Inside Nevadas Pistol Offense, Pt.

1
Posted by Brandon Patterson on August 14, 2012

If you think of the modern shotgun-based, spread-option run game to consist of zone runs and draws, the zone read,
and different flavors of the veer and speed option, its easy to see that the running backs position is a pre-snap
declaration of where possible plays can go, and that the best running plays are wide plays without much interior
balance. All of the runs are fairly slow since the back gets the ball after only a step or two (at most), and the trickier
meshes involved in veers and reads slow the play further.

Opposing coaches, of course, learned these limitations a long time ago. While I havent heard it confirmed, it seems
like defensive coordinators who play against teams that favor these plays have built-in rules for fluid scrape
exchanges where a defensive end who is a likely read target slants hard to the inside, while a backer fills the void
behind him. During the mesh, the quarterback reads the end and runs to fill the vacated gap, not realizing the
linebacker on that side is ready to meet him. Since the running backs position determines the read, the scrape
exchange can be a situational rule thats used effectively even if the back flops sides right before the snap (provided
the defensive players communicate effectively.) Zone blitzes can effectively do the same thing when aligned
properly. Finally, defensive linemen can singly complicate the read by shuffling down the backside; the combination
of squared shoulders and lateral movement can make a defenders intent hard to recognize.

Nevada head coach Chris Ault was familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of these different schemes when he
looked to modernize his I-formation offense in 2005; the aspect that concerned him most was the lack of a powerful
inside run game. He wanted to add the best parts of the shotgun game and leave the bad parts behind. His idea
was to line the QB in a shortened shotgun position four-and-a-half yards behind center, with a halfback directly
behind him. It was a novel solution (if anyone had ever used it before, its been lost to history) that provided
quarterbacks with the pass-protection and vision benefits afforded by the shotgun snap, while letting Ault keep the I-
formations fast-hitting, downhill run attack.
 Pistol formation with an
11 personnel set vs a 4-2-5 defense.

Ault also needed to turn around a Nevada program that was not only struggling, but one he had essentially hired
himself to coach, as he had been head coach, athletic director, or a combination of the two for almost all of 1976-
2004. His first season back was an inauspicious 5-7 slog that prompted action, including his examination of spread
teams.

During a 2010 presentation for Nikes Coach of the Year clinics, he recalled that when he brought the pistol concept
before his staff in January of 2005, they looked at me as if I had really lost my marbles. They began by installing it
as a short-yardage package and discovered new wrinkles. Perhaps most important was that middle-of-the-field
defenders had a hard time seeing the running back if he was lined up three yards behind the QB, especially when the
back made his cut on inside zone plays. This level of obscurity meant that despite being lined up about a yard
deeper in the backfield than in the I-formation, backs not only hit the line of scrimmage with greater actual speed,
they were perceived to be even faster than that.

While Nevada uses the pistol with bunch sets and multiple wingbacks, their base set is an 11 group (one back, one
tight end, three receivers.) The formation was married with Nevadas tight zone game; just about every team runs the
inside zone these days, though Nevada takes inside to the extreme. Where most teams tell their backs to aim for
the playside guards outer hip, Wolf Pack runners aim inside the guard. The linemen take short, two-foot splits across
the line and their initial play-side steps focus more on forward movement than youll see in some schemes. (Ive left
out the blocking schemes to help focus on the backfield movement; Nevada blocks the inside zone like everyone else
by focusing on double-teaming the defensive tackles and then moving up to the second-level defenders.) When
paired with bruising backs, Nevadas inside zone is the football equivalent of grabbing somebody by the lapels and
head-butting him for a few quarters. The quarterback completes the play with a boot action to help stall the backside
end.
 Nevadas inside zone
play; note QB boot off the play.

Even against talented defenses (their 2011 Bowl Game vs. Boston College has a lot of clips floating around), youll
see Nevada pick up yardage on this play because the back is so quick to the hole that penetrating linemen cant get
their bearings straight fast enough to make the tackle. Teams that rely on their middle linebacker to secure both A-
gaps are put under even more pressure.

This twist on the inside zone is the base play that an entire offense is built around. Like any good base play, its
simple to teach, hard to screw up, hard for a defense to disguise an approach to defeat it, and sets the stage for a
host of subsequent plays. By threatening the very center of the defense with undeniable immediacy, second-level
defenders (particularly outside linebackers) have to be cautious when pressing the line of scrimmage, and their
coaches have to weigh the value of traditional run blitzes and other elements to stop spread run games.

