POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
BASIS: Administrative Code during President
Corazon Aquinos time;
HOW WILL YOU DESCRIBE: Ople v. Torres Case:
Points to Remember:
Description of Administrative Code
Description of Administrative Powers
Define Administrative Order
Blas Ople vs. Exec. Sec. Ruben Torres etc.;
National Computer Center (NCC); COA Chair
G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
On 1996, Pres. Fidel Ramos issued AO 308 for the
National Computerized Identification Reference
System which would identify persons seeking basic
social services. By using the Population Reference
Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics
Office (NSO), it would reduce and avoid fraudulent
transactions.
AO 308 also provides that the funds necessary for
the implementation of its system would come from
the budget of the members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee (IACC) such as the NEDA,
DILG, DOH, GSIS, NSO and NCC.
Petitioner Sen. Ople filed for a TRO enjoining its
implementation saying that it is unconstitutional for
usurpation by the president of legislative powers of
congress to make laws.
The provision in appropriating public funds and the
PRN system should be in a law as within the exclusive
right of congress and not in a mere administrative
order since it confers right and imposes duties to
citizens. Lastly, it violates the right to privacy of the
people.
Respondents contend that it is within the
administrative power of the President in merely
implementing the Administrative Code of 1987 and
that AO 308 actually protects a persons right to
privacy. It confers no right, imposes no duty, affords
no protection, and creates no office
ISSUE:
1) Whether AO 308 was a law beyond the power of
the President
2) Whether AO 308 violates the right to privacy
RULING:
Yes. AO 308 was a law since it redefines the
parameters of basic rights of citizens in a state which
should be covered by a law and not an administrative
order. Since citizens cannot transact without the
PRN, they would have difficulty exercising rights and
enjoy privileges in the state. The defense that it gives
no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
2) Yes, it violates the right to privacy. AO 308 not
only aims to implement the PRN, it also aims to apply
biometrics to all citizens by finger-scanning and
others. This shows that it is not merely for
identification but for generation of other data which
may be subject to misuse under A0 308 by several
government agencies.
Sandoval NOTES (as ruled in Ople Case):
DESCRIPTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
The Code is a general law and incorporates in a
unified document the major structural, functional
and procedural principle of governance (Third
Whereas Clause, Administrative Code of 1987) and
embodies changes in administrative structures and
procedures designed to serve the people. (Fourth
Whereas Clause, Administrative Code of 1987) The
Code is divided into seven (7) books. These books
contain provisions on the organization, powers and
general administration of departments, bureaus and
offices under the executive branch, the organization
and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and
other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national
government budget, as well as guidelines for the
exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code
covers both the internal administration, i.e., internal
organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision
and discipline, and the effects of the functions
performed by administrative officials on private
individuals or parties outside government.
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER:
Administrative power is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. It enables the
President to fix a uniform standard of administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents. To this end, he can issue administrative
orders, rules and regulations.
Page | 1
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER:
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be
in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out
the legislative policy.
DEFINITIONS under Executive Order 292
SECTION 2. General Terms Defined. Unless
the specific words of the text, or the context as a
whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different
meaning:
(1) Government of the Republic of the
Philippines:
refers to the corporate governmental entity
through which the functions of government
are exercised throughout the Philippines,
including, save as the contrary appears
from the context, the various arms through
which political authority is made effective in
the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
autonomous regions, the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay subdivisions or other
forms of local government.
(2) National Government
refers to the entire machinery of the central
government, as distinguished from the
different forms of local governments.
(3) Local Government
refers to the political subdivisions
established by or in accordance with the
Constitution.
(4) Agency of the Government
refers to any of the various units of the
Government, including a department,
bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a
distinct unit therein.
(5) National Agency
refers to a unit of the National Government.
(6) Local Agency
refers to a local government or a distinct
unit therein.
(7) Department
refers to an executive department created
by law. For purposes of Book IV, this shall
include any instrumentality, as herein
defined, having or assigned the rank of a
department, regardless of its name or
designation.
(8) Bureau
refers to any principal subdivision or unit of
any department. For purposes of Book IV,
this shall include any principal subdivision
or unit of any instrumentality given or
assigned the rank of a bureau, regardless
of actual name or designation, as in the
case of department-wide regional offices.
(9) Office
refers, within the framework of
governmental organization, to any major
functional unit of a department or bureau
including regional offices. It may also refer
to any position held or occupied by
individual persons, whose functions are
defined by law or regulation.
(10) Instrumentality
refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the
department framework vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory
agencies, chartered institutions and
government-owned or controlled
corporations.
(11) Regulatory agency
refers to any agency expressly vested with
jurisdiction to regulate, administer or
adjudicate matters affecting substantial
rights and interest of private persons, the
principal powers of which are exercised by
a collective body, such as a commission,
board or council.
(12) Chartered institution
refers to any agency organized or operating
under a special charter, and vested by law
with functions relating to specific
constitutional policies or objectives. This
term includes the state universities and
colleges and the monetary authority of the
State.
(13) Government-owned or
controlled corporation
refers to any agency organized as a stock
or non-stock corporation, vested with
functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the Government directly or
Page | 2
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
through its instrumentalities either wholly,
or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-
one (51) per cent of its capital stock:
Provided, That government-owned or
controlled corporations may be further
categorized by the Department of the
Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and
the Commission on Audit for purposes of
the exercise and discharge of their
respective powers, functions and
responsibilities with respect to such
corporations.
If performing Governmental Function:
Part/Includes in the definition of
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP)
If performing Proprietary function: Not part
of GRP
(14) Officer as distinguished
from clerk or employee,
refers to a person whose duties, not being
of a clerical or manual nature, involves the
exercise of discretion in the performance of
the functions of the government. When
used with reference to a person having
authority to do a particular act or perform a
particular function in the exercise of
governmental power, officer includes any
government employee, agent or body
having authority to do the act or exercise
that function.
(15) Employee
when used with reference to a person in the
public service, includes any person in the
service of the government or any of its
agencies, divisions, subdivisions or
instrumentalities.
FOR GOCCs (The purpose for which they are
created) Case of Blaquera
BLAQUERA vs. ALCALA
G.R. No. 109406, September, 11, 1998
PURISIMA, J.:
FACTS:
These are consolidated cases challenging the
constitutionality and validity of Administrative Order
Nos 29 and 268.
Administrative Order 268, which was then issued by
President Corazon Aquino on February 21, 1992,
grants each official and employees of the
government the productivity incentive benefits in an
amount equivalent to thirty percent of the
employees one-month basic salary but which
amount not be less than two thousand pesos. Such
Administrative Order provides that the productivity
incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year
1991.
Moreover, all heads of government agencies,
including government owned and controlled
corporations and financial institutions are strictly
prohibited from granting or availing such benefits for
the year 1992 and the future years pending the
result of comprehensive study being undertaken by
the Office of the President.
Petitioners who are officials and employees of
several government departments and agencies were
paid incentive benefits for the year 1992.
However, on January 19, 1993, then President Fidel
Ramos issued Administrative Order 29 authorizing
the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the
year 1992 in the maximum amount of one thousand
pesos and reiterating the prohibition under Section 7
of Administrative Order 268 enjoining the grant of
productivity incentive benefits without prior approval
of the President. Section 4 of Administrative Order
29 directed all departments, offices and agencies
which authorized payment of productivity incentive
bonus for the year 1192 in excess of one thousand
to immediately cause refund of the excess.
Accordingly, compliance for such caused the
deduction from petitioners salaries or allowances of
the amounts needed to cover overpayments as
alleged by the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of Administrative Orders 29
and 268 were valid exercise of presidential control?
Whether Philippine Tourism Authority is a GOCC and
hence covered by the CS Law.
Page | 3
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
RULING 1:
YES. The court held that the President issued subject
Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of
productivity incentive benefits and to prevent
discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization
among government personnel by committing limited
resources of government for the equal payment of
incentives and awards. The President was only
exercising his power of control by modifying
the acts of the respondents who granted
incentive benefits to their employees without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the
President, thereby resulting to uneven
distribution of government resources.
The duty of the President to execute the law is of
constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all
executive departments. Thus, it is, that department
heads are men of his confidence. Neither can it be
said that the President encroached upon the
authority of the Commission on Civil Service to grant
benefits to governmental personnel. Administrative
Orders 29 and 268 did not revoke the privilege of
employees to receive incentive benefits. The same
merely regulated the grant and amount thereof.
Conformably, it is the President or the head of each
department or agency who is authorized to incur the
necessary expenses involved in the honorary
recognition of subordinate officers and employees of
the government. It is not the duty of Commission to
fix the amount of the incentives. Such function
belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter
ego.
RULING 2: (Sandoval Notes)
YES. Government-owned or controlled corporations
may perform governmental or proprietary functions
or both, depending on the purpose for which they
have been created. If the purpose is to obtain special
corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the
function is proprietary. If it is in the interest of health,
safety and for the advancement of public good and
welfare, affecting the public in general, the function
is governmental. Powers classified as proprietary
are those intended for private advantage and
benefit.
SUPERVISION AND CONTROL
ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION /
DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESORT
1. This doctrine states that courts cannot or will
not determine a controversy which requires
the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative
bodies because technical matters of intricate
questions of fact are involved.
2. Relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy
will be supplied by the court even though the
matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a
court.
SEE: Case of Villaflor
VILLAFLOR V. CA
GR NO. 95694, OCTOBER 9, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
In 1940, Villaflor acquired through Deed of Absolute
Sales, parcel of agricultural landsfrom different
owners. The deed states that the land was sold to
Villaflor but no formal document was then executed,
and since then until the present time, Villaflor has
been in possession and occupation of the same.
In 1946, Villaflor leased to Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc.
a parcel of land, containing an area of 2 has,
together with all the improvements existing thereon,
for a period of 5 years at a rental of P200.00 per
annum to cover the annual rental of house and
building sites for 33 houses or buildings.
In 1948, in an Agreement to Sell Villaflor conveyed
to Nasipit Lumber, 2 parcels of land.From said day,
the parties agreed that Nasipit Lumber shall continue
to occupy the property not anymore in concept of
lessee but as prospective owners. On 7 December
1948, Villaflor and Nasipit Lumber executed an
Agreement, confirming an Agreement to Sell, but
with reference to the Sales Application filed with the
Bureau of Land. Sales Application of Villaflor were
rejected for having leased the property to another
even before he had acquired transmissible rights
thereto.
Page | 4
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
In August 1950, Villaflor executed a document,
denominated as a Deed of Relinquishment of
Rights, in favor on Nasipit Lumber, in consideration
of the amount of P5,000 that was to be reimbursed
to the former representing part of the purchase price
of the land, the value of the improvements Villaflor
introduced thereon, and the expenses incurred in the
publication of the Notice of Sale; in light of his
difficulty to develop the same as Villaflor has moved
to Manila. Pursuant thereto Nasipit Lumber filed a
Sales Application over the 2 parcels of land. Order
of Award was then issued in favor of Nasipit
Lumber. In 1973, Villafor wrote a letter to Nasipit
Lumber, reminding the latter of their verbal
agreement in 1955; but the new set of corporate
officers refused to recognize Villaflors claim. In a
formal protest dated 31 January 1974 which Villaflor
filed with the Bureau of Lands, he protested the Sales
Application of Nasipit Lumber, claiming that the
company has not paid him P5,000.00 as provided in
the Deed of Relinquishment of Rights dated 16
August 1950.
The Director of Lands found that the payment
P5,000.00 in the Deed and the consideration in the
Agreement to Sell were duly proven, and ordered the
dismissal of Villaflors protest. In 1978, Villaflor filed
a complaint in the trial court for Declaration of
Nullity of Contract (Deed of Relinquishment of
Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two parcels of
land subject of the contract), and Damages. In
1983, he died. The trial court ordered his widow,
Lourdes D. Villaflor, to be substituted as petitioner.
RTC dismissed the complaint. The heirs of petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however,
rendered judgment against them. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the findings of the CA conclusive and
binding upon the SC. (Whether the Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction was observed)
RULING:
Yes. Since the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction was
observed and applied, the findings of RTC and CA
are conclusive and binding upon the SC.
Primary Jurisdiction of the Director of Lands
and Finality of Factual Findings of the Court of
Appeals
Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate
courts is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction; i.e., courts cannot and will not resolve a
controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially
where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential
trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving
matters that demand the special competence of
administrative agencies even if the question involved
is also judicial in character. It applies where a claim
is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body; in such case,
the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view.
In cases where the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. In Machete vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court upheld the primary jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board
(DARAB) in an agrarian dispute over the payment of
back rentals under a leasehold
contract. In Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Vasquez,the
Court recognized that the MWSS was in the best
position to evaluate and to decide which bid for a
waterworks project was compatible with its
development plan.
The rationale underlying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction finds application in this case,
since the questions on the identity of the land in
dispute and the factual qualification of private
respondent as an awardee of a sales application
require a technical determination by the Bureau of
Lands as the administrative agency with the
expertise to determine such matters. Because these
issues preclude prior judicial determination, it
behooves the courts to stand aside even when they
apparently have statutory power to proceed, in
recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the
administrative agency.
One thrust of the multiplication of administrative
agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and
the determination of private rights thereunder is no
longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only
by our regular courts
Page | 5
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
Petitioner initiated his action with a protest before
the Bureau of Lands and followed it through in the
Ministry of Natural Resources and thereafter in the
Office of the President. Consistent with the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, the trial and the appellate
courts had reason to rely on the findings of these
specialized administrative bodies.
The primary jurisdiction of the director of lands and
the minister of natural resources over the issues
regarding the identity of the disputed land and the
qualification of an awardee of a sales patent is
established by Sections 3 and 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, also known as the
Under Public Land Act:
Section 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce (now Secretary of Natural Resources)
shall be the executive officer charged with carrying
out the provisions of this Act through the Director of
Lands, who shall act under his immediate control.
Section 4. Subject to said control, the Director of
Lands shall have direct executive control of the
survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form
of concession or disposition and management of the
lands of the public domain, and his decision as to
questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
Thus, the Director of Lands, in his decision,
said:
It is merely whether or not Villaflor has been paid the
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos stipulated
consideration of the deed of relinquishment made by
him without touching on the nature of the deed of
relinquishment. The administration and disposition
of public lands is primarily vested in the Director of
Lands and ultimately with the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of
Natural Resources), and to this end
Our Supreme Court has recognized that the Director
of Lands is a quasi-judicial officer who passes on
issues of mixed facts and law (Ortua vs. Bingson
Encarnacion, 59 Phil 440). Sections 3 and 4 of the
Public Land Law thus mean that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the final
arbiter on questions of fact in public land conflicts
(Heirs of Varela vs. Aquino, 71 Phil 69; Julian vs.
Apostol, 52 Phil 442).
The ruling of this Office in its order dated September
10, 1975, is worth reiterating, thus:
it is our opinion that in the exercise of his power of
executive control, administrative disposition and
allegation of public land, the Director of Lands should
entertain the protest of Villaflor and conduct formal
investigation xxx to determine the following points:
(a) whether or not the Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc.
paid or reimbursed to Villaflor the consideration of
the rights in the amount of P5,000.00 and what
evidence the company has to prove payment, the
relinquishment of rights being part of the
administrative process in the disposition of the land
in question.
Besides, the authority of the Director of Lands to
pass upon and determine questions considered
inherent in or essential to the efficient exercise of his
powers like the incident at issue, i.e., whether
Villaflor had been paid or not, is conceded by law.
Reliance by the trial and the appellate courts on the
factual findings of the Director of Lands and the
Minister of Natural Resources is not misplaced. By
reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said
administrative agencies over matters falling under
their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass
judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that
regard are generally accorded great respect, if not
finality, by the courts. The findings of fact of an
administrative agency must be respected as long as
they are supported by substantial evidence, even if
such evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court
to weigh once more the evidence submitted before
the administrative body and to substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency in
respect of sufficiency of evidence.
However, the rule that factual findings of an
administrative agency are accorded respect and even
finality by courts admits of exceptions. This is true
also in assessing factual findings of lower courts. It
is incumbent on the petitioner to show that the
resolution of the factual issues by the administrative
agency and/or by the trial court falls under any of
the exceptions. Otherwise, this Court will not disturb
such findings.
We mention and quote extensively from the rulings
of the Bureau of Lands and the Minister of Natural
Resources because the points, questions and issues
raised by petitioner before the trial court, the
appellate court and now before this Court are
basically the same as those brought up before the
aforesaid specialized administrative agencies. As
held by the Court of Appeals:
We find that the contentious points raised by
appellant in this action, are substantially the same
matters he raised in BL Claim No. 873 (N). In both
actions, he claimed private ownership over the land
in question, assailed the validity and effectiveness of
the Deed of Relinquishment of Rights he executed in
August 16, 1950, that he had not been paid
the P5,000.00 consideration, the value of the
Page | 6
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
improvements he introduced on the land and other
expenses incurred by him.
In this instance, both the principle of primary
jurisdiction of administrative agencies and the
doctrine of finality of factual findings of the trial
courts, particularly when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals as in this case, militate against petitioners
cause. Indeed, petitioner has not given us sufficient
reason to deviate from them.
Discussion of Primary Jurisdiction in case of
Villaflor (Sandoval Notes)
Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction
of an administrative tribunal, especially where the
question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend
to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that
demand the special competence of administrative
agencies even if the question involved is also judicial
in character. It applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body; in such case,
the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view.
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the
jurisdiction over which is lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Under this doctrine, an administrative decision must
first be appealed to the administrative superiors up
to the highest level before it may be elevated to a
court of justice for review.
Exceptions
See: Cases of Paat and Carale
LEONARDO A. PAAT v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997
TORRES, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman,
while on its way to Bulacan was seized by the DENR
personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the
driver could not produce the required documents for
the forest products found concealed in the truck.
Petitioner Layugan issued an order of confiscation of
the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15)
days to submit an explanation why the truck should
not be forfeited. Private respondents, however,
failed to submit. The Regional Executive Director of
DENR sustained Layugans action of confiscation
invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705
as amended. Private respondents filed a letter of
reconsideration which was, denied. The case was
brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR.
Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for
replevin was filed by the private respondents with
the Regional Trial Court which issued a writ ordering
the return of the truck to private respondents. A
petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with
the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the
trial courts order ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether the suit of replevin filed by the private
respondents be prosper
RULING:
NO. Before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. If a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy
should be exhausted first before courts judicial
power can be sought. The premature invocation of
courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not without its practical and legal
reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies.
Page | 7
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
This doctrine is disregarded:
(EXCEPTIONS)
(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the
controversy was pending before the Secretary of
DENR when it was forwarded to him following the
denial by the petitioners of the motion for
reconsideration of private respondents through the
order of July 12, 1989. By appealing to him, they
acknowledged the existence of an adequate and
plain remedy still available and open to them in the
ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now,
without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, seek courts intervention by
filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief
during the pendency of an administrative
proceedings.
CARALE VS. ABARINTOS
G.R. No. 120704. March 3, 1997
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Private Respondent Pontejos was appointed as Labor
Arbitration Associate. However, petitioner Chairman
of the NLRC (Carale), issued Administrative Order
No. 10-03 series of 1994, detailing/reassigning
private respondent to the NLRC, Fourth Division,
Cebu City.
For this reason, Pontejos filed a complaint before the
RTC of Cebu City against herein petitioners for Illegal
Transfer (R.A. 6715).
On the other hand, Motions to Dismiss were filed by
Carale, arguing that it is the CSC which has exclusive
jurisdiction over any question concerning personnel
movement.
Pontejos alleged that there is no other available and
speedy remedy in order to protect his interest than
to resort to this Honorable Court; that the urgency
of judicial intervention is an exception to the rule of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The RTC dismiss the Motions to Dismiss ruling that
the only effect of non-compliance with the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies is that it will
deprive the complainant of a cause of action; it does
not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether administrative remedies must first be
exhausted before filing a complaint in the court.
RULING:
Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for
administrative review, and provides a system of
administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts,
for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not
entertain a case unless the available administrative
remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given an opportunity to act
and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum.
In the instant case, Pontejos did not attempt to seek
administrative relief, which was both available and
sufficient. Initially, he could have asked for
Page | 8
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
reconsideration of the detail order, failing which, he
could have gone directly to the CSC, through the
MSPB.
The accepted exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies are the following:
1. where the question is purely legal;
2. where judicial intervention is urgent;
3. when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage;
4. where the controverted acts violate due
process;
5. failure of a high government official from
whom relief is sought to act on the matter;
and
6. when the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered
moot.
Sandoval Notes:
Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
jurisdictional. It only renders the action premature,
i.e., claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial
determination and for that reason a party has no
cause of action to ventilate in court.
WHEN MAY THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT
VALIDLY INVOKE THAT PRESCRIPTION MAY
RUN AGAINST THE STATE?
See:Case of Shipside
SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED, vs. CA
G.R. No. 143377. February 20, 2001
MELO, J.:
FACTS:
On October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of Title No.
0-381 was issued in favor of Rafael Galvez, over four
parcels of land Lot 1, Lot 2, Lot 3 and Lot 4.
On April 11, 1960, Lots No. 1 and 4 were conveyed
by Rafael Galvez in favor of Filipina Mamaril,
Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat
in a deed of sale which was inscribed as Entry No.
9115 OCT No. 0-381 on August 10, 1960.
On August 16, 1960, Mamaril, et al. sold Lots No. 1
and 4 to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company
On February 1, 1963, unknown to Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company, the Court of First
Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District, issued
an Order in Land Registration Case No. N-361 (LRC
Record No. N-14012) entitled Rafael Galvez,
Applicant, Eliza Bustos, et al., Parties-In-Interest;
Republic of the Philippines, Movant declaring OCT
No. 0-381 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province
of La Union issued in the name of Rafael Galvez, null
and void, and ordered the cancellation thereof.
On October 28, 1963, Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company sold to herein petitioner Lots No. 1 and 4,
with the deed being entered in TCT NO. 4314 as
entry No. 12381. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
5710 was thus issued in favor of the petitioner which
starting since then exercised proprietary rights over
Lots No. 1 and 4.
In the meantime, Rafael Galvez filed his motion for
reconsideration against the order issued by the trial
court declaring OCT No. 0-381 null and void. The
motion was denied on January 25, 1965. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Republic of
the Philippines in a Resolution promulgated on
August 14, 1973 in CA-G. R. No. 36061-R.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued an Entry of
Judgment, certifying that its decision dated August
14, 1973 became final and executory on October 23,
1973.
On April 22, 1974, the trial court in L. R. C. Case No.
N-361 issued a writ of execution of the judgment
which was served on the Register of Deeds, San
Fernando, La Union on April 29, 1974.
Twenty-four long years thereafter, on January 14,
1999, the Office of the Solicitor General received a
letter dated January 11, 1999 from Mr. Victor
G. Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point
Development Corporation, stating that the
aforementioned orders and decision of the trial court
in L. R. C. No. N-361 have not been executed by the
Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union despite
receipt of the writ of execution.
On April 21, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed a complaint for revival of judgment and
cancellation of titles before the Regional Trial Court
of the First Judicial Region (Branch 26, San
Fernando, La Union) docketed therein as Civil Case
No. 6346
Page | 9
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
In its complaint in Civil Case No. 6346, the Solicitor
General argued that since the trial court in LRC Case
No. 361 had ruled and declared OCT No. 0-381 to be
null and void, which ruling was subsequently
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the defendants-
successors-in-interest of Rafael Galvez have no valid
title over the property covered by OCT No. 0-381,
and the subsequent Torrens titles issued in their
names should be consequently cancelled.
On July 22, 1999, petitioner Shipside, Inc. filed its
Motion to Dismiss, based on the following
grounds: (1) the complaint stated no cause of action
because only final and executory judgments may be
subject of an action for revival of judgment; (2) the
plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest because the
real property covered by the Torrens titles sought to
be cancelled, allegedly part of Camp Wallace
(Wallace Air Station), were under the ownership and
administration of the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) under Republic Act No. 7227; (3)
plaintiffs cause of action is barred by prescription;
(4) twenty-five years having lapsed since the
issuance of the writ of execution, no action for revival
of judgment may be instituted because under
Paragraph 3 of Article 1144 of the Civil Code, such
action may be brought only within ten (10) years
from the time the judgment had been rendered.
An opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by
the Solicitor General on August 23, 1999, alleging
among others, that: (1) the real party-in-interest is
the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) prescription
does not run against the State.
On August 31, 1999, the trial court denied petitioners
motion to dismiss and on October 14, 1999, its
motion for reconsideration was likewise turned
down.
On October 21, 1999, petitioner instituted a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 55535,
on the ground that the orders of the trial court
denying its motion to dismiss and its subsequent
motion for reconsideration were issued in excess of
jurisdiction.
On November 4, 1999, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 55535 on
the ground that the verification and certification in
the petition, under the signature of Lorenzo Balbin,
Jr., was made without authority, there being no
proof therein that Balbin was authorized to institute
the petition for and in behalf and of petitioner.
On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration on the
grounds that: (1) a complaint filed on behalf of a
corporation can be made only if authorized by its
Board of Directors, and in the absence thereof, the
petition cannot prosper and be granted due
course;and (2) petitioner was unable to show that it
had substantially complied with the rule requiring
proof of authority to institute an action or
proceeding.
ISSUES:
1. whether the petition under the signature of
Lorenzo Balbin, Jr., should be dismissed for
it was made without authority? (Admin
Issue)
2. whether the Republic of the Philippines can
maintain the action for revival of judgment?
(Procedural Issue)
RULING:
1. No, The Court has consistently held that the
requirement regarding verification of a
pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such
requirement is simply a condition affecting
the form of the pleading, non-compliance
with which does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective.
On the other hand, the failure of the
petitioner to submit the required
documents that should accompany the
petition, including the certification against
forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal thereof. The same rule
applies to certifications against forum
shopping signed by a person on behalf of a
corporation which are unaccompanied by
proof that said signatory is authorized to file
a petition on behalf of the corporation.
In certain exceptional circumstances,
however, the Court has allowed the belated
filing of the certification.in Loyola,
Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-
compliance with the requirement as to the
certificate of non-forum shopping. With
more reason should we allow the instant
petition since petitioner herein did submit a
certification on non-forum shopping, failing
only to show proof that the signatory was
Page | 10
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
authorized to do so. That petitioner
subsequently submitted a secretarys
certificate attesting that Balbin was
authorized to file an action on behalf of
petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.
2. No, the Republic of the Philippines cannot
maintain the action for revival of judgment.
The Solicitor General, argues that the
States cause of action in the cancellation of
the land title issued to petitioners
predecessor-in-interest is imprescriptible
because it is included in Camp Wallace,
which belongs to the government.This is
misleading.
With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the
BCDA, the government no longer has a
right or interest to protect. Consequently,
the Republic is not a real party in interest
and it may not institute the instant
action. Nor may it raise the defense of
imprescriptibility, the same being applicable
only in cases where the government is a
party in interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest. To
qualify a person to be a real party in interest
in whose name an action must be
prosecuted, he must appear to be the
present real owner of the right sought to
enforced. A real party in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real
interest is meant a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.
The BCDA is an entity invested with a
personality separate and distinct from the
government.
REPUBLIC vs. EXTELCOM
G.R. No. 147210. January 15, 2002
.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
On December 29, 1992, the International
Communications Corporation (now Bayantel) filed
an application with the NTC for a CPCN to install,
operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile
Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a
Provisional Authority (PA)
However, Express Telecommunication Co., Inc.
(Extelcom) filed in NTC an Opposition prayingfor the
dismissal of Bayantels application. On May 3, 2000,
the NTC issued an Order granting in favor of
Bayantel, applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978
Rules of Practice and Procedure. Extelcom filed with
the CA a petition seeking the annulment of the Order
of the RTC, which was eventually granted by
the CA. Aggrieved, Bayantel brought the case to the
SC. Extelcom contends that the NTC should have
applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the
Office of the NAR on February 3, 1993. The NTC, on
the other hand, issued a certification to the effect
that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not
been published in a newspaper of general
circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978
Rules. Thus, the present petition.
Sandoval Notes: (Issue and Ruling)
Discuss the nature and functions of the NTC,
and analyze its powers and authority as well
as the laws, rules and regulations that govern
its existence and operations.
RULING:
The NTC was created pursuant to Executive Order
No. 546, promulgated on July 23, 1979. It assumed
the functions formerly assigned to the Board of
Communications and the Communications Control
Bureau, which were both abolished under the said
Executive Order. Previously, the NTCs function were
merely those of the defunct Public Service
Commission (PSC), created under Commonwealth
Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the
Public Service Act, considering that the Board of
Communications was the successor-in-interest of the
PSC. Under Executive Order No. 125-A, issued in
April 1987, the NTC became an attached agency of
the Department of Transportation and
Communications.
Page | 11
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
In the regulatory communications industry, the NTC
has the sole authority to issue Certificates of Public
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for the
installation, operation, and maintenance of
communications facilities and services, radio
communications systems, telephone and telegraph
systems. Such power includes the authority to
determine the areas of operations of applicants for
telecommunications services. Specifically, Section 16
of the Public Service Act authorizes the then PSC,
upon notice and hearing, to issue Certificates of
Public Convenience for the operation of public
services within the Philippines whenever the
Commission finds that the operation of the public
service proposed and the authorization to do
business will promote the public interests in a proper
and suitable manner. (Commonwealth Act No. 146,
Section 16[a]) The procedure governing the issuance
of such authorizations is set forth in Section 29 of the
said Act.
Is the filing of the administrative rules and
regulations with the UP Law Center the
operative act that gives the rules force and
effect?
RULING:
In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to
operate a CMTS, the NTC applied Rule 15, Section 3
of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure, which
provides:
Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. Upon the filing of an
application, complaint or petition or at any stage
thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the
pleader or on its own initiative, the relief prayed for,
based on the pleading, together with the affidavits
and supporting documents attached thereto, without
prejudice to a final decision after completion of the
hearing which shall be called within thirty (30) days
from grant of authority asked for. (italics ours)
Respondent Extelcom, however, contends that the
NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which
were filed with the Office of the National
Administrative Register on February 3, 1993. These
Revised Rules deleted the phrase on its own
initiative; accordingly, a provisional authority may
be issued only upon filing of the proper motion
before the Commission.
In answer to this argument, the NTC, through the
Secretary of the Commission, issued a certification to
the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules
have not been published in a newspaper of general
circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978
Rules.
The absence of publication, coupled with the
certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating
that the NTC was still governed by the 1987 Rules,
clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not
taken effect at the time of the grant of the
provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the
1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law
Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There
is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which
implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law
Center is the operative act that gives the rules force
and effect. Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 3 thereof
merely states:
Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University
of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on
the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed
within three (3) months from the date shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any
party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his
equivalent functionary, shall carry out the
requirements of this section under pain of
disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by
the issuing agency and shall be open to public
inspection.
This Court, in Tanada v. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915,
December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446) stated, thus:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those
of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative power or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative Rules
and Regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need
not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is
no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws.
Page | 12
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
The Administrative Order under consideration is one
of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and
EO 133 (Philippine International Trading Corp. v.
Angeles, 263 SCRA 421, 446-447 [1996]).
Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine
qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can
take effect. This is explicit from Executive Order No.
200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code, and
which states that:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided (E.O.
200, Section 1).
The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC,
which implements Section 29 of the Public Service
Act (C.A. 146, as amended), fall squarely within the
scope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the
case of Tanada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446 [1986]).
Our pronouncement in Tanada v. Tuvera is clear and
categorical. Administrative rules and regulations
must be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The only exception are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those
so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties (PHILSA International
Placement & Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor,
G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001, 356 SCRA 174).
Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993
Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall
take effect only after their publication in a newspaper
of general circulation (Section 20 thereof). In the
absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978
Rules that governs.
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
GENERALLY: How Describe?
1. To Enforce
2. To Implement
3. To Administer
4. To Execute Laws
ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONSHIPS
Involve Admin Agencies mere
supervision/oversee
See: case of Beja
BEJA vs. CA
G.R. No. 97149. March 31, 1992
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports
authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor in 1975 and
later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On
October 21, 1988, the General Manager, Rogelio A.
Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and
Villaluz for grave dishonesty. Grave misconduct
willful violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. Consequently, they were
preventively suspended for the charges. After
preliminary investigation conducted by the district
attorney for region X, administrative case was
considered closed for lack of merit.
On December 13, 1988 another administrative case
was filed against Beja by the PPA manager also for
dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules
and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and for being notoriously
undesirable. Beja was also placed under preventive
suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The
case was redocketed and thereafter, the PPA
indorsed it to the AAB for appropriate action.
The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja
an opportunity to present evidence. However, on
February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental. Two days later, he filed
with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend
the hearing of administrative case on account of the
pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the
court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the
hearing of the administrative case. Thereafter, Beja
moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and
proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.
ISSUE:
Whether the Administrative Action Board of DOTC
has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving
personnel below the rank of Assistant General
Page | 13
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge

Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority, an actions in accordance with the decentralization of
attached agency of DOTC. personnel functions under the administrative Code
of 1987. The Law impliedly grants the general
RULING:
Manager with the approval of the PPA board of
Directors the power to investigate its personnel
The PPA General Manager is the disciplining
below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be
authority who may, by himself and without the
charged with an administrative offense. During such
approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a
investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject
respondent in an administrative case to preventive
the employee concerned to preventive suspension.
suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned
The investigation should be conducted in accordance
not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857 but also by Sec. 37
with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807.
of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the
Jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions against officers and
employees in the PPA. With respect to the issue, the DOCTRINE OF DELEGATION OF POWERS
Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The
*Legislative powers
PPA was created through PD no. 505 dated July
1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the
Rule: A Power already delegated must no
PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors longer be delegated.
known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council. Sec.
5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power EXCEPTIONS:
to appoint, discipline and remove, and determine
the composition of the technical staff of the authority 1. Local Government
and other personnel. On December 23, 1975, PD 2. President (tariff powers)
no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) 3. Administrative Bodies
thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which 4. Emergency Powers of the Government
would be attached to the then Department of Public 5. People at Large through Plebiscite &
Works, Transportation and Communication. When Referendum
Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987
reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and TESTS OF VALID DELEGATION:
Communication was issued, the PPA retained its
1. COMPLETENESS TEST: Complete in
attached status. Administrative Code of 1987
itself.
classified PPA as an attached agency to the DOTC.
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the *This means that the law must be complete in all its
other two being supervision and control and terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
administrative supervision, Attachment is defined so that when it reaches the delegate, it will have
as the lateral relationship between the department nothing to do but to enforce it.
or its equivalent and the attached agency or
corporation for purposes of policy and program 2. SUFFICIENT STANDARDS TEST: The
coordination. An attached agency has a larger law must offer sufficient standard that must
measure of independence from the Department to be determinate or atleast be determinable
which it is attached than one which is under to specify limits of the delegated authority
departmental supervision and control or and specify conditions under which it is to
administrative supervision. This is borne out by the be implemented.
lateral relationship between the Department and
the attached agency. The attachment is merely for
KINDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
policy and program coordination. With respect to
administrative matters, the independence of an
1. Legislative Regulation: must be
attached agency from the department control and
published/exercising quasi-legislative
supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that power
even an agency under a Departments administrative
supervision is free from Departmental interference a. Contingent
with respect to appointments and other personnel b. Supplemental
Page | 14
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge

2. Interpretative Regulation: Internal (146 SCRA 446; December 29, 1986)

Regulations
1) Whether a distinction be made between laws of
See: Case of Taada general applicability and laws which are not as to
their publication
*Article 2 : Civil Code
2) Whether a publication shall be made in
TAADA vs. TUVERA
publications of general circulation
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
RULING:
ESCOLIN, J.:

(136 SCRA 27; April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

1) The court held that all statute including those of

Petitioners filed a writ of mandamus to compel
local application shall be published as condition for
respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publish various presidential decrees, letters of
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
instructions, general orders, proclamations,
by the legislature.
executive orders, letters of implementations and
administrative orders.
The clear object of this provision is to give the
They invoke the right of the people to be informed
general public adequate notice of the various laws
on matters of public concern as well as the principle
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
that laws, to be valid and enforceable, must be
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
published in the Official Gazette.
would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the
The government argued that while publication was
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had
otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon approval. The court decided on
2) The publication must be full or no publication at
April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
publication of some of the decrees. The court
content of the laws.
ordered the respondents to publish in the official
gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which
(146 SCRA 446; December 29, 1986)
are of general force and effect.
The petitioners suggest that there should be no
1) All statutes, including those of local application
distinction between laws of general applicability and
and private laws, shall be published as a condition
those which are not. The publication means
for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
complete publication, and that publication must be
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
made in the official gazette.
by the legislature.

ISSUES:
2) Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication
of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
(136 SCRA 27; April 24, 1985)
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
1) Whether all laws shall be published in the official
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
gazette
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.
2) Whether publication in the official gazette must
be in full

Page | 15
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
REQUISITE OF A VALID ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATION:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the
legislature
2. It must be within the scope of the authority
given by the legislature.
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with
the prescribed procedure.
4. It must be reasonable.
*OTHERWISE, In EXCESS of authority.
See: Case of Toledo (Second Requisite)
TOLEDO VS. COMELEC & CSC
GR No. 135864. November 24, 1999
PURISIMA, J.:
FACTS:
Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then
Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of the
Education and Information Department of the
Comelec on May 1986, at which time Toledo was
already more than 57 years old. Toledos
appointment papers and his oath of office were
endorsed by the Comelec to the CSC on June 1986
for approval and attestation. However, no prior
request for exemption from the provisions of Section
22, Rule III of the CSRPAPwhich prohibits the
appointment of persons 57 years old or above into
government service without prior CSC approvalwas
secured. Petitioner then reported for work.
Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority
required under CSRPAP, and CSC Memo Circular 5
issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared void
from the beginning Toledos appointment. Petitioner
appealed to CSC, which considered him a de facto
officer and his appointment voidable, and moved for
reconsideration but was denied, hence the present
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N CSRPAP provision is valid
RULING:
No. The Civil Service Act of 959 (RA 2260), which
established the CSC, contained no provision
prohibiting appointment or reinstatement into
government service of any person already 57 years
old. Sec 5 Rule 6 of the Revised Civil Service Rules,
which prohibits such, was purely the creation of CSC.
Marcoss PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which
established a new CSC and superseded RA 2260, also
provided that rules and regulations shall become
effective only 30 days after publication in the OG or
in any newspaper of general circulation. The new
CSC adopted the CSRPAP. No provision re prohibition
of appointment of 57-year-old made in PD 807;
prohibition was purely created by CSC.
The provision cannot be valid, being entirely a CSC
creation, it has no basis in the law which it was
meant to implement. It cannot be justified as a valid
exercise of its function of promulgating rules and
regulations for that function, to repeat, may
legitimately be exercised only for the purpose of
carrying the provisions of the law into effect; and
since there is no prohibition or restriction on the
employment of 57-year old persons in the statute
or any provision respecting age as a factor in
employmentthere was nothing to carry into effect
through an implementing rule on the matter. The
power vested in the CSC was to implement the law
or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law
into effect or execution, not to supply perceived
omissions in it.
Additionally, the CSRPAP cannot be considered
effective as of the time of the application to Toledo
of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules
were never published as required by both RA 2260
and PD 807. The argument that it was a mere
reiteration of existing law and circularized cannot
stand as formerly discussed.
Also, Toledos separation from service was through
no fault of his own. Petition granted.
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and
SERVICES CORPORATIONvs. THE HON.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT;
VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and
CEDRIC LEYSON G.R. No. 103144. April 4,
2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Philsa International Placement and
Services Corporation (Philsa) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers
for overseas employment. In 1985, private
respondents were recruited by petitioner for
employment in Saudi Arabia each paying placement
fees of P5,000 for Mikin and P6,500 for De Mesa and
Leyson.
After being deployed in Saudi, the private
respondents were forced to sign a second and third
contract by their foreign employer Al-Hejailan,
Page | 16
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
increasing their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hour
without additional pay. When they refused to sign,
their work contract was terminated and were
repatriated to the Philippines.
The private respondents filed a case before the POEA
for illegal exaction and contract substitution to the
POEA Hearing Officer for both offices of the Workers'
Assistance and Adjudication Office (POEA-WAAO) for
complaints on money claims of OFWs and the
Licensing and Recruitment Office (POEA-LRO), for
cases involving recruitment violations warranting
suspension or cancellation of license.
POEA ruled in favor of private respondents and
granted the award for damages for illegal exaction in
violation of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11,
Series of 1983 which enumerated the allowable fees
which may be collected from applicant, and POEA
Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 providing
for the applicable schedule of placement and
documentation fees for private employment agencies
not more than P2,500 in compliance with Sec. 32 and
34 of the Labor Code.
Philsa appealed to the Sec. of Labor and Employment
but was denied hence this case. They argued that it
cannot be liable for illegal exaction since both POEA
Memorandum were void for lack of publication or
filed with the National Administrative Register, as
required in Book VII, Chapter 2, Sec. 3 of the Admin
Code of 1987.
Respondent Sec. of Laborend Employment argued
through the Solicitor General that the questioned
administrative circular is not among those requiring
publication contemplated by Taada vs. Tuvera as it
is addressed only to a specific group of persons and
not to the general public.
ISSUE:
Whether the POEA Memorandum orders were void
for lack of publication
RULING:
Yes, both were void for lack of publication or filed
with the National Administrative Register.
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983
was declared void for lack of publication since it is
not internal in nature nor merely regulating only the
personnel of the POEA.
Likewise, POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of
1983 was also void for lack of publication or filing
with the National Administrative Register since its
purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation. The defense of the
SG that this memo had basis other than the POEA
memo cannot stand because the memo itself did not
cite the Art. 32 and 34 of the labor Code.
And since under Book VI, Chapter II, Section 3 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, rules in force on the
date of effetivity were not filed within three months
shall not become the basis of any sanction against
any party or persons. Hence, the petitioner cannot
be liable for damages under the said POEA memos.
Citing Tanada vs. Tuvera, administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is
to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and the public, need not
be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letter of instructions issued by the
administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
Sandoval Notes:
May a person be held liable for violation of an
administrative regulation which was not
published?
Held: Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be
held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum
Circular No. II, Series of 1983, which enumerated the
allowable fees which may be collected from
applicants, is void for lack of publication.
There is merit in the argument.
In Tanada v. Tuvera (136 SCRA 27 [1985]), the
Court held, as follows:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those
of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and the public, need not
Page | 17
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letter of instructions issued by the
administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared
as having no force and effect the following
administrative issuances: a) Rules and Regulations
issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of
Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee
regarding the accreditation of hospitals, medical
clinics and laboratories (Joint Ministry of Health-
Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation
Committee v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 263
[1991]); b) Letter of Instruction No. 416 ordering the
suspension of payments due and payable by
distressed copper mining companies to the national
government (Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 208 SCRA 726 [1992]); c) Memorandum
Circulars issued by the POEA regulating the
recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong (Phil.
Association of Service Exporters v. Torres, 212 SCRA
298 [1992]); d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC
89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International
Trading Corporation regulating applications for
importation from the Peoples Republic of China
(Philippine International Trading Corporation v.
Angeles, 263 SCRA 421 [1996]); and e) Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the
Department of Budget and Management
discontinuing the payment of other allowances and
fringe benefits to government officials and
employees (De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 294
SCRA 152 [1998). In all these cited cases, the
administrative issuances questioned therein were
uniformly struck down as they were not published or
filed with the National Administrative Register as
required by the Administrative Code of 1987
(Administrative Code of 1987, Book VII, chapter 2,
Section 3).
POEA memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
must likewise be declared ineffective as the same
was never published or filed with the National
Administrative Register.
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
provides for the applicable schedule of placement
and documentation fees for private employment
agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order,
the maximum amount which may be collected from
prospective Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00.
The said circular was apparently issued in
compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of the
Labor Code x x x.
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under
consideration is one of those issuances which should
be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to
enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation (Philippine International Trading
Corporation v. Angeles, supra.). Considering that
POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
has not as yet been published or filed with the
National Administrative Register, the same is
ineffective and may not be enforced.
Does the publication requirement apply as
well to administrative regulations addressed
only to a specific group and not to the general
public?
Held: The Office of the Solicitor General likewise
argues that the questioned administrative circular is
not among those requiring publication contemplated
by Tanada v. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a
specific group of persons and not to the general
public.
Again, there is no merit in this argument.
The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a
specified group, namely private employment
agencies or authority holders, does not take it away
from the ambit of our ruling in Tanada v. Tuvera. In
the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters v.
Torres ((212 SCRA 298 [1992]), the administrative
circulars questioned therein were addressed to an
even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong
Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of
workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled
therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said
circulars may not be enforced or implemented.
Our pronouncement in Tanada v. Tuvera is clear and
categorical. Administrative rules and regulations
must be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those
so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. Administrative Circular
No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall
under any of these exceptions.
In this regard, the Solicitor Generals reliance on the
case of Yaokasin v. Commissioner of Customs (180
SCRA 599 [1989]) is misplaced. In the said case, the
validity of certain Customs Memorandum Orders
were upheld despite their lack of publication as they
were addressed to a particular class of persons, the
customs collectors, who were also the subordinates
of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. As
such, the said Memorandum Orders clearly fall under
one of the exceptions to the publication requirement,
namely those dealing with instructions from an
administrative superior to a subordinate regarding
the performance of their duties, a circumstance
which does not obtain in the case at bench.
Page | 18
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from
the three (3) counts of exaction as POEA
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 could
not be the basis of administrative sanctions against
petitioner for lack of publication.
ADMIN REGULATION FOR INTERNAL (need
not be published)
MAY THE WINNING BIDDER COMPEL THE
GOVERNMENT?
(See case COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla)
COMELEC vs. Quijano-Padilla
G.R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Voters Registration Act of 1996 (RA No. 8189) was
passed, pursuant to that the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution approving in the principle the Voters
Registration and Identification System Project (VRIS)
which envisions a computerized database system for
May 2004 Elections with an aim of tamper-proof and
counterfeit-resistant voters identification card.
Comelec then issued pre-qualify and bid for the
supply and installations of IT equipment and ancillary
services for VRIS Project.
Photokina Corporation pre-qualified and allowed to
participate as one of the bidders. After public bidding
was conducted, Photokina garnered the highest
score and was declared the winning bidder, on which
a resolution was issued by Comelec for the approval
of such, and was immediately accepted by
Photokina, parties then initially proceeded to
formalize the contract with Comm. Sadain.
However, under budget appropriation passed by
Congress for the said project was only 1 billion pesos,
on which the actual fund budget for the project was
1.2 bilion. For such disparity, the execution of the
contract was of no avail, irregardless of the
expiration of office of then oppositorComelec
Chairman Demetriou and despite several
notifications by Photokina.
Then incumbent Chairman Benipayo, through press
releases and public announcements, announced that
the VRIS Project has been set aside, and plan of re-
engineering the entire modernization program of the
Comelec. Photokina, with the adverse turn of events,
filed with RTC Quezon City a petition for mandamus,
prohibition and damages against Comelec and all its
Commisioners. Photokina alleged the refusal of
Comelec and the Commissioners to formalize the
contract; that Chairman Benipayo on his statement
committed grave abuse of discretion; and that
Comelec failed to perform its duty under the contract
incurring damages on the part of Photokina.
Respondent Judge Quijano-Padilla issued a
Resolution granting Photokinas application for a writ
of prohibitory injunction. Comelec thru Solicitor
General filed a motion but was denied by respondent
Judge. Hence, a petition for certiorari was elevated
directly to Supreme Court by the OSG in behalf of
Comelec.
ISSUE:
Whether Photokina can compel Comelec, a
government agency, to formalize a contact
notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount
appropriated by Congress for the project?
RULING:
NO. The court reiterated that, No contract
involving the expenditure of public funds by
any government agency shall be entered into
or authorized unless the proper accounting
official of the agency concerned shall have a
certified to the officer entering into obligation
that funds have been duly appropriated for the
purpose and that the amount cover the
proposed contract for the current calendar
year is available for expenditure on account
thereof, subject to verification of the auditor.
(Sec 7, Administrative Code of 1987)
The court ruled that, Photokina cannot accede to its
contention that there is already a perfected contract
since existence of appropriations and availability of
funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or
conditions sine qua non for the execution of
government contracts. To hold otherwise is to allow
a public officer to execute a binding contract that
would obligate the government in an amount in
excess of the appropriations for the purpose for
which the contract was attempted to be made, which
the court found as a dangerous precedent.
Even the draft contract submitted by Commissioner
Sadain that provides for a 1.2 Bilion pesos is
unacceptable, of which the court share sentiment
with then Chairman Demetriou that it circumvents
the statutory requirements on government contracts.
Hence, petitioners are justified in refusing to
formalize the contract with Photokina, as prudence
dictates them not to enter into a contract not backed
up by sufficient appropriation and available funds.
Page | 19
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
NOTE:
What is the remedy available to a party who
contracts with the government contrary to the
requirements of the law and, therefore, void
ab initio?
Held: Of course, we are not saying that the party
who contracts with the government has no other
recourse in law. The law itself affords him the
remedy. Section 48 of E.O. No. 292 explicitly
provides that any contract entered into contrary to
the above-mentioned requirements shall be void,
and the officers entering into the contract shall be
liable to the Government or other contracting party
for any consequent damage to the same as if the
transaction had been wholly between private
parties. So when the contracting officer transcends
his lawful and legitimate powers by acting in excess
of or beyond the limits of his contracting authority,
the Government is not bound under the contract. It
would be as if the contract in such case were a
private one, whereupon, he binds himself, and thus,
assumes personal liability thereunder. (Fernandez, a
Treatise on Government Contracts Under Philippine
Law, 2001, supra., pp. 22-23). Otherwise stated, the
proposed contract is unenforceable as to the
Government.
While this is not the proceeding to determine where
the culpability lies, however, the constitutional
mandate cited above constrains us to remind all
public officers that public office is a public trust and
all public officers must at all times be accountable to
the people. The authority of public officers to enter
into government contracts is circumscribed with a
heavy burden of responsibility. In the exercise of
their contracting prerogative, they should be the first
judges of the legality, propriety and wisdom of the
contract they entered into. They must exercise a high
degree of caution so that the Government may not
be the victim of ill-advised or improvident action
(Rivera v. Maclang, 7 SCRA 57 [1963]).
ON QUESTIONS:
CAN THE CHR issue a TRO? = YES
DOES IT HAVE CONTEMPT POWER? = YES
DOES THE CHR have adjudicatory power? =
NO
See Case of Simon Jr.
SIMON JR. VS. CHR
GR NO. 100150, JANUARY 5, 1994
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
A Demolition Notice was signed by Carlos Quimpoin
his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon
City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under
the Office of the City Mayor. This Notice was sent to
the private respondents, the members and officers
of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated. The Notice of Demolition was for the
removal of private respondents stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia to give way to the Peoples
Park.
On July 12, 1990, the group of vendors led by their
President Roque Fermo filed a letter-complaint
(Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR
against the petitioners, asking the CHR Chairman
Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be
addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon Jr. of Quezon
City to stop the demolition.
CHR in its Resolution ordered the disbursement of
financial assistance of not more than 200,000 in
favor of the private respondents and directed the
petitioners to desist from further demolition with the
warning that violation of said order would lead to a
citation for contempt and arrest.
Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of CHR and
moved for the dismissal of the CHR case. CHR cited
petitioners in contempt for carrying out the
demolition despite the order to desist and imposes a
fine of 500.00 on each of them.
The motion to dismiss filed by petitioners to CHR was
denied and the motion for reconsideration was also
dismissed.
Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether CHR has Jurisdiction over the case
and whether they have an adjudicatory
power.
2. Whether CHR has the power to issue TRO.
3. Whether CHR has contempt power.
Page | 20
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
RULING:
1. NO. In its Order x x x denying petitioners motion
to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of
the members of the Constitutional Commission is to
make CHR a quasi-judicial body. This view, however,
has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In
Carino v. Commission on Human Rights (204 SCRA
483, 492), the Court x x x has observed that it is
only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication
of adjudgment, but that resemblance can in no way
be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The
Court explained:
x x x [T]he Commission on Human Rights x x x was
not meant by the fundamental law to be another
court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the
latter. The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that
it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied
by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have.
2. YES. In Export Processing Zone Authority v.
Commission on Human rights (208 SCRA 125, 131),
the Court x x x explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to
provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission
to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for,
if that were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred only
by the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by
implication.
Evidently, the preventive measures and legal aid
services mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ
of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek
from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of
human rights violations. Not being a court of justice,
the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ,
for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be
issued by the judge of any court in which the action
is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the
Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. x x x. A
writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy.
It is available only in a pending principal action, for
the preservation or protection of the rights and
interest of a party thereto, and for no other
purpose.
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse,
for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of
government (See Export Processing Zone Authority
v. Commission on Human Rights, 208 SCRA 125).
3. YES. On its contempt powers, the CHR is
constitutionally authorized to adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with
the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the CHR acted
within its authority in providing in its revised rules,
its power to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate
penalties in accordance with the procedure and
sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court. That
power to cite for contempt, however, should be
understood to apply only to violations of its adopted
operational guidelines and rules of procedure
essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To
exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be
exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate
with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant
information, or who decline to honor summons, and
the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The order
to desist (a semantic interplay for a restraining
order) in the instance before us, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an
adjudicative power that it does not possess.
Page | 21
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
ADDITIONAL CASES FOR ADMIN LAW
ON JURISDICTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
BODIES
ESTATE DEVELOPERS AND INVESTORS
CORPORATION v. CA, ROSALIE OROPESA
and/or NESTOR OROPESA
G.R. No. 92461. September 2, 1992
NOCON, J.:
FACTS:
On May 23, 1988, petitioner, who is the developer of
a subdivision in Antipolo, filed a complaint before
RTC of Manila for collection of the amount due under
a promissory note executed by respondents
representing the unpaid balance of the purchase
price of a lot bought by the latter from the former.
Respondents refused to pay the balance of the
purchase price of the subdivision lot due to
petitioners abandonment of its undertaking to fully
develop the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
This lead to respondents and other buyers to form
the Antipolo Hills Homeowners Association in order
that they may better be heard by petitioner.
The Association filed a complaint against petitioner
before the HLURB, pursuant to its exclusive
jurisdiction as provided under P.D. 957, for non-
development of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision and
prayed that petitioner be restrained from collecting
the monthly amortization of the homeowners, to take
over the development of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision and to allow respondents to directly
make their payment of monthly amortizations with
the HLURB which the latter granted. Petitioner
appealed the decision to the same board but the
latter sustained the decision.
On the other hand, the petition filed by petitioner in
RTC Manila was granted.
ISSUE:
Whether RTC and not the HLURB has the jurisdiction
to hear and determine cases filed by developer to lot
buyers as the mentioned cause of action did not fall
under HLURBs jurisdiction.
RULING:
NO.
Section 1 of PD 1344 gives the National Housing
Authority (NHA) now HLURB, the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide certain cases as
follows:
"SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to
regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed
by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against
the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman."
The constitutionality of such grant of exclusive
jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority (now
HLURB) over cases involving the sale of commercial
subdivisions was upheld in Tropical Homes case.
A close scrutiny of the complaint discloses that the
promissory note upon which the collection suit is
predicated, merely schedules the amortization of the
balance or unpaid portion of the purchase price of
the house and lot. What appellant is collecting
involves the "sales of lots in commercial
subdivisions," which per the Tropical Homes case
jurisdiction lies with the HLURB, and not with the civil
courts.
The contention of the petitioner that HLURB has no
jurisdiction because what the law provides is that it
may take over only those cases filed by the lot buyers
against the developer and not vice versa is
untenable. The exclusive jurisdiction vested in the
NHA is broad and general to regulate the real
estate trade and business in accordance with the
provisions of said law. As clarified in PD 1344, such
exclusive jurisdiction includes jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving unsound real estate business
practices (Sec. 1 [A]) as well as claims for refund
and complaints for specific performance filed by the
buyer (paragraphs B&C) of PD 1344."
Page | 22
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
ON DUE PROCESS
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO
TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.,
G.R. No. L-46496. February 27, 1940
LAUREL, J.:
FACTS:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a
leather company which supplies the Philippine Army.
Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused
the layoff of a number of his employees. However,
the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the
validity of said lay off as it averred that the said
employees laid off were members of NLU while no
members of the rival labor union (National Workers
Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is
a company dominated union and Toribio was merely
busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The
Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is
entitled to a new trial for the appreciation of new
evidence considering also that respondents were
denied due process for laying off employees without
just cause.
RULING:
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered
evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they
attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence
so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could
not be expected to have obtained them and offered
as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of
such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly
obtained records include books of business/inventory
accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously
accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like
the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of
Court must also make sure that they comply to the
requirements of due process. For administrative
bodies, due process can be complied with by
observing the following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right
of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose
the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that
of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In this case due process requirements are not totally
observed in CIR for the respondents lack evidence
to support their claims which in fact is existing at that
time. Acquiring the aforementioned evidence, it is
the CIR that has the proper forum and jurisdiction to
appreciate evidences that would comply the
respondents right to due process.
Page | 23
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs.
NLRC and RICARDO L. SADAC
G.R. No. 102467 June 13, 1997
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Petition to go against the decision of NLRC in holding
that Sadac as the VP for the legal department of bank
a regular employee of the bank.
Sadac was appointed VP for the legal department of
bank with monthly salary, allowance and Christmas
bonus, with specific legal tasks to perform for the
bank.
Later, nine lawyers of the bank's legal department
addressed a petition-letter to the chairman of the
board of directors accusing Sadac of abusive
conduct, inefficiency, mismanagement,
ineffectiveness and indecisiveness.
Sadac promptly minifested to file criminal, civil and
administrative chrges against the nine lawyers. Then
Chairman Morales called the lawyers in attempt to
resolve the differences, but didn't result positively.
Morales in the board meeting then apprised the
situation, directors adopted a resolution directing
one of the directors (Banico) to look further into the
matter and determine the best course of action for
the bank.
Banico after his meetings with the lawyers and
exploring various alternatives to solve the crisis, but
failed wrote to the board of directors his findings
affirming the charges against Sadac. Morales then
sent Sadac a memorandum informing him of the
charge, the findings of Banico and the expression of
the boards' loss of confidence upon him and that
they advise and awaits for Sadac's resignation.
In reaction to the memorandum, Sadac addressed a
letter to Morales with copies furnish to the directors,
stating that the findings of Banico contained libelous
statements and the decision of the board will amount
to illegal dismissal; with request for a full hearing by
the directors so he could clear his name.
Vice-chairman Romulo answered Sadac that they are
exercising its managerial prerogative to control,
conduct business in the manner deems fit and to
regulate the same.
In reaction thereto, Sadac requested for a full
hearing and formal investigation but the same
remained unheeded. On 9 November 1989,
respondent Sadac filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with damages against petitioner Bank and
individual members of the Board of Directors thereof.
After learning of the filing of the complaint, petitioner
Bank terminated the services of respondent Sadac.
Finally, on 10 August 1989, Sadac was removed from
his office.
Labor Arbiter rendered decision that Sadacs
termination was illegal and entitled to reinstatement
and payment of full back wages. NLRC affirmed the
decision upon appeal by the Bank. Sadac filed for
execution of judgment where it gave its computation
which amounted to P 6.03 M representing his back
wages and the increases he should have received
during the time he was illegally dismissed. The Bank
opposed to Sadacs computation. The Labor Arbiter
favor Sadacs computation. NLRC, upon appeal by
the bank, reversed the decision. CA reversed the
decision of NLRC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent was dismissed without due
process of law.
RULING:
Yes. The existence of an employer-employee
relationship, between the bank and private
respondent brings the case within the coverage of
the Labor Code. Under the Code, an employee may
be validly dismissed if these requisites are attendant:
(1) the dismissal is grounded on any of the causes
stated in Article 282 of Labor Code, and (2) the
employee has been notified in writing and given the
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself as so
required by Section 2 and Section 5, Rule XIV, Book
V, of the Implementing Rules of the Labor
Code.
Article 282(c) of the Labor Code provides that "willful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer" is a cause for the termination of
employment by an employer. Ordinary breach of
trust will not suffice, it must be willful and without
justifiable excuse. This ground must be founded on
facts established by the employer who must clearly
and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the
facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in
the employee may fairly be made to rest; otherwise,
the dismissal will be rendered illegal.
Confident that no employer-employee existed
between the bank and private respondent,
petitioners have put aside the procedural
Page | 24
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
requirements for terminating one's employment, i.e.,
(a) a notice apprising the employee of the particular
acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought,
and (b) another notice informing the employee of the
employer's decision to dismiss him. Failure to
comply with these requirements taints the dismissal
with illegality. This procedure is mandatory, any
judgment reached by management without that
compliance can be considered void and
inexistent. While it is true that the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied in administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain one's side, meetings in the nature of
consultation and conferences such as the case here,
however, may not be valid substitutes for the proper
observance of notice and hearing.
In this place petitioner believes that the relation
between them was not actually within the scope of
an employer employee relationship as required
under the Labor Code, hence mere termination on
the ground of loss of confidence is enough. However,
in this case the court finds that there exist that
relationship and the respondent may be terminated
only upon just cause and with proper notice and
hearing which are not accorded by the respondent.
ADAMSON & ADAMSON, INC., vs.
HON. AUGUSTO M. AMORES, JOHNSON &
JOHNSON [PHILIPPINES], INC. and the
BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
G.R. No. L-58292. July 23, 1987
FERNAN, J.:
FACTS:
Adamson, a Foreign national corporation (Adamson
at that time, was not yet a Philippine national as
defined in RA 5186) and a manufacturer of hygienic
and other related products applied for Certificate of
Authority to BOI in compliance with the Foreign
Investment Act (RA 5455) requiring foreign national
corporation to obtain the said certificate in order for
them to expand their business activities to areas
which is within their primary purpose. They need to
secure the certificate because at that time that the
two laws mentioned are enacted, they are not yet
actually manufacturing their products.
Johnson another foreign corporation was also in the
same line of business with Adamson.
Sometime in 1979, after it had acquired new
machineries, Johnson commenced the manufacture
and marketing of disposable diapers. During the first
quarter of 1980, it manufactured sanitary feminine
tampons and absorbent cotton.
Alleging that Johnson should not be allowed to
expand its business activities "to areas in which it
was not licensed and in which it was not actually
engaged as at the effectivity of Rep. Act Nos. 5186
and 5455 without first obtaining from the Board of
Investments the corresponding certificates of
authority after prior publication and posting of
notices, Adamson filed with BOI a petition praying
for the preliminary stop and desist in the
manufacture of the mentioned products.
BOI informed Johnson of the petition and require the
latter to answer it. While waiting for the answer of
Johnson BOI send notice of hearing to the parties. It
is almost 3 days before the date of the scheduled
hearing when Johnson answer.
On the day of the hearing the parties are given
opportunity to explain their stands and to even cross-
examine witnesses and to give attachments and
documents.
Impatient on the resolution BOI, Adamson filed a
motion praying that hearings be scheduled for the
reception of evidence for a permanent stop and
desist order to Johnson. BOI denied the motion and
release its resolution favoring Johnson.
Adamson filed to RTC of Manila a petition seeking for
judicial relief.
ISSUE:
Whether BOI denied due process to Adamson.
RULING:
No. While administrative tribunals exercising quasi-
judicial powers are free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements they are bound by law and
practice to observe the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in justiciable cases
presented before them. However, the standard of
due process that must be met in administrative
tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the
element of fairness is not ignored. Hence, there is no
denial of due process where records show that
hearings were held with prior notice to adverse
parties. But even in the absence of previous notice,
there is no denial of procedural due process as long
as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard.
Based on the foregoing, the court rule that petitioner
was not deprived of its right to procedural due
process in the BOI. In the first place, it was notified
of the May 14, 1980 hearing. The notice specified
that the hearing was on the petition although it also
Page | 25
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
stated therein with particularity, petitioner's prayer
for a stop and desist order. Necessarily, it is
immaterial that said notice was sent before Johnson
filed its answer to the petition and there was yet no
joinder of issues considering that the proceeding was
before an administrative tribunal where technicalities
that should be observed in a regular court may be
dispensed with.
Secondly, during the hearing, petitioner was given
the opportunity to present its case, including its
prayer for a stop and desist order. As clearly
enunciated in the minutes of the hearing which We
have painstakingly studied and set forth herein to
determine if any irregularity attended the questioned
BOI proceeding, it was conducted for the purpose of
hearing the arguments and receiving evidence of the
parties "to resolve the case expeditiously." Having
been given the opportunity to put forth its case,
petitioner has only itself, or, better still, its counsel
and officers who were present therein, to blame for
its failure to do so.
Petitioner's right to procedural due process was not
violated when the hearing was conducted before a
director of the BOI and not before the members of
the board themselves who decided the case. The
requirements of a fair hearing do not mandate that
the actual taking of testimony or the presentation of
evidence be before the same officer who will make
the decision on the case.
AMERICAN TOBACCO vs. THE DIRECTOR OF
PATENTS
G.R. No. L-26803 October 14, 1975
ANTONIO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the
"Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine
Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended,
authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any
ranking official of said office to hear "inter
partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that
"all judgments determining the merits of the case
shall be personally and directly prepared by the
Director and signed by him." This amendment by
the Director of Patents was approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture.
In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director
of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases
to hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando
Marquez, Teofilo Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector
Buenaluz, the other respondents herein.
Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of
the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that
the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void
because under the law the Director must personally
hear and decide inter partes cases. Said objections
were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the
present petition for mandamus, to compel The
Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of
petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner was denied due process by
the amendment of the Rules of Practice in Philippine
Patents Office to delegate the authority to determine
cases.
RULING:
No. It has been held that power-conferred upon an
administrative agency to which the administration of
a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and
orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in
order to carry out its purposes and provisions maybe
an adequate source of authority to delegate a
particular function, unless by express provisions of
the Act or by implication it has been withheld. There
is no provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166
negativing the existence of such authority, so far as
the designation of hearing examiners is concerned.
Nor can the absence of such authority be fairly
inferred from contemporaneous and consistent
Executive interpretation of the Act.
It could hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude
of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally
each and every case pending in his Office. This would
leave him little time to attend to his other duties.
Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide
resides solely in the administrative agency vested by
law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power
to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision
of the administrative agency will be
made.
The rule that requires an administrative officer to
exercise his own judgment and discretion does not
preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to
investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis
of which the officer makes his decisions. It is
sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally
exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.
Neither does due process of law nor the
requirements of fair hearing require that the actual
taking of testimony be before the same officer who
will make the decision in the case. As long as a party
is not deprived of his right to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof, and the
decision is supported by the evidence in the record,
there is no question that the requirements of due
process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is
Page | 26
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the
officer concerned as the actual decision remains with
and is made by said officer. It is, however, required
that to "give the substance of a hearing, which is for
the purpose of making determinations upon
evidence the officer who makes the determinations
must consider and appraise the evidence which
justifies them."
In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may
make preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions
raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate
decision on the merits of all the issues and questions
involved is left to the Director of Patents.
ERLANGER & GALINGER, INC., and L.B.
NESTLE vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and EULOGIO P. FLORES
G.R. No. L-15118. December 29, 1960
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
FACTS:
On November 9, 1954, upon charges filed by
respondent Eulogio P. Flores, and after preliminary
investigation, a complaint for unfair labor practice
was filed in the Court of Industrial Relations by an
acting prosecutor of that court against Erlanger and
Galinger, Inc (EGI). The complaint alleged that the
corporation and general manager, thru their officers,
supervisors and agents, initiated and assisted in the
formation of a labor organization composed of their
employees and supervisors known as the Kontiki
Employees Association and continuously thereafter
interfered with its administration, supported,
controlled and dominated it, thereby violating the
employees' right to self-organization as provided in
section 3 of Republic Act 975; that by reason of the
union activities of Eulogio P. Flores he was
summarily and discriminatorily discharged him.
Answering the complaint, the herein petitioners,
denied the charge of unfair labor practice and as
special defenses alleged that the separation of
Eulogio P. Flores was justified, and that the filing of
the complaint by an acting prosecutor of the
Industrial Court was violative of the law on due
process.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner EGI was denied due process by
CIR.
RULING:
No. Petitioners in the first-place question the manner
in which the prosecution of the case had been
conducted, alleging that with the filing of the
complaint by the very same acting prosecutor of the
Industrial Court who conducted the preliminary
investigation, the reception of evidence by hearing
examiners of the same court, and the adoption by
Judge Tabigne of the report of Examiner Pedro
Perez, the said Industrial Court assumed the role of
accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. We
find the objection to be without legal basis. The
procedure followed by the Industrial Court was in
accordance with section 5(b) of the Industrial Peace
Act (Republic Act No. 875), which reads in part as
follows:
. . . Whenever it is charged by an offended party or
his representative that any person engaged or is
engaging in any unfair labor practice, the Court or
any agency or agent designated by the Court must
investigate such charge and shall have the power to
issue and cause to be served upon such person a
complaint stating the charges in that respect and
containing a notice of hearing before the Court or a
member thereof, or before a designated Hearing
Examiner at the time and place fixed therein not less
than five nor more than ten days after serving the
said complaint.
Under the above legal provision, it is apparent that
the Court of Industrial Relations, in the exercise of
its investigatory powers, in unfair labor practice
cases, may designate its acting prosecutor to
conduct an investigation of the charges filed by the
aggrieved party, and later have the complaint filed
on the basis of the result of said investigation,
requiring the respondent to file his answer and then
hear both parties thru designated hearing examiners.
Such procedure has been sanctioned by this Court in
case of National Printing Workers vs. Asia Printing,
et. al. (99 Phil., 589; 52 Off. Gaz., [12] 5858). It is
true that the prosecutors and hearing examiners are
officers of the court. Their functions and duties as
such are, however, well-defined in the law and their
findings are not conclusive upon the Industrial Court,
which has the discretion to accept or reject them.
There is, therefore, no reason to fear that the parties
who undergo trial under the procedure as above
stated are denied the constitutional guarantee of due
process.
The fact that the decision rendered by the court
based upon the report of Hearing Examiner Perez
who heard the evidence only in part is of no moment,
for the court below studied and examined not only
the evidence received by said hearing examiner but
also that presented before the others and found that
the findings and conclusions contained in the report
conform to its own. This court has already ruled, in
the case of Indias vs. Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. (101
Phil., 297; 54 Off. Gaz., [6] 1817), that "where the
Court of Industrial Relations approved the report of
Page | 27
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
the hearing examiner after a perusal of the record of
the case, this pre-supposes that it had examined the
evidence and found no justification in modifying his
findings and conclusions. It is not necessary for the
court to make in the order its own discussion of the
evidence or its own findings of fact."
VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC., vs.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-19850. January 30, 1964
CONCEPCION, J.:
FACTS:
RA. 316 granted petitioner Vigan Electric Light
Company, Inc., a franchise to construct, maintain
and operate an electric light, heat and/or power
plant for the purpose of generating and distributing
light, heat and/or power, for sale within the limits of
several municipalities of the province of Ilocos Sur.
Petitioner was also granted certificate of public
convenience by PSC on the scheduled rates the
former filed in the latter.
Five years later petitioner received a letter from PCS
informing them of an alleged letter-petition from
Congressman Crisologo and 107 residents of Vigan
for alleged sale of 2000 electric meters in black
market by the Avegon Co., as anomalous and illegal.
They also alleged excessive rates of Petitioner.
Petitioner denied all allegations.
On March 15, 1962, petitioner received a
communication form the General Auditing Office
notifying him that one Mr. Cesar A. Damole had
"been instructed to make an audit and examination
of the books and other records of account" of said
petitioner, "under the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 325 and in accordance with the request of
the Public Service Commission contained in its letter
dated March 12, 1962", and directing petitioner to
cooperate with said Mr. Damole "for the successful
accomplishment of his work".
2 days later PCS order the reduction of rates by the
Petitioner and based the reduction on the findings of
Mr. Damole that there is an excess of revenue on the
petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners right to due process was denied
by PCS by fixing the rates of the former without
notice and hearing.
RULING:
Yes. When the rules and/or rates are meant to apply
to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
Philippines, this may partake of a legislative
character, such is not the nature of the order
complained of. Indeed, the same
applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is
more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact
based upon a report submitted by the General
Auditing Office that petitioner is making a profit of
more than 12% of its invested capital,
which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is
entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report,
and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents
thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as
well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by
the respondent. In other words, in making said
finding of fact, respondent performed a
function partaking of a quasi-judicial character the
valid exercise of which demands previous notice and
hearing.
Indeed, sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of Commonwealth
Act No. 146, explicitly require notice and hearing
with the PCS when it performs it quasi-judicial
function.
Since compliance with law must be presumed, it
should be assumed that petitioner's current rates
were fixed by respondent after proper notice and
hearing. Hence, modification of such rates cannot be
made, over petitioner's objection, without such
notice and hearing, particularly considering that the
factual basis of the action taken by respondent is
assailed by petitioner.
Whether notice and a hearing in proceedings before
a public service commission are necessary depends
chiefly upon statutory or constitutional provisions
applicable to such proceedings, which make notice
and hearing, prerequisite to action by the
commission, and upon the nature and object of such
proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are,
on the one hand, legislative and rule-making in
character, or are, on the other hand,
determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial, affecting
the rights an property of private or specific persons.
As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded
some opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and
reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a
public service commission. (43 Am. Jur. 716;
Emphasis supplied.)
Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the
issue involved in the order complained of partakes of
the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that
having been issued without previous notice and
Page | 28
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge

hearing said order is clearly violative of the due
process clause, and, hence, null and void,
ELISEO SILVA vs. THE HONORABLE
FELICIANO OCAMPO, GABRIEL P. PRIETO and
QUINTIN PAREDES, JR., in their capacities as
Commissioners of the Public Service
Commission and BELEN CABRERA
G.R. No. L-5162. January 31, 1952
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:
Belen Cabrera filed in the Public Service Commission
an application for a certificate of public convenience
to install, maintain and operate in the City of Lipa an
ice plant with a 10-ton daily productive capacity and
to sell the product of said plant in said city as well as
in several municipalities of the province of Batangas.
Eliseo Silva opposed the application on the ground
that his ice plant was adequate to meet the needs of
the public and that public convenience did not
require the operation of another ice plant.
Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo commissioned
Attorney Antonio H. Aspillera, chief of the legal
division, to receive the evidence. Based on the
evidence received by Aspillera, the Commission
granted the application. On appeal, however, the
Supreme Court held that the proceedings had before
Attorney Aspillera were null and void being in
violation of section 3 of the Public Service Act, as
amended, and set aside the decision of the
Commission and ordered that the case returned for
re-hearing.
At the re-hearing of the case Comm. Ocampo allows
Belen Cabrera the submission or refiling of evidence
presented at the hearing before Comm. Aspillera as
well evidence de novo which petitioner opposed
because it will be a contradiction to the ruling of the
SC that they may refile evidence presented before if
the same was agreed by the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether Comm. Ocampo erred in ordering the
resubmission of the previous evidence and whether
PSC has the authority to issue provisional permit to
operate.
for the purposes of determining whether the
applicant could be given a provisional authority to
operate.
As the court held:
Hearing of a contested application for a permanent
certificate of public convenience before any officer
other than a Commissioner of the Public Service
Commission is null and void under section3 of the
Public Service Act. If a re-hearing of a contested
application was ordered by the Supreme Court for a
violation of section 3 of said Act, the applicant has
no alternative but to present evidence de novo,
unless of course, said parties agree at said hearing
or hearings to re-submit the evidence already
presented and taken down, with such modifications
and under such conditions as they may agree upon,
including such other evidence which they may wish
to present. The rationale of the rule is none other
than to make the Commission, or any of the
Commissioners who may be authorized for this
purpose, to try the case or, receive the evidence
itself, as the law requires, so that it may have the
necessary opportunity for observation and
appreciation of the evidence to enable it to reach an
accurate and intelligent conclusion. Mere re-
submission of the evidence already presented would
not meet this compelling objective, the only
exception being when the opposing parties agree to
such re-submission. This is a privilege that they can
exercise or waive in the use of their discretion.
However, for the purpose of the issuance of a
provisional permit, there being an urgent public need
for the service of applicant, not only by the people of
the vicinity but also of the neighboring towns,
although the evidence presented by the applicant
has been admitted in violation of Sec. 3 of said Act
on a directive of the Supreme Court, such evidence
may serve as justification, if the Commission so finds
it, to warrant the issuance of a provisional permit.
The Public Service Commission has power to grant
temporary or provisional permit when the purpose of
the permit is to meet an urgent public necessity.

RULING:

