-1- (5TH PROOF)

MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH

PAPERS

by
- - -
Madhvamunipriya, Mahamahopa dhya ya
Dr. B. N. K. Sharma, M.A. PhD. D.Litt.
Retired Professor of Sanskrit and Ardhamagadhi
Ruparel College
Mumbai - 400 016.

2001
 -2- (5TH PROOF)

MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS CONTENTS

by
DR. B. N. K. SHARMA, Preface 5
E-mail : bnksharma@usa.net

1. (a) Brahmatarka and other unknown source books

of Madhva 7
(b) Vedanta Desika's strictures on Alepakamata in
his Satadusani (Ch. 65)
Published by : The Author,
(c) His denunciation of interpolations by its
4/2 Shah Bldg.,
activists in to the body politic of traditional
Bhagat Road, Sampradayic Sanyasadharma Texts as quoted
Mumbai - 400 016. by Prof. Mesquita on Page 27 of his work.
(d) These have absolutely nothing to do with
the bona fides of M's now non - extant
sources, on which he had developed his
philosophical system and its theology, for
Printed at : Navin Printers, which Appayya Diksita had arraigned him. 31-34
Near Ruparel College,
Matunga (W), Mumbai - 400 016. 2. Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta -
A farfetched theory. 35

3. The Arsa Tradition of Approach of Madhvacarya

to the interpretation of the Vedanta Sutras. 45
Pages : 74
4. Meet Madhusudana Sarasvati 59

5. Appendix - The question of the

Date of Madhvacarya 67
Price : Rs. 50/-

April 2001
Copyright Reserved by the Author.
-3- (5TH PROOF)

PREFACE
The Dvaita School of Vedanta entered the modern academic
forum effectively only in the early years of the last century.
Since then, it has made steady and rapid progress, during
the last sixty years and has crossed the seas, in the modern
academic sense. It has established an enviable record of upto
date literary output of research work of outstanding merit in
the history of Dvaita literature and its philosophical classics through
international literary medium, by way of translations and expositions
through leading Publishing Houses like the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan,
Motilal Banarsidass and Munshiram Manoharlal. It has established
its own institutes for Advance studies and research foundations
at Bangalore and Anandatirtha Pratisthana under the Akhila Bharata
Madhva Mahamandala. A Variorum edition of the Nyayamrta,
Tarangini and Advaitasiddhi has been published in 3 volumes
- a historical event, by Prof. K. T. Pandurangi. Many western
scholars like Suzanne Siauve, Stafford Betty, Edwin Gerow and
Michael Warren Myers have enriched Dvaita philosophy with their
writings. Moving with the time spirit, the Dvaita School has
established its links with the most modern electronic media of
the Internet / Website through the pioneering efforts of a band
of scholars from the States. In short, it has carved out for itself
a niche in the temple of spiritual quest in the West and has
acquitted itself very well in recapturing its esteemed position
as one of the three living principal schools of Vedanta, whose
study is capable of contributing seminal ideas for the development
of a Global Philosophy of Theism in the future.