In part two, well look at how Ault made this brand of inside zone into the base element of whats essentially

a unique and complete Inside Nevadas Pistol Offense, Pt. 2

Posted by Brandon Patterson on August 21, 2012

The outside zone (or stretch play) is the simplest way to punish defenses that begin overplaying the inside
zone. Nevada employs this play, though I think their specialized extensions of the base inside zone are more
interesting. One of the greatest strengths of zone blocking is its flexibility: linemen and tight ends essentially learn a
single blocking scheme that can be matched to dozens of plays. Nevadas use of the inside zone scheme
exemplifies this approach. As mentioned in Part 1, the QBs boot action can be enough to keep the unblocked
backside end contained. This is important because it lets the offense get a numerical advantage at the point of
attack. When the boot isnt respected, Nevada has a host of alternatives.
In pro-style formations, the fullback is often responsible for picking up an aggressive backside defensive end or
rushing linebacker on zone run plays. Nevadas base three-wide/single-tight end set doesnt use a fullback, so Ault
compensates by motioning a wide receiver across the formation. The ball is snapped when the receiver is between
the play-side tackle and guard, giving him some room to pick up speed before catching a (hopefully) surprised
defender. Ault calls this variation the zone slice; the diagram below shows the flanker making the block, though any
play-side receiver, end, or wingback can be used.

Zone slice with flanker

motion.

When the backside end is recklessly pursuing down the line, Ault uses the zone read play that Rich Rodriguez made
famous. In Nevadas parlance its the zone bluff. The blocking is the same as for the inside zone and zone slice, as
is the tailback movement. The QB modifies his handoff, though, to accommodate the mesh and read the backside
defensive end; if the end crashes down, he keeps the ball and runs outside, away from the blocking (and often away
from the defensive flow.)
 Zone bluff; the defensive
end being read is highlighted in gray.

Ault occasionally runs a triple option off the zone slice principles that attacks the weak side of the formation with
motion. In the version below, a receiver on a rocket sweep (or buck motion at Nevada in a nod to the days of the
Wing-T and single-wing) becomes the pitch receiver. On the rocket sweep, the receiver motions closer to the tight
end; at the snap, the receiver continues running to the opposite sideline by looping behind the tailback. Depending
on the QBs read of the weak defensive end, he can hand the ball to the running back on an inside zone, keep the
ball, or pitch it to the receiver. To add a little more spice, the tight end makes a delayed slice pull to help open the
backside, or even to serve as an option for a shovel pass; I havent heard it confirmed, but on this variation the
tailback mesh might be a fake the entire way.
 Triple option look off a
flanker rocket sweep; the tight end is on a delayed pull.

The run motions for every play Ive described here can be turned into an effective play-action pass. Even the triple
option look above can function as a passing scheme, with the rocket sweep becoming a circle route. Defenses will
often attack the motioning receiver to stop the pitch; this puts them out of position to cover the receivers circle
route. To magnify mistakes like this, Ault will flood the side of the field thats threatened by the rocket sweep; in
addition to stressing defenders even more by presenting numerous threats, putting all of the receiving threats on the
same half of the field simplifies the quarterbacks passing reads. Ault admits to not being a fan of naked bootlegs, so
its common for a tight end or lineman to pull so as to protect the QB with a moving pocket.
 Playaction pass off the
rocket sweep; the tight end pulls to protect the quarterback.

Perhaps the biggest weakness in these plays is that the side the QB opens to can alert the defense to the plays
intent. Ault believes backfield motion can prevent defenses from keying on meshes, though he also employs gap-
blocking attacks to keep defenses honest. Despite common opinions that zone and gap schemes are too conflictive
to employ simultaneously, down-blocking can be a perfect complement to zone schemes. Given the phonebooth
fight mentality of the offense, there isnt much distinction besides step-direction in the two schemes, so it makes
even more sense for the Wolf Pack to use gap-based runs. Well look at a few of those plays and some different
formation tweaks to close this series.

offense as worthy of its own moniker as better-known peers.

Inside Nevadas Pistol Offense, Pt. 3

Posted by Brandon Patterson on August 28, 2012

When youre talking about gap-style runs in football today, you usually start with power and counter plays. Power
plays, roughly speaking, feature a combination of down-blocking and pulling linemen to open holes. Counters are
generally subtly changed power plays that have the quarterback and tailback make a deceptive handoff motion and
first step to get the defense moving in the wrong direction. The QB makes a long, wrapping handoff from backside to
playside, usually with the halfback selling the fake with a backside jab-step before taking off in the right
direction. Offensive linemen either block down to the backside or pull to kick-out or seal-off linebackers.

Tom Osbornes Nebraska teams in the 80s were probably responsible for getting the ball rolling on the modern
power/counter game, and Joe Gibbs Washington Redskins teams built it into one of the best known attacks in
football. The power/counter game seems to get an added bonus from being the pistol formation because the tailback
isnt visible anyway; instead of making a jab step, the runner can get playside movement to better see the blocking
develop and get to the line of scrimmage faster.

Nevadas horn play is variation of this concept, and just might be the fastest counter play in football. Its definitely
been talked to death in terms of execution, though Ill hit the highlights here and focus a little more on how it works
with Nevadas zone scheme. Its a bit of a mash-up play, as are most of todays interesting ideas in the run
game. Heres how Nevada drew it up for American Football Monthly back in 2008.

Textbook horn play.

