Section 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications; tenure; removal and composition.

A special
court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of
justice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a Presiding Justice and eight
Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President.

No person shall be appointed Presiding Justice or Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan; unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40 years of age and for at least ten years has been a
judge of a court of record or been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held office
requiring admission to the bar as a pre-requisite for a like period.

The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his commission and the other Justices shall have
precedence according to the dates of their respective commissions, or, when the commissions of two or
more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their commissions have been
issued by the President.

The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices shall not be removed from office except on impeachment
upon the grounds and in the manner provided for in Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution.

The Presiding Justice shall receive an annual compensation of P60,000.00 and each Associate Justice
P55,000.00 which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. They shall have the same
rank, privileges and other emoluments, be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and enjoy
the same retirement and other benefits as those provided for under existing laws of the Presiding Justice
and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals.
Whenever the salaries of the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals are
increased, such increases in salaries shall be correspondingly extended to and enjoyed by the Presiding
Justice and the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan.

They shall hold office until they reach the age of 65 years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office.
G.R. No. 124067 March 27, 1998

PERLA A. SEGOVIA, REYNALDO C. SANTIAGO, and WINIFREDO SM. PANGILINAN, petitioners,

vs.
The SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and the PRESIDENT of the NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:

The special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar seeks nullification of two (2) Resolutions of the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued in Criminal Case No. 21711 in which petitioners are
prosecuted for a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. The resolutions assailed are:

1) that dated February 1, 1996, which ordered petitioners' preventive suspension for ninety (90)
days in accordance with Section 13 of said R.A. 3019; and

2) that dated February 23, 1996, which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
suspension order.

The primary issue raised is whether it is mandatory or discretionary for the Sandiganbayan to place under
preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it, pursuant to said Section 13 of the law.
Section 13 reads:

Sec. 13.Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property, whether as a simple or
as a complex offense in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. . . . .

It is petitioners' submission that preventive suspension under this section "rests in the sound discretion of
the Sandiganbayan despite the ostensibly mandatory Language" of the statute, and that that discretion
was gravely abused by the Sandiganbayan, or it exceeded its jurisdiction, when it decreed their
suspension.

Petitioners Perla Segovia, Reynaldo Santiago, and Winifredo SM Pangilinan all hold regular executive
positions in the National Power Corporation (NPC). They together with two other officers who have
since resigned from the NPC, namely: Gilberto A. Pastoral and Cecilia D. Vales were designated by the
NPC Board to compose the Contracts Committee for said NPC's "Mindanao Grid LDC & SCADA/EMS
System Operation Control Center and Facilities Project."

The Contracts Committee thus constituted conducted the pre-qualification and bidding procedures for the
project. The lowest and second lowest bidders were the Joint Venture of INPHASE and T & D, and Urban
Consolidated Constructors, Inc., respectively. The Technical Task Force on Bid Evaluation of the NPC
reviewed all the bids submitted and recommended approval of the results. The Contracts Committee,
however, declared the lowest bidder (Joint Venture) disqualified after verification from the Philippine
Contractors Accreditation Board that that group, as well as the second lowest bidder (Urban) had been
"downgraded," thereby rendering both ineligible as bidders.

The Contracts Committee also stated that since a review of relevant factors disclosed that the other bids
had exceeded the Approved Agency Estimates and the Allowable Government Estimates for Options A
and B of the Project, it was needful for the NPC Board to declare a failure of bidding and direct a re-
bidding. The recommendation was unanimously approved by the NPC Board: but for reasons not
appearing on record (and, in any event, not relevant to the inquiry), the project was eventually canceled.

Obviously feeling aggrieved by the turn of events, Urban filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against the Chairman and Members of the Board of Directors of NPC; the Chairman
(Gilberto Pascual) and Members of the NPC Contracts Awards Committee; the Chairman (Perla Segovia)
of the Pre-Qualification Bids & Awards Committee; the Manager (Cecilia D. Vales) of the Contracts
Management Office, and two others.1 Urban alleged that before the bidding, Joint Venture had been
disqualified, but the Contracts Committee, without basis and in order to favor it, reconsidered its
disqualification and thus enabled it to take part in the bidding and in fact to submit the lowest bid; that
the NPC was "already poised to award the contract to Joint Venture" but because Urban protested, it was
compelled to "post-disqualify" the former; that, however, instead of awarding the contract for the project
to Urban as the second lowest bidder, the Committee and the NPC Board declared a failure of bidding
and ultimately canceled the project. These acts, it is claimed, constituted a violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

A preliminary investigation was conducted by the Ombudsman's Office after which Graft Investigation
Officer A.A. Amante submitted a Resolution dated August 2, 19942 recommending, among others, that:

1) petitioners Perla Segovia, Reynaldo Santiago, Winifredo SM Pangilinan, as well as Gilberto

Pastoral and Cecilia Vales be charged with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 for having in "one way
or the other extended undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
and gross inexcusable negligence;" and

2) the NPC President, NPC Chairman and Members of the Board of Directors be cleared of the . . .
complaint as their official actuation of sustaining a failure of bidding and the consequent re-bidding is
supported by factual and legal basis.

Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr., favorably endorsed the recommendation which was
eventually approved on December 6, 1994 by Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez, then the Ombudsman.3

An information was accordingly filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioners Segovia, Santiago, and
Pangilinan, as well as Pastoral and Vales, docketed as Criminal Case No. 21711. They were charged with
infringement of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019: i.e. "causing undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence."

Petitioners sought and obtained a reinvestigation of their case but gained no benefit thereby. For
although the reinvestigating officer made a recommendation on March 7, 1995 that the information
against petitioners be withdrawn because the "prima facie case had already been overthrown,
considering that, as it now stands, the evidence at hand cannot stand judicial scrutiny"4 and that
recommendation met with the approval of the Special Prosecutor, it was ultimately turned down by the
chief Special Prosecutor5 on April 18, 1995, and on April 20, 1995, by the Ombudsman himself.6

The case thus proceeded in the Sandiganbayan. The accused were arraigned and entered pleas of not
guilty; and a pre-trial was held which resulted in a stipulation of facts embodied in an order dated
January 11, 1996.7

Earlier, the People had filed a "Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite" dated October 24 1995,
invoking Section 13 of RA 3019, as amended, and relevant jurisprudence, and alleging that the
"information/s is/are valid."8
Petitioners opposed the motion.9 In their pleading dated November 28, 1995, they theorized that the
explicit terms of the law notwithstanding, their suspension was not mandatory in the premises. They
claimed that the admissions at the pre-trial show that the transactions in question resulted in no
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, or injury, to anyone; that two of the five accused were
no longer employees of the NPC; that the positions that Segovia, Pangilinan and Santiago continued to
occupy in the NPC were quite sensitive and had no relation to pre-qualification of contractors, biddings or
awards which was an additional function temporarily assigned to them and for which they received no
compensation at all and their suspension might cause delay of vital projects of the NPC; and that
under the circumstances obtaining, they were in no position to tamper with any evidence.

Petitioners' opposition was overruled. On January 31, 1996 the Sandiganbayan10 handed down its
Resolution suspending them for a period of ninety (90) days.11 The Sandiganbayan held that the
suspension was mandated under the law upon a finding that a proper preliminary investigation had been
conducted, the information was valid, and the accused were charged with any of the crimes specified in
the law; and stressed that its "authority and power to suspend the accused had been repeatedly upheld"
in several precedents. It subsequently denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration dated February 14,
1996, "(c)onsidering the paucity of the(ir) arguments . . . and in the light of the mass of jurisprudence
involving the power and authority of this Court to issue orders for the preventive suspension of the
accused . . . ."12

Petitioners would now have this Court strike down these resolutions because supposedly rendered in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court will not do so. In no sense may the
challenged resolutions be stigmatized as so clearly capricious, whimsical, oppressive, egregiously
erroneous or wanting in logic as to call for invalidation by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. On the
contrary, in promulgating those resolutions, the Sandiganbayan did but adhere to the clear command of
the law and what it calls a "mass of jurisprudence" emanating from this Court, sustaining its authority to
decree suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Indeed, that the theory of
"discretionary suspension" should still be advocated at this late date, despite the "mass of jurisprudence"
relevant to the issue, is little short of amazing, bordering on contumacious disregard of the solemn
magisterial pronouncements of the Highest Court of the land.

Republic Act No. 3019 was enacted by Congress more than 37 years ago, on August 17, 1960, becoming
effective on the same date. The law was later amended by Republic Act No. 3047, Presidential Decree
677 and Presidential Decree No. 1288. The last amendment to Section 13 thereof was introduced by
Batas Pambansa Bilang 195, approved on March 16, 1972.

The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended treating of the suspension pendente lite of an
accused public officer may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court. As
early as 1984, in Bayot v. Sandiganbayan,13 the Court held that such suspension was not penal in
character but merely a preventive measure before final judgment; hence, the suspension of a public
officer charged with one of the crimes listed in the amending law, committed before said amendment,
does not violate the constitutional provision against an ex post facto law. The purpose of suspension is to
prevent the accused public officer from frustrating or hampering his prosecution by intimidating or
influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence, or from committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office.14 Substantially to the same effect was the Court's holding, in 1991, in
Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan,15 that preventive suspension is not violative of the Constitution as it is not a
penalty; and a person under preventive suspension remains entitled to the constitutional presumption of
innocence since his culpability must still be established.

The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive suspension lies
in the court in which the criminal charge is filed; once a case is filed in court, all other acts connected
with the discharge of court functions including preventive suspension should be acknowledged as
within the competence of the court that has taken cognizance thereof, no violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers being perceivable in that acknowledgment.16

The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under
the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or
pertaining to the career or non-career service.17 It applies to a Public High School Principal;18 a
Municipal Mayor;19 a Governor;20 a Congressman;21 a Department of Science and Technology (DOST)
non-career Project Manager;22 a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG).23 The term "office" in Section 13 of the law applies to any office which the officer might
currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office in relation to which he is charged.24

It is mandatory for the court to place under preventive suspension a public officer accused before it.25
Imposition of suspension, however, is not automatic or self-operative. A pre-condition therefor is the
existence of a valid information, determined at a pre-suspension hearing. Such a hearing is in accord with
the spirit of the law, considering the serious and far-reaching consequences of a suspension of a public
official even before his conviction, and the demands of public interest for a speedy determination of the
issues involved in the case.26 The purpose of the pre-suspension hearing is basically to determine the
validity of the information and thereby furnish the court with a basis to either suspend the accused and
proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or refuse suspension of the latter and dismiss the case,
or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity.27 The accused should be given adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the criminal proceedings against him; e.g. that he
has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation; that the acts imputed to him do not
constitute a specific crime (under R.A. 3019 or the Revised Penal Code) warranting his mandatory
suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act; or that the information is subject to quashal on any
of the grounds set out in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.28 But once a proper determination of the
validity of the information has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to forthwith issue
the order of preventive suspension, The court has no discretion, for instance, to hold in abeyance the
suspension of the accused official on the pretext that the order denying the latter's motion to quash is
pending review before the appellate courts.29

However, the preventive suspension may not be of indefinite duration or for an unreasonable length of
time; it would be constitutionally proscribed otherwise as it raises, at the very least, questions of denial of
due process and equal protection of the laws.30 The Court has thus laid down the rule that preventive
suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days in consonance with Presidential
Decree No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree), now Section 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987.31

While petitioners concede that this Court has "almost consistently ruled that the preventive suspension
contemplated in Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory in character," they nonetheless urge the Court to
consider their case an exception because of the " peculiar circumstances" thereof. They assert that the
evils sought to be avoided by "separating a public official from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while
the same is being investigated"32 e.g., "to preclude the abuse of the prerogatives of . . . (his) office,
such as through intimidation of witnesses,"33 or the tampering with documentary evidence will not
occur in the present situation where:

1. The Project has been canceled.

2. (Their) . . . official duties no longer pertain, in any manner, to the pre-qualification of contractors
dealing with the NPC. Neither are they now involved in any bidding for or awarding of contracts, . . . it
(being) emphasized (in this connection) that they were merely designated as ad hoc members of the
Committee without additional compensation for their additional duties.

3. All the relevant documentary evidence had been submitted either to the Ombudsman or to the
Honorable Sandiganbayan.
They conclude that their preventive suspension "at this point would actually be purposeless, as there is
no more need for precautionary measures against their abuse of the prerogatives of their office."

The arguments are not new. They have been advanced and rejected in earlier cases. They will again be
so rejected in this case.

