Bea Civil Law - Assoc. Dean Paguirigan

FEU MLQU UE MSU-MARAWI MSU-ILIGAN MSU-GENSAN NDU-COTABATO AUSL UM-DAVAO PUP LPUADU SSCR
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
TAADA VS TUVERA, G.R. No. L-63915, 136 SCRA 27, April 24, 1985
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances of a
public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process.
TAADA VS TUVERA, G.R. No. L-63915, 146 SCRA 446,December 29, 1986
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication.
For purposes of the prior publication requirement for effectivity, the term "laws" refer not only to those
of general application, but also to laws of local application; private laws; administrative rules enforcing a
statute; city charters. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant
not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines
to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Also not covered are municipal
ordinances which are governed by the Local Government Code. Publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
PHILSA VS SECRETARY OF LABOR,G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001

An administrative circular should be published for its effectivity, if its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL VS CA, G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993

Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the
new doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof.
Beta Sigma Lambda (Exclusive Law Fraternity & Sorority) 1946 Bar Operations 2017 -1
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
CUI VS ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, G.R. No. L-15127, 2 SCRA 205, May 30, 1961
What is morals? Manresa has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of
morality which have received some kind of social and practical confirmation.
In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to
consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or
is inconsistent with sound policy and good moralsor tends clearly to undermine the security of individual
rights.
VAN DORN VS ROMILLO, G.R. No. L-68470, 139 SCRA 139,October 8, 1985
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
QUITA VS COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 124862, 300 SCRA 406,December 22, 1998
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
CATALAN VS BRAGANZA, GR No. 167109, February 6, 2007

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, before it can be recognized by our courts,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
SAN LUIS VS SAN LUIS,G.R. No. 134029, February 6, 2007

Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
BAYOT VS BAYOT, G.R. No. 163979, November 7, 2008

A foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid
under the national law of the alien spouse.
AZNAR VS GARCIA, G.R. No. L-1674, 7 SCRA 95, January 31, 1963
Article 16, paragraph 2, provides that intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be
found.
BELLIS VS BELLIS, G.R. No. L-23678, 20 SCRA 358,June 6, 1967

The third paragraph of article 17 of the New Civil Code is not an exception to the second paragraph of
article 16. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article," when it incorporated article 11 of the old Civil Code as article 17, while reproducing
without substantial change the second paragraph of article 10 of the old Civil Code, as article 16. The
legislative intent must have been to make the second paragraph of article 176 a specific provision in
itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As a further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under article 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is
governed by the decedent's national law. The decedent's national law governs the order of succession,
the amount of successional rights, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and capacity to
succeed.
A provision in a foreigner's will that his properties should be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not in accordance with his national law is void, being contrary to article 16 of the New Civil
Code.
LLORENTE VS LLORENTE, G.R. No. 124371, 345 SCRA 592,November 23, 2000
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Foreign laws must be alleged and proved.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
HUMAN RELATIONS
VELAYO VS SHELL CO., GR No. L-7817, October 31, 1956

It maybe said that Article 19only contains a mere declarations of principles and while such statement
may be is essentially correct, yet such declaration is implemented by Article 21 and sequence of the
same Chapter on Human Relations.
Article 21 would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
GLOBE MACKAY VS CA, 176 SCRA 778, G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
When the employer clearly fails to exercise in a legitimate manner its right to dismiss an employee, the
latter has the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
BARONS MKTG. VS CA, G.R. No. 126486, February 9, 1998

Where the creditor has very legitimate reasons for rejecting the debtors partial fulfilment of an
obligation, such as protecting its cash position in order for it to pay its own obligations, there is a mere
exercise of a right and notan abuse thereof. Good faith is presumed. Under these circumstances,
creditor is not deemed to have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy as
to violate the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
MWSS VS ACT THEATER, GR No. 147076, June 17, 2004

A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or
recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against the
other.
The exercise of rights is not without limitations. Having the right should not be confused with the
manner by which such right is to be exercised. Article 19 of the Civil Code precisely sets the norms for
the exercise of ones rights: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards the norms set in Article 19 of the Civil Code,
resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
CARPIO VS VALMONTE, GR No. 151866, September 9, 2004

In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done
willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or
injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal
moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. A person should be protected
only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good
faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
GARCIA VS SALVADOR, GR No. 168512, March 30, 2007

Violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to do
something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable to whoever may be injured thereby.
MERALCO VS CA, GR No. 39019, January 22, 1988

The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to
private respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides that any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. This is reiterated by paragraph 10 of Article 2219
of the Code. Moreover, the award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that
wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that,
under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
CUSTODIO VS CA, 253 SCRA 483,G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996

To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by
the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
GASHEM VS CA, GR No. 97336, February 19, 1993

Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
RELLOSA VS PELLOSIS, GR No. 138964, August 9, 2001

The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with
justice, to give everyone his due and to observe honesty and good faith.When a right is exercised in a
manner which discards these norms, resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which the actor can be held accountable.
NPC VS PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC., 369 SCRA 629,G.R. No. 126204, November 20, 2001
In accord with Article 19, a person will be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his
right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or
abuse.
FRETZEL VS CATILO, GR No. 143958, July 11, 2003

Article 22 of the Civil Code is expressed in the maxim: MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO
PROTEST (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery
of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision
does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari
delicto doctrine.
REYES VS LIM, GR No. 134241, August 11, 2003

The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another is embodied in
Article 22 of the Civil Code. This principle applies not only to substantive rights but also to procedural
remedies. One condition for invoking this principle is that the aggrieved party has no other action based
on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law.
NDC VS MADRIGAL WAN HAI, GR No. 148332, September 30, 2003

Where the seller gives a warranty as to the ownership of the object of the sale and against any lien or
encumbrance, including tax liability, and where the buyer has paid for such tax liabilities, justice and
equity oblige the seller to reimburse the buyer for the amounts it paid. It would be unjust enrichment
on the part of the seller to be relieved of such obligation to pay tax liabilities.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
PADILLA VS CA, GR No. L-39999, May 31, 1984

What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has
been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal
for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be
availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that
such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
DONATO VS LUNA, GR No. L-53642, April 15, 1988

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative
juriset de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.
QUIAMBAO VS OSORIO, GR No. L-48157, March 16, 1988

When the actions involved in the case are civil and administrative in character, there is no prejudicial
question to speak of.
APA VS FERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 112381, March 20, 1995

A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
To justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Rule
111, 5 provides: Sec. 6 Elements of prejudicial question.The two (2) essential elements of a
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
BELTRAN VS PEOPLE, 344 SCRA 106,G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
PAHANG VS VESTIL,G.R. No. 148595, July 12, 2004

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into
play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
CIVIL PERSONALITY
GELUZ VS CA, GR No. L-16439, July 20, 1961

The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed with personality and incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the
injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
CITIZENSHIP
MERCADO VS MANZANO, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national
by the said states.For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states.Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
The phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.
REPUBLIC VS LIM, G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004

The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate
children. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
MARRIAGE
AVENIDO VS AVENIDO, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as
the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth certificate
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC, G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007

Status refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. The status of a
person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or
not. The comprehensive term status include such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relationsit is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status. There is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and
its effects.
REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex. In so ruling, the Court more than gives respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and
(2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out.
REPUBLIC VS ALBIOS, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same
Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under
said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A freely given consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that
the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real
intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties
would not be bound. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent
consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the
essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
ABBAS VS ABBAS, 689 SCRA 646, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
RONULO VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014

No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement
gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only
to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage
ceremony.
SEVILLA VS CARDENAS, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006

Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
BANGAYAN VS BANGAYAN, G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license
and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by
Article 34 where no license is necessary, shall be void from the beginning. For bigamy to exist, the
second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.
MALLION VS ALCANTARA, G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Where a person, in a previous case, has expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of his/her
marriage celebration, he/she is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. A subsequent action
for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred.
NAVARRO VS DOMAGTOY, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996

A marriage can be held outside of the judges chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1)
at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both
parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer.
Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue
of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do
so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a
Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the
venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject
the officiating official to administrative liability.
BESO VS DAGUMAN, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, January 28, 2000

Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and
not beyond.
REPUBLIC VS IYOY, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the married couple is
a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse.
REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.
The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: (1) There is a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (2) A valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
CORPUZ VS STO. TOMAS , G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the
Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution
of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse
to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse
(other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.
BORJA-MANZANO VS SANCHEZ, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, March 8, 2001

For the provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other, 3. The
fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The
parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn
statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to
marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a
prior existing marriage.
VOID MARRIAGES
SUNTAY VS SUNTAY, G.R. No. 132524, December 29, 1998

The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that a void marriage is deemed
never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the
spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are
called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged
natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in
good faith or in bad faith.
A voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage
dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions
to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in
voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89. x xx Stated otherwise, the
annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society formed by the
putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences which the marital union produced
during its continuance.
The terms annul and null and void have different legal connotations and implications. Annul means
to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do
away with whereas null and void is something that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that is
annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated through
a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares a status or condition which already
exists from the very beginning.
NIAL VS BAYADOG, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
ENRICO VS MEDINACELI, G.R. No. 173614. September 28, 2007

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death
of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.
TY V CA, G.R. No. 127406, November 27, 2000

Where the second marriage of a person was entered into in 1979, before the promulgation ofWiegel v.
Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986) and the effectivity of the Family Code, during which time the
prevailing rule was found in Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977), People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845
(1954) and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957), there was no need for a judicial declaration of nullity
of a marriage for lack of license and consent, before such person may contract a second marriage.
TERRE VS TERRE, Adm. Case No. 2349. July 3, 1992

A marriage contracted in good faith with woman already married is valid. Hence, contracting a
subsequent marriage with another woman would be bigamous.
IWASAWA VS GANGAN, G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013

A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
FUJIKI VS MARINAY, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the
parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the
wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
REPUBLIC VS OLAYBAR, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014
A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendentelite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A
direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
SANTOS VS CA, G.R. No. 112019. January 4, 1995

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties, required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriages. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
CHI MING TSOI VS CA, 266 SCRA 324, G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. Evidently, one of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-
fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. The senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
REPUBLIC VS MOLINA, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997

Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
BARCELONA VS CA, G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003

Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Only experts in
the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of
psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of
the psychological incapacity. What the new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical
manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity.
MARCOS VS MARCOS, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage, it is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
REPUBLIC VS HERMANO, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004

In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino
spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
DEDEL VS CA, G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004

Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or
sexual promiscuity.
SIAYNGCO VS SIAYNGCO, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004

Sexual infidelity, per se, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.
VILLALON VS VILLALON, G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity.
It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which
make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
FERRARIS VS FERRARIS, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006

Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
In determining the import of psychological incapacity under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction
with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 that would likewise, but for
different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that
these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the
matter.
ANTONIO VS REYES,G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006

A person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend
the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations
attached to marriage, including parenting.
PAZ VS PAZ, GR No. 166579, February 18, 2010

Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to prove the
psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder.
Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity.
SUAZO VS SUAZO, G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010

There is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition
under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists
and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
DOMINGO VS CA, G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993

A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or
a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
(Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Vitug) A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared
a nullity, albeit the preferability for, and justiciability of, such a declaration, will not give it the status or
the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific instances where certain effects of a valid
marriage can still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these cases are children of void marriages
under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure
of partition, delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the
annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or born before the judicial declaration
of nullity of such void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
BELTRAN VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000

The import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for the purposes of remarriage, the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
The accused in a case for concubinage need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for
he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final
judgment declaring his marriage void.
A subsequent pronouncement that the accuseds marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in
a charge for concubinagehe who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
BOBIS VS BOBIS, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage,
requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The
clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity
or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter
of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was
contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its
elements concurtwo of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have
been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
MERCADO VS TAN, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000

The statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragonthat there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriagehas been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such
declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we
hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
MORIGO VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004

Declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio retroacts to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage.There was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the
date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the
accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married.
CALISTERIO VS CALISTERIO, G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000

A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed
period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by
the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid until declared null and void by a competent
court. It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second
marriage.
Under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party
must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under
the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old
rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present
can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.
REPUBLIC VS NOLASCO, G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of
the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the
absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed
dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes a
"well founded belief' that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive
death can be granted.
There are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code: "1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years
if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in
Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a
well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee."
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
The spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the
conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage.
REPUBLIC VS CANTOR, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013

The Family Code was explicit that the courts judgment in summary proceedings, such as the declaration
of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be immediately
final and executory.
The Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage, has consistently
applied the strict standard approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws.
Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter standard required by
the Family Code is met.
REPUBLIC VS CA, G.R. No. 159614, December 9, 2005

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Belief is a state
of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a
determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits,
conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and
are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or
throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or
is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries
made by present spouse.
REPUBLIC VS LORINO, G.R. No. 160258, January 19, 2005

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which
to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section
247, Family Code, supra, are immediately final and executory.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is
immediately final and executory. Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all
judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are immediately final and
executory, the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein.
MANUEL VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law. The phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
because the drafters of the law were of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which
provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of
presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy.
The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the
spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely
because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere
testimony is found incredible. The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State.
The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or
general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the
proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over
transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community. In a real sense, there are three parties to
every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State.
CARIO VS CARIO, G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
ANAYA VS PALAROAN, GR No. L-27930, November 26, 1970

Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by
the last paragraph of Article 86, Civil Code. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital
lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the
law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into
an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain,
the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
AQUINO VS DELIZO, GR No. L-15853, July 27, 1960

Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other
than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage (Art. 85, par. (4) in
relation to Art. 86, par. (3), New Civil Code).
JIMENEZ VS REPUBLIC, GR No. L-12790, 31 August 1960

The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence,
to annul a marriage. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption
is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
LEGAL SEPARATION
OCAMPO VS FLORENCIANO, GR No. L-13553, February 23, 1960

Where there is evidence of the adultery independently of the defendant's statement agreeing to the
legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted, since it would not be based on the
confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based
exclusively on defendant's confession.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
BUGAYONG VS GINES, 100 SCRA 616,G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or, as
stated in I Bouver's Law Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a
husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed".
LAPERAL VS REPUBLIC, GR No. L-18008, October 30, 1962

A womans married status is not affected by a decree of legal separation, there being no severance of
the vinculum, and under Article 372 of the New Civil Code, she must continue using the name and
surname employed by her before the separation.
ONG VS ONG, GR No. 153206, October 23, 2006

The Constitution provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be protected by the
State, thus the rule is the preservation of the marital union and not its infringement; only for grounds
enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should be clearly and convincingly proven, can
the courts decree a legal separation among the spouses.With the enactment of the Family Code, this has
been accomplished as it defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND & WIFE
ARROYO VS ARROYO, GR No. 17014, August 11, 1921

Where the wife is forced to leave the marital home by ill-treatment from her husband, he can be
compelled to provide for her separate maintenance, without regard to whether a cause for divorce
exists or not.
Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should
move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this
step involves a recognition of the anomalous de facto separation of the spouses. From this consideration
it follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it
appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary
from the fault of the husband.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
PELAYO VS LAURON, GR No. 4089, January 12, 1909

Among the reciprocal obligations existing between a husband and wife is that of support, which
obligation is established by law. Where a husband whom the law compels to support his wife is living,
the father and mother-in-law of the latter are under no liability to provide for her.
ILUSORIO VS BILDNER, G.R. No. 139789, May 12, 2000

When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be enforced
under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power
is unnecessary.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans free
choice.
DE LA CAMARA VS RUEDA, GR No. 11263, November 2, 1916

The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her part, may
maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy,
notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to furnish
support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his
own home the one having the right to the same.
PROPERTY RELATIONS
JOCSON VS CA, G.R. No. 55322, February 16, 1989

According to law and jurisprudence, it is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property. The presumption under Article 160
of the Civil Code refers to property acquired during the marriage. Where there is no showing as to when
the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is determinative.
TODA VS CA, 153 SCRA 713, G.R. Nos. 78583-4, March 26, 1990
Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, 14 "(i)n the absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
in virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of
the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It,
therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial approval, without which it is void.15 Furthermore,
Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the
issuance of a decree of separation of property.
WONG VS IAC, G.R. No. 70082, August 19, 1991

Properties acquired during the marriage presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. In the
determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during coverture, the controlling factor
is the source of the money utilized in the purchase.
VALDES VSRTC QUEZON CITY, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may
be, of the Family Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household. Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couples separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
ESTONINA VS CA, 266 SCRA 627, G.R. No. 111547, January 27, 1997
Article 160 of the Civil Code that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership applies
only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of
acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor
of the conjugal partnership.
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS CA, G.R. No. 118305, February 12, 1998
Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly
so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
On the other hand, no presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of
surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be
presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
GUIANG VS CA, G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998

The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of
the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.
Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
FERRER VS FERRER, G.R. No. 166496, November 29, 2006

When the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the
property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the
conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the
time of the improvement, otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse
ALINAS VS ALINAS, G.R. No. 158040, April 14, 2008

By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written
consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
DOCENA VS LAPESURA, G.R. No. 140153, March 28, 2001

Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the
sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The
husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife.
Corollarily, the husband alone may execute the necessary certificate of non-forum shopping to
accompany the pleading. The husband as the statutory administrator of the conjugal property could
have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone, without the concurrence of the wife. If suits
to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may be filed by the husband alone, with more reason,
he may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to the petition.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and the wife
jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act
together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention
of the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. It is believed that even
under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari
and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of
Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping
only by the husband is not a fatal defect.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
MANALO VS CAMAISA, G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002

The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in
appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus,
Article 124 of the Family Code provides: The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse
is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerers.
CARLOS VS ABELARDO, G.R. No. 146504, April 9, 2002

