SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PABLO S. BABASANTA, SPS. MIGUEL LU and PACITA
ZAVALLA LU, respondents

FACTS

On 20 August 1986, the Spouses Lu purportedly sold two parcels of land to respondent
Pablo Babasanta, for the price of fifteen pesos (P15.00) per square meter. Babasanta
made a downpayment of (P50,000.00) as evidenced by a memorandum receipt issued
by Pacita Lu of the same date.
Babasanta wrote a letter to Pacita Lu to demand the execution of a final deed of sale in his
favor so that he could effect full payment of the purchase price. In response, Pacita Lu
wrote a letter to Babasanta wherein she reminded Babasanta that when the balance of
the purchase price became due, he requested for a reduction of the price and when she
refused, Babasanta backed out of the sale
herein petitioner San Lorenzo Development Corporation (SLDC) filed a Motion for
Intervention. SLDC alleged that it had legal interest in the subject matter under
litigation because on 3 May 1989, the two parcels of land involved had been sold to it in
a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage. It alleged that it was a buyer in good faith and
for value and therefore it had a better right over the property in litigation
Respondent Babasanta, however, argued that SLDC could not have acquired ownership of
the property because it failed to comply with the requirement of registration of the sale
in good faith. He emphasized that at the time SLDC registered the sale in its favor on
30 June 1990, there was already a notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles of the
property made as early as 2 June 1989. Hence, petitioners registration of the sale did
not confer upon it any right.
ISSUE:
Did the registration of the sale after the annotation of the notice of lis pendens obliterate
the effects of delivery and possession in good faith which admittedly had occurred
prior to SLDCs knowledge of the transaction in favor of Babasanta?

HELD:NO
It must be stressed that as early as 11 February 1989, the Spouses Lu executed the Option
to Buy in favor of SLDC upon receiving P316,160.00 as option money from SLDC.
After SLDC had paid more than one half of the agreed purchase price, the Spouses Lu
subsequently executed on 3 May 1989 a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor or SLDC. At the
time both deeds were executed, SLDC had no knowledge of the prior transaction of the
Spouses Lu with Babasanta. Simply stated, from the time of execution of the first deed
up to the moment of transfer and delivery of possession of the lands to SLDC, it had
acted in good faith and the subsequent annotation of lis pendens has no effect at all on
the consummated sale between SLDC and the Spouses Lu.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price
for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property.
We rule that SLDC qualifies as a buyer in good faith since there is no evidence extant in the
records that it had knowledge of the prior transaction in favor of Babasanta. At the
time of the sale of the property to SLDC, the vendors were still the registered owners of
the property and were in fact in possession of the lands.
In assailing knowledge of the transaction between him and the Spouses Lu, Babasanta
apparently relies on the principle of constructive notice incorporated in Section 52 of
the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) which reads, thus:
Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if
registered, filed, or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the
time of such registering, filing, or entering.
However, the constructive notice operates as such by the express wording of Section 52
from the time of the registration of the notice of lis pendens which in this case was
effected only on 2 June 1989, at which time the sale in favor of SLDC had long been
consummated insofar as the obligation of the Spouses Lu to transfer ownership over
the property to SLDC is concerned.
ROXAS VS. CA
G.R. No. 118436
March 21, 1997
FACTS: This is a petition for review of the CA decision dated December 8, 1994alleging
reversible error committed by respondent appellate court when it affirmed the decision
of the RTC of Cavite.
On July 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and Development
Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for Registration of two
parcels of unregistered land located in Tagaytay City. In support of its application for
registration, Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10,
1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase price to be
P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the original petitioner
herein (because she was substituted by her heirs in the proceedings upon her death),
Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) on the
basis of Maguesun Corporations application for registration enumerating adjoining
owners, occupants or adverse claimants; Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not
named therein, she was not sent a notice of the proceedings. After an Order of general
default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land registration
case. Eventually, on February 1991 the RTC granted Maguesun Corporations
application for registration.
It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that
petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the
lots in Maguesun Corporations name.
Hence, on April 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the RTC to set aside the
decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual
fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the properties she inherited from her
husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas and that her family had been in open,
continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the
concept of owner for more than thirty years before they applied for its registration
under the Torrens System of land titling (in which no decision has been rendered
thereon). Petitioner further denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she
had never met before and that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. She also claimed that Maguesun Corporation
intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in
the application for registration submitted to the LRA such that the latter could not
send her a Notice of Initial Hearing.
A document examiner from the PNP concluded that there was no forgery. Upon petitioners
motion, the signatures were re-examined by another expert from NBI. The latter
testified that the signatures on the questioned and sample documents were,
however, not written by the same person.
Despite the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the trial court dismissedthe petition
for review of decree of registration. Placing greater weight on the findings and
testimony of the PNP document examiner, it concluded that the questioned documents
were not forged and if they were, it was Zenaida Melliza, and not Maguesun
Corporation, who was responsible. Accordingly, Maguesun Corporation did not
commit actual fraud.
In a decision dated December 8, 1994, respondent court denied the petition for review and
affirmed the findings of the trial court. The CA held that petitioner failed to and
demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or
intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of annuling a judgment or reviewing a
decree of registration.
Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the CA erred in ruling that
Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside of the
registration decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis of Maguesun Corporations
good faith. Petitioners pray that the registration of the subject lots in the name of
Maguesun Corporation be cancelled, that said property be adjudicated in favor of
petitioners and that respondent corporation pay for damages.

