Criterion Vol 12 No 1

April/June 2017
Volume 12, Number 2
Articles
Lahore Resolution & Minorities A. G. Noorani 3
Pakistans Counter Terrorism Efforts: Air Com. (R) Khalid Iqbal 20

Expectations And Accomplishments, Regional Perspective
ISIS in Pakistan & Afghanistan: Ozer Khalid 41

From Rhetoric to Reality
Essays
Tyranny, Civil Society & Terrorism Sahar Pirzada 81
My Father, a Pakistani Prisoner Sunniya Ahmad Pirzada 88

of War in India
Book Reviews
Truths & Myths of 1971 A. G. Noorani 103
Pakistan and a World in Disorder M Saeed Khalid 108

A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century
Lahore Resolution & Minorities
LAHORE RESOLUTION &

MINORITIES
A. G. Noorani*
Abstract
(History has few parallels, if any, to a document of immense consequence,
such as the famous Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League. It was least
understood by its supporters and opponents alike and was subjected to
a close textual analysis by very few. Author)
On 23 March 1940 the All India Muslim League adopted the

Resolution at its Session in Lahore. It altered the geography of the sub-
continent of India and radically diverted the direction of its history from
the course it had followed till then. It demanded a partition of India into
two independent States. But this fundamental is all that was noticed;
applauded by some and denounced by others. Hardly any understood its
implications.
The Resolution ran into five paragraphs; two prefatory and three
operatives. The prefatory part explained its raison detre but not fully.
The first para was uncontroversial. Its flat rejection of the federation
embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935 was music to the ears
of the Leagues opponent, including the Indian National Congress.
The second para made two demands: (a) that the whole constitutional
plan be reconsidered de novo and (b) that the revised plan must
be framed with their (Muslims) approval and consent. They must be
part of the process.
These parts of the Resolution were rooted in experience. The

Quaid-e-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had done his best to negotiate
with the Congress till as late as 1938, but was rebuffed by the Congress
* The author is an eminent Indian scholar and expert on constitutional issues.
CRITERION April/June 2017 3

A. G. Noorani
leaders, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. The
former virtually refused to meet Jinnah and referred him, in a letter on
24 February 1938, almost insultingly, to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.
Nehru asserted that there were only two parties, the Congress and the
British. Despite the snubs at the Round Table Conference in London,
Jinnah entered into a pact with the Congress President, Dr. Rajendra
Prasad, in 1934 (Vide Marguerite Rose Dove; Forfeited Future; Delhi
1987; pp. 463-46 for the text). It was based on joint electorates. Nehru
discarded the settled terms of discourse since the Lucknow Pact of 1936
when he became Congress President in 1937. He said in a statement to
the press on 25 April 1937 that he rejected the very idea of a pact or
alliance with Muslims or others (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru;
Vol.8 p. 128). Jinnah persisted, nonetheless. He propounded the two-
nation theory on 12 April 1939 and advocated and demanded Pakistan
on 23 March 1940.
This is a neglected phase. But it explains the raison detre of the

Lahore Resolution. The story is best told in Jinnahs own words set out
in Jamiluddin Ahmads two Volumes of Speeches and Writings of Mr.
Jinnah (Sheikh Mohammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1960 and 1964). He said on
22 March 1939, almost exactly a year before the Lahore Resolution: I
have always believed in a Hindu-Muslim Pact (Vol.1, p. 86). But no such
pact was possible unless the Muslims united and wielded clout nationally.
No settlement with majority community is possible, as no Hindu

leader speaking with any authority shows any concern or genuine desire
for it. Honourable settlement can only be achieved between equals, and
unless the two parties learn to respect and fear each other, there is no
solid ground for any settlement. Offers of peace by the weaker party
always means, confession of weakness, and an invitation to aggression.
Appeals to patriotism, justice and fair-play and for goodwill fall flat.
It does not require political wisdom to realize that all safeguards and
settlements would be a scrap of paper, unless they are backed up by
power. Politics means power and not relying only on cries of justice
or fair-play or goodwill. (Lucknow Session of the Muslim league,
1937; Vol.1; p.30; italics mine throughout). In his speech at the Aligarh
Muslim University Union on 5 February 1938 he recalled his efforts in
4 CRITERION Volume 12 No.2

the past at that time there was no pride in me and I used to beg from
the Congress. Having no sanction behind me I was in the position of
a beggar and received the treatment that a beggar deserves.
He went to the heart of the problem. We in India have been

brought up in the traditions of British Parliamentary democracy. The
Constitution foisted on us is also modeled more or less on the British
pattern. But there is an essential difference between the body-politic
of the country and that of Britain. The majority and minority parties in
Britain are alterable, their complexion and strength often change. Today
it is a Conservative Government, tomorrow Liberal and the day after
Labour. But such is not the case with India. Here we have a permanent
Hindu majority and the rest are minorities which cannot within any
conceivable period of time hope to become majorities. The majority
can afford to assume a non-communal label, but it remains exclusively
Hindu in its spirit and action. The only hope for minorities is to organize
themselves and secure a definite share in power Paper safeguards were
no good. Power-sharing was the answer a proposition the Congress
rejected then as it did after independence. (Vol1, pp. 42-43).
This, to repeat, was the heart of the problem. Nehrus jibe that it
took Jinnah long to realize that the parliamentary system was not suited
to India was absurd. What worried Jinnah in 1938 has worried political
leaders in other parts of the Third World which have a heterogeneous
population. Unadulterated majority rule implies domination of the
majority community; most notably Sri Lanka. The Tamils fought for an
independent State of Eelam because they feared Sinhala domination. At
one stage, however, they were prepared to consider viable alternatives
to Eelam as an LTTE spokesman in Madras said on 20 December 1986.
It was possible for two nations to co-exist in one country. Lebanon
had a National Pact on power-sharing between its communities. The
Belfast Agreement on Northern Ireland makes power-sharing obligatory
between the Protestants and the Catholics. The Congress refused to share
power. In 1937 it asked Muslim League MLAs in U.P. to dissolve the
party as a price for participation in a Coalition with the Congress. Ever
the tactician, Jinnah held that if you start asking for sixteen annas in a
rupee there is room for bargaining. (Vol.1; p. 415; 13 September 1942).

A. G. Noorani
The Lahore Resolution was adopted in this context. Its three
operative paras read thus: Resolved that it is the considered view of
this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan
would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless
it is designed on the following basic principle, viz. that geographically
contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so
constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary,
that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as
in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to
constitute Independent States in which the constituent units shall be
autonomous and sovereign.
That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be

specially provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and
in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic,
political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation
with them and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in
a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be
specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities
for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political,
administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.
The Session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame

a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles,
providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all
powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and
such other matters, as may be necessary. (Source: Resolution of All-
India Muslim league from December 1938 to March 1940, published by
(Nawabzada) Liaquat Ali Khan, Honorary Secretary, All-India Muslim
league, Delhi, pp.47-48).
That even a highly educated person like Begum Shaista Subrawardy

Ikramullah imagined that, under the Resolution, Delhi could form part
of Pakistan shows how little understood was the first operative para,
with its contradictory terms, and particularly its reference to territorial
adjustments. None had given the slightest hint of their location and
scope.

Half a century later she wrote: For millions of persons like myself
to whom Delhi was synonymous with Muslim culture, a Pakistan
without Delhi was a body without a heart, and yet this is what was going
to happen. In Bengal, Calcutta, the main port, and the lifeline for East
Pakistan, was also to be lost, and there was no time to do anything about
it. Events had got out of control and there was a Kafka-like atmosphere
about the whole thing.
Why the Quaid accepted what he himself had earlier rejected as

a moth-eaten and truncated Pakistan, is the subject for a book in itself.
Here it suffices to say that he did accept it. Minorities in India seem to
have been left to their fate no provision or agreement had been reached
as to what would become of them. It was the Muslim minority in India
who had led the movement for Pakistan, but when Pakistan came into
being they were left behind. (Huseyn Shaheed Subrawardy; Oxford
University Press, Karachi; p.59).
The second para of the Resolution envisaged adequate effective and

mandatory safeguards for minorities in consultation with them in
both States. While this was linked to the first para on the partition it did
not explicitly stipulate what provision for safeguards would form an
integral part of the partition settlement.
Least noticed was the last para which spoke of assumption finally
by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs,
communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary.
This clearly implied an interim set up during the transition. But safeguards
for the minorities did not find a place along with defence, foreign
affairs, etc. On 27 February 1944 Jinnah himself defined the transitional
period. There would be under the new constitution transitional period
for settlement and adjustment during which time British authority so
far as armed forces and foreign affairs are concerned, would remain
paramount. The length of the transitional period would depend on the
speed with which the two peoples and Great Britain adjusted themselves
to the new constitution. Finally, the two Indian nations would enter into
treaties with Britain, just as Egypt did when she won her independence.
(Ahmad; Vol.1; p.585). The promise in the last para of a scheme

A. G. Noorani
of constitution in accordance with these basic principles remained
unfulfilled. The Congress never asked to see it either.
There were doubts among the League leaders regarding the fate of the
minorities under the Lahore Resolution. The Nawab of Chhatari, wrote
to Jinnah on 16 October 1940: even the Lahore resolution will not solve
the problem because the Muslims in the minority provinces will suffer
in any case. Jinnah assured him on 22 October: the resolution made
it quite clear that we cannot leave the Muslims in the Hindu provinces
to their fate and asked him to come out with a definite scheme of his
own which he promised to consider before making a final decision
in this regard. Choudhary Khaliquzzanan was also restive despite his
support to the Lahore resolution.
The Constitution Committee of the League set up in March 1939

apparently went into hibernation. The Foreign Committee did all the
running. Finally on 23 December 1940, Sir Abdullah Haroon submitted
its Report to Jinnah as Chairman, Foreign Sub-Committee of the
League.
The report contained a precious nugget in paragraph 16 which

read: The Lahore resolution of the League does not look forward to
the proposed regional states assuming immediately as they are formed,
powers of defence, external affairs, customs etc. This argues that there
should be a transitional stage during which these powers should be
exercised by some agency common to them all. Such a common co-
coordinating agency would be necessary even independent of the above
consideration, for under the third principle of the resolution, it will be
impossible to implement effectively the provision of safeguards for
minorities without some organic relationship subsisting between the
states under the Hindu influence. A federation is not to the taste of the
Muslims, because they fear that the Hindus will, on the strength of their
majority, dominate the Muslims. But since some common arrangement
is essential to the fulfillment of the provisions of the resolution, an agreed
formula has to be devised whereby the Muslims shall have the control at
the Centre on terms of perfect equality with the Non-Muslims.

This agency would have solved Jinnahs dilemma of old. On
relations between the two parts of India the Report said that the subjects
to be assigned to this central machinery shall be (a) External relations,
(b) Defence, (c) Communications, (d) Customs, (e) Safeguards for
minorities and voluntary inter migration etc. subject to the following
provision in respect of defence and intermigration. It went too far and
cast an unfortunate gloss on para 16. Each State would have its own
Army but, the Navy will be entirely under the Centre.
There is every reason to believe that Jinnah, the hard-headed lawyer,

would have separated the wheat from the chaff and used the nugget in
Para 16 of the Report constructively if only it had been kept under
wraps so as not to tie his hands. It was to be discussed by the Working
Committee on 22 February 1941. On 18 February The Statesman
reported the contents an obvious leak by a scheming member. The
meeting was postponed. Jinnah disowned the committee and its report.
(Mohammad Aslam Malik, The Making of the Pakistan Resolution,
Oxford University press, Karachi, 2001, pp. 199-200, 224-5, and 228-
9. This is based on Quaid-i-Azam Papers, File 242, pp. 33-5. The texts
merit close study, Vide Malik, p. 199 vide A.G. Noorani, The Haroon
Report, Criterion, Vol. III, No.4, pp. 64-75).
Prof. R. J. Moores works on Indias politics since 1937 are noted

for their erudition. His scholarly essay Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand
traces the genesis of the demand. (Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 17,
4[1983] pp. 529-561). So does Ayesha Jalal in her fine work The Sole
Spokesman; (Cambridge University Press; 1984). The lead was taken
by the Sind Provincial Muslim League under the leadership of Sir
Abdullah Haroon. Jinnah was disquieted by the demand and had the
resolution modified to ask for a review. In his famous article in Time
and Tide, as late as on 19 January 1940, he wrote: What is the remedy?
(1) The British people must realize that unqualified Western democracy
is totally unsuited for India and attempts to impose it must cease. (2) In
India, it must be accepted that party government is not suitable and all
governments, Central or provincial, must be governments that represent
all sections of the people. He wrote: there are in India two nations
which both must share the governance of their common motherland so

A. G. Noorani
that India may take its place amongst the great nations of the world.
(Ahmad; Vol. 1; pp. 123-124). This was approximately a mere two
months before the Lahore resolution.
In his speech at the Lahore session in 1940 demanding Pakistan,

Jinnah argued: There is no reason why these states should be
antagonistic to each other. On the other hand, the rivalry and the natural
desire and efforts on the part of one to dominate the social order and
establish political supremacy over the other in the government of the
country will disappear. It will lead more towards natural good-will by
international pacts between them, and they can live in complete harmony
with their neighbours. This will lead further to a friendly settlement all
the more easily with regard to minorities by reciprocal arrangements
and adjustments between Muslim India and Hindu India, which will far
more adequately and effectively safeguard the rights and interests of
Muslims and various other minorities. (ibid.; p.160).
On 10 March 1941 Jinnah said at Aligarh: As a self-respective

people, we in the Muslim minority provinces say boldly that we are
prepared to undergo every suffering and sacrifice for the emancipation
and liberation of our brethren in regions of Muslim majority. By
standing in their way and dragging them along with us into a united
India we do not in any way improve our position. Instead, we reduce
them also to the position of a minority. But we are determined that,
whatever happens to us, we are not going to allow our brethren to be
vassalised by the Hindu majority. But the fact is that the creation of these
independent states will be the surest guarantee for the fair treatment of
the minorities. When the time for consultation and negotiations comes
the case of Muslims in the minority province will certainly not go by
default. (ibid; p.242).
But his rhetoric underwent change as he pursued the demand. He

said at Kanpur on 30 March 1941 that in order to liberate 7 crores of
Muslims where they were in a majority he was willing to perform the
last ceremony of martyrdom if necessary and let two crores of Muslims
be smashed. (ibid.; p.246).

