former had actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court,
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. VS. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY, ET AL. G.R.
NO. L-21603. APRIL 15, 1968
FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from
Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a
writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for
writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash
the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of
jurisdiction.
CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of
Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act
placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for
demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier
decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over
"all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.
ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal. YES
RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion
to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party
may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or
by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier -
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser
to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a
party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only
if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should
have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same
was issued without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended
to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are
prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is
resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to
ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is
essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is
given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a
defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In
the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for
execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for
consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the
motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him
a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that
period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now,
therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
The orders appealed from are affirmed,
REPUBLIC V BATINGUE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Facts:
Respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with
the RTC an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land.
Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition. Thereafter, the RTC Clerk of Court
transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC because the
assessed value of the property was allegedly less than 100,000. The MTC
awarded the land to respondent. On appeal, the CA ruled that since the
but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal.
Petitioner Republic filed a petition for review under rule 45 with the SC.
Issues: 1. WON the Republic is estopped from questioning the courts
jurisdiction.
2. WON the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application
for original registration of land title.
Held: 1. NO. The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by
the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for
the first time on appeal.
TIJAM DOCTRINE IS NOT APPLICABLE. The facts are starkly different in
this case, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner
Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the
records were still with the RTC. At that point, petitioner could not have
questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the case
was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the MTC,
petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that
court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional question in
its Brief. Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is
inapplicable to the instant appeal.
LACHES has been defined as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it."
In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such unreasonable
failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned
or declined to assert its right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
2. YES. In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic
raised two points of contention: (a) the period for setting the date and hour of
the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered.
Sub-Issues:
WON lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application,
because the RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond the
90-day period provided under the Property Registration Decree. - NO
The Property Registration Decree provides:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five
days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of
the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than
ninety days from the date of the order. x x x.
In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July
1997. On 18 July 1997, or a day after the filing of the application, the RTC
immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22
October 1997, which was 96 days from the Order. While the date set by the
RTC was beyond the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did
not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court.
The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing within five days from the filing of the application for registration, as
provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the courts its
jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and
failure to issue the Order within that period did not deprive the RTC of
its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with the five-day
period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the subject matter
dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be contingent upon
the action or inaction of the court.
WON lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application,
because the value of the land does not fall under MTC - NO
Petitioner contended that since the selling price of the property based on the
Deed of Sale was 160,000,the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the case.
Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended,the
MTCs delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land registration cases is
limited to lands, the value of which should not exceed 100,000.
HELD:
Pursuant to the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the MTC has delegated
jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two
instances: first, where there is no controversy or opposition;
or, second, over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed
100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner
opposed respondent Corporations application for registration on 8 January
1998. However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance,
because the value of the lot in this case does not exceed 100,000.
WON the value of the land should be determined from its selling price
NO
Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of the land should not be
determined with reference to its selling price. Rather, Section 34 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the property sought to
be registered may be ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the
claimant; second, by agreement of the respective claimants, if there are
more than one; or, third, from the corresponding tax declaration of the real
property.
In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first
method, because the records are bereft of any affidavit executed by
respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise, valuation cannot be
done through the second method, because this method finds application only
where there are multiple claimants who agree on and make a joint
submission as to the value of the property. Here, only respondent Bantigue
Point Development Corporation claims the property.
The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference to the
corresponding Tax Declarations submitted by respondent Corporation
together with its application for registration. From the records, we find that
the assessed value of the property is 4,330, 1,920 and 8,670, or a total
assessed value of 14,920 for the entire property.Based on these Tax
Declarations, it is evident that the total value of the land in question does not
exceed 100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise its delegated
jurisdiction under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended.
ENERIO v HON. ALAMPAY
FACTS:
On May 27, 1914, petitioners as plaintiffs filed with respondent court of
first instance of Negros Occidental presided by respondent Judge
Nestor B. Alampay a complaint for the recovery of actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs of litigation totalling
close to P30,000.00 against private respondents Sonetran Co., Inc.,
Ernesto Kho and Max Villegas y Yanson as defendants as a result of
the physical injuries caused petitioner-minor, Russel Enerio, eight years of
age (herein represented by his parents, the co-petitioners) when bumped on
the road on January 15, 1974 by a passenger bus of respondents driven
allegedly "in a very reckless, negligent and imprudent manner" by
respondent Max Villegas.
Respondents filed in due course their answer with counterclaim for
P20,000.-moral damages and P2,000.-attorney's fees.
Pre-trial was held by respondent court on November 27, 1974 and on said
date, without its jurisdiction having been questioned or placed in issue by
respondents, it issued moto proprio an order dismissing the complaint on the
ground that "without the claims for moral and exemplary damages, this
case will not fall within the jurisdiction of the court of first instance,"
Petitioners filed petition for review on certiorari of the dismissal order.
ISSUE: WON CFI has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: YES
It is well settled and beyond question that the jurisdiction of a court over a
case, is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and since
petitioners' complaint asserted a total demand, exclusive of interest of
over P10,000.00 (and sought recovery of damages of close to
P30,000.00) the case clearly falls within the original jurisdiction of
respondent court of first instance as provided by section 44 of the
Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296 as amended.
The totality of the demand in suits for recovery of sums of money
between the same parties, i.e. the total or aggregate amount demanded
in the complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction and for
determining the jurisdictional amount in civil cases. Here, petitioners'
total claim of P978.00 for actual damages, P10,000.-moral damages,
P15,000.-exemplary damages and P3,000.-attorney's fees, etc., was clearly
in excess of P10,000.00 and therefore properly fell within the
jurisdiction of respondent court of first instance. Respondent court could
not arbitrarily isolate petitioners lesser claim for actual damages and without
hearing and proofs rule out petitioners other claims for moral and exemplary
damages as "bloated" and summarily dismiss motu proprio the case as not
falling within its jurisdiction contrary to the very allegations on the face of the
complaint.
