Psychological Inquiry Copyright

C 2007 by
2007, Vol. 18, No. 1, 60–71 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

REPLY

Psychology and American Corporate Capitalism:

Further Reflections and Future Directions
Tim Kasser
Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois
Allen D. Kanner
Wright Institute, Berkeley, California
Steve Cohn
Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois
Richard M. Ryan
University of Rochester, Rochester, New York

We want to begin by thanking the nine commenta-
tors for taking the time and energy to read our target
article on American Corporate Capitalism (ACC) and
for formulating such stimulating responses. We also
want to thank them for, on the whole, approaching our
article in the spirit in which it was intended: an attempt
to begin to formulate an understanding of how one of
the most dominant features of contemporary American
life (and, we believe, global life) may be detrimentally
affecting values, goals, quality of life, social function-
ing, and the Earth’s ecology. As we noted in our tar-
get article, it is difficult to write about a politically
and emotionally charged topic such as capitalism in
a scientific manner—certainly we struggled with this
challenge as we went through multiple drafts of our
target article. We hope that this interchange encour-
ages more psychologists to begin to explore this topic
in a rigorous theoretical and scientific manner.
The commentators raise quite a number of interest-
ing issues, and we hope that readers of Psychological
Inquiry will understand that any reply which addressed
each and every point raised would end up appearing de-
fensive, ponderous, and disconnected. We have there-
fore decided to organize this response around the target
article’s major sections and themes, thereby retaining
some of its structure. Hopefully, such a strategy will
make this reply more coherent, integrated and, ulti-
mately, useful.
General Principles Regarding
American Corporate Capitalism
Ideology and Institutions
We noted at the outset of our target article that in
the last two decades psychologists have made signifi-
cant strides in understanding broad social forces such
as individualism/collectivism, religiosity, racism, and
the like. In contrast, significantly less effort has been
expended exploring similar dynamics regarding eco-
nomic systems, despite the fact that economic systems
share with other social systems the twin pillars of ide-
ologies (which are internalized by members of culture)
and institutions (i.e., government practices, laws, etc.)
that help to ensure the efficient and continued operation
of that social system.
Several of the commentators present further evi-
dence supportive of our claim that ACC is in fact like
other social systems in that it has an ideology that orga-
nizes institutions. For example, Dittmar (2007) clearly
shows how certain features of ACC and its cousin con-
sumerism work their way into the identities of people
living under such systems, directing their behavior in
important ways and affecting their own subjective ex-
periences. Further, if Locke’s commentary is treated as
a case study, it is clear that his exposition of Ayn Rand’s
objectivist philosophy represents the use of a particular
set of ideological beliefs concerning human nature and
social values to support a capitalistic worldview.
Another piece of evidence supporting our claim
that ACC has an ideology comes from the interesting
history of Adam Smith’s thought alluded to by
several commentators. Recall that Smith’s place as
the grandfather of capitalism rests in part on his
suggestion that the pursuit of self-interest through
competition provides the best means of ensuring
economic growth, happiness, and the good of the
community. As Gowdy, Whybrow, and Myers all
mention in their commentaries, and as we alluded to
in footnote 3 of our target article, Smith (1776/1976)
also held that community values, love, empathy,
 AUTHORS’ RESPONSE
and neighborliness were necessary to hold unbridled
self-interest and competition in check. Although we
will discuss this issue in more detail below, for now
we want to note that many proponents of ACC happily
cite the portions of Smith’s thought that celebrate
self-interest and competition but rarely discuss the
other, more pro-social features of his philosophy. Such
selectivity commonly occurs among the followers
of ideologies. For example, contemporary Christian
ideology and practice often de-emphasizes, and indeed
contradicts, the portions of Jesus’s philosophy that
insisted upon having few possessions and resolving
conflicts through non-violent means. Our point is that
when ideologies are internalized, followers typically
pick and choose which parts they will emphasize and
which parts they will ignore. The same apparently has
occurred in the history of capitalist thought.
Finally, two commentators show that ACC’s ide-
ology and institutions are indeed connected. Gowdy
(this issue), for example, describes how the neo-liberal
conception of humans as self-interested and rational
(i.e., an ideology) has led to the development of cer-
tain types of public policies (i.e., institutions) designed
to enhance aims consistent with laissez-faire capital-
ism (i.e., ideology). S. H. Schwartz (2007) also empir-
ically demonstrates the connections between ideology
and institutions by reporting a consistent pattern of cor-
relations between the values of nations (i.e., ideology)
and the extent to which their economic systems are
organized in a strategic vs. competitive manner (i.e.,
institutions).
In sum, we believe these types of evidence along
with what we presented in our target article support
the notion that ACC is similar to other social systems
in that it has a clear ideology that helps to organize
institutions. This is important to know for at least three
reasons.
First, some of ACC’s proponents claim that the sys-
tem actually does not rest on an ideology but rather
reflects natural law or a pure expression of human na-
ture. As Heilbroner (1985) pointed out, this supplies “a
kind of moral pardon” (p. 116) for capitalist, accumu-
lative activities. Such a claim reminds us of monarchs
who insisted on “the divine right of kings” as a ratio-
nale for quashing challenges to the manner in which
they ruled, and of whites and males who explained the
lower status of non-whites and females by pointing to
the latter’s supposedly innate inferiorities. Thus, the
claim that ACC has no ideology can be understood as
the portion of its ideology that serves to support the
social system by claiming that the system is “natural
and good.” Sorting out whether such claims are propa-
ganda or actuality is, we believe, vitally important for
the sole reason of truth-value.