ISSUE: WON private respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud

(signature forgery) in obtaining a decree of registration over the two parcels of
land, actual fraud being the only ground to reopen or review a decree of registration.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the CA
is hereby REVERSED AND SET AS
1. The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in
obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner. A close
scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion that
forgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no proof of
respondent Maguesun Corporations direct participation in the execution and
preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that
Maguesun Corporation is not the innocent purchaser for value who merits the
protection of the law. Even to a laymans eye, the documents, as well as the enlarged
photographic exhibit of the signatures, reveal forgery. Additionally, Zenaida Mellizas
non-appearance raises doubt as to her existence

2.Petitioner and her family also own several other pieces of property, some of which are
leased out as restaurants. This is an indication that petitioner is not unaware of the
value of her properties. Hence, it is unlikely that indication that she would sell over
13,000 sqm of prime property in Tagaytay City to a stranger for a measly P200,000.00.
Would an ordinary person sell more than 13,000 sqm of prime property for
P170,000.00 when it was earlier purchased for P200,000.00?

3. Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted

their name, or that of the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an occupant of the
subject property.
The names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned, of the owners of all
adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5 (mortgagors,
encumbrancers, and occupants) and of the person shown on the plan(original
application submitted in LRC No) as claimants are as follows:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road
all at Tagaytay City (no house No.) 30

The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property uninterruptedly
through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez. Respondent Maguesun Corporation also
declared in number 5 of the same application that the subject land was unoccupied
when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker resided in the subject property.
To conclude, it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot tack its possession to that
of petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza conveyed not title over the
subject parcels of land to Maguesun Corporation as she was not the owner
thereof. Maguesun Corporation is thus not entitled to the registration decree which
the trial court granted in its decision.
Petitioner has not been interrupted in her more than thirty years of open, uninterrupted,
exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of an owner over the subject lots by
the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza. She therefore retains title proper and
sufficient for original registration over the two parcels of land in question pursuant to
Section 14 of PD No. 1529.
LIGON v. CA

FACTS:

The Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP), by virtue of an absolute deed, sold to Iglesia ni
Kristo (INK) 2 parcels of land in Tandang Sora, Barrio Culiat, QC. It was stipulated therein that
IDP shall undertake to evict all squatters in the property within 45 days from the execution of the
contract. IDP failed to do this, hence, INK sued for specific performance with damages. IDP, on
the other hand, alleged that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying the payment of
the purchase price and sought to have the contract of sale rescinded. Thereafter, INK filed a
motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that there was actually no genuine issue as
to any material fact; the TC granted. A year after, INK filed a motion in the same case seeking to
compel Leticia Ligon (petitioner), who was in possession of the certificates of title over the
properties as mortgagee of IDP, to surrender said certificates to the RD of QC for the registration
of the absolute deed of sale in its name.

Ligon allegedly refused and/or failed to deliver the certificates despite repeated requests. To this,
Ligon opposed saying that (a) IDP was not served copy of the motion, (b) ownership of INK
over the property was still in issue, (c) and that the trial court had no jurisdiction as the motion
involved the registrability of the document of sale, and she was not made a party in the main
case. The TC granted INKs motion and ordered petitioner to surrender the certificates of title in
open court for the registration of the absolute deed of sale in the latters name and the annotation
of the mortgage executed in favor of petitioner on the new certificates (to be issued to INK).
Upon Ligons motion, the TC redirected her to deliver the documents to the RD of QC.

ISSUE:
W/N INK has a superior right to the possession of the owners copies of the certificated of title.

