the employees right to be secure in his tenure
by indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements inconsistent with
the concept of regular employment defined therein.

The language of the law manifests the intent to protect the tenurial interest of the worker who
may be denied the rights and benefits due a regular employee because of lopsided agreements
with the economically powerful employer who can maneuver to keep an employee on a casual
or temporary status for as long as it is convenient to it.

In tandem with Article 281 of the Labor Code, Article 280 was designed to put an end to the
pernicious practice of making permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple
expedient of extending to them temporary or probationary appointments, ad infinitum.

Under Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution, it is the policy of the State to assure the
workers of security of tenure and free them from the bondage of uncertainty of tenure woven
by some employers into their contracts of employment. The guarantee is an act of social
justice.

When a person has no property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of
livelihood and those of his dependents.

When a person loses his job, his dependents suffer as well.

The worker should therefore be protected and insulated against any arbitrary deprivation of
his job.
UNIVERSAL ROBINA etc. vs. CABALLEDA (please refer to 7.02)

MAGSALIN V. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION 403 SCRA 199 (2003)

By: Patricia Loise Del Rosario

FACTS:

Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc engaged the services of respondent workers as sales route
helpers for a limited period of five months.

After five months, respondent workers were employed by Petitioner Company on a day-to-day
basis to substitute for regular sales route helpers whenever the latter would be unavailable or
when there would be an unexpected shortage of manpower in any of its work places or an
unusually high volume of work.
The practice was for the workers to wait every morning outside the gates of the sales office of
petitioner company.
 If thus hired, the workers would then be paid their wages at the end of the day.

Ultimately, respondent workers asked Petitioner Company to extend to them regular

appointments.
Petitioner company refused.
November 7, 1997 - twenty-three (23) of the temporary workers (herein respondents) filed
with the NLRC a complaint for the regularization of their employment with petitioner
company.
The complaint was amended a number of times to include other complainants that ultimately
totaled fifty-eight (58) workers.
Claiming that petitioner company meanwhile terminated their services, respondent workers
filed a notice of strike and a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with the
NLRC.
01 April 1998 - voluntary arbitration
18 May 1998 - the voluntary arbitrator rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the
thesis that respondents (then complainants) were not regular employees of petitioner
company.
11 August 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the voluntary
arbitrator ; (Petitioners were declared regular employees of Coca Cola Bottlers; dismissal
illegal; ordered to reinstate the workers)

ISSUES:
1. WON the nature of work of respondents in the company is of such nature as to be deemed
necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of petitioner that could qualify them to
be regular employees
2. WON the quitclaims executed by the 36 individual respondents were valid

HELD:
1. YES. In determining whether an employment should be considered regular or non-regular, the
applicable test is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer.
1. Intentionalist approach - Even while the language of law (Art 280) might have been more
definitive, the clarity of its spirit and intent, i.e., to ensure a regular workers security of
tenure, however, can hardly be doubted.
2. Although the work to be performed is only for a specific project or seasonal, where a person
thus engaged has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance
is not continuous or is merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing
need for its performance as being sufficient to indicate the necessity or desirability of that
activity to the business or trade of the employer. The employment of such person is also
then deemed to be regular with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.
3. The postproduction activities done by sales route helpers are important. The nature of
the work performed must be viewed from a perspective of the business or trade in its
entirety and not on a confined scope.
4. The repeated rehiring of respondent workers and the continuing need for their services
clearly attest to the necessity or desirability of their services in the regular conduct of the
business or trade of petitioner company.
5. A contract of employment is impressed with public interest. The provisions of applicable
statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are not at liberty to insulate
 themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply
contracting with each other.

2. YES. While quitclaims executed by employees are commonly frowned upon as being contrary
to public policy and are ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of their legal rights, there
are, however, legitimate waivers that represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of
laborers claims which should be so respected by the Court as the law between the parties.
Where the person making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof,
and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as being a valid and binding undertaking.
Dire necessity is not an acceptable ground for annulling the release, when it is not shown that
the employee has been forced to execute it.