He pleaded for the Muslims in the Hindu majority provinces at the
Delhi Session of the Muslim League on 24 April 1943: Do not forget
the minority provinces. it is they who spread the light when there was
darkness in the majority provinces. It is they who were the spearheads
that the Congress wanted to crush with their overwhelming majority
in the Muslim minority provinces. It is they who had suffered for you
in the majority provinces, for your sake, for your benefit and for your
advantage. But never mind, it is all in the role of a minority to suffer.
(Cheers) We of the minority have suffered and are ready to face any
consequences if we can liberate the 75 millions of our brethren in the
north-western and eastern zones. (ibid.; p.477). He spoke as one who
had consistently championed the cause of Muslims in non-Muslim
majority areas. Events drove him to become head of a State of the
Muslim majority areas as its Governor-General of Pakistan.
The Cripps proposals of 1942 provided for the signing of a Treaty

between India and Britain inter alia for the protection of racial and
religious minorities. Para 19 of the Cabinet Missions Plan of 16 May
1946 provided A preliminary meeting will be held at which the general
order of business will be decided, a chairman and other officers elected
and an Advisory Committee on rights of citizens, minorities and tribal
and excluded areas set up. Thereafter the provincial representatives will
be divided up into three sections shown under A, B and C in the Table
of Representation in sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph.
The Advisory Committee on the rights of citizens, minorities and

tribal and excluded areas will contain due representation of the interests
affected and their function will be to report to the Union Constituent
Assembly upon the list of fundamental rights, clauses for protecting
minorities, and a scheme for the administration, of tribal and excluded
areas, and to advise whether these rights should be incorporated, in the
provincial, the group or the Union constitutions.
But, there was not a word on the minorities in the Partition Plan of
3 January 1947. Instead of a transitional period the process was rushed
through leaving the minorities in the lurch. All that they got were mere
assurances in a statement by the Partition Council on 22 July 1947. It

A. G. Noorani
said: Both the Congress and the Muslim league have given assurances
of fair and equitable treatment to the minorities after the transfer of
power. The two future governments re-affirm these assurances. It is their
intention to safeguard the legitimate interests of all citizens irrespective
of religion, caste, or sex. In the exercise of their normal civic rights, all
citizens will be regarded as equal, and both the governments will assure
to all people within their territories the exercise of the liberties such as
freedom of speech, the right to form associations, the right to worship
in their own way, and the protection of their language and culture. Both
the governments further undertake that there shall be no discrimination
against those who before 15 August may have been political opponents.
The guarantee of protection which both governments give to the

citizens of their respective countries implies that in no circumstances will
violence be tolerated in any form in either territory. The two governments
wish to emphasise that they are united in this determination. (V.P.
Menon; The Transfer of Power in India; pp. 408-9).
A vital part of the Lahore Resolution on the minorities was ignored.

After independence, none exerted himself more for the minorities
than H.S. Subrawardy. He laid his heart bare in a letter to Chaudhary
Khaliquzzaman on 10 September 1947 (Khaliquzzaman; Pathway to
Pakistan; pp. 397-9). He wrote to Jinnah and Gandhi and proposed a
Draft Declaration which reads thus: We hereby solemnly and sincerely
declare that it is the aim of the Dominions of India and Pakistan to
promote peace and friendship between the Dominions and its inhabitants
and to cooperate for the well-being of each other and to assist each other
in every possible way so that the prosperity of each may be promoted
and the relationship of the two Dominions be based on neighbourliness
and mutual reliance.
2. We further declare that we consider peace and unity amongst the

various communities within the two dominions essential for the
preservation of independence and for reaping the full fruit thereof;
that all the communities together go to make a nation, that they have
to live with each other as one family within each State, pledging
unstinted and unswerving loyalty to the State in which they live.

3. It is our considered opinion that separate communal and theocratic
States are undesirable and in course of time are bound to lead to a
perpetual conflict; that disunity and disorder amongst the peoples
make economic progress impossible and is bound to impoverish the
Dominions to such an extent that they will not be able to improve
the lot of the common man. The Dominions are likely, under these
circumstances, to lose their independence and will stand eternally
disgraced in the eyes of the world.
4. We further declare that we renounce war for all time as the method of
settling disputes between us. We deprecate the issue of provocative
statements and aspersions attacking the bona fides of each other and
containing charges and counter-charges which only tend to embitter
feelings and give an incorrect impression that the relationship
between the two Dominions are strained and may at some future
time lead to an armed conflict.
5. We further solemnly declare that it shall be our endeavour to put

down disorder and lawlessness with a firm hand. We demand
impartiality and a high sense of duty from the officials of both the
Dominions and shall take the strongest measures against officers
and other Government personnel who do not perform their duties
with absolute impartiality and without fear or favour.
6. We hereby guarantee to the minorities within our Dominions

fullest protection of life, property, culture, religion, language and
customs and declare that there shall be no discrimination between
the communities by virtue of their caste, creed or religion, that we
shall deal with all the people within our Dominions equally and
justly.
7. We call upon the people of the Dominions to shed any tendency

towards militancy or violence, to rid themselves of mutual hatred
and distrust, to live in friendliness with their neighbours, and for the
majority to assume responsibility for protecting the minorities and
their rights.

A. G. Noorani
8. We hereby call upon the press to cooperate with us in stressing the
need for peace and unity, cooperation and trust, and cease to publish
stories and accounts factual or otherwise of incidents that may
tend to excite communal hatred and bitterness. Only such accounts
of incidents should be printed as have had the imprimatur of a Joint
Board set up by the Dominion Governments.
9. In order to ensure cooperation between two Dominions as well as

to minimize occasions for misunderstanding we have decided to
set up joint committees of representatives of the two Dominions,
which will be stationed in various important places in the country
and whose duty it will be to promote peace and harmony between
the communities, acquaint themselves with the difficulties and
complaints of the majority and minority communities, keep
themselves informed of incidents and remove all causes of suspicion
and mistrust, not only between the peoples but also between the
two Dominions. These representatives will be given diplomatic
privileges and assured the safety of their person by the Dominion or
State in which they happen to discharge their duties.
10. In order to obviate misunderstandings and to enable us to take joint

and quick decisions, and to cooperate on all matters which may
promote our mutual welfare, we have decided to maintain constant
contact with each other, and for this purpose the Ministers of the
Dominions as well as of the Provinces of the Dominions shall meet
together as often as possible and shall visit any part of any Dominion
as they may deem advisable.
11. For the purpose of instilling confidence in the minorities we have

decided to ensure that the services are not exclusively manned by the
personnel of one community but that we have therein an adequate
mixture of all communities. This shall, as soon as possible, be made
applicable to all the branches of the service including the Police and
the Army.
12. We also desire, in order to give further confidence to the minorities

and to recognize their right to participate in the administration that

the Ministries should include representatives of the more important
minorities.
13. The events that have occurred in both the Dominions have been a
stain on civilization. We greatly regret that we have not been able
to afford that protection to the people, which it is the duty of all
governments to ensure, and we extend our deepest sympathies to
those who have suffered. It is not easy for people who have been
victims of atrocities or have lost their near and dear ones, whose
lives have been scared and dislocated, to forgive and forget, but we
have to urge upon them to do so, as any other alternative will lead
to a continuance of untold miseries on innocent and unoffending
persons who desire to live in friendship and amity with each other.
We assert that there is no other alternative and we must not allow
lawlessness to spread further and invade new territories. We must
now proceed to establish a brighter future for the people of the two
Dominions. For those who have had to leave their homes, it shall
be our endeavour to re-settle them in their original homes and to
protect them fully; but where such re-settlement is not desired then
to rehabilitate them in new surroundings. We strongly disapprove of
migrations from one part of the country to the other or of transfer of
populations from one part of the country to the other or of transfer
of population as being detrimental to the future welfare of the two
Dominions.
14. We strongly condemn the acts of brutality which have been

perpetrated by various sections of the people against each other
and in particular we condemn forcible conversion and abduction of
women. We consider that forcible conversion is no conversion at
all and is not sanctioned by any religion. We call upon all persons
forcibly converted to go back to the religion which they professed,
and the people around them to see that they are in no way molested,
but are allowed the fullest liberty to practice their religion, consonant
with the common law of the land and good manners. We declare
that we shall take the strongest action against those who put any
impediments in this way. We consider it shameful and cowardly
to attack defenceless women and desire that all women abducted

A. G. Noorani
should be returned to the members of their community as soon as
possible.
15. For the better attainment of peace, unity, and harmony and toleration
among the peoples of our Dominions, and for putting down disorder
and lawlessness and ensure impartial and just administration, we
consider it not only highly desirable but necessary to enlist the
cooperation of the public. We urge upon them to form Peace
Committees in all cities and villages which would be composed of
such members of all communities as feel the urge to secure peace
and harmony and are ready to make sacrifices in this cause. Such
Committees should be set up as early as possible and will form a
meeting ground whereby constant contact [and] mutual confidence
may be restored, cooperation ensured and the forces of lawlessness
and disorder effectively checked. Each of these Communities should
have under their control a number of peace volunteers who will
prevent miscreants from creating mischief and carry on constant
propaganda in favour of peace and goodwill and toleration and
brotherliness. Such peace volunteers should be drawn from members
of all communities pledged to work with each other in amity and
discipline. We trust that the members of the public will respond to
our request, give us their cooperation and lay the foundations of
peaceful and progressive States that will find an honoured place in
the comity of nations. (Jinnah Papers; First Series; Vol.6, pp. 689-
738).
Unfortunately Subrawardy had goofed in mentioning to Jinnah,

Gandhis endorsement in an earlier draft which he did not provide to
Jinnah for reasons which he explained in his memoirs. While staying
with Mahatma Gandhi I busied myself drawing up a charter of minority
rights which would be useful for the Muslims in India and for the Hindus
in Pakistan. During this period I was traveling continuously between
Delhi, Lahore, Karachi and Calcutta. After discussing the matter with
Mahatma Gandhi I approached Jinnah for his opinion and approval. his
immediate reaction was that I should get the acceptance of the Indian
leaders. Mahatmaji agreed to my draft as did Pandit Nehru and Sardar
Patel. When I again saw Jinnah he wanted the written acceptance of

Mahatma Gandhi before he would consider it, although he agreed that
such a charter would be a useful document. Mahatma Gandhi thereupon
endorsed my draft which, to the best of my recollection, was to the effect
that he agreed with the draft though he considered it somewhat prolix,
but doubted that Jinnah sincerely meant to abide by it.
I made the mistake of showing the endorsement of Gandhiji to

Jinnah who flared up upon seeing it; he refused to consider the document
and handed it back to me. The next day Jinnah wanted the document
back and said he wanted particularly to see the endorsement of Mahatma
Gandhi. I could see that if Jinnah had the document in his possession he
would work himself up into a tearing rage and start another feud with
Mahatma Gandhi which would destroy all hope of any agreement on
this important issue and might further complicate matters between India
and Pakistan and increase the tension that already existed between the
two leaders. I begged leave of Jinnah not to hand over the document to
him and left Karachi. For this Jinnah never forgave me. (Mohammad
H. R. Talukdar (Ed.) Memoirs of Huseyn Shaheed Subrawardy; Oxford
University Press, Karachi, 2009; p.109).
Suhrawardys folly and Jinnahs wrath fall in one part. The

deplorable part is Gandhis mean and petty comment on one whom
he would publicly praise as Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah faced an apparent
contradiction which was inherent in the situation but was resolvable.
It was to reject strong Centre and yet have a say on the minorities in
the non-Muslim majority areas to which he initially owned his rise. It
could have been resolved in one of two ways a limited Centre which
gave the minoritys protection plus a voice on their behalf to their co-
religionists elsewhere or a treaty with proper adequate effective and
mandatory safeguards as envisaged in the Lahore Resolution.
Having rejected the Act of 1935 Jinnah had to evolve an alternative.

If not the Act, precisely what alternative did Jinnah propose, the
Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, kept asking. He reported to the Secretary of
State, Lord Zetland, on 28 February 1939 on his meeting with Jinnah: a
couple of days ago I asked him what suggestions he had to make, to
which he replied that, while he did not reject the federal idea, it must be

A. G. Noorani
a federation which would ensure an adequate equipoise between Muslim
and Hindu votes, and in which there should be an appropriate balance
between the communities. I asked him how he contemplated securing
this, to which he replied that he had in his mind the manipulation of
territorial votes and the adjustments of territorial divisions as to bring it
about. He blushed a little as I pressed the implication of these suggestions
upon him, but in the end maintained that at any rate his project for the
carving up of this country was a better one than Sikandars. In plain
words, a sharing of power on the basis of equality.
As Ayesh Jalal notes: There were contradictions between Muslim

interests in majority and minority provinces, and between an apparently
separatist demand for autonomous Muslim states and the need for a
centre capable of ensuring the interests of Muslims in the rest of India.
At no point was Jinnah able to reconcile these contradictions. He came
away from Lahore not with a coherent demand which squared the circle
of these difficulties, but simply with the right to negotiate for Muslims
on a completely new basis. (pp. 59-69). She writes: In October, 1942,
that is after the Cripps offer, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman wrote to Jinnah
about the potential disadvantages of such territorial readjustments; he
stressed the importance of retaining links between the Pakistan areas
and the minority provinces; Long and hostile distances will intervene
against the cultural influences of the minority provinces on the Pakistan
Zone. Moreover, one of the basic principles lying behind the Pakistan
idea is that of keeping hostages in Muslim Provinces as against the
Muslims in the Hindu provinces. If we allow millions of Hindus to go
out of our orbit of influence, the security of the Muslims in the minority
Provinces will greatly be minimized. (See Khaliquzzaman to Jinnah,
7 October 1942, SCH/U.P. vol. IV and Choudhry Khaliquzzaman,
Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore, 1961), pp. 424-7).
On 6 and 25 April 1948 the Cabinet Mission offered Jinnah a choice

between a limited Centre and Pakistan with its present boundaries. He
preferred the former. It is little noted that the proposals which Jinnah
gave to the Mission on 12 May 1946 provided for a Centre. The six
Muslim provinces (Punjab, NWFP, Baluchistan, Sindh, Bengal and
Assam) shall be grouped together as one group and will deal with

all other subjects and matters except Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Communications necessary for Defence, which may be dealt with by
the Constitution-making bodies of the two groups of provinces-Muslim
Provinces (hereinafter named Pakistan Group) and Hindu Province
sitting together. In Group and Provincial Constitution fundamental
rights and safeguards concerning religion, culture and other matters
affecting the different communities will be provided for. (Papers
Relative to the Cabinet Mission and India, 1946, Government of India
Press, 1946, pp. 20-3).
That explains why he accepted the Missions Plan of 16 May 1946.

Gandhi wrecked it single handedly the very next day. The Congress
obediently followed him. Mountbatten pushed through the partition of
India with frenetic speed. Two crucial paras of the Lahore Resolution
were ignored on the minorities and a transition (the last 2 paras). The
minorities question was not raised. They have suffered a lot.

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
PAKISTANS COUNTER TERRORISM

EFFORTS: EXPECTATIONS AND
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Regional Perspective
Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal, TI (M)*
Abstract
(Terrorism came to haunt Pakistan in the wake of the invasion of
Afghanistan by a UN mandated coalition as a reaction to 9/11. The faulty
military strategy by the international forces provided the opportunity
to hardened Afghan fighters to escape into nearby countries. Keeping
in view the unregulated border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and
the experience of Afghans with regard to their refugeeship tenure in
Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan became
their destination of first choice1. This bunch of Afghan fighters became
the nucleus which soon snowballed into a powerful struggle against
foreign occupation of Afghanistan.2 They adopted hit and run attacks
as their strategy. The fight soon degenerated into indiscriminate
terrorist attacks and counter terrorism efforts by the ISAF/NATO.
For its part Pakistan launched its counter terrorism effort in its own
territories and cooperated with international and regional efforts to
overcome the menace. Other than Afghanistan no other country has
suffered as much as Pakistan has from the fallout of the UN mandated
invasion of Afghanistan. Despite mammoth sacrifices, international
acknowledgment of Pakistans counter terrorism effort has been hard
to come by.
This paper examines the current dynamics of terrorism in South Asia and
adjoining regions, their impact on Pakistan and the ensuing struggle by
Pakistan to combat terrorism.3 Author)
* The author is a member of the National Academic Council, Institute of Policy
Studies (IPS), Islamabad. He is also Chair IPS committee on Strategic aspects
of National and International Security.