A second reason it is important to demonstrate that
ACC has an ideology concerns its future as a psy-
chological construct. Given the results presented in
Table 1 of our target article, it is reasonably clear that
ACC has not yet captured the attention of many psy-
chologists. Understanding the ideology of ACC opens
the door to using extant theorizing and methodologies
on constructs related to other ideologies in order to
study topics related to ACC. It also allows us to look at
variations in people’s internalization of ACC’s ideol-
ogy as a predictor of behavior and well-being. This is
particularly important as polls show that an increasing
proportion of American youth see “getting rich” as a
central life value (Pew Research Center, 2007).
Third, as described above, ideologies influence in-
stitutions and the actions of these institutions are par-
tially responsible for some of the costs we enumerated
in our target article and upon which some commenta-
tors expanded. Thus, if psychologists are interested in
ameliorating the costs of ACC they will need to do so,
in part, through considering the actions of certain in-
stitutions. Recognizing the influence of ideology will
make it easier to think about how to modify institutions
that support ACC and how to design new institutions
that facilitate the outcomes ignored or discouraged by
ACC.
Characterizing ACC and its Effects
We were gratified to see that the commentators had
relatively little quarrel with our attempt to provide an
“objective set of definitions” of ACC—even Locke
conceded that we were “almost right.” Three main
issues were raised, however, to which we would like to
respond.
Advertising. Locke (2007) claims that advertising
does not spread a materialistic mindset, but instead
“gives people product information, if they want it; if
they do not want it, they are free to ignore it.” An
hour or two spent watching advertisements or a second
read of Dittmar’s commentary should make it clear that
precious few ads present only “product information”;
instead, the vast majority attempt to associate a prod-
uct with a particular lifestyle or potential outcomes
such as love, status, sex, and the like. Further, unless
mandated by laws such as those that compel pharma-
ceutical companies to mention the negative side effects
of their drugs, it is rare that advertisers publicize the
downside or limits of their products. Thus, the infor-
mation presented in advertisements tends to be highly
biased towards the positive end.
We also have difficulty understanding how Locke’s
claim about the purity of product information in ad-
vertising is consistent with the ideology of ACC. As
we understand it, a corporation should use any means
at its disposal to influence the spending of potential
consumers, as it is in the corporation’s self-interest to
do so. Clearly, limiting advertisements to mere mes-
sages about “product information” would not be as
effective as more sophisticated marketing; indeed, this
61
 KASSER, KANNER, COHN, RYAN
basic idea was recognized by the early 20th century
psychologists who invented the science of advertising
(Buckley, 1982; Kuna, 1976, 1979). Further, within
ACC’s framework, it would be irrational for corpora-
tions to spend the billions of dollars they do on ad-
vertising if it was not having a financially beneficial
outcome; at the least, corporations that spent their cap-
ital on such ineffective messages would ultimately, by
the rules of capitalism, make less profit and eventually
be replaced by other corporations that pursued more
effective and seductive strategies.
Locke also holds that the human potential to be con-
scious and rational mitigates any untoward effects of
advertising. Certainly we agree with this suggestion,
as substantial research documents that persuasive mes-
sages are often most effective when people pay less at-
tention to them (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). However,
we disagree with Locke’s insistence that consumers
who fail to use their rational faculties are responsible
for the problems associated with advertising; such a
claim, from our viewpoint, “blames the victim.” For
example, it is impossible to reconcile Locke’s claim
with the recent spate of “stealth marketing” that in-
tentionally hides from people the fact that they are
being marketed to; under such circumstances it is ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, to use one’s con-
scious awareness and rational choice to ward off undue
influence. Further, we would note that Locke’s asser-
tion that “no one but the most mentally retarded and
mindlessly gullible individuals will have his choices
‘determined’ by advertising” (p. 39) is actually a pow-
erful (though rather insensitively worded) argument
against advertising to children, whose cognitive ability
to understand the persuasive intent behind most com-
mercial messages is relatively under-developed (APA
Task Force on Advertising and Children, 2004).
Economic Growth
Easterlin (2007) is dubious about our claim that
the costs of ACC are due to the ideology and institu-
tions of capitalism, holding instead that they are the
unintended but inevitable consequences of economic
growth. Specifically, Easterlin implies that there are
three main reasons so many nation-states prioritize eco-
nomic growth in setting public policy and so many peo-
ple have taken on the bundle of values relevant to ACC.
First, modern technology creates new economic oppor-
tunities and requires particular kinds of social institu-
tions to take advantage of these opportunities. Second,
human nature prioritizes the acquisition of economic
goods and the political power that automatically ac-
companies them. And third, people adapt to their eco-
nomic goods and levels of wealth, compare themselves
to people who have more wealth and goods, and thus
become dissatisfied and desire more wealth goods.
Certainly we agree with aspects of Easterlin’s view-
point. Our target article noted that pressures for eco-
62
nomic growth are a key feature of ACC. Further, we
agree with the ideas expressed so well by Easterlin and
others that hedonic adaptation and social comparison
are partially responsible for the well-documented fail-
ure of further economic growth to provide enhanced
happiness in most economically developed nations.
However, it is not obvious to us exactly how and why
economic growth, in and of itself, would inevitably
cause some of the value conflicts that we described
and documented, and that S. Schwartz (2007) empiri-
cally supported in his commentary. For example, why
would economic growth inherently interfere with good
relationships and community feeling? Why would it
automatically undermine certain sorts of autonomy?
Further, we can imagine an economy that sets lim-
its on growth, yet still encourages materialism, self-
interest, and competition in regards to the more limited
resources now available to people.
In contrast with Easterlin we believe that the ideol-
ogy of ACC, which fetishizes unbridled, “winner-take
all” economic growth, seeps into the culture and creates
a variety of beliefs, institutions, practices, and behav-
iors that discourage some and encourage other values.