HACIENDA FATIMA and/or PATRICIO VILLEGAS, ALFONSO VILLEGAS and CRISTINE SEGURA
vs NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE WORKERS-FOOD and GENERAL TRADE
BY: VIN ORTEZA

FACTS:

Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside CAs decision (2/20/2001)
which declared complainant union to have been illegally dismissed.

Workers of Hacienda Fatima organized themselves into a union. However, the organization
was not favored by the petitioners.
Thus, when the union was certified as the collective bargaining representative in the
certification elections, petitioners refused to sit down with the union for the purpose of entering
into a collective bargaining agreement.
In protest, complainants staged a strike which was settled upon the signing of a Memorandum
of Agreement.
Another dispute arose between the parties, it was alleged that respondent union failed to load
the fifteen wagons, so petitioners reneged on its commitment to sit down and bargain
collectively.
Petitioners prevented the organizers from entering the premises and starting September 1991,
did not assign any work forcing the union to stage a strike on 1/2/1992.
But due to the conciliation efforts by the DOLE, another Memorandum of Agreement was signed
by the complainants.
Among other things, the Agreement aims to resolve the status of the subject 36 hacienda
workers, to determine whether or not the concerned Union members are hacienda workers or
employees.
Pursuant thereto, the parties subsequently met and a list of employees was submitted.
Four people are deemed not considered employees, one employee shall be verified in the 1990
payroll and 12 employees are to be reinstated immediately upon availability of work.
However, despite of the Agreement, petitioners again reneged on its commitment.
The complaint of the union was lodged to NLRC and CA.
The appellate courts both found that the accusation that the workers refused to work and was
choosy in the kind of work they have to perform are groundless.
 Further, CA affirmed that while the work of respondents was seasonal in nature, they were
considered to be merely on leave during the off-season and were therefore still employed by
petitioners.
Moreover, the workers enjoyed security of tenure.
Any infringement upon this right was deemed by the CA to be tantamount to illegal dismissal.
The CA likewise concurred with the NLRC's finding that petitioners were guilty of unfair labor
practice.
Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents are seasonal workers or regular employees.

HELD: The workers are regular employees.

The lower courts did not err in its findings that respondents were regular employees.
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, states:

"Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed
to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined
at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

"An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which
he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exist."

For respondents to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it is not enough
that they perform work or services that are seasonal in nature. T
hey must have also been employed only for the duration of one season.
The evidence proves the existence of the first, but not of the second, condition.
The fact that respondents with the exception of Luisa Rombo, Ramona Rombo, Bobong Abriga
and Boboy Silva repeatedly worked as sugarcane workers for petitioners for several years is
not denied by the latter.
Evidently, petitioners employed respondents for more than one season.
Therefore, the general rule of regular employment is applicable.
The Court cited the ruling in Abasolo v. National Labor Relations Commission, that primary
standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between
the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of
the employer.
The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual trade or
business of the employer.
Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance
is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for
its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that
activity to the business.
 Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while
such activity exists.
The Court has already settled that seasonal workers who are called to work from time to time
and are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in said period,
but merely considered on leave until re-employed.
The CA did not err when it ruled that Mercado v. NLRC was not applicable to the case at bar.
In the earlier case, the workers were required to perform phases of agricultural work for a
definite period of time, after which their services would be available to any other farm owner.
They were not hired regularly and repeatedly for the same phase/s of agricultural work, but on
and off for any single phase thereof.
On the other hand, herein respondents, having performed the same tasks for petitioners every
season for several years, are considered the latter's regular employees for their respective
tasks. Petitioners' eventual refusal to use their services even if they were ready, able and
willing to perform their usual duties whenever these were available and hiring of other
workers to perform the tasks originally assigned to respondents amounted to illegal dismissal
of the latter.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the CA's dismissal of what petitioners claim was their valid
exercise of a management prerogative.
The sudden changes in work assignments reeked of bad faith.
These changes were implemented immediately after respondents had organized themselves
into a union and started demanding collective bargaining.
Those who were union members were effectively deprived of their jobs. Petitioners' move
actually amounted to unjustified dismissal of respondents, in violation of the Labor Code.
Where there is no showing of clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment,
the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to
prove that the termination was for a valid and authorized cause.
In the case at bar, petitioners failed to prove any such cause for the dismissal of respondents
who, as discussed above, are regular employees.

DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED. Decision of CA is AFFIRMED.

Skippers United vs NLRC 494 SCRA 661

BY: MAYR TERUEL

FACTS:

Private respondent Gervasio Rosaroso was employed as a Third Engineer with Nicolakis
Shipping, S.A., a foreign firm through its recruitment and manning agency, petitioner Skippers.
The employment contract was for the period of one year beginning July 10, 1997 with a salary
of $800 per month and other benefits.
Rosaroso boarded M/V Naval Gent on July 15, 1997.

He was however ordered to disembark in Bulgaria on August 7, 1997 and repatriated to the
Philippines.
Soon after arrival in Manila, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary
claims.
 The Labor Arbiter found the respondent was in fact illegally dismissed and issued an order
directing petitioner, Skippers, to pay Rosaroso separation pay of $2,4000 or the equivalent of
P100,000, representing three months pay and unpaid salary for seven days of $186.69 or the
equivalent of P7,840.98. Atorneys fees of P5,000 was also awarded.
The NLRC and the CA affirmed en toto the ruling of the Arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to backwage and separation pay on the basis of the
alleged illegal dismissal.

HELD:

A seafarer is not a regular employee as defined in Article 280 of the Labor Code.

Hence, he is not entitled to full backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as
provided in Article 279 of the Labor Code.
Seafarers are contractual employees whose rights and obligations are governed primarily by
the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen, the Rules and Regulations
Governing Overseas Employment, and, more importantly, by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
While the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen and the Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment do not provide for the award of separation or
termination pay, Section 10 of R.A. 8042 provides for the award of money claims in cases of
illegal dismissals, thus:

Section 10. Money Claims. In case of termination of overseas employment

without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker
shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of
his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.

The award of salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, is not an award of backwages
or separation pay, but a form of indemnity for the worker who was illegally dismissed.

The Labor Arbiter may have mislabeled it as separation pay, nonetheless, the award was made
in conformity with law.

LOPEZ vs. METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM

BY: CAROLE CLARIN

FACTS:

By virtue of an Agreement, petitioners were engaged by the MWSS as collectors-contractors,

wherein the former agreed to collect from the concessionaires of MWSS, charges, fees,
assessments of rents for water, sewer and/or plumbing services which the MWSS bills from
time to time.
 In 1997, MWSS entered into a Concession Agreement with Manila Water Service wherein the
collection of bills was transferred to said private concessionaires, effectively terminating the
contracts of service between petitioners and MWSS.
Regular employees of the MWSS were paid their retirement benefits, but not petitioners.

MWSS relied on a resolution of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) that contract-collectors of
the MWSS are not its employees and therefore not entitled to the benefits due regular
government employees.
Petitioners filed a complaint with the CSC. CSC denied their claims, stating that petitioners
were engaged by MWSS through a contract of service, which explicitly provides that a bill
collector-contractor is not an MWSS employee.

Relying on Part V of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993, the CSC stated that
contract services/job orders are not considered government services, which do not have to be
submitted to the CSC for approval, unlike contractual and plantilla appointments.
To further strengthen their case, petitioners refer to CSC Resolution 92-2008 dated 8 December
1992, which states in part:

. . . The fact that they were being hired directly and paid on commission basis
by MWSS itself is indicative that they are government employees and should be
entitled to the incentive awards.

ISSUE: WON petitioners were employees of the MWSS.

HELD: Petitioners are indeed regular employees of the MWSS.