Of late, there seem to be some undercurrents of hidden Agenda

to denigrate the growing prestige of the school by maligning
the fair name of its Founder, by calling into question the textual
bona fides of his source books, many of which are now non
- extant. They are sought to be made out to be works of his
own authorship, intended to be passed off as ancient authorities
to delude the gullible. Akin to this is another attempt to establish
a Jain Background to the development of some aspects of Dvaita
 -4-
6 Preface
logic and Epistemology, its acceptance of Memory as a source
of valid knowledge, the definition and classification of Pramana
into Kevala and Anu etc. These claim to be in the nature of
open research pursued for its own sake by Western scholarship
and have been published in the West recently.
The Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research Foundation and
the Anandatirtha Pratisthana should lose no time in countering
such moves, by undertaking a massive research project to deal
with such issues, as and when they are raised. My aim in the
present publication is to make a beginning to set the ball rolling
in the right direction by drawing attention to the new challenges
of the times which the school will have to face in the realm
of advanced research. The two other papers included here, are
in the nature of routine book-reviews.
My grand daughter-in-law Smt. Asha Purandar Bhavani has
most cheerfully taken the trouble to get the Mss. of these papers
computer - typed for the press and my son Dr. S. K. Bhavani
took the entire responsibility of seeing them through the press.
I thank them both for their co-operation.
- Roque Mesquita in his book written in German and published
Vaisa- kha Sukla Aks.aya Tr. ti ya- B. N. K. Sharma
26-April-2001
4/2 Shah Building,
Bhagat Road,
Mumbai - 400 016.
(Phone : 022 - 431 0035)
(5TH PROOF)
I. BRAHMATARKA AND OTHER
UNKNOWN SOURCE
BOOKS OF MADHVA
PART - I
It is significant that the question of the genuineness of a
large number of unknown and non-extant literary sources cited
by Madhva, the founder of one of the three principal schools
of Vedanta in India, in the 13th century, was raised only in the
Post -Vyasatirtha period, by Appayya Diksita and others. They
had been dismayed by the devastating criticisms of the foundations
and superstructure of Advaita Metaphysics and its interpretation
of the Brahmasutras, by Vyasatirtha in his Nyayamrta and Candrika.
In their chagrin, they raised the bogey of unknown source books
of Madhva as a vulnerable point of attack. These critics were
promptly met and answered by Vijayindratirtha and Narayanacarya
of Advaita - Kalanala fame and many others like Vanamali Misra
from the North. There the controversy ended.
The question has now been re-opened in a big way by Prof.
by the indological Department of the Vienna University (1997).
It has been briefly reviewed in English by Prof. Jan Houben.
I have also discussed this question in my History of Dvaita
School of Vedanta (Motilal B. Dass publication), in the light of
contemporary historical facts and internal evidences of these
texts, of various kinds, linguistic and philological, the varying
lengths of quotes and references to the names of interlocutors
in the texts impugned. I am not able to see from the brief review
in English, if Prof. Mesquita has given due consideration for
accepting the genuineness of the sources and giving Madhva
the benefit of the doubt, at this distance of time . It is not my
contention that this matter should not be investigated afresh
on modern lines. But this discussion should be in a balanced
 -5-
8 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva
way, without imputing motives of fraud and fabrication and with
the courtesy and regard due to the founder of one of the Principal
Schools of Vedanta Philosophy, without straying into sensitive
issues relating to the Avatarhood of the person concerned.
The 13th Century which saw the birth of Madhva was a period
of grave socio-religious and political upheavals in the history
of the country - in the wake of Muslim invasions, occupation
and expansion involving destruction of temples, forced conversions
and destruction of vast manuscript libraries, housing priceless
treasures in all branches of Sanskrit learning, in various parts
of the country. From certain remarks of Madhva in his Mbh.
TN (II 3-7) it seems, that he exerted himself to salvage and
restore to posterity as much of the fading and forgotten sources,
by incorporating them into his own works as much as was possible
and in keeping with his requirements and pass it on to posterity.
It is unfor tunate that instead of appreciating and being grateful
to this Great Son of India and a Jnanopasaka, later day critics
like Appayya Diksita should have chosen to accuse him of fraud
and fabrication. It is difficult to believe with Prof. Mesquita that
the authenticity of the Source Books of Madhva had already
been raised in Madhva's own days or soon after, by Varadaguru
and Venkatanatha and not by Appayyadiksita for the first time
in the 16th Century after Vyasatirtha. It is indeed difficult to
believe that so damaging a charge would have been left unanswered
by any of the stalwarts among the followers of Madhva such
as Aksobhyatirtha who disputed with the famous Vidyaranya on
Tattvamasi or by the lynx-eyed great commentator Jayatirtha
or by Visnudasacarya of Vadaratnavali fame or even by the great
Vyasatir tha himself and it was left to Vyasatir tha's disciple
V i j ay i n d r a t i r t h a . E ve n M a d h u s u d a n a S a r a s va t i h a d n o t
raised the problem of the authenticity of the sources of Madhva.
I t was V i j ay i n d r a - w h o w a s t h e f i r s t t o t a ke c u d g e l s
against Appayya.
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 9
Brahma Tarka is Prof. Mesquita's main target of attack on
Madhva. He regards it as a bogus work authored by Madhva
himself and passed off as an ancient authority. This sensational
theory of his rests on most slippery foundations of a passing
reference to B. T. in the concluding Mangalacarana verse of
Madhva's Upadhikhandana (Brahmatarkokti margatah) that
the treatment of the subject is in accordance with the
teachings of B. T.
Reading too much between the lines of the Mangalacarana
verse, Prof. Mesquita has a brain wave that the entire body
of the text of the Up. Kh. is a verbatim carbon copy of B. T.,
barring the Mangalacarana. It so happens that in keeping with
the title of his work Up. Kh., Madhva comes down heavily on
a desperate plea of Istasiddhi of Vimuktatman that the very
irrationality of the Advaita Concept of Avidya operating as an
Upadhi (limiting adjunct) in obscuring the Nirvisesa - B and
producing an illusory appearance of a multiplicity of Jivatmans,
is not a defect : as such irrationality of Avidya is an embellishment
and not a defect : Durghatatvam Avidyayah Bhusanam Na Tu
Dusanam. This invites a fitting retort from Madhva :
Durghatatvam Bhusanam cet Syad avidyatvamatmanah
Andham tamopyalamkaro Nityaduhkham Siromanih
(Up. Kh.)
Having arrived at the conclusion that Up. Kh. itself is an integral
part of the B. T., emanating from it, Prof. Mesquita triumphantly
declares that the B. T. "polemizes upon Istasiddhi". And as the
I stasiddhi can be placed only between 10th and 11th centuries,
the B. T. too which "polemizes upon it" must have been written
much later in the 13th Century in Madhva's own life time and
by himself. It is all such simple logic! Only, Prof. Mesquita is
reckoning without the host.
 -6-
10 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva
Prof. Mesquita's ascr iption of B. T. to Madhva's ow n
authorship hinges on the casual reference to B. T. in the
concluding Mangala verse of Madhva's Up. Kh. and gives him
a jumping ground. But unfortunately for him, there are two other
references to Durghatatvam of Avidya being an embellishment,
in Madhva's A. V. one in 1 - 1 - 1 - Avidyadurghatatvam ced
syada- tma- pihi ta- drsah and another - Alamkrtah Sadaivayam
durghataireva bhusanih, in the Iksatyadhi. In both these cases,
there is no mention of B. T. in the vicinity or neighbourhood
t o g i ve a ny h a n d l e fo r P r o f. M e s q u i t a t o i n t r o d u c e h i s
hobby horse.
The Up. Khandana is an out and out dialectical work cap
a pie demolishing the Advaita doctrine of Brahma-jna-nava- da from
beginning to end, unsparingly going into the nooks and corners
of the dialectical method. The B. T. on the other hand is a constructive
treatise dealing with a wide range of subjects against a background
of multi-dimensional subjects covering theistic logic, epistemology
and metaphysics as well as principles of textual exegesis relating
to Upasanas and Vaisnava theology in its widest range. The
two works are not thus in pari materia and a dialectical work
like the Up. Khandana cannot be treated as forming a part of
the B. T. by any stretch of the imagination.
Nay, there is one more full-dress dialectic refutation of
Istasiddhi's desperate plea in the V. T. N of Madhva running
over seventeen sentences , short and long, beginning with Na
ca Mithyavastuno durghatatvameva bhusanam and ending with
durghatasya bhusanatve durghatamapi atmamithyatvam syad eva.
Here also, there is no contextual connection with the B. T. Above
all, the VTN is a prose work of Madhva in the main, (though
a few verses are quoted here and there) and Madhva expressly
says that he is the author of VTN by using the first person
in the second opening verse Sa-dhayisya- mi tanyeva kramad. Prof.
Mesquita will do well to abandon his chasing a shadow and
trying to make out that the B. T. is one of Madhva's own works,
paraded as an ancient authority. He must apologise to Madhva.
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 11
It is significant that Madhva pays homage to Vyasa as his
Guru de jure even in his first work on the Gita, before he went
on his pilgrimage to Vyasasrama. What is most interesting is
that even before he wrote his B. S. B. he had a deep insight
and clear anticipation of the correct interpretation of the sutras
-
such as A bha- sa eva ca (ii-3-50), Ya- vadatmabhavitvat (ii-3-30)
in regard to the metaphysical relation between Brahman and
the Jiva in terms of Jiva's Sa- ru- pya, not based on any external
Upadhi. This is derived from two crucial terms Anasi and Aprameya
in Gita II, 18. In the Anandamaya Adhikarana S. throws the
Sutrakara overboard by saying Idam tviha Vaktavyam. Sutrani
tu evam Vyakhyeyani and accuses the Sutrakara of a logical
fallacy in giving the sense of superabundance to "maya" in
Anandmaya alone in the Sutra Vikarasabdat neticenna pracuryat.
Madhva shows that the Sutrakara is a much more astute logician
than S. gives him credit for, as he has impartially extended
the significance of superabundance to all the five forms in the
series. A true disciple is one who stands by his teacher always
and not one who defies him. Judged in this light, Madhva richly
deserves to be regarded as a true disciple of Vyasa, irrespective
of accepting or not accepting that he ever visited Vyasasrama.
Trivikrama Pandita says that Madhva visited Badari twice in his
lifetime. Madhva Vij. says Madhva observed a vow of silence
and meditation for for ty-eight days praying for a call from Badari
to meet Vyasa. If Madhva believed himself to have been sent
down with a special mission to resuscitate Vedantic Theism and
communicated it to his chosen disciples, it was fo r their edification.
Others are free to judge him on his merits.
The B. S. is a theistic treatise which debars the released
soul from exercising the prerogatives of B's creative activities
(iv-4-17). Does not this show that Madhva is a more faithful
commentator? A Theistic philosophy is expected to give a high
place to Bhakti among Sadhanas. According to S. there is no
reference for Bhakti in the Su- tras. It is Madhva who has provided
 -7-
12 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva
a rightful place for Bhakti in the Su- tras by allotting an entire
pa- da in Adh. III-2 immediately after Vairagya Pa-da, as a true
disciple of the Sutrakara. The Upanishads extol Guru Bhakti
and Guru's grace in the development of disciple's advancement,
through many stories. It is Madhva who has given a special
place to Guru's Grace, in the Su-tra Prada- navadeva taduktam
(iii-3-44) where the prefix pra signifies bestowal of grace lovingly.
Do these not show that Madhva was the most faithful disciple
of the Su- trakara? These are crucial facts which entitle us to
decide whether Madhva is justified in claiming himself to be
a true disciple of Vyasa consistent with the tradition of his visit
to Badari for a refresher course.
OTHER NON-EXTANT SOURCES OF MADHVA
Next to B. T. in importance are the numerous Pancaratra
Samhitas from which Madhva has drawn most of his quotations.
The number of Pancaratra Samhitas is more than two hundred.
Prof. Otto Schrader former Director of Adyar Library in his
Introduction to Pancaratras (of which he was pleased to present
me with a complimentary copy) has listed a large number of
them, which still await exploration. The P. R. Samhitas deal with
their subject under four heads of Jnanapada, Kriyapada,Yogapada
and Caryapada.
A verse from Mbh. expressly affirms -
Pancaratrasya krtsnasya vakta Narayanah svayam.
Jnanesu etesu rajendra sarvesu etad visisyate
Yatha yogam yatha nyayam nistha narayanah parah
(XII. 359)
that Visnu - Narayana is the sole author of the entire P. R.
literature . It is on this pronouncement that Madhva, while quoting
from some of them describes them as Visnu Krta Sattatva etc.
This way of reference to some of them in the course of citation
has been twisted by Prof. Mesquita as calculated to confer on
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 13
his own fabricated texts the stamp of divine authority - to
defame Madhva.
An Institute for the special study of P. R. texts, exclusively,
called Pancaratra Parisodhana Parisad was established in Madras
in 1982 headed by Prof. H. Daniel Smith an American Prof.
in collaboration with Dr. K. K. A. Venkatachari. The institute
brought out four publications. It has listed 104 Samhitas / Tantras
with the Adhyaya titles where available, in full or in par t. These
104 works have been surveyed. The second publication pertains
to Hindu Iconography based on P. R. texts. The third is jointly
edited by Prof. Sampat of the Presidency College, Chennai, and
Smt. Sita Padmanabhan of Q.M.C. Chennai. The fourth work
on Padma Samhita Par t II was edited by the Indological Institute,
Pondicherry. Prof. Otto Schrader has pointed out that P. R. Samhitas
originated in North India, and gradually spread to the South.
The Agama Pramanya of Yamunacarya, now lost, bore the title
of Kashmira- gama Pra- ma- nya.
The publication of the Pancaratra Parisodhana Parishad has
six appendixes.
In Appendix-I are found the names of Kapila or Kapileya,
Citrasikhandi, Visnu Rahasya, Hayagriva Samhita, Sanatkumara
Samhita, Dattatreya Samhita and Krsna Samhita, Satya Samhita,
Narayanatantra, Mayavaibhavatantra etc.
Appendix-II has Hari Samhita, Vaisvanara, Satyasamhitas.
In Appendix-III we have Vyasayoga, Kriyayoga, Dattatreyayoga,
Dhyanayoga, Mahayoga, etc.
In Appendix-IV we have Guruviveka, Karmaviveka, Amsaviveka,
Bha- s. a- viveka, Bhavaviveka, Sakti Viveka, Vedar thaviveka,
Padaviveka, Tattvaviveka.
In Appendix-V we have Vibhutitattva, Sabdatattva, Jivatattva,
Dharmatattva, Muktitattva, Sattattva, Bhavatattva.
 -8-
14 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva
In Appendix-VI we h ave A d hya t m a , N a r aya n a d hya t m a ,
Vasudevadhyatma, Ya- dava- dhyatma.
In Appendix-VII Gitakalpa, Narayana Astaksarakalpa, Narayana
Gopala Kalpa, Ramakalpa, all quoted by Madhva.
A more intensive search of the Adyar Library P. R. manuscripts
may well reveal many more titles and sub titles of the P. R.
texts there. Thus a preliminary survey of the contents of the
P. R. Samhitas conducted by the Madras Institute has definitely
improved the prospects of fur ther light coming from the Adyar
collection also.
Prof. Mesquita's effort to condemn Madhva on both the fronts
of B. T. and P. R. Samhitas has definitely misfired. He should
now have the grace to withdraw his sweeping charges against
Madhva and apologise for rushing into print on delusive data.
The G. T. of Madhva (III 42-43) deals with the subject of
merger (Laya) of various abhima- ni davatas of different tattvas
in their higherups at the time of utkranti of Aparoksa jnanis
from their bodies, as stated in the srutis. However, there are
several discrepancies in the accounts in the texts. These conflicting
accounts of the merger of the abhimani devatas, is the subject
of discussion in the G. T. (III - 42-43). This is represented by
two quotes one of 6 lines in the beginning, which is followed
by an objection in prose pointing to discrepancy and another
two verses solving the conflict in an amicable way. The three
verses are quoted with just an itica as in the earlier case. It
stands to reason that the two sets of verses form a unity of
theme from the same source and further elucidation of the manner
of the reconciliation is presented in the GT in the two other
passages, one from Sabdanir naya and another from the
Brahmatarka as such. Now the same subject of the manner
of laya is referred to in BS IV.2.1 in a particular order. The
earliest commentator on Madhva is his close contemporary
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 15
Trivikramapandita. He has suo motu raised this question of
conflicting accounts of the manner of laya in other scriptural
texts. In resolving this conflict amicably, Trivikrama has quoted
the self same three verses beginning with Sarvabhimanino Devah
and referring them to its source as Brahmatarka and the text
of the two other single verses quoted in the G. T. as from
Sabdanirnaya and Brahmatarka respectively. Trivikrama has
explained that there is no difficulty in admitting that in the case
of merger, more than one Abhimanidevata may be admitted in
subordination to other ones, without conflict : Ekatra bahunam
abhimana-avirodhah, citing the example of a King and his village
officers Yatha visayasvami gramasya. It is a matter of simple
logic and we need not suppose that Trivikramapandita was obliged