Essentially our differences with Easterlin seem to re-
volve around whether the costs of ACC are the “nat-
ural” result of the “natural” march of technology and
economic growth or whether they are the “cultured”
result of a particular social system. Because ACC has
spread so widely, it is tempting to naturalize its out-
comes, just as in the 19th and 20th centuries it was
tempting to naturalize traditional gender roles because
of their apparent pervasiveness.
But consider, for example, Braverman’s (1974) clas-
sic analysis of how the evolution of workplace tech-
nology influenced the adversarial character of labor-
management relations in ACC. Braverman showed
how the emergence of alienated work environments in
ACC economies, and the psychological implications
of those environments, reflected the social structure
of ACC economies rather than the inevitable unfold-
ing of technology. For example, Braverman demon-
strated how the conflict of interest between employer
and employee in capitalist economies was exacerbated
in ACC economies by ideological beliefs that firms
had no moral or social obligations to their employ-
ees. This combination promoted the development of
technologies that maximized employer authority in
the workplace, such as the assembly line, routinized
white-collar work, and other Taylorist work practices.
Later research has similarly demonstrated how parent-
ing practices (Kohn, 1977) and educational environ-
ments (Bowles and Gintis’s, 1976) are influenced by
the need to prepare students to fit into the kinds of work
environments characteristic of ACC practices.
Another interesting example of how the culture
created by ACC, rather than economic growth per
se, is partly responsible for the costs we enumerated
 AUTHORS’ RESPONSE

can be seen in current developments in Thailand, Table 1. Zero-order and Partial Correlations of Schwartz’s
where one of us (Cohn) happens to be on sabbatical. (this issue) Cultural and Individual Values with Hall and
At first glance, Thailand appears to be another Gengrich’s (2004) Strategic vs. Competitive Capitalism
“Orange County” poster child (to borrow Easterlin’s Index and Average Annual GDP Growth in the 1990s
memorable imagery) for the universal logic and GDP
experience of economic growth. The last 40 years Capitalism Growth
have witnessed the prioritizing of economic growth Strategic vs. Average Index controlling
by most sections of Thai society and the emergence Competitive Annual controlling for
Capitalism GDP for GDP Capitalism
of modern consumer lifestyles. But far from being a Value Type Index Growth Growth Index
“natural” or inevitable outcome of growth, it is clear
that historically determined distributions of power Cultural Values
as well as ideological and institutional influences Harmony .83∗∗ −.61∗∗ .77∗∗ −.44+
have played an enormous role in the reconstruction Mastery −.52∗ .43+ −.39+ .25
Egalitarianism .33 −.14 .31 .02
of Thai society. For example, forced privatization Hierarchy −.60∗∗ .11 −.63∗∗ −.25
in the countryside has often crippled the option Intellectual .56∗ −.63∗∗ .38 −.51∗
of community-coordinated rural economic growth. Autonomy
Villagers have been denied access to forests and other Embeddedness −.45∗ .49∗ −.28 .36
previously held common property around their farms Individual Values
Power −.35 .06 −.36 −.12
and homes. Investment has been heavily concentrated Achievement −.73∗∗ .52∗ −.64∗∗ .29
in urban areas. And organizing efforts among laborers Universalism .66∗∗ −.52∗ .55∗ −.31
and independent farmers for alternative economic Benevolence .26 −.02 .29 .13
development paths have been violently repressed Self-direction .64∗∗ −.57∗∗ .51∗ −.40+
(Bello, Cunningham, & Po, 1998; Phatharathana- Conformity −.44+ .40+ −.31 .24
nunth, 2006; Ungpakorn, 2003). Although there seems Note: ∗∗ = p < .01; ∗ = p < .05; + = p < .10. High scores on
to have been a yearning for development options these variables indicate a more strategic and less competitive (i.e.,
that would preserve the reciprocity and community ACC) economic organization, higher economic growth, and stronger
oriented culture of the village, these desires have not concern for each value domain.
been actualized (Nartsupha, 1999). These problems,
while involving economic growth, clearly reflect
institutionalized practices of the Thai government and found that nations with a more American (i.e., com-
a particular ideology about how growth should occur. petitive) form of capitalism had higher GDP growth
Given the competing (but not incommensurate) rates in the 1990s (r = −.47, p < .05; recall that high
hypotheses put forward in our target article and by scores on the capitalism index indicate more strategic
Easterlin, we set out to empirically examine these and less competitive forms of capitalism). Next, we
ideas. S. Schwartz (2007) demonstrated that Hall and compared how the six cultural and six individual
Gingerich’s (2004) index of strategic vs. competitive values that S. Schwartz (2007) examined relate to
capitalism related to specific cultural and individual the capitalism index and to GDP growth rates; these
values in a manner largely consistent with predictions results are reported in the second and third columns
derived from our target article. We reasoned that if of Table 1. As can be seen there, the capitalism index
Easterlin’s hypothesis is correct, then a nation’s eco- was significantly correlated with eight of Schwartz’s
nomic growth rate should be associated with these values and marginally correlated with another one;
values in a similar manner, i.e., nations with high GDP growth was significantly correlated with six of
economic growth rates should place high value on Schwartz’s values and marginally correlated with two
the materialistic ACC goals and less value on the others. Generally speaking, the correlations were of
goals representing community, family, and personal approximately the same magnitude, although they
growth/freedom. Further, we reasoned that Easter- tended to be slightly larger for the capitalism index
lin’s hypothesis suggests that controlling for economic than for the GDP growth measure.
growth rates should substantially diminish the size of Next we examined the relative independence of the
the association between the strategic vs. competitive two variables in the prediction of S. Schwartz’s val-
capitalism measure and these values. ues. That is, were associations still significant after
We therefore obtained the average annual growth controlling for the other measure? Partial correlations
in real GDP for 1990–1999 (The Economist, 2001) between the values and the capitalism index controlling
for each of the 20 countries on which S. Schwartz pro- for economic growth showed that five of the correla-
vided data on the Hall and Gingerich (2004) index and tions remained significant and one became marginal.
on values relevant to his model. Although S. Schwartz In contrast, partial correlations between the values and
reported no association between this capitalism index GDP growth rates, controlling for the capitalism index,
and Gross Domestic Product per capita (r = .04), we showed that only one correlation remained significant
63
 KASSER, KANNER, COHN, RYAN
and two became marginal (see columns 4 and 5 of
Table 1).