Where the husband did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife,
but the loan undoubtedly redounded to the benefit of the family when it was used to purchase the
house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family, he shall be solidarily liable
for such loan together with his wife, notwithstanding his alleged lack of consent, under Art. 121 of the
Family Code.
RELUCIO VS LOPEZ, G.R. No. 138497, January 16, 2002

Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit: If a spouse without just cause abandons the
other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the
court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of
the conjugal partnership property. The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely
between them, to the exclusion of all other persons.
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK VSDAILO, G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005
The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife
place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and
those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute
community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their
marriage settlements.
BEUMER VS AMORES, G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012

A foreigner husband cannot claim for reimbursement against his former Filipina spouse for the value of
parcels of Philippine land purchased during the subsistence of their marriage. He cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7,
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
MULLER VS MULLER, G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006

The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Assuming that it was theforeigner
husbands intention that a lot be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the
property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously
and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void.
The foreigner husband had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the
same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a
husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of
the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the
alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as
to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
The distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise.
To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is
not allowed to own.
AGAPAY VS PALANG, G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be
no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial
order or, without judicial conferment, when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlement;
Where the judgment which resulted from the parties compromise was not specifically and expressly for
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
separation of property, the same should not be so inferred as judicial confirmation of separation of
property.
TUMLOS VS FERNANDEZ,G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are not legally capacitated to marry each
other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of a property acquired
during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence,
mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.
Nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a
contribution in its acquisition.
MALLILIN, JR. VS CASTILLO, G.R. No. 136803, June 16, 2000

Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to cases in which a man and a woman live together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage provided they are not incapacitated or are without
impediment to marry each other or in which the marriage is void ab initio.
Article 148 of the Family Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a
woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if
the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.
FEHR VS FEHR, G.R. No. 152716, October 23, 2003

For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2)
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void.
SAGUID VS CA, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003

Proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential where the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship
is involved. Fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
ATIENZA VS DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION
HONTIVEROS VS RTC ILOILO CITY, G.R. No. 125465, June 29, 1999
The inclusion of parties who are not members of the same family takes the case out of the ambit of
Article 151 of the Family Code; The phrase members of the same family refers to the husband and
wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-
blood, but does not include brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law.
GUERRERO VS RTC OF ILOCOSNORTE, G.R. No. 109068, January 10, 1994

Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word No, the requirement is
mandatory that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that, *i+f it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
The attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a
suit between members of the same family.
HIYAS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC. VS ACUA, G.R. No. 154132, August 31, 2006
It is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just
happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its
members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among
themselves. x xx. Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same
family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a
compromise before the action can prosper.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
FAVISVS FAVIS, G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014

A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the
same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action.
Versoza was cited in a later case as an instance analogous to one where the conciliation process at the
barangay level was not priorly resorted to. Both were described as a condition precedent for the filing
of a complaint in Court. In such instances, the consequence is precisely what is stated in the present
Rule. Thus: x xx The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a motion
to dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere procedural imperfection which does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court.
FAMILY HOME
MODEQUILLO VS BREVA, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as
required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as
contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest
before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
Exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
MANACOP VS COURT OF APPEALS,G.R. No. 104875, November 13, 1992

Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Articles 152
and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of
the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
PATRICIO VS DARIO III, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last
during ones lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a
family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband and the
wife or by an unmarried head of a family. The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by any of
its beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is something real, or actually existing, as
opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual
occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be
occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-
laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely
excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.
Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a
minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
ANDAL VS MACARAIG, 89 Phil 165,G.R. No. L-2474, May 30, 1951

A child is presumed to be the legitimate son of a husband and his wife, having been born within three
hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage. That presumption can only be rebutted by proof
that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days
of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. The fact that the wife has committed adultery cannot
overcome this presumption.
Although the husband was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious
that he could hardly move and get up from his bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse, yet that
is no evidence of impotency, nor does it prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons
suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more
inclined to sexual intercourse.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
BABIERA VS CATOTAL, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000

A legitimate child has the requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the birth certificate of one
claiming to be a child of the formers mother.
Article 171 of the Family Code applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his
wifes child, i.e., to declare that such child is an illegitimate child, but not to an action to establish that
such child is not the wifes child at all.
BENITEZ-BADUA VS CA, G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994

A careful reading of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code will show that they do not
contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a
certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own
a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child
by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the
first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological
or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived
through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.
JAO VS CA, GR No. L-49162, July 28, 1987

Blood grouping test can establish conclusively that the man is not the father of the child but not
necessarily that a man is the father of a particular child.
ILANO VS CA, G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994

Before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of paternity either voluntarily or
by court action. This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural
child has no rights from his parents or to their estate because his rights spring not from the filiation or
blood relationship but from his acknowledgement by the parent. In other words, the rights of an
illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his parents but because under the
law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child.
TAYAG VS CA, G.R. No. 95229, June 9, 1992

Where a complaint for recognition was filed before the Family Code took effect, the same should be
resolved under the provisions of the New Civil Code.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
CABATANIA VS CA, G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004

An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the
family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is
required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be
issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the
information of a third person.
While a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to
the childs paternity.
Certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in
evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove
the same.
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded
on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
SALAS VS MATUSALEM, G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013

Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to
prove paternity. As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of
affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to show that he is the father of said
child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis- -vis Article
175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of
filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws, like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence,
the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
The death of the putative father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one
claiming to be his illegitimate child.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
SAYSON VS CA, G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992

A child's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party. The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code x xx does
not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy
of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that by the proper parties, and within
the period limited by law. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.
LIYAO, JR. VS TANHOTI-LIYAO, G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002

Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases,
his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which
the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity
or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.
It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress; The child himself
cannot choose his own filiationif the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the
legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child
of his mothers alleged paramour.
It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
DE JESUS VS ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOADIZON, G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and
no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending
to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to
establish the childs acknowledgment.
The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in
exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child
born to his wifeit is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
CONCEPCION VS CA,G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to
protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides: The child shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception. The law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth.
Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child,
as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the
legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following
the termination of marriage is sought to be established.
A record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. As prima facie evidence,
the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not
conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested
parties.
AGUSTIN VS CA, G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005

Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific
ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification
and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI)
DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child
are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate
to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress.
DE SANTOS VS ANGELES, Gr No. 105619, December 12, 1995

Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states that only natural children can be legitimated. Children born
outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by
any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of
conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
REPUBLIC VS CAPOTE, GR NO. 157043, February. 2, 2007

An illegitimate child never recognized by his father is entitled to change his name a change of name
will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father, and it is also to his best interest as it
will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United States. The Court will not
stand in the way of reunification of mother and son.
BRIONES VS MIGUEL, Gr No. 156343, October 18, 2004

The recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give
support to, but not custody of the child. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate
child; in such a case the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.
IN RE CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN LIN, Gr No. 159966, March 30, 2005

Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish
him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their
father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a
given name and his mothers surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle
name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged illegitimate child.
GRANDE VS ANTONIO, Gr No. 206248, February 18, 2014

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or
not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the
right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must
abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children
ADOPTION (RA 9523)
CERVANTES VS FAJARDO, Gr No. 79955, January 27, 1989

A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents
over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the
adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses.
The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental
authority and responsibility over him.
TAMARGO VS CA, 209 SCRA 519, GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992

The Court does not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to
impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or
physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the
petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor
of the adopted child.
CANG VS CA, Gr No. 105308, September 25, 1998

The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned
the child or that such parent is insane of hopelessly intemperate.
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports any conduct of
the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and
support which parents owe their children. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral
desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
REPUBLIC VS CA, Gr No. 92326, January 24, 1992

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the
person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these
noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
LAHOM VS SIBULO, Gr No. 143989, July 14, 2003

In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State
Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552
secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status
of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the
right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever
the legal ties created by adoption.
IN RE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE ASTORGA, Gr No. 148311, March 31, 2005
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in
general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation.The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of
paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for
all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.
SUPPORT
LACSON VS LACSON, Gr No. 150644, August 28, 2006

When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when
urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual,
with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family
relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of
the giver and to the needs of the recipient.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS, Gr No. 143363, February 6, 2002

Special parental authority under Article 218 of the Family Code applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Under Article 219 of the
Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
under their supervision, instruction or custody.For a school to be liable, there must be a finding that the
act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.
VANCIL VS BELMES, Gr No. 132223, June 19, 2001

Parents are placed first in rank in matters of parental authority. It includes the right and duty to the
custody of the child, excepting only, of course, what might otherwise be best for the childs welfare.
Surviving grandparent can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of parents.
(Concurring opinion of Justice Vitug) When the law speaks of family relations, it must be deemed to
refer, unless the contrary is there indicated or the context of the law otherwise clearly conveys, to both
legitimate and illegitimate ties. The childs legitimacy does not in any way affect the order of priority in
the exercise of parental authority.
PEREZ VS CA, Gr No. 118870, March 29, 1996

It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best
interest of the child. No less than an international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
provides: In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child
shall be a primary consideration.
DAVID VS CA, Gr No. 111180, November 16, 1995

Where the mother of an illegitimate child has been deprived of her rightful custody by the childs father,
she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. The fact that the father of an illegitimate child
has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not
for giving him custody of the child.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
ESPIRITU VS CA, Gr No. 115640, March 15, 1995

In ascertaining the welfare and the best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code
to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes
that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong, but it is not conclusive. It can be
overcome by compelling reasons. If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court
is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award
custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
The welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time
that either parent is chosen to be the custodian.
SANTOS VS CA, Gr No. 113054, March 16, 1995

Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully
assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latters
needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the
education of their hearts and senses.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in
cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows
waiver only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan
institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation
of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
LIBI VS IAC, Gr. No. 70890, September 18, 1992

The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses
committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
CASES IN PROPERTY
REPUBLIC VS DE GUZMAN, Gr No. 137887, February 28, 2000

Possession of a public land, while still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, could not ripen into private ownership and should be excluded
from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous possession in concept of owner. Land
classified as forest land may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain only be a
release in an official proclamation to that effect.
ISAGUIRRE VS DE LARA, Gr No. 138053, May 31, 2000

A possessor in bad faith may only claim reimbursement for necessary expenses and not for any useful
expenses which he may have incurred.
BENITEZ VS CA, Gr No. 104828, January 16, 1997

Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment. This is one of the distinctions
between forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical
possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; thus, he
must allege and prove prior possession. But in unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or
implied. In such a case, prior physical possession is not required.
Possession can also be acquired, not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is
subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right. Possession of land can be acquired upon the execution of the deed of sale thereof by its
vendor. Actual or physical occupation is not always necessary.
BENITEZ VS CA, Gr No. 104828, January 16, 1997

Article 448 of the Civil Code is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on which another in good
faith builds, plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner.
The option is to sell, not to buy, and it is the landowner's choice. Not even a declaration of the builder,
planter, or sower's bad faith shifts this option to him per Article 450 of the Civil Code. This advantage in
Article 448 is accorded the landowner because "his right is older, and because, by the principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing." There can be no pre-emptive right to
buy even as a compromise, as this prerogative belongs solely to the landowner. No compulsion can be
legally forced on him, contrary to what petitioners asks from this Court. Such an order would certainly
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
be invalid and illegal. Thus, the lower courts were correct in rejecting the petitioners' offer to buy the
encroached land.
VDA. NAZARENO VS CA, Gr No. 98045, June 26, 1996

Accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of
these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be
the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if
present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion
gradually received from the effects of the current of waters.
In Republic vs. CA, this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of
the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused
by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus,
in Tiongco vs. Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the
water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate
intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. In
the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley
Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations.
DBP VS CA, Gr No. 109946, February 9, 1996

A land still subject of a Free Patent Application cannot be validly mortgaged.
PLEASANTVILLE VS CA, Gr No. 79688, February 1, 1996

Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of
any defect or flaw in his title. Good faith is presumed. Violation of the contract of sale on instalment
may not be the basis to negate the presumption that the builder was in good faith. Such violations has
no bearing whatsoever on whether the builder was in good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time
he built improvements on the lot in question.
GEMINIANO VS CA, Gr No. 120303, July 24, 1996

While the right to let property is an incident of title and possession, a person may be a lessor and occupy
the position of a landlord to the tenant although he is not the owner of the premises let. After all,
ownership of the property is not transferred, only the temporary use and enjoyment thereof.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Article 448 in relation to Article 546 of the Civil Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful
improvement and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made applied only to a possessor in
good faith. It does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract;
otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to improve his landlord out of the property.
LEUNG VS STRONG MACHINERY, 37 PHIL. 44, G.R. No. L-11658, February 15, 1918
The mere fact that the parties to a mortgage seem to have dealt with the building with strong materials
as separate and apart from the land on which it stood, in no wise changed its character as real property.
It follows that neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery
installed therein, nor the annotation in that registry of the sale of the mortgaged property, had any
effect whatever so far as the building, being a real property, was concerned.
MENDOZA VS ALINAS,G.R. No. 152827, February 6, 2007

Under Article 433 of the Civil Code, one who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another
must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The term "judicial process" could
mean no less than an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the
contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.
TECNOGAS VS CA, G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997

Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the
owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice
to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticality of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law
has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements
after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the
sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option,
because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of
the accessory thing.
NAVARRO VS IAC, G.R. No. 68166 February 12, 1997

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows: Lands added to the shores
by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain.
When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government
shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment
thereof.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed
land in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the
foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public
uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses,
it is not capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization
granted in due form by a competent authority."
ROBLES VS CA, G.R. No. 123509, March 14, 2000

Based on Article 476 of the Civil Code, an action to quiet title is a common-law remedy for the removal
of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or
complainant to have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject
matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud
on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy.
It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor
of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have
been made known to the other co-owner; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
VDA. DE AVILES VS CA, G.R. No. 95748 November 21, 1996

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary
dispute. There is no allegation or evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, written contract, or
paper showing any color of title in the defendant, which could cast a shadow on the title of
complainants to any part of the land; there is no overlapping of description in the muniments held by
either. The land of complainants and defendant join. The line which separates them is in dispute and is
to be determined by evidence aliunde.
DEL CAMPO VS CA, G.R. No. 108228, February 1, 2001

Well-settled is the doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right
to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment.
A co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition
among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at
all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-
owner/vendors undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-
owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words,
the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share
in the property held in common.
QUINTOS VS NICOLAS, G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014

There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. Thus, on the one hand, a co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and
over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion
which is truly abstract. On the other hand, there is no co-ownership when the different portions owned
by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
technically described.
Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and his
proper remedy is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which he may bring at
anytime in so far as his share is concerned. The law generally does not favor the retention of co-
ownership as a property relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners specific shares
so as to prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo.
HEIRS SERASPI VS CA, G.R. No. 135602, April 28, 2000

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary, depending
on whether the property is possessed in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
As Art. 1129 provides: For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.
Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing
was its owner but could not transmit the ownership thereof.
CATAPUSAN VS CA, G.R. No. 109262 November 21, 1996

In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first
makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of
ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie
if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires
the party filing the action to state in his complaint the "nature and extent of his title" to the real estate.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition
of the properties.
VERDAD VS CA, G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996

Article 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty
days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The
deed of safe shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the
vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding
actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner
in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and
status.
TABUSO VS CA, G.R. No. 108558, June 21, 2001

It must be stressed that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a
thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and
consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the
right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. xxx. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding
of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a
thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an
owner and possession of a holder. Possessors in the concept of owners may be the owners themselves
or those who claim to be so. On the other hand, those who possess as mere holders acknowledge in
another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.
CEQUEA VS BOLANTE, G.R. No. 137944, April 6, 2000

Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere
prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the
absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not
prove ownership.
QUIMEN VS CA, G.R. No. 112331, May 29, 1996

An easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the
latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property,
for the benefit of another person or tenement. It is jus in re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and
perpetual, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. A right of way in particular is a privilege
constituted by covenant or granted by law to a person or class of persons to pass over another's
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
property when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet
to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way through the
servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property.
The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate
is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant
estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant
estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance
although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least
prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance;
while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most
convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur
in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest.
STA. MARIA VS CA, G.R. No. 127549 January 28, 1998

It must be stressed that under Article 651 the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which
is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time.
Therefore, the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement.
CRUZ VS CRISTOBAL, G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006

Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not
involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement
of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit.
Absence any strong or compelling reason, this Court is not disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to
prejudice or defeat the rights of an owner. Laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled
by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice. Neither
should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has
been fraudulently registered in the name of another.
CANORECO VS CA, G.R. No. 109338, November 20, 2000
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Electric cooperatives are vested with the power of eminent domain. The acquisition of an easement of a
right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain.
A simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. The acquisition of this
easement, nevertheless, is not gratis.Considering the nature and effect of the installation power lines,
the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives the owner of its ordinary use,
entitling them to just compensation.
VILLANUEVA VS VELASCO, G.R. No. 130845, November 27, 2000

A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and
becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to
which it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The essential requisites for an
easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due
to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
COSTABELLA CORPORATION VS CA, G.R. No. 80511, January 25, 1991

It is already well-established that an easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot be
acquired by prescription.
The owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he has
established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper
indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is
at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the
foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
The isolation of the dominant estate is also dependent on the particular need of the dominant owner,
and the estate itself need not be totally landlocked. What is important to consider is whether or not a
right of way is necessary to fill a reasonable need therefor by the owner. Thus, as Manresa had pointed
out, if the passageway consists of an "inaccessible slope or precipice," it is as if there is no passageway,
that is, one that can sufficiently fulfill the dominant owner's necessities, although by the existence of
that passageway the property cannot be truly said that the property is isolated. So also, while an existing
right of way may have proved adequate at the start, the dominant owner's need may have changed
since then, for which Article 651 of the Code allows adjustments as to width.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
ENCARNACION VS CA, G.R. No. 77628, March 11, 1991

Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be that
which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to
time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which
ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these needs may vary from time to time.
When the easement is of a continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of the value of
the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article 649
of the Civil Code.
DIONISIO VS ORTIZ, G.R. No. 95738, December 10, 1991

One cannot assert a right of way when by their own or voluntary act, they themselves have caused the
isolation of their property from the access road. Article 649 of Civil Code provides that easement is not
compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts. Mere convenience is
not enough to serve as basis for the assertion of a right of way.
CABATINGAN VS THE HEIRS OF CABATINGAN, G.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002

In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still
alive. In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be
taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means
of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3) That the transfer should
be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
GONZALES VS CA, G.R. No. 110335, June 18, 2001

As between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is required is for said donation
to be contained in a public document.Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and
effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of
Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds). Although the non-registration of a deed of donation
shall not affect its validity, the necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third persons
are affected.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
REPUBLIC VS SILIM, G.R. No. 140487, April 2, 2001

The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly
communicated to the donor. Where donor was aware of the acceptance of the done as she in fact
confirmed it later and requested that the donated property be not registered during her lifetime, the
Court cannot in conscience declare the donation ineffective because there is no notation in the
extrajudicial settlement of the donee's acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on mere form
over substance.
QUILALA VSALCANTARA, G.R. No. 132681, December 3, 2001

Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in a public instrument
in order to be valid, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title
over the property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of
the acceptance by the done, provided the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting
the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the property. The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the
lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It may be made in the same deed or in a separate public
document, and the donor must know the acceptance by the donee.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA VS CA, G.R. No. 77425, June 19, 1991
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code, an action for the revocation of a donation
must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the
same is not applicable where the deed of donation expressly provides for automatic reversion of the
property donated in case of violation of the condition therein. Hence, a judicial declaration revoking the
same is not necessary.
When a deed of donation expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property
donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of
the Civil Code.
The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the automatic reversion of the
donated property to the donor upon non-compliance of the condition has been upheld. Said stipulation
is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of
breach, without need of going to court, and that, upon the happening of the resolutory condition or
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need
of a judicial declaration to that effect.
The prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of the property for an entire century,
being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be
declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code.
Such condition shall be considered as not imposed.
REPUBLIC VS GUZMAN, G.R. No. 13296, February 18, 2000

There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b)
the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus
donandi.
When acceptance is made in a separate public writing, the notice of the acceptance must be noted not
only in the document containing the acceptance but also in the deed of donation. Then and only then is
the donation perfected. Thus, in Santos v. Robledo we emphasized that when the deed of donation is
recorded in the registry of property the document that evidences the acceptance if this has not been
made in the deed of gift should also be recorded. And in one or both documents, as the case may be,
the notification of the acceptance as formally made to the donor or donors should be duly set
forth. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the
acceptance made in a separate instrument is either not given to the donor or else noted in the deed of
donation, and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.
GESTOPA VS CA, G.R. No. 111904, October 5, 2000

In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read together. Where the
granting clause shows that the donor donated the properties out of love and affection for the done, this
is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor
intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. Third, the donor reserved sufficient
properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor
intended to part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. An acceptance
clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.
Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees
during the donors' lifetime.
A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the
donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
NOCEDA VS CA, G.R. No. 119730 September 2, 1999

The action to revoke (a donation) by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted
from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring
the action.
IMPERIAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC. VS CA, G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999
The Civil Code specifies the following instances of reduction or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in
cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; (2) four years, for non-
compliance with conditions of the donation; and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his
relatives entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their support.
Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of
impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason we must
resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the
obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent
that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
EDUARTE VS CA, G.R. No. 105944, February 9, 1996

Citing Tolentinos Commentaries in Civil Code: Offense Against Donor. - All crimes which offend the
donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation. There is no doubt, therefore, that the donee who
commits adultery with the wife of the donor, gives cause for revocation by reason of ingratitude. The
crimes against the person of the donor would include not only homicide and physical injuries, but also
illegal detention, threats, and coercion; those against honor include offenses against chastity; and those
against the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. [Manresa 175-
176].
THE CITY OF ANGELES VS CA, G.R. No. 97882, August 28, 1996
The amendment in Sec. 31 of P.D. 957 makes a legal obligation on the subdivision owner / developer to
donate the open space for parks and playgrounds.Although there is a proviso that the donation of the
parks and playgrounds may be made to the homeowners association of the project with the consent of
the city or municipality concerned, nonetheless, the owner/developer is still obligated under the law to
donate. Such option does not change the mandatory character of the provision. The donation has to be
made regardless of which donee is picked by the owner/developer.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
CASES IN SUCCESSION
USON VS DEL ROSARIO, GR No. L-4963, January 29, 1953

The right of ownership of the lawful wife of a decedent who had died before the new Civil Code took
effect became vested in her upon his death, and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law
which commands that the rights of suc-cession are transmitted from the moment of death.The new
right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot be
asserted to the impairment of the vested right of the lawful wife over the lands in dispute. While Article
2253 of the new Civil Code provides that rights which are declared for the first time shall have
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former
legislation, yet this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the
same origin.
Although the lawful wife has expressly renounced her right to inherit any future property that her
husband may acquire and leave upon his death, such renunciation cannot be entertained for the simple
reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
CORONEL VS COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 103577, October 7, 1996

Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent
and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his
will or by operation of law. Sons and daughters of the deceased father are compulsory heirs who are
called to succession by operation of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last breath, the children
stepped into his shoes insofar as the property is concerned, such that any rights or obligations
pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE AGUSTIN MONTILLA VS MONTILLA, GR No. L-4170, January 31, 1952
The creditor of an heir of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which
pertains by inheritance to said heir, only after all the debts of the testate or intestate auccession have
been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the debts of
the deceased must be paid before his heirs can inherit.
A person who is not a creditor of the deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene either in
the proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
LEDESMA VS MCLACHLIN, GR No. 44837, November 23, 1938

The claim for the payment of an indebtedness contracted by a deceased person cannot be filed for its
collection before the committee on claims and appraisal appointed in the intestate of his father, and the
properties inherited from the latter by the children of said deceased do not answer for the payment of
the indebtedness contracted during the lifetime of said person.
DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION VSCA, G.R. No. 118248, April 5, 2000

Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and
obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of
law.
The nature of intransmissible rights as explained by Arturo Tolentino, an eminent civilist, is as follows:
Among contracts which are intransmissible are those which are purely personal, either by provision of
law, such as in cases of partnerships and agency, or by the very nature of the obligations arising
therefrom, such as those requiring special personal qualifications of the obligor. It may also be stated
that contracts for the payment of money debts are not transmitted to the heirs of a party, but constitute
a charge against his estate. In American jurisprudence, (W)here acts stipulated in a contract require the
exercise of special knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, experience, judgment, discretion, integrity, or
other personal qualification of one or both parties, the agreement is of a personal nature, and
terminates on the death of the party who is required to render such service.
There is privity of interest between an heir and his deceased predecessorhe only succeeds to what
rights his predecessor had and what is valid and binding against the latter is also valid and binding as
against the former.
ARUEGO, JR. VS CA, G.R. No. 112193, March 13, 1996

The action for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to
the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect when its application
will prejudice vested rights.
LORENZO VS POSADAS, GR No. 43082, June 18, 1937

If death is the generating source from which the power of the state to impose inheritance taxes takes its
being and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the right of the state to tax
vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the estate as it stood at the time of the
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
decedent's death, regardless of any subsequent contingency affecting value or any subsequent increase
or decrease in value.
CASTAEDA VS ALEMANY, GR No. 1439, March 19, 1904
If a will is signed by the testator or by someone else in his presence and under his express direction, it is
a matter of indifference by whom the mechanical work of writing the will is done. The probate of a will
is conclusive as to its due execution and as to the testamentary capacity of the testator, but not as to
the validity of any provisions made in the will. In proceedings for the allowance or probate of a will, the
courts are without jurisdiction to determine questions concerning the validity of the provisions of the
will.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PROBATION OF THE WILL OF JOSE RIOSA, GR No. 14074, November 7, 1918
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be
tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have
no retrospective effect. This is the rule adopted in the Philippine Islands.
IN RE: WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE DECEASED REVEREND ABADIA, GR No. L-7188, August 9, 1954
The validity of a will as to form is to be judged not by the law in force at the time of the testator's death
or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the
court, but at the time the instrument was executed.
From the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under
it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the Constitution against a
subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills, which would
invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to
observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be
regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession,
and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to
execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested
rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void
wills.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEPH G. BRIMO, GR No. 22595, November 1, 1924

If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that he respect the testator's order that his property be
distributed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines and not in accordance with the laws of his
nation, said condition is illegal, because, according to article 10 of the Civil Code, said laws govern his
testamentary disposition, and, being illegal, shall be considered unwritten, thus making the institution
unconditional.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, GR No. L-23678, June 6, 1967

The decedent's national law governs the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and capacity to succeed.Where the decedent was a citizen
of Texas and under Texas laws there are no forced heirs, the system of legitimes in Philippine law cannot
be applied to the succession to the decedent's testate because the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the decedent's will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law.
Whatever public policy and good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. It has specifically chosen the
decedent's national law to govern, inter alia, the amount of successional rights. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones. A provision in a foreigner's will that his properties should be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not in accordance with his national law is void, being contrary to
article 16 of the New Civil Code.
BUGNAO VS UBAG, GR No. 4445, September 18, 1909

A mere lapse of memory on the part of one of the witnesses to a will as to the precise details of an
unimportant incident, to which his attention was not directed, does not necessarily put in doubt the
truth and veracity of the testimony in support of the execution of the will.
BAGTAS VS PAGUIO, GR No. 6801, March 14,1912

Where notes are made by a testator of the disposition he desires to make of his property, from which an
attorney prepares a formal will which is read to the testator, who assents to it section by section, after
which the whole will is read in a loud voice and is then signed by the testator and four witnesses in the
presence of each other, the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure are fully complied with.
When a testator has never been adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, there is a
presumption of mental soundness which must be overcome by competent proof. To constitute a sound
mind and disposing memory, it is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired,
and unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning f
faculties. Failure of memory is not sufficient unless it be total or extends to his immediate family or
property.
NEYRA VS NEYRA, CA-No. 8075, March 25, 1946
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old age, nor ill health, nor the
fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he might sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will.
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors, who testified for the opponents to the probate of a
will, to the effect that it tended to destroy mental capacity, was held not to affect the full possession of
the mental faculties deemed necessary and sufficient for its execution. The testatrix was held to have
been compos mentis, in spite of the physician's testimony to the contrary, to the effect that she was
very weak, being in the third or last stage of tuberculosis. The testimony of the attending physician that
the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose condition for several days, prior
to his death, was held not sufficient to establish testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive
statement of several credible witnesses that he was conscious and able to understand what was said to
him and to communicate his desires.
ACOP VS PARAISO, GR No. 28946, January 16, 1929

The decedent's alleged will, being written in English, a language unknown to said decedent, cannot be
probated, because it is prohibited by the law, which clearly and positively requires that the will be
written in the language or dialect known by the testator.
JABONETA VS GUSTILO, GR No. 1641, January 19, 1906

The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they
actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do
so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the
moment of inscription of each signature
AVERA VS GARCIA, GR No. 15566, September 14, 1921

When the petition for probate of a will is contested, the proponent should introduce all three of the
attesting witnesses, if alive and within reach of the process of the court; and the execution of the will
cannot be considered sufficiently proved by the testimony of only one, without satisfactory explanation
of the failure to produce the other two.
Nevertheless, in a case where the attorney for the contestants raised no question upon this point in the
court below, either at the hearing upon the petition or in the motion to rehear, it is held that an
objection to the probate of the will on the ground that only one attesting witness was examined by the
proponent of the will, without accounting for the absence of the others, cannot be made for the first
time in this court. A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the requirements of existing
law is not rendered invalid by the fact that the paginal signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses
appear in the right margin instead of the left.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
ICASIANO VS ICASIANO, 11 SCRA 423, G.R. No. L-18979, June 30, 1964
Allegations of fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other. Their joining
as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will.
Inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his signature to one page of a will not fatal.
CAGRO VS CAGRO, 92 Phil. 1033, G.R. No. L-5826, April 29, 1953
The attestation clause is 'a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will' required by
law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned
attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures
at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
NERA VS RIMANDO, 18 Phil. 450, G.R. No. L-5971, February 27, 1911
The position of testator and of the witnesses to a will, at the moment of the subscription by each, must
be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so.
The question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument
in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast
upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but whether at that moment existing
conditions and the position of the parties, with relation to each other, were such that by merely casting
their eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign.
CANEDA VS CA, G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993

The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written
is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any
increase or decrease in the pages; whereas the subscription of the signatures of the testator and the
attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of authentication and identification, and thus indicates that
the will is the very same instrument executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses.
Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare the due execution of the
will as embodied in the attestation clause. The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal
guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof. As it appertains only to
the witnesses and not to the testator, it need be signed only by them. Where it is left unsigned, it would
result in the invalidation of the will as it would be possible and easy to add the clause on a subsequent
occasion in the absence of the testator and the witnesses.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
CRUZ VS VILLASOR, GR No.L-32213, November 26, 1973

The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To
acknowledge before means to avow; to own as genuine, to assent, to admit, and before means in
front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public
himself, he would have to avow, assent or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This
cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other
to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements.
That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting witnesses. For then he
would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of
his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position and the very purpose of the acknowledgment,
which is to minimize fraud would be thwarted.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF LABRADOR,

G.R. Nos. 83843-44, April 5, 1990
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in a holographic will. The
only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator.
AJERO VS CA, G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides the cases in which wills shall be disallowed. In the same
vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code enumerates the grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists are
exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.
In a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the
instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedents last will and testament; (2) whether said will was
executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the
necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of
the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
KALAW VS RELOVA, GR No. L-40207, September 28, 1984
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole,
but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
Where a holographic will has designate only one heir to the entire estate and the designation was
cancelled and another sole heir designated, without the cancellation being authenticated by full
signature of testator, entire will is void.
VDA. DE PEREZ VS TOLETE, G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994

The respective wills ofAmerican citizens will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the
following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines: Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in
which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those
which this Code prescribes. Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New
York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the
Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the
testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted
to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills.
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators reciprocal benefit or
for the benefit of a third person.
TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN VS BOHANAN, G.R. No. L-12105, January 30, 1960
Where the old Civil Code prevails at the time of the death of the decedent, which provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be governed by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, and the decedent whose foreign national law has been taken judicial notice of
by the Court allows the testator to dispose of his property according to his will, the testamentary
provisions are affirmed, although the dispositions for his children are short of the legitime given them by
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
AZNAR VS GARCIA, 7 SCRA 95,G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963

Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the national law shall govern intestate and testamentary
successions. Where the decedent is an alien and a resident of this country, and his national law
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testators domicile, Philippine law
will govern his testamentary dispositions.
TESTATE ESTATE OF MALOTO, 158 SCRA 451, GR No. 76464, Feb 29, 1988
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will does not per se constitute an effective revocation,
unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative
that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person
but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying
that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
MOLO VS MOLO, G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951

A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason
that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure
as to making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said
revocatory clause is void
TOLENTINO VS FRANCISCO, 57 PHIL 749, G.R. No. L-35993, December 19, 1932
When a will is contested it is the duty of the proponent to call all of the attesting witnesses, if available
but the validity of the will in no wise depends upon the united support of the will by all of those
witnesses. A will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the
subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or others, in proving all the facts upon which the
validity of the will rests. It is sufficient if the court is satisfied from all the proof that the will was
executed and attested in the manner required by law.
MERCADO VS SANTOS, 57 Phil. 749, G.R. No. 45629, September 22, 1938
A criminal action for falsification of will, will not lie after its admission to probate. This is the effect of the
probate of a will. The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice
by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and
when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.
NUGUID VS NUGUID, 17 SCRA 449,G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966

Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance in turn is a testamentary disposition depriving any
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. The effects flowing from
preterition are totally different form those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 shall annul
the institution of an heir. This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary
dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918, such
disinheritance shall also annul the institution of the heirs but only insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited, which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. In disinheritance, the nullity is
limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
CANIZA VS CA, 268 SCRA 641, G.R. No. 110427, February 24, 1997
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked;
and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law
being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court."
PECSON VS CORONEL, ET AL, G.R. No. L-20374, October 11, 1923

The liberty to dispose of ones estate by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the
Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889 which provides: Any person who has no forced heirs may
dispose by will all of his property or any part of it in favour of any person qualified to acquire it.
ACAIN VS IAC,G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987

Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein , or even though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited. Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open
to intestate succession the entire inheritance, except those legacies and devices, unless it impairs the
legitime of the heirs.
NERI VS AKUTIN, G.R. No. L-47799, June 13, 1941

Except as to legacies and devises which shall remain valid insofar as they are not officious, preterition
avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession.
VIADO NON VS CA, G.R. No. 137287, February 15, 2000

Where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the
preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
PEREZ VS GARCHITORENA, G.R. No. L-31703, February 13, 1930