Yes and Yes. In this case the court agreed that

Comm. Ocampo erred in ruling the resubmission of
the evidence presented before Atty. Aspillera as it
would negate the very essence of Re-hearing the
case. However, they ruled and they found out that
the evidence was actually used by the Commission
Page | 29
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
FORTUNATO F. HALILI vs. PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION and CAM TRANSIT CO., INC.,
G.R. No. L-5948. April 29, 1953
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner herein is the holder of various certificates
of public convenience to operate auto-truck services
between Balara and various points in the city of
Manila and its suburbs. Respondent CAM Transit Co.,
Inc., also holds a certificate of public convenience to
operate a line of trucks between Balara and City Hall,
Manila. This certificate was obtained by it through
assignment, with the approval of the Public Service
Commission, from Benjamin Encarnacion. One of the
original lines granted to Benjamin Encarnacion. now
operated by the respondent CAM Transit Co., Inc., is
the Balara-City Hall (Manila), via Kamuning line,
starting at Balara fifter plant, passing through
Barangka road, Marikina-San Juan road, Highway 54,
Kamuning road, etc
On July 2, 1952, CAM Transit Co., Inc., filed a
petition with the respondent Commission, alleging
that the route authorized in its City Hall (Manila)-
Balara line, and passing along the Marikina-Barangka
road, Marikina-San Juan road, and Highway 54, is
entirely different from that supported by the
evidence presented in the hearing, and praying that
the certificate be amended so that the route
authorized should be along Highway 54, Silagan
Avenue, U.P. site, ending at Balara, instead of
Highway 54, Marikina San Juan road, Barangka road,
ending at Balara. Acting upon this petition, the
respondent Commission on the following day, July 3,
1952, and without a previous notice to the petitioner
or a previous hearing thereon, ordered the
modification of the line in accordance with the
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the order for amendment of the route,
without notice to the petitioner or hearing in which
the latter may be given opportunity to be present,
was lawfully and validly issued by the Commission.
RULING:
No. The amendment of the respondent operator's
lines affects the rights granted and guaranteed by
the certificate of public convenience of the petitioner.
To allow the respondent Commission to authorize the
amendment, without giving the petitioner
opportunity to be heard and express his objections
thereto, is clearly a deprivation of a precious right
and privilege without due process of law.
."Due process of law, or, in the mean accord with the
procedure outlines in the law, or, in the absence of
express procedure, under such safeguards for the
protection of individual rights as the settled maxims
of law permit and sanction for the particular class of
cases to which the one in question belongs," (16
C.J.S., 1141.) In the case at bar, the Public Service
Act does not include the amendment made in the
disputed order among those may be ordered without
notice or hearing in accordance with Section 17 of
the Act. Is the amendment, without notice or
hearing, permitted by the well settled maxims of
law? We declare it is not, because due process of law
guarantees notices and opportunity to be heard to
persons who would be affected by the order or act
contemplated.
It is therefore hold that the amendment authorized
by the order of the respondent Commission of July
3,1952, is not authorized by the facts contained in
the decision granting the certificate of public
convenience in favor of the predecessor in interest
of the respondent operator, and that even if there
was really an error in the original decision fixing the
route , in that the said routes were not in accordance
with the evidence submitted, the issuance of the
order without proper notice to the petitioner and
opportunity on the part of the latter to be heard in
relation to the petition, is a violation of the
petitioner's right not be deprived of his property
without due process of law.
LIANGA BAY LOGGING, CO., INC., vs. HON.
MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, and AGO TIMBER
CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-30637. July 16, 1987
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
FACTS:
The parties herein are both forest concessionaries
whose licensed areas are adjacent to each other.
Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent
are adjacent to each other, they have a common
boundary-the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary-
whereby the eastern boundary of respondent Ago's
concession is petitioner Lianga's western boundary.
Because of reports of encroachment by both parties
on each other's concession areas, the Director of
Forestry ordered a survey to establish on the ground
the common boundary of their respective concession
areas. Forester Cipriano Melchor undertook the
survey and fixed their common boundaries which
respondent Ago protested claiming that "its eastern
boundary should be the provincial boundary line of
Agusan-Surigao as described in Section 1 of Art.
Page | 30
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
1693 of the Philippine Commission as indicated in the
green pencil in the attached sketch" of the areas as
prepared by the Bureau of Forestry. However, upon
reviewing the documents (license control maps) of
the boundaries, and considering the evidence
presented, the Director of Forestry ruled that "the
claim of the Ago Timber Corporation runs counter to
the intentions of this Office is granting the license of
Mr. Narciso Lansang; and further, that it also runs
counter to the intentions of this Office in granting the
Timber License Agreement to the Lianga Bay
Logging Co., Inc. The intentions of this Office in
granting the two licenses (Lansang and Lianga Bay
Logging Co., Inc.) are patently manifest in
that distances and bearings are the controlling
factors. Hence, they denied the claims of Ago.
A motion for reconsideration was filed but the same
denied. Ago also elevated the matter to the Office of
the president which denied the same. Hence Ago
filed a petition seeking judicial remedy in RTC of
Agusan for the determination of correct boundaries.
RTC ruled in favor of Ago.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge is correct in taking cognizance of
the case excercising Judicial review.
RULING:
No in this particular case. Respondent Judge
erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by
respondent Ago, asking for the determination anew
of the correct boundary line of its licensed timber
area, for the same issue had already been
determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office
of the President, administrative officials under whose
jurisdictions the matter properly belongs. Section
1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests in the
Bureau of Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority
over the demarcation, protection, management,
reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of
all public forests and forest reserves and over the
granting of licenses for game and fish, and for the
taking of forest products, including stone and earth
therefrom. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, as department head, may repeal or
modify the decision of the Director of Forestry when
advisable in the public interests, whose decision is in
turn appealable to the Office of the President.
Courts of justice devoid of jurisdiction to take
cognizance of purely administrative matters. In
giving due course to the complaint below, the
respondent court would necessarily have to assess
and evaluate anew all the evidence presented in the
administrative proceedings, which is beyond its
competence and jurisdiction. For the respondent
court to consider and weigh again the evidence
already presented and passed upon by said officials
would be to allow it to substitute its judgment for
that of said officials who are in a better position to
consider and weigh the same in the light of the
authority specifically vested in them by law. Such a
posture cannot be entertained, for it is a well-settled
doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not
interfere with purely administrative matters which
are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies and their expertise unless there is a clear
showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a
capricious and whimsical manner such that their
action may amount to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction.
A doctrine long recognized is that where the law
confines in an administrative office the power to
determine particular questions or matters, upon the
facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such office
shall prevail over the courts. The general rule, under
the principles of administrative law in force in this
jurisdiction, is that decisions of administrative
officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except
when the former have acted without or in excess of
their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
Findings of administrative officials and agencies who
have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters are generally accorded
not only respect but at times even finality of such
findings is supported by substantial evidence. As
recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged
court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially
factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of
grave abuse of discretion, has become well-nigh
indispensable.
JUANITO A. ROSARIO vs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, and ALEJANDRO CRUZ
G.R. No. 89554 July 10, 1992
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the dismissing his action
to annul and set aside the City Tenants' Security
Commission's Resolution No. 018-78, revoking the
award to him of Lot 3, being a portion of Lot 3, Block
3 of the former Teresa Estate II in Sampaloc, Manila,
and awarding it to the protestant, private respondent
Alejandro Cruz.
Page | 31
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
Pursuant to its "Land for the Landless Program," the
City of Manila, through its City Tenants' Security
Commission, undertook to subdivide and award
parcels of land of the former Teresa Estate II, in
Sampaloc, Manila, to the occupants thereof. Lot 3,
Block 3 was subdivided into three lots.
In 1958, private respondent Alejandro Cruz, who was
the original lessee of the area, subsequently,
constructed a residential house thereon. In the same
year, he sublet his house on Lot 3-A to the petitioner.
Availing of the City's "Land for the Landless
Program," both parties filed with the City Tenants'
Security Commission, their applications to purchase
Lots 3-A and 3-C. On June 24, 1977, Lot 3-A was
awarded to Rosario while Lot 3-C was awarded to
Cruz.
Not satisfied with just Lot 3-C, Cruz opposed the
award of Lot 3-A to Rosario on the ground that, as a
mere lessee of Cruz's house, and not a house owner-
applicant.
After conducting an investigation, the City Tenants'
Security Commission issued a Resolution No. 018-78
dated December 8, 1978 revoking the award of Lot
3-A to Rosario and awarding it to Cruz
the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint on
the ground that plaintiff had not been denied
procedural due process, and that he failed to exhaust
administrative remedies for he should have appealed
the resolution of the City Tenants' Security
Commission to the Office of the President before
seeking a judicial review thereof. As no appeal had
been taken in due time, the resolution became final
and executory.
ISSUE:
Whether court may dismiss the case on the ground
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(Whether the doctrine is jurisdictional)
RULING:
No. Unfortunately, both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals skirted that legal issue and simply
dismissed Rosario's petition for review of the
Resolution of the City Tenants' Security Commission
on the grounds of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and tardiness.
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not,
however, necessarily fatal to an action. Thus, did we
rule in Soto vs. Jareno, 144 SCRA 116:
Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court. The only effect of non-
compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the
complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground
for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper
time, this ground is deemed waived and the court
can then take cognizance of the case and try it.
It does not appear in this case that a motion to
dismiss based on non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies had been filed. We therefore feel, as we
did in a number of cases before this, that "where the
equities warrant such extraordinary recourse," the
petition may be given due course.
Interpreting Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 539
(after which the City Tenants' Security Commission
was modelled) this Court in Santiago, et al. vs. Cruz,
et al. (98 Phil. 168, 169) stressed that "the
intendment of the law is to award the lots to those
who may apply in the order mentioned" that is, the
"first choice is given to the bona fide'tenants,' the
second to the 'occupants' and the last to 'private
individuals.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 16755 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The award of Lot No. 3-A, Block 3 to the
private respondent, Alejandro Cruz, by the City
Tenants' Security Commission under its Resolution is
annulled and set aside. Petitioner Juanito A. Rosario
is declared to have a preferential right to purchase
Lot No. 3-A, and the City Tenants' Security
Commission is ordered to award the sale thereof to
him.
Petitioner Rosario may either reimburse respondent
for one-half of the value of the part of Cruz's house
situated on Lot 3-A and occupied by petitioner, or
allow Cruz to remove his house at his own expense.
If petitioner exercises the first option, the value of
the improvement shall be determined by a
committee composed of the parties or their
authorized representatives, and a representative of
the trial court.
Page | 32
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
JOSE T. VIDUYA, as collector of Customs of
the Port of Manila vs. EDUARDO BERDIAGO
alias EDUARDO BERTIAGO; and HON.
ANDRES REYES, as Presiding Judge of Branch
VI, Court of First Instance of Rizal
G.R. No. L-29218 October 29, 1976
FERNANDO, J.:
Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house,
persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may affect search and seizure without
a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
laws.
FACTS:
Respondent Berdiago is the owner of a Rolls Royce
car, Model 1966, which arrived in the Port of Manila
on January 8, 1968. However, the petitioner, Jose
Viduya, then Collector of Customs of Manila,
obtained reliable intelligence that fraudulent
documents were used by Berdiago in securing the
release of the car from the Bureau of Customs,
making it appear therein that the car was a 1961
model instead of a 1966 one, thus enabling
respondent to pay a much lower customs duty.
There was, accordingly, a formal demand for the
payment of the sum to cover the deficiency,
respondent manifesting his willingness to do so but
failing to live up to his promise. As the car was kept
in a dwelling house at the Yabut Compound, two
officials of the Customs Police Service as duly
authorized agents of petitioner, applied to
respondent Judge for a warrant to search said
dwelling house and to seize the Rolls Royce car found
therein.
Berdiago filed a motion to quash the search warrant
issued by the court based on lack of probable cause
to issue the warrant. Collector Viduya opposed,
alleging that Berdiago could not rely on the
constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure because it was not shown that he owned the
dwelling house which was searched. Nonetheless,
respondent Judge in the challenged order quashed
such search warrant.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in quashing the warrant.
RULING:
The Court opined that except in the case of the
search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search
and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws. There is justification
then for the insistence on the part of private
respondent that probable cause be shown. So
respondent Judge found in issuing the search
warrant.
Apparently, he was persuaded to quash it when he
noted that the warrant for seizure and detention
came later than its issuance. In thus acting,
respondent Judge apparently overlooked that long
before the search warrant was applied for, to be
specific on April 15, 1968, the misdeclaration and
underpayment was already noted and that thereafter
on April 24, 1968, private respondent himself agreed
to make good the further amount due but not in the
sum demanded.
As the car was kept in a dwelling house, petitioner
through two of his officers in the Customs Police
Service applied for and was able to obtain the search
warrant. Had there been no such move on the part
of petitioner, the duties expressly enjoined on him by
law assess and collect all lawful revenues, to prevent
and suppress smuggling and other frauds and to
enforce tariff and customs law would not have been
performed.
While therefore, it is to be admitted that his warrant
of seizure and detention came later than the search
warrant, there were indubitable facts in existence at
that time to call for its issuance. Certainly, there was
probable cause. There was evidently need for the
issuance of a search warrant. It ought not to have
been thereafter quashed.
TOMAS CHIA vs. THE ACTING COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS, HON ALFREDO T. FRANCISCO,
Port Area, Manila, and, GENER SULA ASAC,
Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City
G.R. No. L-43810 September 26, 1989
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
A verified report of a confidential informant that
asserted electronic and electrical equipment and
other articles illegally imported into the Philippines
by a syndicate engaged in unlawful shipside
Page | 33
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
activities (foreign goods are unloaded form foreign
ships in transit through the Bureau of Customs,
thereby evading payment of the corresponding
customs duties, and were found inside the Toms
electronics and Sony Merchandising after
valuation, the Collector of Customs issued warrants
of seizure and detention Nos: 14925 ad 14925-A.
Search Warrant:
Various electronics equipment like cassette tape
recorders, car stereos, phonograph needles, portable
TV sets, imported long playing records, spare parts
of TVs and Radios and other electrical appliances.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrants of seizure and detention are
general warrant issued in violation of Rule 126,
Sections 3 of Rules of Court and thus affect the
power of Custom as an Administrative body.
RULING:
NO. Section 2208 (Customs) Tariff and Customs
Code Right of Police Officer to enter in closure, a
warehouse, store, or other building or in closure used
for keeping or storage or articles does not become a
dwelling house within the meaning.
Section 2536 (Seizure of other articles) The
Commissioner of Customs and Collector of Customs
and or any other Customs officer, with the prior
authorization in writing by the commissioner, may
demand evidence of payment of duties and taxes on
foreign articles.
Search of Dwelling House (Section 2209) Upon
warrant issued by a Judge of the Court or such other
responsible officers as may be authorized by law,
upon sworn application showing probable cause and
particularly describing the place to be searched and
the person or thing to be seized.
The warrants issued by the Collector of Customs in
this case were not general warrant, as erroneously
alleged by petitioner for they identified the stores to
be seized, described the articles to be seized and
specified the provision of the Tariff and Customs
Code.
Admin law: Upon effecting the seizure of the
goods, the Bureau of Customs acquired exclusive
jurisdiction not only over the case but also over the
goods seized for the purpose of enforcing the tariff
and customs laws.
A party dissatisfied with the decision of the Collector
may appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, whose
decision is appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals in
the manner and within the period prescribed by law
and regulations. The decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals may be elevated to the Supreme Court for
review (Secs. 2309-2316; 2401 & 2402 of the Tariff
and Customs Code; Collector of Customs vs. Torres,
et al., 45 SCRA 272).
Since petitioner did not exhaust his administrative
remedies, his recourse to this Court is premature
(Acting Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila vs.
Caluag, 20 SCRA 204; Laganapan vs. Asedillo, 154
SCRA 377; National Development Co. vs. Hervilla,
151 SCRA 520). If for no other reason, the petition
is dismissible on that score.
BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO B.
ZAMORA
G.R. Nos. 142801-802. July 10, 2001
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she
created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling
operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President
Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He
subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be
separated from the service. Thereafter, he created
the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force
Aduana, which EIIB employees claim to be
essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB,
through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the
Supreme Courts power of judicial review in
questioning the said orders. EIIB employees
maintained that the president has no power to
abolish a public office, as that is a power solely
lodged in the legislature; and that the abolition
violates their constitutional right to security of
tenure.
ISSUE:
Whether the president has the power to abolish
office and whether petitioners were deprived of their
right to security of tenure.
Page | 34
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
RULING:
No. It is a general rule that the power to abolish a
public office is lodged with the legislature.
The exception is when it comes to agencies, bureaus,
and other offices under the executive department,
the president may deactivate them pursuant to
control power over such offices, unless such office is
created by the Constitution.
This is also germane to the presidents power to
reorganize the Office of the President. Basis of such
power also has its roots in two laws i.e., PD 1772 and
PD 1416.
These decrees expressly grant the President of the
Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, which includes the power to
group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish
offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize
salaries and materials. The limition to this power to
reorganize is that it must be pursued in good faith.
Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the
abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations has always
exceeded P100 million per year. To save the
government some money, it needed to abolish it and
replace it with TF Aduana which has for its allocation
just P50 million. Further, TYF Aduana is invested
more power that EIIB never had, i.e., search and
seizure and arrest. Lastly, EEIB employees right to
security of tenure is not violated. Since there is no
bad faith in the abolition of EIIB, such abolition is not
infirm. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor
separation of the incumbents. If the public office
ceases to exist, there is no separation or dismissal to
speak of. Indeed, there is no such thing as an
absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
vested right in an office or its salary.
AQUILINO T. LARIN vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
G.R. No. 112745 October 16, 1997
TORRES, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Aquilino Larin was an Assistant Commissioner in the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). He was in charge
of the office of the Excise Tax Service. In 1992, the
Sandiganbayan convicted Larin for grave
misconduct. His conviction was reported to the Office
of the President, at the same time, an administrative
complaint was filed with the same office. The
President then, based on the Sandiganbayan
conviction, created a committee to investigate Larin.
Eventually, Larins removal was recommended. The
President dismissed Larin.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Larin was removed from office
properly (with just cause)
2. Whether the reorganization in this case was
pursued in good faith.
RULING:
1. No. Larin is a presidential appointee who belongs
to the career service of the Civil Service. Although it
is a general rule that the power to remove is inherent
in the power to appoint, such power to remove I with
limitations. In the case at bar, the limitation can be
found in the fact that Larin is a career service officer
and under the Administrative Code of 1987, such
officers who fall under career service are
characterized by the existence of security of tenure,
as contra-distinguished from non-career service
whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the
appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or
limited to a period specified by law or to the duration
of a particular project for which purpose the
employment was made. As a career service officer,
Larin enjoys the right to security of tenure. He can
only be removed from his office on grounds
enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987. In
the case at bar, the basis for his removal was his
conviction in the Sandiganbayan this is not one of
those grounds enumerated in the Administrative
Code. Further, the Supreme Court notes that when
Larins conviction was appealed to the Supreme
Court, the Supreme Court actually absolved Larin.
2. No. It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which
amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These
decrees expressly grant the President of the
Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, which includes the power to
group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish
offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize
salaries and materials.
While the President's power to reorganize cannot be
denied, this does not mean however that the
reorganization itself is properly made in accordance
Page | 35
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
with law. Well-settled is the rule that reorganization
is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good
faith. Thus, in Dario vs. Mison, this Court has had the
occasion to clarify that:
As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in
"good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no
dismissal or separation actually occurs because the
position itself ceases to exist. And in that case the
security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be
that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else
but a separation or removal, is done for political
reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or
otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes
place and whatever abolition is done is void ab initio.
There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely
a change of nomenclature of positions or where
claims of economy are belied by the existence of
ample funds.
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Section 2
of R. A. No. 6656 lists down the circumstances
evidencing bad faith in the removal of employees as
a result of the reorganization, thus:
Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service
shall be removed except for a valid cause and after
due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal
exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization,
a position has been abolished or rendered redundant
or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate
positions in order to meet the exigencies of the
service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil
Service Law. The existence of any or some of the
following circumstances may be considered as
evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a
result of the reorganization, giving rise to a claim for
reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved
party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number
of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned;
b) Where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is
created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the
department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially the same functions as
the original offices;
e) Where the removal violates the order of
separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
A reading of some of the provisions of the questioned
E.O. No. 132 clearly leads the court to an inescapable
conclusion that there are circumstances considered
as evidences of bad faith in the reorganization of the
BIR. (Example: the increase of number of
employees.)
THE UNITED STATES vs. ANICETO BARRIAS
G.R. No. 4349. September 24, 1908
TRACEY, J.:
FACTS:
In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136),
authorized the Collector of Customs to regulate the
business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business
involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or
cascos (small ships/boats).
The said law also provides that the Collector may
promulgate such rules to implement Act No. 1136.
Further, Act No. 1136 provides that in case a fine is
to be imposed, it should not exceed one hundred
dollars. Pursuant to this, the Collector promulgated
Circular No. 397.
Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating
the Pasig River using a lighter which is manually
powered by bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a
violation of Circular No. 397 because under said
Circular, only steam powered ships should be
allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in the
information against Barrias, it was alleged that the
imposable penalty against him should be a fine not
exceeding P500.00 at the discretion of the court
this was pursuant to Circular No. 397 which provides:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing
regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to
a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500,
in the discretion of the court. Barrias now challenged
the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is
entirely different from the penal provision of Act. No.
1136 which only provided a penalty of not exceeding
$100.00 (Note at that time the peso-dollar exchange
was more or less equal).
ISSUE:
Whether the penal provision in the Circular is valid.
Page | 36
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
RULING:
No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different
range of penalty different from that specified by
Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so, then in
effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to
legislate penalties. One of the settled maxims in
constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon
the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by
that department to anybody or authority. Where the
sovereign power of the State has located the
authority, there it must remain; only by the
constitutional agency alone the laws must be made
until the constitution itself is changed.
The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and
patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted
cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing
other agencies upon which the power shall be
developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for
those to which alone the people have seen fit to
confide this sovereign trust. This doctrine is based
on the ethical principle that such a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of
his own judgment acting immediately upon the
matter of legislation and not through the intervening
mind of another. The Collector cannot exercise a
power exclusively lodged in Congress.
Hence, Barrias should be penalized in accordance to
the penalty being imposed by Act No. 1136. In this
case, the Supreme Court determined that the proper
fine is $25.00.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. COURT OF
TAX APPEALS and FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 119761 August 29, 1996
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Fortune Tobacco Corporation is engaged in the
manufacture of different brands of cigarettes. On
various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to
the corporation separate certificates of trademark
registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More"
cigarettes. The CIR initially classified 'Champion,'
'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were
listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to
foreign companies. However, Fortune changed the
names of 'Hope' to Hope Luxury' and 'More' to
'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands
from the foreign brand category. Fortune also
submitted proof the BIR that 'Champion' was an
original register and therefore a local brand. Ad
Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands. RA
7654 was passed in it was provided that 55% ad
valorem tax will be imposed on local brands carrying
a foreign name. Two days before the effectivity of
RA 7654, the BIR issued Revenue Memorandum
Circular No. 37-93, in which Fortune was to be
imposed 55% ad valorem tax on the three brands
classifying them as local brands carrying a foreign
name. Fortune filed a petition with the CTA which
was granted finding the RMC as defective. The CIR
filed a motion for reconsideration with the CTA which
was denied, then to the CA, an appeal, which was
also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the RMC was valid.
RULING:
NO. The RMC was made to place the three brands
as locally made cigarettes bearing foreign brands
and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654.
Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory
provisions applied to locally manufactured cigarettes
which at the time of its effectivity were not so
classified as bearing foreign brands. Prior to the
issuance of the RMC, the brands were subjected to
45% ad valorem tax. In so doing, the BIR not simply
interpreted the law but it legislated under its quasi-
legislative authority. The due observance of the
requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication
should not have been then ignored. The Court is
convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93
has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative
issuance.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 172598. December 21, 2007
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
In 1988, BIR sent a collection letter to Petitioner
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) for
alleged deficiency excise tax liabilities of PhP
1,705,028,008.06 for the taxable years 1992 and
1994 to 1997, inclusive of delinquency surcharges
and interest. As basis for the collection letter, the BIR
Page | 37
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
alleged that PSPC is not a qualified transferee of the
TCCs it acquired from other BOI-registered
companies.
These alleged excise tax deficiencies covered by the
collection letter were already paid by PSPC with TCCs
acquired through, and issued and duly authorized by
the Center, and duly covered by Tax Debit
Memoranda (TDM) of both the Center and BIR, with
the latter also issuing the corresponding Accept
Payment for Excise Taxes (APETs). PSPC protested
the collection letter, but it was denied. Because of
respondent inaction on a motion for reconsideration
PSPC filed a petition for review before the CTA. In
1999, the CTA ruled that the use by PSPC of the TCCs
was legal and valid, and that respondents attempt
to collect alleged delinquent taxes and penalties from
PSPC without an assessment constitutes denial of
due process.
Respondent elevated CTA Decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA) through a petition for review.
Despite the pendency of this case, PSPC received
assessment letter from respondent for excise tax
deficiencies, surcharges, and interest based on the
first batch of cancelled TCCs and TDM covering
PSPCs use of the TCCs. All these cancelled TDM and
TCCs were also part of the subject matter of the now
pending before the CA. PSPC protested the
assessment letter, but the protest was denied by the
BIR, constraining it to file another case before the
CTA. Subsequently, CTA ruled in favor of PSPC and
accordingly cancelled and set aside the assessment
issued by the respondent. Respondent motion for
reconsideration of the above decision which was
rejected thus respondent appealed the above
decision before the CTA En Banc.
The CTA En Banc ruled in favor of respondent and
ordered PSPC to pay the amount of P570,577,401.61
as deficiency excise tax for the taxable years 1992
and 1994 to 1997, inclusive of 25% surcharge and
20% interest.
ISSUE:
1. Whether petitioner is liable for the assessment of
deficiency excise tax after the validly issued TCCs
were subsequently cancelled for having been issued
fraudulently.
2. Whether petitioner was denied procedural due
process.
RULING:
1. No. Petitioner is not liable for the assessment of
deficiency excise tax. In the instant case, with due
application, approval, and acceptance of the
payment by PSPC of the subject TCCs for its then
outstanding excise tax liabilities in 1992 and 1994 to
1997, the subject TCCs have been canceled as the
money value of the tax credits these represented
have been used up.
Therefore, the DOF through the Center may not now
cancel the subject TCCs as these have already been
canceled and used up after their acceptance as
payment for PSPCs excise tax liabilities. What has
been used up, debited, and canceled cannot
anymore be declared to be void, ineffective, and
canceled anew. Besides, it is indubitable that with
the issuance of the corresponding TDM, not only is
the TCC canceled when fully utilized, but the
payment is also final subject only to a post-audit on
computational errors. Under RR 5-2000, a TDM is a
certification, duly issued by the Commissioner or his
duly authorized representative, reduced in a BIR
Accountable Form in accordance with the prescribed
formalities, acknowledging that the taxpayer named
therein has duly paid his internal revenue tax liability
in the form of and through the use of a Tax Credit
Certificate, duly issued and existing in accordance
with the provisions of these Regulations. The Tax
Debit Memo shall serve as the official receipt from
the BIR evidencing a taxpayers payment or
satisfaction of his tax obligation. The amount shown
therein shall be charged against and deducted from
the credit balance of the aforesaid Tax Credit
Certificate. Thus, with the due issuance of TDM by
the Center and TDM by the BIR, the payments made
by PSPC with the use of the subject TCCs have been
effected and consummated as the TDMs serve as the
official receipts evidencing PSPCs payment or
satisfaction of its tax obligation. Moreover, the BIR
not only issued the corresponding TDM, but it also
issued ATAPETs which doubly show the payment of
the subject excise taxes of PSPC. Based on the above
discussion, we hold that respondent erroneously and
without factual and legal basis levied the
assessment. Consequently, the CTA En Banc erred in
sustaining respondents assessment.
2. Yes. The facts show that PSPC was not accorded
due process before the assessment was levied on it.
The Center required PSPC to submit certain sales
documents relative to supposed delivery of IFOs by
PSPC to the TCC transferors. PSPC contends that it
could not submit these documents as the transfer of
the subject TCCs did not require that it be a supplier
Page | 38
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
of materials and/or component supplies to the
transferors in a letter dated October 29, 1999 which
was received by the Center on November 3, 1999.
On the same day, the Center informed PSPC of the
cancellation of the subject TCCs and the TDM
covering the application of the TCCs to PSPCs excise
tax liabilities. The objections of PSPC were brushed
aside by the Center and the assessment was issued
by respondent on November 15, 1999, without
following the statutory and procedural requirements
clearly provided under the NIRC and applicable
regulations.
What is applicable is RR 12-99, which superseded RR
12-85, pursuant to Sec. 244 in relation to Sec. 245
of the NIRC implementing Secs. 6, 7, 204, 228, 247,
248, and 249 on the assessment of national internal
revenue taxes, fees, and charges. The procedures
delineated in the said statutory provisos and RR 12-
99 were not followed by respondent, depriving PSPC
of due process in contesting the formal assessment
levied against it. Respondent ignored RR 12-99 and
did not issue PSPC a notice for informal
conference and a preliminary assessment notice, as
required. PSPCs November 4, 1999 motion for
reconsideration of the purported Center findings and
cancellation of the subject TCCs and the TDM was
not even acted upon.
PSPC was merely informed that it is liable for the
amount of excise taxes it declared in its excise tax
returns for 1992 and 1994 to 1997 covered by the
subject TCCs via the formal letter of demand and
assessment notice. For being formally defective, the
November 15, 1999 formal letter of demand and
assessment notice is void. Paragraph 3.1.4 of Sec. 3,
RR 12-99 pertinently provides:
3.1.4 Formal Letter of Demand and Assessment
Notice.The formal letter of demand and
assessment notice shall be issued by the
Commissioner or his duly authorized representative.
The letter of demand calling for payment of the
taxpayers deficiency tax or taxes shall state the
facts, the law, rules and regulations, or jurisprudence
on which the assessment is based, otherwise, the
formal letter of demand and assessment
notice shall be void. The same shall be sent to the
taxpayer only by registered mail or by personal
delivery. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
In short, respondent merely relied on the findings of
the Center which did not give PSPC ample
opportunity to air its side. While PSPC indeed
protested the formal assessment, such does not
denigrate the fact that it was deprived of statutory
and procedural due process to contest the
assessment before it was issued.
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION vs. NLRC and DANILO
MERCADO
G.R. No. 79182 September 11, 1991
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
In June 1985, Danilo Mercado was dismissed by
PNOC-Energy Development Corporation (PNOC-
EDC) due to serious acts of dishonesty allegedly
committed by Mercado. Mercado then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against PNOC-EDC.
PNOC-EDC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the Labor arbiter and/or the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) has no jurisdiction
over PNOC-EDC because it is a subsidiary of the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), a
government owned or controlled corporation, and as
a subsidiary, it is also a GOCC and as such, the
proper forum for Mercados suit is the Civil Service
Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PBOC-EDC is correct.
RULING:
No. The issue in this case has been decided already
in the case of PNOC-EDC vs Leogardo. It is true that
PNOC is a GOCC and that PNOC-EDC, being a
subsidiary of PNOC, is likewise a GOCC. It is also true
that under the 1973 Constitution, all GOCCs are
under the jurisdiction of the CSC. However, the 1987
Constitution change all this as it now provides: The
Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. (Article IX-B,
Section 2 [1]) Hence, the above provision sets the
rule that the mere fact that a corporation is a GOCC
does not automatically place it under the CSC. Under
this provision, the test in determining whether a
GOCC is subject to the Civil Service Law is the
manner of its creation such that government
corporations created by special charter are subject
to its provisions while those incorporated under the
general Corporation Law are not within its coverage.
In the case at bar, PNOC-EDC, even though it is a
GOCC, was incorporated under the general
Corporation Law it does not have its own charter,
hence, it is under the jurisdiction of the MOLE. Even
though the facts of this case occurred while the 1973
Constitution was still in force, the provisions of the
Page | 39
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
1987 Constitution regarding the legal matters
[procedural aspect] are applicable because it is the
law in force at the time of the decision.
FELICITO R. QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN
(OMBUDSMAN), GREG DIMAANO and DANNY
F. REMO
G.R. No. 72553 December 2, 1986
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with respondent Tanodbayan a
complaint against private respondents for violation
of Republic Act No. 3091 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).
Petitioner alleged that Admiral Adjusters and
Surveyors, Inc. (AASI), of which he was the
president, was engaged by Petrophil Corporation to
render survey services for one (1) year from March
1, 1982 to February 28, 1983; that upon the
expiration of the contract, it was renewed for
another period of one (1) year, from March 1, 1983
to February 2, 1984; that sometime in October,
1983, private respondents Greg Dimaano and Danny
Remo, as manager and analyst, respectively, of the
Bulk Distribution Department and MPED of Petrophil
Corporation, caused the withholding of the fees due
AASI and required AASI to submit an explanation of
the losses caused by leaking valves as reflected in
AASI's survey reports; that despite AASI's
explanation, private respondents still refused to
release the payments and even threatened to forfeit
AASI's performance bond and claim damages and
losses from AASI; that despite AASI's submission of
several explanations, private respondents refused to
release the fees amounting to P147,300.00.
Private respondents moved to dismiss the Complaint
alleging lack of jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan, which
Motion was opposed by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether PETROPHIL Corporation, a subsidiary of the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), is a
government-owned or controlled corporation, whose
employees fall under Tanodbayan jurisdiction, or
not.
RULLING:
Employees of PETROPHIL Corporation fall under
Tanodbayan jurisdiction.
It has to be conceded that PETROPHIL was not
created by special law. As the incumbent Solicitor
General has pointed out, it was originally created as
a private corporation under the Corporation Law with
the name Standard Vacuum Oil Company
(STANVAC). STANVAC was taken over by Esso
Philippines, which was, in turn, bought by Esso
Eastern Standard. Eventually, Esso Eastern Standard
was purchased by the Philippine National Oil
Corporation (PNOC), and its corporate name was
changed to Petrophil Corporation.
While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally
"created" as a government-owned or controlled
corporation, after it was acquired by PNOC, which is
a government-owned or controlled corporation,
PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus
shed-off its private status. It is now funded and
owned by the government as, in fact, it was acquired
to perform functions related to government
programs and policies on oil, a vital commodity in the
economic life of the nation. It was acquired not
temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform
essential government or government-related
functions, as the marketing arm of PNOC to assist
the latter in selling and distributing oil and petroleum
products to assure and maintain an adequate and
stable domestic supply.
It should make no substantial difference that it was
not originally "created" as a government-owned or
controlled corporation. What is decisive is that it has
since been acquired by the Government to perform
functions related to government programs and
policies on oil.
The meaning thus given to "government-owned or
controlled corporations" for purposes of the civil
service provision should likewise apply for purposes
of the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan provisions,
otherwise, incongruity would result, and a
government-owned corporation could create as
many subsidiary corporations under the Corporation
Code as it wishes, which would then be free from
strict accountability and could escape the liabilities
and responsibilities provided for by law. This device
was liberally made use of during the past regime to
the detriment of budgetary restraints and of fiscal
accountability by "private" corporations thus created.
Page | 40
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
ALLIED SERVICES vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION and
ATTY. VIRGILIO SY, as Officer-in-Charge of
the Bureau of Labor Relations
G.R. No. L-49677 May 4, 1989
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the
conduct of a certification election with Regional
Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in order to
determine the exclusive bargaining representative of
the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members
comprised the majority of the employees of the
corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-
arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated
November 7, 1977, holding that NHC "being a
government-owned and/or controlled corporation its
employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or
assist any labor organization for purposes of
collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II,
Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code."
From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the
Bureau of Labor Relations where, acting thereon in
BLR Case No. A-984-77 (RO4-MED-1090-77),
Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of
dismissal and ordered the holding of a certification
election. This order was, however, set aside by
Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of
November 21, 1978 6 upon a motion for
reconsideration of respondent NHC.
In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the
reversal of the said resolution and prays that a
certification election be held among the rank and file
employees of NHC.
ISSUE:
Whether the employees of NHC have the right to
form union being employees of the GOCC.
RULING:
With respect to other civil servants, that is,
employees of all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the government
including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters and who are,
therefore, covered by the civil service laws, the
guidelines for the exercise of their right to organize
is provided for under Executive Order No. 180.
Chapter IV thereof, consisting of Sections 9 to 12,
regulates the determination of the "sole and
exclusive employees representative"; Under Section
12, "where there are two or more duly registered
employees' organizations in the appropriate
organization unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations
shall, upon petition order the conduct of certification
election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive
representative of the rank-and-file employees in said
organizational unit."
Parenthetically, note should be taken of the specific
qualification in the Constitution that the State "shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law" and that they shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided
by law."
ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
assailed resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
dated November 21, 1978, is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE and the conduct of a certification election
among the affected employees of respondent
National Housing Corporation in accordance with the
rules therefor is hereby GRANTED.
NOTES:
ARTICLE IX-A:
Section 2. No member of a Constitutional
Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other
office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the
practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which, in any
way, may be affected by the functions of his office,
nor shall he be financially interested, directly or
indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.
ARTICLE IX-B
Section 5. The Congress shall provide for the
standardization of compensation of government
officials and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, taking into account the nature of
the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
qualifications required for, their positions.
Page | 41
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
ARTICLE IX-D
Section 2 (1)
The Commission on Audit shall have the power,
authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures or uses of funds and property,
owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, and on
a post- audit basis:
a. constitutional bodies, commissions and
offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution;
b. autonomous state colleges and universities;
c. other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and
d. such non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from
or through the Government, which are
required by law or the granting institution
to submit to such audit as a condition of
subsidy or equity. However, where the
internal control system of the audited
agencies is inadequate, the Commission
may adopt such measures, including
temporary or special pre-audit, as are
necessary and appropriate to correct the
deficiencies. It shall keep the general
accounts of the Government and, for such
period as may be provided by law, preserve
the vouchers and other supporting papers
pertaining thereto.
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Classifications of Positions under CSC Law
READ AND MASTER
CHAPTER 2,, SEC. 7, SUB A, TITLE I, BOOK 5
OF EO 292 (Career and non-career position of
CSC)
Chapter 2 Coverage of the Civil Service
SEC. 6. Scope of the Civil Service.
(1) The Civil Service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
(2) Positions in the Civil Service shall be classified
into career service and noncareer service.
SEC. 7. Career Service.
The Career Service shall be characterized by
(1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be