HELD:
YES. Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register
of Deeds unless the owners duplicate certificate is presented together with such instrument,
except in some cases or upon the order of the court for cause shown. In case the person in
possession refuses or fails to surrender the same to the RD so that a voluntary document may be
registered and a new certificate issued, Sec. 107 of P.D. No. 1529 states: Where a voluntary
instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the
owners duplicate, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel surrender of the
same to the RD. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person
withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same and direct the entry of a new
certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate
certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, of if for any reason the outstanding
owners duplicate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as
the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Pursuant to Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, the
distinction between the RTCs general and the limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a
cadastral court has been eliminated. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has
simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the RTCs the authority to act not only on
applications for original registration but also over petitions filed after original registration of title,
with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. Even
while Sec. 107 of PD 1529 speaks of a petition which can be filed by one who wants to compel
another to surrender the certificates of title to the RD, this does not preclude a party to a pending
case to include as incident therein the relief stated under said section, especially if the subject
certificates of title to be surrendered are intimately connected with the subject matter of the
principal action. The principal action is based on expediency and in accordance with the policy
against multiplicity of suits. The order directing the surrender of the certificates to the RD in
order that the deed be registered in favor of INK cannot in any way prejudice her rights and
interests as mortagee, since any lien annotated on the previous certificates which subsists shall be
incorporated or carried over to the new certificates of title.
VICENTE SAPTO VS. FABIANA

FACTS:
The subject property was originally owned by Sapto (this Sapto was a Moro, so only one name)
and located in Alambre, Toril, Davao City. He died, leaving three sons Samuel, Constancio, and
Ramon. The latter predeceased his brothers, leaving no heirs. Samuel and Constancio executed a
deed of sale for a portion of said property in favour of Fabiana in consideration of P240.00. The
sale was approved by the governor of Davao but was never registered. The property was
transferred to Fabiana and from then on he enjoyed possession from 1931 until the case was
filed.

Constancio died with no issue, leaving Samuel as sole administrator of the property. Upon the
latters death, his widow and two children filed the present action for recovery of the parcel of
land sold by their predecessors to defendant. The CFI held that although the sale between the
Sapto brothers and Fabiana was never registered, it was binding valid and binding upon the
parties and the vendors heirs. The CFI also ordered the petitioners to execute the necessary deed
of conveyance in favour of the defendant.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFIs order of conveyance in favour of Fabiana was valid.

HELD:
The SC first affirmed the validity of the sale between the Sapto brothers and Fabiana, ruling, that
even though it was never registered the sale was valid, binding, and effective upon the heirs of
the vendor. According to the court, actual notice of the sale served as registration. Futher, that the
transfer and possession of the property was a clear indication of the validity of the sale.

Regarding the issue on the validity of the order of conveyance, the SC ruled that it was valid. In
assailing the order, the Sapto heirs claimed that the CFI cannot order the conveyance because the
defendants cause of action had already prescribed.

The SC ruled however, that the action for conveyance was actually one to quiet title. In ruling so,
the SC cited American jurisprudence and Art. 480 of the New Civil Code, which states, that
actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The judgement is affirmed, cost against appellants.
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION OF HINIGARAN
vs
ESTANISLAO YULO YUSAY, ET AL.

FACTS:

1. Rafaela Yulo executed in favor of the cooperative a mortgage for P33,626.29, due from
her, her mother, sisters, brothers, and others, which amount she assumed to pay to the
cooperative.

2. A motion was presented to the court by Agricultural Credit Cooperative Association of

Hinigaran (movant) demanding the surrender of the owner's duplicate certificate of title
so that it may annotate said mortgage at the back of the certificate.

3. Estanislao Yusay, a part owner of the lot, opposed the petition on the ground that he is
owner of a part of the property in question; that the granting of the motion would operate
to his prejudice, as he has not participated in the mortgage cited in the motion; that
Rafaela Yulo is dead; that the motion is not verified and movant's rights have lapsed by
prescription. Finally it is argued that his opposition raises a controversial matter which
the court has no jurisdiction to pass upon. The existence of the mortgage is not disputed,
and neither is the fact that the mortgagor Rafaela Yulo is part owner of the lot. The
oppositors (Estanislao joined by Margarita, Maria, Elena and Pilar, all surnamed Yulo) do
not dispute that she is such a part owner, and their main objection to the petition is that as
part owners of the property, the annotation of the mortgage on the common title will
affect their rights.

4. The matter was brought to the CFI, and it ordered the Register of Deeds to register the
mortgage.

ISSUE: Whether the validity or effectivity of a mortgage may be determined during its
registration

HELD: No. Affirmed.

RATIO:

In his Brief before this Court, counsel for appellants argue that the mortgage sought to be
registered was not recorded before the closing of the intestate proceedings of the deceased
mortgagor, but was so recorded only four months after the termination of said proceedings, so
that the claim of movant has been reduced to the character of a mere money claim, not a
mortgage, hence the mortgage may not be registered.
 In the first place, the proceeding to register the mortgage does not purport to determine
the supposed invalidity of the mortgage or its effect. Registration is a mere ministerial act by
which a deed, contract or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office of the
Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of
the deed.