The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable

connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to
the usual business or trade of the employer.
The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed
and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety.
Likewise, the repeated and continuing need for the performance of the job has been
deemed sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of the activity to
the business.
Some of the petitioners had rendered more than two decades of service to the MWSS.

The continuous and repeated rehiring of these bill collectors indicate the necessity
and desirability of their services, as well as the importance of the role of bill collectors
in the MWSS.
Viewed in that context the work rendered by the petitioners is essential to the
companys survival and growth.
MWSS relies for the most part on the bill collections in order to sustain its operations.

It is not intermittent and seasonal, but rather continuous and increasing by reason of its
indisputable essentiality.

PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORP V. NLRC 521 SCRA 222 (2007)

BY: ALDRIN DE GUZMAN
FACTS:

PNOC-EDC is a GOCC engaged in the exploration, development and utilization of energy.

Petitioners Southern Negros Geothermal Production Field in Negros Oriental is divided into 2
phases: PAL I and PAL II.
To augment its manpower requirement occasioned by the increased activities in the
development of PAL II, PNOC-EDC hired private respondents in the administration and
maintenance section.
The termination/expiration of their respective employment were specified in their initial
employment contracts, which, however, were renewed and extended on their respective expiry
dates.

In May 1998, PNOC-EDC furnished respondent employees uniformly worded notices of

termination, stating that they were being terminated from employment effective June 20, 1998
due to the substantial completion of the civil works phase of PAL II.
Private respondents, then, filed before NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner
and sought the payment of back wages, salary differentials, CBA benefits, damages and fees.
o They averred that their dismissal was a clear case of union busting for they had
previously sought union membership and actually filed a notice of strike.
Petitioner contended that respondents were contractual employees; as such, they cannot claim
to have been illegally dismissed because upon the expiration of the term of the contract or the
completion of the project, their employer-employee relationship also ended.
LA dismissed the complaint for lack of legal and factual basis.
NLRC reversed the decision citing that respondents were regular non-project employees for
having worked for more than 1 year in positions that required them to perform activities
necessary and desirable in the normal business or trade of petitioner.
Petitioners arguments: respondents are project employees because as gleaned from their
standard contracts of employment, they were hired for a specific project, the completion or
termination of which had been determined at the time of their engagement.
o Their contracts clearly indicated the completion or termination of the specific project or
of the specific phase thereof at the time they were engaged.
Respondents argument: They were undeniably performing activities which are necessary or
desirable in the usual trade or business of petitioner.
o They aver that the completion of their individual employment was not determined at
the time of their engagement due to the fact that their contracts were renewed and
extended over and over again.
o They claim that had the periods of their employment been determined, then their work
with petitioner would not have lasted beyond the three-month period provided in their
respective initial employment contracts.
o They likewise theorized that the contracts they signed were short-term contracts
covering a long period of the same activity, not for a specific project or undertaking.

ISSUE: WON private respondents were project employees.

HELD: No, private respondents were regular employees of PNOC-EDC.

The applicable formula to ascertain whether an employment should be considered regular or

non-regular is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer.

As held in Grandspan Development Corporation v. Bernardo:

 The principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly
characterized as "project employees," as distinguished from "regular
employees," is whether or not the project employees were assigned to carry out
a "specific project or undertaking," the duration and scope of which were
specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project.
As defined, project employees are those workers hired (1) for a specific project or undertaking,
and (2) the completion or termination of such project or undertaking has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee.

However, petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that respondents were hired merely as
project employees. A perusal of the records of the case reveals that the supposed specific
project or undertaking of petitioner was not satisfactorily identified in the contracts of
respondents.

Another cogent factor which militates against petitioners insistence that the services of
respondents were terminated because the projects for which they were hired had been
completed is the fact that respondents contracts of employment were extended a number of
times for different or new projects. It must be stressed that a contract that misuses a purported
fixed-term employment to block the acquisition of tenure by employees deserves to be struck
down for being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.

PAUL V. SANTIAGO vs CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC.