These results provide mixed support for Easterlin’s
hypothesis but reasonably strong support for the ideas
we presented in our target article. That is, while cul-
tures that are more similar in ideology and practice
to ACC tended to have higher economic growth dur-
ing the period examined, this economic growth did not
fully explain the tendency of such cultures to be more
oriented towards materialistic, self-enhancing values,
and less oriented towards values that are focused on
community, close interpersonal relationships, and self-
direction/autonomy. Of course, these data are limited in
multiple ways. First, they explore only a small portion
of the possible outcomes of interest; it may be that eco-
nomic growth is particularly important for other more
objective indices relevant to our hypotheses. Second,
we only explored relatively recent data, i.e., from the
1990s; it may be that examination of longer time spans
would reveal different results. Further, the hypotheses
were tested in small number of highly economically de-
veloped nations; it may be that different results obtain
in nations less far along the road of capitalistic devel-
opment. Thus, we acknowledge that more research is
needed to adjudicate between Easterlin’s claims and
those made in our target article. Hopefully this discus-
sion and our initial empirical tests will stimulate work
in this area.
Does ACC Discourage, Conflict
with, or Destroy Values?
One of the central points of our target article was that
“when the values and goals necessary for the smooth
functioning of ACC become increasingly central to
individuals and to institutions, the result is a corre-
sponding conflict with three other aims: concern for the
broader community and the world; close, intimate re-
lationships; and feeling worthy and autonomous” (this
issue, p. 6, emphasis added). B. Schwartz (2007) seems
to agree with this basic point but suggests an even
stronger position: The values and goals of ACC may
actually destroy these three types of values. With his
characteristic flair, B. Schwartz provided a number of
examples, both empirical and anecdotal, for this dire
prediction.
Extrapolating from this claim and his other writ-
ings, it seems to us that B. Schwartz has a rather
post-modern, social-constructionist, and tabula rasa
view of humans. Such a viewpoint logically leads
to the conclusion that the values and goals that con-
flict with ACC’s ideology and institutions would be
at greater risk for extinction to the extent that ACC
gains control of more aspects of social and economic
life, as succeeding generations would be exposed more
frequently to socializing influences that emphasize
64
ACC’s values and less frequently to the opposing
set of aims. As a consequence, values and goals for
self-direction/self-acceptance, benevolence/affiliation,
and universalism/community feeling could theoreti-
cally die out.
A slightly (but only slightly) more optimistic view
about human functioning amidst ACC’s ideology and
institutions could be derived from humanistic and some
dynamically oriented perspectives. These viewpoints
typically hold that the social surround either facili-
tates or discourages the pursuit of basic psychological
needs and growth strivings. As such, these perspec-
tives would predict that the ultimate, innate source of
desires for personal growth, affiliation, and connec-
tion with community would remain present in humans,
but to the extent ACC makes it difficult for people to
successfully pursue these aims, tension and instability
might result, catalyzing possible change. As seen in
B. Schwartz’s commentary, the social-constructionist
viewpoint seems to make somewhat different predic-
tions about the costs of living under ACC. We hope
that researchers from both theoretical traditions will
take up the challenge of examining how the ideology
and institutions of ACC play into these age-old ques-
tions about the relative influence of nature and nurture
in explaining different aspects of human behavior.
Some Costs of ACC, Revisited
In this section, we revisit each of the three sets of
aims our target article proposed were undermined and
discouraged by the goals and values of ACC, replying
to and expanding upon points made by the commenta-
tors.
Universalism/Community Feeling
Supportive Behavioral Data. Henrich (2007) noted
that his cross-cultural work, which uses laboratory-
based, behavioral measures of generosity, found that
Americans are among the most generous individuals
he has sampled. He thus suggests that although ACC’s
rhetoric may be opposed to such pro-social concerns,
in actual fact it may not impact behavior. Said differ-
ently, Henrich points to the well-known gap between
attitudes and behavior, and proposes that while our hy-
potheses may hold for beliefs such as values and goals,
they may not hold for specific, objective outcomes.
While we agree that it is necessary to conduct further
research to help discern when the ideology of ACC
undermines community-oriented behavior and when it
does not, we feel data exist that do indeed support our
claim that ACC’s ideology influences actual behavior.
For example, some of the studies we cited in our
target article assessed self-reports of actual social and
environmental behavior (Brown and Kasser, 2005;
 AUTHORS’ RESPONSE
Kasser and Ryan, 1993; McHoskey, 1999). Further,
two of the studies we cited in our target article directly
examined behavioral outcomes associated with the val-
ues of ACC: Sheldon and McGregor’s (2000) study of
resource use and Sheldon, Sheldon, and Osbaldiston’s
(2000) work on the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Finally,
in the interim between submitting our target article to
the commentators and writing this reply, Vohs, Mead,
and Goode (2006) presented four studies demonstrat-
ing that when the idea of money and wealth (a promi-
nent value of ACC) is highly accessible, people are less
likely to engage in pro-social behavior. Specifically, in
comparison to subjects primed with neutral concepts,
subjects primed with ideas of wealth and money vol-
unteered less of their time to help an experimenter
code data (Experiment 3), spent less time helping a
confused confederate (Experiment 4), helped pick up
fewer pencils dropped by a confederate (Experiment
5), and donated less money to a University Student
Fund (Experiment 6).