Manresa provides 3 requisites for fideicommissary: 1. First heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the
estate; 2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a 3rd person the whole or
a part of the estate; 3. Second heir.
RABADILLA VS CA, G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is known as an institucion sub modo or
modal substitution. In a modal substitution, the testator states: 1. The object of the institution; 2.
Purpose or application o the property left by the testator; 3. Charge imposed by the testator upon the
heir. A mode imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his
rights to the succession. In a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be
fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but not
obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.
MORENTE VS DE LA SANTA, G.R. No. L-3891, December 19, 1907

Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made confidential and Article
798 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon
the widow or widower.
ROSALES VS ROSALES, GR No L-40789, February 27, 1987

Intestate heirs/ legal heirs are divided into two: those who inherit in their own right (as in the order of
intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code), and those who inherit by right of representation as
provided in Article 981 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The provisions of the Code which relates to
intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a
decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir.
FRANCISCO VS FRANCISCO, G.R. No. 138774, March 8, 2001

A legitimate daughter may not be deprived of her legitime through a simulated contract executed by her
father transferring his properties to his illegitimate children. As compulsory heir, she cannot be
deprived of her share in the estate, save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.
NIEVA VS ALCALA, G.R. No. L-13386, October 27, 1920

ReservaTroncaltreats of bloodrelationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to
articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established between
each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just what this
article intends to prevent.
It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it is a legitimate ascendant who
inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being
true, there can be no question, because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of
that family and only in favor of that line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we have already
said, the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral
law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the
natural child and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither have the right to
inherit from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier between the two families;
properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family.
FLORENTINO VS FLORENTINO, 40 Phil. 480, G.R. No. 14856, November 15, 1919
Any ascendant, who inherits from his descendant any property while there are living within the 3rd
degree relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the
reservable property received. But if afterwards, all of such relative die, the said property
become free property by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant
heir who can transmit it at his death to his legal succession.
SOLIVIO VS CA, G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990

The persons involved in reservatroncal are: 1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor
(reservista)the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants. 2. The
persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)relatives within the third
degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property
came. 3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue,
making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law.
The reservatroncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it
from another ascendant or a brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant
from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
SUMAYA VS IAC, G.R. No. 68843-44, September 2, 1991

Consistent with the rule in reserve viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse)
had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable character of the property, in
reserve troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the latter
inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate also.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved in real
property subject of reserve viudal insofar as it is applied to reserve troncal stays despite the abolition of
reserve viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is consistent with the rule provided in the second
paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The act of registration shall be the operative
act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned .
DE PAPA VS CAMACHO, G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, aunts and
uncles are excluded from the succession by his niece. Under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles
and aunts may not succeed abintestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are
willing and qualified to succeed.
LLORENTE VS RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. L-3339 March 26, 1908

From the fact that a natural son has the right to inherit from the father or mother who acknowledged
him, conjointly with the other legitimate children of either of them, it does not follow that he has the
right to represent either of them in the succession to their legitimate ascendants. His right is direct and
immediate in relation to the father or mother who acknowledged him, but it cannot be indirect by
representing them in the succession to their ascendants to whom he is not related in any manner,
because he does not appear among the legitimate family of which said ascendants are the head.
PECSON VS MEDIAVILLO, 28 Phil 81, GR No. 7890, Sep 29, 1914

The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the
disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850
provides that "the proof of the truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be established by the
heirs of the testator, should the disinherited person deny it." It would appear then that if the person
disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to
support his allegation by proof. The right of the court to inquire whether or not the disinheritance was
made for just cause is also sustained by the provisions of article 851, which in part provides that:
Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted,
should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person
disinherited.
The right of representation shall always take place in the direct descending line, but never in the
ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters,
whether they be of the whole or half blood.
DOROTHEO VS CA, 320 SCRA 12, GR No. 108581, December 8, 1999
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
The intrinsic validity of a will is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised
even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid
last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator
provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance
according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect.
URIARTE VS CA, 284 SCRA 511, G.R. No. 116775, January 22, 1998
A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse
survive the decedent. That the nephew is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. The determination of
whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the
share of the survivors.
SAYSON VS CA, G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992

An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate
child. The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is
also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children
as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this
earth.
However, while it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the
same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created
by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the
blood relatives of either party.
BAGUNU VS PIEDAD,G.R. No. L-66574, June 17, 1987

The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to
which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following,
firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly,
the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and
sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of
nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity,
expressed in Article 962 of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the
collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
DIAZ VS IAC, 182 SCRA 427,G.R. No. L-66574, February 21, 1990
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession abintestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived;
the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment.
DE LA PUERTA VS CA, G.R. No. 77867, February 6, 1990

It is settled that in testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the
following cases: first, when the person represented dies before the testator; second, when the person
represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when the person represented is
disinherited by the testator. The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a
deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he would have had if still living.
PASCUAL VS PASCUAL, G.R. No. 84240, March 25, 1992

Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession
abintestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law
for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed
to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers
the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in
turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken
in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
MANUEL VS FERRER, Gr No. 117246, August 21, 1995

What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or
intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a
barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that
by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when
the law speaks of "brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of
such brothers and sisters.
VERDAD VS CA, G.R. 109972, April 29, 1996

Article 995 of the Civil Code provides that, in the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and
illegitimate and their descendants, whether legitimate of illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit,
without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under
article 1001.
CACHO VS UDAN, G.R. No. L-19996, April 30, 1965
Collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants, ascendants,
and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can concur with the widow or widower under
Article 1101, they do not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate
(Art. 1003). The legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear
from Article 992 of the Civil Code.
SARITA VS CANDIA, G.R. No. L-7768, November 14, 1912

In the collateral line the right of representation can only take place in favor of the children of brother or
sisters, but not in favor of the grandson of a brother.
BACAYO VS BORROMEO, G.R. No. L-19382, August 31, 1965

Brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherit abintestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while
other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines
merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the
deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.
Therefore, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed abintestato so long as nephews and nieces of
the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
BICOMONG VS ALMANZA, G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977

The nephews and nieces from the brothers and sisters whether full or half blood has the right to inherit.
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Art. 1003 of the
NCC provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces
are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the
deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the
ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008,
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
NCC in relation to Art. 1006 of the NCC, which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to
a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood.
CITY OF MANILA VS ARCHBISHOP, G.R. No. L-10033, August 30, 1917

Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property may be declared escheated. It provides, "when a
person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property . . . leaving no heir or person by law entitled to
the same," that then and in that case such property under the procedure provided for by sections 751
and 752, may be declared escheated.
TORRES VS LOPEZ, G.R. No. L-25966, November 1, 1926
Article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares that, with certain exceptions in favor of near
relatives, no testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his guardian before
the final accounts of the latter have been approved.
Accretion takes place in a testamentary success when two or more persons are called to the same
inheritance or the same portion thereof without special designation of shares and secondly, when one
of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualified to
receive it.
NEPOMUCENO VS IAC, 139 SCRA 206,G.R. No. L-62952, October 9, 1985

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to
do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. The fact that the probate court declared a devise made
in a will null and void will be sustained where no useful purpose will be served by requiring the filing of a
separate civil action and restricting the court only to the issue of extrinsic validity of the will.
PASTOR VS CA, 122 SCRA 885, G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983
As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
to resolve title.
SANCHEZ VS CA, G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997

It is hornbook doctrine that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is
an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. This pronouncement no
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding. Jurisprudence teaches:[A] probate court or
one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that
the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is not
dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have
to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so.
NAZARENO VS CA, 343 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 138842, October 18, 2000
Where there is an implied trustconstituted by the parents in favor of a child, the properties in question
are subject to collation in accordance with Art. 1061 which states:Every compulsory heir, who succeeds
with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may
have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and
in the account of the partition.
MENDOZA VS CA, 199 SCRA 778, G.R. No. 116710, June 25, 2001
Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in
common by such heirs.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY CO. VS CA, 327 SCRA 359, G.R. No. 128102, March 7, 2000
Under Article 1104 of the Civil Code, "[a] partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs
shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons
interested; but the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which
belongs to him." In the present case, no evidence of bad faith or fraud is extant from the records. As to
the two parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is in point; it provides: "A
partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect
to such person." In other words, the participation of non-heirs does not render the partition void in its
entirety but only to the extent corresponding to them.
RALLA VS UNTALAN, Gr No. L-63253-54, April 27 1989

There can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of course,
presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
BALANAY, JR. VS MARTINEZ,GR NO. L-39247, June 27, 1975

The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue
The rule is that the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made
such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made. (Art.792 CC) Where some
valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the
testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries.
PLAN VS IAC,GR NO. L-65656, February 28,1985
In the administration and liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, sales ordered by the probate
court for payment of debts are final and not subject to legal redemption. Unlike in ordinary execution
sales, there is no legal provision allowing redemption in the sale of property for payment of debts of a
deceased person.Such sale is not the one contemplated in article 1067, now article 1088 of the Civil
Code.
OBLICON
MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. VS CAMPOS, G.R. No. 138814, April 16, 2009
The Civil Code enumerates the sources of obligations: Art. 1157. Obligations arise from: (1) Law; (2)
Contracts; (3) Quasi-contracts; (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and (5) Quasi-delicts. Therefore,
an obligation imposed on a person, and the corresponding right granted to another, must be rooted in
at least one of these five sources. The mere assertion of a right and claim of an obligation in an initiatory
pleading, whether a Complaint or Petition, without identifying the basis or source thereof, is merely a
conclusion of fact and law.
MACASAET & ASSOCIATES, INC. VS COA, G.R. No. 83748, May 12, 1989
The terminologies in the contract being clear, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the contracting
parties, their literal meaning control (Article 1370, Civil Code). The price escalation cost must be deemed
included in the final actual project cost and petitioner held entitled to the payment of its additional
professional fees. Obligations arising from contract have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith (Article 1159, Civil Code).
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
PHIL. EXPORT VS V.P. EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION, INC., G.R. No. 140047, July 13, 2004
Our law, specifically Article 1169, last paragraph, of the Civil Code, provides: In reciprocal obligations,
neither party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper
manner with what is incumbent upon him. Default or mora on the part of the debtor is the delay in the
fulfillment of the prestation by reason of a cause imputable to the former. It is the non-fulfillment of an
obligation with respect to time.
TANGUILIG VS CA, 266 SCRA 78, G.R. No. 117190. January 2, 1997
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that the intention of the parties shall be accorded
primordial consideration and, in case of doubt, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
principally considered.
BARZAGA VS CA, G.R. No. 115129, February 12, 1997

The law expressly provides that those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
NPC VS CA, 161 SCRA 334, G.R. No. L-47379, May 16, 1998
If upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud,
negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided
for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned
exclusively by the violence of nature and human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering
into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in
part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure
to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it was, and removed from the rules applicable to
the acts of God. Thus, it has been held that when the negligence of a person concur s with an act of God
in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the
damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be
free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which the loss or damage may have been
occasioned.
PICART VS SMITH, 37 Phil. 813,G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined
by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
SALUDAGA VS FEU, G.R. No. 179337, April 30, 2008

In order for force majeure to be considered, it must be shown that no negligence or misconduct was
committed that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who
has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. Ones negligence
may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless,
showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would
not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a persons
participationwhether by active intervention, neglect or failure to actthe whole occurrence is
humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK & TRUST CORPORATION VS CA, G.R. No. 138569, September 11, 2003
While in culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that
the defendant was at fault or negligent and the burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at
fault or negligent, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was
negligent.
The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a
complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana.
SCHMITZ TRANSPORT VS TRANSPORT VENTURE, INC., G.R. No. 150255, April 22, 2005
In order to be considered a fortuitous event, (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of human
will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitute the casofortuito, or if it can be
foreseen it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in any manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation
in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury,
one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well
apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION VS GLOBE, G.R. No. 147324, May 25, 2004
Article 1174, which exempts an obligor from liability on account of fortuitous events or force majeure,
refers not only to events that are unforeseeable, but also to those which are foreseeable, but
inevitable.A fortuitous event under Article 1174 may either be an act of God, or natural occurrences
such as floods or typhoons, or an act of man, such as riots, strikes or wars.
Article 1159 of the Civil Code also provides that *o+bligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. Courts cannot stipulate
for the parties nor amend their agreement where the same does not contravene law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, for to do so would be to alter the real intent of the parties, and
would run contrary to the function of the courts to give force and effect thereto.
SECURITY BANK VS CA, G.R. No. 117009, October 11, 1995

Under Article 1182 of the Civil Code, a conditional obligation shall be void if its fulfilment depends upon
the sole will of the debtor. Where mutual agreement is required before increased construction cost will
be paid by a party, such is in effect a condition dependent on said partys sole will, since the other party
would naturally and logically give consent to such an agreement which would allow him recovery of the
increased cost.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS TUDTUD, G.R. No. 174012, November 14,
2008
The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts. It does not apply to contracts which have
been completely or partially performed, the rationale thereof being as follows: In executory contracts
there is a wide field for fraud because unless they be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the
intention of the contracting parties. The statute has precisely been enacted to prevent fraud. However,
if a contract has been totally or partially performed, the exclusion of parole evidence would promote
fraud or bad faith, for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already delivered by him from
the transaction in litigation, and, at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities
assumed or contracted by him thereby.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
SONG FO& COMPANY VS HAWAIIAN PHILIPPINE Co., GR No. 23769, September 16, 1925
The terms of payment fixed by the parties are controlling. The time of payment stipulated for in the
contract should be treated as of the essence of the contract.
The general rule is that rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but
only for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in
making the agreement. A delay in payment for a small quantity of goods for some twenty days is not
such a violation of an essential condition of the contract as warrants rescission for non-performance.
CORTES VS CA, G.R. No. 126083, July 12, 2006

Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and which each party is a debtor and
a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other.
They are to be performed simultaneously, so that the performance of one is conditioned upon the
simultaneous fulfilment of the other.
The decisive factor in evaluating an agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily
by the terminology used in the contract but by their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during
and immediately after executing the agreement. As such, therefore, documentary and parole evidence
may be submitted and admitted to prove such intention.
The mutual delay of the parties cancels out the effects of default such that it is as if no one is guilty of
delay.
ROQUE VS LAPUZ, 96 SCRA 741, G.R. No. L-32811, March 31, 1980
Art. 1191 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision where the obligee elects to rescind or cancel
his obligation to deliver the ownership of two lots for failure of the obligor to pay in full the purchase
price on the basis of 120 monthly equal instalments, promptly and punctually for a period of 10 years.
The benefit stated in Art. 1191 of the New Civil Code allowing the court to fix the period within which
obligor may fulfill his obligation will not be granted where to allow him such term will amount to
sanctioning bad faith, as where obligor-vendee refused to pay more than 116 monthly installments.
GIL VS CA, G.R. No. 127206, September 12, 2003

In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to
comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties
fulfills his obligation, delay in the other begins. Thus, reciprocal obligations are to be performed
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
simultaneously so that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the
other. The right of rescission of a party to an obligation under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is
predicated on a breach of faith by the other party that violates the reciprocity between them.
The non-payment of the purchase price of property constitutes a very good reason to rescind a sale for
it violates the very essence of the contract of sale. The non-payment of the purchase price of property
is a resolutory condition for which the remedy is either rescission or specific performance under Article
1191 of the New Civil Code. The consignation by the vendee of the purchase price of the property is
sufficient to defeat the right of the petitioners to demand for a rescission of the said deed of absolute
sale.
RAYOS VS CA, G.R. No. 135528, July 14, 2004

Where the seller promised to execute a deed of absolute sale upon completion of payment of the
purchase price by the buyer, the agreement is a contract to sell. In contracts to sell, where ownership is
retained by the seller until payment of the price in full, such payment is a positive suspensive condition,
failure of which is not really a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey
title in accordance with Article 1184 of the Civil Code. The non-fulfillment by the respondent of his
obligation to pay, which is a suspensive condition to the obligation of the petitioners to sell and deliver
the title to the property, rendered the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. The
parties stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.Article 1191 of the New Civil Code will
not apply because it presupposes an obligation already extant. There can be no rescission of an
obligation that is still non-existing, the suspensive condition not having happened.
CALERO VS CARRION, GR No. L-13246, March 30, 1960

The right to have the period judicially fixed is born from the date of the agreement itself which contains
the undetermined period. Extrajudicial demand is not essential for the creation of this cause of action to
have the period fixed. It exists by operation of law, from the moment the agreement subject to the
undetermined period is entered into, whether the period depends upon the will of the debtor alone, or
of the parties themselves, or where from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it can be
inferred that a period was intended.The action to ask the court to fix the period for the fulfillment of
defendant's obligation prescribes in ten years from the date of the aforesaid agreement.
TRADERS ROYAL BANK VS CA, G.R. No. 78412, September 26, 1989
A stockholder who acted as a surety of the corporation can be sued separately to enforce his liability as
surety, as expressly provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code. Being an officer or stockholder of a
corporation does not make one's property the property also of the corporation, for they are separate
entities
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS, INC. VS CA, G.R. No. 142381, October 15, 2003
Article 2053 of the Civil Code provides: A guaranty may also be given as security for future debts, the
amount of which is not yet known; there can be no claim against the guarantor until the debt is
liquidated. A conditional obligation may also be secured.
COUNTRY BANKERS VS CA, G.R. No. 85161, September 9, 1991