Respondents contention in their comment that "since the award of said
amount (of moral and exemplary damages) is discretionary on its
(respondent court) part, it believed that plaintiffs cannot recover a total
amount in excess of P10,000.00, hence, there is basis for the court in
dismissing the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction" is manifestly
erroneous. If such were the case, respondent court should have narrowed
down the issue at the pre-trial to the question and amount of recoverable
damages, if any, and proceeded to receive the parties proofs thereon and
thereafter rendered judgment on the merits, even utterly refusing any award
of moral or exemplary damages to petitioners if this were its determination.
This simply means that it should have properly assumed and exercised its
jurisdiction and disposed of the case on the merits rather than erroneously
dismissed the complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction with all the attendant
delay caused thereby and the remand of the case back to it.
DOCTRINES:
1. COURTS; JURISDICTION; DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS OF
COMPLAINT. It is well settled and beyond question that the jurisdiction of
a court over a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Since petitioners complaint asserted a
total demand, exclusive of interest of over P10,000 (and sought recovery of
damages of close to P30,000) the case clearly falls within the original
jurisdiction of respondent court of first instance as provided by Section 44 of
the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296 as amended.
3. ACTIONS; RECOVERY OF SUMS OF MONEY; TOTALITY OF DEMAND
IS THE BASIS OF JURISDICTION. The totality of the demand in suits for
recovery of sums of money between the same parties, i.e. the total or
aggregate amount demanded in the complaint constitutes the basis of
jurisdiction and determines the jurisdictional amount in civil cases.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTUAL DAMAGES CANNOT BE ISOLATED FROM
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. Respondent court could not
arbitrarily isolate petitioners lesser claim for actual damages and without
hearing and proofs rule out their other claims for moral and exemplary
damages as "bloated" and summarily dismiss motu propio the case as not
falling within its jurisdiction.
CALIMLIM vs. HON. RAMIREZG.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982
Facts: Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to compel
Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order
that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the
said corporation. Not being the registered owner and the title not being in his
possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the Court
directing him to surrender the said title. This prompted Independent Mercantile Corporation to
file an ex-parte petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name.
The said petition was granted by the respondent Court and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan
issued a new title in the name of the corporation, TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon learning that her
husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court,
sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the court dismissed the
petition. Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No.
68568 but the same was dismissed therein. Petitioners then resorted to the
filing of a complaint in for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that
had been made with respect to the property, covered by TCT No. 9138, against
Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile
Corporation. Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the
property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated
on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners. Francisco Ramos
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the same is barred by prior
judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the
respondent Court dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment
Held: No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in
LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against
the filing of the subsequent civil case. In order to avail of the defense of res
judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the judgment in the prior
action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was
rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or
of the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the
controversy. This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res
judicata does not exist in the case. The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492
was an apparent invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land
registration court. Reliance was apparently placed on Section 112 of the
Land Registration Act wherein it provides that a Court of First Instance,
acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special
jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of
issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving
ownership or title to real property.
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT VS COURT OF APPEALS
149 SCRA 562 Remedial Law Civil Procedure Payment of Docket Fees
Claimed Damages must be Stated in the BODY and PRAYER of
pleadings
FACTS:
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development
Corporation against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter
to execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that
City Land forfeited the formers tender of payment for a certain transaction
thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This
amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated
in the PRAYER of same complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00
only. Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of Manchester that their
action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees
hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied
but what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M. Said
amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint should be admitted.
HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original
complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since the
proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, its as if there is no
complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly
filed which can be amended. So, any subsequent proceeding taken in
consideration of the amended complaint is void.
Manchesters defense that this case is primarily an action for specific
performance is not merited. The Supreme Court ruled that based on the
allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for
damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary
estimation.
Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already
provided in the body of the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly
constitutes an attempt to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To stop
the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court
ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages
shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD. (SIOL), E. B. PHILLIPS AND D. J.
WARBY vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, and
MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG; G.R. NO. 79937-38, FEB. 13, 1989
TOPIC: EFFECT OF NON-FILING OF FEE
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD. (SIOL), E. B. PHILLIPS AND D. J.
WARBY vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, and
MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG; G.R. NO. 79937-38, FEB. 13, 1989
NATURE OF THE CASE: The petition was prompted by the CAs allegedly
incorrect assessment of the damages sought by respondent Tiong in his
complaint, which was to be the basis of the docket fee to be paid. The SC is
then asked to resolve again the issue of whether or not a court acquires
jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been
paid.
FACTS: Sun Insurance filed a complaint for the consignation of a premium
refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of
its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong with the RTC of
Makati. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the
required answer within the reglementary period. Later, Tiong also filed a
case against Sun Insurance for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment, seeking the payment of actual, compensatory,
moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorneys fees, expenses of
litigation, and costs of suit with the RTC of Quezon City. However, the
amount of damages sought by Tiong was not specified, though it can be
inferred from the body of the complaint that it's around P50 million. Tiong
only paid P210 as docket fee for his complaint which prompted Sun
Insurance to raise an objection, which was disregarded by the then presiding
judge of the case Judge Jose Castro.
Upon the order of the SC, the records of the complaint filed by
Tiong along with 22 other cases assigned to the branches of the RTC of
Quezon City were under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees.
Later, the SC returned the records to the RTC and were re-raffled to the
other judges of the said court with the exclusion of Judge Castro. The SC
also ordered the judges, through a Resolution, to reassess the docket fees of
the re-raffled cases and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The
clerks of court were also required to issue certificates of re-assessment of
docket fees. However, the clerk of court who was assigned to reassess the
docket fee of the complaint filed by Tiong had a difficulty complying with the
Resolution because the exact amount sought to be recovered was not
indicated in the complaint. Thus, the now presiding Judge Maximiano
Asuncion required the parties to comment on the clerk of court's report.