The registration of a lease or mortgage, or the entry of a memorial of a lease or mortgage

on the register, is not a declaration by the state that such an instrument is a valid and subsisting
interest in land; it is merely a declaration that the record of the title appears to be burdened with
the lease or mortgage described, according to the priority set forth in the certificate. The mere
fact that a lease or mortgage was registered does not stop any party to it from setting up that it
now has no force or effect.

The court below, in ordering the registration and annotation of the mortgage, did not pass
on its invalidity or effect. As the mortgage is admittedly an act of the registered owner, all that
the judge below did and could do, as a registration court, is to order its registration and
annotation on the certificate of title covering the land mortgaged. By said order the court did not
pass upon the effect or validity of the mortgage - these can only be determined in an ordinary
case before the courts, not before a court acting merely as a registration court, which did not
have the jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged effect or invalidity.
Republic vs Mendoza

FACTS:
Democratico T. Mendoza (respondent) is in possession of 70 or so hectares in Silot Bay through
an Ordinary Fishpond Permit.

On Jan 16, 1967, Pres. Marcos ordered a memorandum that about 700,000 shpond areas
(including respondents land) shall be released by the Bureau of Forestry to the Bureau of Lands
as alienable and disposable, but subject to the disposal of the Bureau of Fisheries for fishpond
purposes

Pursuant to that, respondent issued a sales patent application in order to purchase the said land
and was approved, thus an auction was scheduled.

Despite objection of the local Mayor, on 21 May 1974, then Presidential Executive Assistant
Jacobo C. Clave issued a Memorandum informing the Secretary of the Department of Natural
Resources that President Marcos had approved the recommendation advising approval of the
request of Democrito Mendoza, Sr. for the issuance of a patent over the disputed property.

Prior to the approval, Democrito subdivided the lots and assigned rights and interests in equal
shares to each of his daughters.

On 26 June 1974, Acting Director of the Bureau of Lands Ramon N. Casanova issued an Order
awarding the sales patents over the disputed property to Democrito Mendoza, Sr. and his three
children Gwendolyn, Vilma, and Democrito, Jr., respectively

Sometime in 1988, a protest was led by the sherman-residents of Liloan against the issuance
of the sales patents to the Mendozas. Acting thereon, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Oce No. 7, Cebu City, conducted an investigation

On 23 October 1990, based on the information gathered by the DENR, showing that there were
alleged irregularities in the issuance of the sales patents awarded to the Mendozas, the Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Land Management Bureau, led with the
RTC of Cebu, a complaint for Cancellation of Sales Patents and Titles against Democrito
Mendoza, Sr. and his three children Gwendolyn, Vilma, and Democrito, Jr., together with the
Register of Deeds of Cebu City

After trial on the merits, the trial court, on 3 June 1996, rendered a Decision declaring the sales
patents, as well as the original certicates of title issued to the Mendozas as null and void ab
initio. Declaring that:
1. The sales patent issued be declared void ab initio
2. Ordering said defendants to surrender their OCTs to the register of deeds and ordering
the said register of deeds to cancel the same and all patent titles emanating therefrom.
3. Declaring the lot as inalienable and non-disposable being parts of Silot Bay.
Aggrieved by the Decision, defendants appealed the Case of the CA, and accordingly, CA
reversed the RTCs decision:

ISSUE:
Whether or not said property is alienable and disposable and, therefore, subject to private
appropriation through modes recognized under the Public Land Act.

HELD:
Yes, the property is alienable and disposable. Despite petitioners' assertion that Silot Bay is a
navigable body of water and by its very nature and inherent character is of public dominion, thus,
there is no need for a declaration by any appropriate government agency that it is a communal
shing
ground before Silot Bay may be recognized as such, it cannot be gainsaid that the prerogative of
classifying public lands pertains to administrative agencies which have been specially tasked by
statutes to do so and that the courts will not interfere on matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government and/or quasi-judicial agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under their special technical knowledge and training. It should be stressed that the
function of administering and disposing of lands of the public domain in the manner prescribed
by law is not entrusted to the courts but to executive ocials. And as such, courts should refrain
from looking into the underlying reasons or grounds which impelled the classication and
declaration of Silot Bay as timberland and its subsequent release as alienable and disposable
land. From the facts of the case, it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry released Silot Bay as
alienable and disposable by virtue of the Memorandum issued by then President Marcos on 16
January 1967 which clearly empowered said bureau to identify and locate the 700,000 hectares
of shpond areas and to release said areas as alienable and disposable. Hence, the courts, in view
of the clear legal directive by which said area was released as alienable and disposable, will
refrain from questioning the wisdom of such classification or declaration. After a careful perusal
of the records of the case, We rule that the sales patents handed out to Democrito T. Mendoza,
Sr., Gwendolyn Mendoza, Vilma Mendoza and Democrito Mendoza, Jr., were properly issued.
GOLLOY V. CA 173 SCRA 26 (1989)