determined as far as practicable by competitive
examination, or based on highly technical
qualifications;
(2) opportunity for advancement to higher career
positions; and
(3) security of tenure.
The Career Service shall include:
(1) Open Career positions, appointment to which
prior qualification in an appropriate examination is
required;
(2) Closed Career position which are scientific or
highly technical in nature; these include the faculty
and academic staff of state colleges and universities,
and scientific and technical positions in scientific or
research institutions which shall establish and
maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service, namely,
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional
Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers of equivalent
rank as may be identified by the Career Executive
Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
President;
Page | 42
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
(4) Career officers other than those in the Career
Executive Service, who are appointed by the
President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the
Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the
Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit
system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether performing governmental or
proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-
career service; and
(7) Permanent laborer, whether skilled, semi-skilled,
or unskilled.
SEC. 9. Non-Career Service.
The Non-Career Service shall be characterized by
(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual
tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career
service; and
(2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by
law, or which is coterminous with that of the
appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or
which is limited to the duration of a particular project
for which purpose employment was made.
The Non-Career Service shall include:
(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential
staff;
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank
who hold their positions at the pleasure of the
President and their personal or confidential staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and
boards with fixed terms of office and their personal
or confidential staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those who employment
in the government is in accordance with a special
contract to undertake a specific work or job,
requiring special or technical skills not available in
the employing agency, to be accomplished within a
specific period, which in no case shall exceed one
year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work
or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum
of direction and supervision form the hiring agency;
and
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.
AS TO THE NATURE OF APPOINTMENT AND
DEFINITION
PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG MAYNILA vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-65439 November 13, 1985
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Dr. Esteban had been a permanent employee in the
government for 25 years. Until May 20, 1973, he was
officially connected with the Philippine College of
Commerce (PCC) as its Vice President for Academic
Affairs. However, the position he held was abolished
due to PCC Board of Director's move to streamline
the college organization. Dr. Estaban was given by
PCC an option to continue teaching therein which he
accepted until his transfer to the Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM) upon the invitation of its
President Dr. Consuelo Blanco.
At PLM, Dr. Esteban was initially extended an ad
interim temporary appointment as Vice President for
Administration by Dr. Blanco and from that Dr.
Esteban received his "Notification of Confirmation of
Temporary Appointment from the PLM's Secretary on
June 28, 1973.
The temporary appointments of Dr. Esteban as Vice
President for Administration was renewed and
extended several times and it continuous for almost
two and half years until he discovered that he was
not included in the list of employees recommended
for permanent appointments. He requested Dr.
Blanco to convert his temporary appointment into a
permanent one but it was not granted.
On August 7, 1975, Dr. Consuelo Blanco issued a
memorandum circular terminating Dr. Esteban's
appointment as VP for Administration. Dr. Esteban
appealed to CSC for the protection of his tenure in
the Pamantasan.
ISSUE:
Whether Dr. Esteban holds the position in a
permanent capacity as to guarantee a security of
tenure.
Page | 43
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
RULING:
Yes.
Dr Esteban had been extended several "ad
interim appointments which PLM mistakenly
understands the term ad interim as appointments
temporary in nature. In referring to Dr. Esteban's
appointment, the term is not descriptive of the
nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, it
is used to denote the manner in which said
appointments were made, that is, done by the
President of PLM in the meantime, while the Board
of Regents, which is originally vested by the
University Charter with the power of appointment, is
unable to act.
Not only is the appointment in question an ad interim
appointment, but the same is also a confirmed ad
interim appointment. In its Resolution No. 485, dated
June 20, 1973, the PLM Board of Regents verified Dr.
Esteban's appointment without condition nor
limitation as to tenure. As of that moment, it became
a regular and permanent appointment.
In other words, if the Board is in session, the PLM
President merely nominates while the Board issues
the appointment. But when the Board is not in
session, the President is authorized to issue ad
interim appointment. Such appointments are
permanent but their terms are only until the Board
disapproves them. If confirmed, the appointee's term
is converted into the regular term inherent in the
position.
DEFINITION OF APPOINTMENT
Appointment is one of the means by which a person
may claim a right to a public office. It means the
selection by the authority vested with the power of
an individual who is to exercise the functions of a
given office. It is an act of designation by the
executive officer, board or body to whom that power
has been delegated, of the person who is to exercise
the duties and responsibilities of the given position.
It is also equivalent to filling a vacancy.
ROBERTO A. FLORES ET. AL, v. HON.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d) of RA 7227
otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992 is challenged in this
original petition.
Under Section 13, par. (d) RA 7227:
"The President shall appoint a professional manager
as the Administrator of the Subic Authority with a
compensation to be determined by the Board subject
to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall
be the ex-officio chairman of the Board and who shall
serve as the Chief Executive Officer of the Subic
Authority. Provided, however, that for the first year
of its operations from the effectivity of this act, the
Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as
the Chairman and Chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority."
Respondent Franklin Drilon was then the incumbent
Mayor of the City of Olongapo.
With this petitioner, who claims to be taxpayers,
employees of the US Facility at the Subic Zambales
and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian
Employees Association in US Facilities in the
Philippines, maintain that the provision in par (d) of
Section 13 infringes the following constitutional and
statutory provisions:
(a) Sec. 7 (1) Art. IX-B of the Constitution, which
states that "no elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure."
(b) Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, which
provides that the President shall appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint.
(c) Sec. 261 par. (g) of the Omnibus Election Code
which provides Prohibition on Appointments within
prohibited 45-day period prior to the May 11, 1992
Elections.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the proviso violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation of
elective officials to other government posts.
2. Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex
officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and
thus an excepted circumstance.
3. Whether or not the Constitutional provision
allowing an elective official to receive
double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be
useless if no elective official may be appointed to
another post.
4. Whether there is legislative encroachment on the
appointing authority of the President.
Page | 44
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
5. Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per
diems, allowances and other emoluments which he
may have received pursuant to his appointment.
HELD:
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of
the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his
tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the
President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor
of Olongapo City, to other government post (as
Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what
the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a
situation where a local elective official will work for
his appointment in an executive position in
government, and thus neglect his constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the
SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office
of the Mayor without need of appointment. The
phrase shall be appointed unquestionably shows
the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and
not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo
City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of
the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President
for example, an elective official who may be
appointed to a cabinet post, may receive
the compensation attached to the cabinet position if
specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the
President the power to appoint the Chairman of
SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the
Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the
heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves
an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence,
when Congress clothes the President with the power
to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit
the choice of the President to only one candidate.
Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion
of the appointing power to choose and constitutes
an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets
the qualifications of the officer during the
first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the
Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of
congressional authority to prescribe qualifications
where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the
ineligibility of an elective official
for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first
from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-
attached disqualification before he may be
considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as
long as he is an incumbent, an elective official
remains ineligible for appointment to another public
office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is
ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence,
his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He
however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his
acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and
void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and
in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such
benefits.
OSCAR BERMUDEZ ET. AL. vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES ET. AL
G.R. No. 131429. August 4, 1999
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
There occurred a vacancy in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac. Justice Sec. Teofisto
Guingona, Jr. recommended First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Tarlac and OIC of Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor Oscar Bermudez while Conrado
Quiaoit on the otherhand was supported by then
Rep. Jose Yap of the Second Legislative District of
Tarlac.
On June 30, 1997, Quiaoit emerged the victor when
he was appointed by then President Ramos to the
coveted office. Quiaoit assumed office upon receipt
of his certified xerox copy of appointment and after
taking an oath. However, Bermudez still refuse to
vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Bermudez contends that the provision under Book
IV, Title III, Chapter II, Section 9 of the Revised
Administrative Code (RAC) of 1987 is not complied
for the appointment of Quiaoit lacks
recommendation from Justice Secretary.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a need for recommendation from
Justice Secretary to make respondent's appointment
effective.
Page | 45
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
RULING:
No, the provision given in Section 9 of RAC of 1987
must not be misunderstood. Under the said
provision:
"All provincial and City Prosecutors and their
assistants shall be appointed by the President upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice"
This provision must not be construed as a mandatory
requirement of prior recommendation by the Justice
Secretary. There is no fast rule in ascertaining
whether the language in a statute should be
considered mandatory or directory. More often than
not, it is addressed on a case to case basis taking
into consideration and determining the nature,
structure and aim of the law itself by looking at the
legislative intent.
In this case, the provision is not mandatory in
character. The power to appoint is, in essence a
discretionary one.
An appointment to public office is the unequivocal
act of designating or selecting by one having the
authority therefor of an individual to discharge and
perform the duties and functions of an office or trust.
Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of
discretion on the part of the appointing authority.
The appointing power has the right of choice which
he may exercise freely according to his judgment,
deciding for himself who is best qualified among
those who have the necessary qualifications and
eligibility.
The Constitution clothed the President with the
power to appoint a subordinate officer. Being the
head of the government, his authority includes the
power of control over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices, and the power to assume
directly the functions of the latter. Hence, the
President can interfere in the exercise of discretion
of officials under him or altogether ignore their
recommendations.
Applying this, the phrase "upon recommendation of
the Secretary should be interpreted as a mere
advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is
essentially persuasive in character and not binding or
obligatory upon the party whom it is made.
NOTES:
An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal
act of designating or selecting by one having the
authority therefor of an individual to discharge and
perform the duties and functions of an office or trust.
The appointment is deemed complete once the last
act required of the appointing authority has been
complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the
appointee in order to render it effective.
Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of
discretion on the part of the appointing authority.
The Constitution or law clothes the President with
the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such
conferment must be understood as necessarily
carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to
appoint. The President is the head of government
whose authority includes the power of control over
all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
Control means the authority of an empowered officer
to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what
a subordinate officer has done in the performance of
his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of
the latter, as and when the former deems it to be
appropriate. Expressed in another way, the President
has the power to assume directly the functions of an
executive department, bureau and office.
NULLIFICATION OF APPOINTMENT (Is it valid
on the ground that someone is better?
DANILO F.C. RIMONTE vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN and HENRIETTA F. ROQUE
G.R. No. 112045 May 29, 1995
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner was the incumbent Planning Officer III in
the Office of the Ombudsman. Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez issued Office Order No. 90-32 directing
the implementation of the "performance appraisal
system" as a basis for evaluation of providing for the
"General Policy and Procedural Guidelines in the
Placement of Personnel for the New Staffing
Pattern".
Petitioner applied to different positions including any
of the positions of Records Officer V of the Central
Records Division. Petitioner was appointed to the
position of Associate Graft Investigation Officer III
while Henrietta F. Roque was appointed Records
Officer V.
Petitioner filed a protest on Roque's appointment to
CSC and assailed that he has the better qualifications
than her. However, CSC denied his protest, the same
with his motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. Whether CSC commits grave abuse of discretion.
Page | 46
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
2. Whether the appointment made by the appointing
authority may be disregarded on the ground that
someone has better qualification than the appointed
officer.
RULING:
1. No. CSC is correct in ruling that the appointment
of Roque to the position is proper and that she is
qualified to the disputed position.
The CSC is the single arbiter of all contests relating
to Civil Service; as such its judgement are
unappealable and subject only to certiorari
jurisdiction of the Court.
CSC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in the
exercise of its jurisdiction in attesting to the
appointment of Roque. As long as the appointee is
qualified, the CSC has no choice but to attest and to
respect the appointment even if it be proved that
there are others with superior credentials. The law
limits the Commissions authority only to whether or
not the appointees possess the legal qualifications
and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing
else.
In this case, CSC founds out that Roque possesses
all qualifications to the position. Now the discretion
to appoint her leaves to the appointing authority.
2. No. The power of appointment is essentially
discretionary provided the appointee is qualified.
Even though someone is said to be better or proved
to have superior credentials, the head of the agency
who is the appointing power is the one most
knowledgeable to decide who can best perform the
functions of the office.
NEXT IN RANK: Is it Necessary?
ALEX A. ABILA vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION and FLORENTINA E. ELERIA
G.R. No. 92573 June 3, 1991
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:
Alex A. Abila, Acting Assistant Civil Security Officer of
Civil Intelligence and Security Department of the
Quezon City Government was appointed by then
Officer-in-Charge Brigido Simon Jr. to the vacant
position of Admin Officer IV in the Health
Department due to the retirement of Amado
Villafuerte.
Florentina Eleria, Administrative Officer III of Health
Department filed a protest with the Merit System
Protection Board (Board) in respect of Abilas
appointment. The Board dismissed her protest but
later on appeal to the same Board. The latter
promulgated a decision revoking Abilas appointment
and directed the OIC or Mayor of Quezon City to
appiont Eleria in lieu of Abila. They ruled that
although both Abila and Eleria met the minimum
elgibility and education, Eleria had the edge in terms
of rank and experience as an Adiministrative Officer
and Eleria actually held the position next-in-rank to
that of the vacancy that gave her promotional
priority over Abila.
ISSUE:
1. Whether CSC has authority to substitute its own
judgment for that of the official authorized by law to
make an appointment to the government service.
2. Whether the appointment made by appointing
authority may be disregarded by following the next-
in-rank rule.
RULING:
1. No.The respondent Commission has no such
authority, the power of appointment, which is
essentially discretionary, being vested by law in the
head of the office concerned. The head of the office
is the person on the spot. He occupies the ideal
vantage point from which to identify and designate
the individual who can best fill the post and
discharge its functions in the government agency he
heads. The choice of an appointee from among those
who possess the required qualifications is a political
and administrative decision calling for considerations
of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of
service which can best be made by the head of the
office concerned, the person most familiar with the
organizational structure and environmental
circumstances within which the appointee must
function.
In Lapinid vs. Civil Service Commission, the Court
through Mr. Justice Cruz, stressed that the Civil
Service Commission has no power of appointment
except over its own personnel. Neither does it have
the authority to review the appointments made by
other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee
possesses the required qualifications. The
determination of who among aspirants with the
minimum statutory qualifications should be preferred
belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil
Service Commission. It cannot disallow an
appointment because it believes another person is
better qualified and much less can it direct the
appointment of its own choice.
Page | 47
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
In the case at bar, the respondent Commission itself
acknowledged that both petitioner Abila and
respondent Eleria are legally qualified for the position
in question. Having made the determination, the
Commission had exhausted its powers and may not
act any further except to affirm the validity of
petitioner's appointment.
2. No. the Commission had no authority to revoke
petitioner's appointment because the Commission
believed that private respondent Eleria was better
qualified for the position involved; the Commission's
acts in this respect constituted an encroachment
upon a discretionary authority vested by law in the
Quezon City Mayor and not in the Commission.
The Court notes that a vacant position in the Civil
Service may be filled by promotion, transfer of
present employees, reinstatement and re-
employment or appointment of outsiders who have
the necessary eligibility. The next-in-rank rule
invoked by respondent Commission to justify its
choice of respondent Eleria over petitioner Abila,
applies only where a vacancy is filled by promotion,
a process which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer
to another position higher either in rank or salary. A
promotion involves a situation quite different from
the situation in the case at bar where the
appointment of petitioner Abila was effected through
lateral transfer from a position in one department of
the city government to a position of greater
responsibility in another department of the same
government.
The appointing authority, under the Civil Service
Law, is allowed to fill vacancies by promotion,
transfer of present employees, reinstatement,
reemployment, and appointment of outsiders who
have appropriate civil service eligibility, not
necessarily in that order. There is no legal fiat that a
vacancy must be filled only by promotion; the
appointing authority is given wide discretion to fill a
vacancy from among the several alternatives
provided for by law. The rule is not mandatory.
Hence, the Civil Service Law provides is that if a
vacancy is filled by a promotion, the person holding
the position next in rank thereto "shall be considered
for promotion.
HON. ALMA G. DE LEON, Chairman, HON.
GAMINDE, HON. ERENETA,
JR., Commissioners, CSC, and SECRETARY
ALUNAN, III, DILG, vs. CA and JACOB F.
MONTESA
G.R. No. 127182, January 22, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Jacob F. Montesa, who is not a
Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) or a
member of the Career Executive Service, was
appointed as "Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV in
the Ministry of Local Government" (now DILG), by
then Minister Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. Private
respondent's appointment was approved as
permanent by the Civil Service Commission.
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated EO 262, reorganizing the DILG. On April
8, 1988, then Secretary Luis T. Santos, who
succeeded Minister Pimentel, designated Nicanor M.
Patricio as chief, Legal Service in place of Montesa
who, in turn, was directed to report to the office of
the Secretary to perform special assignments.
Montesa filed a petition for quo warranto against
then Secretary Luis T. Santos and Nicanor Patricio
and the court ruled in favor of Montesa and ordered
his reinstatement to his former position.
Meanwhile, the Salary Standardization Law took
effect on July 1, 1989. Pursuant thereto, the position
of "Department Service Chiefs," which include the
Department Legal Counsel, was reclassified and
ranked with "Assistant Bureau Directors" under the
generic position title of "Director III".
In 1994, then Secretary Alunan III, citing as reasons
the interest of public service and the smooth flow of
operations in the concerned offices, issued DO No.
94-370, relieving private respondent of his current
duties and responsibilities and reassigning him as
"Director III (Assistant Regional Director), Region
XI," Private respondent, however, did not report to
his new assigned position. Instead, he filed a 90-day
sick leave, and upon the expiration thereof, he
submitted a memorandum for then acting Secretary
Aguirre, signifying his intention to re-assume his
position as Department Legal Counsel/Chief, Legal
Services. The memorandum was denied the same
with his motion for reconsideration.
Private respondent appealed to the Civil Service
Commission but the latter sustained his
reassignment to Region XI, on the ground that the
subject reassignment was not violative of the due
process clause of the Constitution or of Montesa's
right to security of tenure; the reassignment did not
entail any reduction in rank or status and that
Montesa could be reassigned from one station to
another without his consent as the rule against
unconsented transfer applies only to an officer who
is appointed to a particular station, and not merely
assigned thereto.
Montesa on the otherhand still did not comply.
President Fidel V. Ramos, upon the recommendation
of the Department, issued Administrative Order No.
235, dropping Montesa, Director III. Legal Service,
Page | 48
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
from the roster of public servants for serious neglect
of duty and absences without leave (AWOL).
ISSUE:
Whether a person who lacks the necessary
qualification (eligibility) for a public position be
appointed to it in a permanent capacity?
RULING:
No. It must be stressed that the position of Ministry
Legal Counsel CESO IV is embraced in the Career
Executive Service. Under the Integrated
Reorganization Plan, appointment thereto shall be
made as follows:
Appointment to appropriate classes in the
Career Executive Service shall be made by
the President from a list of career executive
eligible recommended by the Board. Such
appointments shall be made on the basis of
rank
The President may, however, in
exceptional cases, appoint any person who
is not a Career Executive Service eligible;
provided that such appointee shall
subsequently take the required Career
Executive Service examination and that he
shall not be promoted to a higher class until
qualifies in such examination.
At the initial implementation of this Plan, an
incumbent who holds a permanent
appointment to a position embraced in the
Career Executive Service shall continue to
hold his position, but may not advance to a
higher class of position in the Career
Executive Service unless or until he qualifies
for membership in the Career Executive
Service.
Corollarily, the required Career Executive Service
eligibility may be then acquired by passing the CES
examination that will entitle the examinee to a
conferment of a CES eligibility and the inclusion of
his name in the roster of CES eligible
In the case at bar, there is no question that Montesa
as he admits does not have the required CES
eligibility.
The court ruled by citing the case of Achacoso v.
Macaraig, et al., which provides that:
It is settled that a permanent appointment
can be issued only 'to a person who meets
all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the
Career Service does not automatically
confer security or tenure on its occupant
even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. Such right will have to
depend on the nature of his appointment,
which in turn depends on his eligibility or
lack of it. A person who does not have the
requisite qualifications for the position
cannot be appointed to it in the first place
or, only as an exception to the rule, may be
appointed to it merely in an acting capacity
in the absence of appropriate eligible. The
appointment extended to him cannot be
regarded as permanent even if it may be so
designated.
Evidently, private respondent's appointment did not
attain permanency. Not having taken the necessary
Career Executive Service examination to obtain
requisite eligibility, he did not at the time of his
appointment and up to the present, possess the
needed eligibility for a position in the Career
Executive Service. Consequently, his appointment as
Ministry Legal Counsel CESO IV/ Department Legal
Counsel and/or Director III, was merely temporary.
Such being the case, he could be transferred or
reassigned without violating the constitutionally
guaranteed right to security of tenure.
APPOINTMENT IN THE CAREER EXECUTIVE
LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL vs. RAMON S.
ROCO
G.R. No. 143366. January 29, 2001
350 SCRA 528
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Roco was appointed by then President
Ramos in 1996 as Regional Director of the LTO in
Region V, a position equivalent to CES rank level V
and later reappointed by then President Estrada to
the same position in 1999.
At the time Rocos appointment in 1996 and 1999,
he was not a CES eligible. However, during his
incumbency in 1999, he was conferred CES eligibility
by the CESB.
On September 7, 1999, petitioner Luis Mario General,
who is not a CES eligible, was appointed by President
Estrada as Regional Director of the LTO in Region V,
the same position being occupied by Roco. Pursuant
thereto, DOTC Undersecretary Coloma as OIC issued
a Memorandum directing General to assume the said
office immediately and for Roco to report to the
Office of the Secretary for further instructions.
Page | 49
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
Roco filed before the CA a petition for quo warranto
which was affirmed by the latter and ordered the
nullification of Generals appointment. From this
decision General filed a petition for review against
Roco. The latter contends that CES eligibility is
enough to acquire security of tenure which grants
him the right to hold the position disputed.
ISSUE:
Whether Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility is
enough and the appointment to a CES rank is not
necessary to acquire security of tenure.
RULING:
No. Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law (Subtitle
A, Tittle I, Book V of E.O. No. 292), provides that:
(1) Permanent status. - A permanent appointment
shall be issued to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law,
rules and standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof.
In the career executive service, the acquisition of
security of tenure which presupposes a permanent
appointment is governed by the rules and regulations
promulgated by the CES Board, thus:
Career Executive Service Eligibility
Passing the CES examination entitles the
examinee to a conferment of a CES eligibility
and the inclusion of his name in the roster of
CES eligibles. Conferment of CES eligibility is done
by the Board through a formal Board Resolution after
an evaluation is done of the examinees performance
in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations.
Appointment to CES Rank
Upon conferment of a CES eligibility and compliance
with the other requirements prescribed by the Board,
an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for
appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to a CES
rank is made by the President upon the
recommendation of the Board. This process
completes the officials membership in the CES
and most importantly, confers on him security
of tenure in the CES.
As clearly set forth in the foregoing provisions, two
requisites must concur in order that an employee in
the career executive service may attain security of
tenure, to wit:
a) CES eligibility; and
b) Appointment to the appropriate CES
rank.
In addition, it must be stressed that the security of
tenure of employees in the career executive service
pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the
position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a
career executive service officer may be transferred
or reassigned from one position to another without
losing his rank which follows him wherever he is
transferred or reassigned.
In the case at bar, there is no question that
respondent Ramon S. Roco, though a CES eligible,
does not possess the appropriate CES rank, which is
- CES rank level V, for the position of Regional
Director of the LTO (Region V). Falling short of one
of the qualifications that would complete his
membership in the CES, respondent cannot
successfully interpose violation of security of
tenure. Accordingly, he could be validly reassigned
to other positions in the career executive service.
__________*************________
NOTES:
May an elective public official be validly
appointed or designated to any public office or
position during his tenure?
Ans.: No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure. (Sec. 7, 1
st par., Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution)
May an appointive public official hold any
other office or employment?
Ans.: Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporation.
(Sec. 7, 2 nd par., Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution)
May the President, Vice-President, Members
of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants
hold any other office or employment?
Ans.: The President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. (Sec. 13, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
Page | 50
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
READ WELL : Case of Civil Liberties
PROHIBITION: HOLDS DUAL OFFICE
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
G.R. No. 83896. February 22, 1991
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
The two petitions in this case sought to declare
unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino. The assailed law
provides that:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary
functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department
may, in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two positions in the government and
government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor; Provided,
that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies
or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of
which the President is the Chairman.
The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO
284 contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII
which declares:
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
The petitioners maintained that the phrase unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution used in
Section 13 of Article VII meant that the exception
must be expressly provided in the Constitution.
Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that
the phrase unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution in Section 13, Article VII makes
reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar
as the appointive officials mentioned therein are
concerned. The provision relied upon by the
respondents provides:
Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
ISSUE No. 1:
Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their
deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the
broad exceptions made for appointive officials in
general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?
ISSUE No. 2:
Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex
officio capacity?
ISSUE No. 3:
Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the
perquisites they have received from the offices they
have held pursuant to EO 284?
HELD:
Number 1:
No. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was
to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and
his official family in so far as holding other offices or
employment in the government or elsewhere is
concerned.
Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a
blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple
offices or employment in the government subsuming
both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to
formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII,
specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants from holding any other office or
employment during their tenure, unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution itself. While all other
appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to
hold other office or employment in the government
Page | 51
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
during their tenure when such is allowed by law or
by the primary functions of their positions, members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do
so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article
I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable
to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to
be the exception applicable only to the President, the
Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular
instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the
Vice-President being appointed as a member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or
acting as President in those instances provided under
Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the
Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1),
Article VIII.
Number 2:
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple
offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII
of the Constitution must not, however, be construed
as applying to posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions of
said officials office. The reason is that these posts
do no comprise any other office within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but
are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials. The term ex-officio means
from office; by virtue of office. Ex-officio likewise
denotes an act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the
office. The additional duties must not only be
closely related to, but must be required by the
officials primary functions. If the functions required
to be performed are merely incidental, remotely
related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise
alien to the primary function of a cabinet official,
such additional functions would fall under the
purview of any other office prohibited by the
Constitution.
Number 3:
During their tenure in the questioned positions,
respondents may be considered de facto officers and
as such entitled to emoluments for actual services
rendered. It has been held that in cases where
there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in
good faith has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally
entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in
an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and
other compensations attached to the office. Any per
diem, allowances or other emoluments received by
the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered
in the questioned positions may therefore be
retained by them.
Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional
as it actually allows a member of the cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them
from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
MA. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG vs. ALFREDO L.
BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed
Acting Director IV of the Comelecs EID by then
Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a
temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent
Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together
with other commissioners in an ad interim
appointment. While on such ad interim appointment,
respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman
issued a Memorandum address transferring
petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner
requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as
Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the
Law Department.
She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads
of government offices that "transfer and detail of
employees are prohibited during the election period.
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on
April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300
dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from
the coverage of the said Memo Circular. Petitioner
appealed the denial of her request for
reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also
filed an administrative and criminal complaint16 with
the Law Department17against Benipayo, alleging
Page | 52
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the
Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No.
3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s.
001, and other pertinent administrative and civil
service laws, rules and regulations. During the
pendency of her complaint before the Law
Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain
in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman
and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the
COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a
temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING:
We find petitioners argument without merit. An ad
interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent
character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it
effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress. In the instant case, the President did in
fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended
permanent appointments during the recess of
Congress. They were not appointed or designated in
a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner
Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac34 and Solicitor
General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs.
Bautista. 35 The ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed
by the Constitution which authorizes the President,
during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC
"shall be independent"36, this provision should be
harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that the
independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
interim appointees before the appointees can
assume office will negate the Presidents power to
make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to
the rule on statutory construction to give meaning
and effect to every provision of the law. It will also
run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution.
VICTOR A. AQUINO vs. CSC and LEONARDA
DELA PAZ
G.R. NO. 92403. April 22, 1992
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent de la Paz was appointed as
Supply Officer I by the Division Superintendent of
City Schools, and the Civil Service Regional Office
approved her appointment as permanent. Victor
Aquino questioned her appointment with a
contention that he is more qualified and more
competent in terms of education, experience and
training. The DECS (Dept of Educ, Culture, and
Sports) sustained the protest, appointed Aquino as
the Supply Officer I, and was thereupon issued a
permanent appointment. De la Paz appealed to the
CSC which revoked the appointment of Aquino.
Aquino now seeks to nullify the decision of CSC
revoking his appointment and restoring de la Paz to
her position as Supply Officer I.
ISSUE:
Whether the CSC committed a grave abuse of
discretion in revoking Aquino's appointment as it
found de la Paz better qualified
RULING:
No. The SC ruled that although it in the previous
cases that ruled that the CSC has no authority to
revoke an appointment simply because it (CSC)
believed that another person is better qualified than
the appointee for it would constitute an
encroachment on the discretion solely vested on the
appointing authority.
BUT the situation is different in this case. CSC did not
direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice.
It merely restored the appointment of private
Page | 53
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
respondent who was first appointed to the contested
position. The permanent appointment of de la Paz is
deemed complete. As such, she is entitled to the
protection of the law against unjust approval.
The SC also emphasized that the protest must be "for
cause". It is defined as follows: "It means for reasons
which the law and sound public policy recognized as
sufficient warrant for removal, that is legal cause,
and not merely causes which the appointing power
in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It
is implied that officers may not be removed at the
mere will of those vested with the power of removal,
or without any cause. Moreover, the cause must
relate to and affect the administration of the office,
and must be restricted to something of a substantial
nature directly affecting the rights and interests of
the public."
Aquino's protest that he is more qualified than de la
Paz does not fall within the meaning of "for cause"
contemplated by Article IX-B, Section 2 par. (3) of
the 1987 Constitution, neither under Section 19 par.
(6) of the Civil Service Law (P.D. 807), namely: (1)
that the appointee is not qualified; (2) that the
appointee is not the next-in-rank; and (3) in case of
appointment by transfer, reinstatement, or by
original appointment, that the protestant is not
satisfied with the written special reason or reasons
given by the appointing authority.
CITY MAYOR ROGELIO DEBULGADO and
VICTORIA DEBULGADO vs. CSC
G.R. No. 111471. September 26, 1994
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Mayor Rogelio Debulgado is the incumbent
Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental.
He promoted his wife, petitioner Victoria Debulgado,
as General Services Officer, that is, as head of the
Office of General Services of the City Government of
San Carlos. Before her promotion, petitioner Victoria
had been in the service of the City Government for
about thirty-two (32) years and she rose from the
ranks by successively occupying different
government offices.
Public respondent CSC received a letter from
Congressman Tranquilino Carmona of the First
District of Negros Occidental, calling attention to the
promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor
in favor of his wife. After investigation, the CSC
disapproved the promotion of petitioner Victoria to
the position upon the ground that that promotion
violated the statutory prohibition against nepotic
appointments. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, contending that the statutory
prohibition against nepotism was not applicable to
the appointment of Victoria as General Services
Officer since the prohibition applies only to original
appointments and not to promotional appointments.
Petitioners believe that because petitioner Victoria
was already in the service of the City Government
before she married petitioner Mayor, the reason
behind the prohibition no longer applied to her
promotional appointment. Petitioners also affirm that
petitioner Victoria deserves to be promoted to
General Services Officer, considering her long and
faithful service to the City Government. The CSC had
deprived petitioner Victoria of her right to due
process by unilaterally revoking her appointment.
Petitioners assert that Victoria can no longer be
removed from the position of General Services
Officer without giving her an opportunity to be heard
and to answer the charged of nepotism.
Petitioner Mayor denies that he had been motivated
by personal reasons when he appointed his wife to
the new post. He states that his wife was the most
qualified among the candidates for appointment to
that position, she having worked for the City
Government for thirty-two (32) years and being
highly recommended by the OIC-Treasurer of San
Carlos City. It is also claimed by petitioner Mayor that
his choice of his wife for the position was concurred
in by the Sangguniang Panglungsod. He further
avers that he had consulted the Field and Regional
Officers of the CSC in Bacolod City, and raised the
question of applicability of the prohibition against
nepotism to the then proposed promotion of his wife
in one of the seminars conducted by the
Commission's Regional Office held in San Carlos City.
According to petitioner Mayor, one Gregorio C.
Agdon, a supervising personnel specialist in the
Commission's Bacolod Office, informed him that the
promotional appointment was not covered by the
prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether prohibition against nepotism apply to
promotional appointments.
HELD:
The prohibition against nepotism applies to BOTH
original and promotional appointments. Both an
original appointment and a promotion are particular
Page | 54
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
species of personnel action, which must comply with
the prohibition against nepotism.
The original appointment of a civil service employee
and all subsequent personnel actions undertaken by
or in respect of that employee such as promotion,
transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, etc., must
comply with the Implementing Rules including, of
course, the prohibition against nepotism
The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public
service is set out in Section 59, Book V of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 (also known as EO 292)
under Section 59:
All appointments in the national, provincial, city and
municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a
relative of the appointing or recommending
authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or
of the persons exercising immediate supervision over
him, are hereby prohibited.
The following are exempted from the operation of
the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a
confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians,
and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines: Provided, however, that in each
particular instance full report of such appointment
shall be made to the Commission.
It is essential to stress, however, that the prohibition
applies quite without regard to the actual merits of
the proposed appointee and to the good intentions
of the appointing or recommending authority, and
that the prohibition against nepotism in
appointments whether original or promotional, is not
intended by the legislative authority to penalize
faithful service. The purpose of Section 59 is
precisely to take out of the discretion of the
appointing and recommending authority the matter
of appointing or recommending for appointment a
relative.
The promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria
as formerly approved by the CSC did not vest in her
a right to that position, therefore, she was not
deprived of due process when she was terminated.
Victoria was not deprived due process as there were
no administrative charges in respect of which she
would have been entitled to notice and hearing. The
CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment,
only examines the conformity of the appointment
with applicable provisions of law and whether the
appointee possesses all the minimum qualifications
and none of the disqualifications. At all events, as the
Solicitor General has noted, petitioner Victoria was
afforded an opportunity to be heard when she filed
an MR with the CSC and there challenged the
disapproval by the Commission.
Since the promotional appointment in favor of
petitioner Victoria was a violation of Section 59, it
was null and void from the beginning. A void
appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on
the part of the holder of such appointment.
The CSC is empowered to take appropriate action on
all appointments and other personnel actions, e.g.,
promotions. Such power includes the authority to
recall an appointment initially approved in disregard
of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and
regulations.
CONRADO L. DE RAMA VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. NO. 131136, February 28, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Conrado De Rama, upon his assumption of
office to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao Quezon,
wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service
Commission seeking to recall the appointments of
fourteen municipal employees. The contention of
petitioner was that the appointments of said
employees were midnight appointments of the
former mayor, Ma. Evelyn Abeja. De Rama contends
that the former mayor violated Article VII, Section 15
of the 1987 Constitution. The Civil Service
Commission then denied the petitioners request for
lack of merit. Further, the CSC upheld the validity of
the appointments on the ground that they are
already approved by the Head of CSC Field Office in
Lucena City, and for petitioners failure to present
evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall
of the said appointed employees. Consequently,
petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA
arguing that CSC arrive at erroneous conclusions
after it ignored his supplemental to the consolidated
appeal. CA then ruled that no abuse of power of
appointment on the part of outgoing mayor, and
affirming the decision of CSC in its quasi-judicial
capacity. Hence, the instant petition for review to the
Supreme Court`
ISSUE:
WON CSC erred in not upholding the petitioners
recall of the appointments of private respondents?