Tiong filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" and
indicated P10 million as actual compensatory damages in his prayer. But, in
the second amended complaint Tiong filed, he alleged P44, 601, 623.70 as
actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees. Judge Asuncion
admitted the second amended complaint and the clerk of court reassessed
the docket fee to be P39, 786, which was subsequently paid by Tiong. Sun
Insurance questioned the order of Judge Asuncion admitting the second
amended complaint with the CA. However, while the case filed by Sun
Insurance was still pending in the CA, Tiong filed another supplemental
complaint claiming an additional P20 million as damages, making his total
claim for damages to be P64, 601, 623.70. Seven months after filing said
supplemental complaint, Tiong paid the additional docket fee of P80, 396.
Subsequently, the CA ruled on the petition filed by Sun Insurance.
The CA ordered the RTC to reassess the docket fee to be paid by Tiong on
the basis of the amount of P25, 401, 707. The case was then elevated to the
SC. But during the pendency of this petition in the SC and after the
promulgation of the decision in Manchester, Tiong complied with the CA's
decision and paid an additional docket fee of P62, 132.92 based on the
amount stipulated by the CA. Thus, Tiong paid a total of P182, 824. 90 as
docket fee.
Sun Insurance (Pet): The docket fee paid by Tiong is not sufficient. Tiong
should pay a total of P257, 810.49 because the total damages Tiong actually
sought was P64, 601, 620.70. Pursuant to the ruling in Manchester, Tiong's
complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be
annulled for Tiong's failure to pay the proper docket fee.
Tiong (Res): The ruling in Manchester cannot be applied retroactively. At the
time the complaint was instituted, the Manchester ruling was not yet made.
The correct jurisprudence to apply in the case, then, is the Magaspi v.
Ramolete doctrine wherein the SC held that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.
ISSUES: 1) WON the Manchester ruling can be applied retroactively.
(MAIN ISSUE) 2) WON Tiong could be considered to have filed the case
even if the docket fee paid was insufficient and that the trial court could be
considered to have acquired jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: 1) Yes, The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to
this case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that
extent.
2) Yes, although there was an obvious intent on the part of TIong to defraud
the government of the docket fee due through his amendments in his
complaints, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering
that, unlike in the Manchester case, Tiong demonstrated his willingness to
abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
Thus, even if the Manchester ruling was applied, the SC, through
this case provided the following guidelines regarding docket fees:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where
the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of
said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
This petition was then dismissed. The Clerk of Court was also
instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee to be paid by
Tiong considering the total amount of the claim sought in his original
complaint and supplemental complaint; and to require Tiong to pay the
deficiency.
G.R. Nos. 88075-77 December 20, 1989
MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL vs,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Davao del Norte, Branches 1 and
2, Presidedby Hon. Marcial Fernandez and Hon. Jesus Matas,
respectively, PATSITA GAMUTAN,Clerk of Court, and GODOFREDO
PINEDA,
FACTS: These were two separate cases originally filed by Godofredo
Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession (accion publiciana )
against three defendants, namely Antonio Noel, Ponciano Panes, and
Maximo Tacay. Pineda was the owner of 790sq. meter land evidence by TCT
No. T-56560. The previous owner of such land allowed the three defendants
to use or occupy the same by mere tolerance. Pineda having himself the
need to use the property, demanded the defendants to vacate the premises
and pay reasonable rental therefore, but such demands were refused. The
complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant
alleging that it did not specify the amounts of actual, nominal and exemplary
damages, nor the assessed value of the property, that being a ground to bar
the determination of the RTCs jurisdiction in deciding the case. The Motions
to Dismiss were denied and the claims for damages in the complaint were
expunged for failure to specify the amounts. Thus, the defendantsfiled a Joint
Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, as well as a temporary
restraining order against the RTC.
ISSUE: WON THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES CLAIMED AND THE
ASSESSED VALUE OFTHE PROPERTY ARE RELEVANT IN THE
DETERMINATION OF THE COURTS JURISDICTION IN A CASE FOR
RECOVERY OF POSSESSION OF PROPERTY.
HELD: Yes. Where the action involves real property and a related claim for
damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a)
the value of the property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory
pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees
are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full
payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant,
unless, of course, prescription has set in the meantime. But where-as in the
case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action involving real property have
been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual, moral
and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be
dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the
real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading
and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by
the circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the
accompanying claims for damages because of lack of specification thereof.
What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to
which no amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or
allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so
as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and accept
payment of the requisite fees therefore within the relevant prescriptive
period.
[G.R. No. 149227. December 11, 2003]
LA SALETTE COLLEGE, Represented by Its President, FR. ROMEO
GONZALES, MS; and JESUS T. BAYAUA, Dean of Student
Services, petitioners, vs. VICTOR C. PILOTIN, respondent.
An appeal is not perfected by the mere filing of a Notice of Appeal that has
been served on the adverse party. The docket fees must likewise be paid
within the reglementary period.Petitioners have failed to show why they merit
an exception to these stringent rules.
FACTS: [Respondent] is a bonafide student of [petitioner] College dating
back [to] the school year 1988-1989 taking up the degree of Bachelor of
Science in Commerce. In the enrollment period for the second semester held
on October 22 to November 5, 1993, [respondent] was denied re-enrollment,
despite repeated pleas by x x x himself and by other interested parties and
his lawyer.
On November 16, 1993, he filed his complaint and asked for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to compel [petitioner college to] re-
admit him. On December 28, 1993, an Order was issued directing [petitioner
college] to admit [respondent] for the second semester but still [petitioner
college] refused to re-admit [respondent], despite implementation of said
order and the pleas of [respondent] thru his counsel so that he could catch
up with the bulk of the school days of the semester and could graduate.