The Court's pronouncements in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, supra,34 are germane:

Our holding that, upon the filing of a valid information charging violation of Republic Act No. 30 19, Book
II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or fraud upon government or public property, it is the duty of the
court to place the accused under preventive suspension disposes of petitioner's other contention that
since the trial in the Sandiganbayan is now over with respect to the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution there is no longer any danger that petitioners would intimidate prosecution's witnesses. The
fact is that the possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or otherwise hamper his
prosecution is just one of the grounds for preventive suspension. The other one is, . . . to prevent the
accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.

Bolastig also disposes of the other contention that vital projects of the NPC may be delayed by their
preventive suspension, viz.:35

Finally, the fact that petitioner's preventive suspension may deprive the people of Samar of the services
of an official elected by them, at least temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for reducing what is otherwise
a mandatory period prescribed by law. The vice governor, who has likewise been elected by them, will
act as governor. (The Local Government Code of 1991, sec. 46[a]) Indeed, even the Constitution
authorizes the suspension for not more than sixty days of members of Congress found guilty of disorderly
behavior, (Art. VI, sec. 16[3]) thus rejecting the view expressed in one case (Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46
Phil. 83, 96 [1924]) that members of the legislature could not be suspended because in the case of
suspension, unlike in the case of removal, the seat remains filled but the constituents are deprived of
representation.

The firmly entrenched doctrine is that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, the
suspension of a public officer is mandatory after a determination has been made of the validity of the
information in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose.

In Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,36 decided fairly recently, the Court again expatiated on the
mandatory character of suspension pendente lite under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 and the nature of the
pre-suspension hearing.

This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a public officer is
mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a pre-suspension hearing conducted
for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing conducted to determine basically the validity of the
information, from which the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the
trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct
any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. That hearing may be treated in the same manner as
a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash (See People vs. Alabano, etc.,
et al., L-45376-77, July 28, 1988, 163 SCRA 511)

In the leading case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et al. (L-32950, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 187), we have
set out the guidelines to be followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension under
Section 13 of the law, to wit:
(c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension from
office of public officers charged under a valid information under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019
or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to section 13 of said Act, it may
be briefly stated that upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper
notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be
ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the
prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to
quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would
no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing
held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the
corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withhold such
suspension in the contrary case.

(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal
proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation,
the act for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory
suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act, or he may present a motion to quash the information
on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed by
the act upon determination of the pendency in court or a criminal prosecution for violation of the Anti-
Graft Act or for bribery under a valid information requires at the same time that the hearing be
expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act.
Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the ground alleged in the quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it
shall be called upon to issue the suspension order upon its upholding the validity of the information and
setting the same for trial on the merits.

With the aforequoted jurisprudential authority as the basis, it is evident that upon a proper determination
of the validity of the information, it becomes mandatory for the court to immediately issue the suspension
order. The rule on the matter is specific and categorical. It leaves no room for interpretation. It is not
within the court's discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused officer on the pretext that
the order denying the motion to quash is pending review before the appellate courts. Its discretion lies
only during the pre-suspension hearing where it is required to ascertain whether or not (1) the accused
had been afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the information against him, (2) the
acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the
provisions of Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or (3) the informations against him can be
quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. (People vs.
Albano, etc., et al. supra, fn. 26)

Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court must issue the order
of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is because a preventive
suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the
official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension. In view of this latter provision, the accused elective public officer does not
stand to be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension order in the event that the
information is subsequently declared null and void on appeal and the case dismissed as against him.
Taking into consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending a public officer charged
under a valid information, the protection of public interest will definitely have to prevail over the private
interest of the accused. (Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 61776-61861, March 23, 1984, 128
SCRA 383)

To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, it is
said that the court trying the case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether or not a
preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or
frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless
the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do
both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant
for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is
likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.

The Court is satisfied that the Second Division of the Sandigabayan, after upholding the validity of the
information against petitioners, correctly ordered their preventive suspension from any public office for a
period of ninety (90) days.

As was stressed in Libanan v. Sandiganbayan,37:

. . . When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or
rationalization of the law. Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public
official from office pending a criminal prosecution against him. This Court has repeatedly held that such
preventive suspension is mandatory . . . , and there are no "ifs" and "buts" about it.

WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E.
GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING
JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering the
preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending
criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case from Investigator Gualberto
dela Llana after having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioners request,
came up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file
the appropriate informations against petitioner. On 13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the
informations for clearance; approved, forthwith, three informations were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer,
being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally approve the application for legalization of the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini
Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong
Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Quiu, Wu Hong Guan Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru
Qui @ Mary Go Xu Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se
Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min
Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling
Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1,
1984 in violation of Executive Order no. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said
disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified, thereby giving unwarranted benefits
to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused. [1]
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other
for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and no.
91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued
an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos.Petitioner
posted a cash bail without need for physical appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries
sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991
or until her physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in court. Upon manifestation by the
Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to come unaided to his office on 20 May 1991,
Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be allowed
provisional liberty upon a recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition and Preliminary
Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer
her arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition issued a temporary restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus, informed, issued an order deferring petitioners arraignment and the
consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary
restraining order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner proved unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioners intention to accept a fellowship
from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Sandiganbayan issued an
order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the
case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her
motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At
the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with the Sandiganbayan asseverating that
the names of the aliens whose applications she purportedly approved and thereby supposedly extended
undue advantage were conspicuously omitted in the complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioners
arraignment not later than five days from receipt of notice thereof.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to admit
thirty-two amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations. The court, in
its 11th March 1993 resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and directed her to
post bail on the criminal cases, docketed Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed against her.
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No.
109266, assailing the 03 rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to disqualify
its Presiding Justice, as well as its 14 th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended Informations,
and seeking the nullification thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to cease
and desist from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the 11 th March 1993 resolution ordering
petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 amended informations, and from proceeding with her arraignment
on 12 April 1993 until the matter of his disqualification would have been resolved by the Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP and Ombudsman to
consolidate the 32 amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32 informations were
consolidated into one information under Criminal Case No. 16698.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Redetermine probable Cause and to dismiss or
quash said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with
the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one Rodolfo Pedellaga
(Pedellaga). The presentation was scheduled on 15 September 1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31 st July 1995 motion
for the prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of its
03rd August 1995 order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by the
Sandiganbayan, was elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled Miriam
Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, docketed G.R. No. 123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend her.On 25
January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under consideration and hereby
suspends the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines and from any other government position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her
suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take effect immediately upon notice.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate President, Senate of the
Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of the Senate, for the
implementation of the suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this court of
the action taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of implementation of the suspension
order as well as the expiry of the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be lifted at the time. [2]
Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-
day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines
for the implementation of the suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official
charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential
support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits . any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as
a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has
already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. (As amended
by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982).
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan,[3] the Court reiterated:
The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended --- treating of the suspension pendente lite of an
accused public officer --- may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under
the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or
pertaining to the career or non-career service.[4]
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be
sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of
course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it.[5] Explaining the nature of the preventive
suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan [6] observed:
x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted,
the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension.[7]
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once,
upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted
before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended
only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus,
it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.[8]
En passan, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity of the
information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the
conduct thereof. It has been said that-
x x x No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation;
that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act
3019 or the bribery provisions of the revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension
from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of
the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the
acts for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery
of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to quash the information on any other
grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the
accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions
on bribery of the revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the
criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), section 2 of
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.In other words, a
resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to
an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements
of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code. [9]
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine
(1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3)
whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records an other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing
preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity
to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been
afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a
specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117,
of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.[10]
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioners case before the
Sandiganbayan has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called upon
the resolve several other matters on the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez, [11] petitioner sought
to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act
No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez, [12] petitioner sought the nullification of the hold departure order
issued by the Sandiganbayan via a Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold
Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs. Garchitorena, [13]petitioner
sought the nullification of the resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena disqualified from acting in
said criminal case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed as filed the 32 amended
informations against her; and (4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, [14]petitioner assailed
the denial by the Sandiganbayan of her motion for her reconsideration from its 03 rdAugust 1995 order
allowing the testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases,[15] the Court declared:
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. 16698
(G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue
of the delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in those
petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense punishable under
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under
Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the
policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of qualified
aliens even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31 1983. She concludes that the
Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information(People
vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after
January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions.
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019.[16]
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.[17]
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed
upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring
member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr., vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., [18]the Court
affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his
protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The Court ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power of
each House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel a
Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of
suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct
from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members
of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the
three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence
and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also in the determination of whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave
abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality has evidently been couched in general
terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu.In its
normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to an
affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view [19] that unless an
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not
deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of
government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or
provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is
not, or ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must
promptly react in the manner prescribed by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and
that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive
suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division
of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless,
deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 130872. March 25, 1999]

FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, father and son, were convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
thirteen (13) counts of estafa through falsification of public documents.[1] They now seek a review of their
conviction as they insist on their innocence.
Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his son, his co-
petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay
Bagong Silang, Municipality of Santa Cruz, and concurrently a member of its Sangguniang Bayan (SB)
representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays.
In the 1985 election for the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red [2] won as KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba,
Santa Cruz. Parenthetically, Lenlie Lecaroz did not run as candidate in this electoral exercise as he was no
longer qualified for the position after having already passed the age limit fixed by law.
Sometime in November 1985 Red was appointed by then President Ferdinand Marcos as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. Imee Marcos-Manotoc, then
the National Chairperson of the organization, sent a telegram to Red confirming his appointment and
advising him further that copies of his appointment papers would be sent to him in due time through the
KB Regional Office.[3] Red received the telegram on 2 January 1986 and showed it immediately to Mayor
Francisco M. Lecaroz.
On 7 January 1986, armed with the telegram and intent on assuming the position of sectoral
representative of the KBs to the SB, Red attended the meeting of the Sanggunian upon the invitation of
one of its members, Kagawad Rogato Lumawig. In that meeting, Mayor Francisco M. Lecaroz informed
Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until his appointment had been cleared
by the Governor of Marinduque. Nonetheless, the telegram was included in the agenda as one of the
subjects discussed in the meeting.
Red finally received his appointment papers sometime in January 1986. [4] But it was only on 23 April
1986, when then President Corazon C. Aquino was already in power, [5] that he forwarded these
documents to Mayor Lecaroz. This notwithstanding, Red was still not allowed by the mayor to sit as
sectoral representative in the Sanggunian.
Meanwhile, Mayor Lecaroz prepared and approved on different dates the payment to Lenlie Lecaroz of
twenty-six (26) sets of payrolls for the twenty-six (26) quincenas covering the period 16 January 1986 to
30 January 1987. Lenlie Lecaroz signed the payroll for 1-15 January 1986 and then authorized someone
else to sign all the other payrolls for the succeeding quincenas and claim the corresponding salaries in his
behalf.
On 25 October 1989, or three (3) years and nine (9) months from the date he received his appointment
papers from President Marcos, Red was finally able to secure from the Aquino Administration a
confirmation of his appointment as KB Sectoral Representative to the Sanggunian Bayan of Santa Cruz.
Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against Mayor
Francisco Lecaroz and Lenlie Lecaroz arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the
position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) Informations for estafa through falsification of public documents against
petitioners, and one (1) Information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, against Mayor Lecaroz alone.
On 7 October 1994 the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two (2) accused guilty on all
counts of estafa through falsification of public documents and sentenced each of them to -
a) imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a minimum of FIVE (5) YEARS, ELEVEN (11)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional to a maximum of TEN (10) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY
of prison mayor FOR EACH OF THE ABOVE CASES;
b) a fine in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000) FOR EACH OF THE ABOVE CASES or a total
of SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P65,000), and
c) perpetual special disqualification from public office in accordance with Art. 214 of the Revised Penal
Code.
x x x (and) to pay jointly and severally the amount of TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS (P23,675), the amount unlawfully obtained, to the Municipality of Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque in restitution.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that since Red was elected president of the KB and took his oath of office
sometime in 1985 before then Assemblywoman Carmencita O. Reyes his assumption of the KB
presidency upon the expiration of the term of accused Lenlie Lecaroz was valid. Conversely, the accused
Lenlie Lecaroz ceased to be a member of the KB on the last Sunday of November 1985 and, as such, was
no longer the legitimate representative of the youth sector in the municipal council of Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque.
In convicting both accused on the falsification charges, the Sandiganbayan elucidated -
x x x x when, therefore, accused MAYOR FRANCISCO LECAROZ entered the name of his son, the accused
LENLIE LECAROZ, in the payroll of the municipality of Sta. Cruz for the payroll period starting January 15,
1986, reinstating accused LENLIE LECAROZ to his position in the Sangguniang Bayan, he was deliberately
stating a falsity when he certified that LENLIE LECAROZ was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. The
fact is that even accused LENLIE LECAROZ himself no longer attended the sessions of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Sta. Cruz, and starting with the payroll for January 16 to 31, 1986, did not personally pick up
his salaries anymore.
The accused MAYOR's acts would fall under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister. - The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee,
or notary public who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any
of the following acts: x x x x 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
xxxx
Clearly, falsification of public documents has been committed by accused MAYOR LECAROZ.
Likewise from these acts of falsification, his son, accused LENLIE LECAROZ, was able to draw salaries
from the municipality to which he was not entitled for services he had admittedly not rendered.This
constitutes Estafa x x x x the deceit being the falsification made, and the prejudice being that caused to
the municipality of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque for having paid salaries to LENLIE LECAROZ who was not
entitled thereto.
Conspiracy was alleged in the Informations herein, and the Court found the allegation sufficiently
substantiated by the evidence presented.
There is no justifiable reason why accused MAYOR LECAROZ should have reinstated his son LENLIE in the
municipal payrolls from January 16, 1986 to January 31, 1987, yet he did so. He could not have had any
other purpose than to enable his son LENLIE to draw salaries thereby. This conclusion is inescapable
considering that the very purpose of a payroll is precisely that -- to authorize the payment of
salaries. And LENLIE LECAROZ did his part by actually drawing the salaries during the periods covered,
albeit through another person whom he had authorized.
By the facts proven, there was conspiracy in the commission of Estafa between father and son.
However, with respect to the charge of violating Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3.019, the Sandiganbayan
acquitted Mayor Francisco Lecaroz. It found that Red was neither authorized to sit as member of the SB
because he was not properly appointed thereto nor had he shown to the mayor sufficient basis for his
alleged right to a seat in the municipal council. On this basis, the court a quo concluded that Mayor
Lecaroz was legally justified in not allowing Red to assume the position of Kagawad.
On 1 October 1994 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration of its decision filed by the
accused. This prompted herein petitioners to elevate their cause to us charging that the Sandiganbayan
erred:
First, in holding that Red had validly and effectively assumed the office of KB Federation President by
virtue of his oath taken before then Assemblywoman Carmencita Reyes on 27 September 1985, and in
concluding that the tenure of accused Lenlie Lecaroz as president of the KB and his coterminous term of
office as KB representative to the SB had accordingly expired;
Second, assuming arguendo that the term of office of the accused Lenlie Lecaroz as youth representative
to the SB had expired, in holding that accused Lenlie Lecaroz could no longer occupy the office, even in a
holdover capacity, despite the vacancy therein;
Third, granting arguendo that the tenure of the accused Lenlie Lecaroz as federation president had
expired, in holding that by reason thereof accused Lenlie Lecaroz became legally disqualified from
continuing in office as KB Sectoral Representative to the SB even in a holdover capacity;
Fourth, in not holding that under Sec. 2 of the Freedom Constitution and pursuant to the provisions of
the pertinent Ministry of Interior and Local Governments (MILG) interpretative circulars, accused Lenlie
Lecaroz was legally entitled and even mandated to continue in office in a holdover capacity;
Fifth, in holding that the accused had committed the crime of falsification within the contemplation of Art.
171 of The Revised Penal Code, and in not holding that the crime of estafa of which they had been
convicted required criminal intent and malice as essential elements;
Sixth, assuming arguendo that the accused Lenlie Lecaroz was not legally entitled to hold over, still the
trial court erred in not holding - considering the difficult legal questions involved - that the accused acted
in good faith and committed merely an error of judgment, without malice and criminal intent; and,
Seventh, in convicting the accused for crimes committed in a manner different from that alleged in the
Information under which the accused were arraigned and tried.
The petition is meritorious. The basic propositions upon which the Sandiganbayan premised its conviction
of the accused are: (a) although Jowil Red was duly elected KB Chairman he could not validly assume a
seat in the Sanggunian as KB sectoral representative for failure to show a valid appointment; and, (b)
Lenlie Lecaroz who was the incumbent KB representative could not hold over after his term expired
because pertinent laws do not provide for holdover.
To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the terms of office of KB youth sectoral
representatives to the SB and of the KB Federation Presidents. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1 of the
KB Constitution respectively provide -
Sec. 7. Term of Office. - Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove
mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of
March 1980.
In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of barangay councils and the
president of the federation of kabataang barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous with their
tenure is president of their respective association and federation .
xxxx
Sec 1. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to hold office until the last Sunday
of November 1985 or such time that the newly elected officers shall have qualified and assumed office in
accordance with this Constitution.
The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB since he did
not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath of
office. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of the SB although in a
holdover capacity since his term had already expired. The Sandiganbayan however rejected this postulate
declaring that the holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only to positions in the KB,
clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no holdover
with respect to positions in the SB.
We disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies
that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. [6] It is usually
provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that
term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office
does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to
assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even
though it be beyond the term fixed by law.[7]
In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to occupy
his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he
is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the
contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has
qualified.[8] The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in
the legislative enactment,[9] otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the
same.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, [10] and courts generally indulge in the strong
presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an executive
or administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully
authorized to exercise its functions.[11] This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the
principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a
vacancy[12] and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions. [13]
The Sandiganbayan maintained that by taking his oath of office before Assemblywoman Reyes in 1985
Red validly assumed the presidency of the KB upon the expiration of the term of Lenlie Lecaroz.It should
be noted however that under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in force, specifically Sec. 21,
Art. VI thereof, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not authorized to administer oaths. It was
only after the approval of RA No. 6733 [14]on 25 July 1989 and its subsequent publication in a newspaper
of general circulation that members of both Houses of Congress were vested for the first time with the
general authority to administer oaths. Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office taken by Jowil
Red before a member of the Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid
and amounted to no oath at all.
To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full
investiture with the office.[15] Only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his
right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. Until then, he has none at all. And for as
long as he has not qualified, the holdover officer is the rightful occupant. It is thus clear in the present
case that since Red never qualified for the post, petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz remained KB representative to
the Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a de jure officer,[16] or at least
a de facto officer[17] entitled to receive the salaries and all the emoluments appertaining to the
position. As such, he could not be considered an intruder and liable for encroachment of public office. [18]
On the issue of criminal liability of petitioners, clearly the offenses of which petitioners were convicted,
i.e., estafa through falsification of public documents under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised Penal
Code, are intentional felonies for which liability attaches only when it is shown that the malefactors acted
with criminal intent or malice.[19] If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person
committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to him.Was criminal intent then
demonstrated to justify petitioners' conviction? It does not so appear in the case at bar.
Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake
as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The exception
of course is neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to a
criminal intent, for in this instance, the element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of
negligence and imprudence[20] In the instant case, there are clear manifestations of good faith and lack of
criminal intent on the part of petitioners.
First. When Jowil Red showed up at the meeting of the Sanggunian on 7 January 1986, what he
presented to Mayor Francisco Lecaroz was a mere telegram purportedly sent by Imee Marcos-Manotoc
informing him of his supposed appointment to the SB, together with a photocopy of a "Mass
Appointment." Without authenticated copies of the appointment papers, Red had no right to assume
office as KB representative to the Sanggunian, and petitioner Mayor Lecaroz had every right to withhold
recognition, as he did, of Red as a member of the Sanggunian.
Second. It appears from the records that although Red received his appointment papers signed by
President Marcos in January 1986, he forwarded the same to Mayor Francisco Lecaroz only on 23 April
1986 during which time President Marcos had already been deposed and President Aquino had already
taken over the helm of government. On 25 March 1986 the Freedom Constitution came into being
providing in Sec. 2 of Art. III thereof that -
Sec. 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by. proclamation or executive order or upon the designation of their
successors if such appointment is made within a period of one (1) year from February 26,
1986 (underscoring supplied).
Duty bound to observe the constitutional mandate, petitioner Francisco Lecaroz through the provincial
governor forwarded the papers of Jowil Red to then Minister of Interior and Local Government Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., requesting advice on the validity of the appointment signed by former President
Marcos. The response was the issuance of MILG Provincial Memorandum-Circular No. 86-02 [21] and
Memorandum-Circular No. 86-17[22] stating that -
PROVINCIAL MEMORANDUM-CIRCULAR NO. 86-02
2. That newly elected KB Federation Presidents, without their respective authenticated appointments
from the president, cannot, in any way, represent their associations in any sangguniang
bayan/sangguniang panlalawigan, as the case may be, although they are still considered presidents of
their federations by virtue of the July 1985 elections.
MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 86-17
It is informed, however, that until replaced by the Office of the President or by this Ministry the
appointive members of the various Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panlunsod, and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall continue to hold office and to receive compensation due them under existing laws,
rules and regulations.
The pertinent provisions of the Freedom Constitution and the implementing MILG Circulars virtually
confirmed the right of incumbent KB Federation Presidents to hold and maintain their positions until duly
replaced either by the President herself or by the Interior Ministry. Explicit therein was the caveat that
newly elected KB Federation Presidents could not assume the right to represent their respective
associations in any Sanggunian unless their appointments were authenticated by then President Aquino
herself. Truly, prudence impelled Mayor Lecaroz to take the necessary steps to verify the legitimacy of
Red's appointment to the Sanggunian.
Third. Petitioners presented six (6) certified copies of opinions of the Secretaries of Justice of Presidents
Macapagal, Marcos and Aquino concerning the doctrine of holdover. This consistently expressed the view
espoused by the executive branch for more than thirty (30) years that the mere fixing of the term of
office in a statute without an express prohibition against holdover is not indicative of a legislative intent
to prohibit it, in light of the legal principle that just as nature abhors a vacuum so does the law abhor a
vacancy in the government.[23] Reliance by petitioners on these opinions, as well as on the pertinent
directives of the then Ministry of Interior and Local Government, provided them with an unassailable
status of good faith in holding over and acting on such basis; and,
Fourth. It is difficult to accept that a person, particularly one who is highly regarded and respected in the
community, would deliberately blemish his good name, and worse, involve his own son in a misconduct
for a measly sum of P23,675.00, such as this case before us. As aptly deduced by Justice Del Rosario[24]
If I were to commit a crime, would I involve my son in it? And if I were a town mayor, would I ruin my
name for the measly sum of P1,894.00 a month? My natural instinct as a father to protect my own son
and the desire, basic in every man, to preserve one's honor and reputation would suggest a resounding
NO to both questions. But the prosecution ventured to prove in these thirteen cases that precisely
because they were father and son and despite the relatively small amount involved, accused Mayor
Francisco Lecaroz conspired with Lenlie Lecaroz to falsify several municipal payrolls for the purpose of
swindling their own town of the amount of P1,894.00 a month, and the majority has found them guilty. I
find discomfort with this verdict basically for the reason that there was no criminal intent on their part to
falsify any document or to swindle the government.
The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.
[25]
In Cabungcal v. Cordova[26] we affirmed the doctrine that an erroneous interpretation of the meaning
of the provisions of an ordinance by a city mayor does not amount to bad faith that would entitle an
aggrieved party to damages against that official. We reiterated this principle in Mabutol v.
Pascual[27] which held that public officials may not be liable for damages in the discharge of their official
functions absent any bad faith. Sanders v. Veridiano II[28] expanded the concept by declaring that under
the law on public officers, acts done in the performance of official duty are protected by the presumption
of good faith.
In ascribing malice and bad faith to petitioner Mayor Lecaroz, the Sandiganbayan cited two (2)
circumstances which purportedly indicated criminal intent. It pointed out that the name of accused Lenlie
Lecaroz was not in the municipal payroll for the first quincena of 1986 which meant that his term had
finally ended, and that the reinstatement of Lenlie Lecaroz by Mayor Francisco Lecaroz in the payroll
periods from 15 January 1986 and thereafter for the next twelve and a half (12 -1/2) months was for no
other purpose than to enable him to draw salaries from the municipality. [29] There is however no
evidence, documentary or otherwise, that Mayor Francisco Lecaroz himself caused the name of Lenlie
Lecaroz to be dropped from the payroll for the first quincena of January 1986. On the contrary, it is
significant that while Lenlie Lecaroz' name did not appear in the payroll for the first quincena of January
1986, yet, in the payroll for the next quincena accused Lenlie Lecaroz was paid for both the first and
second quincenas, and not merely for the second half of the month which would have been the case if he
was actually "dropped" from the payroll for the first fifteen (15) days and then "reinstated" in the
succeeding payroll period, as held by the court a quo.
From all indications, it is possible that the omission was due to the inadequate documentation of Red's
appointment to and assumption of office, or the result of a mere clerical error which was later rectified in
the succeeding payroll. This however cannot be confirmed by the evidence at hand. But since a doubt is
now created about the import of such omission, the principle of equipoise should properly apply. This rule
demands that all reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not a crime should be resolved in
favor of the accused. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. [30]
Petitioners have been convicted for falsification of public documents through an untruthful narration of
facts under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised Penal Code. For the offense to be established, the following
elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a document statements in a narration of facts; (b) the
offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and, (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
The first and third elements of the offense have not been established in this case. In approving the
payment of salaries to Lenlie Lecaroz, Mayor Francisco Lecaroz signed uniformly-worded certifications
thus -
I hereby certify on my official oath that the above payroll is correct, and that the services above stated
have been duly rendered. Payment for such services is also hereby approved from the appropriations
indicated.
When Mayor Lecaroz certified to the correctness of the payroll, he was making not a narration of facts
but a conclusion of law expressing his belief that Lenlie Lecaroz was legally holding over as member of
the Sanggunian and thus entitled to the emoluments attached to the position. This is an opinion
undoubtedly involving a legal matter, and any "misrepresentation" of this kind cannot constitute the
crime of false pretenses.[31] In People v. Yanza[32] we ruled -
Now then, considering that when defendant certified she was eligible for the position, she practically
wrote a conclusion of law which turned out to be inexact or erroneous - not entirely groundless - we are
all of the opinion that she may not be declared guilty of falsification, specially because the law which she
has allegedly violated (Art. 171, Revised Penal Code, in connection with other provisions), punishes the
making of untruthful statements in a narration of facts - emphasis on facts x x x x Unfortunately, she
made a mistake of judgment; but she could not be held thereby to have intentionally made a false
statement of fact in violation of Art. 171 above-mentioned.
The third element requiring that the narration of facts be absolutely false is not even adequately satisfied
as the belief of Mayor Francisco Lecaroz that Lenlie Lecaroz was a holdover member of the Sanggunian
was not entirely bereft of basis, anchored as it was on the universally accepted doctrine of holdover. La
mera inexactitude no es bastante para integrar este delito. [33] If the statements are not altogether false,
there being some colorable truth in them, the crime of falsification is deemed not to have been
committed.
Finally, contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan, we hold that conspiracy was not proved in this
case. The court a quo used as indication of conspiracy the fact that the accused Mayor certified the
payrolls authorizing payment of compensation to his son Lenlie Lecaroz and that as a consequence
thereof the latter collected his salaries. These are not legally acceptable indicia, for they are the very
same acts alleged in the Informations as constituting the crime of estafa through falsification. They
cannot qualify as proof of complicity or unity of criminal intent. Conspiracy must be established separately
from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable
doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together however,
the evidence must reasonably be strong enough to show community of criminal design. [34]
Perhaps subliminally aware of the paucity of evidence to support it, and if only to buttress its finding of
conspiracy, the Sandiganbayan stressed that the two accused are father and son. Granting that this is not
even ad hominem, we are unaware of any presumption in law that a conspiracy exists simply because the
conspirators are father and son or related by blood.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of 7 October 1994 and Resolution of 1
October 1997 of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioners FRANCISCO M.
LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ are ACQUITTED of all the thirteen (13) counts of estafa through
falsification of public documents (Crim. Cases Nos. 13904-13916). The bail bonds posted for their
provisional liberty are cancelled and released. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109455 November 11, 1993