Pakistans Counter Terrorism Efforts:
Introduction
It wont be an overstatement that before 9/11 countering terrorism

was, by and large, considered an extension of law enforcement, strictly
falling in the purview of a typical nation state. It has now become
everybodys, and as a corollary, nobodys baby. Unwittingly, it has
also become a vehicle for achieving undeclared strategic objectives.
This has made global and regional counter terrorism approaches
increasingly suspicious, though these options continue to be relevant,
they have become more difficult to implement. Most of the South
Asian states are bogged down into tedious territory and resource
related conflicts supported by heavy political baggage, hence they are
not likely to agree on what constitutes terrorism in their region, leave
aside the prospects of agreeing on joint counter terrorism efforts, at
least at a tactical level.
Extent and Limit of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism
Terrorism is a global phenomenon, almost all countries of the world

have suffered from this menace in one way or the other, during one
timeframe or the other.4 Hence, all states want to bring an end to it, at
least there is an overwhelming indication of intent through supportive
articulations towards this cause - even though corresponding action may
be lacking or in lag.
So far, gains of counter terrorism have been scanty, high in cost,

fragile and reversible. The post 9/11 terrorist is now hardened and
resilient. It does not follow a hit and run strategy, the attacking element is
determined to fight its way to reach the target and neutralize it. Attackers
preference to fight and get killed in an effort to reach a heavily defended
and unreachable target rather than to retrieve and survive to fight another
day makes a modern day typical terrorist a distinct category of fighter
from its cousin guerrilla. The situation is in so much flux that for a while
one tends to think that contemporary terrorism is approaching its fag
end, but is soon bewildered by another mega attack, and begins to think
as if it was only in an embryonic state.

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
Sister Crimes
Terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, money laundering, espionage,

political assassinations, and destabilization of governments have been
characterized as multinational systemic crimes (MSCs).5 These crimes
are distinct from conventional crime and are transnational or international
in character. MSCs are crimes by various kinds of organizations
that operate across national boundaries and in two or more countries
simultaneously.6 Individual acts in connection with such crimes are
part of a highly complicated, well organised system that functions very
much like a modern international business corporation. The concept of
multinational systemic crime is a collective reference to a variety of
criminal behavior systems. Each crime is regarded as a serious threat by
governments when directed against their national interests or national
security. No global criminal justice system to tackle these globalized
crimes has yet come into existence. With increasing terrorist threats
across the world, typical narrow parochial concepts of correction and
law enforcement are not relevant.7
South Asias Terrorism and its Counter Terrorism Mosaic
In the absence of concrete political and or topographical boundaries,

adjoining trans-sub-regional problems leading to terrorism remain as
relevant to South Asia as intra-South Asian fissures. South Asia offers
trans-regional connectivity between all regions of Asia. Hence any event
taking place in any region of Asia is likely to have its impact on South
Asia; likewise, anything happening in South Asia radiates aftershocks
in its neighbourhood.8
Therefore, any attempt to outline a counter terrorism matrix of South

Asia is likely to throw-up attendant difficulties impacting on accuracy
of such calculus. These inadequacies have resulted in popping up of
other more promising counter terrorism arrangements. Notwithstanding,
alongside global efforts, Pakistan has all along been a keen participant in
all regional counter terrorism initiatives in South Asia. At the domestic
level, the first meaningful anti-terrorism legislation by Pakistan dates back
to four years prior to 9/11. It was captioned: Anti-Terrorism Act 1997.9

South Asia has a long history of terrorism of all shades, political,
ethnic, sectarian etc. Asia in general and South Asia in particular are
confronting the challenge of extremism and terrorism since many years.
At least five South Asian countriesIndia, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Myanmar and the Maldives are prone to terrorist activity of one type or
another. Sri Lanka has recently overcome the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) issue. Post 9/11 Afghanistan has thrown up a unique
profile of terrorist activities, impacting on the region and beyond. Typical
terrorist activities are not restricted to South Asia alone; neighbouring
countries like Iran, China and Russia also experience terrorist activities
of varying shades and intensity. Moreover, the adjoining regions of the
Middle East, South East Asia, Central Asia, West Asia and North Africa
are also affected by this phenomenon.
Some contemporary processes of terrorism within and around

South Asia are: the arc of instability arising out of Islamist radicalism,
militancy of various shades in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and
Bangladesh; the Red Corridor comprising Maoist insurgency in India
and Nepal; spillover of Afghan conflict to Pakistan through its Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), political rise of Hindu radicalism
in India and the ensuing hype in anti-Muslim sentiment; the erstwhile
LTTE in Sri Lanka, etc. Prominent terrorist entities which operate or have
links in South Asia are: the Tehrik-i-Taliban (Pakistan & Afghanistan
chapters), Al-Qaeda, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM),
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic State (IS), Shiv
Sena in India and numerous Afghan militant factions. South Asia has
the highest concentration of militant groups in the world. India tops the
list with more than 50 active or dormant terrorist organizations.10 Many
of these regional outfits have ties with international organizations. The
landscape of terrorism in South Asia is diverse and dynamic, making
counter terrorism a complex enterprise.11
Countering terrorism has become the biggest political challenge to

the national leaderships of South Asia. And if present trends are any
indication, countering terrorism may remain the main political problem
in the region, at least for quite some time.

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
Situations of conflict and cooperation on the issue of terrorism in
South Asia have a conflictual bearing on the interpretation of terrorism.
For example: Indias stubborn attitude towards the Kashmir dispute
and its mind-set to equate the indigenous movement of Kashmiris,
for exercising their right of self-determination, with terrorism is not
acceptable to Pakistan and the international community, because the
Kashmir dispute continues to be on the UN agenda and a permanent
UN military observers group is deployed for monitoring the situation
in Kashmir.12 Likewise in our regions neighbourhood, the Myanmar
governments handling of the Rohingya issue is another grey area.
Vibes from Regional Landscape
Going beyond region, Al Qaeda announced the establishment of a

new branch on the Indian subcontinent in 2014, saying it is meant to
revive militant activities in the region. It vowed to crush the artificial
borders established by the English occupiers to divide the Muslims.
Moreover, the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh, is a defacto State in Syria.

It is also close to setting up similar quasi-state(s) in Libya. Intended and
unintended consequences of ongoing events in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) are not under anybodys control.13 Everyone is trying
to harness these to own their advantage; hence throwing up undesired
effects in the immediate and extended neighbourhood - including South
Asia. Some terrorist organizations across South Asia and Middle East
have begun announcing their support for Daesh. Most of the terror
attacks that rocked different countries, especially France and Germany
during 2015-16, have been claimed by Daesh. The leadership of Daesh
has made its intentions of increasing terror attacks globally in the days
and months ahead clear. London police has also warned of terror attacks
in Britain similar to those seen recently elsewhere in Europe. These
terrorists have developed a capacity to act in any part of the world - they
certainly have global reach. A few attacks in Afghanistan, Bangladesh
and Pakistan have also been claimed by Daesh.14
Ongoing conflicts in and around South Asia, like Afghanistan, Iraq,

Libya and Syria, which were expected to come to a responsible end,

have turned out as open-ended tragedies, with no prudent closing in
sight, rather there is a likelihood of their expansion to adjoining sub-
regions. Kick-offs of these conflicts may continue to radiate feelings
of perpetual insecurity in South Asia, making it an instable landmass
with an uneasy notional peace, pegged around fragile counter terrorism
related deterrence. It is in this context that Pakistan has joined the Saudi
led Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT); hopefully
it will provide an extended defence against proliferation of terror from
MENA the South Asia region.
Some South Asian countries - mainly India and Afghanistan have

a tendency to blame their neighbour - Pakistan - to cover up their
own inefficiencies with regard to countering terrorism, hence marring
the success of any meaningful regional approach towards countering
terrorism. Unruly Afghanistan presents a political divide at the highest
level, shifting focus away from counter terrorism. As a result, large
swaths of rural territories are ruled by the Taliban and territories of
some important urban centers often ping-pong between the government
and Taliban.15
In Pakistans immediate neighbourhood, Indias state terrorism in

the occupied territories of Jammu and Kashmir, since July 08, has
resulted in more than 100 deaths and over 10,000 injuries; the most
significant of injuries is permanent partial(one eye) and complete (both
eyes) loss of vision of nearly 1000 youth. This premeditated blinding
is attributed to the barbaric use of pellet firing for dispersing peaceful
protestors. Pakistan has asked India to come forward for talks on
Kashmir, but India has rejected the offer. The disputed status of Jammu
and Kashmir is duly recognized as a dispute by the UN, the OIC and
other international organizations, as well as major world powers.
Despite numerous UNSC resolutions giving out formulations to settle
the dispute, India is bent upon calling the freedom fighters terrorists.
Pakistan is pursuing the UN and major world powers to intervene for
a peaceful solution to the conflict in line with nearly a dozen UNSG
resolutions. The UNSG and important world leaders have time and
again expressed their willingness to mediate the conflict but India is
not budging from its untenable position of considering Kashmir as its

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
integral part. President Donald Trump had also expressed a similar
desire during his campaign days.
Moreover, there have been confessional statements and affidavits

by responsible persons from within India that some of the high profile
incidents blamed on Pakistan were false flag operations planned by Indian
intelligence agencies for accruing political mileage at an international
level and getting Pakistan declared a terror sponsoring entity. Such
irresponsible acts are a major hindrance in the way of launching and
sustaining a seamless counter terrorism effort in South Asia.
To succeed, a global level counter terrorism effort needs to remain

launched continuously with due perseverance and tenacity. No individual
state or any regional conglomeration has the capability and capacity to
counter the menace of terrorism single handedly. Globalization, in terms
of economic integration and speed of communication, has unwittingly
served as a facilitator of terrorism; and apparently there are no effective
ways to reverse the wheel, notwithstanding the trend of the rise of ultra-
right political leadership in major capitals.16
Severing communication between leaders and followers and cutting

off financial and logistic flow to terrorist entities and inter country
movement of individuals are one of the major challenges of regional
and global counter terrorism efforts. In this regard Pakistan has done
meaningful banking reforms to choke terror financing.17
Expanse of terrorisms is very vast, calling for a wholehearted global

counter terrorism campaign. Here, it is pertinent to quote from former
US President Obamas call for all countries around the world to take
responsibility during his September 2015 address to the UNGA:18
No matter how powerful our military, how strong our

economy, we understand the United States cannot solve the
worlds problems alone. In Iraq, the United States learned
the hard lesson that even hundreds of thousands of brave,
effective troops, trillions of dollars from our Treasury,
cannot by itself impose stability on a foreign land. Unless

we work with other nations under the mantle of international
norms and principles and law that offer legitimacy to our
efforts, we will not succeed. And unless we work together
to defeat the ideas that drive different communities in a
country like Iraq into conflict, any order that our militaries
can impose will be temporary. Just as force alone cannot
impose order internationally, I believe in my core that
repression cannot forge the social cohesion for nations to
succeed. The history of the last two decades proves that in
todays world, dictatorships are unstable. The strongmen of
today become the spark of revolution tomorrow. You can jail
your opponents, but you cant imprison ideas. You can try to
control access to information, but you cannot turn a lie into
truth. Indeed, I believe that in todays world, the measure
of strength is no longer defined by the control of territory.
Lasting prosperity does not come solely from the ability to
access and extract raw materials. The strength of nations
depends on the success of their people -- their knowledge,
their innovation, their imagination, their creativity, their
drive, their opportunity -- and that, in turn, depends upon
individual rights and good governance and personal security.
Internal repression and foreign aggression are both symptoms
of the failure to provide this foundation.
Being mindful of limitations of such interventions in ones own

region, Pakistan did not contribute a military contingent in ISAF but
permitted use of its ground lines of communications as well as air
passage to sustain ISAF/NATO operations in Afghanistan.
Another dilemma is that while global and regional affirmations add

to the grandiose of counter terrorism effort, ultimately it is the state
which has the legal cover to implement whatever strategy it deems
appropriate and then bear the responsibility of intended and unintended
consequences; all other intervening entitles do so without bearing the
responsibility of intended and unintended deaths and destruction.

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
Also, a typical state has its own limitations with regard to
accountability. One could refer to the irony that Sri Lanka is the only
South Asian country, in the post 9/11 setting, that has effectively
neutralized the LTTE, however, it is now facing the pressures of a UN
inquiry with regard to war crimes which might have been committed
during the counter terrorism campaign.19
Notwithstanding the aforementioned difficulties, a regional

approach towards countering terrorism offers the advantage of enforcing
containment, this however is dependent on the will of all sates of the
region. And invariably, due to political reasons and local tensions, it
is difficult to accrue full commitment from all the states of a particular
region - and the same is true about South Asia.
With Chinas significant capacity and stakes in the region, a new

concept of security has emerged in Asia.20 This new paradigm encourages
stake holders to find solutions to non-traditional security challenges like
terrorism. Cooperation between Pakistan and China are focused on many
issues including a counter terrorism effort. Moreover, Pakistan seeks
to establish and sustain long-term and mutually beneficial relationships
with global and regional players in Asia in the realm of counter
terrorism. However, some countries in South Asia are trying to disrupt
the implementation of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
aimed at economic uplift and reduction of terrorism in the region. In this
regard, Indias attempt to gain support from elements hostile to Pakistan
are ill-advised. Prime Minster Narendra Modis Independence Day
speech on August 15, 2016 was a clear cut interference in the internal
matters of Pakistan by encouraging separatist elements in Balochistan.
On its part, within hours of this provocative speech, Pakistan made a
formal offer of dialogue to India.
Pakistans Institutional Participation in Regional CT efforts
Terrorism in South Asia is more of a regional rather than a national

challenge, therefore, besides state level effort to counter it, there is a
need of a regional counter terrorism stream as well. Though a difficult
and complicated task, it is inescapable but to evolve a regional approach,

methodology and strategy to meet the challenge of terrorism in South
Asia by ending contestation and accusations between individual states.
This will pave the way to peace and stability in the region and give
people a chance to enjoy the benefits of development. Being a victim
of terrorism, Pakistan is cognizant of the severity of the problem and
its impact. Therefore, Pakistan has always made it a point to be part of
all global and regional efforts to counter terrorism. Pakistan is an active
member of a number of initiatives at regional and extended regional
levels.
South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
Over three decades, SAARC has built an impressive body of thought

and institutional networks. It has the requisite institutional capacity
to lead a regional counter terrorism effort. SAARC has taken some
meaningful initiatives in the context of terrorism. For example, the 3rd
SAARC summit in Kathmandu in 1987 - 14 years before 9/11 - adopted
its first resolution to suppress terrorism, which was further reinforced
in the Summit of 2001. SAARC has adopted several conventions on
this count, these are: SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of
Terrorism21 (signed by all member states and came into force in 1988);
Additional Protocol (2014) to the SAARC Regional Convention on
Suppression of Terrorism (2002).22 Pakistan actively participated in
negotiations leading to all these counter terrorism instruments.23
SAARC could cover a lot of mileage in the context of counter

terrorism like: sharing intelligence/ information; enacting a
consolidated strategy to counter the financing of terrorism by enacting
regional money laundering laws; regional law enforcement; regional
capacity building training; setting up of a Regional Counter Terrorism
framework; joint counter terrorism exercises; coordination among
regional law enforcement agencies; development of Regional Strategic
Communication plan, etc. All easier said than done. The biggest hurdle
is that most South Asian countries are mired in serious bilateral conflicts,
and their interpretation of terrorism is seldom accurate and uniform. It is
indeed high time for South Asian countries to re-emphasize the role of
SAARC towards an effective counter terrorism strategy and campaign.