It has hints of single-wing/Wing-T play with the way immediate blockers angle towards the center, wedge-style. Most
of the playside blocks are fold blocks where an exterior lineman blocks down on a defender on the line of
scrimmage, while the offensive lineman to the inside loops around the block to pick up defenders (usually
linebackers) away from the line. The backside is blocked just like the backside on a zone run, with the lineman
bucket-stepping towards the play and going for cut blocks on anyone they cant engage with their hands.

When Nevada coaches talked with AFM, they described the center/guard team as a pure fold block, with the center
trying to reach the linebacker in front of him. It doesnt always work out that way. Heres another example of the horn
play, this time with a twist.
 Horn play vs. Fresno
State, 2008.

In the diagram above, though, youll see the center pulling down the line and wrapping around the tackle, which
leaves the middle linebacker untouched. I drew this particular variation because I saw it used in a different manner in
a 2008 clip versus Fresno State. The defense is a 4-3 under look, where the defensive linemen slide towards the
weak side of the formation and the Sam backer walks up to the line of scrimmage opposite the tight end. With all
three linebackers on the field, it should be pretty effective against a three-wide formation.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k1H2UDBkCiY]

Thats right, you just saw the center intentionally ignore a guy whos primary job in this situation is stuffing the run in
order to pick up the centerfield safety. Why? Because they take themselves out of the play. The weak-side backer
(53) stays put because hes reading the fake handoff and probably worried about the zone read coming back in his
direction. Meanwhile, the middle linebacker (54) is so confused by whats going on that, rather than either effectively
flowing to the ball or attacking the play in the backfield, he holds the gap and gets swallowed up in the wash.

I dont know if this is something figured out in the booth, part of their regular planning when they get a defense
crossed, something identified by the tight end and QB at the start of the clip, or if the center has a blocking rule to pull
if he doesnt see the linebacker coming. Whatever it is, Nevadas got the Mike crossed up like a Pop Warner player
whos just seen his first fullback spinner.

I also want to mention a more power-oriented pistol version Nevada uses that features a second offset running
back. Versus Boston College in the 2011 Kraft Fight Hunger Bowl, they used this formation to pitch to the plays lone
wide receiver, and along the way used about every trick in their playbook. Heres how it looked:
 Wide receiver reverse off
an option look.

First, Nevada set-up this play with two prior plays from the offset-I, one a simple run and the other a pass. For this
play, in addition to the offset-I, Nevada has two tight ends on the field, both lined up to the left of the center, making
this a power running formation, though oddly enough, the right tackle is in a two-point stance. Just before the snap,
the offset fullback turns and begins running left, only getting a step or two before the balls in the air.

At the snap, the blockers on the line of scrimmage block to the left in what looks to the defense like a regular zone
play, though on closer inspection theyre shield blocking like theyre protecting a quick QB rollout; meanwhile, the
tight end at wingback steps out to block, and the receiver steps downfield to block or catch. The motioning fullback
bends his motion into a rocket sweep, the halfback runs up the gut on an inside zone look, and the quarterback fakes
a counter handoff before running down the line. The playing is screaming speed option.

Then everything changes. The right tackle is floating downfield and waiting. The wingback changes direction and
pulls down the line of scrimmage to pick up stray defenders. The wide receiver turns around, too, only he cuts
deeper into the backfield and suddenly its apparent that hes the pitch man. The right tackle is sealing the end, and
the pulling tight end is a lead blocker.

Its a testament to the discipline of BCs defense (and especially linebacker Luke Kuechly) that the play was stopped
short of a first down because every single Nevada player involved in this play was part of either a pure fake or
misdirection. Add to the fact that this play was set up by two preceding plays that used elements of this third down
attempt, and you can probably think of quite a few times where this play could cause serious damage.

Like all evolutions in scheme, the pistol isnt a perfect formation, and neither are the play calls associated with it. As
with any shotgun formation, there are times during the cadence where the center and quarterback take their eyes off
the defense. Zone blocking and simple reads can help negate shifting Ds, but not completely.
In comparison to under-center plays, not even Nevadas inside zone is as immediate a threat to the defense as a
quarterback sneak, particularly when run contrary to cadence tendencies. Nevadas short line splits dont always
create angles conducive to pure down-blocking plays, and teams that are familiar with rocket/jet motions will have an
easier time defending veer and pitch-option plays than they would against a flexbone or pro-set team, for
example. You also have to get skill position players who like running into oncoming DEs and linebackers. Finally,
the obscured tailback can work both ways, as being behind the QB makes identifying incoming blitzes harder.

Of course, you can write a list of tradeoffs for any formation, and I think the evolution of the game will be kinder to this
wrinkle than many others, particularly as more teams adopt it. If game footage is any indication, the tradeoff Ault
takes most seriously is the ability of running backs to protect the QB, as hell occasionally line his backs up in the
traditional shotgun. All that said, the single- or double-tight end pistol formation might be the games most truly
balanced formation, and I imagine well see it become a fixture in the sport.