RAUL A. GALAROSA, in his capacity as incumbent President and Representative of the
Association of Barangay Captains of the Municipality of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EUDARLIO B. VALENCIA, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SORSOGON; and RODOLFO
SALAY, respondents.
Villanueva, Bernardo & Gabionza for petitioner.
Elizalde D. Diaz for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
At the hub of the present controversy is Section 494 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, which provides as follows:
Sec. 494. Ex officio Membership in Sanggunians. The duly elected presidents of the Liga [ng mga
Barangay] at the municipal, city and provincial levels, including the component cities and municipalities of
Metropolitan Manila, shall serve as ex-officio members of the sanggunian bayan, sanggunian panglunsod,
and sanggunian panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as such only during their term of office as
presidents of the liga chapters, which in no case shall be beyond the term of office of the sanggunian
concerned.
Petitioner Raul A. Galarosa (hereinafter GALAROSA) is the incumbent president of the katipunang
bayan or Association of Barangay Councils (ABC)1 of the municipality of Sorsogon, province of Sorsogon,
and was appointed as a member of the Sanggunian Bayan (SB) of Sorsogon pursuant to Executive Order
No. 342 in relation to Section 146 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the quondam local government code. The
salient issue in this case is whether or not GALAROSA can continue to serve as a member of the SB
beyond 30 June 1992, the date when the term of office of the elective members of the SB of Sorsogon
expired. The respondent Judge ruled that GALAROSA could not; GALAROSA thinks otherwise and asks us
to set aside the decision of the court a quo.
In August 1992, private respondent Rodolfo Lasay (hereinafter LASAY), the incumbent barangay captain
of barangay Gimaloto of the municipality of Sorsogon and an aspirant for the position of president of the
ABC of the said municipality, filed with the court a quo against the public respondent SB of Sorsogon a
petition for declaratory relief and injunction with a prayer for the issuance a temporary restraining order.
LASAY sought the determination by the court of the "appropriate, proper interpretation of the provision of
Sec. 494 of Republic Act No. 7160" and of "whether or not the President of the Association of Barangay
Captains can continue holding office despite the termination of the Terms of Office of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Sorsogon on June 30, 1992. 2 He posited the theory that the term of office of GALAROSA as
an ex officio member of the SB of Sorsogon is coterminous with that, of the said SB which expired on 30
June 1992; hence there was a need for the new election of an ABC representative. He further alleged
that during its session, the SB of Sorsogon accepted and recognized the participation of GALAROSA over
his (LASAY's) protest, allegedly on the basis of the memorandum of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) allowing the ABC presidents elected before 30 June 1992 to continue in office until
the election of new ones. LASAY then prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining
the SB of Sorsogon from recognizing GALAROSA as an ex officio member thereof and from allowing him
to participate in its deliberations, for the holding in abeyance of GALAROSA's salaries, and, after hearing,
for a judgment "embodying the literal interpretation of Sec. 494 of the New Local Government Code to
the effect that the term of office of the ex officio membership to the Sangguniang Bayan of the
President; of [the] ABC should in no case be beyond the term of office of said Sangguniang Bayan." The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5755.
In its Answer,3 the SB of Sorsogon, represented by the Provincial Prosecutor, asked for the dismissal of
the petition because (a) LASAY "has no legal right to file the petition or the petition "is based on pure
speculative rights," and (b) the petition is premature since the resolution of the issues raised may still be
the subject of rules and regulations to implement Section 494 of the Code.
On 9 September 1992, the trial. court, per respondent Judge Eudarlio B. Valencia issued a temporary
restraining order directing the SB of Sorsogon "to desist from recognizing the participation of the old Ex
officio membership of the President of the Association of Barangay Captains and to hold in abeyance the
taking and/or payment of salaries from the Municipal Government of Sorsogon relative thereto." 4 It set
the hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on 22 September 1992. On the latter
date, the court heard LASAY and the SB of Sorsogon. It then issued an order granting the parties thirty
days within which to file their memoranda in support of their respective positions, after which both the
incident on the preliminary injunction and the merits of the case shall be deemed submitted for decision. 5
On 22 October 1992, the respondent Judge issued an order granting the application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond of P40,000.00. 6
On 26 January, 1993, GALAROSA filed with the court a quo an Appearance with Motion to Annul
Injunction order. 7He prayed therein that the 22 October 1992 Order be annulled, that the SB of
Sorsogon be directed to recognize his participation as an ex officio member thereof, that he be allowed to
enjoy all the benefits and emolument's of the and that his appearance be noted.
On 26 February, 1993, the respondent Judge issued an order noting the above pleading of GALAROSA
and directing LASAY to file his "comment and/or opposition thereto" within five days from receipt of a
copy of the said order, after which "the incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution." 8
The trial court never resolved that "incident."
On 24 March 1993, the respondent Judge handed down a decision 9 in favor of LASAY, the adjudicatory
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) Declaring the incumbent President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Sorsogon as without
any further right or legal basis to continue in office as ex-officio member of the present Sangguniang
Bayan of Sorsogon pursuant to and conformably with Section 494 of Republic Act No, 7160; and
(2) Ordering the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon to cease and desist from recognizing the
participation of the old ex-officio membership of the President of the Association of Barangay Captains of
the town of Sorsogon.
In holding for LASAY, the respondent Judge rejected the claim of the SB of Sorsogon that (1) pursuant to
DILG Memorandum Circular No. 92-38 dated 29 June 1992, Section 494 of the Local Government Code
was reconciled with Article 210 (d)(3), Rule XXIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the said
Code which provides that incumbent ABC presidents shall continue to serve as ex officio members of their
respective sanggunians unless sooner removed for cause or the new officers shall have been elected and
qualified; (2) LASAY is not the proper party in interest and even if he is, he did not exhaust all available
administrative remedies; and (3) what is involved is a political question which is beyond the province of
the trial court. As to the first, the respondent judge ruled that Article 210 of the Rules and Regulations
does not expressly provide that the term of office of the ABC presidents as ex officio members of the SB
shall go beyond the term of the SB concerned; since the term of the sanggunianconcerned expired on 30
June 1992, it stands to follow that the ex officio membership of the liga president in the said sanggunian,
by express mandate of law, likewise ended on the said date. As to the exhaustion of administrative
remedies, the respondent Judge ruled that it is not applicable since the issue involved is "purely a legal
one". He rejected the "political question" issue by stating that the interpretation of laws, rules, and
regulations is a judicial function and prerogative. Furthermore, he invoked Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution on the scope of judicial review. The respondent Judge did not squarely tackle the issue
regarding the locus standi of LASAY, although he described LASAY as "the incumbent Barangay Captain
of Gimaloto . . . a declared aspirant for President of the [ABC] . . . as well as being a taxpayer claiming
direct interest to complain, protest and seek the proper relief."
Unable to accept the decision, GALAROSA filed this petition which we have decided to treat as one
for certiorari under Rule 65. He submits therein that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED WHEN HE RULED THAT THE PETITIONER, DESPITE HIS INCUMBENCY
AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF BARANGAY COUNCILS OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF
SORSOGON, HAS NO LONGER ANY LEGAL BASIS OR RIGHT TO HIS EX-OFFICIO MEMBERSHIP IN THE
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON.
We required the respondents to comment on the petition, and on 3 June 1993 we issued a temporary
restraining order directing the respondent Judge to cease and desist from implementing and effecting the
challenged decision.
In his comment, LASAY states that GALAROSA, not being a party to the case before the trial court, has
no right to file the instant petition. LASAY argues that although GALAROSA had filed a motion for
intervention, that pleading was not acted upon by the trial court. As to the merits of the petition, he asks
that we sustain the challenged decision because it is in accord with existing jurisprudence and the
principles of statutory construction; he also avers that Memorandum Circular No. 92-38 of the DILG,
which is relied upon by GALAROSA, violates and contravenes the clear mandate of Section 494 of the
Code which provides that in no case shall the membership of the ex officiomembers of the SB extend
beyond the term of the SB concerned, which ended on 30 June 1992. GALAROSA filed a Reply to this
Comment to which LASAY filed a rejoinder. Not to be out done, the former filed a Sur-rejoinder.
On 14 July 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its comment. While not explicitly saying so, it
asks us to grant the petition and to set aside the challenged decision because there respondent Judge
should have dismissed the action on the following grounds: (a) LASAY failed to present a justiciable
controversy since he is not an ABC president but a mere aspirant thereto, or, elsewise stated, his right to
an ex officio membership in the SB is purely anticipatory; (b) not being an ABC president, LASAY is not a
proper party to assail the ex officio membership of GALAROSA; and (c) the latter, who was to be directly
affected by the petition of LASAY, was not named a party-respondent; in view of this "non-joinder of
proper part[y]," respondent Judge should have dismissed the petition outright pursuant to Section 5, Rule
64 of the Revised Rules of Court.
We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda, which the subsequently complied with.
Before proceeding to the main issue, we will address some issues which the parties have raised, to wit:
(a) the legal personality of LASAY to file the petition for declaratory relief and injunction with the trial
court, (b) the absence of a justiciable controversy, (c) the non-joinder of an indispensable party in the
said petition, and (d) the precipitateness of the trial court's decision.
It must be stressed that the petition filed by LASAY with the trial court is one for declaratory relief and
injunction and not solely for the former. The latter can be either prohibitory or mandatory in character.
LASAY sought to enjoin the SB of Sorsogon from recognizing GALAROSA as an ex officio member of the
SB and from allowing him to participate in its deliberations, and to direct it to hold in abeyance the
payment of GALAROSA's salaries. LASAY brought the action in his capacity as a barangay captain who is
seeking the presidency of the ABC of Sorsogon and in his capacity as a taxpayer. This Court agrees with
GALAROSA and the Office the Solicitor General that with respect to the first, LASAY does have the legal
standing to institute the action for he is a mere aspirant to the presidency of the ABC and his right
thereto is a mere expectancy. We do rule, however, that as a taxpayer he has a sufficient legal standing,
because the injunction he prayed for is founded on what he believed to be an illegal disbursement of
public funds of his municipal government. In this jurisdiction, the strict, rule relative to the determination
of real parties in interest has been sufficiently relaxed to allow a taxpayer to bring an action to restrain
the unlawful disbursement of public funds. 10
We also hold that the requisites for an action for declaratory relief were present, namely: (a) that there is
justiciable controversy, (b) that the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse, (c) that
the party seeking relief has a legal interest in the controversy, and (d) that the issue invoked is ripe for
judicial determination.11 The controversy is whether GALAROSA can continue to serve as a member of the
SB after 30 June 1992. LASAY, as a taxpayer, has the locus standi to have it resolved because a decision
against GALAROSA would mean that he is not entitled to receive his salary and other benefits as a
member of the SB and any such payment to him beyond 30 June 1992 would be illegal.
Nonetheless, the form and nature of the action filed by LASAY required the inclusion of GALAROSA as an
adverse party. It is his right to his office that is challenged and he is the person who would be directly
affected by any decision therein. No final determination of an action can be had unless he is joined
therein. He is therefore, an indispensable party. Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the joinder of indispensable parties is compulsory; consequently, no action can proceed unless they are
joined. 12 The absence of an indispensable party in a case render ineffectual all the proceedings
subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment. 13LASAY should have been required to
implead GALAROSA and should he fail to do so, the petition should be dismissed. 14 GALAROSA in fact
sought to intervene in the case by filing on 26 January 1993 an "Appearance with Motion to Annul the
Injunction Order." Unfortunately, after it was noted and LASAY was directed to file his "comment and/or
opposition thereto" after which the incident would be submitted for resolution, the respondent Judge, for
reasons known only to him, never did resolve it. Then with undue and precipitate haste, he rendered the
challenged decision on 24 March 1993. That decision must be set aside for having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since an indispensable party, GALAROSA was
not effectively impleaded and recognized as a party in the case and given the opportunity to file a
responsive pleading.
A remand of this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the above disquisition
would be the natural course of action to follow. However, considering that the principal issue posed is
purely legal and the pleadings of the parties have exhaustively discussed the main issue and all collateral
matters, the controversy could be forthwith resolved on the basis thereof. The remand of the case to the
trial court would only delay the final disposition of the case and would not serve the public interest,
especially here where our decision would affect all ABC presidents throughout the country. We have
consistently ruled that the remand of a case to a lower court for the reception of evidence is not
necessary if this Court can already resolve the dispute on the basis of the records before it. 15
We shall then take up the core issue.
Section 494 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides for the ex officio membership in the
respective sanggunians of the duly elected presidents of the liga at the municipality, city, and provincial
levels, including the component cities and municipalities of Metro Manila. The liga referred to therein is
the liga ng mga barangay. Section 491 of the Code provides for its creation and purpose:
Sec. 491. Purpose of organization. There shall be an organization of all barangays to be known as the
Liga ng mga Barangay for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the
sanggunians and for ventilating, articulating, and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government
administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.
Every barangay is represented in the liga ng mga barangay by the punong barangay, or in his absence or
incapacity, by a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose among its members. 16 The principal
aim of the liga ng mga barangay is to promote the development of barangays and secure the general
welfare of their inhabitants.17
The forerunner of the liga ng mga barangay is the katipunan ng mga barangay under Section 108 of B.P.
Blg. 337, which was known as the katipunang bayan in municipalities, katipunang panglungsod in
cities, katipunang panlalawigan in provinces, and katipunan ng mga barangay on the national level. Each
barangay therein was represented by the punong barangay. The katipunang bayan was also referred to
as the Association of Barangay Councils or ABC for short. Pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 146
of B.P. Blg. 337, the president of the said organization was among the members of the sangguniang
bayan the legislative body of the municipality subject, however, to appointment by the President of
the Philippines. Under Section 110(3) thereof, the term of office of all officers of the katipunang bayan,
including its president, was to be governed by "the by-laws of the organization, without prejudice,
however, to their term of office as member of the sanggunian to which they may be correspondingly
appointed." Section 25 of the By-Laws of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay18 provides that "the term of
office of all officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from the date of their elections until the next
katipunan elections following general barangay elections, subject to the limitations of Section 4 and the
succeeding sections hereof."19
On 7 March, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum Circular No. 51 providing for policy
guidelines on the representation of certain sectors, including the president of the katipunang bayan, in
the legislative bodies of local governments. Then on 28 November 1988 she issued E.O. No. 342
delegating to the Secretary of Local Government the power to appoint certain local offices under certain
sections, including Section 146(1) of B.P. Blg. 337. Thereafter, appointments of the presidents of
the katipunang bayan as members of the sangguniang bayanwere made by the Secretary of Local
Government.
Immediately prior to the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991, the katipunang bayan or ABC in
a municipality was composed of the barangay captains who were elected in the barangay elections of 28
March 1989 held pursuant to R.A. No. 6679. In the case at bar, it is presumed that GALAROSA was an
elected punong barangay in the municipality of Sorsogon and was later elected president of the ABC of
Sorsogon.
On 7 April 1989, the Department of Local Government issued Circular No. 89-09 providing for the
reorganization of the katipunan ng mga barangays in all levels and prescribing the guidelines for the
election of their officers. Guideline 2.2 thereof on terms of office reads:
The terms of office of all officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from the date of their election until
their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified, without prejudice, however, to the terms of
their appointments as member of the sanggunian, to which they may be correspondingly appointed.
Accordingly, the president of the katipunang bayan became, after an appointment extended by the
President through the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, a member of the
first sangguniang bayan organized under the 1987 Constitution following the local elections held on 18
January 1988. That GALAROSA was extended such appointment is not disputed.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not explicitly provide that upon its effectivity the katipunan ng
mga barangay under B.P. Blg. 337 automatically became the liga ng mga barangay under the Local
Government Code and that the president of the ABC automatically became the president of the liga
whose term as ex officio member of the first sangguniang bayan under the 1987 Constitution is
coterminous with that of the other regular members of the SB or until 30 June 1992 pursuant to Section
494 of the Local Government Code in relation to Section 2, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution 20 and
Section 5 of R.A. No. 6636. 21 Absent such explicitness and considering (1) that the opening clause of
Section 491 is expressed in the future tense such that the liga can only be deemed to exist upon the
effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991 and (2) that Section 494 speaks of "duly elected
presidents of the liga" thereby clearly implying an election after the organization of the liga, the
conclusion to be drawn is that the legislature never intended that Section 494 would apply to the
incumbent presidents of the katipunang bayan.
In short, there is no indication at all that Section 491 and Section 494 should be given retroactive effect
to adversely affect the presidents of the ABC. They should thus be applied prospectively. There is a
substantive rationale for this. The Local Government Code significantly altered the previous law and rules
relative to the membership of the presidents of the katipunang bayan or the ABC. In the first place, a
prior appointment by the President, as required under Section 110(3) of B.P. Blg. 337 or by him through
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government pursuant to E.O. No. 342, is no longer necessary. It may
be pointed out that B.P. Blg. 337 has been expressly repealed under paragraph (a), Section 534 of the
Local Government Code of 1991. Accordingly, E.O. No. 342 is likewise deemed repealed either as a
consequence thereof or under paragraph (f) of the said section which repeals, inter alia, executive orders
inconsistent with any provisions of the said Code. In the second place, Section 494 specifically provides
that the term of office of the liga presidents shall in no case go "beyond the term of office of
the sanggunianconcerned." Consequently, the expiration of their term of office of the regular members
thereof. The section however, does not fix the specific duration of their term as liga president. This is left
to the by-laws of the ligapursuant to Article 211(g) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code (IRR for brevity). It may be recalled that under R.A. No. 6679, the term of office of
the punong barangay elected in the 28 March 1989 election for barangay officials was five years
commencing on 1 May 1989 and ending 31 May 1994. It also provides that the next regular election of
barangay officials shall be on the second Monday of May 1994 and on the same day every five years
thereafter and that their term of office shall begin on the first day of June following their election and
until their successors shall have been elected an qualified. On the other hand, Section 43(c) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 fixes the term of elective barangay officials at three years which, insofar as
those first elected under it are concerned, shall begin "after the regular election . . . on the second
Monday of May 1994.
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the prospective character of Section 494 of the Local Government Code of
1991, the fact remains that the presidents of the katipunang bayan or ABC who were appointed as
members of the sangguniang bayan by the President through the Secretary of Local Government by
virtue of E.O. No. 342 were appointed to the sangguniang bayan whose regular members were elected in
the 18 January 1988 local elections and whose terms expired on 30 June 1992. It is t be presumed that
they could not have been appointed for a term beyond that of the sangguniang bayan. This is evident
from both Section 110(3) of B.P. Blg. 337 and Circular No. 89-09 of the Department of Local Government
which respectively provide that the term of office of the ABC presidents therein determined is "without
prejudice to their term of office as member of the sanggunian to which they were accordingly appointed'
and "without prejudice however, to the terms on [ sic] their appointments as members of the sanggunian,
to which they may be correspondingly be appointed." Accordingly, while ABC presidents could remain as
such after 30 June 1992 because their term of office as ABC presidents have not yet ended, their term of
office as members of the sangguniang bayan has expired.
There is, however, no law which prohibits them from holding over as members of the sangguniang
bayan. On the contrary, the aforementioned IRR, prepared and issued by the Oversight Committee upon
specific mandate of Section 533 of the Local Government Code, expressly recognizes and grants that
hold-over authority to ABC presidents. Pertinent portions of paragraphs (d) and (f), Article 210 of the IRR
read as follows:
Art. 210 Liga ng mga barangay.
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Ex officio membership in the sanggunian
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The incumbent presidents of the municipal, city, and provincial chapters of the liga shall continue to
serve as ex officio members of the sanggunianconcerned until the expiration of their term of office,
unless sooner revoked for cause.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Organizational structure
(l) . . . . Pending election of the presidents of the municipal, city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters of
the liga, the incumbent presidents of the association of barangay councils in the municipality, city,
province, and Metropolitan Manila shall continue to act as presidents of the corresponding liga chapters
under this Rule.
This was further elaborated in an unnumbered Circular of the DILG dated 15 June 1992 on the subject
"Clarifying the Term of Office of Liga Chapter Presidents (ABC) as Members of the Sanggunian which
reads:
In order to clarify issues arising from various interpretations of pertinent provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and the Implementing Rules and Regulations relative to the term of office of
the Liga chapter presidents as members of the sanggunian, the following guidelines are hereby issued.
1. The incumbent presidents of the ABC at the municipal, city, province and Metropolitan Manila shall
continue [sic] to act as presidents of the corresponding Liga chapters.
2. To ensure continued representation of the barangay in the sanggunian, they shall continue to serve
as ex-officio members of the sanggunian concerned, unless sooner removed for cause, pending the
election of the first set of officials on the national Liga and local chapters.
3. The election of the first set of officials of the national Liga and local chapters shall be within six (6)
months (not to go beyond March 9, 1993) from ratification by the National Liga and its constitution and
by-laws.
4. The ratification of the Liga Constitution and by-laws shall -be within six (6) months (not to go beyond
September 9, 1992) from the promulgation of the Implementing Rules and Regulation (IRR) of the Local
Government Code on March 9, 1992.
And on 29 June 1992, the DILG issued Memorandum Circular No. 92-38 which reads as follows:
In view of the numerous issues and concerns reaching this Department requesting for a clarificatory
ruling regarding the term of office of the incumbent ABC Presidents as ex-officio members of the
respective sanggunian pending the reorganization and election of the new liga chapter, the following
guidelines are hereby promulgated for the guidance and reference of all concerned:
Section 494 Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160)
The duly elected presidents of the liga at the municipal, city and provincial levels, including the
component cities and municipalities of Metro Manila, shall serve as ex officio members of the
sangguniang bayan, sangguniang panglunsod [and] sangguniang panlalawigan, respectively. They shall
serve as such only during their term of office as presidents of the liga chapters which in no case shall be
beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned.
Article 210 (d) (3), Rule XXIX of the IRR
The incumbent presidents of the municipal, city and provincial chapters of the Liga shall continue to serve
as ex officio members of the sanggunian concerned until the expiration of their term of office, unless
sooner removed for cause.
The aforequoted provisions of the Code and its IRR clearly provide that upon the cessation from office of
the elective sanggunian members, these ex-officio members shall likewise cease to hold office upon the
election and qualification of their successors since they cannot serve beyond the end of the term of office
of the elective members (See Laspinas vs. Santos, G.R. No. 83520, June 23, 1988; Cadugon vs. Singuat-
Guerra, G.R. No. 85884, March 9, 1989).
Be that as it may, following the generally accepted principle that laws shall have prospective effect unless
the contrary if expressly provided (Section 19, Chapter 5, Introductory Provisions, Administrative Code of
1987), the applicability of the aforequoted provisions does not contemplate of the incumbent sanggunian
members, appointive or elective.
This principle is buttressed by Article 210 (f), Rule XXIX of the IRR which declares, in part, the "pending
election of the presidents of the municipal, city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters of the liga, the
incumbent presidents of the association of barangay councils in the municipality, city, province, and
Metropolitan Manila shall continue to act as presidents of the corresponding liga chapters under this Rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The application of the hold-over doctrine in both the aforementioned provisions of the IRR and the
issuances of the DILG should be upheld. The rule is settled that unless " "holding over be expressly or
impliedly prohibited, the incumbent may continue to hold over until some one else is elected and qualified
to assume the office." 22 This rule is demanded by the most obvious must requirements of public policy,
for without it there must frequently be cases where, from a failure to elect or a refusal or neglect to
qualify, the office would be vacant and the public service entirely suspended." 23 Otherwise stated, the
purpose is to prevent the hiatus in the government pending the time when the successor may be chosen
and inducted into office.24 Section 494 of the Local Government Code could not have been intended to
allow a gap in the representation of the barangays, through the presidents of the ABC, in the sanggunian.
Since the term of office of the punong barangays elected in the 28 March 1989 election and the term of
office of the presidents of the ABC have not yet expired and taking into account the special role conferred
upon and the broader powers and functions invested in the barangays by the Code as a basic political
unit, a primary planning and implementing unit of government policies in the community, and as forum
wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed and considered and where disputes may be
amicably settled,25 it would be in harmony with sound logic to infer that the Code never intended to
deprive the barangays of their representation in the sangguniang bayan during the interregnum when
the liga has yet to be formally organized with the election of its officers.
Besides, the promulgation of the IRR by the Oversight Committee and the pertinent issues of the DILG
are in the nature of executive construction and are thus entitled to great weight and respect by the
Court,26 especially that of the former since the composition of the Oversight Committee includes six
Members of Congress of the Philippines three Senators, one of whom was the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Local Government, and three Congressmen, one of whom was the Chairman of the House
Committee on Local Government who are presumed to know the intent of the law.
We therefore hold that GALAROSA, as president of the ABC of Sorsogon, can legally and validly hold over
as a member of the sangguniang bayan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, until the election of the first set of
officers of the liga ng mga barangay, unless he is sooner removed for cause.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the decision of the
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 5575 of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
Costs against private respondent Rodolfo Lasay.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 118883. January 16, 1998]