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
Pakistan would support adoption of each of these measures at regional
levels.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, while addressing the SAARC Interior

Ministers Summit held in Islamabad, on August 04 2016, called for joint
efforts to curb regional challenges such as terrorism.24 He shared with
the SAARC Interior Ministers Pakistans remarkable gains against
terrorism through operation Zarb-e- Azb and effective implementation
of the National Action Plan (NAP).25 He said these gains reflected the
governments determination to eliminate the scourge of terrorism.26
However, the SAARC approach on terrorism appears less than

comprehensive. SAARC has no effective mechanism for conflict
resolution and peace building. Although terrorism and violent conflict
remains a challenge among many of these states there is an absolute
lack of coordination in terms of evidence sharing or negotiation on this
matter. There is a legal and normative basis for regional counterterrorism
cooperation among the SAARC nations, but traditional power politics
has constrained the operational spaces for SAARC to emerge as an
effective regional counterterrorism actor.27 The SAARC concept and
strategy on terrorism needs elaboration and explication, if necessary
by amending its charter.
In 2002 the Nepal Police floated the idea of SAARCPOL to provide

a regional channel for the sharing of information.28 Although the idea
of SAARCPOL was endorsed by the Home/Interior Ministers meeting
in 2006, since then there has been no visible progress to institutionalize
police cooperation in the fight against transnational crime and terrorism
in South Asia.29
Rather than regional, a hybrid approach is more clearly visible

in South Asia, whereby, Pakistan and India are focusing on bilateral
partnership with the neighboring countries and adjoining regions. India
has perhaps abandoned the SAARC project and is instead focused more
on supporting the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).30

Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in
Asia (CICA)
Pakistan is an active member of CICA. It is an interesting

organization. Being an Asia-wide entity it overcomes the limitations of
other security related regional and sub-regional forums. During its fourth
summit on May 21, 2014, President Xi Jinping proposed a new Asian
security concept.31 This concept proposes zero tolerance for terrorism,
separatism and extremism, and urges strengthening international and
regional cooperation to counter these.32 It calls for commitment to
resolve disputes through peaceful means, and rejects the practice of
shifting trouble to neighbours and seeking selfish gains at the expense
of others.33
CICA is the largest and most representative regional security forum

of Asia, fast evolving into a security dialogue and cooperation platform
that covers the whole of Asia. In the long run, CICA might evolve
into a preferred multilateral body for coordinated anti-terror efforts in
Asia. China also focuses on bilateral cooperation to fight terrorism as a
transnational phenomenon, including extradition treaties and police and
intelligence exchanges. So far China has signed 36 extradition treaties.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
The SCO is a regional security organization that has built meaningful

cooperation in combating terrorism. Pakistan and India are in the process
of becoming its members. The SCO has an institutional focus towards
counter-terrorism, its sub-entity, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
(RATS) provides a robust framework for SCOs anti-terror efforts.34
RATS has been acting for over 12 years as a coordinating structure
facilitating the fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism.
The Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism and
Extremism was adopted in 2001 and the SCO Convention Against
Terrorism complemented it in 2009. The SCO formalized unified
legal definitions of terms like terrorism, terrorist act, terrorist
organization, etc.

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
RATS serves as a meeting platform for SCO member states
counter-terrorism agencies and facilitates intelligence sharing in the
form of a joint database and blacklists of individuals and groups linked
to terrorism. In October 2015 the first ever joint anti-terrorist exercise
of SCO called Xiaomen-2015, focusing on counteracting the use of
internet for terrorist, separatist and extremist purposes was conducted
in China.35 The objective of the exercise was to study legal aspects,
organizational and technical capacities as well as joint action plans and
mechanisms for cooperation.36
SCO has established contacts and executed regulatory legal acts

regarding RATS cooperation with numerous international organizations
like the UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Interpol, the Eurasian
Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing,
the CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre, etc.37 With potential enlargement, the
SCO could become an important player in the fight against terrorism in
Eurasia.38
Heart of Asia(HoA)-Istanbul Process
Pakistan is also a member of the HoA-Istanbul Process. The Process

provides an agenda for regional cooperation in the Heart of Asia by
placing Afghanistan at its center and engaging the Heart of Asia
countries for contributing to the stability and prosperity of Afghanistan
and its surrounding region. The countries participating in the Istanbul
Process take part in continuous and effective dialogue between
Afghanistan and its near and extended neighbours concerning all issues
of common interest and importance for Afghanistan and the region as
a whole. It also seeks to stabilize Afghanistan through infrastructural
development. Pakistan is of the view that a stable prosperous and
peaceful Afghanistan is a prerequisite for eliminating terrorism
from South Asia. Pakistan is funding some important infrastructure
related projects. Despite scarcity of finances, Pakistan is contributing
generously for helping Afghanistan - infrastructural projects of half a
billion dollar are at various stages of implementation.

Quadrilateral Coordination (QCG)
QCG comprises of Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the US. QCG

is pursuing to open a new chapter in the ongoing search for a peace
process for Afghanistan. So far the group has met four times. Although
sustainable direct talks with the Taliban are yet to begin, behind the
scene effort is continuing. Despite its slow progress, QCG is envisaged
by the international community as the most suitable platform to achieve
tangible results with regard to peace in Afghanistan. From this platform,
Pakistan has been making strenuous efforts to bring the Taliban to the
negotiating table.
The Saudi Led Alliance
The Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT)

(alternative translation Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition) is
an intergovernmental military alliance of countries in the Muslim world
united around military intervention against Daesh and other terrorist
activities.39 Its primary objective is to protect Muslim countries from
all terrorist groups. The coalition has stated that it will fight terrorists in
Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Afghanistan. The IMAFT has reaffirmed
that it would operate in line with the UNO and Organization of Islamic
Conferences (OIC) provisions on terrorism.40 Keeping in view the
relevance, Pakistan welcomed the initiative and became its founding
member. The setting up of this organization has been widely appreciated.
Pakistans former Army Chief General (R) Raheel Sharif has been
approached to head this organization,41 which is an acknowledgement
of Pakistans contribution towards regional counter terrorism efforts.42
Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM)
Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM)

was launched on August 03, during a meeting of the military leadership
of China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan, in Urumqi.43 They aim
to coordinate and provide mutual support to four countries in the fields
of counter terrorism situation evaluation, clue verification, intelligence
sharing, counter terrorism capacity building, counter terrorism joint

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
training exercises and personnel training. It could help in reducing
the mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan.44 The QCCM has
also affirmed to adhere to the principles of the UN charter and other
universally recognized principles and norms of international law. The
formation of QQCM has been welcomed by the US and other counties.45
Border Management
Pakistan is keen to secure its borders with all neighboring countries.

Institutional arrangements, including conflict management mechanism,
are in place with all adjoining countries. Keeping in view the counter
terrorism effort, border management with Afghanistan is of special
significance to Pakistan.46 Since 9/11, Pakistan has been floating various
proposals to Afghanistan. Despite acceptance of necessity of efficient
and effective border management, Afghan governments participation
has, at best, been lukewarm.
While the Durand Line constitutes the legal international border

between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the rubric of easement rights
to various Pashtun and other tribes has come to be misunderstood as
facilitative of cross border movement at will. Based on the premise of
easement rights, the Pak-Afghan border has unwittingly emerged as a
soft border. It is important to understand that easement rights are only
exercisable by members of the tribes divided by the Durand Line and are
not available to other ordinary nationals of Afghanistan or Pakistan.47
UNSCR 1373 permits Pakistan to legitimately stop and check people
sporadically crossing the international border in order to comply with
its obligations to deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support,
or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens and to prevent those
who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their
respective territories for those purposes against other states or their
citizens.48
An effective immigration mechanism at all crossing points along

the Pak-Afghan border is necessary to crush terrorism. Both countries
would benefit from requisite border management.

Domestic Level Efforts
Pakistan has taken numerous concrete steps at a national level which

are radiating positive effects within the country as well as at the regional
level. These are summarised in the following text.
National Action Plan. Pakistan has launched a 20-point National

Action Plan (NAP) which is a multi-disciplinary effort to curtail the
space to terrorist individuals and entities. NAP combines military action,
law enforcement operations, choking terrorist financing and countering
extremist narrative. This strategy has produced impressive results. Year
2015 saw the lowest number of terrorist attacks and suicide bombings
since 2007; however, 2016-17 witnessed high profile terrorist attacks
in various cities of Pakistan. This trend was in line with the increased
frequency of high profile terrorist attacks in various cities of Europe
and elsewhere. After a series of attacks in February 2017, national
resolve towards implementation of NAP has strengthened. Progress is
monitored at the highest level of leadership, the Prime Minster chairs
such meetings.
Military Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Military operation, Zarb-e-Azb,

was launched in North Waziristan in June 2014. It is the largest counter
terrorism effort anywhere in the world. It has produced remarkable
results. Most Terrorists sanctuaries, command & control centres and
infrastructure have been destroyed.49 Thousands of terrorists have been
killed or captured. The rest are on the run. As the operation goes into
its final phase, their few remaining hideouts will be cleared. Within
less than three years, the tide has turned against terrorism in Pakistan.
The outcome of this operation has been widely acknowledged by the
international community.
Military Operation Radd-ul-Fassad. Terrorist attacks during February

2017 were large in number as well as lethal. These were conducted in
various urban centres located in all provinces. This well synchronised
and wide spread terrorist activity brought forth the fact that terrorist
elements still retained the capacity to conduct terrorist attacks at places
and timing of their choosing. This necessitated a country wide effort.

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
Hence, countrywide Operations Radd-ul-Fassad was launched to
counter terrorist entities and individuals.50 For the first time security
forces were given political level clearance to even carry out trans-border
attacks to dismantle the structures supporting terrorist activities from
across Afghanistan.51
Nationwide Re-identification of Pakistani Citizens. National Database

and Registration Authority (NADRA) has embarked upon a massive
exercise to re-identify its over 200 million citizens.52 This pursuit shall
help in identifying aliens/ people of dubious origin who could have
obtained citizenship through deceit.
Electronic Surveillance. A plan to install tracking chips [ankle bands]

on 1,700 people being monitored for terrorist links is underway as the
government has introduced the relevant legislation in this regard.53 Law
enforcement agencies had already identified the people last year.
Conclusion
Significant improvement in the security situation in Pakistan could

not have been possible without the resolve of the people, parliamentary
consensus and the dedication and sacrifice of the security forces. The
entire nation came together to counter and confront this menace. The
blood that has been shed has only strengthened the national resolve to
fight until the last terrorist is eliminated. The task is not yet accomplished
and a lot of space in the realm of counter terrorism is still untraversed.
The silver lining is that the resolve to continue is unwavering.
However, Pakistans criticism at the international level, with

regard to its counter terrorism effort is unwarranted. The international
community must acknowledge that terrorism emerges from multiple
sources. We need to address not only the symptoms, but also its root
causes, which are often to be found in political or social alienation
and exclusion, as well as extreme poverty. Identifying terrorism with
a specific culture or group is disingenuous. It only serves to shift the
responsibility, but does not mitigate the challenge of terrorism which so
many societies face today.

Pakistan has taken and is taking numerous steps to counter terrorist
generated violence by focusing on the activities of terrorist entities
and individuals. These steps have contributed towards curtailing
terrorism related violence within the country and the region. Pakistan
is coordinating its counter terrorism efforts with regional and global
regimes as well. Pakistan is party to and compliant of all UN resolutions
on combating terrorism.
At the regional level, Pakistan actively participates in all regimes

working towards countering terrorism. The menace of terrorism is
neither country nor region specific, rather it has spread its tentacles
everywhere and nobody is safe from it. State and regional level counter
terrorism efforts are expected to yield only partial successes, that too
patchy, fragile and reversible. It is time that the United Nations should
convene an international convention on counter terrorism to make bold
course corrections in the light of lessons learnt from global experience
in countering terrorism since 9/11.
Refferences
1 Zachary Laub, The Taliban in Afghanistan, CFR Backgrounder, Council
on Foreign Relations, July 4, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-
afghanistan/p10551
2 Ibid.
3 Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal, Countering Regional Extremism and
Terrorism: Pakistans Perspective, Criterion Quarterly (Islamabad), Vol 10
No 3 , June-September 2015. http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/countering-
regional-extremism-and-terrorism-pakistans-perspective/ , (accessed on March
20, 2017).
4 Air Marshal (Retd) Ayaz Ahmed Khan, Terrorism and Asymmetrical Warfare
International and Regional Implications, Defence Journal, February 2002.
http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/february/terrorism.htm, (accessed on
March 20, 2017)
5 Regional approach needed to tackle terrorism in South Asia, Asia Times,
January 25, 2016, www.atimes.com/article/regional-approach-needed-to-tackle-
terrorism-in-south-asia/ (accessed on March 20, 2017).
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal, Countering Regional Extremism and
Terrorism: Pakistans Perspective, Criterion Quarterly (Islamabad), Vol 10

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
No 3 , June-September 2015. http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/countering-
regional-extremism-and-terrorism-pakistans-perspective/ , (accessed on March
20, 2017).
9 The Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, ACT NO. XXVII OF 1997, Dated 20th August,
1997. Josh and Mark International, https://joshandmakinternational.com/
resources/laws-of-pakistan/anti-terrorism-laws/the-anti-terrorism-act-1997/
(accessed on March 20, 2107)
10 Animesh Roul, South Asia: Hotbed of Islamic Terrorism, The National Bureau
of Asian Research, August 2008, http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.
aspx?id=136, (accessed on March 20, 2017).
11 Ibid.
12 UN observers to remain deployed on LoC, Daily Excelsior, 25 May 2000.
http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2000/kashmir20000525b.
html ( accessed on March 20, 2017).
13 U.S. Department of the State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview, (Chapter 2). In
Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, August 5, 2010. https://www.state.gov/j/
ct/rls/crt/2009/140886.htm (accessed on March 20, 2017).
14 Greg Botelho and Masoud Popalzai, CNN News Alert, ISIS claims deadly
attack on Pakistani Consulate in eastern Afghanistan, January 13, 2016. http://
edition.cnn.com/2016/01/13/asia/afghanistan-pakistan-consulate-attack/index.
html (accessed on March 20, 2017).
15 BTI 2016, Pakistan Country Report https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/
country-reports/detail/itc/pak/itr/aso/ (accessed on March 20, 2017).
16 Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer.ed., Convergence, Illicit Networks
and National Security in the Age of Globalization. (Center for Complex
OperationsInstitute for National Strategic StudiesBy National Defense University
Press Washington, D.C.2013), https://www.scribd.com/document/239594196/
Convergence (accessed on March 20, 2017).
Ibid.
17 Pakistan confronts extremism, Job half-done: The army and the government
have taken the fight to the enemywithin limits The Economist, December 16,
2015. http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21684178-army-and-government-
have-taken-fight-enemywithin-limits-job-half-done , (accessed on March 20,
2017).
18 United Nations Headquarters, New York, Remarks by President Obama
to the United Nations General Assembly, September 28, 2015. https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/remarks-president-
obama-united-nations-general-assembly , (accessed on March 20, 2017).
19 War Crimes Prosecution Watch, Volume 9 - Issue 3, May 5, 2014, http://
www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/
WCPW_050414_newmaster.html , (accessed on March 20, 2017).
20 Mariam Shafqat, Emerging order in Asia Pacific: Indian opposition to CPEC
ill-advised: Aziz. Express Tribune (Islamabad), November 19, 2015. https://

tribune.com.pk/story/994162/emerging-order-in-asia-pacific-indian-opposition-
to-cpec-ill-advised-aziz/ (accessed on March 20, 2017).
21 SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and its Additional
Protocol, http://www.saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/detail.php?activity_
id=21 ,(accessed on March 20, 2017)
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 PM calls for joint efforts by SAARC to root out corruption, terrorism,
Nation(Islamabad), August 05, 2016. http://nation.com.pk/national/04-
Aug-2016/pm-calls-for-joint-efforts-by-saarc-to-root-out-corruption-terrorism .
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia.http://opinion.bdnews24.
com/2016/02/25/counterterrorism-cooperation-in-south-asia/ .
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 New Asian security concept for new progress in security cooperation (Remarks
at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the Peoples Republic of China,
at Shanghai Expo Centre), 21 May 2014, http://china.org.cn/world/2014-05/28/
content_32511846.htm ,(accessed on March 20, 2017).
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Moritz Rudolf, Marc Julienne, & Johannes Buckow, Chinas Counterterrorism
Campaign Goes Global, Diplomat, June 03, 2015. http://thediplomat.
com/2015/06/chinas-counterterrorism-campaign-goes-global/ , (accessed on
March 20, 2017)
35 Yevgeniy Sysoyev, Europeans Believe SCO RATS is a Successful Platform to
Combat Terrorism, RATS News, June 24, 2016. The Regional Anti-Terrorist
Structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (RATS SCO). http://ecrats.org/
en/news/6175 .
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Islamic Military Alliance, http://www.wow.com/wiki/Islamic_Military_
Alliance .
40 Pakistan Defence Command, Face Book. https://www.facebook.com/
OfficialPakistanDefenceCommand/photos/a.424786794312436.1073741828.42
4759244315191/478950162229432/?type=3&theater (accessed on March 20,
2017).
41 Pakistans ex-army chief General Raheel Sharif to lead Saudi military alliance Fast
Mail, http://www.thefastmail.com/page/detailnews/pakistans-ex-army-chief-
general-raheel-sharif-to-lead-saudi-military-alliance/41397#sthash.9ycOpvYz.