Such behavioral evidence suggests Henrich’s data
yielded a different pattern of findings than what we
proposed in our target article because of the predictor
variable, not the dependent variable (i.e., behavioral
vs. attitudinal). That is, whereas Henrich examined
how citizenship in one or another nation related to
generosity, the studies just described either measured
how much the materialistic values of ACC were in-
ternalized or manipulated how much such values were
cognitively accessible. These latter operationalizations
are, we think, more valid ways of assessing the influ-
ence of ACC than is “being an American,” as many
other factors compose this particular identity status,
some of which may promote generosity. What seems
clear from the studies just reviewed is that the val-
ues of ACC were likely working against any generous
behavior emitted by Henrich’s American subjects. Fu-
ture studies would do well to examine a variety of
cultural beliefs, including the internalization of ACC’s
values, in attempting to understand cultural differences
in community-oriented behaviors, or any other type of
behavior, for that matter.
Where did Smith’s Moral Virtues Go? The commen-
taries of Gowdy, Whybrow, B. Schwartz, and Myers all
raise the question of how Adam Smith’s philosophy of
capitalism evolved in the case of ACC to become a
one-sided ideology emphasizing competition and self-
interest at the expense of compassion, empathy, and
neighborliness. In particular, these commentators won-
der about the processes that removed the moral checks
that Smith held to be an important and essential part
of a free market capitalistic system. We see three com-
plementary approaches to this issue.
The first, most obvious explanation for why ACC
undermines community and universalism values con-
cerns the inherent incommensurability of the two aims.
As we noted in our target article, S. Schwartz (1992)
has long pointed towards the difficulties of simulta-
neously pursuing self-interest and universalism val-
ues, and recent cross-cultural evidence presented by
Grouzet et al. (2005) has demonstrated via circular
stochastic modeling analyses that the values of finan-
cial success and community feeling are almost di-
ametrically opposed, laying 192 degrees from each
other (perfect opposition being of course 180 degrees).
The fascinating studies conducted by Frey and Stutzer
(2002) referred to by B. Schwartz in his commentary
and the studies of Vohs et al. (2006) described above
provide further evidence for how the activation of fi-
nancially relevant cognitions “crowds out” community
and universalism aims. Such work suggests that so-
cial cognitive methods could be applied to understand
the associative networks that lead these two values to
be in conflict. Further, it would be extremely informa-
tive to study the kinds of businesspeople described by
Myers (2007) in order to understand how they man-
age the frequent conflict between these aims. Are such
businesspeople actually motivated primarily by tran-
scendent aims, as Myers suggests, thus alleviating the
conflict? Do particular personality or situational factors
help them cope, resolve, or live with this conflict? And
when their transcendent aims come in serious conflict
with profit making, is Bakan (2004) correct in his as-
sertion that even the most well-intentioned individuals
will bow to the bottom line?
The second explanation for ACC’s relative rejection
of Smith’s neighborly values concerns the fact that na-
tional and inter-national institutions support the values
of financial progress and discourage economic deci-
sions based on universalism/community feeling values.
As we noted in our target article, and as B. Schwartz
(2007) also emphasized, US laws designed to promote
economic growth and to protect the “rights” of share-
holders compel the Boards and the CEOs of publicly-
held corporations to pursue profit at all costs and to
ignore concerns for the greater good of the community
in their decision-making process; similar laws increas-
ingly govern international economic treaties (such as
NAFTA, etc.). Not all nations have such laws, and fam-
ily businesses of the type described by Myers (2007)
do have the opportunity to insert their own (sometimes
transcendent) values into their business decisions in a
way that is just not as much of an option, legally, for
limited liability corporations owned by share-holders.
Again, it would be fascinating to better understand how
such situational constraints faced by politicians and
businesspeople in the real world affect their behavior
in interpersonal interactions; social-dilemma games in
the laboratory may also give insight into this dynamic.
The third approach to understanding how Smith’s
neighborly values have been de-emphasized relates to
what political economist Princen (2002) calls “dis-
tancing.” When consumers are unable to see the up-
stream production costs (e.g., sweatshop labor) and
65
 KASSER, KANNER, COHN, RYAN
downstream environmental costs (e.g., pollution when
an item is discarded) of goods they purchase, they
are necessarily “distanced” from these “externali-
ties”; certainly such downstream and upstream costs
are very rarely included in the product information
of which Locke (2007) suggests advertisements are
comprised. When consumers are not confronted with
awareness of such factors, they are less likely to
enter these community-oriented variables into their
decision-making processes than when they live in the
same neighborhood as the low-paid workers and the
garbage dumps full of pollution from discarded goods
(see also Clapp, 2002).
Similar distancing processes can be identified on the
production end of the equation as well. Many features
of ACC seem to ensure that decision makers of large
corporations are distanced from those who are affected
by their decisions. CEOs and board members rarely see
the workers laboring in factories far from the home of-
fice, vice presidents are transferred from town to town
every few years before they can put down roots and feel
part of a community, and faceless shareholders spread
across the globe ultimately have the say in the decisions
a corporation makes. As Whybrow (2007) notes, these
features of the modern global economy are in striking
contrast to the setting in which Smith’s philosophy de-
veloped: capitalists living in small villages, employing
and selling to their neighbors. Myers (2007) provides
a glimpse into this “earlier time” by sharing exam-
ples of business owners in Hope, Michigan: men who
grew up with and continue to “rub elbows” with their
employees, and who contribute to their community be-
cause they feel they have a stake in it. As we know
from years of social psychological research, proximity
breeds liking and people tend to treat members of their
in-groups in more beneficent ways than members of
out-groups. It may be that globalization, in addition
to connecting people in the world through the inter-
change of products, services, and money, is breeding
conditions that also create distance, to the detriment of
worker equality and environmental sustainability.
