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Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No.

127255, August 14, 1997


Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which


amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners,
who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation
of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated
so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile
the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The
bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack
of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The
interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of
the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections
to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the
same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr.
Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although
Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval
of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the
Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a
particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to
be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House


with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no
quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum
had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum.
The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum
is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Arroyo v De Venecia G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.

Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
"constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question
on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress
as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on
November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on
November 22, 1996.

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and
spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.

Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that
Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is
therefore dismissed.

Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due
the other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void
because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow
those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can
find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be
acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to
do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can
seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence
of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in
the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body.

In view of what is essential


Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED.

First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.'"

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction


This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In
the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look
into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an
act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by
itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the
government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction".
In view of House Rules
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases
such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the
motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar
as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven
years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate
follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every
time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third
readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a
bill over the veto of the President.

In view of grave abuse


Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a
settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack
of power.

In view of the enrolled bill doctrine


Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that
it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.

This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if
old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient
Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch
and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities
with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators,
the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
government.

(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we
assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation
of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on
cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its
rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open
to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other
way would be better, more accurate, or even more just.

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