Page | 55
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
RULING:
No. The court ruled that when petitioner brought the
matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen
employees before the CSC, the only reason he cited
was that they were midnight appointments that are
forbidden within the contemplation of Article VII,
Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the
court provides that the ground for recall of the
appointments validly followed by CSC are that (1) the
rules on screening of applicants based on adopted
criteria were not followed; (2) there was no proper
posting of notice of vacancy; and (3) the merit and
fitness requirements set by the civil service rules
were not observed. However, such were not
presented by the petitioner.
The court, furthermore upheld, that upon the
issuance of an appointment and the
appointees assumption of the position in the
civil service, he acquires a legal right which
cannot be taken away either by revocation of
the appointment or removal except for cause
and with previous notice and hearing.
Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming
a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable
right to the position. This right is protected not only
by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which
cannot be taken away by either revocation or
removal unless a valid cause provided there is a
previous notice and hearing.
BALTAZAR CAMPOREDONDO V. NLRC
GR. NO. 129049, AUGUST 6, 1999
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner was the administrator of the Surigao del
Norte Chapter, Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
until his early retirement. Petitioner alleged that his
retirement was forced after he was required to
restitute shortages and unremitted collections in the
total sum of P135,927.78 as determined by the field
auditor of the PNRC.
Petitioner filed with the NLRC, Sub-Regional
Arbitration Branch X, Butuan City, a complaint for
illegal dismissal, damages and underpayment of
wages against the PNRC and its key officials.
PNRC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of Jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case because PNRC is a Government Corporation
whose employees are members of the GSIS and
embraced within the Civil Service Law and
Regulations.
ISSUE:
Whether PNRC is a Government Owned and
Controlled Corporation.
RULING:
Yes, PNRC is a government owned and controlled
corporation, with an original charter under Republic
Act No. 95, as amended.
The test to determine whether a corporation is
government owned or controlled, or private in nature
is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the
exercise of a public function, or by incorporation
under the general corporation law? Those with
special charters are government corporations subject
to its provisions, and its employees are under the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are
compulsory members of the Government Service
Insurance System. The PNRC was not "impliedly
converted to a private corporation" simply because
its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to
secure loans, be exempted from payment of all
duties, taxes, fees and other charges of all kinds on
all importations and purchases for its exclusive use,
on donations for its disaster relief work and other
services and in its benefits and fund raising drives,
and be allotted one lottery draw a year by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office for the support
of its disaster relief operation in addition to its
existing lottery draws for blood program.
Having served in the Philippine National Red
Cross for a number of years since his initial
employment, he must know that it is a government
corporation with its own charter and that he was
covered by compulsory membership in the
Government Service Insurance System, which is why
he could apply, as he did, for "early" retirement from
the service under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or
Republic Act No. 1616.
CSC AND PAGCOR VS. RAFAEL M. SALAS
GR NO. 123708, June 19, 1997
REGALADO, J.:
DOCTRINE: The nature of the position, as may be
ascertained by the court in case of conflict, which
finally determines whether a position is primarily
confidential, policy-determining or highly technical.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Salas was appointed by PAGCOR
Chairman as Internal Security Staff [ISS] member
and assigned to the casino at Manila Pavilion Hotel.
Page | 56
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
2. His employment was terminated for loss of
confidence after a covert investigation of the
Intelligence division of PAGCOR.
a. From affidavits of 2 customers of PAGCOR who
were used as gunners by the respondent, the latter
was allegedly engaged in proxy betting.
b. 2 polygraph tests show corroborative and
unfavorable results.
3. Salas submitted a letter of appeal to the Chairman
and the Board of Directors of PAGCOR requesting for
reinvestigation since he was not given an opportunity
to be heard. It was DENIED.
4. The appeal with the Merit Systems Protection
Board was denied on the ground that as a
confidential employee, respondent was not
dismissed from service but his term of office expired.
CSC affirmed the decision of MSPB.
5. CA- Salas is not a confidential employee, hence he
may not be dismissed on the ground of loss of
confidence.
a. CA applied proximity rule
b. Sec. 16 of PD 1869 has been superseded and
repealed by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the
Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
WON respondent Salas is a confidential employee.
NO.
RATIO:
1. The power to declare a position as policy
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical
as defined therein has subsequently been codified
and incorporated in Section 12(9), Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code
of 1987. a. Serves to bolster the validity of the
categorization made under Section 16 of Presidential
Decree No. 1869. Such classification is not absolute
and all encompassing.
2. Two recognized instances when a position may be
considered primarily confidential: a. When the
President, upon recommendation of the CSC, has
declared the position to be primarily confidential; b.
In the absence of such declaration, when by the
nature of the functions of the office there exists
close intimacy between the appointee and the
appointing power which insures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom of
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state.
3. It would seem that the case falls under the first
category by virtue of Sec. 16 of PD 1869, but the
second category shows otherwise.
4. Since the enactment of Civil Service Act of 1959,
it is the nature of the position which finally
determines whether a position is primarily
confidential, policy determining, or highly technical.
Executive pronouncements [like PD 1869] are merely
initial determinations that are not conclusive in case
of conflict.
5. Piero doctrine -- notwithstanding any statutory
classification to the contrary, it is still the nature of
the position, as may be ascertained by the court in
case of conflict, which finally determines whether a
position is primarily confidential, policy-determining
or highly technical -- is still controlling with the
advent of the 1987 Constitution and the
Administrative Code of 1987, Book V of which deals
specifically with the Civil Service Commission,
considering that from these later enactments, in
defining positions which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical, the phrase
"in nature" was deleted
a. Submission that PAGCOR employees have been
declared confidential appointee by operation of law
must be rejected.
6. The primary purpose of the framers of the
Constitution in providing for declaration of a position
as policy determining, highly confidential, or highly
technical is to exempt these categories from
competitive examination as a means for determining
merit and fitness. a. These positions are covered by
security of tenure although they are considered
noncompetitive only un the sense that appointees do
not have to undergo examinations to determine
merit and fitness.
7. CA Correctly applied proximity rule. Where the
position occupied is remote from that of the
appointing authority, the element of trust between
them is no longer predominant. a. Position of the
private respondent does not involve such close
intimacy between him and the appointing authority.
FACTORS:
i. Routine duties of Salas [check full text] ii. ISS
members do not directly report to the office of the
chairman in the performance of their official duties.
Subject to the control and supervision of an Area
Supervisor. iii. Position of ISS belongs to the bottom
level salary scale of the corporation, being in pay
class 2 level only [pay class 12 being the highest]
DISPOSITIVE: CA order affirmed. Salas not a
confidential employee.
CSC vs. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY
G.R. No. 135805. April 29, 1999
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
Page | 57
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-
President, filed with the Civil Service Commission,
Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy,
for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism.
After the fact-finding investigation, the Civil Service
Regional Office found a prima facie case against
respondent. Accordingly, the Civil Service
Commission conducted a formal investigation, and,
promulgated its resolution finding no substantial
evidence to support the charge of habitual
drunkenness and misconduct. However, the
Commission found respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy
guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the
appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy,
as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their
assignment under his immediate supervision and
control as the Vocational School Administrator
Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed
on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.The
Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing
and setting aside the decision of the Civil Service
Commission, ruling that respondent did not appoint
or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and,
hence, was not guilty of nepotism.
ISSUE #1:
Whether the service of the respondent should have
dismissed.
RULING:
Yes. Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty
of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a
relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing
authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the
bureau or office, and d) person exercising immediate
supervision over the appointee. To constitute a
violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment
is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising
immediate supervision over the appointee.While It is
true that he did not appoint or recommend his two
sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in
the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, However,
it was respondent Dacoycoy who certified that funds
are available for the proposed appointment of Rito
Dacoycoy and even rated his performance as very
satisfactory. On the other hand, his son Ped stated
in his position description form that his father was
his next higher supervisor. The circumvention of the
ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably,
Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro
O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. He
authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the
appointment of first level employees under his
immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag
recommended the appointment of respondents two
sons and placed them under respondents immediate
supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the
school. Both positions are career positions. Thus, the
unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy
was behind the appointing or recommending
authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly,
he is guilty of nepotism.
ISSUE #2:
Whether the Civil Service Law does not contemplate
a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges.
RULING:
No. As an aggrieved party, The Civil Service
Commission may appeal the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court. When the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service
Commission and held respondent not guilty of
nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not
the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the
charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who
was merely a witness for the government.
Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has
become the party adversely affected by such ruling,
which seriously prejudices the civil service system.
By this ruling, the Court expressly abandon and
overrule extant jurisprudence that the phrase party
adversely affected by the decision refers to the
government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action which may take the form of
suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer,
removal or dismissal from office and not included are
cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for
not more then thirty (30) days or fine in an amount
not exceeding thirty days salary or when the
respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no
occasion for appeal. In other words, the Court
overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service
Law does not contemplate a review of decisions
exonerating officers or employees from
administrative charges.
ISSUE #3:
Whether the Court of Appeals reliance on Debulgado
case may prosper.
Page | 58
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
RULING:
No. The Court of Appeals reliance on Debulgado vs.
Civil Service Commission, to support its ruling is
misplaced. The issues in Debulgado are whether a
promotional appointment is covered by the
prohibition against nepotism or the prohibition
applies only to original appointments to the civil
service, and whether the Commission had gravely
abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving
the promotional appointment given to petitioner
after the Commission had earlier approved that
appointment. Debulgado never even impliedly
limited the coverage of the ban on nepotism to only
the appointing or recommending authority for
appointing a relative. Precisely, in Debulgado, the
Court emphasized that Section 59 means exactly
what it says in plain and ordinary language: x x x The
public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly
fundamental in importance, and the Court had
neither authority nor inclination to dilute that
important public policy by introducing a qualification
here or a distinction there.
FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR. vs. CA
G.R. No. 97149. March 31, 1992
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports
authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor in 1975 and
later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On
October 21, 1988, the General Manager, Rogelio A.
Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and
Villaluz for grave dishonesty. Grave misconduct
willful violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
Consequently, they were preventively suspended for
the charges. After preliminary investigation
conducted by the district attorney for region X,
administrative case was considered closed for lack of
merit.
On December 13, 1988 another administrative case
was filed against Beja by the PPA manager also for
dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules
and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and for being notoriously
undesirable. Beja was also placed under preventive
suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The
case was redocketed and thereafter, the PPA
indorsed it to the AAB for appropriate action. The
AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an
opportunity to present evidence. However, on
February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental. Two days later, he filed
with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend
the hearing of administrative case on account of the
pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the
court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the
hearing of the administrative case. Thereafter, Beja
moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and
proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Action Board of
DOTC has jurisdiction over administrative cases
involving personnel below the rank of Assistant
General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority, an
attached agency of DOTC
RULING:
The PPA General Manager is the disciplining
authority who may, by himself and without the
approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a
respondent in an administrative case to preventive
suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned
not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857 but also by Sec. 37
of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the
Jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions against officers and
employees in the PPA. With respect to the issue, the
Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The
PPA was created through PD no. 505 dated July
1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the
PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors
known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council. Sec.
5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power
to appoint, discipline and remove, and determine
the composition of the technical staff of the authority
and other personnel. On December 23, 1975, PD
no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a)
thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which
would be attached to the then Department of Public
Works, Transportation and Communication. When
Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987
reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and
Communication was issued, the PPA retained its
attached status. Administrative Code of 1987
classified PPA as an attached agency to the DOTC.
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the
other two being supervision and control and
administrative supervision, Attachment is defined
as the lateral relationship between the department
or its equivalent and the attached agency or
corporation for purposes of policy and program
Page | 59
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
coordination. An attached agency has a larger
measure of independence from the Department to
which it is attached than one which is under
departmental supervision and control or
administrative supervision. This is borne out by the
lateral relationship between the Department and
the attached agency. The attachment is merely for
policy and program coordination. With respect to
administrative matters, the independence of an
attached agency from the department control and
supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that
even an agency under a Departments administrative
supervision is free from Departmental interference
with respect to appointments and other personnel
actions in accordance with the decentralization of
personnel functions under the administrative Code
of 1987. The Law impliedly grants the general
Manager with the approval of the PPA board of
Directors the power to investigate its personnel
below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be
charged with an administrative offense. During such
investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject
the employee concerned to preventive suspension.
The investigation should be conducted in accordance
with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807.
RICARDO T. GLORIA vs. CA
GR No. 131012, April 21, 1999
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents are public school teachers. On
various dates, during the teachers strikes, they did
not report for work. For this reason, they were
administratively charged with (1) grave misconduct,
(2) gross neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of Civil
Service Law Rules and Regulations and reasonable
office regulations, (4) refusal to perform official duty,
(5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, and (7) absence
without leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive
suspension. The investigation was concluded before
the lapse of their 90-day suspension and private
respondents were found guilty as charged.
Respondent Nicanor Margallo was ordered dismissed
from the service, while respondents Amparo Abad,
Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang were
ordered suspended for 6 months.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
affirmed the decision of the MSPB with respect to
Margallo, but found the other three (Abad, Bandigas,
and Somebang) guilty only of violation of reasonable
office rules and regulations by failing to file
applications for leave of absence and, therefore,
reduced the penalty imposed on them to reprimand
and ordered them reinstated to their former
positions.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 in this Court. Pursuant to Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95, the case was referred to the Court
of Appeals which, on September 3, 1996, rendered a
decision reversing it insofar as the CSC ordered the
suspension of Nicanor Margallo. The appellate court
found him guilty of violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations only and imposed on him the
penalty of reprimand.
the Court of Appeals, while maintaining its finding
that private respondents were guilty of violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations for which
they should be reprimanded, ruled that private
respondents were entitled to the payment of salaries
during their suspension beyond ninety (90) days.
Petitioner contends that the administrative
investigation of respondents was concluded within
the 90-day period of preventive suspension, implying
that the continued suspension of private respondents
is due to their appeal, hence, the government should
not be held answerable for payment of their salaries.
Moreover, petitioner lays so much store by the fact
that, under the law, private respondents are
considered under preventive suspension during the
period of their appeal and, for this reason, are not
entitled to the payment of their salaries during their
suspension.
ISSUE:
Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for
the period pending their appeal if they are
subsequently exonerated?
HELD:
Yes, they are entitled to backwages.
The court ruled that there are thus two kinds of
preventive suspension of civil service employees who
are charged with offenses punishable by removal or
suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending
investigation (51) and (2) preventive suspension
pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the
disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and,
after review, the respondent is exonerated (47(4)).
preventive suspension pending appeal is actually
punitive although it is in effect subsequently
Page | 60
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and
the administrative decision finding him guilty is
reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full
pay for the period of the suspension. Thus, 47(4)
states that respondent shall be considered as under
preventive suspension during the pendency of the
appeal in the event he wins. On the other hand, if
his conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated,
the period of his suspension becomes part of the final
penalty of suspension or dismissal.
Private respondents were exonerated of all charges
against them for acts connected with the teachers
strike of September and October 1990. Although
they were absent from work, it was not because of
the strike. For being absent without leave, they were
held liable for violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations for which the penalty is a reprimand.
NOTES:
Discuss the kinds of preventive suspension under the
Civil Service Law. When may a civil service employee
placed under preventive suspension be entitled to
compensation? Held: There are two kinds of
preventive suspension of civil service employees who
are charged with offenses punishable by removal or
suspension:
(1) preventive suspension pending investigation
(Sec. 51, Civil Service Law, EO No. 292) and
(2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the
penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is
suspension or dismissal and, after review, the
respondent is exonerated (Section 47, par. 4, Civil
Service Law, EO No. 292).
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a
penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the
disciplining authority to investigate charges against
respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating
or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If
the investigation is not finished and a decision is not
rendered within that period, the suspension will be
lifted and the respondent will automatically be
reinstated. If after investigation respondent is found
innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should
be reinstated. However, no compensation was due
for the period of preventive suspension pending
investigation. The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No.
2260) providing for compensation in such a case
once the respondent was exonerated was revised in
1975 and the provision on the payment of salaries
during suspension was deleted. But although it is
held that employees who are preventively suspended
pending investigation are not entitled to the payment
of their salaries even if they are exonerated, they are
entitled to compensation for the period of their
suspension pending appeal if eventually they are
found innocent. Preventive suspension pending
investigation x x x is not a penalty but only a means
of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an
unhampered investigation. On the other hand,
preventive suspension pending appeal is actually
punitive although it is in effect subsequently
considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and
the administrative decision finding him guilty is
reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full
pay for the period of the suspension.
REPUBLIC ACT 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT) Section 13 (See
Aguinaldo and Mojica Case)
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law,
but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been
filed against him.
MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA vs. ARTURO C.
MOJICA
G.R. No. 139043. September 10, 1999
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu
City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the
supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the
period 1998-2001, which was to commence on
September 1998 upon F.E. Zuelligs first delivery.
Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out
regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt
by Cebu City, through the contract signed by
petitioner. This prompted the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the
matter.
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special
prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman,
was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as
INQ-VIS-99-0132. After investigation, he
recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to
Page | 61
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
criminal and administrative cases against petitioner
and the other city officials involved. Respondent
Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, approved this recommendation
ISSUES:
1. Whether Garcia may be held administratively
liable.
2. Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its
powers by virtue of the Local Government Code.
RULING:
1. No. As previously held, a reelected local official
may not be held administratively accountable for
misconduct committed during his prior term of
office. The rationale is that when the electorate put
him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with
full knowledge of his life and character, including his
past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it
still reelects him, then such is considered a
condonation of his past misdeeds.
However, in the present case, respondents point out
that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E.
Zuellig was signed just 4 days before the date of the
elections. It was not made an issue during the
election, and so the electorate could not be said to
have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this
particular aspect of his life and character.
Petitioner can no longer be held administratively
liable for an act done during his previous term. The
agreement between petitioner and F.E. Zuellig was
perfected on the date the contract was signed,
during petitioners prior term. At that moment,
petitioner already acceded to the terms of the
contract, including stipulations now alleged to be
prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any
culpability petitioner may have in signing the
contract already became extant on the day the
contract was signed. It hardly matters that the
deliveries under the contract are supposed to have
been made months later.
While petitioner can no longer be held
administratively liable for signing the contract with F.
E. Zuellig, this should not prejudice the filing of any
case, other than administrative, against petitioner.
The ruling does not mean the total exoneration of
petitioners wrongdoing, if any, that might have been
committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling
is now limited to the question of his administrative
liability therefore, and it is our considered view that
he may not.
2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it
has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the
pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two
statutes on the specific matter in question are not so
inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us
to only uphold one and strike down the other. The
decision of the Ombudsman (6 month suspension)
will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if the
evidence of guilt is strong. The power to preventively
suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but
also to the Deputy Ombudsman.
Discuss the power of Ombudsman to conduct
administrative investigations, and to impose
preventive suspension.
Worth stressing, to resolve the present controversy,
we must recall that the authority of the Ombudsman
to conduct administrative investigations is mandated
by no less than the Constitution. x x x R.A. 6770, the
Ombudsman Law, further grants the Office of the
Ombudsman the statutory power to conduct
administrative investigations. X x x Section 21 of R.A.
6770 names the officials subject to the
Ombudsmans disciplinary authority x x x. Petitioner
is an elective local official accused of grave
misconduct and dishonesty. That the Office of the
Ombudsman may conduct an administrative
investigation into the acts complained of, appears
clear from the foregoing provisions of R.A. 6770.
However, the question of whether or not the
Ombudsman may conduct an investigation over a
particular act or omission, is different from the
question of whether or not petitioner, after
investigation, may be held administratively liable.
This distinction ought here to be kept in mind, even
as we must also take note that the power to
investigate is distinct from the power to suspend
preventively an erring public officer. Likewise worthy
of note, the power of the Office of the Ombudsman
to preventively suspend an official subject to its
administrative investigation is provided by specific
provision of law. X x x We have previously
interpreted the phrase under his authority to mean
that the Ombudsman can preventively suspend all
officials under investigation by his office, regardless
of the branch of government in which they are
employed (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 654
[1993]), excepting of course those removable by
impeachment, members of Congress and the
Judiciary. The power to preventively suspend is
available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the
Deputy Ombudsman. This is the clear import of
Page | 62
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
Section 24 of R.A. 6770 above cited. There can be
no question in this case as to the power and authority
of respondent Deputy Ombudsman to issue an order
of preventive suspension against an official like the
petitioner, to prevent that official from using his
office to intimidate or influence witnesses (Gloria v.
CA, et al., G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999, p. 7, 306
SCRA 287) or to tamper with records that might be
vital to the prosecution of the case against him
(Yasay, Jr. v. Desierto, et al., G.R. No. 134495,
December 28, 1998, p. 9, 300 SCRA 494). In our
view, the present controversy simply boils down to
this pivotal question: Given the purpose of
preventive suspension and the circumstances of this
case, did respondent Deputy Ombudsman commit a
grave abuse of discretion when he set the period of
preventive suspension at six months? Preventive
suspension under Sec. 24, R.A. 6770 x x x may be
imposed when, among other factors, the evidence of
guilt is strong. The period for which an official may
be preventively suspended must not exceed six
months. In this case, petitioner was preventively
suspended and ordered to cease and desist from
holding office for the entire period of six months,
which is the maximum provided by law. The
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt
is strong as to warrant preventive suspension rests
with the Ombudsman (Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031
[1960]; others omitted.). The discretion as regards
the period of such suspension also necessarily
belongs to the Ombudsman, except that he cannot
extend the period of suspension beyond that
provided by law (Castillo-Co v. Barbers, supra.). But,
in our view, both the strength of the evidence to
warrant said suspension and the propriety of the
length or period of suspension imposed on petitioner
are properly raised in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition. X x x X x x Given these findings, we
cannot say now that there is no evidence sufficiently
strong to justify the imposition of preventive
suspension against petitioner. But considering its
purpose and the circumstances in the case brought
before us, it does appear to us that the imposition of
the maximum period of six months is unwarranted.
X x x [G]ranting that now the evidence against
petitioner is already strong, even without conceding
that initially it was weak, it is clear to us that the
maximum six-month period is excessive and
definitely longer than necessary for the Ombudsman
to make its legitimate case against petitioner. We
must conclude that the period during which
petitioner was already preventively suspended, has
been sufficient for the lawful purpose of preventing
petitioner from hiding and destroying needed
documents, or harassing and preventing witnesses
who wish to appear against him
RODOLFO AGUINALDO VS. LUIS SANTOS
G.R. No. 94115 August 21, 1992
NOCON, J.:
FACTS:
Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the
province of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup
dtat was crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a
telegram & letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring
him to show cause why he should not be suspended
or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic.
A sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of
several municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo
for acts committed during the coup. Aguinaldo
denied being privy to the planning of the coup or
actively participating in its execution, though he
admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the
rebel soldiers.
The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for
60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the
formal investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a
decision finding petition guilty as charged and
ordering his removal from office. Vice-Governor
Vargas was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo
appealed.
Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or restraining order with the SC, assailing the
decision of respondent Secretary of Local
Government. Petitioner argued that: (1) that the
power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove
local government official under Section 60, Chapter
IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987
Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no
longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner,
the former could not appoint respondent Melvin
Vargas as Governor; and (3) the alleged act of
disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved
by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a
mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an act
punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal
Code.
While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Governor of Cagayan. Three petitions for
disqualification were filed against him on the ground
that he had been removed from office.
The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was
reversed on the ground that the decision of the
Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still
pending review with the Court. As Aguinaldo won by
Page | 63
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution
paved the way for his eventual proclamation as
Governor of Cagayan.
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of
Governor of Cagayan has rendered the
administration case moot and academic
2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or
remove local government officials as alter ego of the
President
RULING:
1. Yes. Aguinaldos re-election to the position of
Governor of Cagayan has rendered the
administrative case pending moot and academic. It
appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner
garnered the most number of votes among the
candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The
rule is that a public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior
term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no
application to criminal cases pending against
petitioner for acts he may have committed during the
failed coup.
2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local
government officials is anchored on both the
Constitution and a statutory grant from the
legislative branch. The constitutional basis is
provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987
Constitution which vest in the President the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices and the power of general supervision over
local governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that
the acts of the department head are presumptively
the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by
him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 was
repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution
as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the
legislature the power and authority to enact a local
government code, which provides for the manner of
removal of local government officials. Moreover, in
Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this court had
the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in
force despite the effectivity of the present
Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local
Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power
of the DILG secretary to remove local elective
government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of
BP 337.
What is the doctrine of forgiveness or
condonation? Does it apply to pending
criminal cases?
Held:
1. A public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior
term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officers previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no
application to criminal cases pending against
petitioner. (Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768,
773 [1992])
2. A reelected local official may not be held
administratively accountable for misconduct
committed during his prior term of office. The
rationale for this holding is that when the electorate
put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so
with full knowledge of his life and character,
including his past misconduct. If, armed with such
knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection
is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
(Mayor Alvin B. Garcia v. Hon. Arturo C.
Mojica, et al., G.R. No. 139043, Sept. 10, 1999
[Quisumbing])
SECOND SET OF CASES LAW ON PUBLIC
OFFICERS
CAYO G. GAMOGAMO vs. PNOC SHIPPING
AND TRANSPORT CORP.
G.R. No. 141707. May 7, 2002
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner was first employed with the DOH as Dental
Aide and later on promoted to the position of Dentist
1. He remained employed at the DOH for fourteen
years until he resigned on 2 November 1977.
On 9 November 1977, petitioner was hired as
company dentist by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
(LUSTEVECO), a private domestic
corporation. Subsequently, Respondent PNOC
acquired and took over the shipping business of
LUSTEVECO, and on 1 August 1979, petitioner was
among those who opted to be absorbed by the
Respondent. Thus, he continued to work as company
dentist and assumed without interruption petitioners
Page | 64
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
service credits with LUSTEVECO, but it did not
assume petitioners service credits with the DOH.
On 10 June 1993, President Ramos issued
memorandum approving privatization of PNOC
subsidiaries. Accordingly, respondent implemented a
Manpower Reduction Program wherein under this
program, retrenched employees shall receive a two
month pay for every tear of service. Petitioner
requested to be included in the next retrenchment
schedule but it was denied for a reason that he was
holding a permanent position and that he was
already due for mandatory retirement under his
retirement plan.
Eventually, petitioner retired after serving
respondent for 17 years and 4 months upon reaching
60 yrs old. However, upon approval of two
permanent employees retrenchment, petitioner now
filed a complaint at NLRC for the full payment of his
retirement benefits arguing that his service with the
DOH should have been included in the computation
of his years of service. Hence, with an accumulated
service of 32 years and should have been paid a two
month pay for every year of service per the
retirement plan.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners service rendered in DOH will be
credited and will be added to his creditable service
later acquired in PNOC-Shipping and Transport, a
GOCC w/o original charter.
HELD:
We cannot uphold petitioners contention that his
fourteen years of service with the DOH should be
considered because his last two employers were
government-owned and controlled corporations, and
fall under the Civil Service Law.Article IX(B), Section
2 paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution states --
Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
It is not at all disputed that while Respondent and
LUSTEVECO are government-owned and controlled
corporations, they have no original charters; hence
they are not under the Civil Service
Law. In Philippine National Oil Company-Energy
Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, we ruled:
xxx Thus under the present state of the law, the test
in determining whether a government-owned or
controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service
Law are [sic] the manner of its creation, such that
government corporations created by special
charter(s) are subject to its provisions while those
incorporated under the General Corporation Law are
not within its coverage.
Consequently, Respondent was not bound by the
opinion of the Civil Service Commission of 18 May
1993.
Petitioners contention that the principle of tacking of
creditable service is mandated by Republic Act No.
7699 is baseless. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7699
reads:
SEC 3. Provisions of any general or special law or
rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, a covered worker who transfer(s)
employment from one sector to another or is
employed in both sectors, shall have his creditable
services or contributions in both systems credited to
his service or contribution record in each of the
Systems and shall be totalized for purposes of old-
age, disability, survivorship, and other benefits in
case the covered employee does not qualify for such
benefits in either or both Systems without
totalization: Provided, however, That overlapping
periods of membership shall be credited only once
for purposes of totalization.
Obviously, totalization of service credits is only
resorted to when the retiree does not qualify for
benefits in either or both of the Systems. Here,
petitioner is qualified to receive benefits granted by
the Government Security Insurance System (GSIS),
if such right has not yet been exercised. The
pertinent provisions of law are:
SEC. 12 Old Age Pension. -- (a) xxx
(b) A member who has rendered at least three years
but less than fifteen years of service at the time of
separation shall, upon reaching sixty years of age or
upon separation after age sixty, receive a cash
payment equivalent to one hundred percent of his
average monthly compensation for every year of
service with an employer (Presidential Decree No,
1146, as amended, otherwise known as the
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977).
SEC. 4. All contributions paid by such member
personally, and those that were paid by his
employers to both Systems shall be considered in the
processing of benefits which he can claim from either
or both Systems: Provided, however, That the
amount of benefits to be paid by one System shall
be in proportion to the number of contributions
actually remitted to that System (Republic Act No.
7699).
In any case, petitioners fourteen years of service
with the DOH may not remain uncompensated
Page | 65
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
because it may be recognized by the GSIS pursuant
to the aforequoted Section 12, as may be determined
by the GSIS. Since petitioner may be entitled to
some benefits from the GSIS, he cannot avail of the
benefits under R.A. No. 7699.
LUZ LUMANTA, ET AL. vs. NLRC and FOOD
TERMINAL, INC.
G.R. No. 82819 February 8, 1989
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners file a complaint against FTI for unpaid
retrenchment/separation pay and underpayment of
wages and non-payment of ECOLA with the DOLE.
FTI moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction contending that employees of
government owned and controlled corporation is not
governed by the Labor Code but the Civil Service Law
and hence, fall within jurisdiction of the CSC and not
the DOLE.
Petitioners on the other hand contends that FTI has
still a mark of a private corporation for it directly
hires its employees without seeking approval from
CSC and that its employees are covered by SSS and
not GSIS.
ISSUE:
Whether labor law claim against GOCC without
original charter like FTI falls within the jurisdiction of
DOLE.
HELD:
Yes. The 1987 Constitution which took effect on 2
February 1987, governs and which reads:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter.
(Article IX-B, Section 2 [1])
The jurisdiction is determined as of the time of the
filing of the complaint. At the time the complaint
against private respondent FTI was filed (i.e., 20
March 1987), and at the time the decisions of the
respondent Labor Arbiter and National Labor
Relations Commission were rendered (i.e., 31 August
1987 and 18 March 1988, respectively), the 1987
Constitution had already come into effect. latter of
Instruction No. 1013, dated 19 April 1980, included
Food Terminal, Inc. in the category of "government-
owned or controlled corporations." Since then, FTI
served as the marketing arm of the National Grains
Authority (now known as the National Food
Authority). The pleadings show that FTI was
previously a privately-owned enterprise, created and
organized under the general incorporation law, with
the corporate name "Greater Manila Food Terminal
Market, Inc." The record does not indicate the
precise amount of the capital stock of FM that is
owned by the government; the petitioners' claim,
and this has not been disputed, that FTl is not
hundred percent (100%) government-owned and
that it has some private shareholders.
We conclude that because respondent FTI is
government-owned and controlled
corporation without original charter, it is the
Department of Labor and Employment, and not the
Civil Service Commission, which has jurisdiction over
the dispute arising from employment of the
petitioners with private respondent FTI, and that
consequently, the terms and conditions of such
employment are governed by the Labor Code and
not by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
RICARDO SUMMERS vs. ROMAN OZAETA,
Secretary of Justice, and MANUEL
AGREGADO, Auditor General
G.R. No. L-1534. October 25, 1948
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner was a Cadastral Judge who qualified for
and assumed the position of Judge-at-arge of CFI
upon receiving an ad interim appointment. However,
such appointment was later on disapproved by
Commission on Appointment as a result thereof, the
Secretary of Justice informed him of his separation
from service.
Petitioner contend that he is entitles to continue as a
Cadastral Judge pursuant to Sec. 9, Art. VIII of the
Constitution because the latter position does not
cease upon his acceptance of the position as judge-
at-large.
ISSUE:
Whether the acceptance of a position of Judge-at-
large amounts to a waiver of petitioners right to hold
the position as Cadastral Judge.
Page | 66
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner's voluntary acceptance of the position
of judge-at-large consequent upon his taking of the
oath of office on February 16, 1946, amounted to a
waiver of his right to hold the position of cadastral
judge during the term fixed and guaranteed by the
Constitution. But it is maintained that an ad interim
appointment is merely temporary and the petitioner
cannot be said to have vacated the office of cadastral
judge in view of the rejection of said appointment by
the Commission on Appointments. This point has to
be resolved adversely to the petitioner, if we are to
be consistent with the decision in Zandueta vs. De la
Costa, supra, wherein it was held that "when a judge
of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court
of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a
legal and valid appointment, accepts another
appointment to preside over the same branch of the
same Court of First Instance, in addition to another
court of the same category, both of which belong to
a new judicial district formed by the addition of
another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters
into the discharge of the functions of his new office
and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons
his old office and cannot claim to be entitled to
repossess it or question the constitutionality of the
law by virtue of which his new appointment has been
issued; and, said new appointment having been
disapproved by the commission on Appointments of
the National Assembly, neither can he claim to
continue occupying the office conferred upon him by
said new appointment, having ipso jure ceased in the
discharge of the functions thereof.
Moreover, an ad interim appointment is one made in
pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII,
of the Constitution, which provides that the "
President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but
such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress." It is an
appointment permanent in nature, and the
circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. An ad interim appointment is
disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its
provisional period has expired. Said appointment is
of course distinguishable from an "acting"
appointment which is merely temporary, good until
another permanent appointment is issued.
In the case at bar, the petitioner accepted and
qualified for the position of judge-at-large by taking
the oath of office of judge-at-large, and not merely
of an "acting" judge-at-large. He cannot argue that
said acceptance was conditioned upon the approval
of the appointment by the Commission on
Appointments, for, as stated in Zandueta vs. De la
Costa, supra, the petitioner "knew, or at least he
should know, that his ad interim appointment was
subject to the approval of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly and that if
said commission were to disapprove the same, it
would become ineffective and he would cease
discharging the office.
RICARDO L. MEDALLA, JR. vs.
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her
capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission
G.R. No. 94255 May 5, 1992
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
There occured a vacancy in the position of Division
Manager in the B P and G Division of MIAA.
Consequently, Engr. Singson was designated as the
Acting Division Manager thereof. However, in the
meeting conducted by MIAA Selection/Promotion
Board, Engr. Ricardo Medalla, then Supervising
Engineer A of the same Division was issued formal
appointment by then MIAA General Manager. With
this, Singson protest the appointment of Medalla to
MSPB of the CSC.
Pending resolution of his protest in MSPB, MIAA
underwent a reorganization. Pursuant to its new
staffing pattern, MIAA reappointed Medalla and
Singson as Division Manager D and Principal
Engineer C respectively of the New Civil Works
Division, which replace the B P and G Division.
Notwithstanding the reorganization, MSP still
rendered its decision revoking Medallas appointment
and replace Singson in his stead having the position
next in rank to that of the vacant position.
ISSUE:
Whether MSPB of the CSC may revoke appointment
made by the MIAA.
HELD:
No. The Court has already repeatedly ruled that the
Commission has no such authority to do so. Its only
function is limited to approving or reviewing
appointments to determine their accordance with the
requirements of the Civil Service Law. Thus, when
Page | 67
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge