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES, CATANDUANES, Represented by VICE MAYOR
NENITO AQUINO and MAYOR LYDIA T. ROMANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
AUGUSTO T. ANTONIO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Although a resignation is not complete without an acceptance thereof by the proper authority, an office
may still be deemed relinquished through voluntary abandonment which needs no acceptance.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] promulgated on January 31, 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34158, which
modified the Decision dated February 18, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court [3] of Virac, Catanduanes,
Branch 42, in Sp. Civil Case No. 1654.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED such that paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 thereof
are deleted. Paragraph 3 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.[4]
Antecedent Facts
Private Respondent Augusto T. Antonio was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay, San Andres,
Catanduanes in March 1989. He was later elected president of the Association of Barangay Councils
(ABC)[5] for the Municipality of San Andres, Catanduanes. In that capacity and pursuant to the Local
Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the President as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipality of San Andres.
Meanwhile, then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
declared the election for the president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Councils (FABC)
of the same province, in which private respondent was a voting member, void for want of a
quorum. Hence, a reorganization of the provincial council became necessary. Conformably, the DILG
secretary designated private respondent as a temporary member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Catanduanes, effective June 15, 1990.
In view of his designation, private respondent resigned as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. He
tendered his resignation[6] dated June 14, 1990 to Mayor Lydia T. Romano of San Andres, Catanduanes,
with copies furnished to the provincial governor, the DILG and the municipal treasurer. Pursuant to
Section 50 of the 1983 Local Government Code [7] (B.P. Blg. 337), Nenito F. Aquino, then vice-president of
the ABC, was subsequently appointed by the provincial governor as member of the Sangguniang
Bayan[8] in place of private respondent.Aquino assumed office on July 18, 1990 after taking his oath. [9]
Subsequently, the ruling of DILG Secretary Santos annulling the election of the FABC president was
reversed by the Supreme Court in Taule vs. Santos. [10] In the same case, the appointment of Private
Respondent Antonio as sectoral representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was declared void,
because he did not possess the basic qualification that he should be president of the federation of
barangay councils.[11] This ruling of the Court became final and executory on December 9, 1991.
On March 31, 1992, private respondent wrote to the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres
advising them of his re-assumption of his original position, duties and responsibilities as sectoral
representative[12] therein. In response thereto, the Sanggunian issued Resolution No. 6, Series of 1992,
declaring that Antonio had no legal basis to resume office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. [13]
On August 13, 1992, private respondent sought from the DILG a definite ruling relative to his right to
resume his office as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. [14] Director Jacob F. Montesa, department legal
counsel of the DILG, clarified Antonios status in this wise:
Having been elected President of the ABC in accordance with the Departments Memorandum Circular No.
89-09,[15] you became an ex-officio member in the sanggunian. Such position has not been vacated
inasmuch as you did not resign nor abandon said office when you were designated as temporary
representative of the Federation to the Sangguniang Panlalawiganof Catanduanes on June 7, 1990. The
Supreme Court in Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees (192 SCRA 327), declared that:
designation implies temporariness. Thus, to designate a public officer to another position may mean to
vest him with additional duties while he performs the functions of his permanent office. In some cases, a
public officer may be designated to a position in an acting capacity as when an undersecretary is
designated to discharge the functions of the Secretary pending the appointment of a permanent
Secretary.
Furthermore, incumbent ABC presidents are mandated by the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
1991 Local Government Code to continue to act as president of the association and to serve as ex-officio
members of the sangguniang bayan, to wit:
Article 210 (d) (3), Rule XXIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 7160, provides
that:
The incumbent presidents of the municipal, city and provincial chapters of the liga shall continue to serve
as ex-officio members of the sanggunian concerned until the expiration of their term of office, unless
sooner removed for cause.
(f) x x x Pending election of the presidents of the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan chapters of
the liga, the incumbent presidents of the association of barangay councils in the municipality, city,
province and Metropolitan Manila, shall continue to act as president of the corresponding liga chapters
under this Rule.
In view of the foregoing, considering that the annuled designation is only an additional duty to your
primary function, which is the ABC President, we find no legal obstacle if you re-assume your
representation in the sanggunian bayan as ex-officio member.[16]
Despite this clarification, the local legislative body issued another resolution [17] reiterating its previous
stand.
In response to private respondents request, [18] Director Montesa opined that Antonio did not relinquish or
abandon his office; and that since he was the duly elected ABC president, he could re-assume his position
in the Sanggunian.[19] A copy of said reply was sent to the members of the local legislative body.
Notwithstanding, the Sanggunian refused to acknowledge the right of private respondent to re-assume
office as sectoral representative.
On December 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamuswith preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or restraining order before the RTC. On February 18, 1994, the trial court
rendered its decision holding that Augusto T. Antonios resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan was
ineffective and inoperative, since there was no acceptance thereof by the proper authorities. The decretal
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against
the respondents and ordering the latter:
(1) to pay the petitioner jointly and severally the amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and the cost of
the suit;
(2) to allow petitioner to assume his position as sectoral representative of the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Andres, Catanduanes;
(3) to pay the petitioner jointly and severally his uncollected salaries similar to those received by the
other members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes as certified to by the Municipal
Budget Officer and Municipal Treasurer of the same municipality from April 8, 1992 up to the date of this
judgment; and
(4) declaring Resolution No[s]. 7 & 28 series of 1992 null and void and to have no effect. [20]
Petitioners appealed this judgment to the Court of Appeals.
Appellate Courts Ruling
Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling but deleted the first, second and fourth
paragraphs of its dispositive portion. It held that private respondents resignation was not accepted by the
proper authority, who is the President of the Philippines. While the old Local Government Code is silent as
to who should accept and act on the resignation of any member of the Sanggunian, the law vests in the
President the power to appoint members of the local legislative unit. Thus, resignations must be
addressed to and accepted by him. It added that, though the secretary of the DILG is the alter ego of the
President and notice to him may be considered notice to the President, the records are bereft of any
evidence showing that the DILG secretary received and accepted the resignation letter of Antonio.
Moreover, granting that there was complete and effective resignation, private respondent was still the
president of the ABC and, as such, he was qualified to sit in the Sangguniang Bayan in an ex
officio capacity by virtue of Section 494 [21] of R.A. 7160[22] and Memorandum Circular No. 92-38. [23] In
view, however, of the May 1994 elections in which a new set of barangay officials was elected, Antonios
reassumption of office as barangay representative to the Sangguniang Bayan was no longer legally
feasible.
The appellate court added that private respondent could not be considered to have abandoned his
office. His designation as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was merely temporary and not
incompatible with his position as president of the ABC of San Andres, Catanduanes.
Finally, Respondent Court deleted the award of attorneys fees for being without basis, and held that
Resolution Nos. 6 and 28 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres involved a valid exercise of the
powers of said local body. It thus modified the trial courts judgment by affirming paragraph 3 and
deleting the other items. Unsatisfied, petitioners brought the present recourse.[24]
Issues
The petitioner, in its memorandum,[25] submits before this Court the following issues:
I. Whether or not respondents resignation as ex-officio member of Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan ng San
Andres, Catanduanes is deemed complete so as to terminate his official relation thereto;
II. Whether or not respondent had totally abandoned his ex-officio membership in Petitioner Sangguniang
Bayan;
III. Whether or not respondent is entitled to collect salaries similar to those received by other members
of Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan from April 8, 1992 up to date of judgment in this case by the Regional
Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes.[26]
In sum, was there a complete and effective resignation? If not, was there an abandonment of office?
This Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious. Although the terms of office of barangay captains, including private
respondent, elected in March 1989 have expired, the Court deemed it necessary to resolve this case, as
the Court of Appeals had ordered the payment of the uncollected salaries allegedly due prior to the
expiration of Respondent Antonios term.
First Issue: Validity of Resignation
The petitioner submits that the resignation of private respondent was valid and effective despite the
absence of an express acceptance by the President of the Philippines. The letter of resignation was
submitted to the secretary of the DILG, an alter ego of the President, the appointing authority. The
acceptance of respondents resignation may be inferred from the fact that the DILG secretary himself
appointed him a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes. [27]
In Ortiz vs. COMELEC,[28] we defined resignation as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which
he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of the incumbent in
some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the
acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from
public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of
relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. [29] The last one is required by reason of
Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.[30]
The records are bereft of any evidence that private respondents resignation was accepted by the proper
authority. From the time that he was elected as punong barangay up to the time he resigned as a
member of Sangguniang Bayan, the governing law was B.P. 337 or the Local Government Code of
1983. While said law was silent as to who specifically should accept the resignation of an appointive
member of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sec. 6 of Rule XIX of its implementing rules states that the
[r]esignation of sanggunian members shall be acted upon by the sanggunian concerned, and a copy of
the action taken shall be furnished the official responsible for appointing a replacement and the Ministry
of Local Government.The position shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance of the resignation.
It is not disputed that private respondents resignation letter was addressed only to the municipal mayor
of San Andres, Catanduanes. It is indicated thereon that copies were furnished the provincial governor,
the municipal treasurer and the DILG. Neither the mayor nor the officers who had been furnished copies
of said letter expressly acted on it. On hindsight, and assuming arguendo that the aforecited Sec. 6 of
Rule XIX is valid and applicable, the mayor should have referred or endorsed the latter to the
Sangguniang Bayan for proper action. In any event, there is no evidence that the resignation was
accepted by any government functionary or office.
Parenthetically, Section 146 of B.P. Blg. 337 states:
Sec. 146. Composition. - (1) The sangguniang bayan shall be the legislative body of the municipality and
shall be composed of the municipal mayor, who shall be the presiding officer, the vice-mayor, who shall
be the presiding officer pro tempore, eight members elected at large, and the members appointed by the
President consisting of the president of the katipunang bayan and the president of the kabataang
barangay municipal federation. x x x.(Emphasis supplied.)
Under established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory provisions as to whom they
should be submitted, should be tendered to the appointing person or body. [31]Private respondent,
therefore, should have submitted his letter of resignation to the President or to his alter ego, the DILG
secretary. Although he supposedly furnished the latter a copy of his letter, there is no showing that it was
duly received, much less, that it was acted upon. The third requisite being absent, there was therefore no
valid and complete resignation.
Second Issue: Abandonment of Office
While we agree with Respondent Court that the resignation was not valid absent any acceptance thereof
by the proper authority, we nonetheless hold that Private Respondent Antonio has effectively relinquished
his membership in the Sangguniang Bayan due to his voluntary abandonment of said post.
Abandonment of an office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder,
with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. [32] Indeed, abandonment of office is
a species of resignation; while resignation in general is a formal relinquishment, abandonment is a
voluntary relinquishment through nonuser.[33] Nonuser refers to a neglect to use a privilege or a right
(Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.) or to exercise an easement or an office (Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th
ed.).
Abandonment springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. [34]Its concomitant
effect is that the former holder of an office can no longer legally repossess it even by forcible
reoccupancy.[35]
Clear intention to abandon should be manifested by the officer concerned. Such intention may be express
or inferred from his own conduct.[36] Thus, the failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must
be with the officers actual or imputed intention to abandon and relinquish the office. [37] Abandonment of
an office is not wholly a matter of intention; it results from a complete abandonment of duties of such a
continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment. [38] Therefore, there are two essential elements of
abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and, second, an overt or external act by which the intention
is carried into effect. [39]
Petitioner argues that the following clearly demonstrate private respondents abandonment of his post in
the Sangguniang Bayan:
Admittedly, the designation of respondent as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes
was worded temporary, but his acts more than clearly established his intention to totally abandon his
office, indicating an absolute relinquishment thereof. It bears to emphasize that respondent
actually tendered his resignation and subsequently accepted an ex-officio membership in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes. He performed his duties and functions of said office for
almost two (2) years, and was completely aware of the appointment and assumption on July 18, 1990 of
Nenito F. Aquino, who was then Vice-President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of San
Andres, Catanduanes, as ex-officio member of petitioner Sangguniang Bayan representing the ABC.
xxxxxxxxx
Moreover, it may be well-noted that ABC Vice President Nenito Aquino assumed respondents former
position for twenty (20) months, without him questioning the term of office of the former if indeed
respondents designation as ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was only
temporary. Likewise, for almost eight (8) months after knowledge of the decision in Taule vs. Santos, et.
al., Ibid., nullifying his designation as representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, respondent opted
to remain silent, and in fact failed to seasonably act for the purpose of reassuming his former
position. Evidently, respondent had clearly abandoned his former position by voluntary relinquishment of
his office through non-user.[40] [Underscoring supplied.]
We agree with petitioner. Indeed, the following clearly manifest the intention of private respondent to
abandon his position: (1) his failure to perform his function as member of the Sangguniang Bayan, (2) his
failure to collect the corresponding remuneration for the position, (3) his failure to object to the
appointment of Aquino as his replacement in the Sangguniang Bayan, (4) his prolonged failure to initiate
any act to reassume his post in the Sangguniang Bayan after the Supreme Court had nullified his
designation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On the other hand, the following overt acts demonstrate that he had effected his intention: (1) his letter
of resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan; [41] (2) his assumption of office as member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, (3) his faithful discharge of his duties and functions as member of said
Sanggunian, and (4) his receipt of the remuneration for such post.
It must be stressed that when an officer is designated to another post, he is usually called upon to
discharge duties in addition to his regular responsibilities. Indeed, his additional responsibilities are
prescribed by law to inhere, as it were, to his original position. A Supreme Court justice, for instance,
may be designated member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. In some cases, a public
officer may be designated to a position in an acting capacity, as when an undersecretary is tasked to
discharge the functions of a secretary for a temporary period. [42] In all cases, however, the law does not
require the public servant to resign from his original post. Rather, the law allows him to concurrently
discharge the functions of both offices.
Private respondent, however, did not simultaneously discharge the duties and obligations of both
positions. Neither did he, at that time, express an intention to resume his office as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan. His overt acts, silence, inaction and acquiescence, when Aquino succeeded him to
his original position, show that Antonio had abandoned the contested office. His immediate and natural
reaction upon Aquinos appointment should have been to object or, failing to do that, to file appropriate
legal action or proceeding. But he did neither. It is significant that he expressed his intention to resume
office only on March 31, 1992, after Aquino had been deemed resigned on March 23, 1992, and months
after this Court had nullified his designation on August 12, 1991. From his passivity, he is deemed to
have recognized the validity of Aquinos appointment and the latters discharge of his duties as a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan.
In all, private respondents failure to promptly assert his alleged right implies his loss of interest in the
position. His overt acts plainly show that he really meant his resignation and understood its effects. As
pointed out by the eminent American commentator, Mechem:[43]
Public offices are held upon the implied condition that the officer will diligently and faithfully execute the
duties belonging to them, and while a temporary or accidental failure to perform them in a single
instance or during a short period will not operate as an abandonment, yet if the officer refuses or
neglects to exercise the functions of the office for so long a period as to reasonably warrant the
presumption that he does not desire or intend to perform the duties of the office at all, he will be held to
have abandoned it, not only when his refusal to perform was wilful, but also where, while he intended to
vacate the office, it was because he in good faith but mistakenly supposed he had no right to hold it.
Lastly, private respondent, who remained ABC president, claims the legal right to be a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan by virtue of Section 146 of B.P. Blg. 337. However, his right thereto is not self-
executory, for the law itself requires another positive act -- an appointment by the President or the
secretary of local government per E.O. 342.[44] What private respondent could have done in order to be
able to reassume his post after Aquinos resignation was to seek a reappointment from the President or
the secretary of local government. By and large, private respondent cannot claim an absolute right to the
office which, by his own actuations, he is deemed to have relinquished. [45]
We reiterate our ruling in Aparri vs. Court of Appeals: [46]
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public
x x x. The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists,
when it exists at all, only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it x x x. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office.Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary x x x.
Third Issue: Salary
Having ruled that private respondent had voluntarily abandoned his post at the Sangguniang Bayan, he
cannot be entitled to any back salaries. Basic is the no work, no pay [47] rule. A public officer is entitled to
receive compensation for services actually rendered for as long as he has the right to the office being
claimed.[48] When the act or conduct of a public servant constitutes a relinquishment of his office, he has
no right to receive any salary incident to the office he had abandoned. [49]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman,
RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE
PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG
and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
[G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges
that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the
President. The warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional
issues embedded on the parties dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves
the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner
believing he would rescue them from lifes adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a
six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly
but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000.Ilocos Sur
Governos, Luis Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner,
his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.[1]
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto
Guingona Jr, then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech
entitled I Accuse. He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from
Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from
Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech
was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by
Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for
joint investigation.[2]
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then
headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the
other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the
move to impeach the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin
issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking
petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern. [3] Two days
later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the
resignation of the petitioner.[4] Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino
also demanded that the petitioner take the supreme self-sacrifice of resignation. [5] Former President Fidel
Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of
the Department of Social Welfare and Services [6] and later asked for petitioners resignation. [7] However,
petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior
Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar
Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip. [8] On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II
also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry. [9] On November 3, Senate President Franklin
Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling
coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.[10]
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House
Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment [11] signed by 115 representatives, or more than
1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in
both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President.Speaker
Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentabella. [12] On November 20, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme
Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding. [13]
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial
started.[14] the battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing
as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker
Arroyo, Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios,
Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private
prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon
Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General
and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flamiano, former Deputy
Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day
to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and
low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the
December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI
Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature
Jose Velarde on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4,
2000.[15]
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas.When it
resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty.
Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioners Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that
the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of
insider trading.[16] Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 [17] the senator-
judges ruled against the opening of the second envelop which allegedly contained evidence showing that
petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The public and private
prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate
President.[18] The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the
streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of
sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective
resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment
tribunal.[19] Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment
proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public
prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.[20]
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioners resignation. A 10-kilometer line
of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala
Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the peoples solidarity in demanding petitioners
resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their
concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of
persuasion, attracted more and more people.[21]
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner
informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election
for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m.,
Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the
armed services went to the EDSA Shrine. [22] In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and
hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that on behalf of your Armed
Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing
our support to this government.[23] A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major
service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement. [24] Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts. [25] Rallies for
the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage,
petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial
second envelop.[26] There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the
peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacaangs Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive
Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political
Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the
presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now
Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of
Justice Hernando Perez.[27] Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and
anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries.The negotiations
consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to
respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of
the Philippines.[28] At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace. [29] He issued the
following press statement:[30]
20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to
be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people
with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter: [31]
Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m., on January 20. [32] Another copy
was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.
[33]