Because of the adamant refusal of [respondent] school in re-admitting him
and his defiance to the order and because the period of the second semester
[was] already about to close, [respondent] amended his complaint and
concentrate[d] on damages, hence, this case.
On the other hand, the [petitioner college] alleged that it opened its
enrollment period for the second semester of school year 1993-1994 on 11
October 1993 up to 22 October, 1993 to 05 November, 1993. However,
classes for the second semester of that school year commenced on 25
October, 1993. During these periods for enrolment, [respondent] never
enrolled with the x x x College and neither did he accomplish the basic
requirements for enrolment. However, on 05 November, 1993, the
x x x College was in receipt of a letter from Atty. Quirino L. Pilotin dated on
that same date requesting for a reconsideration of an alleged decision
denying enrolment to the [respondent]. Upon receipt of the said letter, it was
endorsed to [Respondent] Bayaua who in turn wrote Atty. Pilotin explaining
among others that was not denied enrolment but rather [the] latter did not
enroll with the said College. Considering, however, that the x x x College
started its regular classes on 25 October, 1993, in the event [respondent]
was able to enroll on 6 November, 1993, he would have then exceeded the
required absences for his supposed enrolled subjects.
Since plaintiff failed to enrol on the last day for enrolment, there is no reason
why the x x x College should relax its rules to accommodate
[respondent]. The x x x College merely imposed its disciplining authority
when it sets dates for the period to enrol and the matter of admission of
students is within the ambit of academic freedom and beyond the province of
the Courts to decide.[6]
Trial Court - rendered judgment in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed a
Notice of Appeal, which the RTC approved. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration thereof on the ground of petitioners failure to pay the docket
fees within the reglementary period. The trial court, however, denied the
Motion in its April 23, 1999 Order.
CA - Dismissed the appeal of petitioners for their failure to pay the required
docketing fee within the period for filing an appeal. But, upon their motion,
the CA granted reconsideration of their appeal, which it reinstated in the
interest of substantial justice and considering that [petitioners] already paid
the docket fees.
In the challenged November 16, 2000 Resolution, dismissed the appeal filed
by petitioners, because the docket fees were only paid after one (1) year and
eleven (11) months from the filing of the notice of appeal.[11] It deemed it
imperative to reverse the March 14, 2000 Resolution to conform with the law
and long settled jurisprudence[12] on the matter. Thus, in the June 22,
2001 Resolution, it denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the payment of the Appellate Court Docket Fees
were made timely.
The payment of docket fees is not a trivial matter. These fees are necessary
to defray court expenses in the handling of cases.[15] For this reason, and to
secure a just and speedy disposition of every action and proceeding, [16] the
Rules on Civil Procedure[17] mandates the payment of docket and other
lawful fees within the prescribed period. Otherwise, the jurisdiction of the
proper court to handle a case is adversely affected.[18]
Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a decision rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the following requirements
must be complied with. First, within 15 days, a notice of appeal must be filed
with the court that rendered the judgment or final order sought to be
appealed; second, such notice must be served on the adverse party;
and third, within the same 15-day period, the full amount of appellate court
docket and other legal fees must be paid to the clerk of the court that
rendered the judgment or final order.
It should be noted that full payment of the appellate docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory,[19] even jurisdictional,[20] for the perfection of
the appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court would not be able to act on the
subject matter of the action,[21] and the decision or final order sought to be
appealed from would become final and executory.[22]
In the present case, petitioners insist that they seasonably paid the docket
fees. After resolving thrice the timeliness of the payment of the docket fees,
the CA finally found that these had been paid one (1) year and 11 days from
the filing of their notice of appeal.
To recapitulate, on November 26, 1998, petitioners received the November
17, 1998 RTC Decision. Consequently, they had 15 days to file their Notice
of Appeal. They did so on November 26, 1998, but failed to pay the docket
fees. A review of the records shows that they paid these only on July 8,
1999,[23] or after almost seven (7) months from the mandated last day for
payment, which was December 11, 1998. Clearly, the November 17,
1998 RTC Decision, which petitioners sought to appeal, had long become
final and executory.
Relaxation of the Rule on Nonpayment of Docket Fees
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of
appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified
by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period
allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power
should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound
discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as
with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant
circumstances.
In the present case, petitioners have not shown any satisfactory reason to
warrant the relaxation of the Rules. In fact, the manner in which they
presented their case before us leaves too much to be desired. Indeed, we
are almost tempted to say that they tried to mislead -- nay, deceive -- this
Court as well as the appellate court.
The present case calls for the adjudication of whether petitioners paid the
docket fees on time. Hence, it is essential that they specify the exact dates
when they filed their notice of appeal and paid the corresponding docket
fees. But nowhere in their pleadings did they do so. All they said was that the
appeal had been seasonably filed.
In accordance with the requisites for the perfection of an appeal as
enumerated earlier, petitioners should have (1) filed a notice of appeal with
the RTC of Santiago, Isabela, within 15 days from the issuance of the trial
court Decision being appealed; (2) paid the docket fees within the same
period; and (3) served the notice to the adverse party.

True, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal within the prescribed period, but
they paid the docket fees only seven (7) months thereafter. They adamantly
insisted on page 6 of their Petition[28] that the appeal was seasonably filed,
but later said that the the appeal fee was paid immediately after 23 April
1999 when the court a quo denied the respondents motion for
reconsideration and approved the appeal. x x x. With the foregoing therefore,
the notice of appeal was seasonably filed with the payment of docket fees on
time.[29]
They admitted, though, that because of the excusable negligence or mistake
of their counsel, the official receipts for the Notice of Appeal had not been
attached. They reasoned that they had failed to transmit the proof of
payment of the docket fees to the CA, because such provision of civil
procedure was relatively new x x x at that time.[30] At any event, respondent
denies being served such notice.[31]
Assuming arguendo that the period of appeal was interrupted by
respondents motion for reconsideration of the RTCs approval of petitioners
notice of appeal, the required docket fees for the latter were still not paid on
time. From November 23, 1998, when petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal,
until April 23, 1999, when the trial court approved it with finality, they made
no effort to pay those fees. It took them more than two (2) months to
immediately pay the docket fees after being informed of the April 23, 1999
Order denying respondents motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order
approving petitioners Notice of Appeal. This lapse of time hardly reflected
sincere willingness to abide by the Rules, especially when respondent had
raised the very issue of nonpayment of docket fees as early as December
28, 1998.
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO, SR., represented by Ruben
Reinoso Jr., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PONCIANO TAPALES, JOSE
GUBALLA, and FILWRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE
CORPORATION,* *
FACTS: The complaint for damages arose from the collision of a
passenger jeepney and a truck at around 7:00 oclock in the evening of June
14, 1979 along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. As a result, a passenger
of the jeepney, Ruben Reinoso, Sr. (Reinoso), was killed. The
passenger jeepney was owned by Ponciano Tapales (Tapales) and driven by
Alejandro Santos (Santos), while the truck was owned by Jose
Guballa (Guballa) and driven by Mariano Geronimo (Geronimo).
On November 7, 1979, the heirs of Reinoso (petitioners) filed a complaint for
damages against Tapales and Guballa. In turn, Guballa filed a third party
complaint against Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation (FGAC) under
Policy Number OV-09527.
On March 22, 1988, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners
and against Guballa. The decision in part, reads:
In favor of herein plaintiffs and against defendant Jose Guballa:
1. For the death of Ruben Reinoso, Sr. 30,000.00
2. Loss of earnings (monthly income at the time of death 120,000.00
(2,000.00 Court used 1,000.00 only per month (or
12,000.00 only per year) & victim then being 55 at death
had ten (10) years life expectancy
3. Mortuary, Medical & funeral expenses and all incidental 15,000.00
expenses in the wake in serving those who condoled..
4. Moral damages .. 50,000.00
5. Exemplary damages 25,000.00
6. Litigation expenses . 15,000.00
7. Attorneys fees 25,000.00
Or a total of 250,000.00
For damages to property:
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales and against defendant Jose Guballa:
1. Actual damages for repair is already awarded to
defendant-cross-claimant Ponciano Tapales by Br. 9, RTC-
Malolos, Bulacan (Vide: Exh. 1-G-Tapales); hence, cannot
recover twice.
2. Compensatory damages (earnings at 150.00 per day) 9,000.00
and for two (2) months jeepney stayed at the repair shop.
3. Moral damages ... 10,000.00
4. Exemplary damages . 10,000.00
5. Attorneys fees 15,000.00
or a total of 44,000.00
Under the 3rd party complaint against 3rd party defendant Filwriters Guaranty
Assurance Corporation, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of said
3rd party plaintiff by way of 3rd party liability under policy No. OV-09527 in the
amount of 50,000.00 undertaking plus 10,000.00 as and for attorneys
fees.
For all the foregoing, it is the well considered view of the Court that plaintiffs,
defendant Ponciano Tapales and 3rd Party plaintiff Jose Guballa established
their claims as specified above, respectively. Totality of evidence
preponderance in their favor.
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
In favor of plaintiffs for the death of Ruben Reinoso, Sr.250,000.00;
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales due to damage of his passenger
jeepney.44,000.00;
In favor of defendant Jose Guballa under Policy No. OV-
09527....60,000.00;
All the specified accounts with 6% legal rate of interest per annum from date
of complaint until fully paid (Reformina vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260; and finally;
Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
CA - set aside and reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint
on the ground of non-payment of docket fees pursuant to the doctrine laid
down in Manchester v. CA.[4] In addition, the CA ruled that since prescription
had set in, petitioners could no longer pay the required docket fees.[5]
- Upon a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision but it was
denied in a resolution dated June 30, 1994.[6] Hence, this appeal,
anchored on the following
ISSUES:
RULING:
The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory.[8] In Manchester v. Court of Appeals,[9] it was
held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment
of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule was, however,
relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion,[10] wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on
the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide by the
rules by paying the additional docket fees required.[11]
Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas Bank v.
Ros,[12] the Court explained that where the party does not deliberately intend
to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness
to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the
court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not
the strict regulations set in Manchester, will apply. It has been on record that
the Court, in several instances, allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-
payment of docket fees in order to afford the parties the opportunity to fully
ventilate their cases on the merits. In the case of La Salette College v.
Pilotin,[13] the Court stated: Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the
requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its
strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees
within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic,
dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction
with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice
and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration
of all attendant circumstances.[14]
While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there
is, on the other, a greater demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and
equitably,[15] for it is far better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a
primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in injustice.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before the RTC
and said trial court had already rendered a decision. While it was at that
level, the matter of non-payment of docket fees was never an issue. It was
only the CA which motu propio dismissed the case for said reason.
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict application of
the rules so that the petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute
their claim on the merits at the appellate level rather than fail to secure
justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties,
bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice.[16]
The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before
the Manchester ruling came out. Even if said ruling could be applied
retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in view of the
recency then of the ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to the
cases of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals[17] and Spouses
Jimmy and Patri Chan v. RTC of Zamboanga.[18] In the case of Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Mangubat (Mactan),[19] it was stated that
the intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants full opportunity to comply with
the new rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in view of
the recency of the changes introduced by the new rules. In Mactan, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also failed to pay the correct docket
fees on time.