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
dpuf, (accessed on March 20,2017).
42 Ibid.
43 QCCM: A new counter terrorism regional bloc of Pakistan China Afghanistan
Tajikistan, Times of Islamabad, August 03, 2016. https://timesofislamabad.com/
qccm-a-new-counter-terrorism-regional-bloc-of-pakistan-china-afghanistan-
tajikistan/2016/08/03/ , (accessed on March 20, 2017).
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Terrorism Threat In South Asia And Its Implications International Law Essay,
UK Essays, Last edited March 23, 2015. https://www.ukessays.com/essays/law/
terrorism-threat-in-south-asia-and-its-implications-international-law-essay.php ,
(accessed on March 20, 2017)
47 Measures to manage Pak-Afghan border welcomed, Dawn, Jun 14, 2016,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1264663
48 Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Management: A Legal Perspective, Pakistan
Institute for Legislative Development and Transparency. ISBN: 978-969-558-
480-4. Published March 2015.
49 Dr. Maria Sultan, Crushing Terrorism - National Resolve, Hilal English,
June 2015 No 12, Vol 51 (ISPR: 2015). http://hilal.gov.pk/index.php/layouts/
item/1433-crushing-terrorism-national-resolve .
50 Radd-ul-Fasaad: Pakistan Army announce nationwide operation, Jasarat
News, February 22, 2017. http://www.jasarat.org/2017/02/22/rud-ul-fassad-
pakistan-armed-forces-announce-nationwide-operation/ (accessed on March 20,
2017).
51 Pak army destroys militant hideouts in Afghanistan in cross border attacks,
News International (Islamabad), February 18, 2017. https://www.thenews.
com.pk/latest/186995-Pak-army-destroys-militant-hideouts-near-Pak-Afghan-
border.
52 Now re-verify your NADRA CNIC & Family Tree through SMS, News Teller,
June 27, 2016. http://www.thenewsteller.com/pakistan/now-re-verify-your-
nadra-cnic-family-tree-through-sms/37866/ .
53 Pakistan Prints, Defence News, https://www.defensetech.org/2004/12/15/
pakistan-prints/ (accessed on March 20, 2017).

ISIS in Pakistan & Afghanistan: From Rhetoric to Reality
ISIS IN PAKISTAN & AFGHANISTAN:

FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY
The Monster Reaches our Doorstep
Ozer Khalid*
Abstract
(This essay explores ISIS`s presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, how its
poisonous ideology will shape both existing and upcoming extremists in
the region, and what a resilient response from the Pakistani government,
authorities and civil society could entail. Author)
Pakistan already has an over-crowded terror operating theater which

is why ISIS Khorasan (ISIS-K denoting the ISIS South Asian affiliate)
has not found it easy to make institutionalized inroads. Vestiges of
Al Qaeda remain, Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP ) - especially the
Fazlullah faction - are still the fiercest extremists. They recently pursued
realigning with Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Sipah-i-Sahaba who bear a soft
spot for ISIS-Khorasan, per intelligence agencies. The killings of SP
Chaudhry Aslam in Karachi and ANP leader Bashir Bilour in Peshawar
are grim reminders of such radical alignments.
Though there is still no overwhelming explicit evidence of ISISs

central leadership in Iraq and Syria actively, consistently and overtly
directing terrorist activities in Pakistan, its poisonous ideology has
spread like cancer amongst our midst, inspiring individuals or groups in
South Asia (at times autonomous previously unaffiliated ones) to recruit,
raise funds, logistically organize and execute attacks to demonstrate to
* zer Khalid is a Senior Consultant, Geo-Strategist and Freelance Writer. He can

be reached on ozerkhalid@yahoo.com or Twitter followed on @ozerkhalid
The opinions expressed in this essay are analytical and expert views offered by field
specialists who have been duly cited and referenced at length, and do not necessarily
always overlap with this author`s nor with Criterion Journal`s official stance.

zer Khalid
ISIS their support. It is this potential for convergence among multiple
terrorist groups that causes most consternation and cause for concern.
ISIS-K`s regional ruling ambitions, ubiquitous social media sway,

radical extremist ideology, and vast recruitment pool of existing and
potential militants in Pakistan, imply that ISIS-K cannot be ignored as a
potentially pernicious threat to Pakistan`s social fabric and its subsequent
fallout for the entire South and Central Asian region as a whole.
A mlange of push and pull factors contributed to these

local militants decision to join ISIS push aspects include a
disillusionment with their idols in TTP or the Afghan Taliban plus TTPs
losing grip of territorial control in the Federally Administered Tribal
Agencies (FATA), which obliged its top brass to worm their way into
Afghanistan. Pull factors include a virulent Apocalyptic allure toward
the ideology and successes of ISIS or its ability to bankroll extremists
more lucratively than other radical groups.
ISIS-K enjoys much more influence and traction in Afghanistan as

compared to Pakistan though recently they have gained an increasing
foothold in Pakistan as well, with copious evidence of their nationwide
penetration. ISIS is
not finding it easy to
fully operationalize
itself in Pakistan
due to commendable
law enforcement
clampdowns and
military operations in a
more stable Pakistan as
compared to a strife and
war-torn Afghanistan,
yet ISIS-K networks
have emerged in the
shadows.
Source: Iranian Diplomacy IRD (2016) IS Activity in Afghanistan and Pakistan

The government of Pakistan understandably does not want to stir
up an alarmist hornets nest over ISIS-K, but as time unfolds ISIS in
South Asia has evolved from a fledgling operation to a mature terrorist
organization capable of carrying out complex and diverse attacks,
conducting fifth generation asymmetrical warfare, reconnaissance and
retaliation missions using escape and evasion techniques. Nave or
negligent deniability can no longer be used to cloak the reality that
ISIS-K in South Asia is a hazardously growing menace.
This essay explores ISIS`s presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan,

how its poisonous ideology will shape both existing and upcoming
extremists in the region, and what a resilient response from the Pakistani
government, authorities and civil society could entail.
ISIS IN SOUTH ASIA A SPECTATOR OR A SPOILER?

Beginnings, Background and Context
The Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, Tehreek-e-Taliban

Pakistan, Taliban Fazlullah faction, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-
Mohammed, Ahle-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat are just some of the unsavoury
terror organizations that were orchestrating deadly operations in
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India much before the advent of ISIS.
Prior to 2014, ISIS-K South Asia was a mere spectator, but

thereafter has become a spoiler of significant proportion. ISIS has been
expansionist in South Asia since 2014. In initial maps released by ISIS
Iraqi & Syrian head-quarters, the merciless death merchants of the
Levant envisaged far-reaching geographical expansion whose caliphate
was to span from Spain in the West to India and China in the east. South
Asia prominently being featured in their initial map makes the region
intensely susceptible to their sinister designs.
ISIS-K is run by a deviant distorted strain of Sunni fanatics.

They exploit raw emotions yearning for the delusional grandeur of a
bygone era of Salafist Takfiri literalist ideological indoctrination. This
worldview coalesces with some South Asian theocratic clerics, thirsting
for the dj vu of theocratic empire-building.

zer Khalid
Such wayward nostalgic dreamers relish the renaissance of age-
old caliphates. It is these very sentiments and nave impulses which
remain entrenched in a tiny minority of brain-washed ideologically-
conditioned South Asian militant fascists, hell-bent on super-imposing
and force-feeding their narrowly distorted version of religion over all
of society. It is this deadly and dreamy nostalgia that ISIS-K exploits
to the hilt, riding on a populist, identity-based sectarian tide of insular
dogma.
ISIS-K zealots, eerily growing in number, have snaked their way

into Afghanistan, Bangladesh (witness the recent lynching of multiple
secular bloggers), a radicalized minority in Pakistan and an inflammatory
India where an orgy of RSS BJP induced communal violence and the
lynching of Muslims has anti-climaxed to pre-partition 1947 proportions.
Such an inhumane treatment of Muslims in India, of wrongly

accusing them of eating beef, gifts the ghastly ISIS-K India grounds
to exploit legitimate Muslim grievances, and commit atrocities,
take for instance the March 2017 Madhya Pradesh train blast
claimed by a self-proclaimed Indian èmir` of ISIS-K.
Under Modi`s government, the so-called largest democracy

on earth, India, is where religious, ethnic, minority and communal
violence and bigotry are at an alarming high. The Dadri, Dimapur and
Jharkhand mob lynches in India with flagrant human rights violations in
Occupied Kashmir - a valley where tears flow from the eyes of mothers
and pellets are fired into the eyes of their sons, where Burhan Wani
is iconoclastically idolized as society gets radicalized is igniting the
country towards incendiary fascism. A highly toxic cocktail in a heavily
nuclearized South Asia.
ISIS-K South Asia banks on a psychological breakdown of the

Islamic society from deep within, which as witnessed above, is exactly
what is occurring, leaving behind a trail of victims and an identity based
insecurity vacuum swiftly filled by ISIS-K.

South Asia`s imperialist legacy and the British Raj have also left
an indelible grievance and a victimhood subjugation mentality in South
Asia. Scarring the egos, hearts and minds of angry insecure theocrats,
whose offspring, to this day, remain intoxicated by an insatiable anger
towards Western colonialists and coalition forces, makes it easier for
ISIS-K and other terror miscreants to infiltrate their minds and incite
their desire for historical revenge.
Such misplaced pent up frustration and anger is a malevolent malaise

channeled and vented in all the wrong ways, for all the wrong reasons,
by all the wrong people, which explains (to a degree) the recent spate of
mob lynching in Afghanistan, Bangladesh and India.
ISIS-K and other militants, frothing at the mouth, feed off such
frustration not only to survive but to thrive. Exacerbating ethnic sectarian
and religious bigotry and bias, most notably between Shias and Sunnis,
is their most favourite fetid past time - creating generational rifts
amongst fellow Muslims in already highly-strung sectarian societies
such as Afghanistan, India and Pakistan.
ISIS-K fascists articulate the artificiality of borders carved out

during the British Raj. They highlight the manufactured nature of
nation-states in the region and artificial borders carved up amongst
them only to divide, rule and conquer. Interestingly, this conceptually
feeds into Benedict Anderson`s seminal theory of nations being nothing
more than imagined communities. Just like imperialist predecessors,
ISIS too by accentuating a non-realistic global Caliphate seeks to
super-impose an imagined community over the Ummah, wilfully
ignoring that there can never be a single interpretation of Islam. That
Islam is a mosaic and not a monolith.
ISIS-K label all South Asian nation states as phony and convince
malleable minds that existing governments are illegitimate sham
democracies bought by the highest financial bidders. Pseudo-democracies
and oligarchies for sale from rented states.

zer Khalid
As ISIS in Iraq and Syria are suffering crushing defeat, where Syria
is likely to be chopped up into multiple pieces, they have now focused
their recruitment efforts in farther flung corners such as Chinas Xinjiang
province, the Caucasus, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. With
incremental but incessant momentum ISIS activates their terror cells
in China, the Caucuses and South Asia via network building and
establishing contacts with like-minded Salafi Takfiri radicals, weaving a
web of influence in South and Central Asia to offset territorial setbacks
in the Middle East. In Iraq itself ISIS has lost 50% of the territory it
once held and 25% of its land grab in Syria has been reclaimed by the
opposition.
From the get-go ISIS Khorasan (ISIS-K) South Asia was a secondary
contingency plan if they were to lose the Middle East. Such contingency
planning and back-up shows their ability of foresight and also unearths
their expansionist aims and claims. They eventually envisage uniting
radicals in Pakistan and Afghanistan, co-opting even the Taliban (which
will never happen), as a single army and, at the same time, have been
asking al-Qaeda (again impossible) to join their ranks in an unholy
alliance to erect and establish a single Islamic caliphate.
As the initial Arab founders of IS were busy in the raging blood

drenched battlefields of Iraq and Syria, they saw an opportunity with
the fracturing of TTP and immediately started courting South Asian
terror misfits to embrace their global franchise as local chapters in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, just as any global trans-national entity
would, in what this CQ author dubbed (in a previous CQ edition) as IS
being a new breed of Multi-National Terrorist Corporation (MTC)
in the 21st century.
Establishment of Isis Khorasan: The Monster reaches South Asian

doorsteps
From the ashes of a botched up Iraq invasion emerged ISIS in Iraq

and Syria. Its preliminary territorial land grab attracted many terrorist
outfits and recruits to its fold. In an already over-saturated South
Asian terror theater, the self-proclaimed Caliph, Al-Baghdadi, and IS

leadership declared Afghanistan, Pakistan and Northern India as the
state of Khorasan envisioned to be led by IS in South Asia.
ISs self-styled Khorasan Province branch (ISIS-K) has taken root

in the mountainous areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, intensifying its
recruiting drive and terror attacks nationwide. The word Khorasan refers
to a centuries-old description of Afghanistan and surrounding areas of
Central Asia and Iran.
ISIS chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appointed Qari Hafiz Saeed Khan,
a former TTP leader of Orakzai agency, as the organizations commander
and the Wali (Governor) of the affiliate or Wilayat (Province) Khorasan
for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The graphic hereunder casts light on ISIS Khorasan, the multiple

stakeholders involved in Pakistan and Afghanistan and some of their
competing claims:
Source: Singh, Hardeep (2016) The Quint, August 11, 2016.

zer Khalid
Hafiz Saeed Khan lived in the tribal belt nestled between the Pak-
Afghan border. Hafez Saeed Khan became the head of a twelve member
Shura (Committee) comprising of nine Pakistanis and two Afghans.
The composition of the Shura with nine Pakistanis has empowered

ISIS-K to intensify operations more heavily in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The top brass of the Wilayat Khorasan Shura, have an established
understanding of the Pakistani terrain, its security vulnerabilities and how
to manipulate the grievances of its citizenry. Their clout, connections,
tribal-feudal associations and know-how offer Wilayat Khorasan (aka
ISIS-K) an augmented support and recruitment base in Pakistan. Shura
member Omar Mansoor for instance has links to Lal Masjid (Red
Mosque) in Islamabad, a blatant networking nexus for militants.
The Shuras link with the Lal Masjid could help ISIS establish
connection with a myriad of mushrooming neo-terrorist alliances and
could enable them to recruit from Deobandi madrassas all over Pakistan,
linked to Lal Masjid. All the more reason why Pakistan`s intelligence
agencies must keep Lal Masjid and its undesirables under microscopic
scrutiny and accountability.
Notoriously, back in 2014 a girl`s seminary, Jamia Hafsa, associated

with the controversial cross-dressing cleric Abdul Aziz of Lal Masjid
pledged allegiance to ISIS in a video message. The cowardly cross-
dressing cleric saving his own skin as usual pledged support for ISIS
during various hate-spewing Lal Masjid sermons. Tashfeen Malik, of
the San Bernardino attack infamy, was also linked to the Red Mosque.
Tashfeen pledged allegiance to the demonic death cult ISIS in a social
media message before unleashing hell in San Bernardino, USA.
ISIS-Khorasan in Afghanistan
Afghanistan was never a final vision for ISIS-K. Their premier

aim was to convert pockets of Afghanistans soil into a center for
secondary spread of the crumbling caliphate to facilitate the spread
to farther-flung destinations. ISIS-K in Afghanistan, largely formed up
of formerly embittered ex-Taliban members, is particularly interested

in the peripheral provinces of Afghanistan, the eastern border regions
of Iran, Central Asia (Russia), and Chinas far-west Muslim Xinjiang
Province, where recently ISIS Uighurs threatened rivers of blood in
China.
Therefore, strategically speaking, Al-Baghdadi and his coterie of

sycophants envision Afghanistan not as a simple extension of their
caliphate but to fulfil the role of being a launch pad and passage
given the strategic geography of Afghanistan as a nerve-center crucially
connecting Central Asia to South Asia.
ISIS-K maintains that the Greater Khorasan region is the eastern

portion of its caliphate, commencing from Central Asia, encompassing
China, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and culminating in northern India.
These lands were historically ruled by the Umayyad and Abbasid
dynasties. These dynasties, unlike the Crusaders, never imposed Islam
by the sword but relied on the might and influence of the intellectual
pen.
ISIS-K sets its strategic sights on three portions in Afghanistan.

