ABOITIZ SHIPPING V.

CA
G.R. NO. 84458 | NOVEMBER 6, 1989

Facts: Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia owned by petitioner Aboitiz Shipping
Corp at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. The vessel arrived at Pier 4,
North Harbor, Manila and was taken over by Pioneer Stevedoring for the latter to unload the
cargoes from the said vessel pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. An hour after the
passengers and Viana had disembarked the vessel the crane operator began its unloading
operation. While the crane was being operated, Viana who had already disembarked the vessel
remembered that some of his cargoes were still loaded there. He went back and while he was
pointing to the crew where his cargoes were, the crane hit him pinning him between the side of
the vessel and the crane resulting to his death. A complaint for damages was filed against
petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner contends that Viana ceased to be a
passenger when he disembarked the vessel and that consequently his presence there was no
longer reasonable. CA affirmed the trial courts order holding Aboitiz liable. Hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is still responsible as a carrier to Viana after the latter had
already disembarked the vessel.

Ruling: YES. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger
has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owners dock or premises.
Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after
reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carriers conveyance or had a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carriers premises. All persons who remain on the premises a
reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a
reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his
departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the
person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in
the carriers premises to claim his baggage.
The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify
the presence of the victim on or near the petitioners vessel. We believe there exists such a
justifiable cause. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his
cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioners vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is
duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a
reasonable time to claim their baggage. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the
victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.

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La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-20761 | July 7, 1966

Facts: Plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their three minor daughters (Milagros, 13
years old, Raquel, about 4 years old and Fe, 2 years old) boarded the Pambusco at San
Fernando Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. Such bus is owned and operated by
the defendant. They were carrying with them four pieces of baggage containing their personal
belonging. The conductor of the b us issued three tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff
and their eldest child Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below
the height which fare is charged in accordance with plaintiffs rules and regulations.
After about an hours trip, the bus reached Anao where it stopped to allow the
passengers bound therefore, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off.
Mariano Beltran, carrying some of their baggage was the first to get down the bus, followed by
his wife and children. Mariano led his companion to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of
the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in
controversy to get his paying, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter followed
him unnoticed by his father. While said Mariano Beltran was on he running board of the bus
waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one its seats near the
door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading suddenly started moving forward,
evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor was still attending to
the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed in a
complete stop, it had traveled about 10 meters from point where plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing the bus was again in motion; Mariano immediately jumped form the running
board without getting his bayong from conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost
board in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and his children. At that time, he saw
people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull
crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run
over by the bus in which she rode earlier together her parent. For the death of the said child,
plaintiffs comment the suit against the defendant to recover from the latter damages.

Issue: Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of the bus involved in the incident,
and therefore, the contract of carriage was already terminated?

Held: There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to
the bus for his bayong which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between
him and the petitioner remained subsisting. The relation of carrier and passenger does not
necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car aids the carriers servant or
employee in removing his baggage from the car.

It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease the moment the passenger
alights from the carriers vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination but
continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave
the carriers premises.
The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they
alighted from the bus. Raquel must have followed her father. However, although the father was
still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong,
the bus started to run, so that even he had jumped down from the moving vehicle. It was that
this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the
circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carriers agent had exercised the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed
by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. The
driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. He started to run the
bus even before the conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading
part of the baggage of the passengers Beltran and family. The presence of the said passengers
near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers
of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.

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PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC. vs. NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-10605 | June 30, 1958

FACTS: A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines. While entering a wooden bridge, its front wheels swerved to the right, the driver lost
control and the truck fell into a breast-deep creek. The mother drowned and the son sustained
injuries. These cases involve actions ex contractu against the owners of PRBL filed by the son
and the heirs of the mother. Lower Court dismissed the actions, holding that the accident was a
fortuitous event.

ISSUE: Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle,
and whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence
required by law (Art. 1755, new Civil Code)

HELD: Yes. While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the manufacturer
of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of
the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carriers liability
is the fact that the passengers has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment;
hence, he has no remedy against him, while the carrier has. We find that the defect could be
detected. The periodical, usual inspection of the steering knuckle did not measure up to the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care and foresight can provide
and therefore the knuckles failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the
carrier from responsibility.

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YOBIDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113003 | October 17, 1997

FACTS: On April 26, 1988, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children, Ardee and
Jasmin, boarded at Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, a Yobido bus bound for Davao City. Along Picop
road in Km. 17, Sta. Maria, Agusan del Sur, the left front tire of the bus suddenly exploded. The
bus fell into a ravine around three (3) feet from the road and struck a tree which resulted in the
death of Tito Tumboy and physical injuries to other passengers. Thereafter, a complaint for
breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorney's fees was filed by Leny and her children
against Alberta Yobido, the owner of the bus, and Cresencio Yobido, its driver in the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City.

Defenses: Abundio Salce, who was the bus conductor when the incident happened, testified
that the 42-seater bus was not full as there were only 32 passengers, such that he himself
managed to get a seat; the bus was running at a speed of "60 to 50" and that it was going slow
because of the zigzag road; the left front tire that exploded was a "brand new tire" that he
mounted on the bus on April 21, 1988 or only five (5) days before the incident.

DECISION:
(1) Trial Court: dismissing the action for lack of merit
(2) Court of Appeals: rendered a decision reversing that of the lower court

ISSUE: Whether the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event

RULING:
No. A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligations must be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation
in a normal manner; and
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to
the creditor.

As Article 1174 provides, no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire
exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss. There is no reason to overturn the
findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners' contention that they are
exempted from liability because the tire blowout was a fortuitous event that could not have
been foreseen, must fail. It is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the
automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the
carrier from liability for damages. Accordingly, the challenged decision is affirmed subject to
modification that petitioners shall additionally pay herein, respondents P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event.
There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply
that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the
vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name
noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five days' use. Be
that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or
through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from
liability for damages.

It was incumbent upon the defense to establish that it took precautionary measures
considering partially dangerous condition of the road. As stated above, proof that the tire was
new and of good quality is not sufficient proof that it was not negligent. Petitioners should have
shown that it undertook extraordinary diligence in the care of its carrier such as conducting
daily routinary check-ups of the vehicle's parts. As the late Justice J.B.L. Reyes said: "It may be
impracticable, as appellee argues, to require of carriers to test the strength of each and every
part of its vehicles before each trip, but we are of the opinion that a due regard for the carrier's
obligations toward the traveling public demands adequate periodical tests to determine the
condition and strength of those vehicle portions the failure of which may endanger the safety
of the passengers." It is interesting to note that petitioners proved through the bus conductor,
Salce, that the bus was running at "60-50" kilometers per hour only within the prescribed lawful
speed limit. However, they failed to rebut the testimony of Leny Tumboy that the bus was
running so fast that she cautioned the driver to slow down. These contradictory facts must,
therefore, be resolved in favor of liability in view of the presumption of negligence of the
carrier in the law.