We held in another case:
x x x It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived
and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of
justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the
balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and
not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would
tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the
power of the Court to suspend the Rules, or except a particular case
from its operation.[20]
The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference between the actual
fees paid and the correct payable docket fees to be assessed by the clerk of
court which shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2 of
Rule 141 which provides:
SEC. 2. Fees in lien. Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim
not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the
pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall
constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court
shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.
As the Court has taken the position that it would be grossly unjust if
petitioners claim would be dismissed on a strict application of
the Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action, under ordinary
circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the case to the CA.
Considering, however, that the case at bench has been pending for more
than 30 years and the records thereof are already before this Court,
a remand of the case to the CA would only unnecessarily prolong its
resolution. In the higher interest of substantial justice and to spare the parties
from further delay, the Court will resolve the case on the merits.
The facts are beyond dispute. Reinoso, the jeepney passenger, died as a
result of the collision of a jeepney and a truck on June 14, 1979 at
around 7:00 oclock in the evening along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City.
It was established that the primary cause of the injury or damage was the
negligence of the truck driver who was driving it at a very fast pace. Based
on the sketch and spot report of the police authorities and the narration of
the jeepney driver and his passengers, the collision was brought about
because the truck driver suddenly swerved to, and encroached on, the left
side portion of the road in an attempt to avoid a wooden barricade, hitting the
passenger jeepney as a consequence. The analysis of the RTC appears in
its decision as follows:
Perusal and careful analysis of evidence adduced as well as proper
consideration of all the circumstances and factors bearing on the issue as to
who is responsible for the instant vehicular mishap convince and persuade
this Court that preponderance of proof is in favor of plaintiffs and defendant
Ponciano Tapales. The greater mass of evidence spread on the records and
its influence support plaintiffs plaint including that of defendant Tapales.
The Land Transportation and Traffic Rule (R.A. No. 4136), reads as follows:
Sec. 37. Driving on right side of highway. Unless a different course of action
is required in the interest of the safety and the security of life, person or
property, or because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance
therewith, every person operating a motor vehicle or an animal drawn vehicle
on highway shall pass to the right when meeting persons or vehicles coming
toward him, and to the left when overtaking persons or vehicles going the
same direction, and when turning to the left in going from one highway to
another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the center of the
intersection of the highway.
Having in mind the foregoing provision of law, this Court is convinced of the
veracity of the version of the passenger jeepney driver Alejandro Santos,
(plaintiffs and Tapales witness) that while running on lane No. 4 westward
bound towards Ortigas Avenue at between 30-40 kms. per hour (63-64 tsn,
Jan. 6, 1984) the sand & gravel truck from the opposite direction driven by
Mariano Geronimo, the headlights of which the former had seen while still at
a distance of about 30-40 meters from the wooden barricade astride lanes 1
and 2, upon reaching said wooden block suddenly swerved to the left into
lanes 3 and 4 at high speed napakabilis po ng dating ng truck. (29 tsn, Sept.
26, 1985) in the process hitting them (Jeepney passenger) at the left side up
to where the reserve tire was in an oblique manner pahilis (57 tsn, Sept. 26,
1985). The jeepney after it was bumped by the truck due to the strong impact
was thrown resting on its right side while the left side was on top of the
Bangketa (side walk). The passengers of the jeepney and its driver were
injured including two passengers who died. The left side of the jeepney
suffered considerable damage as seen in the picture (Exhs. 4 & 5-Tapales,
pages 331-332, records) taken while at the repair shop.
The Court is convinced of the narration of Santos to the effect that the gravel
& sand truck was running in high speed on the good portion of E. Rodriguez
Avenue (lane 1 & 2) before the wooden barricade and (having in mind that it
had just delivered its load at the Corinthian Gardens) so that when suddenly
confronted with the wooden obstaclebefore it had to avoid the same in a
manner of a reflex reaction or knee-jerk response by forthwith swerving to his
left into the right lanes (lanes 3 & 4). At the time of the bumping, the jeepney
was running on its right lane No. 4 and even during the moments before said
bumping, moving at moderate speed thereon since lane No. 3 was then
somewhat rough because being repaired also according to Mondalia who
has no reason to prevaricate being herself one of those seriously injured.
The narration of Santos and Mondalia are convincing and consistent in
depicting the true facts of the case untainted by vacillation and therefore,
worthy to be relied upon. Their story is forfeited and confirmed by the sketch
drawn by the investigating officer Pfc. F. Amaba, Traffic Division, NPD,
Quezon City who rushed to the scene of the mishap (Vide: Resolution of
Asst fiscal Elizabeth B. Reyes marked as Exhs. 7, 7-A, 7-B-Tapales, pp. 166-
168, records; the Certified Copy found on pages 598-600, ibid, with the
attached police sketch of Pfc. Amaba, marked as Exh. 8-Tapales on page
169, ibid; certified copy of which is on page 594, ibid) indicating the fact that
the bumping indeed occurred at lane No. 4 and showing how the gavel &
sand truck is positioned in relation to the jeepney. The said police sketch
having been made right after the accident is a piece of evidence worthy to be
relied upon showing the true facts of the bumping-occurrence. The rule that
official duty had been performed (Sec.5(m), R-131, and also Sec. 38, R-a30,
Rev. Rules of Court) there being no evidence adduced and made of record
to the contrary is that said circumstance involving the two vehicles had been
the result of an official investigation and must be taken as true by this
Court.[21]
While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in
automobile collisions,[22] the position of the two vehicles, as depicted in the
sketch of the police officers, clearly shows that it was the truck that hit
the jeepney. The evidentiary records disclosed that the truck was speeding
along E. Rodriguez, heading towards Santolan Street, while the
passenger jeepney was coming from the opposite direction. When the truck
reached a certain point near the Meralco Post No. J9-450, the front portion of
the truck hit the left middle side portion of the passenger jeepney, causing
damage to both vehicles and injuries to the driver and passengers of
the jeepney. The truck driver should have been more careful, because, at
that time, a portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue was under repair and a wooden
barricade was placed in the middle thereof.