the Commission finds the appointee to be qualified NAB OF THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
and all the other legal requirements have been (NAPOLCOM) vs. P/INSP. JOHN A.
satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the MAMAUAG, SPO2 EUGENE ALMARIO, SPO4
appointment. Thereafter, its participation in the ERLINDA GARCIA and SPO1 VIVIAN FELIPE
appointment process. Indeed, the determination of [G.R. No. 149999. August 12, 2005]
who among several candidates for a vacant position
has the best qualifications is vested in the sound
CARPIO, J.:
discretion of the Department Head or appointing
authority and not in the Commission. This is because
FACTS:
the appointing authority occupies the ideal vantage
point from which to identify and designate the
A criminal case for child abuse was filed against
individual who can best fill the post and discharge its
Judge Angeles due to the complaint of two minors
functions in the government agency he heads.
Gaspan and Pacay recorded in the police blotter in
Consequently, when the appointing authority has
QC CPDC attended by herein respondents. On the
already exercised his power of appointment, the
otherhand, Judge Angeles filed an administrative
Commission cannot revoke the same on the ground
case against respondent police herein relative to the
that another employee is better qualified for that
criminal charge against her.
would constitute an encroachment on the decision
vested in the appointing authority. The Commission
Upon investigation of the administrative case, QC
may not and should not substitute its judgment for
CPDC dismissed the case. Judge Angeles moved for
that of the appointing authority.
the reinvestigation of the case before PNP Chief
Sarmiento where the latter ordered the dismissal of
In fine, the Court has categorically ruled:
Ganias, BIlledo and Cario; the suspension of
Mamauag and Almario for 90 days and the
We declare once again, and let us hope for the last
exoneration of Garcia and Felipe.
time, that the Civil Service Commission has no power
of appointment except over its own personnel.
Judge Angeles filed a motion for Partial
Neither does it have the authority to review the
Reconsideration of the decision. PNP Chief modified
appointments made by other offices except only to
his decision and ordered the dismissal of Mamauag,
ascertain if the appointee possesses the required
Almario, Garcia and Felipe (Mamauag et., al.).
qualifications. The determination of who among
aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications
Mamauag et., al. petition to court for the injunction
should be preferred belongs to the appointing
of PNP Chiefs Resolution but the case was dismissed
authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
cannot disallow an appointment because it believes
Hence, they filed an appeal to NAB which however,
another person is better qualified and much less can
dismissed their petition as well as the MR for late
it direct the appointment of its own choice.
filing. Mamauag et., al. appealed to CA, where the
latter ordered to Set Aside PNP Chiefs Resolution for
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even
excess of jurisdiction.
this Court cannot compel. While the act of
appointment may in proper cases be the subject
of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee ISSUE:
taking into account the totality of his qualifications,
including those abstract qualities that define his 1. Whether Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975 (RA
personality is the prerogative of the appointing 6975) allows the filing of a motion for
authority. This is a matter addressed only to the reconsideration; (This refers to the PNP Chiefs acts
discretion of the appointing authority. It is a political of modifying its previous decision where it only
question that the Civil Service Commission has no suspends and exonerate respondents)
power to review under the Constitution and the
applicable laws. 2. Whether the private complainant (Judge Angeles)
in an administrative case has the legal personality to
move for reconsideration, or appeal an adverse
decision of the disciplining authority.