On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers
and duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in
Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office
as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of
Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines,
addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which
request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority
given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to
administer the oath of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at
noon of January 20, 2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that maybe filed by a proper
party.
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys.
[34]
Recognition of respondent Arroyos government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January
23, in a reception or vin d honneur at Malacaang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio
Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent
Arroyo.[35] US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House
conveying US recognition of her government.[36]
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives.[37] The House then passed Resolution No. 175 expressing the full support of the House
of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines.[38] It also approved Resolution No. 176 expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of
the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the nations goals under the Constitution. [39]
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act. [40] A few days later, she
also signed into law the Political Advertising Ban and Fair Election Practices Act. [41]
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.
[42]
the next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator
Guingona, Jr.[43] Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmea voted yes with
reservations, citing as reason therefore the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyos
presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.
[44]
The House of Representatives also approved Senator Guingonas nomination in Resolution No. 178.
[45]
Senator Guingona took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later. [46]
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus
officio and has been terminated.[47] Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated for the record that she
voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide
on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still
qualified to run for another elective post.[48]
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyos public acceptance rating jacked up
from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001. [49] In another survey conducted by the ABS-
CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted
President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is
accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55%
in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social
classes:
58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass, and 54% among the Es or very poor
class.[50]
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters.Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB
Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and
corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on
November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct,
violation of the Code of Conduct for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by
the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and
corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong,
et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property,
plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the
charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the
following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus
and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to
the aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No.
146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin
the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629,
1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until
after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Thru another counsel,
petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable
to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution. Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the
respondents to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001. On
February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing
of the respondents comments on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15.
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing,
Chief Justice Davide, Jr.,[51] and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban [52] recused themselves on motion of
petitioners counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag
that they have compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side but
nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to
file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press
statement for Gag Order on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738,
the Court resolved:
(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office
of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the
alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being
cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at
bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from
resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman
may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing
held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic. [53]
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for
decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution
of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he
is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.

