GR No.

170829
PATRICIO VS. DARIO
NOVEMBER 20, 2006

FACTS:

M died intestate and was survived by his wife and two children. The
surviving heirs extrajudicially settled his estate. One of the properties
he left was the family home. A new title for the said property was
thereafter issued under the name of the wife and the two children as
co-owners. After some time, the wife and one of the sons expressed
their desire to partition the family home and terminate the co-
ownership. The other son opposed the partition on the ground that
the family home should remain despite the death of one or both the
spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The supposed
minor beneficiary is oppositor's son, the grandchild of the decedent.

ISSUE:

Whether the partition of the family home is proper where one of the
co-owners refuse to accede to such a partition on the ground that a
minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.

HELD:

To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur:

(1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of
the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are
dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1)
The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a
family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and
sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term
'descendants' contemplates all descendants of the person or persons
who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must
necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the
spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should
not distinguish. Thus, private respondent's minor son, who is also the
grandchild of the deceased satisfies the first requisite.

As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living

in the family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. The
son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent has been
living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death
of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.

However, as to the third requisite, the grandson cannot demand

support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are
capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily
on his parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is
the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation
of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the
father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the
grandparents.

ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS

G.R. No. 165060 November 27, 2008

Facts:
In Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant, which is a case for
collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner
failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on various dates in 1994.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City found petitioner liable to respondent. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts decision in Toto. Petitioner filed
before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed in a Resolution dated
February 18, 2002. The Judgment became final and executory on May 21, 2002.

A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003 and enforced on August 21, 2003. On
August 29, 2003, certain personal properties subjects of the writ of execution were auctioned off.
Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully satisfy
the judgment credit.

On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, questioning the sheriffs levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real properties.
Petitioner claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his children; and that the
real property was his family home thus exempt from execution.

Issue:
Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioners children as well
as the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment award in favor
of respondent is legal.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a
sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. It is
the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and likewise a
shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that binds
them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family
home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social institution, and since no
custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect, the trial
courts failure to observe the proper procedures to determine the veracity of petitioners allegations, is
unjustified.

The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite
petitioners allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the nature
of the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they belonged to
petitioner or to someone else.

Spouses De Mesa vs Spouses Acero

G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012
FACTS:
Spouses De Mesa obtained a loan from Spouses Acero which was secured by a mortgage over the
subject property. When Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan, the property was sold at a public
auction. Spouses Acero was the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued
to them. Thereafter, they leased the subject property to Spouses De Mesa who then defaulted in the
payment of the rent. Unable to collect the rentals due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment
against Spouses De Mesa. In their defense, Spouses De Mesa claimed that Spouses Acero have no
right over the subject property. They deny that they are mere lessors, alleging that they are the lawful
owners of the subject property and, thus cannot be evicted therefrom. The MTC ruled in Spouses
Aceros favor. Spouses De Mesa appealed the Decision.
In the meantime, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to
nullify the title of Spouses Acero on the basis that the subject property is a family home which is
exempt from execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have not been validly levied upon for
purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan. The RTC dismissed their complaint. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject property is exempt from execution
HELD:
It is without dispute that the family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.
However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status
of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff,
but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the
person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for
exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners negligence or omission to assert their right within a
reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert
it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon
the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriffs
duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home. (Spouses Araceli Oliva-
De Mesa vs. Spouses Claudio F. Acero, Jr., G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012)

Only grandchildren, as blood relatives, are entitled to support from the grandparents, in case
of disability by the parents themselves. Mother not included
Ma. Cheryl married Edward in 1979. She then lived with him in his parents Prudencio and Filomenas
house in Forbes Park, where also lived Edwards grandmother Chua Giak. Ma. Cheryl and Edward
begot three children, Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Edward worked in the family
business, which provided him with a monthly income of P6,000.00.
In 1990, Ma. Cheryl and her children moved out of the house after she caught Edward in a very
compromising situation with Chua Giaks in-house midwife.
Ma. Cheryl then filed an action for support against Edward, the spouses Lim, and Chua Giak. While
ongoing trial, the court ordered Edward to provide P6,000.00 monthly support. After trial, the court
ordered the defendants to provide P40.000.00 monthly support to Ma. Cheryl and her children,
Edward shouldering P6,000.00 and the others the balance of P34,000.00 Filomena and Prudencio
asked for reconsideration of the decision, holding out that as grandparents, they are not required to
support Ma. Cheryl and her children. The court denied the motion, hence they filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals, which also deemed their appeal, unmeritorious.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court modified the decision as follows:
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe constriction of the
scope of familial obligation to give support. In the first place, the governing text are the relevant
provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on
Parental Authority. While both areas share a common ground in that parental authority encompasses
the obligation to provide legal support, they differ in other concerns including the duration of the
obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing degrees. Thus, although the obligation to
provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, the same
obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligees lifetime..
Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents,
passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support
passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide
sufficient support. As we observed in another case raising the ancillary issue of an ascendants
obligation to give support in light of the fathers sufficient means:
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their
grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them.
This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199. We agree with this view.
xxx
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward
is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents basic needs. This
inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their
obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal19
lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners
theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children
because of parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more
than able to fill the void.
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is
commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by
blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category.
Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward,
arising from their marital bond.Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the amount of monthly support the
trial court awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the
case to the trial court for this limited purpose.
G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009,SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM, Petitioners,
vs.MA. CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of her minor children LESTER EDWARD S.
LIM, CANDICE GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO S. LIM, III, Respondents.