to seek clarification from Madhva, as a school boy, when one
of the two single quotes connected with the same topic has
been traced to Brahmatarka in the G. T. itself.
PART - II
I have since got a copy of the complete English Edition of
Prof. Mesquita's work "Madhva's unknown Literary Sources -
Some Observations" published by Aditya Prakashan, New Delhi.
I am now in a better position to offer my comments on all aspects
of the problem as dealt with by him.
At the very outset, in the chapter on M and his Critics on
P. 27, the Prof. makes an astounding statement about me.
"As admitted by the followers of M. Venkatanatha (13th Century)
was one of his outspoken critics" and in a foot note to this,
adds "Sharma is widely mistaken in that he thinks Venkatanatha
(1268-1369) lived after Appayya Diksita and his pupil Bhattoji".
I am constrained to enlighten the Professor that the Venkatanatha
I was referring to placing him after Bhattoji, is quite a different
person, later than Madhusudana Sarasvati and a cantankerous
commentator on the Gita. He has taken M to task on several
occasions.
 -9-
16 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva
Venkatanatha was the personal name of the celebrated Leader
of the Vadagalai sect of the Ramanuja school, respectfully referred
to as Vedanta Desika in Visistadvaita tradition. We in S. India
always refer to him as Desika or Vedanta Desika, following the
custom. I have in all my writings all these sixty years and more
always referred to him by that name and nowhere by his personal
name. It is Prof. Mesquita in his over-enthusiasm who has
committed an error of judgement of mistaken identification,
which I can not help.
The mistake could have been avoided if the Prof. had taken
note of other established facts known about Desika's acting as
a referee in the historic debate on the import of the Tattvam
asi text between Aksobhya Tir tha and Vidyaranya and giving
his verdict in favor of Aksobhya in the well known verse :
Asina- Tattvamasina- Parajivaprabhedina-
Vidyaran.yam maharan.yam Aks.obhyamunir acchinat
which is well attested by early Visistadvaitic works. Moreover,
Vedanta Desika agrees with M. in condemning Advaita as
Pracchanna Bauddha and calls upon the faithful to root it out
and counsels them to remain steadfast to R. or else to accept
M's school as nearest to R's heart. Both M and Desika hold
the Pancaratras highly authoritative and do quote from Ekayana
Srutis and Daivi Mimamsa which to S and Appayya are highly
suspect. In these circumstances, it is highly incredible that
Venkatanatha alias Desika could have accused M. of fabricating
texts in support of his philosophical system (unlike Appayya).
The subject matter of the Alepakamatabhangavada of Vekatanatha
quoted by the Prof. and the charges it makes against unscrupulous
writers advocating heretical innovations polluting the time honored
rigid codes of Sannyasa Dharma and quoting from non - extant
texts attributed to Vyasa and other sources in their support,
has nothing to do with the theological and philosophical doctrines
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 17
of M and his interpretations of the Sutras and Upanisads-against
which Appay ya had his complaint. But the quotes from
Venkatanatha's Alepakamatabhanga given by Prof. Mesquita have
nothing to do with Vedanta or theology but are wholly connected
with the Yatidharma and its violators. How have these criticisms
been presumed to be directed against M? The offenders are
nowhere mentioned by their names and M's name is conspicuous
by its absence throughout. Why, if he is the chief offender and
the main culprit? While Appayya has expressly named M why
has the author of the Alepakamatabhanga not named M? What
is the Professor's answer to these straight questions? Or, is
it all a case of pure hallucination on his part? Who are the
Papis.t.has Venkatanatha has in mind? We wait for an answer.
Or is it a case of Abaddham pat.hitva kucodyam karoti?
There is not even a shred of evidence that these charges
have been levelled against M. M has paid eloquent tributes
to the sanctity of Yatyasrama and Yatidharma in his Gitabhasya
(MGB III 4). He has quoted Narayana As. t.aks. arakalpa in
support which according to the Prof. is an unknown source
but which has been listed in the Pancaratra Samsodhana
Publications referred to in Par t I.
S had downgraded Karmayoga of the Gita and equated it
with Ka-myakarma and deemed Arjuna to be unfit for Jna-namarga
(SGB II 47). M on the other hand, showed that Karmayoga of
the Gita was essentially the same as Nivrttakarma as opposed
to Pravrttakarma and is based on enlightened action dedicated
to the Supreme :
Niska- mam jna- napu- rvam to nivrttam iha cocyate,
R quotes a Parallel from P. R.
Tasma-t samyak parambrahma Va- sudeva- khyam avyayam
Asma- d ava- pyate sa- stra- t Jna- napu- rvena karman.a-
(Sribhasya II.2.41)
 -10-
18 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva
To S. Arjuna is only a Madhyama- dhikari not fit for jna- nanistha-
(II 47). To M. Arjuna is an Uttamadhikari like Janaka and Priyavrata
of the Bhagavatapurana (II.7.45). Arjuna is the chosen exemplar
of Lokasangraha (III. 20). Jnanamarga and Karmamarga are
not water tight compartments. Efficient performance of either
yields the benefit of both (V. 4) which implies that each has
an appreciable content of the other. The only difference is there
is more of external activity and social responsibility than in other
(M. G. T). Hence the statement sankocat bahyakarmanah and
the clarification : Jna-nina- m api hi karma anus.t.heyam karmina-
pi jna- tavyo Bhagava-n (M. G. T). There is nothing in all this
to warrant Prof. Mesquita's surmise that it refers to authors
degrading the function of dharma or karma, going back to Vyasa
himself and his disciples, like Jaimini, Asmarathya and "the principle
of first interpolate and then claim to find them in some Puranas"
(P. 28). Incidentally Vyasa Smrti has been listed in the P. R.
Samsodan Publication and quoted by S. (VSNB).
M would be the last person to countenance / encourage or
connive at any inroads on Yatidhar ma by anyone. In his
BSB III.4.3 he administers a ster n war ning that even an
Aparoksajnani shall not transgress any established codes of
conduct of ascetic discipline.
Atita-anagatajna-ni Trailokyoddharan.aks.amah
Etadrsopi na-ca- ram srautam sma- rtam parityajet.
Trivikrama Pandita records that M had set an exemplary record
of adherence to Yatidharma, as a Paramahamsa :
Sla- ghyah Pa-ramahamsya a- sramavaro Yacchila
Ganga-jalasna-to
vyaktam ayogya sangamabhuvo dos.a- t Punar moks.itah
The Prof. makes a sneaking attempt to connect the charges
of meddling with Sanyasadharma by some unscrupulous authors
mentioned by Venkatanatha, with the topic of the various ways
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 19
in which the Samanvaya of Karmakanda texts in B have been
attuned with B by Audulomi, Jaimini Kasakrtsna as disciples
of Vyasa, as partial aspects of his teaching in the Vakya-nvaya
Sutra of the B. S. (1.4.20) with the licentiousness towards
Ya t i d h a r m a l e t l o o s e by s o m e D i s s e n t e r s a c c o r d i n g t o
Venkatanatha. This is highly objectionable . The two have nothing
in common.
Krsnadvaipayanamatad ekadesavidah pare
Vadanti te yathaprajnam no virodhah kathamcana
(M.BSB.1.4.23)
The Professor's remarks in this connection are baseless,
motivated and uncalled for. His is mixing up issues deliberately.
His hypothesis that M. put up his claims to be an Avatara
o f Vayu only after his visit to Badari and receivingVyasa's mandate,
tho true, does not mean that M. was not sure or aware of his
Avatarhood earlier. The fact that his earliest work the Gita Bhasya
pays homage to Narayana and Vyasa as his Devata and Guru
(see f. n. on p. 34 and also AV 2c).
Devam Narayanam natva- sarvadosavivarjitam
Paripurnam Gurumsca- n Gita- rtham vaksya- mi lesatah 1
confirms his faith in his being a direct sisya of Narayana - Vyasa
come to fulfil a Divine mission. It would be otherwise impossible
to explain his unerr ing quotations from many lost Vedic
Sa- khas like Gaupavana Agnivesya, Aya- sya, Anabhimlana,
Madhucchandasa, Sa- ndilya, Pippala- da, Yaska and a number of
PR Texts like Narayana Astaksara Kalpa, Gita Kalpa, Vyasasmrti
and others in his very first work. There are indications of this
in M.Vij.V.53. The formal authorisation of M to write a commentary
on the B. S. described in M.Vij. VIII.46 only completes the picture.
Glowing with a new illumination and a renewed faith in his mission
in life M returns to his camp, writes his Bhasya on the Sutras,
has it copied by Satyatirtha, sends an advance copy of it to
 -11-
20 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva
Acyutaprajna his Asramaguru at Udupi and returns after visiting
great centres of learning on the Godavari and acquiring fresh
disciples on the way back. (M. vij IX. 5-6)
Sayana in his introduction to Rgveda bhasya says :
Yuga- nte antarhita-n Veda- n Setihasan maharsayah
Lebhire tapasa purvam anujna- ta- h svayambhuva- .
Among the direct disciples of M, Trivikrama Pandita is the
only one who gives us a personal description of the Acarya's
personality as a Mahapurusa both physically and intellectually.
The Acarya himself defines a Mahapurusa :
S.an.n.avatyangulotsedho Nyagrodhaparimandalah
Saptatalas caturhastah sa Devairapi pujyate
Vimsallaksanato anunah tapasvi bahuvedavit
Veda ityeva yam pasyet sa vedo jna- nadarsana- t
Trivikrama writes -
Pratyaks.am eva etallaks.an.am dr.syate Bhagavati
Bha- s.yaka- re
And proceeds saying :
Sabra- hman.opanisadah nikhilas susiddha- h Veda- h vettum
tadasya mahima- yam acintaniyah
The variety, voluminosity and multidimensional range of his literary
contributions to the sum total of human knowledge of his times
stands unparalleled to this day. His poetic talents find expression
thro' different genre. His logic is inexorable and his spiritual
mysticism deep and abiding. His devotion to God is unparalleled.
He is the only Indian philosopher andVedantin who has recognised
the continuation of Bhakti even after Moksa, as an end in itself.
Bhaktya- Jna-nam tato Bhaktih Tato drs.tih tatasca sa-
Tato muktih tato bhaktih saiva sya- t sukharupin.i
(A. V. 1639)
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 21
The Gita says God descends on earth in all Yugas and surely
some of the gods too do so with Him. The BV Bhavan, Mumbai
has published a volume of Vedic Su- ktas conforming to Rgvedic
prototype in language, idiom and accentuation, tested by experts. 2
If a gifted genius of our own times can do this, why disbelieve
the ability of a great thinker like M to be able to recapture lost
sakhas by his Yogic spiritual power, centuries ago, for the benefit
of posterity?
Over a dozen commentaries are known to have been written
on the Sutras of Badarayana till the times of M. Still, there
is no consensus among Vedantins about their teachings.
Commentators have been going on the merry-go-round of real
Brahmaparinamavada either wholly or in part, Bhedabhedavada,
Vivartavada, Sacchaktiparinamavada etc. Do these exhaust the
possibilities of a solution? Is there no possibility of going beyond
the beaten track including the Nyayavaisesika conception of a
Cosmic Potmaker and conceive of B in a better light as the
efficient cause only in terms of being the source of the being,
becoming and functioning of all finite reality, with primordial Matter
as the material cause, sinceVedanta philosophy does not subscribe
to creation de novo and ex-nihilo . Why should such a conception
be looked at askance, instead of as a viable solution?
An unprejudiced critical and comparative study of the existing
Bhasyas on the sutras discloses many directions in which M's
Bhasya has been far ahead of earlier ones. While the others
have explained a-di in BS i.1.2 as referring only to Sthiti and
dissolution of the world, the internal evidence of Sutra III.2.5
shows obscuration of Jivas' Jnana by Ajnana and consequent
bondage and subsequent release by the gracious will of the
L o r d ( Pa ra - a b h i d hya n a t ) w h i c h a d d u p t o e i g h t c o s m i c
dispensations by the Lord as Jagatkarana (See also BS i-3,
10-11). Sutra IV.4.17 debars released souls from exercising the
Divine prerogatives of Jagadvyapara. Where then is there any
 -12-
22 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva
possibility of identity between Jiva and B in Moksa, in the
philosophy of Badarayana?
Advaita dismisses Jivasvarupa as an illusory appearance of
B like the reflected image of the sun in the waters. The opening
words of the Sutra Ata eva (meaning, as already stated) upama
suryakadivat (iii, 2.18) calls attention to the particular grounds
on which the relation is intended to be taken and not in a literal
sense, which would reduce the Jivasvarupa to an insentient
reflection brought about by a medium and hence impermanent
non-eternal. But not only are Jivas Nitya according to Katha
Up. (II:2, 13), B. S. (IV 4.17) and Gita (II.18.XIV.2) but are sentient
beings and not Jadas - which shows that the words of the Sutra
Ata eva (Upama) are intended to make clear in what precise
sense the simile is to be understood and in what sense it
should not be misunderstood. Hence, M commentary :
Ata eva-bhinnatva-tadadhinatva sa-drsya- bhya- m eva
Suryaka- dyupama- Na upa- dhyadhinatva- dina-
(M.B.S.B. III. 2. 18)
referring back to Sutras II.3.1; II.3.28; II.3.29. The association
of Buddhi with Jivasvarupa cannot at all be regarded as ya-vada-
tmabha- vi (II.3, 30) without interpolating of Samsarabhavi after
-
Atma- as S would have it. The significance of the warning sounded
by Ata eva (as above) cannot be missed.
- M believes in a threefold classification of souls based on
The term A bha- sa (B. S. II.3.50) deserves to be understood
in a much better sense than that of a lifeless, insentient reflection
- expressing itself according to Gita XVII. 2-3 (sattvanurupa) -
of B. M's interpretation of Abha- sa as one who shines forth as
a conscious being on account of B and bears a similarity to
it in terms of tadgunasa- ratva raises the spiritual status of the
Jiva from that of a lifeless inanimate reflection to "Tata
a- bha- sate nityam tadvad abhasate pi ca Bha-nam astitvam api
caiva a- samantad yatas tatah. Jiva a- bha- sa uddistah sadaiva
Paramatmanah (AV)". Only such an exalted inherent everlasting
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 23
spiritual relation between Jiva and B which is yavadatmabhavi
II.3.30 could be consistent with the status of both. The Sruti
: Rupam R u p a m p r a t i r u p o b a b h u va Ta d a s ya R u p a m
-
praticaksana ya (RV VII.47.18) makes it clear that the Bimba
for m of B is intended to be perceived by the Jiva (asya
praticaksanaya). The perceiving Jiva must be a real person and
not a lifeless insentient projection, like the Suryaka. Such are
the new trails of light on the teachings of the B. S. blazed by
M's Bhasya -
It is sickening to see seasoned modern research scholars
like Prof. Mesquita to still go on repeating parrot-like old and
worn out opinions of Bhandarkar or Ghate and their assessment
of M's bhasya as "a performance of little or no merit." "He (M)
has interpreted the Sutras in a fantastic manner and he would
very well have set them aside altogether but that their uncontested
authoritativeness prevented his doing so" (P. 20 fn) as Gospel
truth - at this distance of time . Why should our most modern
scholars not profit by the latest critical and comparative studies
of all the commentaries of the principal schools of Vedanta now
made available to them and think for themselves instead of holding
to the apron strings of a Ghate or a Bhandarkar; for a change,
even after so much has been written, discussed, published and
made available, on behalf of the Dvaita school?
their svarupayogyata (inherent fitness) or Trividha sraddha-
satva meaning the core of the being of the selves, as Aurobindo
has pointed out.
On P. 69 the Prof. acknowledges that Otto Schrader has
shown that it has the support of PR. What is wrong then if
M accepts it on the same authority, apart from his own independent
logical arguments in favor of it :
 -13-
24 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva
Yadyana- dir viseso na sa- mpratam katham eva tu
Adrs.t.a- devacadrstam svikrtam sarvavadibhih (AV III.4.41)
The BS speak of seven Hells (III. 1. 16). In the same context
the wording of III. 1.14 referring to the Aroha (Upward Journey)
and Avaroha (Downward Journey) of some others (itaresam)
lends support to the existence of a region of utter darkness
(andham tamas). The Hayagriva Samhita (p. 84) is not "unknown
work". It is listed in the PR Samsodhanaparishad Publication
along with Visnukr ta - Tattvaviveka. Tantrabha- gavata is not
"unknown" (P. 211). It is mentioned by Jiva Gosvamin as a part
of Hayasirsa Pancaratra. Parama Samhita- is not "unidentified"
(P.231). It has been quoted by both R & M and listed in the
PR Samsodhana Publication.
The attempted raid on M's Library at the instigation of
Padmatirtha mentioned in M. Vij (XIV. 2) is cur tly dismissed
by Prof. Mesquita as a "myth" (P. 176). When religious passions
are roused, such retaliatory measures are not uncommon and
need not cause any disbelief. The M. Vij may be a hagiological
work and may be in some respects panegyrical. But at the core,
it is an outstanding historical biography and a near contemporary
one at that. It has set a very high standard of authenticity and
historical accuracy of details of M's tours, places visited en
route, names of scholars met in disputation giving even the Tulu
names of villages in South Kanara and wrestlers who challenged
him for a trial of strength with them, in their Sanskritised form.
In regard to copiousness of details and accuracy of facts narrated,
it stands on a higher pedestal than the Sankaravijayas which
are mutually in discord and are not less than four or five centuries
later than the subject of their biography and often anachronistic
Cf. Sa hi khan.d.anaka- ramu- d.hadarpam
The author of the M. Vij, on the other hand, in his own notes
on M. Vij. (Bhavaprakasika) has given details of the steps he
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 25
