J E R R O L D L.

A R O N S O N

UNTANGLING ONTOLOGY FROM EPISTEMOLOGY

IN CAUSATION

W. V. O. Quine and I have proposed and defended a model for capturing

the direction of the causal relation, one which utilizes the direction of the
transference of quantities such as energy, momentum and heat in order to
make sense of its asymmetrical features. 1 While such an analysis is at
loggerheads with the traditional Humean approach to causation, I feel that
this "ontological" approach may help us understand, among other things,
how the causal relationship can be stronger than that of the mere corre-
lation of events; the transference model also serves as a criterion for de-
termining the direction of causation without appealing to anthropomor-
phic standards such as Gasking's manipulation version. Thus, it allows us
to perceive causation in objective terms, retaining its rightful place in the
physical sciences.
Recently, D. Fair developed this model even further in order to antici-
pate a variety of objections that have been raised, as well as to bring out its
virtues. 2 He, too, has met with criticism in D. Dieks' note on causation and
the flow of energy 3 while T. Beauchamp and A. Rosenberg have just re-
cently submitted yet another batch of objections. 4 It is clear that several
important issues about the nature of causation have surfaced since the
transference model was first proposed and subsequently attacked. If any-
thing, I feel that their reactions indicate that the model is misunderstood,
calling out for a clarification of its workings. Below, I will attempt to
systematically cover and meet these criticisms, with hopes that the reader
will see the model in a new and more favorable light.
We often find in the physical sciences that there are certain fundamental
quantities which are conserved throughout a physical interaction. The con-
servation of momentum and energy are such well-known examples. Once
such quantities are ascribed to objects an "accounting" problem arises
when bodies interact in that we wish to know what happens to them
before, during and after interaction takes place. For the purposes of illust-
ration, consider the following experiment. It consists of two spheres, a
and b, one moving and the other at rest at time1. At time z, a makes contact
with b, comes to a halt while b moves off at time 3. In other words, a lost all

Erkenntnis 18 (1982) 293-305. 0165~0106/82/0183 0293 $01.30

Copyright 9 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.
294 JERROLD L. ARONSON

of its m o m e n t u m in this sequence of events while b gained momentum. The

obvious answer to the questions " W h a t happend to a's m o m e n t u m ? " and
" H o w did b acquire its m o m e n t u m ? " is that it was transferred from a. This
means that, barring friction, the m o m e n t u m b has at time3 is exactly the
same m o m e n t u m a had at time t. This makes a the cause and b's motion,
the effect, as expressed by the transference criterion for the directionality of
causation:

Prior to the time of the occurrence of the effect, the cause object possessesa quantity (e.g.,
momentum, energy, heat, etc.) which is transferred to the effectobject and manifested as the
effect.

In this case, the transference of m o m e n t u m from a is manifested by b's

motion at time 3.
In a single instance of a causal relation, then, the direction of cause to
effect depends on what object gives up a particular quantity and what
receives it. Some classic test cases. In the case of two gears, a and b, which
are turning together at time 3, even though it is true that gear b turns if and
only if gear a turns, nevertheless only one causes the other to rotate. We
distinguish cause from effect in terms of which gear is contributing angular
m o m e n t u m to the other. Gasking's case of heating iron causing it to glow
is another counter-example for the nomological approach of determining
the direction of causation, for it is true the iron glows if and only if it is at a
certain temperature but only one causes the other. According to the trans-
ference criterion, the reason why we say heat causes iron to glow but not
the other way around is because while we have theories that tell us of the
existence of processes which convert heat energy into the molecular energy
of the iron, which, in turn, is converted into light energy, we know the
reversal is highly unlikely, borderlining the impossible. (Imagine light
coming from all directions, converging upon the piece of iron and heating
it up to an extremely high temperature. If so, we then have an extremely
unlikely case of glowing causing iron to get hot.)
As Fair and Quine carefully point out, the above criterion is not in-
tended as an analysis of the meaning of 'cause' but designed instead to
make sense of the asymmetrical features of causation which do not seem
to be built into our laws of nature (which are symmetrical), s This criterion
also makes sense of how it is that the causal relation is stronger than the
mere correlation of events. In the case of a causing b to move, b's momen-