As we hope is obvious from this discussion, research
on pro-social behavior, sharing, proximity, in-groups
and out-groups, and decision-making processes might
fruitfully test these propositions in future research.
Benevolence/Affiliation
Two commentators raised questions about how the
aims of ACC interfere with goals concerning love and
close interpersonal relationships. We respond to each
in turn.
First, Locke (2007) wonders, “So does this mean
that capitalists cannot distinguish between business
and the rest of their lives? Does it mean that they do
not have friends and do not fall in love?” (p. 39). In
answer, nowhere in our target article did we claim that
66
people who have highly internalized the aims of ACC
do not have friends and fall in love. Surely they do,
as the motive for love and connection to other people
is a basic human need shared by all people, regardless
of the economic system under which they live. What
we did claim is that when the aims of ACC become
increasingly salient to people, tendencies towards self-
interest, competition, and objectification are likely to
generalize to their relationships in non-business con-
texts. We supported this claim by reporting data that
materialistic individuals have lower quality relation-
ships (Kasser and Ryan, 2001; Solberg, Diener, and
Robinson, 2004) and compete rather than cooperate
with their friends (Sheldon et al., 2000), and that in the
last few decades under ACC, Americans are spend-
ing more time working to the detriment of their rela-
tionships with families and friends (Hochschild, 1997;
Lane, 2000; Schor, 1991). We hope this clarifies our
position that rather than eliminating such desires for
affiliation and intimacy, the values of ACC instead in-
filtrate and damage such relationships.
Second, S. Schwartz (2007) found a positive but
non-significant correlation between benevolence val-
ues and Hall and Gingerich’s (2004) strategic vs. com-
petitive capitalism index, leading him to conclude that
ACC “affects pro-social motivation toward members
of the in-group (Benevolence values) only weakly,
if at all” (p. 56). To be clear, the direction of the
correlation S. Schwartz reported is consistent with
the predictions derived from our target article—what
needs to be explained is the relative weakness of the
correlation.
A starting point can be derived from close exami-
nation of the circumplex models of values and goals
presented in Figures 1 and 2 of our target article. Es-
pecially in Figure 2, it can be seen that financial suc-
cess goals more directly oppose community feeling
goals than affiliation goals. Indeed, Grouzet et al.’s
(2005) circular stochastic modeling analyses showed
that financial success and community feeling aspira-
tions were 192 degrees apart, whereas financial success
and affiliation goals had a less direct conflict, being
105 degrees apart. Thus, it appears somewhat easier,
although still basically difficult, for people to balance
the aims of ACC with benevolence/affiliation goals
than with universalism/community feeling goals. As
such, potential correlations between ACC and benevo-
lence values should be weaker than with universalism
values, which is of course what S. Schwartz (2007)
found.
But why is the opposition between the aims of ACC
and benevolence/affiliation goals somewhat less se-
vere than the opposition between the aims of ACC and
universalism/community feeling goals? It seems to us
that the answer lies in how transcendent the two types
of values and goals are. In both circumplex models,
universalism values, and community feeling goals are
 AUTHORS’ RESPONSE
labeled transcendent and concern something “higher”
and “outside the self” as well as “society as a whole.”
In contrast, affiliation and benevolence goals, at least in
the Grouzet et al. (2005) model presented in Figure 2 of
our target article, are only slightly more transcendent
than financial success goals, with both lying at about
the mid-point of the vertical dimension labeled self-
transcendent vs. physical. As such, affiliation goals
have less of a transcendent quality than do commu-
nity goals, making them somewhat more like financial
success goals in that they are more self-interested. S.
Schwartz’s comments reinforce this interpretation, as
he notes that benevolence goals concern the “in-group”
which people often experience as “extensions of the
self.”
This common bond of “self-interest” may help peo-
ple who have strongly internalized ACC’s aims to enact
benevolence values and affiliation goals. A good exam-
ple of this can be seen in Locke’s contention that when
the wealthy donate, “it should be to causes in which
they have a selfish interest, e.g., if a capitalist’s father
dies of cancer, he might want to donate money for can-
cer research” (p. 40). Not only is this a clear example of
Miller’s (1999) concept of the norm of self-interest, but
it demonstrates that individuals who strongly identify
with the values of ACC may be more likely to act in
benevolent ways so long as they also see such behavior
as being in their own self-interest. In contrast, it may
be more difficult for a person oriented towards ACC to
come to terms with the more “self-less,” transcendent
aims typical of universalism and community feeling.
Such considerations lead us to wonder whether the
primary way in which ACC damages affiliation and
benevolence goals is by working against the more “self-
less” behaviors that are necessary to maintain and en-
hance good intimate relationships. We had noted in our
target article several examples relevant to this, as peo-
ple who have highly internalized ACC’s aims are less
empathic, less cooperative, and more likely to manip-
ulate others. Thus, while it seems as though ACC does
not eliminate the very human desire for intimate re-
lationships, the self-interested, competitive values of
the economic system creep into them, diminishing
the kinds of transcendent, self-less, empathic behav-
iors that help create optimal experiences of love and
friendship.
Self-direction/Self-acceptance
Locke’s commentary provides an excellent example
of how freedom is viewed by many proponents of ACC:
Capitalism is the system of freedom. You can choose
your career. You can choose what jobs to apply for.
You can choose what business(es) to enter. You can
choose to leave a job situation you dislike. You can
choose to start your own business. You can choose
how to invest your money. Even in a mixed economy,
you can keep at least most of the money you earn.
You can choose what to buy and what to sell. You can
choose whom to do business with (italics in original;
p. 39).