The first being the northeastern part of Afghanistan, which borders
Fergana valley; Chinas Xinjiang Province and Central Asia (including
Central Asian Republics (CARs) such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and
Kyrgyzstan).
Thesecond regionencompasses Afghanistans Farah and Helmand

regions as well as the southern part of the country, which strategically
borders a nuclear Iran, increasingly relevant especially if the Iran deal
and the Geneva talks unravel and an assertive Tehran decides to reassert
her nuclear muscles. ISIS-K is attempting to gain influence in Helmand,
where 91 % of Afghanistans opium is made - a lucrative and secure
source of criminal revenue to finally consolidate its deadly domination
over the region.
Thethird regionis the eastern region, which nestles between

Pakistans border regions and Afghanistans Khost and Nuristan
provinces, a mountainous terrain whose umbilical cord stretches to

zer Khalid
Pakistans North Waziristan. Local groups, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and
other trigger-happy terror active ethnicities like the Uyghurs, Uzbeks,
Tajiks and some subgroups of al-Qaeda are present in this terror crowded
region.
To begin with, the relation between ISIS-K and Taliban was peaceful.
In July 2014 ISIS-K even convinced the Taliban to allow themselves into
Afghanistan as yet another insurgent militant group that would share
the (distorted) Jihadi space alongside numerous other Central Asian
and Middle Eastern zealots already active there. By the end of 2014 it
became apparent that ISIS-K was pro-actively persuasively poaching
Taliban commanders to its sway.
Tensions simmered and in February 2015 armed conflict reached

boiling point between the two groups in Helmand, before swiftly
spreading all over Afghanistan.
Still ISIS-K`s footprint in Afghanistan and Pakistan was comparably

precarious as compared to the South Asian veteran, the Taliban. The
most violent conflict between ISIS and the Taliban erupted in Nangarhar.
From June 2015 onwards bitter tribal rivalries beset competing Taliban
commanders. This was not, by any grand design, hatched by Daesh`s
central command in Syira or Iraq.
ISIS-K, in a few instances, even tactically triumphed over the Taliban

in places like Shinwari and Mohmand Dara in eastern Nangahar. This
blatant turf war between ISIS-K and the Taliban implied that all ISIS-K
associated units in Afghanistan came under mounting pressure from the
Taliban.
Their Nangarhar victory was offset by the destruction of the pivotal

ISIS-K base, in Kajaki (Helmand), and by the assault on numerous
ISIS-K units in western Afghanistan, where the Taliban and the Iranian
Pasdaran became bedfellows to battle Daesh.
View below the conceptual and strategic differences and similarities

in the aims, methods and objectives of ISIS-K and Taliban:

Source: Sender, Hanna (2016) The Taliban and ISIS are more different than they are
alike, International Business Times.
Afghanistan, already a war-wracked faltering state, has profoundly

suffered from terrorism especially since 2001 following the ousting of
the Taliban regime, the departure of US troops, and a theocratic fascist
awakening across Central and South Asia. All of these realities render
Afghanistan fertile future ground for ISIS-K radicalisation. Afghanistan
might yet witness worse days ahead, given the presence of ISIS-K in its
fold.

zer Khalid
In 2014 and 2015 ISIS-K insurgents were mushrooming all over
Afghanistan owing to commanders of the Taliban, Hizb-i Islami and
other militants switching sides and forming new strategic allegiances.
Subsequently, from spring 2015 onwards, a procedure of consolidation
materialized, with ISIS-K seeking to birth robust bases in carefully
selected localities especially in easily defendable, mountainous
terrains such as Khogyani and Mohmand Dara in eastern Nangarhar.
Well-armed ISIS-K groups flocked to these areas.
The blood drenched Kabul suicide bombings in 2016, culminating in

the death of 81 innocent Shia Hazara Afghans coupled with 300 injuries
claimed by ISIS-K was by far the deadliest attack on Afghanistan`s
capital since 2001. ISIS-K venomously shows its deadly presence in
Afghanistan with a deafening bang. In April 2017, ISIS-K also claimed
responsibility for several suicide bombings in urban cities, most recently
at the gates of the presidential palace in Kabul, an attack that killed at
least five people.
Over the past two years the self-appointed Islamic State fortified its
foothold, especially in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan provinces, a
stone` s throw away from Pakistan. ISIS-K has insidiously been active
in eastern Afghanistan over the past two years. ISIS inflicted terror in
Northern Jouzjan province, where six employees of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were brutally killed. 1600
terrorists have pledged allegiance to ISIS in Nangahar. By March 2016,
intelligence officials estimated that the group had 2,000 to 3,000 fighters
across 11 districts.

Source: Institute for the Study of War (2016) ISIS-K control in Afghanistan, April
12, 2016.
The awakening of this new and unwanted Goliath on its Western

borders of the Durand Line, itself a highly porous and permeable
border gives Pakistan grave cause for concern. The Afghan spillover
into Pakistan along with the Taliban spring offensive in 2016 further
erodes the autonomy of an already quasi-impotent Kabul government.
The district, provincial and regional governments remain confined to
their urban epicenters, paving the way for ISIS-K militants to creep in
and fill the void.
In Afghanistan, if ISIS is not immediately curtailed, it might flare

up into an epic battle between the Islamic Republic and the Islamic
State which faces rigid resistance from the Taliban, who are unwilling
to cede ground without a fierce fight. Meanwhile, factions of TTP have
been opportunistically fence-sitting, ready to throw in the towel and join
the victors du jour.

zer Khalid
Mother of all bombs or Mother lode of bad ideas?
Partly to reassert US leadership on a global scale, partly to quell

ISIS-K`s cancerous spread in Afghanistan, partly to avenge the killing
of a green beret, and most notably to send North Korea`s nuclear trigger-
happy Kim Jung Un a decisive message to `reign it in`, President Trump
and the US military, very soon after the Tomahawk missile attack on
Syria, oversaw the US armed forces drop a 10 ton potent conventional
non-nuclear bomb off a cargo plane, (the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance
Air Blast (MOAB hereafter), colloquially labelled the mother of all
bombs) on a cave complex in eastern Afghanistan`s mountain tunnels
in the Tangi Assadkhel area of the Achin district in Nangarhar Province,
a stronghold of ISIS-K.
This is part of a stealth American aerial campaign against ISIS-K,

thus far averaging as many as 10 a day in the initial weeks of April
2017. This stealth maneuver was aimed at curtailing ISIS-K`s use of
caves, tunnels and an extensive belt of improvised explosive devices,
(roadside bombs), to resist Afghan and coalition operations. This
exercise now allegedly leaves only around 700 ISIS-K fighters across 3
districts compared to their previous stronghold over 11 districts.
This is the first time we have encountered an extensive

obstacle to our progress that was constituted by I.E.D.s, the
presence of tunnels and caves, and therefore the MOAB was an
appropriate weapon to use at this time, justified U.S. General
Nicholson. It was the right time to use it tactically against the
right target on the battlefield, and it has enabled us to resume our
offensive operations. The hidden posts and safe havens of IS
were hitherto impenetrable thus it was decided to use the MOAB
bomb to render such posts vulnerable. As Criterion Quarterly goes
to print there are no reports of civilian casualties as yet from the
MOAB.
After the U.S. MOAB attack ISIS-K has been on the defensive
throughout Afghanistan and even in Pakistan, where the TTP has
intensified attacks against them. This is slowing (but certainly not

eliminating) the recruitment drive by ISIS-K, despite the deep coffers
and generous funds lavished by ISIS-K for new recruits. Now even in
Nangarhar, where ISIS-K has been most territorially triumphant, the
terrorists are ceding ground.
The Taliban have been recently revitalized by talks with Russia as

the Kremlin courts them to forge an alliance to combat ISIS Khorasan,
understandably ruffling feathers in Washington.
In the grander scheme of things, all these factors combined are

strategically defeating for ISIS-Ks designs, as its initial image of being
àn invincible organisation` is being shattered from every nook and
corner of the globe. ISIS will eventually have to contend and reconcile
themselves with accepting a digital Caliphate increasingly reliant
on lone wolves and self-starters to do their bidding, as their physical
Caliphate crumbles.
Even sources within ISIS-K reportedly confess to facing mounting

pressure from some of its `well-oiled` donors to augment activities in
other peripheral regions, like Central Asia, leveraging its well-honed
contacts with Central Asian terror groups in northern Afghanistan.
Strategically we witness a paradigm shift of ISIS moving away from the
core (the Middle East) toward the periphery (Central Asia).
ISIS Khorasan in Pakistan
A short-lived truce titled the Waziristan Accord brokered in 2006 was

unsurprisingly broken by the two-faced Taliban. Another day. Another
bomb. Pakistan has been especially ensnared with the nefarious specter
of trans-national and domestic terrorism since 2007 where reprobates
from the venomous Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP hereafter) took an
unacceptable toll of human lives.
Sadly, after the Pakistani state`s noteworthy assaults against the

TTP in South Waziristan, swift follow up action was not executed and
the theocratic fascists deep-rooted themselves in Northern Waziristan,
where the rough and rugged treacherous topography and terrain

zer Khalid
enabled TTP to develop safe sanctuaries replete with training grounds,
armaments, artilleries and even manufacturing units for suicide vests
whilst brain-washing human clones to mount suicide assaults.
For inexplicable reasons, North Waziristan did not get sanitized by

anti-terror operations, affording the TTP carte blanche to mount terror
attacks on innocent victims with shocking impunity. US surgical drone
strikes in North Waziristan allowed the TTP to relocate, whilst stoking
intensified anger as at least 70,000 innocent Pakistanis lost their lives,
whereby a war on terror become a war of terror.
When the PML-N government warmed the seats of power in June

2013, it cosseted peace talks with terrorist leaders but it became promptly
ostensible that the forerunners of doom and gloom were only utilizing
such talks as a distracting `delay tactic` to regroup, reassemble and rearm
themselves, whilst attacking the Karachi airport leaving heavy scores
of human casualties. By means of reprisal, the noteworthy military
operation of Zarb-e-Azb was inaugurated with full fury, encompassing
both aerial and ground assaults.
The precision of aerial surveillance technologies allowed Pakistan`s

armed forces to pin-point the exact whereabouts of the terrorists, locating
their safe sanctuaries, arms, artilleries and training camps and targeting
them with meticulous precision, whilst avoiding civilian casualties.
Pakistan efficaciously flushed out large swathes of TTP led torment
from its topsoil.
Certain terror top brass were killed in the attacks while others
wormed their way into Afghanistan. Their backs were broken, yet the
TTP managed to subsequently spearhead unconscionable acts of terror
on our Army Public School children in Peshawar and the University of
Charsadda, inflicting an unacceptable loss of young innocent lives. The
APS and Charsadda inhumane Genocide renewed the resolve of a nation
on the edge and in fury to reclaim its safety and defeat the terrorists.
Sweep up operations with vigilant and far-reaching assaults on TTP

safe havens, by the highly able former COAS Raheel Sharif and his

brilliant cadre, significantly `contained` terror and Operation Zarb-e-
Azb was rightly dubbed a triumph.
Operation Zarb-i-Azb`s success splintered and dispirited

TTP, whereby a few of its rank and file were immediately
ready to sell their soul to ISIS-K for survival. Thereafter a few
splinter groups of TTP swore allegiance to the so-called ISIS-K
whose ethos is a hardwired hatred for humanity. Despite some sporadic
attacks, where ISIS-K eagerly claimed responsibility, it could not
find an easy foothold in Pakistan due to Operation Zarb-i-Azb and the
Rangers clean-up operations, thus it was constrained to concentrate in
Afghanistan. However recently their clout in Pakistan has augmented
as miscreants from Afghanistan cross the perilous porous border into
Pakistan.
Back in September 2014, ISIS commenced its treacherous attempt

to intensify its sphere of influence in Pakistan by distributing propaganda
leaflets in Peshawar and in bordering provinces of Afghanistan. The
twelve page propaganda pamphlet titled Fatah (victory) was published
in Pashto and Dari languages to ideologically indoctrinate whomsoever
read it, and was distributed in Peshawar along with Afghan refugee
camps striding the outskirts of the city.
The logo of their propaganda pamphlet bore the Kalma, the

historical stamp and declaration of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and a
Kalashnikov assault rifle. Some copies were also mysteriously sent to
Afghan journalists working in Peshawar.
ISIS knew exactly how to hit a raw nerve and how to prey on the
vulnerable - especially on displaced refugees who had risked life and
limb, kith and kin to save their lives and had nothing more to lose.
Since time immemorial, Afghan militant resistance organizations,

including the Haqqani Network (greatly disrupted by Operation Zarb-
i-Azb) Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan and the Tora Bora group have
published similar propaganda pamphlets, magazines and divisive
hate literature in Peshawars black markets. However none of their

zer Khalid
propaganda campaigns were as slick, catchy, or media-savvy as that of
ISIS. Their twelve page Fatah pamphlet immediately caught the eye,
making a strong ideological appeal to malleable minds amongst the
local population for supporting its struggle for the establishment of a
so-called Ìslamic` Caliphate, which obviously is a perverted distortion
of Islam and actually represents a profoundly intolerant theocratic
fascist super-imposition by a deluded cult of death merchants and
megalomaniacs.
There are competing narratives and conflicting reports about the

presence and operations of ISIS in Pakistan. This account aspires to be
as truthful, investigative and impartial as possible.
In February 2016, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar stated, The

Daesh (ISIS-K) has no presence in Pakistan. The other militant groups
which are already involved in anti-state activities are using its name.
On the other hand, Aftab Sultan, DG of the Intelligence Bureau
(IB) declared in front of the Senate Standing Committee on Interior
in the same month, Daesh was emerging as a threat in Pakistan
because certain militant groups had a soft corner for it. Examples
of such groups includeLashkar-i-Jhangvi and Sipah-i-Sahaba and
Ahle-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat.
Mr. Amir Rana, a security expert and director of the Pakistan

Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) informed this author in an interview
that ISIS have taken root in Pakistan whereby current extremists are
drawing rabid inspiration from ISIS who are the global trendsetters
in unleashing shock-and-awe terror like never before. Lt General (r)
Khalid Munir informed this author in an interview that ISIS does not
pose an imminent or immediate threat to Pakistan because they are the
same radicals operating under a new nomenclature, new cover same
pages, so to speak.
This writer begs of course to respectfully differ with the esteemed

Lt General (r) Munir, as I believe, based on empirical evidence that
ISIS, if left unchecked, presents a clear, present and imminent danger
to Pakistanis.