has taken to verify the historical details from collateral sources
collected and cross checking them. The miracles attributed to
M in the biography are well within the possibility of Yogasiddhis
(M. Vij. XVI. 25,26, 29 & 30).
T h e s t a t u s o f M u k hya p r a n a ( Vay u ) w h o s e ava t a r M
claims to be is very high already in the Upanisads. He is
the only deity who never sets (anastamita- devata- ) (Brh.
Up. IV, 5, 22). He renders account of our doings to God
(Isa 4). He is the immaculate base of meditation on B
unthwar ted by asuric influences (Chan. Up. 1.2.7-8). The
Santi mantra recited by all Brahmins before commencing
Vedic recitation and at its close, hails Vayu - Namaste Vayo.
You are the visible Brahma. I proclaim you as such. I am stating
the truth and nothing but the truth.
Prof. Mesquita is precipitate in declaring "all unknown sources
proclaiming Vyasa as a primary Avatar should be regarded as
later productions of M" (P. 51). This statement is belied by clear
statements to the contrary and the Skandapurana quoted both
by M and Sudarsanasuri a predecessor of Desika. This quotation
consists of twelve verses beginning with :
Narayanad vinispannam Jnanam krtayuge...
and runs on :
Avatirno mahayogi bhagavan purusottamah cakara
Brahmasutrani etc.
The test of Anusandhana as the only proof of personal identity
of being put forward by M to which the Prof. seems to demur
is approved by the Lord in the Gita (IV. 5). One wonders
why the Prof. should take exception to M's view that the
body of Vyasa the direct Avatar of Visnu is not caused by
karma and not made of Prakrti (P. 38). The authority quoted
in support by M :
Na tasya Pra- krta- murtih mamsamedo asthi sambhava
 -14-
26 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva
is also quoted by Ramanujiyas. We have already seen that
Sudarsanasuri accepts Vyasa as a direct avatar of Narayana.
At the conclusion of his Nyaya Vivarana M pays a soulful
homage to his spiritual Guru Vyasa in the most eloquent terms
and with deepest feelings :
Aham tu tatprasadaika maha- spadabaloddhatah
Tatprasadam rte kasya saktih samsarasagare
..... tatkat.a- ks.aikasamedhitah
Ka- nu saktih bhaven naiva tat kotra ativismayah?
There are similar statements so often made by M in most
of his other writings which show that he was imbued with a
deep inward conviction of being a chosen instrument of the
Almighty to redeem the eligibles (See M. Vij VIII.50).
On P. 110 the Prof. has tried to play down the outspoken
criticism of Mayavadins in the text of the Maitrayaniya Up (VII
8-9) as a mere general warning to orthodox believers to be
on guard against those who try to mislead them with their deceitful
argumentation. The words used in the text such as Mithyatarka,
drstantas, kuhakendrajala have a close family resemblance with
the terms of the Mithyattvanumana of Advaita and its Drstantas
like shell-silver, snake in the rope and Dvaitendrajala used by
Suresvara and especially the phrase Vaidikesu paristhatum icchanti
which are all tell tale. They deserve to be compared with the
outspoken denunciations by early writers like Bhaskara : Vigitam
Vicchinnamulam mahayanikam Bauddha gathitam mayavadam
vyavarnayantah lokan Vyamohayanti. Parthasarathi Misra writes
Tadvaram mayavadan Mahayanikam andYadavaprakasa observes
Yuyam ca Baudhasca samana sampadah. The words Vaidikesu
paristhatum icchanti are particularly significant. Buddhists are
frankly Nairatmyavadis. They do not care or wish to be regarded
as Vaidikas or Atmavadins. Atmasvarupa according to Advaita
is incapable of knowing itself as an object of its own consciousness
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 27
(Atmani svakriyavirodhat). As for accepting the Vedas as eternal,
S writes isyate vedasyapi abhavah prabodhe (BSB). Advaita has
a threefold classification of reality which has its parallel in the
Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga (310-390 A-D) (Edited by V.
V. Gokhale JRAS 1947). The differences are purely terminological.
Neither Paingi Up., Paingi rahasya brahmana nor Bhallaveya
sakha is extant. If S's citations from them can pass muster
why not M's? A quotation given by Suresvara speaks of the
highest place of Visnu. M's quote from Bhallaveya also reads
Tam vai Visnum paramam udaharanti and both are metrical and
non - extant.
On P. 10, 63 and 64-65 the Prof. has erred in misconstruing
the verse from Mbh. T. N. (XXXII. 158) : "Vedetihasamsca purana
yuktan as claiming that M himself has composed all the Vedas
together with the PR" and adds a footnote that according to
the statement M appears as the author of the Vedas' (P. 65).
A little more attention to elementary Sanskrit grammar will show
that the Vedas have already been mentioned in the plural as
Vedan in the first quarter and that the term Veda in the third
quarter is the finite verb of the entire verse and is to be separated
from itihasa in Vedetihasa- n .
M is a staunch believer in the Apauruseyatva of the Vedas
and has established their Nityatva and svatah Pramanya at the
very outset of his VTN and earlier in the GB III 5b quoting
Vaca Virupa Nityaya (RV VIII, 75. 6) and Anadinidhana nitya
vagutsrsta svayambhuva and Ata evaca nityatvam (BS). It is
preposterous to maintain as the Prof. seeks to do that such
an ardent believer in the Apauruseyata of the Vedas should put
up an absurd claim to be the author of the Vedas . This is clearly
a case of Abaddham pathitva kucodyam karoti.
On P. 106 the Prof. has a fling at M that he has "twisted"
the thesis of Monism expressed in the verse "Prapanco yadi
 -15-
28 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva
Vidyeta nivarteta" to mean just the opposite and interpreted
vidyeta as utpadyeta and so on. First of all it is a disputed
issue whether the verses are explanatory of the Mandukya Up.
as its part or of Gaudapada's Agamasastra. Opinion is divided
on this point even among traditional Advaitins like Appayya Diksita,
Brahmayogi and Anandagir i, not to speak of Ramanuja,
Kuranarayana and of course M.
Irrespective of this difference of opinion about the status of
the verses, it has to be admitted that the wording : Prapanco
yadi Vidyeta and nivarteta shows that it is formulated as a
hypothetical proposition with two Ifs and two ling forms of the
predicate (Vidyeta and Nivarteta) which are unmistakable proof
of a Tarka form of argument called Prasanga in Indian Logic,
corresponding to a reductio ad absurdum . In short, it is not
an affirmative proposition at all, either from the Advaita standpoint
or the Dvaita. Both have to grapple with it as a hypothetical
proposition. There is no alternative. The hypothetical proposition
Yadi vidyeta has to rest on a sound invariable logical concomitance
(Vyapti) between whatever exists and its sublation (from the
Advaita point of view). That is impossible as the Advaita Brahman
exists for ever and is never sublated. There is the rub and a
complete breakdown of the Vyapti. This calls for a viable
interpretation of Vidyeta and nivarteta willynilly irrespective of
the question whether it is a part of Gaudapada's work or a
Sruti. According to Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan "Gaudapada had
a deep insight into Tarkasastra" (Gaudapada - A Study of Early
Advaita P. 86) and we cannot believe he would have blundered
so egregiously in formulating a viable vyapti. Qua Sruti, a viable
vyapti can be formulated in terms of Utpadyeta (if produced)
it is sure to be destroyed some time (nivarteta) Utpattireva hi
Nivrttiyuk prayah.
The location of the intriguing explanatory verses in the Mandukya
Up. renders it possible to overcome the breakdown of the Vyapti
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 29
between Vidyeta and Nivar teta by assigning more viable
meanings to them, as has been done by M.
The disapproval of the view of creation of the Universe as
akin to dream creations of Maya in favor of the Siddhanta view
as the outcome of the Lord's will as in "Apta kamasya ka sprha"
(9 cd) provides support to accepting the viable interpretation
of Vidyeta and Nivarteta put forward by M on sound logical
foundations. The root vida sattayam can justifiably be understood
in its nearest cognate sense of genesis Utpatti (asatas satta
samavayo janih) and Nivrtti in the sense of liability to destruction
later so that the Vyapti is not violated . The description of B
as "Deva" and "Advaita" among all other existents - Devah
Sarvabhavanam Advaitah - using the selective genitive (Nirdharana
Sasthi) bears out the fact that B stands towering over all other
reals (Sarvabhavanam). Thus M's interpretation fits in admirably
in getting over the muddle created by the breakdown of the
Vyapti created by the hypothetical proposition in its Advatitic
application.
In keeping with the requirements of the Vyapti the term
Prapanca itself has to be construed in the sense of a group
or a variety of five eternal distinctions embracing the three eternal
verities of Anadijivas, Anadimaya and the Supreme Being and
their mutual distinctions from one another, which add up to five
- denoted by the term Pra-panca as explained by M. The grammatical
derivation of Pancah as explained by Jayatirtha : Pancan sabdat
jatiyaro arthe dah is incontestable. The prefix pra has the sense
of excellence in that their knowledge is highly conducive to
liberation. (Moksopayogi jnanangataya). All that we need is a
contextual reference to the existence of these five distinctions
in the text of the verses . They are embodied in the verse immediately
preceeding verses 17-18 which reads :
Anadimayaya supto yada Jivah prabudhyate
Ajam anidram asvapnam advaitam budhyate tada (1.16)
 -16-
30 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva
Anadimaya is Jada. Jivas and B are both beginningless and
eternal. The Jivas are overpowered by Avidya-nidra. The Supreme
watching over them is wide awake (anidram asvapnam) and Advaita
one without an equal or superior. He towers over all other existents
Sarvabhavanam Advaitah as conveyed by the use of the selective
genitive case : Nirdharana Sasthi (Pan II.3.41). Do we need
any more evidence that the five eternal distinctions are given
in the text of the verses themselves?
It is therefore in keeping with these facts to read Jnate Dvaitam
na vidyate with an elided "a" grammatically permissible here
unlike in the case of 'Sambhuti' the opening word in Isa Up.
14 in Sankara's Bhasya, without any grammatical warranty
whatsoever. There are very good reasons to believe that the
prose passages of the Mandukya Up. of which the verses of
the Agama Prakarana are explanatory according to Anandagiri
too that the four Padas of 'Atman' referred to there are not
those of the Jivatman as such but of the Forms of the Antaryami
Brahman monitoring the states of the embodied Jivatman in the
Jagrat, Svapna and Susupti states under the names of Visva
Taijasa, Prajna & Turiya. This is confirmed by the prose text
of Mandukya 6 describing the Prajna the third (Prajnas Trtiyah)
as Sarvesvarah Esa Sarvajnah and above all as Eso Antaryami
etc. It goes without saying that when one of the three (Prajna)
is identified as Antaryami (impeller from within antahsthitva
yamayati) the others preceeding and following are also Antaryami
forms. The Mandukya is not alone in holding the Prajna to be
the Antaryami Brahman. BS i.2.18 also affirms it. Nay, Brh. Up.
IV. 3. 21 tells us that the embodied self Purusah lies locked
in the embrace of the Prajna Atman. This passage is made
the subject of the adhikarana in B. S. i.3.42. And S. in his Sutra
Bhasya commenting on this writes - Purus.ah. Sa- rirah Pra- jnah
Paramesvarah.
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 31
What more evidence do we need in support of M's position
that all the three in the series Visva, Taijasa, Prajna (and Turiya)
are indeed the monitoring forms of the Supreme Being? If the
commentary on the Mandukya Up. attributed to Adi Sankara
disagrees with the views of S author of the BSB, it can only
mean that the former must be apocryphal.
CONCLUSION
After acquiring a copy of Prof. Roque Mesquita's English edition
of his work "Madhva's unknown literar y sources - some
Observations", I have carefully gone thro the two chapters
64-65 of Vedanta Desika's Satadusani edited and published with
his erudite Bhumika- in Sanskrit by Prof. V. Srivatsankacarya
(1974).
In his Yatilingabhedavada, Vedanta Desika refers to the views
of his Paramacarya Vatsya Varada on how best the authenticity
and acceptability of the Tridandi and Ekadandi orders of Orthodox
traditional Sanyasa Asrama, within the frame-work of Varnasrama
Dharma, can be reconciled on the basis of Vikalpa (option) in
terms of Mukhya and Amukhya respectively, with par ticular
reference to Tridanda and Ekadanda and the retention of the
Sikha (tuft of hair on the head) and the sacred thread (Yajnopavita)
or of dispensing with them, as current in the Tridanda and
Ekdanda orders. Desika quotes from Varada Guru's Yatilinga
Samarthanam, on the scope of the Vikalpa as defined by his
Paramacarya -
Mundah Sikhi Va- ityadi vikalpasyapi,
Tridanda, Ekadandadharana Vikalpavat Mukhya -
Amukhyatayaiva nirvahya tvat . va sabdah carthah iti
parama-ca- rya- Vya- cakhyuh
(Vada 64 - page 268)
 -17-
32 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva
It may be noted in passing that ascetics and Pontiffs of the
Dvaita and Advaita schools follow Ekadandi traditions and those
of the Ramanuja School follow the Tridanda Sampradaya.
The subject matter of the Alepakamatabhanga (65) of Desika,
on the other hand, is entirely different . The Alepakas have been
defined as followers of an order of Sanyasins who have accepted
the philosophy of Mrsa- va- da (Ma- ya- va- da) and consider themselves
as Ana-sramins and Atya-sramins. They discard all taboos of right
and wrong conduct as liberated ones, taking and sporting the
name of "Knowers of Brahman" - in name only and indulging
in forbidden food and straying away from righteous conduct.
(P 7 Bhu-mika- ). They pose as Atyasramins and Anasramins -
not bound by traditional Asramic injunctions and prohibitions.
They claim to be beyond the pale of disciplinar y codes of
Varnasrama - based sanyasa system, practise nudity, sport locks
of matted hair (Jata) on their heads, accepting food from all
people indiscriminately. They impart Upadesa of Mahavakyas
unrestr ictedly to their clientele. It does not appear from
D e s i k a ' s w o r k that Va r a d a G u r u a l s o h a d a d d r e s s e d
himself to the same subject.
Desika comes down virulently on the Sanyasins of the
Alepaka order of Mayavada. Perhaps, he had been feeling that
various circles of Mayavadins of his days were inclined to turn
a blind eye towards those who claimed or were regarded by
the lay people as Atyasramins and Anasramins who were prone
to Alepakavada and wanted to nip it in the bud, in all coscience.
It is significant that Desika refers in this connection to the claims
of some AlepakaVadins that their non-conformism has the approval
and suppor t of the precepts and examples of respectable leaders
of their school of ancient times like Gaud.apa- da and Bhartr.hari
(Va- da 65 P. 281, Satadusani).
It is in this connection , Desika discusses the Puranic accounts
of the unconventional ways of life led by Jadabharata, Rbhu,
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 33
Suka, Samvartaka and others of the hoary past and offers suitable
explanations of them. He quotes -
Ana- sarmi, na tisthettu ks.an.ama- tram api Dvijah
He probably takes his stand on the parting Upadesa in the Taitt.
Up. (1,11,3) Ya- nyasma-kam sucaritani tani tvaya Upasyani no
itarani. He debunks the misinterpretations of Pa- ndityam nirvidya
ba- lyena tisthaset, quoting the Sutra Ana- vis.kurvan (B. S. III. 49).
It is in this context that Desika condemns the behavior of
the Papis.t.has (great sinners) who freely resort to interpolations
in favor of their defiance of established codes of ascetic discipline,
from unknown and unheard of texts into the existing body of
Puranic sources, attributing them to Vyasa and others, as quoted
by Prof. Mesquita on P. 27 of his English edition in the opening
chapter on 'Madhva and His Critics'. Any one who reads that
part of the text from Alepaka Vada Bhanga with open eyes in
the given context, will see that the subject matter of Desika's
denunciation is absolutely different from the question of the bona
fides of M's sources in support of his systematisation of his
philosophy and theological doctrines, raised by Appayya Diksita
in the 16th century. The way in which Prof. Mesquita has misused
the quotation from Desika's text in the Alepaka Matabhanga,
to mislead his readers is unforgivable .
It is a case of Abaddham pathitva kucodyam Karoti - brazen
suppressio veri and suggestio falsi .
In his over-self confidence to put Madhva on the dock,
Prof. Mesquita has placed himself in inextricable difficulties.
He has not been able to establish any one of his contentions:
1. That M is the author of Brahmatarka which he has tried
to pass off as an ancient authority,
2. That his quotes from PR Samhitas are spurious
 -18-
34 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva
3. That he claims himself to be the author of the Vedas
and above all
4. That both Varada Guru and Vedanta Desika were the earliest
par ties against Madhva in the controversy about the
bona fides of his source books in support of his philosophical
a n d t h e o l o g i c a l d o c t r i n e s - a g a i n s t w h i c h A p p ay ya
Diksita raised a hue and cr y for the first time in the
sixteenth century.
To err is human. Even supposing that the Professor's charges
against Madhva are due purely to errors of judgement,
t h e i r c u mu l a t i ve e f fe c t m ay we l l h ave i t s ow n a d ve r s e
r e p e r c u s s i o n s. I t w o u l d t h e r e fo r e b e a d v i s a bl e fo r t h e
Professor to withdraw his charges, apologise to Madhva
and close the chapter, for good once for all.
1. It is highly presumptuous of Prof. Mesquita to say "Nowhere in
the works of M. did I find a corraboration for the opinion of M.
Vij. that M. acknowledges Vyasa as his teacher" (Intro. P. 17 fn.).
This is a good illustration of Yaska's Nahyesa sthanoraparadhah
-
yadenam andho na pasyati. J. explains a n as honorific reference