A provision which calls for the forfeiture of the remaining deposit still in the possession of the lessor,
without prejudice to any other obligation still owing, in the event of the termination or cancellation of
the agreement by reason of the lessees violation of any of the terms and conditions of the agreement is
a penal clause that may be validly entered into.
A penal clause is an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the
purpose of insuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special prestation (generally
consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or
inadequately fulfilled. As a general rule, in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute
the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance. This is specifically
provided for in Article 1226, par. 1, New Civil Code. In such case, proof of actual damages suffered by
the creditor is not necessary in order that the penalty may be demanded.
However, there are exceptions to the rule that the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages
and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance with the principal obligation. They are first,
when there is a stipulation to the contrary; second, when the obligor is sued for refusal to pay the
agreed penalty; and third, when the obligor is guilty of fraud (Article 1226, par. 1, New Civil Code).
COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION OF CAGAYAN DE ORO VSCA, G.R. No. 78315, January 2, 1989
Art. 1229 of the Civil Code applies only to obligations or contract, subject of a litigation, the condition
being that the same has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. The provision also
applies even if there has been no performance, as long as the penalty is iniquituous or unconscionable.
It cannot apply to a final and executory judgment.
PRYCE CORPORATION VS PAGCOR, G.R. No. 157480, May 6, 2005

In certain cases, a stipulated penalty may nevertheless be equitably reduced by the courts. This power is
explicitly sanctioned by Articles 1229 and 2227 of the Civil Code.The question of whether a penalty is
reasonable or iniquitous is addressed to the sound discretion of the courts. To be considered in fixing
the amount of penalty are factors such asbut not limited tothe type, extent and purpose of the
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
penalty; the nature of the obligation; the mode of the breach and its consequences; the supervening
realities; the standing and relationship of the parties; and the like.
ASIA TRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK VS CONCEPTS TRADING, G.R. No. 130759, June 20, 2003
When the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed
upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents of the agreement itself.
This rule allows exceptions, in that a party may present parole evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleadings: a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection in the written agreement; b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto; c) The validity of the written agreement; or d) The
existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of
the written agreement.
JISON V COURT OF APPEALS, GR No. L-45349, August 15, 1988

Judicial action for the rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may
be cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. However, even in the cited cases, there was
at least a written notice sent to the defaulter informing him of the rescission. The act of a party in
treating a contract as cancelled should be made known to the other.
Further, in obligations with a penal clause, the judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the
principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor.It follows that, in any case
wherein there has been a partial or irregular compliance with the provisions in a contract for special
indemnification in the event of failure to comply with its terms, courts will rigidly apply the doctrine of
strict construction and against the enforcement in its entirety of the indemnification, where it is clear
from the terms of the contract that the amount or character of the indemnity is fixed without regard to
the probable damages which might be anticipated as a result of a breach of the terms of the contract;
or, in other words, where the indemnity provided for is essentially a mere penalty having for its principal
object the enforcement of compliance with the contract.
SONNY LO VS KJS ECO-FORMWORK SYSTEM PHIL., INC., G.R. No. 149420, October 8, 2003
In dacion en pago, as a special mode of payment, the debtor offers another thing to the creditor who
accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. In order that there be a valid dation in
payment, the following are the requisites: (1) There must be the performance of the prestation in lieu of
payment (animosolvendi) which may consist in the delivery of a corporeal thing or a real right or a credit
against the third person; (2) There must be some difference between the prestation due and that which
is given in substitution (aliud pro alio); (3) There must be an agreement between the creditor and debtor
that the obligation is immediately extinguished by reason of the performance of a prestation different
from that due.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS PINEDA, G.R. No. 46658, May 13, 1991
Where the repossession of the machinery and equipment in question was merely to secure the payment
of a loan obligation and not for the purpose of transferring ownership thereof in satisfaction of said
loan, no dacion en pago was ever accomplished.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK VS CA, G.R. No. 121989, January 31, 2006
Article 1208 of the Civil Code mandates the equal sharing of creditors in the payment of debt in the
absence of any law or stipulation to the contrary.
Generally, the third person who paid anothers debt is entitled to recover the full amount he had paid.
The law, however, limits his recovery to the amount by which the debtor has been benefited, if the
debtor has no knowledge of, or has expressed his opposition to such payment. Where the defenses that
could have been set up by the debtor against the creditor were existing and perfected, a payment by a
third person without the knowledge of the debtor cannot obligate the debtor to such third person to an
amount more than what he could have been compelled by the creditor to pay. Thus, if the debt has
been remitted, paid, compensated or prescribed, a payment by a third person would constitute a
payment of what is not due; his remedy would be against the person who received the payment under
such conditions, and not against the debtor who did not benefit from the payment.
CULABA VS CA, G.R. No. 125862, April 15, 2004

Payment is a mode of extinguishing an obligation. Article 1240 of the Civil Code provides that payment
shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor-in-
interest, or any person authorized to receive it.
TOWNE & CITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS CA, G.R. No. 135043, July 14, 2004
A voucher is not necessarily an evidence of payment. It is merely a way or method of recording or
keeping track of payments made, a procedure adopted by companies for the orderly and proper
accounting of funds disbursed. Unless it is supported by an actual payment like the issuance of a check
which is subsequently encashed or negotiated, or an actual payment of cash duly receipted for as is
customary among businessmen, a voucher remains a piece of paper having no evidentiary weight. A
receipt is a written and signed acknowledgment that money has been or goods have been delivered,
while a voucher is documentary record of a business transaction.
CORONEL VS CAPATI, G.R. No. 157836, May 26, 2005
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the burden of
proving that it has been extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such defense to
the claim of the creditor.
PEOPLES INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL CORPORATION VS CA, G.R. No. 112733, October 24, 1997
A contract to sell involves the performance of an obligation, not merely the exercise of the privilege or a
right.Consequently, performance or payment may be effected not by tender of payment alone but by
both tender and consignation.The mere sending of a letter by the vendee expressing the intention to
pay, without the accompanying payment, is not considered a valid tender of payment. Besides, a mere
tender of payment is not sufficient to compel seller to deliver the property and execute the deed of
absolute sale. It is consignation which is essential in order to extinguish buyers obligation to pay the
balance of the purchase price. The rule is different in case of an option contract or in legal redemption
or in a sale with right to repurchase, wherein consignation is not necessary because this cases involve an
exercise of a right or privilege (to buy, redeem, or repurchase) rather than the discharge of the
obligation, hence tender of payment would be sufficient to preserve the right or privilege. The provision
on consignation are not applicable when there is no obligation to pay.
ETERNAL GARDENS VS CA, G.R. No. 124554, December 9, 1997

One cannot suspend payment on the pretext that it did not know who among the subject propertys
claimants is the rightful owner. It had a remedy under the New Civil Code of the Philippinesto give in
consignation the amounts due, as these fell due. Consignation produces the effect of payment.
NAGA TELEPHONE CO., INC. VS CA, 230 SCRA 351, G.R. No. 107112, February 24, 1994
Article 1267 speaks of service which has become so difficult. Taking into consideration the rationale
behind this provision, the term service should be understood as referring to the performance of the
obligation. According to Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, Article 1267 states in our law the doctrine of
unforeseen events. This is said to be based on the discredited theory of rebus sic stantibus in public
international law; under this theory, the parties stipulate in the light of certain prevailing conditions, and
once these conditions cease to exist the contract also ceases to exist. Considering practical needs and
the demands of equity and good faith, the disappearance of the basis of a contract gives rise to a right to
relief in favor of the party prejudiced.
TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES, INC. VS CA, G.R. No. 109172, August 19, 1994
Article 1271 of the Civil Code raises a presumption, not of payment, but of the renunciation of the credit
where more convincing evidence would be required than what normally would be called for to prove
payment. The rationale for allowing the presumption of renunciation in the delivery of a private
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
instrument is that, unlike that of a public instrument, there could be just one copy of the evidence of
credit. Where several originals are made out of a private document, the intendment of the law would
thus be to refer to the delivery only of the original original rather than to the original duplicate of which
the debtor would normally retain a copy.
FRANCIA VS IAC, 162 SCRA 753, No. L-67649, June 28, 1988
As a general rule, alleged gross inadequacy of price is not material when the law gives the owner the
right to redeem as when a sale is made at public auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price, the
easier it is for the owner to effect redemption.
BPI VS CA, G.R. No. 142731, June 8, 2006

Compensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent amount the obligations of persons who in
their own right and as principals are reciprocally debtors and creditors of each other. Legal
compensation takes place by operation of law when all the requisites are present, as opposed to
conventional compensation which takes place when the parties agree to compensate their mutual
obligations even in the absence of some requisite.
PEOPLES BANK AND TRUST CO. VS SYVELS INCORPORATED,G.R. No. L-29280, August 11, 1988
Novation takes place when the object or principal condition of an obligation is changed or altered. It is
elementary that novation is never presumed. It must be explicitly stated or there must be manifest
incompatibility between the old and the new obligations in every aspect.
YOUNG VS CA, 196 SCRA 795, G.R. No. 83271, May 8, 1991
Novation has been defined as the extinguishment of an obligation by a subsequent one which
terminates it, either by changing its object or principal conditions, referred to as objective or real
novation or by substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by subrogating a third person to the
rights of the creditor, also called as subjective or personal novation.
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK VS MAALAC, JR., 457 SCRA 203, G.R. No. 145441, April 26, 2005
In order for novation to take place, the concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable: 1. There
must be a previous valid obligation, 2. There must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new
contract, 3. There must be the extinguishment of the old contract, and 4. There must be the validity of
the new contract.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
ASTRO ELECTRONICS CORP. VS PHIL. EXPORT, G.R. No. 136729, September 23, 2003
Subrogation is the transfer of all the rights of the creditor to a third person, who substitutes him in all
his rights. It may either be legal or conventional. Legal subrogation is that which takes place without
agreement but by operation of law because of certain acts. Instances of legal subrogation are those
provided in Article 1302 of the Civil Code. Conventional subrogation, on the other hand, is that which
takes place by agreement of the parties.
PILTEL VS TECSON, G.R. No. 156966, May 7, 2004

A contract of adhesion is just as binding as ordinary contracts.Should there be ambiguities in a contract
of adhesion, such ambiguities are to be construed against the party that prepared it. If, however, the
stipulations are not obscure, but are clear and leave no doubt on the intention of the parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulations must be held controlling. Such contracts have been struck down as being
assailable when the weaker party is left with no choice by the dominant bargaining party and is thus
completely deprived of an opportunity to bargain effectively. Nevertheless, contracts of adhesion are
not prohibited even as the courts remain careful in scrutinizing the factual circumstances underlying
each case to determine the respective claims of contending parties on their efficacy.
PNB VS CA, G.R. No. 88880, April 30, 1991

The contract must bind both contracting parties. Its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of
one of them.In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law between the
parties, there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential equality. A contract
containing a condition which makes its fulfilment dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of
one of the contracting parties, is void.
DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION VS CA, G.R. No. 118248, April 5, 2000

The general rule is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest
except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2)
stipulation or (3) provision of law.
TANAY RECREATION CENTER AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS FAUSTO, G.R. No. 140182, April 12, 2005
When a lease contract contains a right of first refusal, the lessor is under a legal duty to the lessee not to
sell to anybody at any price until after he has made an offer to sell to the latter at a certain price and the
lessee has failed to accept it. The lessee has a right that the lessors first offer shall be in his favor. The
right of first refusal is an integral and indivisible part of the contract of lease and is inseparable from the
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
whole contract. The consideration for the lease includes the consideration for the right of first refusal
and is built into the reciprocal obligations of the parties.
GILCHIRIST VS CUDDY, 29 Phil. 542, G.R. No. L-9356, February 18, 1915
The interference with lawful contracts by strangers thereto gives rise to an action for damages in favor
of the injured person. The law does not require that the responsible person shall have known the
identity of the injured person.
MONTECILLO VS REYNES, G.R. No.138018, July 26, 2002

Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to
demand the fulfilment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while the latter
prevents the existence of a valid contract.
FRANCISCO VS HERRERA, G.R. No. 139982, November 21, 2002
A void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and effect from the very beginning. Hence, it is as
if it has never been entered into and cannot be validated either by the passage of time or by ratification.
There are two types of void contracts: (1) those where one of the essential requisites of a valid contract
as provided for by Article 1318 of the Civil Code is totally wanting; and (2) those declared to be so under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code. By contrast, a voidable or annullable contract is one in which the essential
requisites for validity under Article 1318 are present, but vitiated by want of capacity, error, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or deceit.
CORONEL VS CONSTANTINO, G.R. No. 121069, February 7, 2003

Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some
unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is
this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore
unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification.
LAUDICO AND HARDEN VS ARIAS RODRIGUEZ, 43 Phil. 270, G.R. No. 16530, March 31, 1922
Under article 1262, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, an acceptance by letter does not have any effect until
it comes to the knowledge of the one making the offer. Before notice of acceptance, the offerer is not
bound and may withdraw the offer. Before notice of acceptance, the offer may be revoked, and the
revocation will have the effect of preventing the perfection of the contract, although it may not be
known by the acceptant.
VILLANUEVA VS CA, 244 SCRA 395, G.R. No. 114870, May 26, 1995
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Under Article 1323 of the Civil Code, an offer becomes ineffective upon the death, civil interdiction,
insanity, or insolvency of either party before acceptance is conveyed. The reason for this is that: [T]he
contract is not perfected except by the concurrence of two wills which exist and continue until the
moment that they occur. The contract is not yet perfected at any time before acceptance is conveyed;
hence, the disappearance of either party or his loss of capacity before perfection prevents the
contractual tie from being formed.
ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC. VS CA, G.R. No. 111238, January 25, 1995
In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the contract is
resolved or rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until the full payment
of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition and failure of which is not a breach but
an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective. Thus, a
deed of sale is considered absolute in nature where there is neither a stipulation in the deed that title to
the property sold is reserved in the seller until the full payment of the price, nor one giving the vendor
the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period.
SERRA VS CA, G.R. No. 103338, January 4, 1994

A contract of adhesion is one wherein a party, usually a corporation, prepares the stipulations in the
contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature or his adhesion thereto. These types of
contracts are as binding as ordinary contracts. Because in reality, the party who adheres to the contract
is free to reject it entirely.
MALBAROSA VS CA, G.R. No. 125761, April 30, 2003

The acceptance of an offer must be made known to the offeror. Unless the offeror knows of the
acceptance, there is no meeting of the minds of the parties, no real concurrence of offer and
acceptance. The offeror may withdraw its offer and revoke the same before acceptance thereof by the
offeree. The contract is perfected only from the time an acceptance of an offer is made known to the
offeror. If an offeror prescribes the exclusive manner in which acceptance of his offer shall be indicated
by the offeree, an acceptance of the offer in the manner prescribed will bind the offeror.
VDA. DE APE VS CA, G.R. No. 133638, April 15, 2005

He who alleges fraud or mistake in a transaction must substantiate his allegation as the presumption is
that a person takes ordinary care for his concerns and that private dealings have been entered into fairly
and regularly. The exception to this rule is provided for under Article 1332 of the Civil Code which
provides that *w+hen one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that
the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.
MAYOR VS BELEN, G.R. No. 151035, June 3, 2004

Fraud refers to all kinds of deception, whether through insidious machination, manipulation,
concealment or misrepresentation to lead another party into error. The deceit employed must be
serious. It must be sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into error, taking into
account the circumstances of each case.
BAUTISTA VS CA, G.R. No. 158015, August 11, 2004

The mere inadequacy of the price does not affect its validity when both parties are in a position to form
an independent judgment concerning the transaction, unless fraud, mistake or undue influence
indicative of a defect in consent is present. A contract may consequently be annulled on the ground of
vitiated consent and not due to the inadequacy of the price.
DAUDEN-HERNAEZ VS DE LOS ANGELES, G.R. No. L-27010, April 30, 1969

To the general rule that the form (oral or written) is irrelevant to the binding effect inter parties of a
contract that possesses the three validating elements of consent, subject matter, and causa, Article
1356 of the Code establishes only two exceptions, to wit: (a) Contracts for which the law itself requires
that they be in some particular form (writing) in order to make them valid and enforceable (the so-called
solemn contracts). Of these the typical example is the donation of immovable property that the law
(Article 749) requires to be embodied in a public instrument in order "that the donation may be valid",
i.e., existing or binding. Other instances are the donation of movables worth more than P5,000.00 which
must be in writing, "otherwise the donation shall be void" (Article 748); contracts to pay interest on
loans (mutuum) that must be "expressly stipulated in writing" (Article 1956); and the agreements
contemplated by Article 1744, 1773, 1874 and 2134 of the present Civil Code; (b) Contracts that the law
requires to be proved by some writing (memorandum) of its terms, as in those covered by the old
Statute of Frauds, now Article 1403(2) of the Civil Code. Their existence not being provable by mere oral
testimony (unless wholly or partly executed), these contracts are exceptional in requiring a writing
embodying the terms thereof for their enforceability by action in court.
HEIRS OF CLAUDEL VS CA, G.R. No. 85240, July 12, 1991

The rule of thumb is that a sale of land, once consummated, is valid regardless of the form it may have
been entered into. However, in the event that a third party, as in this case, disputes the ownership of
the property, the person against whom those claim is brought cannot present any proof of such sale and
hence has no means to enforce the contract. Thus the Statute of Frauds was precisely devised to protect
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
the parties in a contract of sale of real property so that no such contract is enforceable unless certain
requisites, for purposes of proof, are met.
The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations
depending for their evidence upon the unassisted memory of witnesses by requiring certain
enumerated contracts and transactions to be evidenced in Writing.
BERMAN MEMORIAL PARK, INC. VS FRANCISCO CHENG, G.R. No. 154630, May 6, 2005
The hornbook rule on interpretation of contracts gives primacy to the intention of the parties, which is
the law among them. Ultimately, their intention is to be deciphered not from the unilateral post facto
assertions of one of the parties, but from the language used in the contract. And when the terms of the
agreement, as expressed in such language, are clear, they are to be understood literally, just as they
appear on the face of the contract.
GUZMAN, BOCALING & CO. VS BONNEVIE, G.R. No. 86150, March 2, 1992
Under Article 1380 to 1381 (3) of the Civil Code, a contract otherwise valid may nonetheless be
subsequently rescinded by reason of injury to third persons, like creditors.
Rescission is a remedy granted by law to the contracting parties and even to third persons, to secure
reparation for damages caused to them by a contract, even if this should be valid, by means of the
restoration of things to their condition at the moment prior to the celebration of said contract. It is a
relief allowed for the protection of one of the contracting parties and even third persons from all injury
and damage the contract may cause, or to protect some incompatible and preference right created by
the contract. Rescission implies a contract which, even if initially valid, produces a lesion or pecuniary
damage to someone that justifies its invalidation for reasons of equity.
EQUATORIAL REALTY VS MAYFAIR, G.R. No. 106063, November 21, 1996