Daeshs ideological allure, global franchise, branding outreach,
meaningful financial coffers and social media ubiquity afford it room
even in Pakistans already crowded extremist space. ISIS-K`s agenda
and narrativewhich is anti-Shia, anti-Pakistan, anti-West, pro-
Caliphate, and pro-Kashmir liberation sentimentsrender it appealing
to fanatical half-wits such as the unsavoury Ahle-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat,
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Sipah-i-Sahaba who have all supported ISIS
in the past20 and are likely to do so in the future. This necessitates
that we intensify the scrutiny, monitoring and reporting of their illicit
activities.
New radical outfits are springing up, for example Sawt-al-Ummah

pledged allegiance to ISIS.This group is an offshoot of Hizb-ut-Tahrir,
whose campaign of support for an Islamic Caliphate (by instigating
military coups) could sway its members to gravitate toward ISIS.
Hizb-ut-Tahrir`s recruitment is especially potent and persuasive at
universities, outside mosques and in swaying disgruntled prisoners
towards extremism by exploiting their vulnerability.
However, the most poignant militant group in Pakistan, the TTP,

has not expressed support for ISIS elements in South Asia, owing to its
unholy alliance with the Afghan Taliban, which has suffered territorial
setbacks to ISIS since 2015. The LeT bears animosity towards ISIS as,
unlike ISIS-K, LeT does not attack citizens within Pakistan; however,
there have reportedly been former LeT members who have defected to
ISIS in Syria.
A number of militant outfits operating in Pakistan (but mostly

in Afghanistan) have notoriously pledged allegiance and loyalty to
ISIS-K; they include the ill-reputed Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost and
Maulvi Abdul Qahar, stalwarts of Salafi Takfiri militancy operating in
eastern Afghanistan`s Nuristan and Kunar provinces.
The Ahrar-ul Islam, a faction of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

(TTP), is already working along the lines of ISIS. Ahrar-ul-Islam do not
recognize Westphalian territorial boundaries or states between Islamic
countries, and are working for the establishment of a region-wide

zer Khalid
militant network throughout Southern and Central Asia. The group
doesnt recognize al Baghdadi as the caliph, but considered Mullah
Omar (Afghan Taliban`s now deceased founder) as a commander of
the faithful, echoing the sentiments held by the TTP . Similar is the
status of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as
Hizb-e-Islami Turkistan.
ISIS-K in Pakistan draws funding primarily from donations by

sympathisers, particularly from opaque Takfiri Salafi exporting Gulf
States, via groups like Abt-al-ul-Islam. ISIS-K militant operations
are bankrolled (though recently curtailed) via informal hawala (funds
transfer) networks from abroad, which underscores a dire need to
formalize the informal economy, intensify stock exchange subscription
and legislate more stringent Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and fund
transfer laws.
During the blood-drenched Safoora Chowrangi bus butchery in

Karachi several ISIS supporters were implicated of regularly donating
to the group. ISIS-K also raises funds through criminal activities. Again
in Karachi, a police detainee with alleged ties to Daesh confessed to
committing a series of bank robberies in Sindh and Balochistan to fund
terrorist acts.
Along with infiltration into Pakistan via Afghanistan, ISIS

are equipping themselves with logistical and financial firepower
and training and embedding àssets` in their host communities.
Quantitative estimates of the strength of ISIS membership and support
in Pakistan, according to a 2016 Royal United Services Institute report,
state that there were 7,0008,000 ISIS members based in Afghanistan
and 2,0003,000 based in Pakistan - this includes both fighters and
support elements.However, in its annual report on foreign fighters in
Syria, the authoritative New York based security consultancy firm, the
Soufan Group, estimated that as of August 2015 some 70330 Pakistani
nationals had travelled to Syria to fight for Daesh.

ISIS-K in Punjab
Pakistani authorities, on the other hand, offered alternative estimates.

In early 2016, Mr Rana Sanaullah, Punjab Law Minister, estimated that
no more than one hundred persons had left Pakistan to join Daesh. Some
of these are educated citizens. A glaring example being Noreen Leghari,
a girl with a promising future who was brain-washed and battle-hardened
in ISIS hinterland. She returned to Pakistan and was ready to don a
suicide vest in April 2017 to blow up all and sundry to smithereens on
Easter.
Mr Sanaullah added that Daesh (a synonym for ISIS-K) would

not be allowed to establish `roots` in Pakistan. Pakistani intelligence
agencies must closely monitor those 100-300 Pakistani citizens returning
from Iraq and Syria, placing them on a discrete high alert high-threat
`watch list`. As it is, often those battle-hardened disgruntled dogmatic
discontents who return back and reintegrate into Pakistani society (or
any other country for that matter) do so to solely sow the seeds of death,
demolition and destruction.
In Punjab, Pakistani authorities uncovered a similar network

of women in Lahore in December 2015. Pakistani authorities have
discovered Punjab based ISIS supporters who, though they had no ties
to Wilayat Khorasan had established links with ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
In 2015, one such group based in Daska tehsil of Sialkot

with eight suspects (three of which had received military training)
were arrested. They comprised of former Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and
Jamaatud-Dawa misfits who had taken oaths to impose a Caliphate
in Pakistan and were sending Pakistani volunteers to Daesh training
camps in Syria.16 Another cell uncovered in Lahore consisted of well-
educated women, who reportedly left for Syria with twenty others to
fight alongside Daesh in 2015. Both cells deployed social media to lure
new recruits.
ISIS-K recruitment includes recruitment networks in other major

urban areas. For instance in April 2016, Karachi police released a

zer Khalid
statement alleging that more than two dozen Daesh-linked militants
were operating in Karachi. Their venomous ideology has seeped its
way into South Punjab, which is why the military Operation Radd-ul-
Fasad is extremely well timed and required.
Pakistan`s Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) and intelligence

agencies are working day and night to curtail ISIS-K`s activities. In
September 2016 for instance the CTD pro-actively arrested at least four
terrorists belonging to Daesh, during a joint raid in Allama Iqbal Town
in Lahore.
The arrested suspects were Abdullah Aalam, Muhammad Hafeez,

Nisar Ahmed and Ahmed Tassawur who were planning to target
government buildings and sensitive installations in the provincial
capital. As per reports two 2kg explosives, detonators and weapons
were recovered during the operation near the Moon Market area.
In September 2016 Pak Army spokesperson Lieutenant General

Asim Bajwa briefed media outlets that the law enforcement agencies
have so far arrested 309 people associated with Islamic State (IS) in
Pakistan. Lieutenant General Bajwa stated that major terror attacks
planned by IS on targets, including the ministry of foreign affairs, foreign
embassies, consulates and their staff, the Islamabad airport, prominent
public figures, media persons and law enforcement personnel, were pro-
actively averted.
ISIS-K in KPK and FATA
ISIS-K have been notoriously active in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-

P) and Fata where the rugged terrain, geography (close proximity to
a porous Afghanistan) and demography all conspire to serve their
sinister agenda. In April 2017 authorities announced that at least 24
members of the Islamic State (IS) that had been involved in several
coordinated attackshad been arrested and their networks brought
down in Peshawar.
ISIS in Fata have been especially active from their targeted killing
of three soldiers in September 2016 to the killing of a FATA secretariat

employee in June 2016. On March 21, 2017 five terrorists, including
an IS commander, were killed in an intelligence based operation (IBO)
in Orakzai Agency.IS were planning to target the Shia Nauroz (New
Year) festivals.
In February 2017, pamphlets with the Daesh insignia were

distributed in Pakistan`s border area of Kurram Agency. The
black and white printouts, with images of beheadings, states
that after Daeshs success in Afghanistan, it will be intensifying
activities in Pakistans tribal belt of Hangu and Dera Ismail
Khan.Such areas must immediately be placed on high alert.
ISIS-K in Sindh
In Sindh thus far the Ranger`s clean-up operation since two years
has been momentous - nabbing many terror sanctuaries. In early 2016
Sindh polices Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) asserted that it has
not detected the direct presence of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Karachi
or other parts of the province so far, but there are self-styled militants
operating in small, individual groups after becoming inspired by the
Middle East-based terrorist organisation.
Such ISIS inspired lone wolves are autonomous terrorists stated

Raja Umer Khattab, the CTD Anti-Transnational Terrorists Intelligence
Group chief. Our continuous operations have busted the networks of
these like-minded groups, he added.
In Pakistan, al-Qaeda and TTP operatives are working together and

targeting officials and installations of security forces, he said. Their
affiliation with ISIS isnt possible as the latter has basically dislodged
al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq. The AQIS and TTP are working together and
recruiting young, religious-minded people at educational institutions,
the official added. Crackdowns were launched with the assistance of
intelligence agencies and several terrorists were arrested in Karachi.
Most of them were former members of religious groups or parties

who were expelled over their militant tendencies. Citing examples,

zer Khalid
Khattab mentioned Saad Aziz and Khalid Yousuf Bari, both well
educated middle class citizens, who were arrested by the CTD for their
involvement in the tragic Karachi Safoora Goth shooting where 47
members of the Ismaili community were atrociously gunned down in
May 2015. The banned extremist outfit Jundallahclaimed responsibility
for the bus shooting. Pamphlets supportingISIL, with whom Jundallah
claims allegiance, were also found at the crime scene.
Although Wilayat Khorasan initially claimed responsibility for the

Safoora Goth attack, the atrocity seems to have been masterminded by a
Pakistan-based cell headed by Saad Aziz, a former Al Qaeda sympathizer
who lacked any discernible links to or contact with Wilayat Khorasan or
Daesh in Syria and Iraq.
Deeper investigation also reveals that Bari (the other Safoora culprit)
independently provided funds and shelter to the members of his group
and that Baris wife, Naheed Baji, formed an organisation called Idara-
e-Al Zakirah Academy in Baloch Colony via which she recruited women
for the group and delivered hateful speeches inspired by ISIS. There
were about 20 women from affluent educated backgrounds working for
the academy. At the academy, young women were brainwashed and
delegated to amass financing for the group through Zakat (alms giving)
and donations.
During interrogation, Bari himself confessed that he was previously

associated with the Tanzeem-e-Islami and, after experiencing differences
with the organisation, he joined the Dr Akmal Waheed group, an al-
Qaeda affiliate. Bari was also associated with al-Qaeda Karachi chief
Umer Jalal. Apart from being involved in terrorist attacks itself, the
group facilitated al-Qaeda both financially and logistically.
The Safoora Goth terror manifestly exhibits that groups in Sindh

and all over Pakistan have internalized Daeshs ideology and their
Apocalyptic world-view despite having no direct link to ISIS nor its
regional affiliate nor its headquarters in the Levant.Such groups open
the possibility for disparate autonomous cells to form. They also
provide a platform for ISIS to commence operational ties with or inspire

the actions of unconnected local cells that share its abhorrent sectarian
agenda, which could perniciously bolster ISISs capacity to carry out
more elaborate attacks in Pakistan`s near-future. Time and again ISIS
have proven, the world over, that they are neither to be taken lightly nor
to be undermined.
ISIS` presence in Sindh was tragically reinforced in February 16,

2017, as a suicide bomber struck devotees at a Sufi shrine at
Sehwan, Sindh, where 88 innocent souls professing their faith
perished and over a 300 were injured beyond belief. Deash
claimed responsibility through its media wing.
ISIS in Balochistan
The presence of ISIS in Balochistan was felt for the first time after
the killing of Balochistan Bar Association, Advocate Bilal Anwer Kasi,
on August 8, 2016. His body was taken to the Civil Hospital Quetta. As
lawyers gathered at the hospital to pay homage to the deceased another
terrorist attack occurred. This time, a suicide bomb attack took over
70 lives and injured many more. ISIS claimed responsibility for this
attack. The attack seemed in line with Indias attempt to destabilize
Balochistan and, as a result, CPEC.
This attack was followed by the Police Training Academy attack

in Quetta (collaboration between Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and ISIS) and the
attack on the Shah Noorani sufi shrine.
Balochistan remains a strategically important province for Pakistan

because of its natural resources and deep-sea port of Gwadar. The
province, with its rugged terrain and borders with not only the other
provinces of Pakistan but also Iran and Afghanistan, seems to be the
ideal place for ISIS to establish its safe havens and implement its
expansionist strategies.

zer Khalid
Source: Al Jazeera (2017) attacks on shrines since 2005 in Pakistan.
Recommendations The Roadmap Ahead
Despite desperate disavowals from all official quarters, ISIS is

on a full-throttle recruitment drive in South Asia. This recruitment
is orchestrated for financing, geographical spread, autonomy and
ideological reinforcement,.
In order to assert its terror credentials - vis--vis donors and future

recruits - ISIS-K will seek to intensify its targeting of the Afghan
government, the Russian-Taliban alliance, Iranian and Western interests.
However, ISIS-K has not yet demonstrated the credibility, capabilities
nor the numbers of fighters to dent so many actors that are spread
across so many operational theaters.