HELD:

1. Section 45 of RA 6975 provides that

a disciplinary action imposed upon a member
of the PNP shall be final and executory. Under
Page | 68
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
Section 45, a disciplinary action is appealable only if
it involves either a demotion or dismissal from the
service. If the disciplinary action is less than a
demotion or dismissal from the service, the
disciplinary action shall be final and executory as
Section 45 of RA 6975 expressly mandates. Thus, a
decision imposing suspension on a PNP member is
not subject to appeal to a higher authority.
Administrative disciplinary action connotes
administrative penalty. If the decision exonerates
the respondents or otherwise dismisses the charges
against the respondents, there is no disciplinary
action since no penalty is imposed. The provision
that a penalty less than demotion or dismissal from
service is final and executory does not apply to
dismissal of charges or exoneration because they are
not disciplinary actions.
Before the case of CSC v. Dacoycoy. case law held
that dismissal of the charges or exoneration of the
respondents in administrative disciplinary
proceedings is final and not subject to appeal even
by the government. Thus, in Del Castillo v. CSC, et
al., the Court held:
Section 37, paragraph (a), of PD 807, the Philippine
Civil Service Law, provides:
(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving
the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more
than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office xxx (Italics
supplied).
Interpreting the above provision, we held in Mendez
v. CSC that:
It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provision of law.
A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise
known as The Philippine Civil Service Law
shows that said law does not contemplate a
review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges.
Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:
Said provision must be read together with Section 39
paragraph (a) of P.D. 805 which contemplates:
Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party
adversely affected by the decision.
The phrase party adversely affected by the decision
refers to the government employee against whom
the administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action which may take the form of
suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. In the instant case,
Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered
an aggrieved party because he is not the respondent
in the administrative case below.
Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D.
807, the city mayor, as head of the city government,
is empowered to enforce judgment with finality on
lesser penalties like suspension from work for one
month and forfeiture of salary equivalent to one
month against erring employees.
By inference or implication, the remedy of
appeal may be availed of only in a case where
the respondent is found guilty of the charges
files against him. But when the respondent is
exonerated of said charges, as in this case,
there is no occasion for appeal.
2. In Dacoycoy, the Court modified the rule in Del
Castillo and earlier cases by allowing the Civil
Service Commission to appeal dismissals of charges
or exoneration of respondents in administrative
disciplinary proceedings. In Dacoycoy, the Court
ruled:
At this point, we have necessarily to resolve the
question of the party adversely affected who may
take an appeal from an adverse decision of the
appellate court in an administrative civil service
disciplinary case. There is no question that
respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of
Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service
Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent
official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the
service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court
required the petitioner therein, here respondent
Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission
as public respondent as the government agency
tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional
and statutory provisions on the civil service.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Civil Service Commission and held
respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may
appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to
the Supreme Court? Certainly not the
respondent, who was declared not guilty of
the charge. Nor the complainant George P.
Suan, who was merely a witness for the
government. Consequently, the Civil Service
Commission has become the party adversely
affected by such ruling, which seriously
Page | 69
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as
an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision
of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and
overrule extant jurisprudence that the phrase party
adversely affected by the decision refers to the
government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action which may take the form of
suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer,
removal or dismissal from office and not included are
cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for
not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount
not exceeding thirty days salary or when the
respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no
occasion for appeal. In other words, we overrule
prior decisions holding that the Civil Service
Law does not contemplate a review of
decisions exonerating officers or employees
from administrative charges.
Subsequent decisions of the Court
affirmed Dacoycoy.
Dacoycoy allowed the Civil Service Commission to
appeal dismissals of charges or exoneration of
respondents in administrative disciplinary
proceedings.
However, Dacoycoy maintained the rule that the
private complainant is a mere government witness
without a right to appeal. Thus, case law holding that
the private complainant has no right to appeal the
decision of the disciplining authority remains good
law. As explained by Justice Jose Melo in his
concurring opinion in Floralde v. Court of
Appeals:
However, in Civil Service Commission v.
Dacoycoy which incidentally is another ponencia of
Mr. Justice Pardo, the majority, with
undersigned ponente dissenting, modified the above
doctrine by allowing the CSC to appeal in cases
where the respondent is exonerated of the
charges. Nevertheless, in both cases, the Court
did not deviate from the doctrine that the
complainant, being a mere witness for the
government, cannot appeal the decision
rendered in the administrative case.
In Paredes, we declared that the complainant is not
the party adversely affected by the decision so that
she has no legal personality to interpose an appeal
to the CSC. In an administrative case, the
complainant is a mere witness. No private interest is
involved in an administrative case as the offense is
committed against the government.
LUZVIMINDA DE LA CRUZ, Et. Al. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CSC and THE
SECRETARY OF THE DECS
G.R. No. 126183 March 25, 1999
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners are public school teachers who were
simultaneously charged, preventively suspended,
and eventually dismissed by Sec. Carino in Oct. 1990.
It was alleged that the teachers participated in the
mass action/ illegal strike on Sept. 1990. The
teachers also violated the return-to-work order
issued by the DECS. Respondents failed to explain to
the DECS despite the 5-day period given. Hence,
they were found guilty as charged, and subsequently
dismissed from office by Sec. Carino of the
DECS. The Civil Service Commission, upon appeal,
found the teachers guilty of conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of service, and imposed upon them
the reduced penalty of six months suspension.
However, in view of the length of time that the
teachers had been out of service due to the dismissal
issued by Sec. Carino, the CSC likewise ordered their
immediate reinstatement without back wages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the teachers conducts are prejudicial to
the best interest of service.
2. Whether or not the teachers are entitled to back
wages for the period of 3 years pending their appeal
deducting the 6 months suspension eventually
meted out to them.
HELD:
1. YES, the mass actions amounted to a prohibited
strike of civil service servants. Although the right to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances is guaranteed by
the Constitution, this liberty must be exercised
within reasonable limits. The public-school teachers
committed acts prejudicial to the interest of the
service by staging the mass protests on regular
school days, abandoning their classes and failing to
return despite the return to work order.
2. NO, they are not entitled to back wages. The
teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably
suspended, the 2 circumstances necessary for the
grant of back wages in
administrative disciplinary cases.
Page | 70
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM
HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ
REQUESTING HONORABLE JUSTICE
MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN
ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT.
A.M. No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated
16 March 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez,
"Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr.
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-complaint, dated
14 December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned
Employees of the Supreme Court," together with a
telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten
(10) days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan
had brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of
the Court en banc in view of the important
implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.
Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor.
He forwarded to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a
letter-complaint. The letter was said to be from
concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous
letter).
The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales
referring to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr.
Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking
him (Gonzales) to do something about it.
The Court furnished to Mr. Raul M. Gonzales a copy
of the per curiam Resolution in which, the Court
Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complaint
Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of
merit. In the same Resolution, the Court Resolved to
require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he
should not be administratively dealt with for making
unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice
Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had
granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988,
Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an
omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia,
Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as
Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned, the Court
treated this pleading as a Motion for
Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated
15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr
Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be
disbarred during his term of office.
HELD:
A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under
the Constitution is required to be a Member of the
Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by
him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment
during the incumbency of such public officer.
Further, such public officer, during his incumbency,
cannot be charged criminally before the
Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with any offense
which carries with it the penalty of removal from
office.
Another reason why the complaint for disbarment
should be dismissed is because under the
Constitution, members of the SC may be removed
only by impeachment. The above provision
proscribes removal from office by any other method.
Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be
removed solely by impeachment to be charged
criminally while holding his office with an office that
carries the penalty of removal from office, would be
violative of the clear mandate of the Constitution.
The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of
position and disqualification to hold any office of
honor, trust or profit under the Republic. Judgment
in cases of impeachment shall not extend further
than removal from office and disqualification to hold
any office. But the party convicted shall nevertheless
be held liable and subject to prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law.
The court is not saying that its Members or other
constitutional officers are entitled to immunity from
liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other
supposed misbehavior. What the court is saying is
that there is a fundamental procedural requirement
that must be observed before such liability may be
determined and enforced. A member of the Supreme
Court must first be removed from office, via the
constitutional route of impeachment, and then only
may he be held liable either criminally or
administratively (that is, disbarment), for any wrong
or misbehavior that may be proven against him in
appropriate proceedings.
Page | 71
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
vs.
GERTRUDES MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE
BERNARDO
G.R. No. 164316. September 27, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Ombudsmans authority to impose
administrative penalty and enforce
compliance therewith is not merely
recommendatory but mandatory within the
bounds of the law.
FACTS:
The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman charging
Gertrudes Madriaga, school principal of San Juan
Elementary School and Ana Marie Bernardo, Canteen
Manager of the same school, with violation of Section
1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules
Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. They
were subsequently found guilty of the offense
charged. Consequently, they were meted out the
penalty of six (6) months suspension.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the
six-month suspension meted out by the Office of the
Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo (Gertrudes)
is merely recommendatory to the Department of
Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has
the authority to impose administrative sanctions over
public officials
HELD:
Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants
the Ombudsman administrative disciplinary power to
direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the
constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the power
to recommend the imposition of penalty on erring
public officials and employees and ensure
compliance therewith.
The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the
"order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure,
or prosecute" an officer or employee akin to the
questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the
refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply
with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an
erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary
action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's
"recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature
but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the
Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or
any officer concerned. It has long been settled that
the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public
official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman
"recommends" the action to be taken against an
erring officer or employee, the provisions in the
Constitution and in R.A. 6770 intended that the
implementation of the order be coursed through the
proper officer, which in this case would be the head
of the BID.
The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be
read in conjunction with the phrases "ensure
compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary
authority as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770.
In fine, the Ombudsman's authority to impose
administrative penalty and enforce compliance
therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is
mandatory within the bounds of the law. The
implementation of the order imposing the penalty is,
however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
U.P. BOARD OF REGENTS, DR. JOSE V.
ABUEVA vs. HON. JAINAL D. RASUL, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 69 of the
Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila, and
DR. FELIPE A. ESTRELLA, JR.,
G.R. No. 91551. August 16, 1991
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
Dr. Felipe Estrada Jr. was the Director of PGH
appointed by the UP Board of Regents which
intended to have him serve his full term as a Director.
President Abueva, the new president of UP, upon
assuming position submitted a memorandum to BOR
Page | 72
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
to reorganize UP Manila including PGH and
recommended that certain key positions of UP
Manila, including that of the plaintiff be declared
vacant.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Dr. Estrella's security of tenure was
violated due to reorganization. YES
2. Whether UP has authority to abolish office. NO
HELD:
1. The whole reorganization set-up under our law
cannot or should not have the effect of abolishing
the position of the plaintiff unless legal requirements
are complied with. If the reorganization plan results
in abolishing the position of the plaintiff and in
putting in his place another one, with substantially
the same duties, not to say qualifications, in the
name of leadership, it will surely be considered a
device to unseat the incumbent and to circumvent
the constitutional and statutory prohibition of
removal from office of a civil service officer even
without cause provided by law. Plaintiffs position
should not therefore be deemed abolished by mere
implication If the abolition of office is made to
circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of
civil service employees, our Supreme Court, has
ruled that such abolition is null and void.
Respondent Dr. Estrella was appointed Director of
PGH on 1986 by the LTP Board of Regents. His
appointment was to be effective September 1, 1986
until April 30, 1992 or unless sooner terminated.
Appointees of the LTP Board of Regents enjoy
security of tenure during their term of office.
Petitioners argue, however, that the abolition of the
position of respondent Dr. Estrella Jr. negates his
claim to security of tenure. The argument is devoid
of merit.
It is clear from the record that the PGH itself was not
abolished in the reorganization plan approved by the
UP Board of Regents. The PGH was merely renamed
"UP-PGH Medical Center" and some of it functions
and objectives were expanded or consolidated.
There is no substantial distinction, in terms of
functions, between PGH and the proposed UP-PGH
Medical Center.
It is true that a valid and bona fide abolition of an
office denies to the incumbent the right to security
of tenure. However, in this case, the renaming and
restructuring of the PGH and its component units
cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolition of
the position of PGH Director. This is because where
the abolished office and the offices created in its
place have similar functions, the abolition lacks good
faith.We hereby apply the principle enunciated
in Cesar Z. Dalio vs. Hon. Salvador M. Mison that
abolition which merely changes the nomenclature of
positions is invalid and does not result in the removal
of the incumbent.
2. The UP Board of Regents acted within the scope
and limitations of its charter, Act No. 1870, as
amended when it approved the reorganization plan
renaming the PGH and expanding and consolidating
some of its functions and objectives. The UP Board
of Regents did not and could not have abolished
PGH. And rightly so. The PGH and one of its
component units, the Cancer Institute, are creations
of special laws, the old Administrative, Code
(Chapter 29, Secs. 706-707) and Commonwealth Act
No. 398, respectively. The authority of the UP under
Act No. 1870 as amended, to combine two or more
colleges in the interest of economy and efficiency
does not empower UP to abolish offices created by
special laws.
It is therefore clear that the authority of the UP is
limited to what is expressly provided in Act No. 1870
as amended, that is, to combine or merge colleges.
That is all the law speaks of in such instance.
On the other hand, the power to create and abolish
offices carries with it the power to fix the number of
positions, salaries, emoluments, and to provide
funds for the operation of the office created. This
power is inherently legislative in character. The UP
Board of Regents does not have such power. Hence,
the abolition of the position of respondent Dr.
Estrella is not valid.
WENONAH L. MARQUEZ AZARCON
vs. HOUSING AND LAND USE ARBITER
CHARITO BUNAGAN, BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS (SPECIAL DIVISION),
EQUITY HOMES, INC., SAGANA
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.
and J. M. BUILDERS, INC.,
[G. R. No. 124611. March 20, 2003]
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
SAGANA and JIM Builders entered into a contract to
sell the house and lot with Wenonah Azarcon located
in QC the balance to be paid through SSS loan. The
loan was disapproved partly for failure of SAGANA to
submit certain requirements. She offered cash but
Page | 73
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
the latter refused. She then occupied the property.
Housing and Land Use Arbitrator modified the
previous decision and require Azarcon to pay the
balance of 3k rental per month said amount of rental
shall form part of the purchase price of the premises.
SAGANA received the payment but refused to
execute Deed of Sale on the ground that Azarcon had
yet to pay rentals. SAGANA filed to HLA to compel
AZARCON to pay rentals. The Board issued Writ of
Execution in accordance with its previous modified
order. Azarcon petition to CA that the order is
different, it varies from the previous order.
ISSUE: Whether HLA decisions vary thus CA erred
in affirming HLA decision.
HELD: Writ of Execution in question varied to the
terms of HLURB previous decision.
The dispute thus arises from the parties conflicting
understanding or interpretation of the phrase the
said amount of rental shall form part of the purchase
price as adjusted found in the fallo, Azarcon
contending that the payment of rentals is an
alternative to the payment of the balance of the
purchase price, and SAGANA contending that the
rental payments shall be in addition to the balance
of the purchase price.
Of the partys interpretations, SAGANAs is contrary
to their agreement. They agreed upon the purchase
price of the subject property in 1995 when they
entered into the contract to sell. The amount agreed
upon became the law between them.
To follow the interpretation proffered by SAGANA
would allow the Board to alter the parties agreement
on the purchase price.
Upon the other hand, Azarcons interpretation is more
in accord with the finding of the Board that
the delay in the payment of the purchase price was
not due to her fault, precisely on account of which
finding it deleted the order for the payment of
interest by Azarcon. Held the Board:
[SAGANA] has failed to convincingly refute
[AZARCONs] argument that the non-release of the
loan was due to its non-submission of certain
requirements.
Hence, for this reason, the issue [of whether or not
Azarcon is liable for the payment of interest] is
resolved in the negative.
We are convinced that [Azarcon] should not be held
responsible for the delay in the release of the loan a
nd consequently for the non-
payment of the purchase price.
Such being the case, we believe that a recall of our
previous ruling ordering [Azarcon] to pay interest by
way of damages is in order.
If Azarcon had been spared by the Board of paying
interest by way of damages because she was not
responsible for the delay in the release of the loan
and consequently for the non-payment of [the
balance] of the purchase price, why should the Board
have intended to make her liable to pay rentals over
and above the balance of the purchase
price, especially given her tender of payment of suc
h
balance after the loan applicationwas not approved,
which tender SAGANA refused to accept without
interest being paid thereon? That the Board had no
such intention, the following portion of its May 10,
1993 decision instructs:
In the absence of payment through housing loan, the
buyershould effect payment through other means w
ithin a reasonable period. The seller should also
extend all support and assistance to make it possible
for the buyer to find such means, particularly if it
contributed to the non-release of the loan. If parties
cannot agree on the substitute method of payment
on the period for effecting the same, then the Board
may step to fix the same. Meantime we believe
that until this matter can be resolved, complainant s
hould pay rentals as equitable payment for use of t
he premises, which can be applied to the balance of
the purchase price.
From the immediately foregoing disquisition of the
Board, it is clear that the payment of rentals was
devised by it merely as an interim scheme, until a
substitute method of payment [of the balance of the
purchase price] was agreed upon by the parties.
Since Azarcon fully paid the balance of the purchase
price on July 22, 1993, less than three months after
the Board decision was promulgated on May 10,
1993, that part of the decision respecting payment
through other means devised by the Board for
Azarcon to, in the meantime, pay rentals as equitable
payment for the use of the premises, which can be
applied to the balance of the purchase price, had
become functus oficio. To hold otherwise would be
to fault Azarcon in whom none was, as reflected
above, found by the Board. It would also gloss over
Azarcons initial payment of a substantial amount
when they entered into the contract to sell and her
Page | 74
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
tender of payment of the balance which was,
however, rejected by SAGANA. It would thus ignore
the interest of justice and equity which underlies all
systems of justice.
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING
COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS vs. HON.
ANIANO A. DESIERTO as Ombudsman
G.R. No. 130140 October 25, 1999
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
FACTS:
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order
No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans,
In its FOURTEENTH (14TH) REPORT ON BEHEST
LOANS to President Ramos, dated 15 July 1993, the
COMMITTEE reported that the Philippine, Seeds,
Inc., (hereafter PSI) of which the respondents in
OMB-0-96-0968 were the Directors, was one of the
twenty-one corporations which obtained behest
loans.
President Ramos directed COMMITTEE Chairman
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo to, inter alia, "proceed
with administrative and judicial actions against the
twenty-one firms. The COMMITTEE filed with the
OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint against the
Directors of PSI and the BDM who approved the
loans for violation of RA No. 3019.
In the resolution OMBUDSMAN dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription. Relying
on People v. Dinsay, a case decided by the Court of
Appeals, he ratiocinated that since the questioned
transactions were evidenced by public instruments
and were thus open for the perusal of the public, the
prescriptive period commenced to run from the time
of the commission of the crime, not from the
discovery thereof.
The COMMITTEE argues that the right of the
Republic of the Philippines to recover behest loans as
ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible pursuant to the
mandate of Section 15 of Article XI of the
Constitution, which provides:
The right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees,
from them or from their nominees as transferees,
shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel.
The ruling in Dinsay is not applicable to the case at
bar. First, it is a decision of the Court of Appeals;
hence, it does not establish a doctrine and can only
have a persuasive value.
The OMBUDSMAN takes a different view. For one, he
asserts that Section 15 of Article XI of the
Constitution is not applicable, since what the
COMMITTEE seeks is not to recover the unlawfully
acquired wealth from the respondents therein but to
hold them criminally liable for violation of R.A. No.
3019.
According to him, the computation of the prescriptive
period from the date of discovery would only be
resorted to if the commission of the crime be not
known at the day of the commission. The phrase "if
the same be not known" does not mean "lack of
actual knowledge
ISSUE:
Whether the OMBUDSMAN gravely abused its
discretion in holding that offenses had already
prescribed
HELD:
We agree with the OMBUDSMAN that Section 15 of
Article XI of the Constitution applies only to civil
actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to
criminal cases. It is just the imprescriptibily of the
civil action, it does not cover imprescriptibility of
criminal action.The prescription shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting double jeopardy.
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for
the State, to have known the violations of R.A. No.
3019 at the time the questioned transactions were
made because, as alleged, the public officials
concerned connived or conspired with the
"beneficiaries of the loans." Thus, the prescriptive
period for that should be computed from the
discovery of the commission thereof and not from
the day of such commission.
OMBUDSMAN forthwith dismissed the complaint
without even requiring the respondents to submit
their counter-affidavits and solely on the basis of the
dates the alleged behest loans were granted. It
should have first received from the complainant and
the respondents to resolve the case on merits and
on the issue of the date of discovery of the offense.
Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the
preliminary investigation.
Page | 75
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
ADDITIONAL CASES FOR FINALS
PERLA A. SEGOVIA, REYNALDO C. SANTIAGO,
and WINIFREDO SM. PANGILINAN vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and the PRESIDENT of the NPC
G.R. No. 124067 March 27, 1998
NARVASA, C.J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner, who are the officers composing the
Contracts Committee of the NPC was accused to
have violated RA 3019 for having extended undue
advantage to Joint Venture (one of the bidders in its
project).
The complaint against petitioner was filed in the
Ombudsman where the latter conducted preliminary
investigation and release its resolution charging
petitioners the violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019.
Consequently, an information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against petitioners. On the
otherhand, the People filed a motion to suspend
accused pendent lite invoking Sec. 13 of RA 3019, as
amended and alleged that the information is valid.
The court resolved in favor of the People and
suspend the petitioners for a period of 90 days.
Petitioners questioned the said suspension,
contending that suspension by Sandiganbayan by SB
under RA 3019 is not mandatory.
ISSUE:
Whether the preventive suspension under Sec. 13,
RA 3019 is mandatory.
HELD:
Yes. Upon a proper determination of the validity of
the information, it becomes mandatory for the court
to immediately issue the suspension order. The rule
on the matter is specific and categorical. It leaves no
room for interpretation. It is not within the court's
discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the
accused officer on the pretext that the order denying
the motion to quash is pending review before the
appellate courts. Its discretion lies only during the
pre-suspension hearing where it is required to
ascertain whether or not (1) the accused had been
afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the
filing of the information against him, (2) the acts for
which he was charged constitute a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the
provisions of Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, or (3) the informations against him can be
quashed, under any of the grounds provided in
Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. (People vs.
Albano, etc., et al. supra, fn. 26)
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form
and substance, then the court must issue the order
of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs
and buts about it. This is because a preventive
suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed as a
result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted,
the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension. In view of this
latter provision, the accused elective public officer
does not stand to be prejudiced by the immediate
enforcement of the suspension order in the event
that the information is subsequently declared null
and void on appeal and the case dismissed as against
him. Taking into consideration the public policy
involved in preventively suspending a public officer
charged under a valid information, the protection of
public interest will definitely have to prevail over the
private interest of the accused.
To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court
under Section 13 of Republic Act No.3019, it is said
that the court trying the case has neither discretion
nor duty to determine whether or not a preventive
suspension is required to prevent the accused from
using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate
his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance
in office. The presumption is that unless the accused
is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or
commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the
same way that upon a finding that there is probable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the
law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the
arrest of the accused. The law does not require the
court to determine whether the accused is likely to
escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001]
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
A group of employees from CID filed complaint to the
Ombudsman against then CID Commissioner
Santiago, a Senator of the Philippines at the time this
complaint was filed, for alleged violation of RA 3019
by approving the application for legalization of the
stay of some disqualified aliens.
Page | 76
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
As a result thereof, an information was filed by
Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan where the
latter orders preventive suspension of Santiago from
her position as Senator and from any other
government position she may be holding at present
or hereafter for 90 days effective immediately.
ISSUE:
Whether Sandiganbayan has authority to decree 90
days preventive suspension from any other
government position.
HELD:
Yes. The petition assails the authority of the
Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive
suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any
government position, and furnishing a copy thereof
to the Senate of the Philippines for the
implementation of the suspension order. The
authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the
preventive suspension of an incumbent public official
charged with violation of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential
support.
Xxx
In the relatively recent case of Segovia v.
Sandiganbayan (288 SCRA 328 [1998]), the Court
reiterated: The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as
amended treating of the suspension pendente lite
of an accused public officer may no longer be put
at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this
Court. X x x The provision of suspension pendente
lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid
information under the Act, whether they be
appointive or elective officials; or permanent or
temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or
non-career service. (At pp. 336-337) It would
appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court
to issue an order of suspension upon determination
of the validity of the information filed before it. Once
the information is found to be sufficient in form and
substance, the court is bound to issue an order of
suspension as a matter of course, and there seems
to be no ifs and buts about it.
Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension,
the Court in the case of Bayot v. Sandiganbayan (128
SCRA 383 [1984]) observed: x x x It is not a penalty
because it is not imposed as a result of judicial
proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension. (At p. 386) In issuing the
preventive suspension of petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the
jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than
once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree
the suspension of public officials and employees
indicted before it. Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019 does not state that the public officer concerned
must be suspended only in the office where he is
alleged to have committed the acts with which he
has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the
use of the word office would indicate that it applies
to any office which the officer charged may be
holding, and not only the particular office under
which he stands accused. (Bayot v. Sandiganbayan,
supra; Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, supra.)
En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not
automatic or self-operative as the validity of the
information must be determined in a pre-suspension
hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the
conduct thereof. It has been said that
xxx
No specific rules need be laid down for such
presuspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him, e.g., that he
has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands
charged do not constitute a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery
provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would
warrant his mandatory suspension from office under
Section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to
quash the information on any of the grounds
provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
x x x. x x x
Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the
propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the
acts for which he is charged do not constitute a
violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on
bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to
present a motion to quash the information on any
other grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court. However, a challenge to the validity of the
criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for
which the accused is charged do not constitute a
violation of the provisions of Rep. Act No. 3019, or
of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal
Code, should be treated only in the same manner as
a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a
motion to quash on the ground provided in
Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute
Page | 77
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
an offense. In other words, a resolution of the
challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding,
on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry
whether the facts alleged in the information, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of
an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the
provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused
must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding
before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it
contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the
strength of the evidence of culpability against him,
(2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether
or not his continuance in office could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity
of the records and other evidence before the court
could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive
suspension pending the trial of the case. All it
secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to
challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings
against him, such as, that he has not been afforded
the right to due preliminary investigation, that the
acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime
warranting his mandatory suspension from office
under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that
the information is subject to quashal on any of the
grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure (Segovia v.
Sandiganbayan, supra; Resolution of the Supreme
Court in A.M. No. 00-05-03-SC, dated 03 October
2000, which became effective on 01 December
2000)
Xxx
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the
information filed against petitioner, behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to
forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act
No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which
provides that each x x x house may determine the
rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days. (Section 16[3], Article
VI, 1987 Constitution) The suspension contemplated
in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon determination by the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its
resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, et al. (G.R. No. 118364, 08 August
1995), the Court affirmed the order of suspension of
Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan,
despite his protestations on the encroachment by the
court on the prerogatives of Congress. The Court
ruled: x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the
power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish
its Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or
expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members subject to the qualification that the penalty
of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed
sixty days in unavailing, as it appears to be quite
distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13
of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that
the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives. The doctrine of separation of
powers by itself may not be deemed to have
effectively excluded Members of Congress from
Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The
maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal
and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and
effectively prevents one branch from unduly
intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit.
Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement
of actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also in the
determination of whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. The provision
allowing the Court to look into any possible grave
abuse of discretion committed by any government
instrumentality has evidently been couched in
general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial
interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu. In
its normal concept, the term has been said to imply
an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to
an affair internal to either of Congress or the
Executive, the Court subscribes to the view that
unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional
proscription thereby inheres the Court should not
deign substitute its own judgment over that of any
of the other two branches of government. It is an
impairment or a clear disregard of a specific
constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt
the steel door for judicial intervention. If any part of
the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive
to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the
Court, who must promptly react in the manner
Page | 78
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
prescribed by the Charter itself. Republic Act No.
3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order. Attention
might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No.
16698 has been decided by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting
herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it
appropriate to render this decision for future
guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.
(Sandoval Notes)
HOLD OVER DOCTRINE: CONCEPT AND
PURPOSE
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE
LECAROZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 130872 March 25, 1999
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
In the 1985 election, Jowl Red on as KB
Chairman of Brgy. Matalaba Sta. Cruz where
petitioners Francisco Lecaroz was the
municipal mayor and his son Lenlie Lecaroz
was the outgoing Chairman of KB of Sta. Cruz
and concurrently a member of its
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing
Federation of Kabataang Barangays.
Red filed a complaint to Ombudsman alleging
that despite appointment as member of the SB
by then President Marcos, the confirmation
letter from Imee Marcos, then National
Chairperson of the Organization, and his prior
oath takng, Mayor Lecaroz still not allowed
him to sit as sectoral representative in the SB.
He further alleged that petitioners falsified the
payroll to appear that Lenlie was reinstated in
the position in the SB and still received its
salary despite the expiration of his tenure in
office.
ISSUE:
Whether the outgoing public officer may hold
over position beyond his term.
HELD:
The concept of holdover when applied to a public
officer implies that the office has a fixed term and
the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding
term. It is usually provided by law that officers
elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in
office not only for that term but until their successors
have been elected and qualified. Where this
provision is found, the office does not become vacant
upon the expiration of the term if there is no
successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the
present incumbent will carry over until his successor
is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond
the term fixed by law.
In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say
that a Sanggunian member can continue to occupy
his post after the expiration of his term in case his
successor fails to qualify, it does, not also say that
he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an
express or implied constitutional or statutory
provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay
in office until his successor is appointed or chosen
and has qualified. The legislative intent of not
allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at
least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise
it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body
favors the same.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public
offices, and courts generally indulge in the strong
presumption against a legislative intent to create, by
statute, a condition which may result in an executive
or administrative office becoming, for any period of
time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully
authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded
on obvious considerations of public policy, for the
principle of holdover is specifically intended to
prevent public convenience from suffering because
of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the
performance of government functions.
RAUL A. GALAROSA vs. HON. EUDARLIO B.
VALENCIA
G.R. No. 109455 November 11, 1993
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Raul Galarosa is a president of the Katipunang Bayan
of the municipality of Sorsogon. Like the LGC of
1991, the(old) LGC of 1983 or BP 337 grants
Galarosa the right to serve as ex-officio member of
the sangguniang bayan. However,when the new LGC
of 1991 finally took effect, Rodolfo Lasay filed a case
against Galarosa in his capacity as taxpayer
questioning the right of Galarosa to remain as an ex-
officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Lasay
Page | 79
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
claimed that the new LGC of 1991 provided for the
liga ng mga barangay, which, although admittedly
was structurally and functionally the same as
katipunan ng mga barangay, nevertheless abolished
the katipunan ng mga barangay, thereby a new set
of officers have to be appointed by the President of
the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether Galarosa can continue to serve as a
member of Sangguniang Bayan beyond the term of
his office.
HELD:
Yes. The rule is settled that unless holding over be
expressly or impliedly prohibited, the incumbent may
continue to hold over until someone else is elected
and qualified to assume the office. This rule is
demanded by the most obvious requirements of
public policy, for without it there must frequently be
cases where, from a failure to elect or a refusal or
neglect to qualify, the office would be vacant and the
public service entirely suspended. Otherwise stated,
the purpose is to prevent a hiatus in the government
pending the time when the successor may be chosen
and inducted into office. (Sandoval Notes)
HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, in his capacity as
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas vs.
HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, Presiding
Judge, Branch XXVIII, Regional Trial Court,
G.R. No. 108072 December 12, 1995
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents, who are all public officials of
Mandaue City were complained crimall and
administratively before the Ombudsman by
Mandaue City Councilors Dionson and Bercedo
for alleged Alteration and/or falsification of an
Ordinance by increasing the allocated
appropriation without authority from the
Sanguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City.
Councilors Dionson and Bercede also moved
for the respondents preventive suspension
which the latter opposed and prayed for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to try, hear
and decide the administrative case against
them since Sec. 63 of LGC of 1991 granted the
power to investigate and impose
Administrative sanctions against said local
officials, as well as to effect their Preventive
Suspension had now been vested with the
Office of the President.
ISSUE:
Whether Ombudsman has been divested of his
authority to conduct administrative
investigation over local elective officials by
virtue LGC of 1991 granting such authority to
the Office of the President.
HELD:
No. We reach the foregoing conclusion, however,
without necessarily subscribing to petitioners claim
that the Local Government Code, which he averred
should apply to this case of an elective local official,
has been violated. True, under said Code, preventive
suspension may only be imposed after the issues are
joined, and only for a maximum period of sixty days.
Here, petitioner was suspended without having had
the chance to refute first the charges against him,
and for the maximum period of six months provided
by the Ombudsman Law. But as respondents argue,
administrative complaints commenced under the
Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated
under the Local Government Code. Respondents
point out that the shorter period of suspension under
the Local Government Code is intended to limit the
period of suspension that may be imposed by a
mayor, a governor, or the President, who may be
motivated by partisan political considerations. In
contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose a longer
period of preventive suspension, is not likely to be
similarly motivated because it is a constitutional
body. The distinction is valid but not decisive, in our
view, of whether there has been grave abuse of
discretion in a specific case of preventive suspension.
Xxx
Respondents may be correct in pointing out the
reason for the shorter period of preventive
suspension imposable under the Local Government
Code. Political color could taint the exercise of the
power to suspend local officials by the mayor,
governor, or Presidents office. In contrast the
Ombudsman, considering the constitutional origin of
his Office, always ought to be insulated from the
vagaries of politics, as respondents would have us
believe.
Page | 80
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
On the matter of whether or not the Ombudsman
has been stripped of his power to investigate local
elective officials by virtue of the Local Government
Code, we said: Indeed, there is nothing in the Local
Government Code to indicate that it has repealed,
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent
provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes
on the specific matter in question are not so
inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us
to only uphold one and strike down the other.
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES,
CATANDUANES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
AUGUSTO T. ANTONIO
[G.R. No. 118883. January 16, 1998]
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Antonio, priate respondent, was elected barangay
captain of Sapang Palay Catanduanes on March
1989. He was later elected president of the
Association of Barangay Council (ABC) for the
Municiplity of San Andres Catanduanes. Pursuant to
the Local Government Code of 1983, he was
appointed by the President as Member of the
Sanguniang Bayan of the sid municipality.
Meanwhile, DILG Sec. declared the election for the
president of the Federation of the Association of
Barangay Council (FABC) void for lack of quorum. As
a result, the provincial council was reorganized.
DILG Sec then designated private respondent as a
temporary member of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan
of Catanduanes effective on 15 June 1990. Because
of his designation, private respondent tendered his
resignation as a member of the Sanguniang Bayan
dated 14 June 1990 to the Mayor of San Andres
Catanduanes. Copies of his letters were also
forwarded to the provincial governor, DILG and the
municipal treasurer. Subsequently, Aquino then the
Vice President of ABC was appointed by the
provincial governor as member of the Sanguniang
Bayan in place of private respondent.
Aquino assumed office on 18 July 1980 after taking
his oath. Subsequently, the ruling of the DILG
annulling the election of the FABC president was
reversed by the Supreme Court and declared
the appointment of private respondent void for
lacking the essential qualification of being the
president of FABC. On 31 March 1992, private
respondent wrote to the Sanguniang Bayan (SB) of
San Andres regarding his re-assumption of his
original position. SB refused.
ISSUE:
Whether Antonios resignation was complete and
whether respondent abandoned his membership in
the SB.
HELD:
The resignation was not complete for lack of
acceptance thereof of the proper authority however,
an office may still be deemed relinquished through
voluntary abandonment which needs no acceptance.
In Ortiz vs Comelec, resignation is defined as the act
of giving up of an officer by which he declines his
office and renounces the further right to use it.
It can be express or implied. To constitute a
complete and operative resignation the
following must be present.
(a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term;
(b) an act of relinquishment; and
(c) an acceptance by the proper authority.
In the case at bar, there was no evidence that the
private respondents resignation was accepted by the
proper authority. Although the Local Government
Code of 1983 was silent as to who specifically should
accept the resignation it provides that the position
shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance of
resignation and should be acted upon by the
Sangunian concerned.
The resignation letter was tendered to the mayor and
copies were sent to the governor, DILG and the
municipal treasurer but none of them expressly acted
on it. Furthermore, under established jurisprudence,
resignations, in the absence of statutory provisions
as to whom it should be submitted, should be
submitted to the appointing power.
Therefore, the resignation should have been
submitted to the president or to the DILG as the
presidents alter ego. Tackling the second issue,
abandonment has been defined as the voluntary
relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the
intention of terminating his possession and control
thereof. It is a species of resignation. While
resignation is the formal relinquishment,
abandonment is the voluntary relinquishment by
non-user.
Page | 81
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
There are 2 essential elements of
abandonment:
(1) an intention to abandon and
(2) an overt act by which intention is carried on.
In the case at bar, the first element
was manifested on the following instances:
(1) private respondents failure to perform his
function as SB;
(2) his failure to collect the corresponding
remuneration for the position,
(3)his failure to object to the appointment of Aquino
as his replacement to SB and
(4) his prolonged failure to initiate any act to
reassume his post in the SB after SC had nullified his
designation as member of Sanguniang Panlalawigan.
The second element was demonstrated by the
following:
(1) his letter of resignation,
(2) his assumption of office as member of the
Sanguniang Panlalawigan,
(3) his faithful discharge of his duties and functions
of SP and
(4) his receipt of remuneration for such post.
It is the act of giving up or the act of an officer by
which he declines his office and renounces the
further right to use it. It is an expression of the
incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the
intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the
office and the acceptance by competent and lawful
authority. To constitute a complete and operative
resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an
intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act
of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the
proper authority. The last one is required by reason
of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.
Abandonment of an office has been defined as the
voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder,
with the intention of terminating his possession and
control thereof. Indeed, abandonment of office is a
species of resignation; while resignation in general is
a formal relinquishment, abandonment is a voluntary
relinquishment through nonuser. Abandonment
springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and
freedom of choice. Its concomitant effect is that the
former holder of an office can no longer legally
repossess it even by forcible re-occupancy. Clear
intention to abandon should be manifested by the
officer concerned. Such intention may be express or
inferred from his own conduct. Thus, the failure to
perform the duties pertaining to the office must be
with the officers actual or imputed intention to
abandon and relinquish the office. Abandonment of
an office is not wholly a matter of intention; it results
from a complete abandonment of duties of such
continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment.
Therefore, there are two essential elements of
abandonment; first, an intention to abandon and,
second, an overt or external act by which the
intention is carried into effect. (Sandoval Notes)
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO
DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
The case basically revolves around the series of
events that happened prior and subsequent to the
event we know as EDSA II. During the 1998
elections, Joseph E. Estrada and Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo were elected as president and vice-president
respectively. The downfall of the Estrada
administration began when For. Gov. Luis Chavit
Singson went to the media and released his expos
that petitioner was part of the Jueteng scandal as
having received large sums of money. After this
expose, a lot of different groups and many
personalities had asked for the resignation of the
petitioner. Some of which are the Catholic Bishops
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), Sen. Nene
Pimentel, Archbishop of Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin,
For. Pres. Fidel Ramos, and For. Pres. Corazon
Aquino who asked petitioner to make the supreme
self-sacrifice. Respondent also resigned as
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Services and also asked petitioner for his resignation.
4 senior economic advisers of the petitioner resigned
and then Speaker Manny Villar, together with 47
representatives, defected from Lapian ng Masang
Pilipino.
By November, an impeachment case was to be held
as Speaker Manny Villar had transmitted the Articles
of Impeachment to the senate. On November 20, the
21 senators took oath as judges to the impeachment
trial with SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr., presiding. The
impeachment trial was one for the ages. It was a
battle royal of well-known lawyers. But then came
the fateful day, when by the vote of 11-10, the
judges came to a decision to not open the second
envelop allegedly containing evidence showing that
the petitioner had a secret bank account under the
name Jose Velarde containing P3.3 billion. The not
Page | 82
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
opening of the 2nd envelop resulted to the people
going to the streets and the public prosecutors
withdrawing from the trial. On January 19, AFP Chief
of Staff Angelo Reyes marched to EDSA shrine and
declared on behalf of your Armed Forces, the
130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we
wish to announce that we are withdrawing our
support to this government. PNP Chief, Director
General Panfilo Lacson together with some Cabinet
members made the same announcement.
June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20
AM, negotiations started for the peaceful transition
of power. But at around 12 noon, respondent took
oath as the 14th president of the Philippines. At 2:30
PM, petitioner and his family left Malacanang. He
issued the following Press Statement:
20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many
other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I
do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the
restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang
Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for
the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our
people with gratitude for the opportunities given to
me for service to our people. I will not shirk from
any future challenges that may come ahead in the
same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me
in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved
people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
It also appears that on the same day, January 20,
2001, he signed the following letter:
Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII
of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers
and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting
President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
On January 22, this Court issued the following
Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC.
The said resolution confirmed the authority given by
the 12 SC justices to the CJ during the oath taking
that happened on January 20. Soon, other countries
accepted the respondent as the new president of the
Philippines. The House then passed Resolution No.
175 expressing the full support of the House of
Representatives to the administration of Her
Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines. It also approved Resolution No. 176
expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of
the Republic of the Philippines, extending its
congratulations and expressing its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the
nations goals under the Constitution.
On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto
Guingona to be the vice president. On February 7,
the Senate adopted Resolution 82 which confirmed
the nomination of Senator Guingona. On the same
day, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring
that the impeachment court is functus officio and
has been terminated. Several cases were filed
against the petitioner which are as follows: (1) OMB
Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on
October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and
corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the
Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on
November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and
corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct,
violation of the Code of Conduct for government
Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed
by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on
November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and
corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong,
et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of
public funds, illegal use of public funds and property,
plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by
Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD
1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB
Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr.
on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and
corruption.
Page | 83
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created
by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the
charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by
Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio
with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew
Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de
Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22,
the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to
file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his
witnesses as well as other supporting documents in
answer to the aforementioned complaints against
him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On
February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No.
146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos.
OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758
or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed
in his office, until after the term of petitioner as
President is over and only if legally warranted. Thru
another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR
No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for
judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have
taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution. Acting on GR Nos.
146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6,
required the respondents to comment thereon
within a non-extendible period expiring on 12
February 2001. On February 13, the Court ordered
the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No.
146738 and the filing of the respondents comments
on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the
urgent motion for copies of resolution and press
statement for Gag Order on respondent
Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R.
No. 146738, the Court resolved:
(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue
a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office
of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief
Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged
resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel
who are officers of the Court under pain of being
cited for contempt to refrain from making any
comment or discussing in public the merits of the
cases at bar while they are still pending decision by
the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective
immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman
from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending
investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing
from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman
may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner
Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing
held on February 15, 2001, which action will make
the cases at bar moot and academic.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave
while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President. NO
2. Whether conviction in the impeachment
proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal
prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative
and on the assumption that petitioner is still
President, whether he is immune from criminal
prosecution.
(NO. The impeachment proceedings was already
aborted. As a non-sitting president, he is not entitled
to immunity from criminal prosecution)
HELD:
I. Whether or not petitioner resigned as
President.
Resignation is a factual question and
its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by
acts of relinquishment. There is no required form of
resignation. It can be expressed, implied, oral or
written. It is true that respondent never wrote a
letter of resignation before he left Malacanang on
June 20, 2001. In this issue, the Court would use the
totality test or the totality of prior, contemporaneous
and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this test, the Court rules that the petitioner had
resigned. The Court knows the amount of stress that
the petitioner had suffered. With just a blink of an
eye, he lost the support of the legislative when then
Manny Villar and other Representatives had
defected. AFP Chief of Staff General Angelo Reyes
had already gone to EDSA. PNP Chief Director
General Panfilo Lacson and other cabinet secretaries
had withdrawn as well. By looking into the Angara
diaries, it was pointed out that the petitioner had
Page | 84
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
suggested a snap election at May on which he would
not be a candidate. Proposing a snap election in
which he is not a candidate means that he had intent
to resign. When the proposal for a dignified exit or
resignation was proposed, petitioner did not disagree
but listened closely. This is proof that petitioner had
reconciled himself to the reality that he had to
resign. His mind was already concerned with the
five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It
was a matter of time.
The negotiations that had happened were about a
peaceful transfer of power. It was already implied
that petitioner would resign. The negotiations
concentrated on the following: (1) the transition
period of five days after the petitioners resignation;
(2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and
his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second
envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner.
Also taken from the Angara diaries, The President
says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado
nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want
any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the
red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want
to clear my name, then I will go. The quoted
statement of the petitioner was a clear evidence that
he has resigned.
The second round of negotiations were about the
consolidating of the clauses which were proposed by
both sides. The second round of negotiation cements
the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will
be noted that during this second round of
negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was
again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled
points at that time were the measures to be
undertaken by the parties during and after the
transition period.
When everything was already signed by the side of
the petitioner and ready to be faxed by Angara, the
negotiator for the respondent, Angelo Reyes, called
to Angara saying that the SC would allow respondent
to have her oath taking. Before petitioner left
Malacanang, he made a last statement.
The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today,
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds
of our country, I have strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as president, I do not wish to be a
factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and
order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang
Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for
the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our
people with gratitude for the opportunities given to
me for service to our people. I will not shrik from
any future challenges that may come ahead in the
same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me
in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved
people.
MABUHAY!
By making such statement, petitioner impliedly
affirms the following: (1) he acknowledged the oath-
taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic albeit with the reservation about its
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the
Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of
our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind of inability and that he was going to
re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the
people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given
him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured
that he will not shirk from any future challenge that
may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioners reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called
on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if
he did not give up the presidency.
Petitioner however argues that he only took a
temporary leave of absence. This is evidenced by a
letter which reads as follows:
Sir
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of
the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers
and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting
President.
Page | 85
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada
The Court was surprised that the petitioner did not
use this letter during the week long crisis. It would
be very easy for him to say before he left Malacanang
that he was temporarily unable to govern, thus, he
is leaving Malacanang. Under any circumstance,
however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the
resignation of the petitioner. If it was
prepared before the press release of the petitioner
clearly showing his resignation from the presidency,
then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If,
however, it was prepared afterthe press release, still,
it commands scant legal significance.
Petitioner also argues that he could not resign. His
legal basis is RA 3019 which states:
Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign
or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him,
for any offense under this Act or under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
During the amendments, another section was
inserted which states that:
During the period of amendments, the following
provision was inserted as section 15:
Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official
shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending
a prosecution against him, for any offense under the
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official from
office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this
Act for an offense committed during his
incumbency.
The original senate bill was rejected because of the
2nd paragraph of section 15. Nonetheless, another
similar bill was passed. Section 15 then became
section 13. There is another reason why petitioners
contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar,
the records show that when petitioner resigned on
January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before
the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-
00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758.
While these cases have been filed, the respondent
Ombudsman refrained from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the
reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner
was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases
cannot be considered as pending for the
Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on
them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore
be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of
cases whose investigation or prosecution do not
suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the
immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment
proceeding is an administrative investigation that,
under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from
resigning. The Court holds otherwise. The
impeachment proceeding may be arguable.
However, even if the impeachment proceeding is
administrative, it cannot be considered pending
because the process had already broke down. There
was also a withdrawal by the prosecutors to partake
in the impeachment case. In fact, the proceeding
was postponed indefinitely. In fact, there was no
impeachment case pending when he resigned.
II. Whether or not the petitioner is only
temporarily unable to act as President
This issue arose from the January 20 letter which
was addressed to then Speaker Fuentebella and then
Senate President Pimentel. Petitioners contention is
that he is a president on leave and that the
respondent is an acting president. This contention is
the centerpiece of petitioners stance that he is
a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only
an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in
order. It provides:
SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that
he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties
shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting
President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their
written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that
no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and
Page | 86
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of
all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five
days to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their
written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Congress shall decide the issue? For that purpose,
the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session,
within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules
and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the
last written declaration, or, if not in session within
twelve days after it is required to assemble,
determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses,
voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising the powers and
duties of his office."
After studying in-depth the series of events that
happened after petitioner left Malacanang, it is very
clear that the inability of the petitioner as president
is not temporary. The question is whether this Court
has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise
the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.
The Court says that they cannot, for such is an
example of a political question, in which the matter
has solely been left to the legislative,
NOTES:
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
ARTICLE VI, Section 13:
No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.
ARTICLE IX
C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Section 1.
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years
of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective positions in
the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
Enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.
Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and
city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
Page | 87
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission
on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not
appealable.
Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.
Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government; and accredit citizens' arms
of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered.
Those which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and
adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported
by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments
and their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to elections,
constitute interference in national affairs, and, when
accepted, shall be an additional ground for the
cancellation of their registration with the
Commission, in addition to other penalties that may
be prescribed by law.
File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own
initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion
of voters; investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted,
and to prevent and penalize all forms of election
frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
candidacies.
Recommend to the President the removal of any
officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its
directive, order, or decision.
Submit to the President and the Congress, a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of
election cases, including pre- proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard
and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
Section 4. The Commission may, during the
election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment
or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants,
special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary.
Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure
equal opportunity, time, and space ,and the right to
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or
suspension of sentence for violation of election laws,
rules, and regulations shall be granted by the
President without the favorable recommendation of
the Commission.
Section 6. A free and open party system shall be
allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the
people, subject to the provisions of this Article.
PD 1606
Section 1.
Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications;
tenure; removal and composition. A special
court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and
possessing all the inherent powers of a court of
justice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby
created composed of a Presiding Justice and eight
Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the
President.
Page | 88
 POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW REVIEWER 2017
Atty. Edgar P. Borge

No person shall be appointed Presiding Justice or

Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan; unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40
years of age and for at least ten years has been a
judge of a court of record or been engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines or has held office
requiring admission to the bar as a pre-requisite for
a like period.

The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his

commission and the other Justices shall have
precedence according to the dates of their respective
commissions, or, when the commissions of two or
more of them shall bear the same date, according to
the order in which their commissions have been
issued by the President.

The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices shall

not be removed from office except on impeachment
upon the grounds and in the manner provided for in
Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution.

The Presiding Justice shall receive an annual

compensation of P60,000.00 and each Associate
Justice P55,000.00 which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office. They shall have
the same rank, privileges and other emoluments, be
subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications,
and enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as
those provided for under existing laws of the
Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court
of Appeals.

Whenever the salaries of the Presiding Justice and

the Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals are
increased, such increases in salaries shall be
correspondingly extended to and enjoyed by the
Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan.

They shall hold office until they reach the age of 65

years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office.

Page | 89