An option is a contract granting a privilege to buy or sell within an agreed time and at a determined
price. It is a separate and distinct contract from that which the parties may enter into upon the
consummation of the option. It must be supported by consideration.
Where a period is given to the offeree within which to accept the offer, the following rules generally
govern:
(1) If the period is not itself founded upon or supported by a consideration, the offeror is still free
and has the right to withdraw the offer before its acceptance, or, if an acceptance has been
made, before the offerors coming to know of such fact, by communicating that withdrawal to
the offeree. The right to withdraw, however, must not be exercised whimsically or arbitrarily;
otherwise, it could give rise to a damage claim under Article 19 of the Civil Code which ordains
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
(2) If the period has a separate consideration, a contract of option is deemed perfected, and it
would be a breach of that contract to withdraw the offer during the agreed period. The option,
however, is an independent contract by itself, and it is to be distinguished from the projected
main agreement (subject matter of the option) which is obviously yet to be concluded. If, in fact,
the optioner-offeror withdraws the offer before its acceptance (exercise of the option) by the
optionee-offeree, the latter may not sue for specific performance on the proposed contract
(object of the option) since it has failed to reach its own stage of perfection. The optioner-
offeror, however, renders himself liable for damages for breach of the option.
The right of first refusal is an integral part of contracts of lease. The consideration is built into the
reciprocal obligations of the parties.
RIVERA VS DEL ROSARIO, G.R. No. 144934, January 15, 2004

In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold;
while in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the
vendee until full payment of the purchase price. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price
is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation
that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.
While Article 1191 uses the term rescission, the original term used in Article 1124 of the old Civil Code,
from which Article 1191 was based, was resolution. Resolution is a principal action that is based on
breach of a party, while rescission under Article 1383 is a subsidiary action limited to cases of rescission
for lesion under Article 1381 of the New Civil Code.
REPUBLIC VS DAVID, G.R. No. 155634, August 16, 2004

The rescission contemplated under Article 1191 is a principal action for resolution, which is based on a
breach by a party of its reciprocal obligations.
Doctrinally, mutual restitution must follow rescission. Under Article 1385 of the Civil Code, rescission
creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with their
fruits, and the price with its interests x xx. Moreover, *t+o rescind is to declare a contract void at its
inception and to put an end to it as though it never was. Hence, rescission restores the parties to their
relative positions, as if no contract has been made.
AIR FRANCE VS CA, G.R. No. L-57339, December 29, 1983
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
There is no breach of contract of carriage where the passengers where duly informed that the tickets
will not be honored beyond the validity period reflected in the tickets themselves.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION VS CA, 327 SCRA 378, G.R. No. 129644, March 7, 2000
Under Article 1381(3) of the Civil Code, contracts which are undertaken in fraud of creditors when the
latter cannot in any manner collect the claims due them, are rescissible.The existence of fraud or intent
to defraud creditors may either be presumed in accordance with Article 1387 of the Civil Code or duly
proved in accordance with the ordinary rules of evidence.
The law presumes that there is fraud of creditors when:a) There is alienation of property by gratuitous
title by the debtor who has not reserved sufficient property to pay his debts contracted before such
alienation; orb) There is alienation of property by onerous title made by a debtor against whom some
judgment has been rendered in any instance or some writ of attachment has been issued. The decision
or attachment need not refer to the property alienated and need not have been obtained by the party
seeking rescission.
CADWALLADER & COMPANY VS SMITH, BELL & COMPANY, G.R. No. L-3246, February 9, 1907
The consignee who by means of misrepresentation of the condition of the market induces his consignors
to sell to him the property consigned, at a price less than that for which he had already contracted to
sell part of it, and who thereafter disposes of the whole at an advance, must answer for the
difference. Such conduct on the part of the agent constitutes fraud, entitling the principal to annul the
contract of sale.
VDA. DE BUNCIO VS ESTATE OS SPOUSES DE LEON, 156 SCRA 353,G.R. No. L-29330, December 14, 1987
The action to annul a contract on the ground that consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud prescribes in four (4) years; and the period is reckoned, in case of mistake or
fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same.
ASIA PRODUCTION VS PANO, G.R. No. L-51058, January 27, 1992

The statute of frauds is not applicable where there is partial performance by way of the payment of
consideration in lieu of the promise of the defendants.
AVERIA VS AVERIA, G.R. No. 141877, August 13, 2004

It is not enough for a party to allege partial performance in order to render the Statute of Frauds
inapplicable; such partial performance must be duly proved. But neither is such party required to
establish such partial performance by documentary proof before he could have the opportunity to
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
introduce oral testimony on the transaction. The partial performance may be proved by either
documentary or oral evidence.
CLEMENO VS LOBREGAT,G.R. No. 137845, September 9, 2004

Article 1403 is applicable only to executory contracts and not to completed, executed or partially
executed contracts.
SPOUSES FIRME VS BUKAL ENTERPRISES & DEVELOPMENT, G.R. No. 146608, October 23, 2003
Consent is an essential element for the existence of a contract, and where it is wanting, the contract is
non-existent. The essence of consent is the conformity of the parties on the terms of the contract, the
acceptance by one of the offer made by the other.
SUMIPAT VS BANGA, G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004

Being an absolute nullity, a contract is subject to attack at any time, in accordance with the rule in
Article 1410 of the Civil Code that an action to declare the inexistence of a void contract does not
prescribe. When there is a showing of illegality, the property registered is deemed to be simply held in
trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered, and the former then has the right
to sue for the reconveyance of the property. The action for the purpose is also imprescriptible. As long
as the land wrongfully registered under the Torrens system is still in the name of the person who caused
such registration, an action in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey the property to the real
owner.
GOCHAN VS HEIRS OF BABA, G.R. No. 138945, August 19, 2003

Under Article 1318 of the Civil Code, there is no contract unless the following requisites concur: (1)
consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3)
cause of the obligation. The absence of any of these essential requisites renders the contract inexistent
and an action or defense to declare said contract void ab initio does not prescribe, pursuant to Article
1410 of the same Code. There is no effective consent in law without the capacity to give such consent.
In other words, legal consent presupposes capacity.
FORNILDA VS RTC, 169 SCRA 351, G.R. No. 72306, October 6, 1988
Where there is a void contract, the action or defense for the declaration of its inexistence is
imprescriptible . The defect of a void or inexistence contract is permanent. Mere lapse of time cannot
give it efficacy. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
SUNTAY VS CA, 251 SCRA 430,G.R. No. 114950, December 19, 1995
It is provided by law that a contract of purchase and sale is void and produces no effect whatsoever
where the same is without cause or consideration in that the purchase price, which appears in the said
contract, has in fact never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor.
TEJA MARKETING VS CA, 148 SCRA 347, G.R. No. L-65510, March 9, 1987
Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense, the kabit system is invariably recognized as
being contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and in existent under Article 1409 of the Civil Code.
As provided in Article 1422 of the Civil Code, A contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal
contract, is also void and inexistent. It is a fundamental principle that the court will not aid either party
to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave both where it finds then.
DBP VS ADIL, 161 SCRA 307, Gr. No. L-48889, May 11, 1988
When a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot be enforced by the creditor. But a new contract
recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable.
ROBLETT VS CA, 266 SCRA 71, G.R. No. 116682, January 2, 1997
Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when
he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain
facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the
former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
BUCTON VS GABAR, 55 SCRA 499,G.R. No. L-36359, January 31, 1974

By the delivery of the possession of the land, the sale is consummated and title is transferred to the
buyer. An action to quiet title to property in the possession of said buyer is imprescriptible.
OLACO VS CA, 220 SCRA 656, G.R. No. 58010, March 31, 1993
There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price
is paid by another for the purpose ofhaving the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the
trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. In resulting trust, the rule of imprescriptibility may apply as
long as trustee has not repudiated the trust. Once it is repudiated, it is converted to a constructive trust
and subject to prescription.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
A resulting trust is repudiated if the following requisites concur: (1) the trustee has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation ; (2) Such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
cestui qui trust; (3) the evidence is clear and convincing.
CHIAO LIONG TAN VS CA, 228 SCRA 75,G.R. No. 106251, November 19, 1993
The New Civil Code recognizes cases of implied trust other than those enumerated therein. Thus, it is
undeniable that an implied trust was created when the certificate of registration of the motor vehicle
was placed in the name of one, although the price thereof was not paid by him but by another. The
principle that a trustee who puts a certificate of registration in his name cannot repudiate the trust by
relying on the registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a title. A trust, which derives its
strength from theconfidence one reposes on another especially between brothers, does not lose that
character simply because of what appears in a legal document.
GICANO VS GEGATO, 157 SCRA 141,G.R. No. L-63575, January 20, 1988
An action to recover an immovable from a person allegedly holding it under a constructive trust
prescribes in ten years, counted from the issuance of title to said person.
CRUZ VS FERNANDO, SR., G.R. No. 145470, December 9, 2005

The absence of any formal deed of conveyance is a strong indication that the parties did not intend
immediate transfer of ownership. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is the positive
suspensive condition upon which the transfer of ownership depends. The parties, however, are not
prohibited from stipulating other lawful conditions that must be fulfilled in order for the contract to be
converted from a contract to sell or at the most an executory sale into an executed one.
PINGOL VS CA, G. R. No. 102909, September 6, 1993

In a contract of sale, the title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold, whereas in a
contract to sell, by agreement, ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until the full
payment of the price. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and
unless the contract is resolved or rescinded, whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor
until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition, failure of which
is not a breach but an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming
effective.
PORTUGAL VS CA, 159 SCRA 179, G.R. No. 73564, March 25, 1988
Beta Sigma Lambda (Exclusive Law Fraternity & Sorority) 1946 Bar Operations 2017 -
100
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
A contract without the indispensable requisite of a valid cause or consideration is void. The action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
SANCHEZ VS RIGOS, G.R. No. L-25494, June 14, 1972

In accepted unilateral promise to sell, since there may be no valid contract without a cause or
consideration, the promisor is not bound by his promise and may, accordingly, withdraw it. Pending
notice of its withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to sell which,
if accepted, results in a perfected contract of sale.
While the law permits the offeror to withdraw the offer at any time before acceptance even before the
period has expired, some writers hold the view, that the offerorcan not exercise this right in an arbitrary
or capricious manner. This is upon the principle that an offer implies an obligation on the part of offeror
to maintain it for such length of time as to permit the offeree to decide whether to accept or not, and
therefore cannot arbitrarily revoke the offer without being liable for damage which the offeree may
suffer. A contrary view would remove the stability and security of business transactions.
ROSARIO VS PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., G.R. No. 139233, November 11, 2005
Under Article 1625 of the New Civil Code, an assignment of credit, right or action must appear in a
public document to bind third persons.
FORNILDA VS RTC PASIG, G.R. No. 72306, January 24, 1989

A lawyer is prohibited from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved
which are the object of the litigation in which he intervened by virtue of his profession. A contract
entered into under such circumstances is in contravention of Article 1491 of the Civil Code, is expressly
prohibited by law and therefore inexistent and void ab initio. Being a void contract, the action of
defense for the declaration of its inexistence is imprescriptible. The defect of a void contract is
permanent. Mere lapse of time cannot give it efficacy. Neither can the right to set up the defense of
illegality be waived.
NORKIS DISTRIBUTORS, INC. VS CA, G.R. No. 91029, February 7, 1991

Article 1496 of the Civil Code provides that in the absence of an express assumption of risk by the buyer,
the things sold remain at sellers risk until the ownership thereof is transferred to the buyer. Where
there was neither an actual nor constructive delivery of the thing sold, the risk of loss should be borne
by the seller, which was still the owner and possessor of the thing when it was destroyed. This is in
accordance with the well-known doctrine of res perit domino.
101
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
GAISANO CAGAYAN, INC. VS INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, G.R. No. 147839, June 8,
2006
When the seller retains ownership only to insure that the buyer will pay its debt, the risk of loss is borne
by the buyer.
Under Article 1504,unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the sellers risk until the ownership
therein is transferred to the buyer, but when the ownership therein is transferred to the buyer, the
goods are at the buyers risk whether actual delivery of the goods has been made to the buyer or to a
bailee for the buyer, in pursuance of the contract and the ownership in the goods has been retained by
the seller merely to secure performance by the buyer of his obligations under the contract, the goods
are at the buyers risk from the time of such delivery.
LAWYERS COOPERATIVE PUBLISHING CO. VS TABORA, G.R. No. L-21263, April 30, 1965
The rule that an obligor should be held exempt from liability when the loss occurs thru a fortuitous
event only holds true when the obligation consists in the delivery of a determinate thing and there is no
stipulation holding him liable even in a fortuitous event. It does not apply when the obligation is
pecuniary in nature and the obligor binds himself to assume the loss after delivery of the goods to him.
DURAN VS IAC, G.R. No. L-64159, September 10, 1985

The mortgagee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate of title, and did not have to
inquire further. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of Torrens Certificate of Titles
would be futile and nugatory. Thus the rule is simple: the fraudulent and forged document of sale may
become the root of a valid title if the certificate has already been transferred from the name of the true
owner to the name indicated by the forger.
AZNAR VS YAPDIANGCO, G.R. No. L-18536, March 31, 1965

Ownership is not transferred by contract merely, but by tradition or delivery. Contracts only constitute
titles or rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while delivery or tradition is the mode of
accomplishing the same.
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY VS PALILEO, G.R. No. 83432, May 20, 1991
Applying Section 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil
Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was a buyer in
good faith and even if this second sale was registered. It was explained that this is because the
purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment
102
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
debtor, and merely acquires the latters interest in the property sold as of the time the property was
levied upon.
NUGUID VS CA, G.R. No. 77423, March 13, 1989

Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that consideration exists and is lawful, unless the
debtor proves the contrary.
GURREA VS SUPLICO, G.R. No. 144320, April 26, 2006

Article 1491 of the Civil Code expressly prohibits lawyers from acquiring property or rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. Article 1409 of the
same Code provides, among others, that contracts which are expressly prohibited or declared void by
law are considered inexistent and void from the beginning.
MOLES VS IAC, G.R. No. 73913, January 31, 1989

As a general rule, there is no implied warranty in the sale of secondhand articles. An express warranty
can be made by and also be binding on the seller even in the sale of a second-hand article. In the cited
case of Markman vs. Hallbeck, while holding that there was an express warranty in the sale of a
secondhand engine, the court said that it was not error to refuse an instruction that upon the sale of
secondhand goods no warranty was implied, since secondhand goods might be sold under such
circumstances as to raise an implied warranty.
VILLOSTAS VS CA, G.R. No. 96271, June 26, 1992

While it is true that Article 1571 of the Civil Code provides for a prescriptive period of six months for a
redhibitory action, a cursory reading of the ten preceding articles to which it refers will reveal that said
rule may be applied only in case of implied warranties.
UY VS ARIZA, G.R. No. 158370, August 17, 2006

Eviction shall take place whenever by a final judgment based on a right prior to the sale or an act
imputable to the vendor, the vendee is deprived of the whole or part of the thing purchased. The vendor
shall answer for the eviction even though nothing has been said in the contract on the subject. The
contracting parties, however, may increase, diminish or suppress this legal obligation of the vendor.
DE GUZMAN VS TOYOTA CUBAO, INC., G.R. No. 141480, November 29, 2006
103
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Under Article 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or
keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages.
GOODYEAR PHILIPPINES, INC. VS SY, G.R. No. 154554, November 9, 2005

In a contract of sale, the vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is the
object of the sale. Moreover, the implied warranties are as follows: first, the vendor has a right to sell
the thing at the time that its ownership is to pass to the vendee, as a result of which the latter shall from
then on have and enjoy the legal and peaceful possession of the thing; and, second, the thing shall be
free from any charge or encumbrance not declared or known to the vendee.
VILLARICA VS CA, G. R. No. L-19196, November 29, 1968

Where (a) the price of the real estate propertysubject matter of an instrument of absolute salewas
not inadequate, (b) the vendor did not remain in possession of the land sold as lessee or otherwise: (c)
the vendee as new owner granted the vendor merely an option to buy the property sold within a certain
period of time from the execution of the instrument of sale, and (d) the taxes paid by the vendor were
back taxes up to the time of the sale, said instrument of absolute sale cannot be presumed and
construed as an equitable mortgage.
LEAL VS CA, 155 SCRA 395, G.R. No. L-65425, November 5, 1987
For conventional redemption to take place, the vendor should reserve, in no uncertain terms, the right
to repurchase the thing sold. Thus, the right to redeem must be expressly stipulated in the contract of
sale in order that it may have legal existence.
BUCE VS CA, G.R. No. L-75575, January 25, 1988