FACTS: Petitioner Golloy has been, for more than 20 years, the registered owner and in
possession of a parcel of land covered by TCT 45764. The southwest boundary is owned by
private respondents covered by certificate of title 8565. Sometime in 1966, private respondents
subdivided their land among themselves and in the course of doing so, private respondents had
placed 2 monuments in the southwest portion of the petitioners land. As a result, petitioner
Golloy filed an action to quiet title (claim ownership over a real property) before the CFI Tarlac.

Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss with counterclaim, denying Golloys allegation and
maintained that they merely subdivided their own property and as such, Golloy had no cause of
action.

During the pre-trial both parties agreed that the question of the boundaries of their respective
properties could be resolved by appointing a surveyor to relocate the disputed area.

In May 1968, JovinoDauz, the surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, reported the following:
1. Petitioners land is Lot A of the subdivision plan, Psd-1413, being a portion of the land
described in OCT 126 in the name of Augustin Golloy. The land under OCT 126 was
surveyed on Mar 1918 and subsequently titled in 1919
2. Private respondents land is Lot no. 1, 11-8218 in the name of Domingo Balanga, which
was surveyed on Mar 1913 and originally titled and registered on Mar 1918
3. There is overlapping on the boundaries which was due to the defect in the survey on
petitioners since it did not duly conform with the previously approved of survey of Lot
1, 11-3218 under OCT 8565
4. Private respondents land, TCT 8565, prevails over petitioners land since the former was
surveyed and titled ahead.

Trial court held in favor of private respondents. CA affirmed the same.

ISSUE: Between the two title holders, who is entitled to the land in question?

HELD: Petitioner Golloy is entitled to the disputed portion of land. It is undisputed that that
Balangas property was surveyed and titled earlier than Golloys. Having been surveyed and
thereafter registered, monuments were placed therein to indicate their respective boundaries. It is
hardly persuasive that the private respondents predecessor Balanga, believing that she has a
rightful claim to the overlapped portions, did not make any move to question the placement of
the monuments. She could have easily objected to the placement and point out that the
placements of the monuments excluded the overlapped portions from her property. However, no
such objections were made. As such, it may be construed that Balanga never believed that she
has a right and legal claim to the overlapped portion.

Considering that the petitioner and his predecessors have in continuous possession in the concept
of an owner, for almost 50 years (from 1919 when it was registered to 1966 when the dispute
ensued), the private respondents are guilty of laches.
Mere possession of certificate of title under Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holders
true ownership of all the property described therein for he does by virtue of said c certificate
alone become the owner of the land illegally included.
Ybanez vs Ca