The Court likewise sustains the finding of the RTC that the truck owner,
Guballa, failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the hiring and
supervision of his employee. Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
xxxx
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for
ones own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another,
there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection or supervision of his
employee.[23] Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualification, experience and service
record. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and
impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be
shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence.[24] Thus, the RTC
committed no error in finding that the evidence presented by respondent
Guballa was wanting. It ruled:
x x x. As expected, defendant Jose Guballa, attempted to overthrow this
presumption of negligence by showing that he had exercised the due
diligence required of him by seeing to it that the driver must check the vital
parts of the vehicle he is assigned to before he leaves the compound like the
oil, water, brakes, gasoline, horn (9 tsn, July 17, 1986); and that Geronimo
had been driving for him sometime in 1976 until the collision in litigation
came about (5-6 tsn, ibid); that whenever his trucks gets out of the
compound to make deliveries, it is always accompanied with two (2) helpers
(16-17 tsn, ibid). This was all which he considered as selection and
supervision in compliance with the law to free himself from any responsibility.
This Court then cannot consider the foregoing as equivalent to an exercise of
all the care of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
driver Mariano Geronimo.[25]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 20, 1994 Decision and
June 30, 1994 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the March 22, 1988 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
8, Manila, is REINSTATED.
DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES, INC. V. SECURITY BANK
CORPORATION
Doctrine: Non-payment of additional filing fees due on additional claims do
not divest the Court of the jurisdiction italready had over the case. However,
after-judgment lien for said unpaid filing fees only applies to cases (1)where
the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or (2) where the court has
discretion to fix the amountof the award. None of these are present in this
case and award was in fact already specified. Also, ONLY the Supreme
Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts.
Parties or even the trial court cannot waive payment of fees.
Facts: Spouses Lim took a loan from Security Bank. Unable to pay on
time, the Lims assigned to the Bank their real properties including a building
and lot. The Bank then offered to lease said property to the Lims through Do-
All Metals Industries, Inc. (DMI) primarily for business and partly as Lim's
residence. A 2-yearlease contract was executed on the condition that the
Bank has the right to pre-terminate the lease and should the Bank decide to
sell the property, DMI shall have the right of first refusal. Months before the
lease was up, the Bank notified DMI that it was pre-terminating it. While
negotiations were ongoing, the Lims claim that they continued to use the
property but the Bank posted security guards at the said place and the
guards, on instructions of the Bank, padlocked the entrances and barred the
Lims and DMIs employees from entering, even pointing gun at one
employee. Because of this, DMI was unable to close several projects with
potential clients and Lims were unable to retrieve personal items left at the
property.
DMI and Lims (DMI) then filed a complaint with RTC Pasig for
damages with prayer for the issuance of a TRO or preliminary
injunction against the Bank. RTC directed the Bank to allow DMI to enter
the building and get their machineries, equipment and personal things but
DMI was unable to find their properties.
In a supplemental complaint, DMI alleged that the Bank surreptitiously
took such properties, resulting in additional actual damages of over
P27M. RTC ruled in favor of DMI, ordering the Bank to pay the P27M actual
damages, + moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. The
Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among
other things the RTCs authority to grant damages considering DMIs
failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint. The RTC
denied the motion. On appeal, CA ruled in favor of the Bank and denied the
subsequent MR, hence this petition.
Issues:1. W/N the RTC acquired JURISDICTION on the supplemental
complaint against the Bank considering DMI and Lims' failure to pay
the filing fees on the amounts of damages they claim in it; YES.
2. Whether or not the Bank is liable for the intimidation and harassment
committed against DMI. YES.
3. W/N the Bank is LIABLE to DMI for the machineries, equipment, and
other properties they allegedly lost after they were barred from the
property. NO.
Held: (1) YES. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over their action from
the moment they filed the original complaint accompanied by the
payment of the filing fees due on the same. Their non-payment of the
additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not divest the
RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.
(2) YES. The Bank belittles the testimonies of the DMIs witnesses for having
been presented ex parte but the ex parte hearing, having been properly
authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible. It was the Banks fault that it
was unable to attend the hearing. It cannot profit from its lack of diligence.
Employees of DMItestified regarding the Bank guards unmitigated use of
their superior strength and firepower and such were never refuted. Police
testified finding Lim locked in the building and being told by a Bank
representative that they had instructions to prevent anyone from taking any
property out of the premises. While the lease may have already lapsed, the
Bank had no business harassing and intimidating the Lims and DMI
employees.
G.R. No. 125138. March 2, 1999
NICHOLAS Y. CERVANTES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
THE PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., respondent.
FACTS: On March 27, 1989, the private respondent, PAL, issued to
petitioner a round trip plane ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los Angeles-
Honolulu-Manila, which expressly provided an expiry of date of one year
from issuance, i.e., until March 27, 1990. The issuance of the said plane
ticket was in compliance with a Compromise Agreement entered into
between the contending parties in two previous suits, docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 3392 and 3451 before the Regional Trial Court in Surigao City.
Four days before the expiry date of subject ticket, the petitioner
used it. Upon his arrival in Los Angeles on the same day, he immediately
booked his Los Angeles-Manila return ticket with the PAL office, and it was
confirmed for the April 2, 1990 flight.
Upon learning that the same PAL plane would make a stop-over in San
Francisco, and considering that he would be there on April 2, 1990, petitioner
made arrangements with PAL for him to board the flight in San Francisco
instead of boarding in Los Angeles.
On April 2, 1990, when the petitioner checked in at the PAL counter in San
Francisco, he was not allowed to board. The PAL personnel concerned
marked the following notation on his ticket: TICKET NOT ACCEPTED DUE
EXPIRATION OF VALIDITY.