to Vyasa - Tannamasu pathat.
2. Chando Darsana by Daivarata Sharma (1968).
(5TH PROOF)
II. JAINA BACKGROUND OF DVAITA
VEDANTA - A FARFETCHED THEORY
Madhva was the historical founder of a new system of Vedanta
which superseded many earlier ones which had accepted
Brahman's Parinama or personal transformation into the nature
of the world of matter and selves, wholly or in part. This amounts
to a loss of B's authentic being as an independent reality endowed
with auspicious attributes of infinite knowledge and bliss, never
subject to any change - as all change is ultimately due to external
causes, pressures and forces. The Vivar tavada of Sankara- dvaita
had made B a mute passive one subject to beginningless ignorance
(Avidya) not withstanding its self - luminosity (Svapraka-satva)
and yet the abode of beginningless ignorance and the object
of such an ignorance.
-
A srayatva vis.ayatva bha- gini nirvisesacitir eva kevala-
(Sanksepasariraka)
In Nyayavaisesika, the atoms and Jivas are real in their own
right and do not owe them to God, ontologically. The Mimamsaka
had no place for a Supreme Being as such. He did not believe
in periodical Creation or Pralaya. The yoga school had assigned
no more than a secondary place to God as an auxiliary in creation
like rains in the production of crops.
In the field of epistemology, the Nyayavaisesika had defined
Pramana in such a way as would rule out the claims of Memory
to be a source of knowledge. The same was the case with
Mimamsa and Advaita Philosophy which pledged its support to
Bhattanaya in all Vyavahara. The thinkers of the Visistadvaita
school were divided in their opinion on the status of memory.
Madhva's mission in life was therefore primarily connected
with setting right the anomalies of theVaidikadarsanas and restoring
Vedantadarsana to its rightful place as a robust Theistic philosophy
 -19-
36 Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta - A farfetched theory
with B. as the ultimate source of the being, becoming and functioning
of all else in finite reality (their satta, pratiti and pravrtti). His
main interest was therefore confined to rectifying the shortcomings
of the Vaidikadarsanas in the home front and only seconarily
with such aspects of Avaidikadarsanas in principle as taken note
of in the Brahmasutras. As there was already a broad agreement
between Madhva and the Jainas on the question of the status
of memory as a valid source of knowledge in principle there
was no need for him to go into the nature of its configuration
and its distinct terminology. But as this was not the case in
the treatment of memory in the Nyayavaisesika, Mimamsa and
Advaita schools, he had to address himself primarily to that
task alone.
The Jaina theory differed from Madhva's only in its methodology
of arriving at its validity - whereas in Vaidikadarsanas its validity
rested on the larger question of its pragmatic necessity affecting
human experience as a whole. This comes out from Madhva's
basic question Pu- rvanubhu-te kim ma- nam ityukte sya- t kim uttaram
at the starting point. This moot question does not also seem
to have been raised by the Jainas in their approach.
As Madhva's philosophy accepted only three Pramanas, the
case of memory could not be accommodated under Pratyaksa.
To rely on the impressions of the past experience as an image
for inference of memory, would again involve a memory of it.
It has therefore to be accommodated under Pratyaksa. Madhva
has therefore brought it under Manasapratyaksa as a direct mental
perception, given the lightning speed of the mind and its power
to penetrate in to the past as in Yogipratyaksa with the samskaras
(latent impressions) acting as a link (sannikarsa) with the past.
The involvement of Saksi, the Apperceiving Self and its
Svarupendriya as both Jnana - gra- haka and Jnana - pra- ma- nyagra-
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 37
haka in the system enabled Madhva to explain the presentation
of the first experience as "past" by memory, For every act of
awareness, be it a memory, a perception or an inference, has
always an in-built relation to its time factor. Memory takes the
form of that (past), experience that "this is X", and inference
takes the form of X is or was or will be. The present, past
and the future are not something unconnected with the time
factor intuited by the Saksi. This is borne out by everybody's
experience and cannot be gainsaid. Even the past and the future
are not beyond the grasp of the saksi.
Atita anagatau ka- lau api nah sa-ks.igocarau (AV)
The word pra-ma--na has the suffix lyu.t (ana) which is used
in the sense of both an instrument (karane lyu.t) and bhava (basic
essence) or being true.
The term saksi which according to Panini's Grammar means
one that perceives directly and immediately. (Saksad drastari
samjna- ya- m) is the Apperceiving Self in mundane life. It is capable
of meeting all the needs of valid experience in life both physical
and psychological. There is no need to invest the physical sense
organs with their different innate powers as Bha- vendriya and
dravyendriyas as in Jainism. The saksi or the Jivasvarupa as
self-luminous in respect of its own being as well as in regard
to its objective experiences can do duty for the Bhavendriyas
as Saksi and its svarupendriyas are a unity in diversity (Savisesa
- abhinna). Moreover, there was no need for Madhva to seek
the help of Jainism to establish the claims of Smrti (memory)
as a pramana as the recognition of Smrti as a pramana goes
back to the Taittriya - Aranyaka text :
Smr tih pratyaksam aitihyam anumanacatustayam
Pramanam iti vijneyam dharmadyarthe bubhusubhih
(T. A. II. 1)
 -20-
38 Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta - A farfetched theory
Hence there was no need for Madhva to seek outside help to
establish the validity of memory.
The concept of Saksi is not alien to Vedanta. It has its roots
in the Upanisads and is current coin in Advaita vedanta as the
witness self (Saksi) which is the reflection of Suddhacaitanya
in Avidyavrtti. As such it is a tainted instrument open and common
to both Prama and Bhrama - valid knowledge in its Vyavaharic
sense and erroneous ones alike. But the Saksi of Dvaita philosophy
is not the reflection of Caitanya in Avidyavrtti and hence a tainted
instrument. It is the pure Apperceiving Self never erring and
ever infallible principle of validation (niyata ya-tha- rthya). For the
place of Saksi in Madhva's epistemology see my English version
of Nyayasudha of Jayatir tha Part II pp 252-53.
Dr. B. K. Matilal in his Logic, Language and Reality (Motilal
B. Dass P. 226) has argued that "it is not true that Memory
hangs on that object as one whose previous state has ceased.
For we do not have the awareness of the cessation of the previous
state. If I do not have the prior awareness of something, I cannot
have memory of it. If we did remember such a thing, it would
not be a memory." (P. 226). The difficulty raised by Matilal
has been met and answered by Jayatirtha centuries back in
his Prama-n.apaddhati :
Nanu Nivrtta purvavasthataya smrtih artham
visayikartum neste.
Tatha ananubhava-t. Ananubhuta visesa visayatve
atiprasanga-t (iticenna)
Ananubhuta - eta-van ma- trasya saksi visayataya na
a tiprasangah.
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 39
To explain - the mind with its power of penetration into the past,
aided by the latent impressions which provide the link takes
into account the first experience, by the saksi as the Jnanagrahaka
which intuites all time and space with its inherent powers and
coordinates the memory data with a past experience as its own,
as past and stamps it as "Past". Thus the temporal gap is bridged
by the saksi and legitimised in the memory report. Such is the
position of Dvaita. Thus the Madhva theory of memory as the
valid source of knowledge is a completely self contained and
a viable re-exposition on the basis of its own epistemological
resources.
We have no such explanation from Zydenbos of how the
discrepancy and gap has been explained in the Jain theory on
its own.
However, Prof. Zydenbos who has sought to maintain in his
paper on Jaina Background of Dvaita Vedanta published in the
Journal of Indian philosophy (1991), Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Netherlands, has argued at length that the Dvaita view of the
validity of Smrti is largely indebted to the Jain theory as presented
in Tattvarthasutra and its commentary by Bhaskaranandi whose
terminus ad-quem has been placed at 1250 AD. Zydenbos has
also laid stress on circumstantial evidences such as the existence
of Jain settlements and widespread influence of the Jain community
in South Kanara and the existence of Jain rulers and chieftains
and centres of learning in the neighbourhood in the days of
Madhva himself.
It should be clarified from the full accounts of the details
of Jain theory and its epistemological concepts and categories
of the system if there is no good case for holding the outlines,
foundations and superstructure of the Dvaita theory on the status
 -21-
40 Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta - A farfetched theory
of memory are not and cannot be a harmonious development
from within, resting on its own distinctive epistemological
presuppositions and their natural outcome. Above all, in the social
and religious barriers between the Jaina and the Brahminical
community of those days and the Atheistic character of the Jaina
System it would be difficult to believe that there was scope
for initiating any warm exchange of thought on matters of mutual
interest in philosophical matters between the leaders of two
communities to support any theory of borrowing or adaptation
from one to the other. The circumstantial evidences cited are
therefore purely for tuitous and tenuous and cannot be magnified
and blown out of proportion.
On P. 259 of his paper, Prof. Zydenbos has observed that
under Brahmasutra II.2.26 all the Brahminical commentators have
misrepresented the Jaina Theory of Mukti as everlasting upward
movement of the soul which is far from correct and that it only
describes the conditions of the soul in the few movements
immediately following death in its final incarnation. Here he
complements J saying Jayatirtha shows an independent spirit
and greater fairness towards Jains when he describes their view
of Mukti as moksah sva- bha- vika- tma svarupa- virbha- vah.
These two ways of describing the Jain Theory need not be
taken to be mutually inconsistent or subject to any self contradiction.
Both may be equally true in themselves.
There is, however, one crucial point about the Jain theory
of the status of memory. Jayatir tha says (P. 250 NS press edition)
that according to Jainas the definition of Pramana is sva-apurva-
artha vyavasayatmakam jnanam and rejects it as inapplicable
as its terms exclude memory from its scope.
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 41
Tasya sva-apru- va-artha-visayakatva-abha- va- t as it depends on
an earlier experience, which is no longer existent. If the qualifying
adjunct sva-apurva is to be justified because memory too is
valid, in so far as it refers to a previous experience revealed
as now past (which is true enough) the adjunct would still be
uncalled for as there is no disagreement on the point. The example
of Dharavahika Bhrama would be irrelevant as according to
Anekantavada even ks.anikatva of thought is admissible and there
will be no continuity of fact left and as such it would also come
under the scope of Sva- pu- rva- rtha.
It is on record that Jayatir tha was a native of N. Karnataka
and lived and studied in Manyakheta (Malkhed) the ancient capital
of the Rashtrakutas where Jainism flourished from earlier times
and that there is still a famous Jain monastery in Malkhed.
Jayatir tha in his NS (II. 2. See Page 414, NS Press edition)
tells us that ancient Jainas (Jarad Jaina-h) used the term Pudgala
in the sense of the Self as such instead of a physical substance
composed of rupa, rasa, gandha and sparsa.
Similarly, the one and only definition of Prama- na given by
him , according to Jainas as sva-apu- rva- rtha vyavasa- ya- tmakam
jna- nam (II. 1. P. 250) rules out the validity of memory as it
falls back upon a previous experience (sva-purva) whose data
have reference to an earlier space time setting, which is no
longer in existence. This really shows that the earlier school
of Jainas was against acceptance of Memory as a valid source
of knowledge like the Naiyayikas, Samkhyas and the Advaitins.
The question therefore arises - what were the forces at work
responsible for the Jainas breaking away from and abandoning
the earlier definition of Pramana and opting for a new, more
 -22-
42 Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta - A farfetched theory
positive, forthright and pragmatic one of "being true to the nature
of the object" - corresponding to the Dvaita definition of Pramana
as Yathartham or Ya- tha- rthyam . The Jainas were Realists. They
could not have failed to realise that a denial of validity to memory
would cut at the very root of rational life and business and
other transactions in various spheres of human life and
development. They were bound to answer the common man's
rational question - in the absence of Memory and denial of its
validity, as a source of knowledge, what is the proof of the
reality of our own past experiences at all - pu- rva- nubhu- te kim
manam?
The two meanings assigned to Pramana as valid knowledge
as such and the instruments of its acquisition rest on grammatical
sanction of Paninian grammar. Neither Jainism nor Dvaita
philosophy has a monopoly of them.
The concept of Sa- ks.i which plays a vital role in Dvaita
epistemology has its root in Panini's sutra 'Sa- ks.a- d dras.tari Samjna-
ya- m' (V. 2. 11). It is the name given to the apperceiving Self
whose judgements are ever veridical (niyata ya- tha- rthya). It bridges
the temporal gap between the first experience of the Smrti data,
which are now past and coordinates them with his own direct
experience - as the intuiting self of all events in time past, present
and future and establishes Tad - idamtva graha with the same
self on the basis of its own resources as has been explained
by Jayatirtha in his Pramana Paddhati quoted earlier.
The term Sa- ks.i does not figure in the Jaina theory of the
validation of Memory. The Jaina acceptance of five different bha-
vendriyas as 'Potentialities of the Soul' (Op. Cit. P. 256) by
Bhaskaranandi and other Jains has to rest on the acceptance
of Savisesa-abheda relation between them and the self. This
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 43
relation is derived in Dvaita thought on the basis of a Srutarthapatti
based on Sruti texts like evam dharman prthak pasyan (Katha,
II.1, 14), Ekadhaiva anudrastavyam neha nanasti kimcana (Br.
Up. IV. 4. 19), Avinasi va- ayam atma- anucchittidharma (Br. Up.
IV. 5. 14) and Para- sya Saktih vividhaiva sruyate svabhaviki jnana
bala kriya ca (Svet. Up. IV. 8).
Accepting parallel development on the question of Smr ti
pramanya in Jainism and Dvaita thought on the basis of their
own respective epistemological resources and retention of technical
terms like Yatharthya > Yathathmya, Manasa Pratyaksa > Paroksa,
the question still remains to be answered as to what led to
the abandonment of the earlier definition of Pramana quoted
by Jayatirtha in favor of a more positive and pragmatic one
of yatharthyam > Sic Ya-tha- thmyam. From this point of view it
has to be admitted that the ball is still in the other court.
We have already seen that the classification of Pramana into
kevala and anupramana in M's philosophy rests on the grammatical
significance of the suffix lyut in terms of karana and bhava according
to Sanskrit Grammar in their inbuilt sense. The basic definition
(Pramana) as yathar tham is satisfied by both kevala and
anupramana as both are true to their data. Similarly, the threefold
classification of Jiva in Dvaita is derived from the doctrine of
threefold Sraddha- which is intrinsic to the nature of the different
types as explained in the Bhagavad Gita (XVII. 2. 3). The term
Sraddha- has been identified as per taining to the Svabhava of
different types of souls. And Svabhava cannot be adventitious.
The term Sattvanurupa (XVII. 3) similarly refers to the essential
nature of the Self as sattva has the sense of a living being,
according to Amarakosa (3.5.26.43) and Raghuvamsa (II). This
classification may be parallel to the Jain one of Jiva, Bhavya
and Abhavya. The Rgveda (VI. 47. 16) too speaks of a three
fold classification of beings.
 -23-
44 Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta - A farfetched theory
Commenting on the Syadvada of Jainism Prof. Zydenbos says
Sankara and other earlier commentators on BS had perverted
its original meaning and other Vedantins had followed suit (p.
254). As leading Jain writers like Bhaskaranandi (1250) came
long after Sankara, it is not made clear why he had not spoken
out and taken Sankara to task for his misrepresentation of
Anekantavada or whether any other Jain writers have dealt with
the point. If they had done so, it is upto Prof. Zydenbos to
bring it to light, instead of saying simply that the "Syadvada
does not say so" (p. 254).
The exegetical principle of Upajivyapramanaprabalya is not
in any way dependent on the Brahmatarka, as Zydenbos would
have it. It is a principle of Mimamsa sastra and has been accepted
in principle by Advaita writers also such as Sriharsa :
Pa- ramar thikam Advaitam pravisya saranam Srutih
Virodhat upajivyena na bibheti kutascana
(5TH PROOF)
-
III. THE ARS.A TRADITION OF
- -
APPROACH OF MADHVACARYA
TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
- -
VEDANTA SUTRAS
A friend of mine has just sent me a Xerox copy of the tenth
chapter of Dr.S.M. Srinivasachari's work on the philosophy of
the Vedanta Sutras from Ramanuja's point of view, published
by Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi.(1998). I have carefully
gone through this chapter containing the author's General
Evaluation and Conclusion.
I can understand Dr. Chari cannot approve of Sankara's
interpretation of the Brahmasutras as he agrees with M's. views
that the souls are many in reality and exist as separate entities