Locke makes important points here, and we agree
that it is worth reiterating that capitalism, including
the form of capitalism we have called ACC, has in-
deed opened up some choices and options that are less
available under other systems. ACC does not directly
restrict people’s movement, identity adoptions, or in
most cases, their consumer behaviors. And sometimes
the dynamics of ACC have increased choices, as ex-
emplified by the increasing number of corporations
that are adopting “flex time” because it is profitable.
Indeed, part of the core dynamic of ACC is to have a
large menu of certain types of options before everyone.
But as we noted in our target article, work by Lane
(2000), B. Schwartz (2004) and others suggests that
having too many choices can be daunting and even
burdensome. And, more importantly for our argument,
as Ryan and Deci (2006) recently expressed, “one can
have many options, and not feel autonomy” (p. 1577).
That is, while we agree that it is rare under ACC that
people are compelled to work at McDonald’s or in a
sweatshop, practically speaking a significant portion
of people living under ACC do not have the freedom
to pursue any aim they desire, and certainly not any
career or occupation they desire. Consider that many
people in developing nations are leaving rural areas
and moving to urban megalopolises to take jobs in fac-
tories. Do some of them choose (i.e., make a decision)
to do so? Absolutely. But do some of them do so be-
cause the global forces of agribusiness, controlled by
a few massively powerful corporations and supported
by international laws, have diminished the viability of
their small farms and the chances they have to feed
their families? Absolutely. Do some single mothers
choose to work two minimum-wage jobs? Absolutely.
Do some do so because they live in a system that, as
of this writing, does not insist that full-time workers
receive a living wage and that does not provide a strong
social safety net for the significant percentage of the
population that does not have the discretionary income
to choose in what company to invest their retirement
fund? Absolutely.
These problems with limited freedom and options
are surely most salient to the individuals at the bottom
of ACC’s social hierarchy who often lack opportunity
to gain access to or partake in such options. But,
as we discussed in our target article, there are other
limits to ACC as well. That is, like any social system,
ACC provides certain choices and benefits (wealth,
a panoply of consumer goods, etc.), but the options
it offers are generally those that fit the system’s
goals; as can be seen from Locke’s prose, these are
primarily economic freedoms involving the pursuit
67
 KASSER, KANNER, COHN, RYAN
of making and spending money. Acknowledging that
ACC provides these freedoms does not imply that it
provides all freedoms that people might value. To say
it once again, ACC is most likely to offer options that
are consistent with its own ideology and institutions
and is least likely to offer options that are inconsistent
with its ideology and institutions. Further, it is most
likely to provide the freedoms it offers to those who
are willing and able to follow the dictates of the
system; those who, for whatever reason, do not fit into
the system well are more or less out of luck.
An excellent example of how these macro-options
are limited under ACC concerns advertising. Certainly
there are millions of options for watching television
ads that support the ACC mindset that consumption
is fun and good. But consider the plight of an or-
ganization known as Adbusters, which pokes fun at
commercialism and over-spending through the use of
sophisticated marketing images. Adbusters has repeat-
edly attempted to purchase, at the going-rate, air-time
for its “anti-ads,” only to meet with frequent refusal
from the corporations who own television networks
(Bordwell, 2002). Why? Because the ads run counter
to the ideology of these corporations, which demand
profit and which obtain that profit largely by spreading
the consumerist mindset through advertising.
In sum, if ACC claims that it “is the system of free-
dom” when in fact freedom is only limited to certain
individuals and to certain options, we insist that ideol-
ogy rather than fact drives such a claim. Psychologists
interested in these dynamics have many theories and
tools at their disposal to study this issue. Two com-
mentators suggest what seem to us particularly fruitful
avenues for future work. Specifically, B. Schwartz and
his colleagues have pointed the way towards docu-
menting how the enormous number of micro-options
provided within the ACC framework can interfere with
certain aspects of freedom. In addition, Dittmar (2007)
cogently shows how the identity options provided by
consumer culture often create a “cage within” that lim-
its opportunities for self-direction and self-acceptance.
The study of these and other topics will certainly help
to distinguish the types of freedoms that ACC does and
does not provide.
Towards a Psychological Science
of Economic Systems
In the opening sentence of his comment on our tar-
get article, Henrich (2007) notes that we “ . . . pose an
important and often unaddressed question: how do dif-
ferent institutional forms, or economic systems, shape
the beliefs, motivations, and practices of their members
or participants . . . ?” (p. 36) Indeed, our target article
and most of the comments on it were focused on the
psychological consequences of economic institutions.
68
In this last section, we hope to go beyond these issues
and sketch out what we believe a fuller psychological
analysis of economic systems would entail.
As we have noted, all social systems, including
systems designed to address economic issues, are
themselves built around key assumptions about hu-
man nature, about social interactions, and about what
optimally motivates individuals. ACC is a particu-
lar economic system with particular assumptions, i.e.,
that people are primarily self-interested, are most
productive in competitive situations, and are most
effectively motivated by material rewards. Identify-
ing these assumptions, we believe, is a central task
of any full psychological analysis of economic sys-
tems, as it lays the groundwork for identifying the
ways in which the system’s ideology and institutions
relate to psychological, behavioral, and social out-
comes. That is, the psychological assumptions be-
hind ACC deeply influence the institutions—such as
corporations, the WTO, and the like—that emerge
from these assumptions. These institutions, in turn,
work alongside the ideology to contribute to peo-
ple becoming more self-interested, competitive, and
materialistic, with concomitant costs for universal-
ism/community feeling, benevolence/affiliation, and
self-direction/self-acceptance aims in life.
When the psychological assumptions embedded in
an economic system are not clearly identified and ex-
amined, proponents of the system can point to the re-
sulting emotional and behavioral outcomes as evidence
that the economic system simply reflects human nature,
rather than molds it. Stated somewhat differently, the
assumptions behind economic systems lead certain as-
pects of human nature to be rewarded and promoted
while other aspects are punished or suppressed. Rec-
ognizing and more deeply understanding this process
is critical to a full psychological analysis of any eco-
nomic system.