Facts:
Records show that private respondent Valentin Ouano, a claimant-occupant of Lot No. 986, Pls-
599-D situated at sitioBagsac, barrio of Manikling, Governor Generoso (now San Isidro), Davao
del Norte, containing an area of three (3) hectares, 48 ares and 78 centares which was surveyed
on March 13, 1958as evidenced by the "Survey Notification Card" issued in his name, a
homestead application 1 with the Bureau of Lands. The said application was approved in an order
dated March 3, 1959 issued by the District Land Officerand by authority of the Director of
Lands.
Three (3) years thereafter,a "Notice of Intention to Make Final Proof was made by Valentin
Ouano to establish his claim to the lot applied for and to prove his residence and cultivation
before Land Inspector.
On April 15, 1963, an "Original Certificate of Title No. P-15353" was issued to private
respondent Valentin Ouano over Homestead Patent No. 181261 which was transcribed in the
"Registration Book" for the province of Davao on October 28, 1963. 3
After 19 years of possession, cultivation and income derived from coconuts planted on Lot No.
986, private respondent Valentin Ouano was interrupted in his peaceful occupation thereof when
a certain ArcadioYbanez and his sons, Melquiades, Abdula, Eugenia Numeriano, Apolonio and
Victoriano, forcibly and unlawfully entered the land armed with spears, canes and bolos.
Because of the unwarranted refusal of ArcadioYbanez, et al. to vacate the premises since the
time he was dispossessed in 1975, private respondent Valentin Ouano fileda complaint for
recovery of possession, damages and attorney's fees before the then Court of First Instance (now
RTC) of Davao Oriental. Seeking to enjoin the Ybanezes from further the coconuts therefrom
and restore to him the peaceful possession and occupation of the premises. In his complaint,
Valentin Ouano, then plaintiff therein, alleged that he has been in lawful and peaceful possession
since 1956to which an Original Certificate of Title No. P-(l5353)-P-3932 was issued in his name;
that petitioners, then defendants therein, unlawfully entered his land on January 4, 1975 and
started cultivating and gathering the coconuts, bananas and other fruits therein, thereby illegally
depriving him of the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the premises.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that plaintiff Valentin Ouano, now private respondent, has
never been in possession of any portion of Lot No. 986 as the same has been continously
occupied and possessed by petitioners since 1930 in the concept of owner and have introduced
valuable improvements thereon such as coconuts and houses; that Lot No. 986 was the subject
matter of administrative proceedings before the Bureau of Lands in Mati, Davao Oriental which
was consequently decided in their favor by the Director of Lands on the finding that Valentin
Ouano has never resided in the land; that it was declared by the Director of Lands that the
homestead patent issued to private respondent Valentin Ouano was improperly and erroneously
issued, since on the basis of their investigation and relocation survey, the actual occupation and
cultivation was made by petitioner ArcadioYbaez and his children, consisting of 9.6 hectares
which cover the whole of Lot No. 986 and portions of Lot Nos. 987, 988 and 989; that based on
the ocular inspection conducted, it was established that Valentin Ouano did not have a house on
the land and cannot locate the boundaries of his titled land for he never resided therein.
The trial court, after hearing, rendered its decision 6 in favor of private respondent.
Petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
The Intermediate Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division promulgated a decision, 8 affirming
the decision of the trial court, with modification.
Hence the instant recourse by petitioners.

Issue:
WON Valentine Ouano is the rightful owner of the questioned parcel of land.

Held:
Affirmative;
The public land certificate of title issued to private respondent attained the status of
indefeasibility one (1) year after the issuance of patent on April 15, 1963, hence, it is no longer
open to review on the ground of actual fraud. Consequently, the filing of the protest before the
Bureau of Lands against the Homestead Application of private respondent on January 3, 1975, or
12 years after, can no longer re-open or revise the public land certificate of title on the ground of
actual fraud. No reasonable and plausible excuse has been shown for such an unusual delay. The
law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires
them to act.
The trial court merely applied the rule and jurisprudence that a person whose property has been
wrongly or erroneously registered in another's name is not to set aside the decree, but, respecting
the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the
ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, for damages. 18
The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10)
years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. 19
private respondent Ouano has a better right of possession over Lot No. 986 than petitioners who
claimed to own and possess a total of 12 hectares of land including that of Lot No. 986. Records
indicate that petitioners have not taken any positive step to legitimize before the Bureau of Lands
their self-serving claim of possession and cultivation of a total of 12 hectares of public
agricultural land by either applying for homestead settlement, sale patent, lease, or confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete title by judicial legalization under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Law, as amended by R.A. No. 1942 and P.D. 1073, or by administrative legalization (free patent)
under Section 11 of Public Land Law, as amended.1wphi1 What was clearly shown during the
trial of the case was that petitioners wrested control and possession of Lot No. 986 on January 4,
1975, or one (1) day after they filed their belated protest on January 3, 1975 before the Bureau of
Lands against the homestead application of private respondent, thus casting serious doubt on
their claim of prior possession and productive cultivation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Borromeo Vs Descalar

FACTS:

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in love
and live together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their
names. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration, it was refused
on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public
domain. Consequently, his name was erased but his signature remained and the property was
issued on the name of the Respondent alone. However their relationship did not last long and
they found new love.

Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner for a
sum of money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his properties to the petitioner and a Deed of
Absolute Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when the Petitioner sought to
register the deed of assignment it found out that said land was registered in the name of
Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not transfer and
assign any rights and interest in favor of the petitioner?

2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents make his the
owner thereof.

RULINGS:

1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich who
possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition
of the properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used to purchase the three parcels of land, and
to construct the house. Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but his name was
deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature
remained in the deed of sale where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to
transfer all his rights, interest and participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue
of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during
the couples cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-ownership applies to a man
and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar,
respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an
adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each
of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to
able to lay claim to any portion of it.