By: Patricia Loise Del Rosario

FACTS:

Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. for about five years.
On 2/3/1998, petitioner signed a new contract of employment with respondent, with the
duration of 9 months.
The contract was approved by the POEA.
Petitioner was to be deployed on board the "MSV Seaspread" which was scheduled to leave the
port of Manila for Canada on 2/13/1998.
Prior to scheduled date of departure, Capt. Pacifico Fernandez (Vice President) conveyed to the
captain that, based from a phone call he received from unidentified persons, petitioner will
jump ship in Canada like his brother.
Subsequently, the Capt. of "MSV Seaspread," informed petitioner that he would not be leaving
for Canada anymore, but he was reassured that he might be considered for deployment at
some future date.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages, and attorney's fees
against respondent and its foreign principal, Cable and Wireless (Marine) Ltd.
Labor Arbiters Ruling rendered respondent liable for damages.
o Respondent violated the rules and regulations governing overseas employment when
it did not deploy petitioner. Employment contract remained valid but had not
commenced since petitioner was not deployed.
o Petitioner is entitled to damages representing lost salary income for 9 months and fixed
overtime fee.
NLRCs Ruling reversed LAs decision.
o No employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent because under
the POEA Standard Contract, the employment contract shall commence upon actual
departure of the seafarer from the Port of Manila.
Court of Appeals Ruling affirmed.
 o Petitioner is not entitled to actual damages because damages are not recoverable by a
worker who was not deployed by his agency within the period prescribed in the POEA
Rules.
o Since petitioner had not departed from the Port of Manila, no employer-employee
relationship between the parties arose and claims for damages against the so-called
employer cannot be recovered.

Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled (a) to recover damages representing lost salary income
and fixed overtime fee; and (b) to be considered a regular employee, having worked for 5 years
on board the same vessel.

HELD:

(A) YES, Petitioner may recover damages but he is not entitled to overtime pay.
There is no question that the parties entered into an employment contract on 2/3/1998,
whereby petitioner was contracted by respondent to render services on board "MSV
Seaspread" for the consideration of US$515.00 per month for 9 months, plus overtime pay.
However, respondent failed to deploy petitioner from the port of Manila to Canada.
Considering that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point
of hire, the employment contract did not commence and no employer-employee
relationship was created between the parties.
However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract
and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship.
The perfection of the contract occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the
object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein.
The commencement of the employer-employee relationship would have taken place
had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire.
Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship,
contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth
of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action
against the erring party.
While the POEA Standard Contract must be recognized and respected, neither the manning
agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed without a valid
reason.
Respondents act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and
boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to
petitioners cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on
its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages
he suffered.
Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that one is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Respondent is thus liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of 9
months worth of salary as provided in the contract.
However, the Court ruled that he is not entitled to overtime pay.
 While the contract indicated a fixed overtime pay, it is not a guarantee that he would
receive said amount regardless of whether or not he rendered overtime work.
Even if the amount is stipulated in the contract, it will be paid only if and when the employee
rendered overtime work.
In the case of Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, it was discussed that: The rendition of overtime work and the submission of
sufficient proof that said work was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before
a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay The contract provision guarantees the
right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established.
Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays on board a ship
or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule.
For the employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be
sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be
extremely unfair and unreasonable.

(B) NO. The Court did not sustain petitioners claim that respondents failure to deploy petitioner is an
act designed to prevent the latter from attaining the status of a regular employee.
Even if petitioner was able to depart the port of Manila, he still cannot be considered a
regular employee, regardless of his previous contracts of employment with respondent.
In Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court ruled that seafarers are
considered contractual employees and cannot be considered as regular
employees under the Labor Code.
Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and
their employment is terminated when the contract expires.
The exigencies of their work necessitates that they be employed on a contractual
basis.

DISPOSITION: Petition is GRANTED IN PART. Labor Arbiters decision is REINSTATED with the
MODIFICATION that respondent CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc. is ordered to pay actual or
compensatory damages.