Facts: Charles Gotardo and Divina Buling became a couple in in the last week of January 1993. They
started intimate sexual relations sometime in September 1993. By August 1994 Divina found out she
was pregnant. The couple made plans to marry but later on Charles backed out of the wedding plan.
Divina filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry. This was
later on amicably settled.
Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March 1995. Charles failed to show up and support the child. Divina
sent him a demand letter on July 1995 demanding recognition and support. When Charles did not
answer, she filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite. Charles denied
the imputed paternity.
RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffzes filiation. It found the
respondents testimony inconsistent on the question of when she had her first sexual contact with the
petitioner, i.e., September 1993 in her direct testimony while last week of January 1993 during her
cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact even after she had refused the
petitioners initial marriage proposal. It ordered the respondent to return the amount of support
pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay P 10,000.00 as attorneys fees.
CA departed from the RTCs appreciation of the respondents testimony, concluding that the latter
merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the questions of the petitioners counsel. It
noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that the
respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the
petitioners allegation that the respondent had previous relationships with other men remained
unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to
recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order granting a P 2,000.00 monthly child
support.
Issue: WON CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC appreciation of the respondents
testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity.
Decision: SC affirmed CA.
The burden of proof in paternity cases is on the person alleging. Divina established prima facie case
against Charles through her testimony, corroborated by Charles uncle (dorm owner), that shes only
been involved with one man at the time of conception. Charles did not deny his sexual relations with
her, only that it occurred at a later date.
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. We have held that such other proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting
[his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
In Herrera v. Alba, we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.35 We explained that a
prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by corroborative proof that she had sexual
relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father. We
explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability
of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother
had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.

Jenie San Juan dela Cruz vs Ronald Paul S. Gracia, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to
use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the
deceased father, and because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to
his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The
trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten
Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be
considered as a recognition of paternity.

RULING:
Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an
admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father
in the private handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent
in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate
child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in order
for the latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied Armis
allegations. In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid )
DNA testing to establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba.
However, Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has not yet
garnered widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and that
the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not
yet recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the
prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no question as to the
acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the
decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the other
hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court
provides, which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other
things, the following data:
how the samples were collected,
how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by courts
before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test inquires:
Whether the theory or technique can be tested,
Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review,
Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance
In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be had,
the DNA test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is the
biological father. However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a 100% )
does not immediately result in the DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It
does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case Herrera, is the
biological father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable evidence which can
be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with.
What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the
biological father?
Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the right against
self-incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion
of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. There is no testimonial compulsion in the
getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.

Filiation May Be Proved By An Admission Of Legitimate Filiation In A Public Document Or A