I
Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question

Private respondents[54] raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence,
are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases
at bar assail the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration. They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended
the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14 th President of the
Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by
foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket which the
Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the
shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the
courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of
powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills constitutional law. [55] In the
United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled
out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr,[56] viz:
x x x Prominent on the surface on any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretions; or the impossibility of a courts
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no
dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political questions presence. The doctrine of which we
treat is one of political questions, not of political cases.
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer
delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question. [57] Our leading case is Tanada v.
Cuenco,[58] where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political
questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has
narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of
this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
[59]
Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the thou shalt nots of the Constitution directed against the
exercise of its jurisdiction.[60] With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to
determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just
grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions
of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section
18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to x x x review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x.
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano
v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.[61] and related cases[62] to support their thesis that since the
cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political
question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited
cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution
by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution [63] declared that
the Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people in
defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended. It is familiar learning that the
legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny
for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the
government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at
the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution. [64] In her oath, she categorically swore to
preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the
powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear.EDSA
I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office
of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that
resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President
are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal
questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not
inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of
the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call
for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among the reforms sine
quibus non.[65] The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898,
provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas
or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of
association for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to
send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively. Thesefundamental rights were
preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the instruction
to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically
provided that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of
the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. The guaranty
was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1966.[66]
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,[67] and
the 1973 Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987
[68]