Article 1602, in relation to Article 1604 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, finds strong application in a
case where the following circumstances are attendant: 1) the price of the sale was unusually
inadequate; 2) the apparent vendor remained in possession of the properties sold; 3) the vendor
continued to pay the taxes on the things sold; and 4) the vendor paid interest on the supposed
consideration of the sale.
SANTOS VS CA, 179 SCRA 363,G.R. No. 83664, November 13, 1989
Gross inadequacy of price indicates that the transaction is one of equitable mortgage not an absolute
sale. Fact that purported vendor remained in physical possession of the land, indicates existence of a
contract of loan, with the land given as security.
104
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
ADORABLE VS INACALA, G. R. No. L-10183, April 28, 1958

The right of redemption provided under Article 1606, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code refers to cases
involving a transaction where one of the parties contests or denies that the true agreement is one of
sale with right to repurchase. It cannot apply where the sale is expressly one with right to repurchase.
BANDONG VS AUSTRIA, GR No. 9785, September 24, 1915

The statutory limitation of the exercise of the right of repurchase to a period of four years set forth in
the first paragraph of article 1508 of the Civil Code is applicable only "in the absence of an express
agreement" touching the time within which a right to repurchase may be exercised in such cases. The
second paragraph of article 1508 provides that "in case of stipulation, the period of redemption shall not
exceed ten years."
BAYQUEN VS BALAORO, GR No. L-28161, August 13, 1986

Where the contract between the parties is admitted and which has been stipulated by the parties to be
a deed of sale with right to repurchase, there should be no issue or dispute about the effects thereof
that once there is failure to redeem within the stipulated period, ownership thereof becomes vested or
consolidated by operation of law on the vendee. Any other interpretation would be violative of the
sanctity of the contract between the parties.
UY VS CA, G.R. No. 107439, July 20, 1995

The exercise of a right of legal redemption presupposes the existence of a co-ownership at the time the
conveyance is made by a co-owner and when it is demanded by the other co-owner or co-owners. There
is co- ownership when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.
VERDAD VS CA, G.R. No. 109972, April 29, 1996
Article 1623 provides that the right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except
within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding
actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner
in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and
status.
105
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
PARTNERSHIP
AGAD VS MABATO, GR No. L-24193, June 28, 1968

A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property or real rights are
contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall be necessary (Art. 1771, Civil Code). A
contract of partnership is void, whenever immovable property is contributed thereto, if inventory of said
property is not made, signed by the parties, and attached to the public instrument (Art. 1773).
OBILLOS VS CIR, GR No. L-68118, October 29, 1985

Where the father sold his rights over two parcels of land to his four children so they can build their
residence, but the latter after one (1) year sold them and paid the capital gains, they should not be
treated to have formed an unregistered partnership and taxed corporate income tax on the sale and
dividend income tax on their shares of the profits from the sale. Their original purpose was to divide the
lots for residential purposes. If later on they found it not feasible to build their residences on the lots
because of the high cost of construction, then they had no choice but to resell the same to dissolve the
coownership. The division of the profit was merely incidental to the dissolution of the co-ownership
which was in the nature of things a temporary state. It had to be terminated sooner or later.
Article 1769(3) of the Civil Code provides that ''the sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a
partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any
property from which the returns are derived". There must be an unmistakable intention to form a
partnership or joint venture.
PASCUAL VS CIR, GR No. L-78133, October 18, 1988

In order to constitute a partnership inter sese there must be: (a) An intent to form the same; (b)
generally participating in both profits and losses; (c) and such a community of interest, as far as third
persons are concerned as enables each party to make contract, manage the business, and dispose of the
whole property.The common ownership of property does not itself create a partnership between the
owners, though they may use it for purpose of making gains; and they may, without becoming partners,
agree among themselves as to the management and use of such property and the application of the
proceeds therefrom. The sharing of returns does not in itself establish a partnership whether or not the
persons sharing therein have a joint or common right of interest in the property. There must be clear
intent to form a partnership, the existence of a juridical personality different from the individual
partners, and the freedom of each party to transfer or assign the whole property.
106
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
LITONJUA VS LITONJUA, G.R. Nos. 166299-300, December 13, 2005

A partnership exists when two or more persons agree to place their money, effects, labor, and skill in
lawful commerce or business, with the understanding that there shall be a proportionate sharing of the
profits and losses between them. A contract of partnership is defined by the Civil Code as one where
two or more persons bound themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund
with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. A joint venture, on the other hand, is hardly
distinguishable from, and may be likened to, a partnership since their elements are similar, i.e.,
community of interests in the business and sharing of profits and losses. Being a form of partnership, a
joint venture is generally governed by the law on partnership.
ORTEGA VS CA, G.R. No. 109248, July 3, 1995

A partnership that does not fix its term is a partnership at will. The birth and life of a partnership at will
is predicated on the mutual desire and consent of the partners. The right to choose with whom a person
wishes to associate himself is the very foundation and essence of that partnership. Its continued
existence is, in turn, dependent on the constancy of that mutual resolve, along with each partners
capability to give it, and the absence of a cause for dissolution provided by the law itself. Verily, any one
of the partners may, at his sole pleasure, dictate a dissolution of the partnership at will. He must,
however, act in good faith, not that the attendance of bad faith can prevent the dissolution of the
partnership but that it can result in a liability for damages.
The presence of a period for its specific duration or the statement of a particular purpose for its creation
prevent the dissolution of any partnership by an act or will of a partner. Among partners, mutual agency
arises and the doctrine of delectus personae allows them to have the power, although not necessarily
the right, to dissolve the partnership. An unjustified dissolution by the partner can subject him to a
possible action for damages.
The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the parties caused by any partner
ceasing to be associated in the carrying on, as might be distinguished from the winding up of, the
business. Upon its dissolution, the partnership continues and its legal personality is retained until the
complete winding up of its business culminating in its termination.
The liquidation of the assets of the partnership following its dissolution is governed by various
provisions of the Civil Code; however, an agreement of the partners, like any other contract, is binding
among them and normally takes precedence to the extent applicable over the Codes general provisions.
DE LOS REYES VS LUKBAN, GR No. 10695, December 15, 1916

The creditor, who has not succeeded judicially in recovering a debt owing him by a general
copartnership, on account of its insolvency, has a right to sue the partners thereof in the manner
107
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
provided by article 127 of the Code of Commerce, inasmuch as each and all of the copartners are
personally and severally liable with all their property for the result of the transactions made in the name
and for the account of the partnership, under the signature of the latter, and by a person authorized to
make use thereof.
AGENCY
DOLES VS ANGELES, G.R. No. 149353, June 26, 2006

The basis of agency is representation. Though the fact or extent of authority of the agents may not, as a
general rule, be established from the declarations of the agents alone, if one professes to act as agent
for another, she may be estopped to deny her agency both as against the asserted principal and the
third persons interested in the transaction in which he or she is engaged.
For an agency to arise, it is not necessary that the principal personally encounter the third person with
whom the agent interacts. The law in fact contemplates, and to a great degree, impersonal dealings
where the principal need not personally know or meet the third person with whom her agent transacts:
precisely, the purpose of agency is to extend the personality of the principal through the facility of the
agent.
If their respective principals do not actually and personally know each other, such ignorance does not
affect their juridical standing as agents, especially since the very purpose of agency is to extend the
personality of the principal through the facility of the agent.
If an act done by one person in behalf of another is in its essential nature one of agency, the former is
the agent of the latter notwithstanding he or she is not so called. The question is to be determined by
the fact that one represents and is acting for another, and if relations exist which will constitute an
agency, it will be an agency whether the parties understood the exact nature of the relation or not.
RALLOS VS RALLOS, GR No. 6906, September 27, 1911

When the relationship of principal and agent is established, and the principal gives notice of the agency
and holds out the agent as his authorized representative, upon the termination of the agency it is the
duty of the principal to give due and timely notice thereof, otherwise, he will be held liable to third
parties acting in good faith and properly relying upon such agency
GOZUN VS MERCADO, G.R. No. 167812, December 19, 2006
108
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Generally, the agency may be oral, unless the law requires a specific form. However, a special power of
attorney is necessary for an agent to borrow money, unless it be urgent and indispensable for the
preservation of the things which are under administration.
The requirement of a special power of attorney refers to the nature of the authorization and not to its
form. . . . The requirements are met if there is a clear mandate from the principal specifically authorizing
the performance of the act. As early as 1906, this Court in Strong v. Gutierrez-Repide (6 Phil. 680) stated
that such a mandate may be either oral or written. The one thing vital being that it shall be express. And
more recently, We stated that, if the special authority is not written, then it must be duly established by
evidence: the Rules require, for attorneys to compromise the litigation of their clients, a special
authority. And while the same does not state that the special authority be in writing the Court has every
reason to expect that, if not in writing, the same be duly established by evidence other than the self-
serving assertion of counsel himself that such authority was verbally given him.
It is a general rule in the law of agency that, in order to bind the principal by a mortgage on real
property executed by an agent, it must upon its face purport to be made, signed and sealed in the name
of the principal, otherwise, it will bind the agent only. It is not enough merely that the agent was in fact
authorized to make the mortgage, if he has not acted in the name of the principal.
ANGELES VS PNR, G.R. No. 150128, August 31, 2006

Where agency exists, the third partys liability on a contract is to the principal and not to the agent and
the relationship of the third party to the principal is the same as that in a contract in which there is no
agent. Normally, the agent has neither rights nor liabilities as against the third party. He cannot thus sue
or be sued on the contract. Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against each
other, the real party-in-interest, either as plaintiff or defendant in an action upon that contract must,
generally, be a contracting party.
The legal situation is, however, different where an agent is constituted as an assignee. In such a case,
the agent may, in his own behalf, sue on a contract made for his principal, as an assignee of such
contract.
SIASAT VS IAC, GR No. L-67889, October 10, 1985

An agent may be universal, general or special. A universal agent is one authorized to do all acts for his
principal which can lawfully be delegated to an agent. A general agent is one authorized to do all acts
pertaining to a business of a certain kind or at a certain particular place. He has usually authority either
expressly conferred in general terms or in effect made general by the usage, customs or nature of the
business which he is authorized to transact. A special agent is one authorized to do some particular act
109
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
or to act upon some particular occasion. Such acts are usually in accord with specific instructions or
under limitations necessarily implied from the nature of the act to be done.
The principal cannot deprive his agent of the commission agreed upon by cancelling the agency and
thereafter dealing directly with the buyer.
VELOSO VS CA, G.R. No. 102737, August 21, 1996

A notarized power of attorney carries with it the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its
due execution.
There was no need to execute a separate and special power of attorney since the general power of
attorney had expressly authorized the agent or attorney in fact the power to sell the subject property.
The special power of attorney can be included in the general power when it is specified therein the act
or transaction for which the special power is required.
CUISON VS CA, G.R. No. 88539, October 26, 1993

One who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent and holds him out to the public as such
cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of
innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith and in the honest belief that he is what he
appears to be.Thus, even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable
with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers (Article 1911 Civil
Code).
RURAL BANK OF BOMBON (CAMARINES SUR), INC. VS CA, G.R. No. 95703, August 3, 1992
Agent who signs a Deed of Mortgage in his name alone does not validly bind owner of mortgaged
estate.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CA, G.R. No. 109937, March 21, 1994
The liability of an agent who exceeds the scope of his authority depends upon whether the third person
is aware of the limits of the agents powers. If the third person dealing with an agent is unaware of the
limits of the authority conferred by the principal on the agent and he (third person) has been deceived
by the non-disclosure thereof by the agent, then the latter is liable for damages to him.The rule that the
agent is liable when he acts without authority is founded upon the supposition that there has been
some wrong or omission on his part either in misrepresenting, or in affirming, or concealing the
authority under which he assumes to act. Inasmuch as the non- disclosure of the limits of the agency
110
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
carries with it the implication that a deception was perpetrated on the unsuspecting client, the
provisions of Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines come into play.
GREEN VALLEY POULTRY & ALLIED PRODUCTS, INC. VS IAC, GR No. L-49395, December 26, 1984
In an agency to sell, the agent is liable to pay the principal for goods sold by the agent without the
principals consent. The commission agent cannot, without the express or implied consent of the
principal, sell on credit. Should he do so, the principal may demand from him payment in cash, but the
commission agent shall be entitled to any interest or benefit, which may result from such sale. (Art.
1905, N.C.C.)
SEVILLA VS CA, GR Nos. L-411823, April 15, 1988

In an agency coupled with an interest, the agency is created for the mutual interest of the agent and the
principal. Where the agents interest is not limited to the commissions she earned as a result of her
business transactions, but one that extended to the very subject matter of the power of management
delegated to her, the agency is one coupled with interest, which cannot be revoked at the pleasure of
the principal.
VALENZUELA VS CA, G.R. No. 83122, October 19, 1990

There is an exception to the principle that an agency is revocable at will and that is when the agency has
been given not only for the interest of the principal but for the interest of third persons or for the
mutual interest of the principal and the agent. In these cases, it is evident that the agency ceases to be
freely revocable by the sole will of the principal.
Where the principal terminates or repudiates the agents employment in violation of the contract of
employment and without cause x xx the agent is entitled to receive either the amount of net losses
caused and gains prevented by the breach, or the reasonable value of the services rendered. Thus, the
agent is entitled to prospective profits which he would have made except for such wrongful termination
provided that such profits are not conjectural, or speculative but are capable of determination upon
some fairly reliable basis. And a principals revocation of the agency agreement made to avoid payment
of compensation for a result which he has actually accomplished.
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. VS CA, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994
With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages,
the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
111
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default,
i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until
the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established
with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the
time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount
finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of
legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum
from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.
FLORENDO VS CA, G.R. No. 101771, December 17, 1996

Escalation clauses are valid stipulations in commercial contracts to maintain fiscal stability and to retain
the value of money in long term contracts. By virtue of CB Circular 905, the Usury Law has been
rendered ineffective. Thus, petitioners' contention that the escalation clause is violative of the said law
is bereft of any merit.
The unilateral determination and imposition of increased interest rates by a bank is obviously violative
of the principle of mutuality of contracts ordained in Article 1308 of the Civil Code.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS CA, G.R. No. 107569, November 8, 1994

P.D. No. 1684 and C.B. Circular No. 905 no more than allow contracting parties to stipulate freely
regarding any subsequent adjustment in the interest rate that shall accrue on a loan or forbearance of
money, goods or credits. In fine, they can agree to adjust, upward or downward, the interest previously
112
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
stipulated. However, the said law and circular did not authorize either party to unilaterally raise the
interest rate without the others consent.
GULLAS VS PNB, GR No. 43191, November 13, 1935

The relation existing between a depositor and a bank is that of creditor and debtor. The general rule is
adopted for this jurisdiction that a bank has a right of set off of the deposit in its hands for the payment
of any indebtedness to it on the part of the depositor.
GUINGONA VS CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, GR No. L-60033, April 4, 1984

The relationship between the a depositor and a bank is that of creditor and debtor; consequently, the
ownership of the amount deposited was transmitted to the bank upon the perfection of the contract
and it can make use of the amount deposited for its banking operations, such as to pay interests on
deposits and to pay withdrawals. While the bank has the obligation to return the amount deposited, it
has, however, no obligation to return or deliver the same money that was deposited. Failure of the
bank to return the amount deposited will not constitute estafa through misappropriation punishable
under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but it will only give rise to civil liability over which
the public respondents have no jurisdiction.
SPOUSES TAN TOH VS SOLID BANK CORPORATION, G.R. No. 154183, August 7, 2003
An extension of the period for enforcing the indebtedness does not by itself bring about the discharge of
the sureties, unless the extra time is not permitted within the terms of the waiver.Under Art. 2055 of
the Civil Code, the liability of a surety is measured by the terms of his contract, and while he is liable to
the full extent thereof, his accountability is strictly limited to that assumed by its terms. Under Art. 2079
of the Civil Code, *a+n extension granted to the debtor by the creditor without the consent of the
guarantor extinguishes the guaranty.
Any release or impairment of the security as a primary source for the payment of a debt, will discharge
the surety to the extent of the value of the property or lien released.
DIZON VS SUNTAY, GR No. L-30817, September 29, 1972

The owner of a diamond ring may recover the possession of the same from a pawnshop where another
person had pledged it without authority to do so. Article 559 of the Civil Code of the Philippines applies
and the defense that the pawnshop acquired possession of the ring without notice of any defect in the
title of the pledgor is unavailing. The owner is not estopped from pursuing an action against the
pawnshop for the recovery of the possession of the said ring.
113
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
SPOUSES UY TONG VSCA, GR No. L-77465, May 21, 1988

The two elements for pactumcommissorium to exist are: (1) that there should be a pledge or mortgage
wherein a property is pledged or mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal
obligation; and (2) that there should be a stipulation for an automatic appropriation by the creditor of
the thing pledged or mortgaged in the event of non-payment of the principal obligation within the
stipulated period.
ACME SHOE VS CA, G.R. No. 103576, August 22, 1996