Private Handwritten Instrument And Signed By The Parent Concerned, And Such Due Recognition In
Any Authentic Writing Is, In Itself, A Consummated Act Of Acknowledgment Of The Child, And No
Further Court Action Is Required
APRIL 17, 2015 BY THE LAWYER'S POST
The Facts:
Spouses Alfredo and Cadelaria (Aguilar) died without will and without debts in 1983 and 1994,
respectively, leaving two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-25896 and T-(156462) 1070. Rodolfo
Aguilar) filed a petition for mandatory injunction with damages against Edna (Siasat) in 1996,
alleging that he is the only son of the spouses Alfredo and Candelaria; that when he searched for the
two tiles the same cannot be found, and suspected that someone from the Siasat clan stole it,hence he
executed an affidavit of loss, and later filed a petition for issuance of duplicate owners copy of the
titles, which Edna (Siasat) opposed, claiming that the titles were in her possession, were not stolen,
and entrusted to her by her aunt Candelaria, and refused to surrender the titles. Rodolfo thus filed the
instant case to compel Edna to surrender the titles to him. In her defense, Edna claimed that Rodolfo is
not the son of the spouses Alfredo and Candelaria but a stranger raised by them merely out of
generosity and kind heart; that Alfredo predeceased Candelaria, thus the latter inherited his conjugal
share; upon her death, her brothers and sisters inherited the estate of Candelaria, and the titles were
entrusted to her by Candelaria. At trial Rodoldo presented documentary exhibits such as his school
records, where Alfredo was indicated as his father; his ITR which listed Candelaria as her mother,
Alfredos SSS E-1 Form which listed Rodolfo as his son; and other pertinent documents to show his
filiation to the spouses. He also presented his wife Luz Marie, to prove the fact that he is the son of
Alfredo and Candelaria; and his aunt, Ester, sister of Alfredo, who testified that Rodolfo is the only
son of Alfredo and Candelaria, born at BMMC, and they knew of this fact hence she and her siblings
did not anymore claim on Alfredos properties because they recognised rodolfo as Alfredos son. After
his release from prison, Rodolfo lived with his mother Candelaria at one of the properties and
continues to live there. Edna on the other hand presented the testimonies of Aurea, a sister of
Candelaria, who stated that the spouses does not have a son, though he know of a certain Rodofo
with a nickname Mait and that Alfredo had a sister named Ester. Edna also presented an Affidavit
executed by Candelaria announcing that she and Alfredo had no issue, and she is the sole heir to
Alfredos estate.
The RTC, after trial, rendered judgment in favour of Edna. It ruled that Rodolfo failed to present any
evidence that he is the biological son of Alfredo and Edna, further complicated by the lack of a
certificate of live birth and the affidavit of Candelaria that she had no issue.
In his appeal to the CA, Rodolfo argued that his failure to present a Certificate of Live Birth was by
reason of the destruction of all records at the Local Civil Registry Bacolod City for the period 1941-45
as shown by Exhibit Q3; that under Article 172 of the Family Code, an admission of filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten document signed by the parent constitute proof of filiation,
which he sufficiently proved by his documentary exhibits. The CA ruled otherwise, averring that the
documents presented by Rodolfo by itself did not prove that he is the son of Alfredo and Candelaria;
that use of the family surname does not establish pedigree. Having failed to establish his filiation to
the spouses, Rodolfo failed to prove that he had a clear and unmistakable right that had been violated.
Rodolfo elevated his case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the documents he presented satisfy the
requirements of Article 172 in relation to Sections 19 and 23 of Rule 132; that Edna had no personality
to assail his paternity and foliation; and that the action to impugn his legitimacy had already
prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code.
The Courts ruling:
The Court grants the Petition.
This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon[1], has held that
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of
an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court
action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to
prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to
establish the childs acknowledgment.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents.
The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse
is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.
Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases
Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption
becomes fixed and unassailable[2]. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be concluded that petitioner
who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar[3] and before their respective deaths[4] has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue
of the Aguilar spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit G)
satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172
of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records covering
the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated
the introduction of other documentary evidence particularly Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1
(Exhibit G) to prove filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof, the same
being an express recognition in a public instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and
such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of
the child, and no further court action is required. And, relative to said form of acknowledgment, the
Court has further held that:
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules
respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the paramount consideration in resolving
questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of
which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.
It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity
and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x. Too, (t)he State as parens patriae
affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained a copy of his Certificate
of Live Birth from the National Statistics Office (NSO), since the Bacolod City Civil Registry copy
thereof was destroyed. He would not have had to go through the trouble of presenting other
documentary evidence; the NSO copy would have sufficed. This fact is not lost on petitioner; the
Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry (Exhibit Q)
contained just such an advice for petitioner to proceed to the Office of the Civil Registrar General at
the NSO in Manila to secure a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, since for every registered birth in
the country, a copy of the Certificate of Live Birth is submitted to said office.
As to petitioners argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and cannot
collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed
pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, the Court has held before that
Article 263[6] refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person
is not a mans child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioners
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but
that she is not a child of Jose at all[7].
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses, then he is as well
heir to the latters estate. Respondent is then left with no right to inherit from her aunt Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilars estate, since succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line[8].
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 30, 2006 Decision and December 20, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229, as well as the August 17, 1999
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby ordered to SURRENDER to the
petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owners duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and
T-(15462) 1070.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015, RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, PETITIONER.
VS. EDNA G. SIASAT, RESPONDENT.
JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710, [June 6, 2011]
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his
mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted
documents which include (a) petitioners certificate of live birth; (b)
petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college diploma, showing that he graduated from
Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation
from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of
Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical
prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set
the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had
on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father.
Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to
establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of
Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima faciecase, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was
scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant
petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four
significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not
be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order
HELD:
Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing
since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
RATIO:
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The statement
in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant proceduralaspects in a traditional paternity case which
parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted
by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that
petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a
partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may, at any time, either
motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order
a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was
not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to
DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a
scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors,
if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA
testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest
of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This
does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the
hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a
reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court
order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie
case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of
probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which
are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be
made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree,
and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood
testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily
undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order
for blood testing The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the
putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing,
the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.