Constitution, viz:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
The indispensability of the peoples freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-
evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of
assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering
truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and
fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining
the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus. [69] In this sense, freedom
of speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the conflict necessary to the
progress of a society can take place without destroying the society. [70] In Hague v. Committee
for Industrial Organization,[71]this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus
curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized
that the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk
rather than force; and this means talk for all and by all.[72] In the relatively recent case of
Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,[73] this Court similarly stressed that "... it should be clear even to those
with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all
should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their
grievances are ciphers.
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section
1 of Article II,[74] and section 8[75]of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section
11[76] of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from
suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As
early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,[77] the doctrine has been laid down that it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . .
Thus, respondents invocation of the doctrine of political is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President

We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political
question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of
the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers
from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when
respondent Arroyo took her oath as president.
The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which
provides:
Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the
Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of
the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then acts as
President until President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x.
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of
January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14 th President of the Republic. Resignation is not
a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must
be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. [78] The validity
of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It
can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he
evacuated Malacaang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and
omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous
and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the
succession of events after the expos of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioners alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon
investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of
Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express
speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of
Representatives.Soon, petitioners powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as
Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and Former Speaker Villar defected with 47
representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary
of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the peoples call for his resignation intensified.The call
reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open
the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was
over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number
grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the
petitioner. The window is provided in the Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the diary of Executive
Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.[79] The Angara Diary reveals that in
morning of January 19, petitioners loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA,
hence, they decided to crate an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m.,
petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: Ed,
seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)[80] An hour later
or at 2:30, p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would
not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not
be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at
that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the
resignation of the petitioner and dramatically announced the AFPs withdrawal of support from the
petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner
weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to
consider the option of dignified exit or resignation.[81] Petitioner did nor disagree but listened
intently.[82] The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the
petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by
saying that petitioner would allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his family.
[83]
Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and
dignified exit but said he would never leave the country. [84] At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to
Secretary Angara, Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace.
[85]
This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His
mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It
was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and
requested, Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (lets cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and
orderly transfer of power.[86] There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily
agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly
transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of
January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition
period of five days after the petitioners resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and
his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner.
[87]
Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner
cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the
petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the
petitioner, viz:
xxx
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses
that he just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to
clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa
red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too
painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go.[88]
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear
when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following
happened:
Oppositions deal
7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagals spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this
round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled Negotiating Points. It reads:
1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective
on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the
Republic of the Philippines.
2. Beginning today, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration
shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice president to various positions and offices of the
government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the
president and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings
account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant
to the request to the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:
1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and
property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed
freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector throughout their natural
lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of
Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities Vice President (Macapagal).
3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate siting as an impeachment court will authorize
the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account
does not belong to President Estrada.
4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the Transition
Period), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet
officials as part of the orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under Vice
President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the
necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance
thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for
in Annex A heretofore attached to this agreement.[89]
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will
be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was
again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be
undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement which was premised on the resignation of the
petitioner was further refined. It was then signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General
Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by
the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara Diary narrates
the fateful events, viz:[90]
xxx
11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a
peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices
in the background.
Agreement
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be
effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic
of the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January
2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start
orientation activities with incumbent officials.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security
of the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military
and police authority Vice President.
4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national
military and police authorities.
5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial,
the contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the
President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex B
heretofore attached to this agreement.
xxx
11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and
awaiting the signature of the United Opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (Why couldnt you wait? What about the
agreement)? I asked.
Reyes answered: Wala na, sir (Its over, sir).
I asked him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?
And General Reyes answer: Oo nga, i-delete na natin, sir (Yes, were deleting that part).
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is
already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the
documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other
side, as it is important that the provision on security, at least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the
oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The president is too stunned for words.
Final meal
12 noon Gloria takes her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The President is having his final meal at the Presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet
members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG
is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the
President.
1 p.m. The Presidents personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada familys personal
possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronie Puno mentions that the President needs to release a final statement before
leaving Malacaang.
The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as
president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil
society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people
with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shrik from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking
of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind
of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he
assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of
our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
presidentwhich he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The
press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave of
absence due to his inability to govern. In support of this thesis, the letter dated January 20, 2001 of
the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the
said letter, viz:
Sir
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.[91] The pleadings filed by the petitioner in
the cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation.Neither
did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It
strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by
the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its
existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in
his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of
government to respondent Arroyo for the time being. Under any circumstance, however, the
mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the
press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the resignation
must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant
legal significance. Petitioners resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a
changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his
repudiation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance
to petitioners letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he
could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the
petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated from Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was
submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now
stands.However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, reserved to
propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official
who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall
be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire.[92] During the period of amendments, the following provision was
inserted as section 15:
Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this
Act for an offense committed during his incumbency.[93]
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second
paragraph of the provision and insisted that the Presidents immunity should extend even after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar to Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section
15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly
focused on the immunity of the President which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original
bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public
official with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of
the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being
used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal
or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law
or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled
to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right. [94] A public official has the right
not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a
public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or
retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He
cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records
show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the
Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While
these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune
from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked
jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it
contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal
obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under
section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment
proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not
be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a
majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private
prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and
the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against
petitioner when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.

We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the
powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim
is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President
Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of
the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is
that Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII. [95] This
contention is the centerpiece of petitioners stance that he is a President on leave and
respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall
be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and
duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five
days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress
shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-
eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session within
twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties
of his office."
That is the law. Now the operative facts:
(1) Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and
Speaker of the House;
(2) Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at
about 12:30 p.m.;
(3) Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175;[96]
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176[97]which
states:
RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION
INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER
ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the peoples loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police
and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their
recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing
and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus
by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the
individual members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives
must ensure to the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to
the attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the
nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of
national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole
nation;
WHEREAS, without surrendering its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for
the House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her
Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the
national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its
congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the
Nations goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 178[98] which
states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF SENATOR
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency
of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such
vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both
Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the
Philippines - qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioners letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the
Senate signed the following:
RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change
and challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of
purpose and resolute cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite
diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and resolve to discharge our duties to attain desired changes and overcome the nations
challenges.[99]
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82[100] which states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF SEN.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is it vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President due to the assumption to the Presidency
of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such
vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both
Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Phillippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence, and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice. Senator of the land -
which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic:Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83[101] which states:
RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus
officio and has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court of Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January
16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the second envelope be
transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the
Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the
Senate President.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in
the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously
with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13 th)
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as
President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from
any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly
rejected petitioners claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability
of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco,[102] we hold that this
Court cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an issue in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislative x x x branch of the government. Or to use the language
in Baker vs. Carr,[103] there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it. Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and
duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing
the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is
a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been
laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-
equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings
against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioners contentions, a revisit of our legal history on executive immunity will be most
enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In
the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco tiaco and Crossfield,[104] the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese
citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, J.E. Harding and
C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for
damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to
touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will,
unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the
execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free
from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the
executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. On
the contrary, it means, simply, that the Governor-General, like the judges of the courts and the members
of the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act
executed in the performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the
matter is properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-
General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived
his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of
whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority
of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General personally in
damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more that it can a member of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all
in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the
discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an
analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a
case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercise discretion in
determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from
personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without
authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining
whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the
question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority
was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not
protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its
determination. In such case, he acts, not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and, as such,
must answer for the consequences of his act.
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from
suit, viz: x x x. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief
executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest
officials of the State and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder; resulting in a way,
in a distrust as to the integrity of government itself. [105]
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive
immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos
and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the amendments
involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for
official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this
Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco Professional Chair Lecture entitled, Presidential Immunity And All The
Kings Men: The Law Of Privilege As A Defense To Actions For Damages, [106] petitioners learned counsel,
former Dean of the UP college of Law, Atty. Pacifico Agabin, brightlined the modifications effected by this
constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the
absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only from civil claims but also
from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of
the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include
not only the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who
acted upon orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS
(or absolute immunity defense syndrome).
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of
executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by then Member of Parliament,
now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted
to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the
immunity as a return to the anachronism the king can do no wrong.[107] The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People
Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the
executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate
J. Bernas, viz:[108]
Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the committees omitting in the draft proposal the immunity
provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in
striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under
the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first
sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not
provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the
President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution
was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that
he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors
and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed
Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.[109] Since the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual
bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a
better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings
and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional
Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation
of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:[110]
xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the
impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily
dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation
would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects
of it may continue in the ordinary courts.
This is in accord with our ruling in In re: Saturnino Bermudez[111]that incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but
not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner
has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a
condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. His reliance in the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan[112] and related
cases[113]are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-
sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold
that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. [114] Indeed, a critical reading of current
literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the
privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a
right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,[115] US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was
subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and
advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixons associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct
justice and other offenses which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters
in Washingtons Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was
named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground,
among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be
impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The
claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that when the ground for asserting privilege
as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice. In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,[116] the US Supreme Court
further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only official
acts. Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton
v. Jones[117] where it held that the US Presidents immunity from suits for money damages arising out of
their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive
immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public
office is a public trust.[118] It declared as a state policy that (t)he State shall maintain honesty and
integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption."[119] It ordained that (p)ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives. [120] It set the rule that (t)he right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees,
shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. [121] It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-
graft court.[122] It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among
which is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.[123] The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy. [124] These constitutional
policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioners claim that a non-sitting president enjoys
immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in
violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of
unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. [125] The British
approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts
readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.
[126]
The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential
effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different
strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood,
clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or
annul convictions in high profile criminal cases.[127] In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,[128] later reiterated in
the case of Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[129] we laid down the doctrine that:
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like
all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to
a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds
right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the
trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible
to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to
our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts
and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of
touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from
publicity lest they lose their impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are learned in the law and trained
to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere
exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v.
Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual
prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof
that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his
case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired
a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented
during the trial.Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.
[130]
and its companion cases. viz.:
Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the
substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes,
its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For
sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated
even today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and
sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a
fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public.Inn the
seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was wisely held:
xxx
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates
conclusively that the time this Nations organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted
fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on
secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was
recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often
follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing
an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that societys
criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice, Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75
S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken,
uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded
that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nations system of
justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a
common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be
read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees;
the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom
doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover,
the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as
a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately
linked by the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and
representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been
thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the public the
right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been
recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is
implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which
people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be
eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al.,we
held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that
attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ
Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of
an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal
investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights
of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear
that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The
length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which
they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we
note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias
resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity. (emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to
enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent
Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.
[131]
He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity
of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still
undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent
Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members
of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity
against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second
guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To
quote petitioners submission, the respondent Ombudsman has been influenced by the barrage of slanted
news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs. [132] News
reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the
cases of the petitioner[133]and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be
influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the
news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially
in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of
good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt
the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent
Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give
investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they
are reviewable by their superiors.[134] They can be reversed but they can not be compelled to change their
recommendations nor can they be compelled to prosecute cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In
other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if
the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that
the finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it
before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue

A word of caution to the hooting throng. The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different
dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from
the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be
more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State
to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been
categorized as the most fundamental of all freedoms. [135] To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to
do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce
calls the impatient vehemence of the majority. Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose
judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of
number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of
the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has
respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of
thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to mans progress from the cave to civilization. Let
us not throw away that key just to pander to some peoples prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.