Contracts of security are either personal or real. In contracts of personal security, such as a guaranty or a
sure-tyship, the faithful performance of the obligation by the principal debtor is secured by the personal
commitment of another (the guarantor or surety). In contracts of real security, such as a pledge, a
mortgage or an antichresis, that fulfillment is secured by an encumbrance of propertyin pledge, the
placing of movable property in the possession of the creditor; in chattel mortgage, by the execution of
the corresponding deed substantially in the form prescribed by law; in real estate mortgage, by the
execution of a public instrument encumbering the real property covered thereby; and in antichresis, by
a written instrument granting to the creditor the right to receive the fruits of an immovable property
with the obligation to apply such fruits to the payment of interest, if owing, and thereafter to the
principal of his creditupon the essential condition that if the principal obligation becomes due and the
debtor defaults, then the property encumbered can be alienated for the payment of the obligation, but
that should the obligation be duly paid, then the contract is automatically extinguished proceeding from
the accessory character of the agreement. As the law so puts it, once the obligation is complied with,
then the contract of security becomes, ipso facto, null and void.
While a pledge, real estate mortgage, or antichresis may exceptionally secure after-incurred obligations
so long as these future debts are accurately described, a chattel mortgage, however, can only cover
obligations existing at the time the mortgage is constituted. Although a promise expressed in a chattel
mortgage to include debts that are yet to be contracted can be a binding commitment that can be
compelled upon, the security itself, however, does not come into existence or arise until after a chattel
mortgage agreement covering the newly contracted debt is executed either by concluding a fresh
chattel mortgage or by amending the old contract conformably with the form prescribed by the Chattel
Mortgage Law. Refusal on the part of the borrower to execute the agreement so as to cover the after-
incurred obligation can constitute an act of default on the part of the borrower of the financing
agreement whereon the promise is written but, of course, the remedy of foreclosure can only cover the
debts extant at the time of constitution and during the life of the chattel mortgage sought to be
foreclosed.
ROXAS VS CA, G.R. No. 100480, May 11, 1993
Section 5 of R.A. No. 720, as amended by R.A. No. 5939, provides that notices of foreclosure should be
posted in at least three (3) of the most conspicuous public places in the municipality and barrio where
114
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
the land mortgaged is situated. It is settled doctrine that failure to publish notice of auction sale as
required by the statute constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the sale. Even slight
deviations therefrom are not allowed.
CERNA VS CA, G.R. No. 48359, March 30, 1993

A chattel mortgage may be "an accessory contract" to a contract of loan, but that fact alone does not
make a third-party mortgagor solidarily bound with the principal debtor in fulfilling the principal
obligation that is, to pay the loan.
The signatory to the principal contract loan remains to be primarily bound. It is only upon the default of
the latter that the creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged
properties in lieu of an action for the recovery of the amount of the loan. And the liability of the third-
party mortgagors extends only to the property mortgaged. Should there be any deficiency, the creditor
has recourse on the principal debtor.
A Special Power of Attorney authorizing another to mortgage one's property as security of latter's
obligation does not in itself make the person executing the same a co-mortgagor thereof. When,
however, the mortgagee elects to file a suit for collection, not foreclosure, thereby abandoning the
chattel mortgage as basis for relief, he clearly manifests his lack of desire and interest to go after the
mortgaged property as security for the loan."
NORTHERN MOTORS, INC. VS COQUIA, GR No. L-40018, August 29, 1975

After a chattel mortgage is executed, there remains in the mortgagor a mere right of redemption. To
levy upon the mortgagors incorporeal right or equity of redemption, it was not necessary for the sheriff
to have taken physical possession of the mortgaged property. It would have sufficed if he furnished the
chattel mortgagor, with a copy of the writ of execution and served upon it a notice that its right or
equity or redemption in the mortgaged property was being levied upon pursuant to that writ. Levying
upon the property itself is distinguishable from levying on the judgment debtors interest in it.
The chattel mortgagee may file third-party claim, even before there is a breach of the mortgage because
the recording of the mortgage gives him the symbolical possession of the mortgaged chattel which was
construed as equivalent to the actual delivery of possession to the creditor, and because what a
judgment creditor of the chattel mortgagor can attach is only the equity or right of redemption and, to
effectuate the attachment or levy, it is not requisite that the mortgaged chattel itself be seized by the
sheriff.
NORTHERN MOTORS, INC. VS COQUIA, GR No. L-40018, December 15, 1975
The essence of the chattel mortgage is that the mortgaged chattels should answer for the mortgage
credit and not for the judgment credit of the mortgagors unsecured creditor. The mortgagee is not
115
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
obligated to file an independent action for the enforcement of his credit. To require him to do so
would be a nullification of his lien and would defeat the purpose of the chattel mortgage which is to give
him preference over the mortgaged chattels for the satisfaction of his credit.
The registration of the chattel mortgage is an effective and binding notice to the assignee of the
unsecured judgment creditor of the chattel mortgagor of its existence. The mortgage creates a real right
or a lien which, being recorded, follows the chattel wherever it goes.
At an execution sale, the buyers acquire only the right of the judgment debtor which is a mere right or
equity of redemption. The sale does not extinguish the pre-existing mortgage lien. Where mortgaged
property is no longer recoverable, proceeds of execution sale may be regarded as partial substitute for
unrecoverable property.
MAKATI LEASING AND FINANCE CORP VS WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS, INC., GR No. L-58469, May 16,
1983
Where a chattel mortgage is constituted on machinery permanently attached to the ground, the
machinery is to be considered as personal property and the chattel mortgage constituted thereon is not
null and void, regardless of who owns the land.
ASSOCIATED INSURANCE & SURETY COMPANY, INC. VS Lya, GR Nos. L-10837-38, May 30, 1958
A building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which
it is adhered to belong to the same owner (Lopez vs. Orosa, supra, p. 98). It cannot be divested of its
character of a realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed belongs to another. If the status
of the building were to depend on the ownership of the land, a situation would be created where a
permanent fixture changes its nature or character as the ownership of the land changes hands.
As personal properties could only be the subject of a chattel mortgage, the execution of a chattel
mortgage on a building is invalid and a nullity, the registration of the chattel notwithstanding. The
registration of the chattel in the Chattel Mortgage Registry produced no effect whatsoever for where
the interest conveyed is in the nature of a real property, the registration of the document in the registry
of chattels is merely a futile act. Thus the registration of the chattel mortgage of a building of strong
materials produce no effect as far as the building is concerned (Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37
Phil. 644).
A mortgage creditor who purchases real properties at an extra-judicial foreclosure sale thereof by virtue
of a chattel mortgage constituted in his favor, which mortgage has been declared null and void with
respect to said real properties, acquires no right thereto by virtue of said sale (De la Riva vs. Ah Kee, 60
Phil. 899).
116
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
REPUBLIC VS PERALTA, GR No. L-56568, May 20, 1987

Articles 2241 and 2242 jointly with Articles 2246 to 2249 establish a two-tier order of preference. The
first tier includes only taxes, duties and fees due on specific movable or immovable property. All other
special preferred credits stand on the same second tier to be satisfied, paripassu and pro rata, out of any
residual value of the specific property to which such other credits relate. Credits which are specially
preferred because they constitute liens (tax or non-tax) in turn, take precedence over ordinary preferred
credits so far as concerns the property to which the liens have attached. The specially preferred credits
must be discharged first out of the proceeds of the property to which they relate, before ordinary
preferred creditors may lay claim to any part of such proceeds.
Article 110 of the Labor Code does not purport to create a lien in favor of workers or employees for
unpaid wages either upon all of the properties or upon any particular property owned by their
employer. Claims for unpaid wages do not therefore fall at all within the category of specially preferred
claims established under Articles 2241 and 2242 of the Civil Code, except to the extent that such claims
for unpaid wages are already covered by Article 2241, number 6: "claims for laborers' wages, on the
goods manufactured or the work done;" or by Article 2242, number 3: "claims of laborers and other
workers engaged in the construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings, canals and other works, upon
said buildings, canals or other works." To the extent that claims for unpaid wages fall outside the scope
of Article 2241, number 6 and 2242, number 3, they would come within the ambit of the category of
ordinary preferred credits under Article 2244.
Very substantial effect may be given to the provisions of Article 110 without grievously distorting the
framework established in the Civil Code by holding, as we so hold, that Article 110 of the Labor Code has
modified Article 2244 of the Civil Code in two respects: (a) firstly, by removing the one year limitation
found in Article 2244, number 2; and (b) secondly, by moving up claims for unpaid wages of laborers or
workers of the Insolvent from second priority to first priority in the order of preference established by
Article 2244.
DBP VS NLRC, G.R. No. 106655, September 1, 1994

A distinction should be made between a preference of credit and a lien. A preference applies only to
claims which do not attach to specific properties. A lien creates a charge on a particular property. The
right of first preference as regards unpaid wages recognized by Article 110 does not constitute a lien on
the property of the insolvent debtor in favor of workers. It is but a preference of credit in their favor, a
preference in application. It is a method adopted to determine and specify the order in which credits
should be paid in the final distribution of the proceeds of the insolvents assets. It is a right to a first
preference in the discharge of the funds of the judgment debtor.
117
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Even if Article 110 and its Implementing Rule, as amended, should be interpreted to mean absolute
preference, the same should be given only prospective effect in line with the cardinal rule that laws
shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided (Article 4, Civil Code). The right to
preference given to workers under Article 110 of the Labor Code cannot exist in any effective way prior
to the time of its presentation in distribution proceedings. It will find application when, in proceedings
such as insolvency, such unpaid wages shall be paid in full before the claims of the Government and
other creditors may be paid. But, for an orderly settlement of a debtors assets, all creditors must be
convened, their claims ascertained and inventoried, and thereafter the preferences determined in the
course of judicial proceedings which have for their object the subjection of the property of the debtor to
the payment of his debts or other lawful obligations.
TORTS AND DAMAGES
GLAN VS IAC, G.R. No. 70493, May 18, 1989

The doctrine of last clear chance applies where the driver of the jeep had the last clear chance to avoid
the accident, while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or
swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a
speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, the duty of the driver was to seize that
opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expectthe other vehicle to swerve and
leave him a clear path.The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to
accident liability.
AFRICA VS CALTEX, GR No. L-12986, March 31, 1966

Presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: Where the thing which caused the
injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management
or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care (45 C.J. 1193).
The intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from
consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the
independent cause in the resulting injury.
DULAY VS CA, G.R. No. 108017, April 3, 1995
118
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
There is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions
resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
The term physical injuries in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing
death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only
physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide.
REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 129029, April 3, 2000

In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability
arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can
not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same
negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery. In other words, the
same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex
delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto either of which may be enforced against the culprit, subject to
the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover damages under
both types of liability.
Under Article 2176 the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct
and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
Enforcement of the judgment against the employer does not require the employee to be insolvent since
the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily
considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary.
Under the law, this vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of
law. The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow
an action predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured party against the employer for an act
or omission of the employee and would necessitate only a preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here,
the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject
to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement of
the judgment against the employer in an action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to
be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being
statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary. The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by
his employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches when the employee is convicted of a
crime done in the performance of his work and is found to be insolvent that renders him unable to
properly respond to the civil liability adjudged.
CUSTODIO VS CA, G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996
119
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability
for that breach before damages may be awarded.The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from
an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. In order that the law will give redress for an
act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnumetinjuria. If,
as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or
property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an
injury, the damage is regarded as damnumabsqueinjuria.
In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was
damage or injury to the plaintiff.
LIBI VS IAC, G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992

The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides
for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the
minor and the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable.
Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article
2180 provides that (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
COCA-COLA VS CA, G.R. No. 110295, October 18, 1993

While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the
applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e.,
the act which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict.
CITY OF MANILA VS TEOTICO, GR No. L-23052, January 29, 1968

Where a person "fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue,"
which street is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila, the latter is liable for damages for
the injuries suffered by the former. The liability of the City of Manila in the case at bar is governed by
Article 2189 of the Civil Code which provides that: "Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
120
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision."
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that
the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is
exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality has either "control or
supervision" over said street or road.
GUILATCO VS CITY OF DAGUPAN, G.R. No. 61516, March 21, 1989

The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the
defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code. It is not even necessary for the defective road
or street to belong to the province, city, or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires
that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the public
works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2189 of the Civil Code is
clear.
GOTESCO VS CHATTO, G.R. No. L- 87584, June 16, 1992

The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises,
appliances and amusement devices are sage for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine
being subject to no other exception or disqualification than that he does not contract against unknown
defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. Where a patron or a theatre or other place
of pubic amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly or exclusively under the
control and management of the owner, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events
would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or
permits an inference of negligence on the part of the owner or proprietor.
MMTC VS CA, G.R. No. 116617, November 16, 1998

The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance of their duties
is primary, that is, the injured party may recover from the employers directly, regardless of the solvency
of their employees.
Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees within the scope of
their assigned tasks only if they can show that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. For this purpose, they have the burden of proving that they have indeed
exercised such diligence, both in the selection of the employee who committed the quasi-delict and in
121
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
the supervision of the performance of his duties. In the selection of prospective employees, employers
are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other
hand, with respect to the supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof.
GELUZ VS CA, GR No. L-16439, July 20, 1961

The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed with personality and incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the
injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. The
damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the moral damages for the
illegal arrest of the normal development of the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant
to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations, as well as to exemplary damages, if
the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, New Civil Code).
VILLANUEVA VS UCPB, G.R. No. 138291, March 7, 2000

For a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the prosecution
did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2)
the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted
without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malicean improper or a sinister
motive. Stripped of legal jargon, malicious prosecution means persecution through the misuse or abuse
of judicial processes; or the institution and pursuit of legal proceedings for the purpose of harassing,
annoying, vexing or injuring an innocent person.
In malicious prosecution, even if the act complained of does not constitute a crime, there can still be
probable cause behind the commission of a civil wrong. The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not
the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action
with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.
INHELDER CORPORATION VS CA, GR No. L-52358, May 30, 1983

Malicious prosecution, to be the basis of a suit, requires the elements of malice and want of probable
cause. There must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate
a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false and groundless.
122
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
Nor can malice be inferred from want of probable cause. It would be a harsh rule to hold that, where
the evidence was merely sufficient to make a prima facie showing of want of probable cause, malice
must necessarily be inferred therefrom.
It should also be stressed that the mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious
prosecution should he be unsuccessful. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right
to litigate. Sound principles of justice and public policy demand that persons shall have free resort to
Courts of law for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights without fear of later on standing trial
for damages should their actions lose ground.
GERALDEZ VS CA, G.R. No. 108253, February 23, 1994

Moral damages may be awarded in breaches of contract where the obligor acted fraudulently or in bad
faith, as when a party employs fraud in inducement in securing the consent of the other.
PEOPLE VS PRADES, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998

Civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. It is distinct from and should not be
denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the
court in the exercise of sound discretion.
The recent judicial prescription is that the indemnification for the victim shall be in the increased
amount of P75,000.00 if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws. Applying
the foregoing policy, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the offended party in the case at bar is and
should be P75,000.00.
Moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as
the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been
the practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegataetprobata in civil procedure and for
essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect
included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made.
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital
thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on
her part as a gauge of her credibility.
RCPI VS CA, G.R. No. 79578, March 13, 1991

Gross carelessness or negligence constitutes wanton misconduct. Punitive damages may be recovered
for wilful or wantonly negligent acts in respect of messages, even though those acts are neither
123
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES
authorized nor ratified. Thus, punitive damages have been recovered for mistakes in the transmission of
telegrams.
124

Bea Civil Law - Assoc. Dean Paguirigan

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Bea Civil Law - Assoc. Dean Paguirigan

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

FEU MLQU UE MSU-MARAWI MSU-ILIGAN MSU-GENSAN NDU-COTABATO AUSL UM-DAVAO PUP LPUADU SSCR

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

PHILSA VS SECRETARY OF LABOR,G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001

UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL VS CA, G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

CATALAN VS BRAGANZA, GR No. 167109, February 6, 2007

SAN LUIS VS SAN LUIS,G.R. No. 134029, February 6, 2007

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

BAYOT VS BAYOT, G.R. No. 163979, November 7, 2008

BELLIS VS BELLIS, G.R. No. L-23678, 20 SCRA 358,June 6, 1967

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

VELAYO VS SHELL CO., GR No. L-7817, October 31, 1956

BARONS MKTG. VS CA, G.R. No. 126486, February 9, 1998

MWSS VS ACT THEATER, GR No. 147076, June 17, 2004

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

CARPIO VS VALMONTE, GR No. 151866, September 9, 2004

GARCIA VS SALVADOR, GR No. 168512, March 30, 2007

MERALCO VS CA, GR No. 39019, January 22, 1988

CUSTODIO VS CA, 253 SCRA 483,G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996

GASHEM VS CA, GR No. 97336, February 19, 1993

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

RELLOSA VS PELLOSIS, GR No. 138964, August 9, 2001

FRETZEL VS CATILO, GR No. 143958, July 11, 2003

REYES VS LIM, GR No. 134241, August 11, 2003

NDC VS MADRIGAL WAN HAI, GR No. 148332, September 30, 2003

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

PADILLA VS CA, GR No. L-39999, May 31, 1984

DONATO VS LUNA, GR No. L-53642, April 15, 1988

QUIAMBAO VS OSORIO, GR No. L-48157, March 16, 1988

APA VS FERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 112381, March 20, 1995

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

PAHANG VS VESTIL,G.R. No. 148595, July 12, 2004

GELUZ VS CA, GR No. L-16439, July 20, 1961

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

MERCADO VS MANZANO, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999

REPUBLIC VS LIM, G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004

AVENIDO VS AVENIDO, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC, G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007

REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

REPUBLIC VS ALBIOS, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

RONULO VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014

SEVILLA VS CARDENAS, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006

BANGAYAN VS BANGAYAN, G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

MALLION VS ALCANTARA, G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

NAVARRO VS DOMAGTOY, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996

BESO VS DAGUMAN, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, January 28, 2000

REPUBLIC VS IYOY, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005

REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

CORPUZ VS STO. TOMAS , G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

BORJA-MANZANO VS SANCHEZ, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, March 8, 2001

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

SUNTAY VS SUNTAY, G.R. No. 132524, December 29, 1998

NIAL VS BAYADOG, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES

ENRICO VS MEDINACELI, G.R. No. 173614. September 28, 2007

TY V CA, G.R. No. 127406, November 27, 2000

TERRE VS TERRE, Adm. Case No. 2349. July 3, 1992

IWASAWA VS GANGAN, G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013

CIVIL LAW DOCTRINES