even in the state of Moksa, without losing their individuality and
that they cannot exercise B's prerogatives of creation of the
world, its maintenance and its dissolution.
Broadly speaking then, R's philosophy is in agreement with
M on these points. But it disagrees with M's holding that the
Cits (Jivas) and Acit (Avyakta or Prakrti) form an integral part
of B. Theirs is an intra- organic relation of parts and whole
(Aprthaksiddhi)-variously described in terms of Amsa-Amsi bhava,
Ananyatva, neither absolutely different from B. nor absolutely
identical, nor both different and identical in their primary senses
at the same time. The serpent and coil relation is also utilised
in the same connection. Though denied the right to exercise
Jagadvyapara, the Muktas are never the less said to enjoy the
fullest measure of the boundless and infinite bliss of B.
Some of these ideas are not acceptable to M's philosophy.
They have been discussed and set aside in the writings of M.and
his commentators. It is expected of an evaluator to have gone
into those objections of the Dvaita school and disposed of them
in order to make his Evaluation authentic and conclusive. There
is no sign of such a proceeding having been gone through in
 -24-
46 The Arsa Tradition of Approach of Madhvacarya
the main body of the book on these disputed issues in the Evaluation
to make it authentic and decisive. This omission leaves R's stand
on the disputed issues unsubstantiated.
It is regrettable that Dr. Chari should have observed that
M. seems to have developed an antagonism towards S to such
an extent as to avoid even his Visayavakyas of the Sutras from
the Upansisads and go to the Rgveda and other sources instead.
(P 173). We shall be seeing in what follows that M. has always
taken great care in choosing his Visayavakyas in various
Adhikaranas with due regard to the Adhyaya and Pada Sangatis
of their topics, their freedom from overlapping or repetition and
the criteria of homologous affinity between the key words of
the Sutras and those of the Visayavakyas-which are often violated
by S and R as we shall be seeing. The BS being a scientific
treatise divided into well knit chapters with their own subject
matter clearly fixed. it will be most improper to take up random
topics and Sutars torn out of their context in the so called new
approach to the Sutras without going chapter wise . The question
of relevant Sutras without reference to this fixed division of topics
will lead one nowhere.
It is true M draws his Visayavakyas from the pre-Upanisadic
sources of the Vedic heritage also, besides the Upanisads. This
is not because of any animosity against S or others but to his
adherence to the Arsa tradition which treats both the Vedic and
Upanisadic heritages as one integral revelation and Illumination
(Gati Samanyat) - whose contents form the subject matter of
investigation and import in terms of Brahma Vidya par excellence
as their Nirnayaka Sastra, for which role they have been cast
according to the ancient tradition recorded in the Skanda Purana
and borne out by the internal evidence of the wording of the
Sutra, Sarva Vedanta Pratyayam (Brahma) (III.3.1) as we shall
be seeing.
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 47
THE TRUE MEANING OF THE TERM 'VEDA-ANTA'.
It is an error of judgement to hold that 'Vedanta' means only
the closing part of the Vedic heritage- the Upansiads. Apart
from the received tradition that the Vedas are 'Ananta' (endless),
most of their thousand and more Sakhas mentioned by the
Mahabhasyakara and others are now totally lost to us. Lingering
statements such as "Sarve Veda yat Padam Amananti" (Katha
i.2.15) and "Vedaisca Sar vair Ahameva Vedyo Vedanta Kr t
Vedavideva Caham" (Gita XV.15) establish that the Lord alone
is competent to fix their authentic import. This term 'Anta' in
Vedanta Krit here can only mean the determination of their import
(Tatparya Nirnaya) - as in the earlier use of the same term
'Anta' in the Gita itself. 'Ubhayorapi Drsto Antah Anayos Tattva
Darsibhih' (II.6). Otherwise, Vedanta Krt may even tend to mean
one who puts an end to or destroys the Vedas, which would
be preposterous.
Given then, the correct meaning of the term 'Anta' in Vedanta
and the further reference to the BS in the Gita itself as 'Hetu
madbhih' and 'Viniscitaih' there can be no doubt that we will
be on the right track in identifying the BS as the Nirnayaka
Sastra which holds the key to the correct understanding and
interpretation of the entire source books of both the Vedic and
Upanisadic heritage as their Nirneya Sastra. It is this sense
that is conveyed by the opening Sutra of the Gunopasamhara
Pada of the Sadhana Adhyaya of the BS declaring B to be Sarva
Vedanta Pratyayam,the Being whose true knowledge (Pratyaya)
is authentically established by the decisive ruling (Anta) on the
p u r p o r t of the entire Ve d i c h e r i t a g e - S a r va Ve d a
Nirnayotpadyajnanam Brahma - as M puts it. No sane person
who holds the Vedic and Upanisadic heritage in equal respect
can object to this interpretation. M's commentator, Raghuttama
Tirtha explains the terse statement of M as follows: Sarva Vedanam
Antena (Nirnayena Utpadyamanah) Pratyayo (Jnanam) Yasya tat
(Brahma) iti Vyadhikarana Bahuvrihih. Anyapadartho Brahma.
 -25-
48 The Arsa Tradition of Approach of Madhvacarya
A veteran Mimamsaka and Visistadvaita scholar, the late D.
T. Tatacarya, in his Krishnaswami Rao Endowment Lectures at
the Madras University in 1948 has observed - "The Rgveda
has the idea of Brahman. If we apply and I don't know why
they cannot apply, the principles of interpretation enunciated
by Badarayana as meaning B to the hymns of this Veda, we
cannot escape the conclusion that this Veda is as much connected
with B as to Upanisads.
This august role of the BS as 'Sarva Sastrartha Nirnayaka'
has been described in a group of twelve verses from the Skanda
Purana cited by M at the outset of his Sutrabhasya beginning
with the words:
'Narayanad Vinispannam Jnanam Krtayuge Sthitam'. After
referring to the reclamation of the Vedas, their division into four
with their respective sakhas and the composition of the BS to
fix their import (tasyarthavittaye), by the Vyasavatara, the text
of the Puranas concludes saying:
Sutresu yesu sarvepi nirnayas samudiritah
Sabda jatasya sarvasya yatpramanasca nirnayah
Evam vidhani sutrani krtva Vyaso mahayasah
The same group of verses from the Skanda has been quoted
by Sudarsana Suri in his C. on R's Sri Bhasya. But the crucial
line "Sabdajatasya sarvasya yatpramanasca nirnayah", as given
above is missing in the printed editions of the Srutaprakasa.
This creates a serious gap and a break of continuity of thought
between the first and the third lines which makes the high
compliment paid to the Sutras in such glowing terms as "Evam
vidhani sutrani", hanging loose without a referent syntactically
connected with a proper antecedent such as Sabdajatasya sarvasya
nirnayah samudiritah. The mere fact of the Sutars being Alpaksara
etc. like other Sutras could be no compliment to the august
position of the BS as described earlier, as contrasted with other
Sutras referred to as Savisesana Sutrani and the BS as Nirvisesana
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 49
Sutrani. I have published a note on the missing line from the
Skanda Purana in the printed editions of Srutaprakasa in an
appendix to my English rendering of Jayatirtha's Nyayasudha
Vol. I (Raghavendra Ashram, Malleshwaram, Bangalore. 1995)
to which further reference is invited.
-
THE A RS.A TRADITION
There is sufficient evidence in the RgVeda Suktas and the
Aranyakas that according to the Seers there is only one Supreme
Being who is the bearer of the names and epithets of the various
gods like Agni, Indra , Varuna with their own respective jurisdiction
over Cosmic government. Their names are applicable to them
in their conventional sense only. In their highest and fullest primary
connodenotation they refer to one Supreme Being. This is spelt
out in such texts as :
"Yo devanam namadha eka eva" (RV X.82.3)
"Indram Mitram Varunam Agnim Ahur atho divyah sa
suparno Garutman
Ekam Sad Viprah Bahudha Vadanti (RV I.164.46)
"Etam hyeva Bahvrca mahatyukthe Mimamsante etam
agnav Adhvaryavah
Etam mahavrate Chandogah etameva sarvesu bhutesu
Brahmetyacaksate"
(AA iii. 2. 3.)
"Sarve Vedah sarve Ghosah Sarva Rcah Ekaiva
Vyahrutih Pranarca Ityeva Vidyat (AA ii.2.2)
"Kaschandasam yogam aveda dhirah (RV X.114.9)
"Taddhaitat pasyanto rsayah Kavaseyah ahuh kimartha
vayam adhyesyamahe
kimar tha vayam yaksyamahe iti" (AA iii. 2.3)
These texts have been quoted by M. They establish that there
is only one Sarvana-mava- n. They endorse the position that all
 -26-
50 The Arsa Tradition of Approach of Madhvacarya
sacrifices offered to various gods under their various names
are really intended in principle to reach the One Supreme thro
them. This is confirmed by the words of the Gita also: Aham
hi sarva yajnanam bhokta ca prabhur eva ca. (xi.24)
Thus the Arsa tradition provides the key to integrating the
seeming Polytheism of the Pantheon with an overall conception
of one Sarvanamavan. This paves the way for performance of
all sacrifices as intended in principle for the one Supreme. By
such an integral approach to the Vedic and Upanisadic sources
as a whole, M. has been able to set right the age long injustice
that has been done to India's Vedic heritage by the early Western
Indologists and their followers among modern Indian scholars
as well. By righting this wrong, M has also opened the eyes
of traditional commentators on the BS to the unmerited denigration
of their original status, to which our Vedic heritage has been
exposed all along. Suresvara in his Var tika on the Brh. Up. Bhasya
of S. has cited a metrical passage from the Bhallavi Sakha
which speaks of dedicated performance of karma in the spirit
of Phalatyaga which leads one to the highest abode of Visnu.
Another metrical line from the Bhallaveya Sruti cited by M speaks
of Visnu as the Sarvanamavan.
M has therefore rightly focussed attention on the Arsa tradition
as providing the master key to a smooth reconciliation of both
the seeming Polytheism of the Vedas and their sacrificial system
in the true spirit of the Upanisad : Yadeva vidyaya karoti sraddhaya
upanisada tadeva viryavattaram bhavati. (Chan. Up. ii, 10) with
Brahmavidya. He has accordingly worked out an excegetical method
based on a dual Sabdavrtti in terms of Paramamukhyavrtti and
a conventional mukhyavrtti of entire Sabda Jata by way of
Samanvaya of entire Sastra in B which he has adopted in his
interpretation of the Vedanta Sutras with remarkable results. His
approach is ratified by the opening words of the BS (III.3.1)
: Sarva Vedanta Pratyayam (Brahma) as has already been
pointed out.
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 51
BS I.1.3 Sastrayonitvat declares that B is truly knowable only
thro Sastras. S renders the word 'Sastra' as "Rgveda and others".
Elsewhere in his C. on BS III.3.5 he has quoted from the Ait.
A . III .2.3 "The one Supreme Being is the subject of worship,
meditation and realisation of the Rgvedins thro the Uktha, of
the Adhvaryus thro the sacred fire and of the Chandogas thro
the Mahavrata rites. These are all parts of the Karmakanda.''
This shows that S was fully aware of the possibility of attuning
the Karmakanda texts and rites also to BrahmaVidya in principle,
as part of the Arsa tradition as commended by the Upanisadic
passage 'Yadeva vidyaya karoti...'
Very probably, the Arsa tradition had come to be forgotten
and lost currency when long afterwards regular commentaries
came to be written on the BS by historical personages who
had therefore to confine their attention to the Upanisads alone.
And S too had to fall in line with them.
M was born in a family accredited to the Rksakha. He was
very deeply read in the Vedas and Aranyakas which he had
at his fingertips. He was naturally deeply inspired by the Arsa
tradition as may be seen from his illustrative c. on the first
forty Suktas of RgVeda and his c. on the Mahanamni hymns
in his Karmanirnaya in which the higher Adhyatma interpretation
of the Rks has been fully brought out. Many incidents of his
early and later life narrated in his near contemporary biography,
the M. Vij. (VI. 1, VI.13, VI.17, XVI.5; 43) bear witness to his
mastery of the Vedas and how deeply he was moved by the
message of the Arsa tradition. The spontaneous tribute he has
paid to the words of the Aranyakas : "Sarve Vedah, Sarve Ghosah,
Sarva Rchah, Ekaiva Vyahrtih Pranarca ityeva vidyat" (AA ii.2)
in his c.
"Kimuca Vedah Samudra Ghosa Vrksapatana
bheritadanadayah sarve sabdah
tasyaiva namani yatha yogam yojaniyani"
 -27-
52 The Arsa Tradition of Approach of Madhvacarya
speaks volumes of the heighs of his Mystic experience of the
Arsa tradition. No wonder his BSB should blaze a new trail of
light in this direction . Dr. Chari seems to be under the impression
that M. adopts a sectarion stance in using the term 'Visnu' with
reference to B in his Sutrabhasya. We have seen that to M
all the names of the Vedic gods refer to B in principle. But
the words 'Visnu' and 'Narayana' used by him have a special
significance as referring in their highest etymological sense in
the highest context to the Supreme Being who is the sole survivor
in Mahapralaya, when the entire universe, including the gods
lay submerged in the waters of Mahapralaya. (Arvag Deva Asya
Visarjanena) (RV X. 129). - There was only That One (Tadekam)
which was breathing windless by its own power (Anidavatam
Svadhaya tat ekam) and there was none else equal to or higher
than it. (RV X. 129. 2b). There are frequent references to the
Supreme B in the Vedic texts referring to it as Antah Samudre
(T.A.X, 1.1). Samudre Antah kavayo avayanti (T.A.X, 1.1). Yam
antah Samudre (T.A.X. 1.1). Mama yonih apsvantah samudre
(RV X.125.7). It is this Supreme Being which is designated as
Jalan (Jala-an) in the Chandogya text (III.14) : Sarvam Khalvidam
Brahma. Tat Jalan ityupasita. The term Sarvam in its old Vedic
usage signified what is full and complete (Purna) as in Sarvo
vava mama patih (Jai Br.)
The other term 'Narayana' refers to the Supreme One which
alone survives in Mahapralaya. Nara means the waters of Pralaya
and Narayana denotes the Being who abides (ayana) in the
waters of Pralaya, as explained in the Manusmrti. It is to indicate
the special importance of this name that M says 'Brahma - sabdasca
Visnaveva Narayanam Natva Sutrartha ucyate' at the outset of
his Bhasya. The Visistadvaita tradition too which believes in the
triunity of the Karma, Devata and Brahmamimamsa Sastra holds
that the two closing Sutras of the Daivi Mimamsa : Sa Visnur
aha hi. Tam Brahmetyacaksate Tam Brahmetyacaksate, speaks
for itself. If Dr. Chari had been acquainted with the Visistadvaita
tradition, he would not have rushed to find fault with M for
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 53
his use of the word Visnu to denote the Supreme B in principle.
R's Vedartha Samgraha which upholds the pre-eminence of Visnu
must have cooled down in his Sutra Bhasya after his bitter
experience in the Chola country which forced him to migrate
to Karnataka.
It is equally regrettable that Dr. Chari should have observed
that M seems to have developed an antagonism towards S to
such an extent as to avoid even his Visayavakyas from the
Upanisads and go to the RgVeda and other sources instead,
with a vengeance at it were. There is more heat than light in
this comment of Dr. Chari. A close examination of M's Visayavakyas
will show that they are chosen with the utmost regard for their
contextual relevance to the Adhyaya and Pada Sangatis, logical
maintainability of the wording of the Visayavakyas and their
homologous affinity between the key words of the Sutra and
the wording of the Visayavakyas. These are often transgressed
by S and R, as we shall be seeing.
Take S and R's inter pretation of the Sutras, 'Sar vatra
prasiddhopadesa' (i. 2. 1). The 'Sautra' word is Sarvatra in the
locative sense, but the wording in S and R's Visayavakya from
Chan. Up. III. 14, is Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma, Tat jalan ityupasita.
M's Visayavakya on the other hand, from A. A III.2.3, has nearly
a dozen locative nouns, Mahavrate, Agnau, Vayau, Akase,
Sarvabhutesu etameva Brahmetyacaksate. S and R's explanation
of Tatjalan suffers from a needless transposition of the natural
and logical order of creation, sustenance and dissolution of the
world in Brahman as set forth in the Upanisad and accepted
by S and R too under BS i.1.2. What is the necessity for this
transposition of the natural and logical order here?
Take again M's preference for the Visayavakya from AA for
the Pranadhikarana. (i.1. 28-31) in lieu of S and R's choice
from Kausitaki Brahmana Up. (iii.3). According to S the Adhi
establishes B as Sarvatmaka but in the Kausitaki text, the
 -28-
54 The Arsa Tradition of Approach of Madhvacarya
Paramatman manifesting itself in Indra tells Pratardana "I Am
Prana". That is all. This does not make for Sarvatmakatva,
whereas in the AA text B manifesting itself in Indra appears
before Visvamitra, the interlocutor, who has at Indra's request
tirelessly repeated one thousand Brhatisahasra verses three times,
tells him in response to his request, "Tva- m eva vijaniyam", O
Sage, I am Prana, You are Prana, so are all these beings Prana,
which may tend to establish Prana's Sarvatmakatva, as S would
like to have it.
The declaration of Indra speaking thro the Antaryami B is
explained on the basis of Sastra Drsti or Antaryami Drsti by
M. According to S and R the term Vaktuh in the Sutra refers
to Indra the speaker, who is already covered by the reflexive
use of the pronoun, 'Atmopadesa' whereas in the AA text the
term Vaktuh refers to Visvamitra, the reciter (Samsita) of the
Brhati Sahasra and not Indra.
Take again the Arambhanadhi (II.1.15) whose Visayavakya
according to S and R is from the Chan. Up. (vi.1) based on
three illustrations, of one clod of clay, one nugget of gold and
a pair of nail scissors by knowing which all things made of
clay, gold etc are known. (Eka Vijnanena, Sarva Vijnanam). The
wording of these illustrations as they stand fail to support any