RTC - Petitioner Cervantes the filed a Complaint for Damages, for breach of
contract of carriage. But was dismissed for lack of merit.
CA Upheld the dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the defense of lack of authority was correctly
ruled upon;
2. Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was
proper.
RULING:
1. The admission by Cervantes that he was told by PALs legal counsel
that he had to submit a letter requesting for an extension of the validity
of subject tickets was tantamount to knowledge on his part that the PAL
employees had no authority to extend the validity of subject tickets and
only PALs legal counsel was authorized to do so.
However, notwithstanding PALs failure to raise the defense of lack of
authority of the said PAL agents in its answer or in a motion to dismiss,
the omission was cured since the said issue was litigated upon, as
shown by the testimony of the petitioner in the course of trial. Rule 10,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform or authorize presentation of
evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with express
or implied consent of the parties, as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause
them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. xxx
Thus, when evidence is presented by one party, with the express or implied
consent of the adverse party, as to issues not alleged in the pleadings,
judgment may be rendered validly as regards the said issue, which shall be
treated as if they have been raised in the pleadings. There is implied consent
to the evidence thus presented when the adverse party fails to object
thereto.[13]
2. An award of damages is improper because petitioner failed to show
that PAL acted in bad faith in refusing to allow him to board its plane in
San Francisco.
In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach
must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted
fraudulently or with malice or bad faith.[14] Petitioner knew there was a strong
possibility that he could not use the subject ticket, so much so that he bought
a back-up ticket to ensure his departure. Should there be a finding of bad
faith, we are of the opinion that it should be on the petitioner. What the
employees of PAL did was one of simple negligence. No injury resulted on
the part of petitioner because he had a back-up ticket should PAL refuse to
accommodate him with the use of subject ticket.
Neither can the claim for exemplary damages be upheld. Such kind of
damages is imposed by way of example or correction for the public good,
and the existence of bad faith is established. The wrongful act must be
accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only
if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent
manner.[15] Here, there is no showing that PAL acted in such a manner. An
award for attorneys fees is also improper.
Allan C. Go, doing business under the name and style of ACG Express
Liner vs. Mortimer F. Cordero/Mortimer F. Cordero vs. Allan C. Go, doing
business under the name and style of ACG Express Liner, et al.,G.R. No.
164703/G.R. No. 164747, May 4, 2010
Appeal; findings of fact of lower courts conclusive upon Supreme
Court. The existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a
rule, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court,
are conclusive on this Court. We see no compelling reason to reverse the
findings of the RTC and the CA that respondents acted in bad faith and in
utter disregard of the rights of Cordero under the exclusive distributorship
agreement.
Jurisdiction; submission to jurisdiction by voluntary appearance and
request for affirmative relief. We find no error committed by the trial court
in overruling Robinsons objection over the improper resort to summons by
publication upon a foreign national like him and in an action in personam,
notwithstanding that he raised it in a special appearance specifically raising
the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. Courts acquire jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the
defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons
upon them in the manner required by law or through their voluntary
appearance in court and their submission to its authority. A party who makes
a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based
on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, however,
although the Motion to Dismiss filed by Robinson specifically stated as one
(1) of the grounds the lack of personal jurisdiction, it must be noted that he
had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate responsive pleading
even beyond the time provided in the summons by publication. Such motion
did not state that it was a conditionalappearance entered to question the
regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the
jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by publication issued
by the court and praying for additional time to file a responsive pleading.
Consequently, Robinson having acknowledged the summons by publication
and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to
secure affirmative relief in his motion for additional time, he effectively
submitted voluntarily to the trial courts jurisdiction. He is now estopped from
asserting otherwise, even before this Court.

Parties; real party-in-interest. First, on the issue of whether the case had
been filed by the real party-in-interest as required by Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, which defines such party as the one (1) to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. The purposes of this provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of
actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require
that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action;
3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage litigation and keep it
within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy. A case is dismissible
for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-
in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.

On this issue, we agree with the CA in ruling that it was Cordero and not
Pamana who is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines as shown
by the Certification dated June 1, 1997 issued by Tony Robinson. Petitioner
Go mentions the following documents also signed by respondent Robinson
which state that Pamana Marketing Corporation represented by Mr.
Mortimer F. Cordero wasactually the exclusive distributor: (1) letter dated 1
June 1997; (2)certification dated 5 August 1997; and (3) letter dated 5
August 1997 addressed to petitioner Cordero concerning commissions to be
paid to Pamana Marketing Corporation. Such apparent inconsistency in
naming AFFAs exclusive distributor in the Philippines is of no moment. For
all intents and purposes, Robinson and AFFA dealt only with Cordero who
alone made decisions in the performance of the exclusive distributorship, as
with other clients to whom he had similarly offered AFFAs fast ferry vessels.
Moreover, the stipulatedcommissions from each progress payments made by
Go were directly paid by Robinson to Cordero. Respondents Landicho and
Tecson were only too aware of Corderos authority as the person who was
appointed and acted as exclusive distributor of AFFA, which can be gleaned
from their act of immediately furnishing him with copies of bank transmittals
everytime Go remits payment to Robinson, who in turn transfers a portion of
funds received to the bank account of Cordero in the Philippines as his
commission. Out of these partial payments of his commission, Cordero
would still give Landicho and Tecson their respective commission, or cuts
from his own commission. Respondents Landicho and Tecson failed to refute
the evidence submitted by Cordero consisting of receipts signed by them.
Said amounts were apart from the earlier expenses shouldered by Cordero
for Landichos airline tickets, transportation, food and hotel accommodations
for the trip to Australia. Allan C. Go, doing business under the name and
style of ACG Express Liner vs. Mortimer F. Cordero/Mortimer F.
Cordero vs. Allan C. Go, doing business under the name and style of
ACG Express Liner, et al.,G.R. No. 164703/G.R. No. 164747, May 4,
2010