As these considerations suggest, it is important for
psychologists to question whether the ideologies and
institutions present in our economic system foster the
values, beliefs, and behaviors toward which society
wishes its members to move. Given that our target ar-
ticle and some of the commentaries raise significant
concerns about the costs of ACC, we hope that psy-
chologists will begin to study not only the processes
by which certain economic structures create alien-
ation, stress, and unhappiness, but also how economies
can be designed that might better promote the fea-
tures of humans that will bring them greater happi-
ness, more social cohesion, and greater environmental
sustainability. How might the discipline set about this
formidable and interesting task?
Some of the responses to our article begin to an-
swer this question by noting examples in which cer-
tain companies are not consumed by the profit motive
(Myers, 2007) or by comparing nations highly oriented
 AUTHORS’ RESPONSE
towards ACC with those that have less competitive
forms of capitalism (S. Schwartz, 2007). Such ap-
proaches rightly recognize that there are various forms
of capitalism and various ways of living within an eco-
nomic framework such as ACC that might bear fewer
of the costs we describe. To give another example,
some research has begun to examine topics such as
ethical consumption, whereby people privilege non-
financial values in their economic decisions (Shaw and
Shiu, 2003), and Voluntary Simplicity, whereby peo-
ple reject the high-stress, high-pay, high-consumption
lifestyle encouraged by ACC for a life oriented around
personal growth, family, community involvement, and
oftentimes spiritual development (Brown and Kasser,
2005). By examining such topics, psychologists can
begin to point towards ways that people might avoid
some of the costs of ACC even when they still live
within that system.
Psychologists can also study social systems and the
individuals within them who resist forces of globaliza-
tion by examining individuals who participate in local
economies. Myers (2007), for example, pointed to the
ability of local ownership to limit the excesses of large
corporations. Other aspects of a local, rather than a
global, economy might also work against the costs of
ACC. For example, opponents of globalization have
supported local currency movements (Helleiner, 2002)
and have proposed that economies be organized around
the principle of “subsidiarity,” such that:
whatever decisions and activities can be undertaken lo-
cally should be. Whatever power can reside at the local
level should reside there. Only when additional activ-
ity is required that cannot be satisfied locally should
power and activity move to the next highest level, that
of regional, national, and finally, world. (Cavanagh
and Mander, 2004, p. 83)
Proponents of such local economic arrangements ar-
gue they foster more environmentally sound business
practices as they require, for example, far less trans-
portation of goods—one of the largest sources of eco-
logical destruction. And as Myers points out (2007),
local ownership means owners have more involvement
in the community and more at stake in local affairs,
and as a result are likely to be more responsive to local
needs than are large, multi-national corporations with
distant owners. Finally, as our discussion of distancing
(Princen, 2002) suggested, consumers in such locally-
oriented systems may be more apt to make decisions
that are more informed by non-financial values when
they purchase a locally-made product from a neighbor.
These are all empirical questions that can certainly be
tested by psychologists.
As much promise as these approaches hold, we hope
that psychology will not limit itself to solely exam-
ining sub-systems within capitalistic societies, as or-
ganizing investigations exclusively around capitalism
would significantly curtail the field’s ability to address
some of the most pressing and interesting questions
in this area. Instead, a broader approach is required
that explores non-capitalistic systems as well. That is,
just as Martin and Shirk (2007) have pointed out that
our understanding of the self and social interactions
are limited by the fact that almost all studies of these
topics take place in “highly technological countries,
[that are] ultimately dependent on intensive agricul-
ture for their subsistence, are relatively sedentary (in
the sense of being non-nomadic), and are subject to the
pressures of living in relatively dense populations,” a
full understanding of the psychology of economic sys-
tems can not be based solely on work conducted with
people who live in cultures that are organized around
the capitalistic economic system, with its concomitant
ideology and institutions.
What is therefore necessary instead is to study indi-
viduals who exist under other types of economic orga-
nization. For example, it would be useful to examine
people who live in “immediate-return societies” (Mar-
tin and Shirk, 2007) or operate on “gift economies”
(Hyde, 1983), especially since anthropological work
suggests that these social organizations typify the expe-
rience of our human ancestors. In contrast to modified
forms of ACC, which focus on striking a balance be-
tween cooperation and generosity on the one hand and
competition and self-interest on the other, these older
social systems typically assume that humans flour-
ish when cooperation and sharing within the group
form the basis of social and economic activity. Such
economies also do not value private property and ma-
terial wealth nearly as much as even modified versions
of ACC. To fully understand the psychological signif-
icance of all of the factors we have been discussing—
cooperation, competition, generosity, selfishness, love,
freedom, and values—it is necessary to examine indi-
viduals living in non-capitalist economies.
Conclusion
We were gratified that the comments on our tar-
get article were mostly supportive of our call for
psychology to focus its attention on economic sys-
tems, and in particular, on the costs and benefits of
ACC. We sincerely hope that fifteen or twenty years
from now, when scholars conduct a PsychInfo search
on “capitalis*” they will not be met with the same
paucity of research we reported in Table 1 of our target
article, but will instead find myriad studies utilizing the
many methodological approaches and theoretical per-
spectives that characterize the field. Such an outcome,
we believe, would benefit both psychology and soci-
ety as a whole. Psychology will have integrated into
its nomological network of constructs a social factor
69
 KASSER, KANNER, COHN, RYAN
that clearly influences human behavior and experience.
And such psychological work may well help society
begin pursuing paths less damaging to its own health,
the health of its citizens, and the health of the Earth’s
ecosystem.
Note
Address correspondence to Tim Kasser, Box K-83,
2 East South Street, Knox College, Galesburg, IL
61401. E-mail: tkasser@knox.edu
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