such material cause and effect relation between the pairs named.
A proper way of putting it would be Mrda Vijnataya Mrnmayam
jnatam bhavati. However, the illustration of Nakhanikrntana is
a misfit as it is itself an effect and not a cause of any other
effect. These glaring inadequacies in the wording, from the point
of view of S and R's interpretation cannot be dismissed as minor
t e r m i n o l o g i c a l i n ex a c t i t u d e s, w h e n a b e t t e r a n d m o r e
commensurate explanation of the text as it stands worded can
be thought of on the basis of similarity, primacy and kaimutyanyaya,
as pointed out by M in his Chandogya bhasya is available (see
my Mahatatparya of Mahavakyas P. 75-77 and also my Nyayasudha
rendering Vol. 2 P. 291).
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 55
Apar t from this, the key word in the Arambhana Adhi, according
to S and R does not tally with the opening Sautra word 'Arambhana'
(Sabda) which stands by itself as a single word whereas it figures
in S and R's interpretation as the second member of a compound
(vacarambhanam). M's interpretation of this Adhi. is not open
to the defect of Gatarthata (repetition) as in their case.
The problem raised by M in the Tadananyatva Adhi (II.1.15)
is a fresh one of the utmost importance to all Theistic philosophy
in general and with special reference to the Theism of the Up.
which recognises the eternality of many entities besides B. :
Nityo Nityanam - as creation in Upanisadic philosophy is not
ex-nihilo, as it is in Christianity. Naturally, this leads to a vexed
question : How far B's. making use of other eternal accessories
like Prakrti, Jivas, space, time, etc. would not be compromising
to B's metaphysical status of absolute independence of initiative,
if it is obliged to make use of other eternal accessories .
B cannot dispense with these pre-existent accessories which
would lead to creation, ex-nihilo. There is a lurking fallacy in
this dilemma. This adhi is therefore utilised by M to solve this
riddle without affecting B's status of absolute freedom and
independence of initiative in regard to accessories. The solution
is found by reading the Guna Sutra, Satvaca avarasya (II.1.17)
together with the opening sutra which would enable us to hold
that B's making use of pre existing accessories which are also
eternal is consistent with it's absolute independence in so far
as even the eternal existence of the eternal accessories and
their powers of functioning are all pre-determined by B's will
and pleasure. This is suppor ted by texts like Pacyamsca sarvan
parinamayed yah (Svet Up. V.5).
Dravyam karmaca kalasca svabhavo jiva eva ca
Yadanugrahatas santi na santi yadupeksaya (Bhag)
Vedanta Desika has also held that the independence of B is
not compromised in any way by making use of other eternal
 -29-
56 The Arsa Tradition of Approach of Madhvacarya
accessories in creation as their very existence and powers of
functioning are pre determined and subject to B's eternal will
and pleasure :
Sahakaribhih arambhe na svatantryam vihanyate
Tatsadbhava pravrttyosca svadhinatva vyavasthiteh
The double negative, Tat ananyatvam is to explain that the one
independent source of all creation is no other than the Supreme
One; Svatantra Karana - ananyat Brahma. There is no repetition
of the topic in this way of dealing with the adhi. as there is
in the interpretation of S and R in trying to establish B's material
causality of the world again and again .
On the whole, there are far too many adhis in R's interpretation
on the subject of the intra-organic relation between Cit and Acit
with B such as the Prakrtyadhi (I.4.24), Arambhana adhi (II.1.15),
Amsa adhi (II.3.43) and Ahikundala Adhi (III. 2. 28). Amsa-Amsi
bhava relation is possible only between a given substance and
its physical par ts as between a large piece of cloth and a bit
torn from it. It cannot be applied to two substances of opposite
natures too with a third one. As B is impar tible and partless,
it cannot have parts .
The Ahikundala adhi is an ideal one for establishing an intimate
and inseparable relation of identity which admits of a distinction
of reference to the attributes as such without a distinction of
essence. This relation is one of Savisesa-abheda as between
the serpent and its coil or time as a whole and its divisions
into past, present and future. It is not clear why R should fight
shy of it while he is so keen on establishing again and again
an organic and inseparable relation between B and Cit and Acit
of opposite natures. One would however expect of R an ardent
follower of Pancaratra theology which does not admit any mutual
difference or distinction among the Vyuha forms and Para-Vasudeva
or their six sovereign attributes as pointed out by S : Na ca
Pancaratra siddhantibhih, Vasudevadisu ekasmin sarvesuva
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 57
jnanaisvaryadi taratamyakr to bhedah abhyupagamyate (SBSB II.
2. 44) . One is left to wonder if the sovereign attributes of Satyam
Jnanam ananda etc mentioned in apposition with B in the Srutis
are ineligible to be treated as organically related to B much
more logically than Cit and Acit. The Svet. Up. speaks of jnana,
bala and kriya as inseparable saktis of B : Parasya Saktih vividhaiva
sruyate svabhaviki jnana bala kriya ca. The Visnu Purana often
quoted by R likens them to the intimate relation betw een fire
and heat .
Saktayas sarvabhavanam acintyajnanagocarah
Yato ato Brahmanastah sargadya bhavasaktayah
Bhavanti tapatam srestha pavakasya yathosnata
(VP I.3.1-2)
Dr. Chari asserts that there is no mention of Aparoksa jnana
or Direct vision of God in the Sutras as accepted by M. This
observation is evidently due to the fact that according to R the
highest experience of B thro Dhyana is only an approximation
to actual vision (darsana samanakara) on this side of release.
But Mund. Up. (III.3) clearly says that the Supreme B reveals
its own for m (svam tanum) to one whom it chooses. Cf.
Paramatmaparoksyam ca tat prasadadeva na jivasaktya (MBSB
III.2.23). The Isa. Up. refers to the prayer of the Jiva to the
Lord to show him that form of B which is Kalyana tamam, tat
te pasyami (I,6). The Brh. Up. says, Atmava are drastavyah ,
srotavyo mantavyah. Sravana, Manana and Dhyana lead to
Darsana. The Gita also says,
Bhaktya tvananyaya sakya aham evam vidho Arjuna
Jnatum drastum ca pravestum ca parantapa (XI, 54).
Here, Jnana stands for Paroksa Jnana and Drastum for Direct
vision and Pravestum for Communion. All that apart, in the
Sadhana Adhyaya of BS (III.3) there are two consecutive Sutras
Vidyaivatu nirdharanat (III.3.48) and Darsanat (III.3.49). The former
evidently refers to Paroksa Jnana gained thro Sravana, Manana
 -30-
58 The Arsa Tradition of Approach of Madhvacarya
and Dhyana and Darsana must naturally be Direct vision - for
however short a while of a split second it may last, on this
side of release.
R holds that though forbidden to exercise the Lord's prerogatives
of world creation etc which are an expression of His infinite
blissfulness, released souls still enjoy the fullest measure of
the Lord's blissfulness. Apart from its illogicality, such a position
goes against the description of the highest state of Moksa described
in Brh. Up. (iv.3.32) : Esa Brahmalokah Esasya Paramagatih
Parama sampat Eso asya Paramolokah Eso asya Parama Anandah,
which concludes with a clear statement : Etasyaiva anandasya
anyani bhutani matram upajivanti (iv.3.32) that the denizens of
this world subsist on an iota of the boundless bliss of B. The
words Anyani bhutani in this context must necessarily denote
the actual residents of this world and not those still in
Samsara.
Dr. Chari proffers an advice to followers of M to change the
name of Dvaita of their philosophy. This designation of Dvaita
is based on M's own classification of Tattva or Prameya defined
as Anaropitam pramiti visayah into two kinds as Svatantra and
Paratantra. Svatantra stands for the Supreme B which is not
dependent on any other for its being, knowing, functioning, unlike
the dependent (finite reality). Hence there is no need for a change
of the name, "Dvaita". The philosophy of Ramanuja stands midway
between Dvaita and Advaita with its acceptance of an inseparable
intraorganic relation of body and soul with B. But it seems possible
to subsume in principle the two categories of Acit and Cit into
a single head of finite reality dependent on B. thus arriving
at two broad categories. Would it not be more logical then for
R's philosophy to be renamed Dvaita, instead?
(5TH PROOF)
IV. MEET MADHUSUDANA SARASVATI
Advaitasiddhi-a critical study by Prof. K. Maheswaran Nair
- Kerala University - India Book Centre, 40/5, Saktinagar,
Delhi - 7 (1990).
Prof. Maheswaran Nair has made a distinctive, long awaited
contribution to the world of Vedanta scholarship by bringing out
a first English translation of Vyasatirtha's Nyayamrta and its
criticism the Advaitasiddhi side by side. It fills a great gap, as
till now no complete translation in English of either has been
available for modern scholars specialising in Vedanta dialectics.
But this edition suffers from want of a perspective index, which
i s absolutely necessary for a modern work of such great importance.
The Dvaita known to Gaudapada and Sankara was not an
Aupanisada Darsana. It was Madhva who gave the final shape
to Vedanta as a robust Theism of the Prasthanatraya - the
triple canon and brought Dvaita - Advaita philosophical polemics
to contemporary attention with his monographs on disputed themes
like Mayavada, Upadhi and Mithyatva besides re-interpreting the
ten Upanisads, Brahmasutras and Gita. Jayatirtha and others
after him continued the polemics on the home front.
It was Vyasatirtha the Saint - Philosopher of the Vijayanagar
Empire who took Dvaita - Advaita philosophical polemics to an
All - India Forum in his Nyayamrta by widening the range and
scope of the subject and its dimensions, by placing in the hands
of his contemporaries a New Agenda for a more complete,
comprehensive and fruitful study, discussion and assessment
of the credentials and credibility of the contending systems.
Much of the credit given to Madhusudana Sarasvati for having
ushered in a Neo - Advaita, in its traditional setup, must really
go to Vyasatirtha, as has been handsomely acknowledged by
the late Mm. Anantakrishna Sastri, long ago. In dealing with
 -31-
60 Meet Madhusudana Sarasvati
the subject, Vyasatirtha had set for himself a very high standard
of parliamentary decorum and discipline in the use of controversial
language and vocabulary which was scrupulously adhered to
by the Tarangini in its reply to the A-siddhi, in glaring contrast
with the style of writing of both Madhusudana and Brahmananda.
The Tg in its replies invariably begins with the words Atra vadanti
and replies strictly to the point without heat or passion. Not
so Madhusudana and his commentator who freely indulge in
invective rhetoric, discourtesy, derision and abusive language,
to the extent of unprintable insults as on pages 50 and 119
in the translation. Dr. Nair should have taken the responsibility
to delete all such jarring notes in the English translations by
using his discretion and better judgment.
While paying dutiful respects to his Vidyaguru, Diksaguru and
Paramaguru at the outset, Madhusudana has omitted to do so
- -
in respect of the Adiguru of Advaita namely A disankara - which
is in glaring contrast with the example set by Vyasatirtha.
Madhusudana wantonly twists and misconstrues Vyasatirtha's
statement : Yadrsam brahmanah satvam tadrsam syat jagatyapi
for the sake of jeering at his adversary, by resorting to a Chala,
by cutting a bad joke at his expense in the form of a foolish
suitor to the hand of a maiden, answering her father's question
of what his gotra may be, by telling him "it is the same as
yours, Sir".
What the statement of Vyasatirtha actually means and is
intended to convey is that like B the world too has an existence
and a reality, in the same way as B, though it may not be
self luminous (svaprakasa) like B. It is doubtful however if the
Advaitabrahman can be self - luminous, because it is claimed
by Sankara that it cannot know itself (atmani-svakriya virodhat).
That apart, the term yadrsam merely refers to a similarity of
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 61
nature and not identity. Vyasatirtha's statement does not mean
that the material world has no reality apart from B's. Vyasatirtha
has clarified :
Brahma ka- latrayepi sat. viyada- di kada- cideva iti nityatva -
anityatva- bhyam eva
vaisamyam na tu satyatva - mithya-tvabhya- m
(P. 37 Nym. Nirnayasagar Press Edn.)
There is nothing in this for Madhusudana to jump to the conclusion
that the world and B. share one and the same reality. Evidently,
Madhusudana is not aware of the fact that Dvaita Philosophy
does not accept anugatasatta- among existents -
Bhinnasca bhinnadharmasca padartha- nikhila- api (AV)
Difference and resemblance are both unique and sui generis
to each particular, tho made out thro their counter - correlates.
That apart, are we to take it that Madhusudana does not understand
the difference between Nitya and Anitya, as explained by Vyasatirtha
in the same work? No wonder, the Tg pulls up Madhusudana
: Bhava - anavabodhat.
Most Advaitins and their modern apologists continue to believe
and accuse Dvaita Philosophers of deliberately confounding the
Vyavaharika and the Paramarthika stand -points of S's Philosophy.
Dr. K. Narain, in his Critique of Madhva refutation of the Sankara
school of Vedanta, had done so and Prof. Nair has committed
the same mistake. It is all very well for him to insist that " the
practical reality of the world is never negated . What is negated
is its absolute reality." (P. 40 translation). But, the more important
question is from which angle or standpoint is the practical reality
sought to be negated. The Nym. has actually raised this moot
question - whether the vyavaharika prapanca is negated from
the Vyavaharika or the absolute point of view. Negation of the
 -32-
62 Meet Madhusudana Sarasvati
practical reality from the practical point of view would be suicidal.
The negation has to be from the absolute point of view. But
that is beset by an inextricable logical fallacy of mutual
interdependence (anyonyasraya). That is where the shoe pinches
and there lies the heel of Achilles. The words of Nym. are crystal
clear on the point. For Paramarthikatva, as defined by Advaita,
consists in uncontradictedness (abadhyatva). Only when one
has a complete knowledge of what is Paramarthika, as not open
to sublation with reference to all the three periods of time, can
one understand the nature of Mithyatva of the Vyavaharika as
liable to be negated with reference to all the three periods of
time. Unless one has such a knowledge of Mithyatva, one cannot
understand what Paramarthika reality is as not open to negation
at all. After quoting faithfully from Nym : Napi dvitiyah
A b a d hya t va r u p a p a r a m a r t h i k a t va s ya - b a d hya t va r u p a
m i t hya t va n i r u pya t va t a n yo nya s r aya t va t , t h e L o g i c i a n i n
Madhusudana is forced to admit tamely - Maivam Svarupenaiva
traikalika nisedhasya prapance suktirupye ca angikarat (A - siddhi
Sri Vidya Press Edn). This lets the cat out of the bag.
This outspoken confession of Madhusudana, in dealing with
second definition of falsity in his A-siddhi, is nowhere to be
found, in Prof. Nair's English translation of the text of the A-
siddhi. One wonders why. Anyway, the frank confession of
Mdhusudana that both the illusory silver and the practical world
(Prapanca) are negated per se in respect of their own respective
forms of appearance as such (Svarupena as Asad - vilaksana
= Mithya) would consequently reduce them to an essenceless
void - as pointed out by Vyasatirtha -
Mithyabhu-tasya-pi svarupen.aiva traikalika nis.edha iti
paks.e, nihsvarupatvasya durva- ratva- t
The reader of the English translation is entitled to know what
Madhusudana's reactions are to the crucial point raised by
Vyasatirtha. The translation is silent on the point.
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 63
Madhusudana is prone to play tricks with evidence, in dealing
with the Advaita interpretation of Ekameva - advitiyam he adver ts
to the Nasadiya - Sukta (R.V. X, 129) where in the opening
line, there is reference to Tadanim with reference to the existence
of Time in Mahapralaya. Madhusudana, therefore, proceeds to
shift it to the next line to avoid a survival of Time as a reality
in Mahapralaya. But, the shifting of the term tadanim to the
next line can serve no purpose as the context remains the same
Mahapralaya. However, he also says the words Sat and Asat
in the opening line should be construed in what he calls their
we l l k n ow n ( P r a s i d d h a r t h a ) u s a g e o f Pa r a m a r t h i k a a n d
Aparamar thika instead of in their scriptural meanings of Murta
and Amur ta, as suggested by Madhva on the basis of the Brh.
Up. (II.3, 2-3). The undesirable consequence of Madhusudana's
move would be to reduce even the surviving residual B. in
Mahapralaya, as the one Sat breathing windless by its own power
(anid avatam svadhaya tadekam) to a state of anirvacaniya. To
avoid this, Madhusudana proposes to call to aid some other
Srutis from elsewhere , which is quite unnecessary, if Sat and
Asat are understood as Murta and Amurta as supported by Brh.
Up. As a Sastrajna, Madhusudana is expected to adhere to the
principle of interpretation of Sastric words in their scriptural
connotation : Sastrastha va tannimittatvat, as far as possible.
What surprises one is that Madhusudana has not even cared
to adhere to Sankara's interpretation of the words Sat and Asat,
used in Prasna Up. (II. 5) as Murta and Amurta, respectively.
Are we to suppose that Madhusudana had not read even Sankara's
own bhasya on the Upanisads? If he had, why has he not stuck
to them here?
After valiantly fighting for the establishment of B's formlessness
(nirakaratva), Madhusudana seems to have had a guilty conscience
and seems to have hastened to make amends by saying "I know
of no other higher than Murali Krsna : Krsnatparam kimapi tattvam
 -33-
64 Meet Madhusudana Sarasvati
aham na jane." This verse is relevant to the present section