2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of
confirming the existence with notice to the world at large. The mere possession of a title does not
make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the
disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner.
Republi v Sayo

FACTS:

The case at bar started at 1961 whe the spouses Casiano and Luz Sandoval filed an application
for a parcel of land, Lot 7454 originally party of Santiago but had since then been transferred to
Nueva Vizcaya. The registration was opposed by Bayaua, Reyes, and the Philippine Cacao and
Farm Products. The case went on until on 1981, 20 years after, the Heirs of Sandoval, Heirs of
Bayaua, and the Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development entered a compromise
agreement, which effectively distributed parts of lot 7454 among the aforesaid parties and the
counsel of the Heirs of Sandoval as attorney's fees. The compromise agreement was approved by
the court and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms.
Having knowledge of the incident, the Solicitor General filed a complaint before the court to
annul the decision rendered by the court a quo for being void and made in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General contended that the the Heirs of Sandoval
et. al. did not present any evidence to support their claims of ownership or registration, nor did
the government agencies involve have a y authority to enter into the compromise agreement, and
finally, that he was not notified of the proceedings and so had not opportunity to take part
therein.

As for the Heirs of Sandoval et.al.'s contention, they asseverate that the land is not a public land
as the possessory information title in their name and of their predecessorsin-interest, the pre-war
certification appearing in the Bureau of Archives, and the fact that the proceeding of the
registration was brought under the Torrens act which presupposes an existing title to be
confirmed, are all evidences that the land is a private land.

ISSUE:
W/N the respondent's evidences can be considered as proof that the lot 7454 is
a private land.

RULING:
NO. Under the Regalian Doctrine 2 all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land registration
proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. 3 Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear
and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either
by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any
other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the
public domain . 4 The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his
claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual
evidence of possession and title. 5

In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the
applicants for registration, to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their
application, was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library. But, as this Court has
already had occasion to rule, that Spanish document cannot be considered a title to property, it
not being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting
primary evidence of ownership. 6 It is an inefficacious document on which to base any finding of
the private character of the land in question.
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the
compromise agreement of the parties. But that compromise agreement included private persons
who had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the
registration proceeding. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities
who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. The assent
of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and
could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents.

As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private respondents, it should be pointed out that
under the Spanish Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of acquiring title to public lands,
subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription thereof in the Registry of Property, and second,
actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty (20) years (later
reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here, proof of fulfillment of these conditions is absent,
the informacion posesoria cannot be considered as anything more than prima facie evidence of
possession.

Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the compromise
agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who
is the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason for our holding that "Court orders
and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases,
are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General."
Director of Lands Vs Abistado

FACTS:

Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration during the pendency of his petition,
applicant died. He was substituted by his heirs. The land registration court in its decision
dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. It noted that applicants failed to comply with
the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of
Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Unsatisfied, they
appealed to Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The Director of Lands assailed this decision of Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration
court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.

RULING:
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The
said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. Section
23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and
(3) posting, all of which must be complied with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said
section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons
named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties,
and occupants of the land. If mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning,
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included
such requirement in its detailed provision. The reason for the mandatory rule is that due process
and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the
interested parties on time. There was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement
of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have
mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. This Court has no authority to dispense
with such mandatory requirement. Petition Granted.
Maglasang Vs Maceren

FACTS:

Maglasang secured the registration in his name lots No. 8898 and 5106 of the cadastral
survey of Ormoc, Leyte. He sought from the trial court a writ of possession against several
persons. Trial court ordered the issuance of the writ of possession against Alejandra Conde and
Santiago Tumolak (respondents) with respect to lot no. 5106, it appearing that said persons were
claimants-oppositors and that their claims were dismissed, but denied the petition as regards the
other persons who took possession of the lots in question after final adjudication of the case upon
the theory that said persons cannot be expelled from their possession by a mere motion unless
they are brought to courts of justice by independent ordinary action, invoking said effect the
doctrine laid down by the SC in Yumul vs. Rivera and Dizon.
Maglasang now seeks from the SC mandatory order to compel the respondent judge to
issue a writ of possession against respondents regarding whom the latter denied the issuance of
such writ.

ISSUE

WON a writ of possession may be issued against persons who took possession of the lots after
issuance of final decree?

RULING:

No, Petition denied

Respondent judge acted correctly in refusing to issue the writ of possession prayed for.
The person who took possession of the lots in question after the final adjudication of the
same in registration proceedings cannot be summarily ousted through a writ of possession
secured by a mere motion.
Regardless of any title or lack of title of said persons to hold possession of the lots in
question, they cannot be ousted without giving them their day in court in a proper
independent proceeding.
MANOTOK REALTY INC v. TECSON

FACTS
In a complaint filed by the petitioner for recovery of possession against defendants, CFI ruled
declaring respondent Nilo Madlangawa a builder in good faith. CA affirmed and SC dismissed
for lack of merit.