and not to the beginning of the one as printed here. The
Kumbakonam edition places it at the end of the present section.
The same is the case with the abusive verse - Iha kumatih
atatve tatvavadi varakah which should appear in the Epilogue
and not where it is found in Prof. Nair's translation.
The trouble taken by Advaita to castrate B of its vital essences
of Satyam, Jnanam and Ananda and other metaphysical attributes
by Akhandar tha surgery is an unfortunate exercise in futility
by taking it to the brink of Apohavada. Intellectual sophistry
cannot go beyond Akhandartha by smothering the Upanisadic
Brahman with a number of gags without a single gap of attributes
for it to breathe . When one reads the thrilling and sonorous
description of B in the Taitt. Up. as Satyam jnanam anantam
B, followed by an assurance that one who realises it reaches
it along with the enlightened Brahmadeva, one hardly suspects
that it can be twisted and mangled into so many negatives and
exclusions of their opposites only (atadvyavrtti). No wonder, even
a sincere Advaitin like Dr. P. K. Sundaram recoils from interpreting
satyam, jnanam etc. as the absence of existence, absence of
ignorance and absence of pain - a dark emptiness and blankness
and bankruptcy of being. The profound depth of existence of
B is not conveyed by denial but by affirmation , not by is not,
but by is . A reality which is said to be Satyasya satyam cannot
be an essenceless Vacuum (P. 6-7 E. T. of Istasiddhi). There
must be some linking agency, some internal mechanism in the
constitution of B to admit of a differenceless identity which however
facilitates a distinction of reference without necessitating a
distinction of essence. It cannot fall outside B's ontological essence
or an expression of it or one alien to it. The name Svarupavisesa
given to it in Dvaita philosophy is most appropriate, signifying
its own internal dynamism.
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 65
Karl Potter has made it clear that tho Advaita thought looks
upon self-knowledge as not given by any Pramana and is an
immediate intuition, still the precise nature of its content has
to be gathered from the sruti. Thus ultimately, it has to look
upon scripture and language, as its critical means of proof of
its truthfulness of such anubhava (Encyclopaedia of Indian
Philosophies Vol - II P. 98). S too endorses the same :
Brahmatmabhavasya sastram antarena anavagamyamanatvat
(BSB I, 1, 4).
It is for this reason that Vyasatirtha has given top priority
to the discussions of over twenty Advaita Srutis, with special
reference to their context, language, wording, syntax, concord
and significance of the illustrations given. Of these Madhusudana
has dealt with only Aham Brahmasmi andTattvam asi (Akhandartha)
and has skipped Neha nanasti, vacarambhanam, Prapanco yadi
vidyeta and such other crucial texts and giving cursory attention
to Ekameva Advitiyam and a few others. Prof. Nair sums up
his comment on Ekam eva Advitiyam in two or three sentences.
We cannot, therefore, admit Prof. Nair's plea that Madhusudana
"does not explain all these other Srutis for fear of inordinate
length of the discussions" (P 74). He could have given more
attention to them , instead of enlarging on the topic of Vipratipatti
pradarsana at the beginning, which has no interest to modern
scholars. The Nadi Samudra drstanta in Tattvam asi has been
thrown out by Vacaspati Misra (Bhamati on BSB I.4.22). The
illustration of salt dissolved in water, the invisible power hidden
behind the tiny banyan seeds ordered to be cut open (broken),
the thief and imposter with stolen property caught red handed
and brought to trial, the dying man on his sick bed are all hard
nuts to crack, from an Advaita point of view. A baffled Madhusudana
beats a hasty retreat, saying that illustrations do not run on
all fours, or that they are not transparent, or do not refer to
 -34-
66 Meet Madhusudana Sarasvati
any differences as really existing and lastly, and above all , that
they are indifferent alike to the existence of real difference or
real identity (between Jiva and Brahma - Vastavabheda abhedayor
audasinyena, P. 836 N. S. Press Edition). Prof. Nair's Translation
has drawn a black curtain over all such irresponsible and facetious
pleas of Madhusudana, in hisTranslation. Such replies are evasive.
The question is whether the illustrations given by Uddalaka support
the thesis of difference between Jiva Brahman or their identity.
They cannot do both. Neither can they be neutral and indifferent
to both . Yet, nothing daunted, Madhusudana coolly says they
do neither !! This is no compliment to the Sruti or to Uddalaka
or to our intelligence .
(5TH PROOF)
APPENDIX
THE QUESTION OF THE DATE OF
MADHVACARYA
The date of Acarya Madhva given by him in his Mahabharata
Tatparya Nirnaya (xxxii, 131) as "after the lapse of 4300 years
of Kaliyuga" is not an epigraphical evidence or a diary entry.
It is only a broad statement in terms of 43 centuries after (in
Kali). The precise date has therefore to be fixed after taking
into account all other relevant facts known about his life history.
Hrsikesa Tirtha, one of the eight Taulava disciples of the Acarya,
who later became the Head of the Palimar Mutt of Udupi, has
left us a completeTulu Ms. copy of the collected work s (Sarvamula)
of Madhva preserved in palm leaves in the Mutt for centuries.
It has been printed, edited by Bannanje Govindacarya on behalf
of Palimar Mutt, by the late Sri Vidyamanya Tirtha. The edition
mentions that in this collection is found the text of a short work
on Tithinirnaya by the Acarya dated corresponding to 1308 AD.
The Madhva Vijaya mentions Hrsikesa T. as a beloved and leading
disciple of the Acarya (Sisya Pravara XIII, 40) who used to recite
the Bhagavata Purana in a melodious voice which matched the
Acarya's. Two works of Hrsikesa T. have come down to us, a
Sampradaya Paddhati and an Anumadhvacarita . It is natural to
expect such a leading and beloved disciple of the Acarya to
have left us a short life sketch of the Acarya in which he has
given precise information about cyclic year of Madhva's exit from
the scene of his worldly activities, the tithi and month and the
cyclic year of his disappearance and his age at the time of
his leaving the earthly life :-
Ekonasiti varsani bhutva manusadrstigah
Pingalabde maghasuddha navamyam Badarim yayau
The verse clearly says that the Acarya left the world in his
79th year on the ninth day of the bright half of Magha in the
 -35-
68 Appendix - The question of the Date of Madhvacarya
cyclic year of Pingala which corresponds to 1317 (18) AD. To
this day the departure anniversary of the Acarya is observed
by the entire Madhva community and its Mathas on Magha Suddha
Navami as "Madhva Navami". The broad statement of the Mbh.
TN (XXXII, 131) read with the above precise data of the
Anumadhvacarita of the Acarya's own leading disciple Hrsikesa
T. should set at rest all doubts about the precise date of the
Acarya as 1238-1317 (18) AD.
The Guruparampara of the four up-ghat disciples of the Acarya
who succeeded to their Pitha one after the other till we come
to the fourth disciple Aks.obhya T. adds upto 33 years. If we
go by the theory of P. S. Seshagiri Acharya that the Acarya
lived for only 70 years from 1199 AD, the Acarya would have
left the world in 1270 AD. That would clash with the evidence
of the copper plate inscription of the fourth disciple Aksobhya
T. dated 1337 AD in which he is stated to have purified two
Brahmin brothers of their sin of Brahmahatya and restored their
social status as before. This record has been published by Kapatral
Krishna Rao of Gulbarga in the Kannada Tattvavada from Gadag
in April, 1968.
Narahari T. one of the four up-ghat disciples of Madhva was
converted and admitted to Sanyasa order in 1264 AD by his
Guru Ananda T. according to the earliest inscription of Narahari
T. His Srikurmam inscription dated 1281 AD mentions that he
belonged to the Ministerial family of the Kalinga kingdom and
was earnestly advised by the Acarya, his Guru, to assume charge
as Prime Minister of the state during the period of a grave crisis
and break down of law and order situation in the state on account
o f t h e i n s u r r e c t i o n s o f t h e S a b a ra h o r d e s ( ve r s e 6 o f
Srikurmam inscription).
These are clear guidelines for us to go by in fixing the date
of Madhva between 1238-1317 (Pingala) overlooking the gap
of 39 years as already explained.
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 69
By-passing all these data Seshagiri Acharya of Mysore has
been doggedly upholding the date 1199-1270 in his controversy
with me in the Kannada Tattvavada of the Akhila Bharata Madhva
Mahamandala, Bangalore.
His latest move is to exploit the incident narrated in M. Vij.
V. 38 of a disputation between the young, rising M. and an
Advaitic monk in Anantasayana over M's criticism of some
interpretations of Brahmasutras by Sankara in the course of
his own exposition of the Sutras to an audience there. The Advaitic
Sanyasi is repor ted to have objected to M's criticising
Sankarabhasya on the ground that M. had no business to criticise
a Bhasyakara when he himself had not produced any Bhasya
of his own. (Mahanatikramo Sutrarthavado akrtabhasyakesu -
M. Vij. V, 38). The Acarya asked him to reply and answer his
criticisms if he were able to do so and that he will certainly
be coming out with a Sutrabhasya of his own in good time (M.
Vij. V. 39).
Now who was this Advaita Sanyasi who had opposed M. at
Anantasayanam? Seshagiri Acharya identifies him with no less
a personage thanVidyatirtha the then ruling Pontiff of the prestigious
premier Advaitic Matha of South India, the Sringeri Pitha, on
the basis of a study of the records of Sringeri Matha by Prof.
K. Nilakantha Sastri of the Madras University and a staunch
disciple of the Matha that it was Vidyatirtha himself who is said
to have humbled the pride of M. at Anantasayanam. Seshagiri
Acharya has manipulated the date of Vidyatirtha to syncronise
with that of his own date for M. viz. 1199-1270.
The idea that it was Vidyatir tha, Head of the Sringeri Matha
who had taken part in the disputation with M. was first put forward
by CNK Aiyar of Coimbatore in his Madhva & Madhvaism (1907).
C. M. Padmanabhachar of Coimbatore while refuting many of
 -36-
70 Appendix - The question of the Date of Madhvacarya
CNK Aiyar's aspersions against M. in his Life & Teachings of
Madhva (1912) did not question his identification of the Advaita
monk (who disputed with M. at Anantasayanam) with Vidya
(Sankara) Tirtha of the Sringeri Mutt. The reason was that neither
of them had heard of or had access to the Bhavaprakasika notes
on M. Vij. by Narayana Panditacarya himself published in 1923
by the Kaniyur Math of Udupi in which the Advaita Sanyasi who
disputed with M. had been identified as a Taulava ascetic of
the Advaita school bearing the Taulava family sur name of
Kudiposatur - aya whose Sanskrit equivalent had been given
in M. Vij. as Apramsunutnopapada - adhivasaja (M. Vij. V, 38).
The subsequent publication of Visvapati T.'s Com. on M. Vij.
by the Pejavar Mutt in 1951 also decodes it as Kudiposatur
aya. The mistaken identification of this Advaitic monk with Vidya
T. of Sringeri Mutt was first corrected by me in my paper on
"Madhva Vidyasankara Meeting - A Fiction" published in or about
1932 in the Annamalai University Journal (Vol. II). I do not know
if Pof. Nilakantha Sastri had taken any notice of it in his study
of the Sringeri Mutt records as he is said to have done by
Seshagiri Acharya.
The Taulava lineage of Kudiposaturaya r ules out the
possibility of his induction to the prestigious Sringeripitha,
recr uitment to which was and is not open to Taulavas.
Most probably this ascetic owed allegiance to a Bhagavata
Sampradaya Advaitic Matha of South Kanara of those days, such
as the Edaniru Matha whose Svamijis worship Visnu (Krsna)
and Siva on an equal footing, Krsna in the morning & noon
and Siva at night, wear ing Gopicandana dvadasanamas
during day Puja & Ahnika and Vibhuti (ashes) for evening
Puja of Siva. The Edaniru Mutt at Vishnumangala is the
Guru Matha of a large number of Tulu Brahmana families who
had not joined the M. fold.
(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 71
CONCLUSION :
Irrespective of Nilakantha Sastri's study of the records of
the Sringeri Matha, the identification of the Advaitic Sanyasi
in question with Vidya T. of the Sringeri Matha can not pass
muster from the point of view of either side .
First look at it from the angle of the Sringeri Mutt. The Pontiffs
of this Mutt which represents the premier Advaita Pitha in South
India enjoy royal honors and insignia. It would be infra dig and
highly compromising to the prestige, standing and status of its
ruling Pontiff to let himself be drawn into any philosophical
disputation with a rebel , much younger and absolutely unknown
to fame and name from Udupi, who had not yet established
his credentials and reputation as the exponent of a new school
of thought by his writings - even as Kudiposaturaya himself puts
it to him so sarcastically and disdainfully - Mahan atikramo
sutrarthavado akrtabhasyakesu (M. Vij. V, 38). In the opinion
of Kudiposaturaya too the young Madhva was an upstart rebel
with no reputation to lose.
Worse still would be the attitude of the great Pontiff of the
Sringeri Mutt, Vidyatirtha, who would be the last man to be
lured unwarily into a debate with an unknown rebel with no
locus standi . All that we know from M. Vij. is that the Advaita
Sanyasi raised a point of order and did not answer the criticism .
There was thus actually no va- da at all. Seshagiri Achar has
disarmingly tried to put in that it is natural for each party to
a debate to claim victory. But the point here is Madhva's opponent
merely raised a point of order on technical grounds that only
a Bhasyakara can criticise another. He himself declined to go
into details in defence of Sankara. Where then is the "Va- da"
when one of the parties refuses to go further and rebut the
other's criticism?
 -37- (5TH PROOF)
72 Appendix - The question of the Date of Madhvacarya
When even Kudiposaturaya declined to argue with M. so 1)
patronisingly, worse still would be the attitude of the real Vidyatirtha
of the Sringeri Mutt, not to get into trouble if the odds went
against him as they seem to have from the evidence let in by
M. Vij. V. 46 and comments on it in the Bhavaprakasika . Even
2)
when the famous Satyadhyana Tirtha of the Uttaradi Mutt issued
an open challenge to all the Advaita pithas , the Sringeri Mutt
only deputed its Pandits like Mm. Anantakrishna Shastri to take
3)
part in the famous Kumbakonam debate.
Now, let us look at it from the other side. Narayana Pandita
4)
must have heard all about the Kudiposaturaya episode from his
father. If this Kudiposaturaya was really Vidyatir tha of the Sringeri
Mutt why should he (Narayana Pandita) not have given us his
(Kudiposaturaya's) official name and designation but go on only 5)
referring to him as Apramsunutnopapada- dhivasaja throughout 6)
both in his M. Vij. and in the Bhavaprakasika? Why has he
not even once used his new official designation and name as
Vidyatir tha of the famous Sringeri Mutt if it was the fact and
the truth? Would it not have added greatly to the prestige of
the young rising M. if he had done so as common sense tells
7)
us? Why has Narayana Pandita kept mum on this most important
detail? What would Seshagiri Achar himself have done had he
been the author of M. Vij.? 8)
9)
10)
OTHER PUBLISHED BOOKS OF THE AUTHOR
Catus-Sutri Bhasya of Sri Madhvacharya with two unpub-
lished commentaries. English Introduction and Notes,
Foreword by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Law Journal Press,
Chennai, 1934 (Now O. P.)
Madhva's Teachings in His Own Words. E. T. and anno-
tations of 150 selections from the Sarvamula. Pub. Bharatiya
Vidya Bhavan, Mumbai, 4th Edn. 1998.
Philosophy of Sri Madhvacharya. Revised Second Edn.
Motilal Banrasidass, Delhi, 1999.
History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and Its Literature.
Revised Enlarged Second Reprint Edition, (single volume)
Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2000.
Lectures on Vedanta, Karnatak University, Dharwad, 1973.
Brahmasutras and their Principal Commentaries of the
three Major Schools of Vedanta of Sankara, Ramanuja
and Madhva. First Edn. in three Vols. by Bharatiya Vidya
Bhavan, Mumbai (1971-76) Reprint Edn. in three vols.
Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1986.
Satyam eva Jayate. A Hagiological work, Sri Vyasaraja
Mutt, Bangalore, 1984.
Kannada Tr. of my History of Dvaita School of Vedanta
and Its Literature. By Prof. Bharatiramanachar in two Vols.
D vaita Ve d a n t a S t u d i e s a n d R e s e a r c h Fo u n d a t i o n ,
Bangalore - 4, 1988, 1993.
Madhva's Aupanisadam Darsanam.
D vaita Ve d a n t a S t u d i e s a n d R e s e a r c h Fo u n d a t i o n ,
Bangalore.
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad As Expounded by Madhvacarya.
D vaita Ve d a n t a S t u d i e s a n d R e s e a r c h Fo u n d a t i o n ,
Bangalore - 1988.
 -38- (5TH PROOF)
74 Other published books of the Author

11) English Translation of Sri Madhva's Gita Bhasya with

Tex t . Ananda Tir tha Pratisthana, A . B. M . M . ,
Bangalore - 28, 1989.

12) Aroor Srinivasa Rao Endowment Lectures on Dvaita

Philosophy (1989-90 Madras University)

13) Visvapriya-Vilasa Prabandha of Cochi Rangappacharya,

Va d i r a j a- s. t. a k a e t c . E d i t i e d w i t h E n g l i s h S y n o p s i s,
Chennai, 1992.

14) Advaita Siddhi Vs Nyayamr ta - An uptodate Critical

Re-Appraisal. Ananda Tir tha Pratisthana, A. B. M. M.
Bangalore - 28, 1994.

15) Numerous miscellaneous works, Research Papers, Articles

and Introductions to various Publications of other Scholars
and Institutions.

16) Two outstanding Contributions of Dvaita Thought to Indian

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17) Nya-yasudha- of Jayatirtha Panca- dhikarani, English render-

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18) Maha Tatparya of Maha- va- kyas and other Advaita Srutis.
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19) Vijayindra Vijaya Kavya of Madhva Kavi.