Petitioner filed with the trial court motion for the approval of the petitioner's exercise of option
and for satisfaction of judgment(that is final and executory) which was dismissed. Hence this
petition for mandamus. However, since there is a pending case (Manotok v. NHA) involving the
expropriation of the land in question it is better to suspend the current case til after the outcome
of the expropriation proceedings is done. Moreover, a fire engulfed the Tambunting estate
covering the disputed area of the land.The expropriation case was not granted and the law that
provided for such was declared unconstitutional.

Due to the fire, petitioner is contending that the execution of the decision must now involve the
delivery of possession.
ISSUE
Whether or not there should be a delivery of possession by the respondent to the petitioner

RULING
When the decision of the trial court became final and executory, it becomes incumbent upon the
respondent judge to issue the necessary writ for the execution of the same. Since the
improvements have been gutted by fire, and therefore, the basis for private respondent's right to
retain the premises has already been extinguished without the fault of the petitioner, there is no
other recourse for the private respondent but to vacate the premises and deliver the same to the
petitioner.
 Republic Vs INC

In 1978, Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) purchased a parcel of land from one Carmen Racimo in Ilocos Norte. In 1979, INC
sought to register said land under its name pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law. The Director of Lands
opposed the application as it averred that the said parcel of land is part of the alienable public land; that INC cannot
register said land because it is not a Filipino citizen. INC argues that it is a private land because Racimo, its
predecessor-in-interest has been in possession thereof for more than 30 years; that the Constitutional prohibition
does not apply to INC, a corporation sole (solely incorporated by one man, Erao Manalo, a Filipino citizen), hence it
can acquire said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not INC can register said parcel of land under its name.
HELD: No.
1. The disputed land has never lost its public character. Racimo, though occupying said land for more than 30
years, never applied for confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title over said land. Under the law, all lands that were
not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. As exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest
since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
2. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law allows the registration of alienable public lands but only by Filipino
citizens. INC is not a Filipino citizen. There is no basis on the contention that as a corporation sole, INC is not
prohibited from holding said land. The benefit only applies to Filipino citizens not to a corporation sole which has
citizenship.
 GUARANTEED HOMES, INC. v. VALDEZ
Facts

CA reversed the order of RTC-Olongapo, which granted the motion to dismiss filed by
petitioner Guaranteed Homes.

Respondents, descendants of Pablo Pascua, filed a complaint seeking reconveyance of a

parcel of land in Cabitaugan, Subic Zambales and covered by OCT No. 404 in the name of
Pablo.

They are praying for damages.

From the annexes attached in the complaint, it was ascertained that the OCT contained
several annotations which showed that the property had been sold by Pablo to
AlejandriaMarquinez and Resituto Morales.

Also attached in the complaint, and averred by the respondents:

o Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales executed by
Cipriano Pascua, Sr., declaring himself as the only heir of Pablo and confirming
the sales made by Pablo to spouses Rodolfo;
o TCT Nos. T-8241 issued in the name of Cipriano without cancellation of OCT
No. 404 & not signed by Register of Deeds;
o TCT No. T-8242 issued in the name of spouses Rodolfo, which canceled T-
8241;
o TCT No. T-10863 issued in the name of petitioner when spouses Rodolfo sold
the property to petitioner, which canceled T-8242;
o Deed of Sale with Mortgage between spouses Albino Rodolfo and Fabia Rodolfo
and Guaranteed Homes;

Jorge Pascua, Sr., son of Cipriano filed a petition with RTC-Olongapo for the issuance of a
new owners duplicate of OCT No. 404, which was denied. The trial court held that
petitioner was already the owner of the subject property, noting that the failure to annotate
the subsequent property to it at the back of said OCT did not affect its title to the property.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

o Action is barred by the Statute of Limitations (since more than 28 years have
passed since the issuance from T-10863 to the filing of the complaint);
o No cause of action, since petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value relying on
the clean title of spouses Rodolfo.

RTC granted the motion.

CA reversed and held that the respondents complaint for quieting of title had not yet
prescribed.
Issue
Whether petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value, i.e. there is no need to go beyond the
registered title of spouses Rodolfo.

Held
Yes (there is no need for petitioner to go beyond the clean title presented to them).
Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside.
The Court held that it is basic that a person dealing with registered property need not go
beyond, but only has to rely on, the title of his predecessor-in-interest. Since the act of
registration is the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, it follows that where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any
cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser
is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest
for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.

In the present case, it is enough that petitioner examined the latest certificate of title issued
in the name of spouses Rodolfo. The petitioner as purchaser is not bound by the original
certificate but only by the certificate of title of the person from whom he had purchased the
property.

Furthermore, registration in the public registry is considered a notice to the whole world. Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting
registered land shall be, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the
province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from
the time of such registering, filing or entering.