ISIS-K is trying to exploit the patchwork of ethnicities and religious
sects present in Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, over the long haul
ISIS-K will prove a fragmenting fiefdom; a drop in an ocean of warring
militant factions; one of the many loud but shallow voices hurling for
religious absolutism. They might eventually reconcile themselves for a
digital caliphate as opposed to a physical caliphate, which al-Baghdadi
has in fact already alluded to.
Specifically for Pakistan, the inauguration of the China Pakistan

Economic Corridor (CPEC) marshals multiple merits and contributes
to peace in the erstwhile strife torn region. CPEC ushers in economic
progress and development. It indicates to miscreants that they will
sorely miss out if they do not mount atop the prosperity bandwagon of
growth. Many are heeding the government`s clarion call to lay down
their arms and align themselves with future progress.
Enemies of Pakistan, both internal and external, keep trying to

derail CPEC. To their detriment, CPEC continues to gain momentum
and their heinous plot to destabilize Pakistan along with other nefarious
conspiracies are being thwarted by a staunch security apparatus .36
The international community, with Russia taking the lead, has

commenced to accept the Afghan Taliban as a political reality, especially
in its bid to take on ISIS-K and act as a bulwark against it. The Afghan
National Unity Government and its Indian sympathizers fail to see
the advantage of giving political oxygen to the Taliban (even if only
temporarily) in order to bring peace in Afghanistan because they fear
being displaced from their seat in the government by the Taliban.
Pakistan is a major stakeholder in the peace process in Afghanistan,

since the ripple effect of a destabilized Afghanistan causes tremors in
Pakistan37, whose major development projects like the Central Asia-
South Asia power project, known by the acronymCASA-100038 (a $1.16
billion project currently under construction that will allow for the export
of surplus hydroelectricity from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Pakistan
and Afghanistan) and the TurkmenistanAfghanistanPakistanIndia
Pipeline (TAPI)39 are contingent upon peace in Afghanistan.

zer Khalid
The need of the hour is for Pakistan and Afghanistan to cast
aside differences and cement coordination and cooperation in their
erstwhile attempts to counter radical militancy. The common enemy
of both neighbours is terrorism, which is now visible in the shape of
ISIS-K. Pooling their intelligence resources can achieve a much needed
momentum in `countering and containing` (if not totally eliminating)
the ISIS so that it fails to establish its roots even in Afghanistan. Neither
Afghanistan nor Pakistan can elevate to their true potential as long as
terrorism rules the roost.
After APS, Charsadda, Quetta, Awara, Mohmand, Parachinar40,

Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Safoora Chowrangi, Lahore`s Mall Road blast and
countless other atrocities, Pakistani society has wholesale rejected
extremism and terrorism and is struggling to reclaim moderation and
the Quaid`s vision of Pakistan through Zarb-e-Azb, Radd-ul-Fassad,
CPEC, CASA, TAPI and the brokering of the recent ECO Summit in
Islamabad for regional stability, which Afghan senior leaders did not
attend to their detriment41.
Afghanistan must rekindle positive neighborly relations with

Pakistan, shed nefarious alliances with the mischief-making RAW
and learn from Pakistans experience on how to contain radicalization
without playing the age-old `blame game`.
Pakistans response to ISIS-K must be multi-pronged and

multifaceted. The strategy implemented thus far against ISIS-K has
primarily been through military action. Stealth military operations in
2015 swept out militant safe havens in the FATA, but these terrorists,
including Wilayat Khorasan (ISIS-K), made an unholy migration to
Afghanistan or Balochistan, in the latters case aided and abetted by
RAW to derail CPEC. Pakistan must now deploy fast-track bilateral and
multilateral diplomacy with Afghanistan to combat this looming terror
menace, focusing on better border control to stem the flow of terrorists
between both nations. Border dispute resolution is essential.
An effective effort to combat Daesh requires a civilian organization

at the helm of national affairs to assess, plan, sensitize, strategize and

orchestrate national counterterrorism (CT ) efforts vis--vis ISIS-K
and other militant misfits. The movement of radicals to urban cities
ensuing the clean-up operations in FATA requires a more significant
role by the local police. They can be as effective as the military as
they are permanently stationed in their communities. Recent training
co-operation between the IB and police is noteworthy.
A national CT stratagem could confine the utilization of paramilitary

wings for operations in semi-governed `tough` areas like the FATA and
Baluchistan and should simultaneously prioritize long-term training,
sensitization, logistical and operational capacity building for police
and civilian intelligence services to contain extremist elements in these
areas.
Print and electronic media should starve terrorists from the publicity
oxygen they strive for. Counter terrorism must, by course of necessity,
involve civil society, activist youth and grass-roots movements to
counter the main strength of ISIS-K in Pakistan - the resonance of its
insidious ideology amongst different segments of Pakistani society.
These plans, as an ensemble, should rectify Pakistans lethal anti-

state sectarian divisions through debate, dialogue, inter-faith inter-
sect goodwill building, workshops, community cohesion programs,
poverty mitigation programs, and resilience programs by our military
intelligence apparatus, government, bureaucracy, donors, foreign
missions and the well-funded deep-pocketed private sector. This will
all help to conceptually contain and curtail Wilayat Khorasan and other
fundamentalists in their tracks and stem the tide of their recruitment.
The government must designate grass-root community organizations

at the federal, provincial, district and tehsil (union) levels which develop
an alternative vision, a national narrative of democracy, liberal inclusive
values, tolerance, pluralism, multi-faith acceptance and the rule of law
to counter and contain the virulent spread of ISIS-like ideology.
Finally, this strategy must counter militant propaganda in all its

stripes shapes and forms, by empowering minorities and, most notably,

zer Khalid
marginalized women and youth, through comprehensive and sustained
outreach aspirations.42 For women and youth are our beacons and brand
ambassadors who represent our promise and potential for a better and
brighter Pakistan.
Selected Bibliography
Khalid, Ozer (2016) The Specter of Multi-National Terrorism in the 21st century, from
a Clash of Civilizations to a Consensus Coalition, Criterion Quarterly, Volume 11,
Number 1, May 27 (2016). Accessible to readers at http://www.criterion-quarterly.
com/the-spectre-of-multi-national-terrorism-in-the-21st-century/
Khalid, Ozer (2017) Islamabad`s ECO Summit, Express Tribune, March 3, 2017,
accessible at https://tribune.com.pk/story/1344259/islamabads-eco-summit/
Khalid, Ozer (2017) How Trump`s Anti Terror Strategy affects Pakistan, ARY Digital
News, January 24, 2017.
The article can be accessed at https://blogs.arynews.tv/trump-pakistan-terrorism/
Khalid, Ozer (2017) Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad: Pakistan`s Historic Calling, The

Express Tribune, February 27, 2017 the article can be accessed at https://tribune.
com.pk/story/1339945/operation-radd-ul-fasaad-pakistans-historic-calling/
Anderson, Benedict (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and

Spread of Nationalism.
Shakespeare, William (1997) MacbethinThe Norton Shakespeare. Edn. Stephen

Greenblatt. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997.
Darwin, Charles Robert (2001)The Origin of Species.Vol. XI. The Harvard Classics.
New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 190914, 2001.
Nye, Joseph (2011) The Future of Power, Public Affairs.
Mazetti, Mark (2013) The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the
Ends of the Earth, Penguin Press, 2013.
Naveeni, P. (2017)Madhya Pradesh train blast: Mastermind Al-Qasim, a self-

proclaimed India emir of Khorasan group.Times of India. 8 March,2017.
Bjrgo, Tore; John Horgan (2009) Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and
Collective Disengagement. Taylor & Francis. Especially pp.1-228.
Golovnina, Maria and Amjad Ali (2014)Peace talks between Pakistan and Taliban

collapse after killings.Reuters. February 17, 2014.
Khan, Wajahat S (2014) Zarb-e-Azb: Gear up for the forever war.A series of
special reports on Operation Zarb-e-Azb by the newspapers National Security
Editor. The News. 14 October, 2014.
Kumar, Rao (2016) ISIS in Afghanistan, part 3: Analyzing Wilayat Khorasans

Propaganda, (2016) Al-Jibaal Fi Hadha Dunya, February 20, 2016.
Antonio Giustozzi (2016) The Islamic State in Khorasan: A Nuanced View,

RUSI, February 5, 2016.
Zenn, Jacob (2014).Beijing, Kunming, Urumqi and Guangzhou: The Changing

Landscape of Anti-Chinese Jihadists.China Brief.Jamestown Foundation.14(10),
23 May, 2014.
Al-Furqn Media Presents a New Audio Message from the Islamic States Shaykh
Ab Muhammad al Adnn al-Shm: Say, Die In Your Rage, (2015) Jihadology,
January 26, 2015.
Interview with the Wali of Khurasan (2015) Dabiq, Issue 13, pp. 48-58.
Warren Fiske & Amy Sherman (2015)Trump says Iran deal forces U.S. to defend
Iran if its attacked by Israel,PolitiFact,September 4, 2015.
Mazhar I Sharif (2017) ISIS guns down 6 ICRC workers in Afghanistan, Times of
Islamabad February 8, 2017.
Web Desk, (2016) Rise of ISIS in Afghanistan: The monster has reached at the
doorstep; Times of Islamabad, July, 24, 2016.
Mujib, Mashal, Abed Fahim, Zahra Nader, Helen Cooper, Camilla Schick and Mark
Scheffler (2017) Mother of All Bombs Killed Dozens of Militants, Afghan Officials
Say, New York Times, April 14, 2017
Griffiths, James; Starr, Barbara and Dewan, Angela (2017) US defends dropping
mother of all bombs. CNN, April 14, 2017.
Ackerman, Spencer; Rasmussen, Sune Engel (2017)36 Isis militants killed in US

mother of all bombs attack, Afghan ministry says.The Guardian. April 14, 2017.
Panzino, Charlsy (2017)CENTCOM: US drops mother of all bombs on ISIS in

Afghanistan.Air Force Times. 13 April2017.
Pakistani Taliban Splinter Group Again Pledges Allegiance to Islamic State, (2015)

zer Khalid
Long War Journal, January 13, 2015.
Mazzetti, Mark, Scott Shane and Alissa J. Rubin (2011). Brutal Haqqani Crime
Clan Bedevils U.S. in Afghanistan.The New York Times, 24 September, 2014.
SPILLOVER EFFECT: ISIS MAKES INROADS INTO PAKISTAN (2014), THE

EXPRESS TRIBUNE, 3 SEPTEMBER, 2014.
Nisar Says Daesh Has No Presence in Pakistan, (2016) Pakistan Herald, February
13, 2016.
Khan, Iftikhar A. (2016) IS Emerging as a Threat, Warns IB Chief, Dawn News,

February 11, 2016.
Bin Parwaiz (2016) In Karachi IS Present in Spirit Only, April 7, 2016.
Web Desk (2016) Daesh in Pakistan, Pakistan Today, September 16, 2016.
Gishkori, Zaheed (2015)National Action Plan: Pakistan in fresh push to choke

terror funding. Express Tribune, 2015. Express Tribune, January 10, 2015.
Daesh Commander Claims 44 Terrorism Acts in Deathbed Confessions, (2016)

Frontier Post, March 18, 2016.
Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into

Syria and Iraq, (2015) Soufan Group, December 2015.
About 100 Left Pakistan for Syria, Iraq to join Daesh: Sanaullah, (2016) National
International, January 4, 2016.
Abid Hussain, Umer Farooq, Ghulam Dastageer, and Shair Ali Khan (2016) Islamic
Republic versus Islamic State, Herald, March 2016.
Chaudhary, Asif (2015) IS Cell Busted in Sialkot, Claim Officials, Dawn News,
December 29, 2015.
Cheema, Umar (2015) 20 Men, Women, Children from Lahore Join Daesh, Go to
Syria, Geo News, December 31, 2015.
Ali, Imtiaz (2016) 25 IS Inspired Militants Operating in Karachi: CTD Police,

Dawn News, April 7, 2016.
Not so imaginary after all (2017) Express Tribune, April 9, 2017.
Web Desk (2016) Daesh in Pakistan, Pakistan Today, September 16, 2016.

Arfeen, Syed (2017) Daesh in Pakistan, GEO TV, February, 16, 2017.
Ali, Imtiaz (2015) Four Well-Educated Men Held on Terrorism Charge, Dawn
News, December 9, 2015
Salls Bin Parwaiz (2016) In Karachi ISIS Present in Spirit Only, The News, January
25, 2016.
Janowski, Kris (2015)Aga Khan Shocked and Saddened by Attack on the Ismaili
Community in Pakistan. Gouvieux, France:Aga Khan Development Network. 13
May2015.
Ahmad, Tufail (2015) Massacre of Ismaili Muslims in Karachi Indicates Islamic

States (ISISs) Rise in Pakistan; South Asias Shiites Could Face Serious Danger,
MEMRI, Inquiry & Analysis Series no. 1158, May 14, 2015.
Hashmi, Talha (2017)Sehwan suicide bomber was not female: CTD official Raja
Umar Khattab.Geo TV, 17 February, 2017.
Johnson, Jenna (2015)Donald Trump: Let Russia fight the Islamic State in
Syria.The Washington Post, September 25, 2015.
Shah, Syed Ali; Sherani, Hafeezullah (2016)60 killed in twin suicide attacks as
terrorists storm police training college in Quetta. Dawn. October 24, 2016.
Khan, Iftikhar A. (2016) The director general of the Intelligence Bureau, Aftab
Sultan, informed the Senate Standing Committee on Interior that the militant Islamic
State group was emerging as a threat in the country, Dawn, , Feb, 11 2016.
Hali M. Sultan (2017) IS Threat and Pakistan, Pakistan Observer, March 31, 2017.
Putz, Catherin (2016)World Bank Tries to Answer CASA-1000 Criticisms. The

Diplomat. 11 May, 2016
LeVine, Steve (2007)The Oil and the Glory: The Pursuit of Empire and Fortune on
the Caspian Sea. Random House. Especially from pp. 1-293.
Afzal, Hussain (2017)Carnage at Parachinar market; 25 killed, 87 injured.Dawn,

January 22, 2017.
Not so imaginary after all (2017) Express Tribune, April 9, 2017.
Anadolu Agency (2017)Afghanistan mosque blast hurts 6. Anadolu Agency. 1

January 2017. Retrieved1 January2017.

zer Khalid
The Indian express, (2017) Singh, Alok.Two Manipur militants held in Delhi,
another in Imphal.The Indian Express. Retrieved13 January2017.
Taliban attack near Afghan parliament kills more than 20. Reuters. 10 January
2017.
Dr. Antonio Giustozzi (2016) RUSI, Daesh has established a foothold in

Afghanistan, but its rivalry with the Taliban means its success is far from assured,
Afghanistan,International Security Studies,Terrorism 5 February 2016.
Indian mob kills man over beef eating rumour (2015) Al Jazeera. 1 October 2015.
Citation for Diagrams, Maps, Infographics and Pictorials

Singh, Hardeep (2016) The Quint, August 11, 2016.
Sender, Hanna (2016) The Taliban and ISIS are more different than they are alike,
International Business Times.
Institute for the Study of War (2016) ISIS-K control in Afghanistan, April 12, 2016.
Digital Globe via Bing Maps (2016) Why American Airstrikes go wrong.
Iranian Diplomacy IRD (2016) IS Activity in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Al Jazeera (2017) attacks on shrines since 2005 in Pakistan.
References
1 Whose now deceased head, Mullah Omar, is still considered as its ideological
icon.
2 Led by Hafiz Saeed, whose public, political and charitable arm is called Jamaat-
ud-Dawah.
3 Naveeni, P. (2017)Madhya Pradesh train blast: Mastermind Al-Qasim, a self-
proclaimed India emir of Khorasan group.Times of India. 8 March,2017.
4 Indian mob kills man over beef eating rumour (2015) Al Jazeera. 1 October
2015.
5 See excellently Anderson, Benedict (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections
on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.
6 Khalid, Ozer (2016) The Specter of Multi-National Terrorism in the 21st centu-
ry, from a Clash of Civilizations to a Consensus Coalition, Criterion Quarterly,
Volume 11, Number 1, May 27 (2016). Accessible to readers at http://www.
criterion-quarterly.com/the-spectre-of-multi-national-terrorism-in-the-21st-
century/

7 Interview with the Wali of Khurasan (2015) Dabiq, Issue 13, 48-58.
8 Kumar, Rao (2016) ISIS in Afghanistan, part 3: Analyzing Wilayat Khorasans
Propaganda, (2016) Al-Jibaal Fi Hadha Dunya, February 20, 2016.
9 Antonio Giustozzi (2016) The Islamic State in Khorasan: A Nuanced View,
RUSI, February 5, 2016.
10 The San Bernardino shooter`s husband, Syed Farooq, grew up in an abusive
home and witnessed the father attack the mother, which accentuates the need for
early mental health intervention along with the perils of domestic violence.
11 For a deeper overview of terrorism in China: Zenn, Jacob (2014).Beijing,
Kunming, Urumqi and Guangzhou: The Changing Landscape of Anti-Chinese
Jihadists.China Brief.Jamestown Foundation.14(10), 23 May, 2014.
12 Warren Fiske & Amy Sherman (2015)Trump says Iran deal forces U.S. to de-
fend Iran if its attacked by Israel,PolitiFact,September 4, 2015.
13
14 Al-Furqn Media Presents a New Audio Message from the Islamic States
Shaykh Ab Muhammad al Adnn al-Shm: Say, Die In Your Rage, (2015)
Jihadology, January 26, 2015.
15 Dr. Antonio Giustozzi (2016) RUSI, Daesh has established a foothold in Af-
ghanistan, but its rivalry with the Taliban means its success is far from assured,
Afghanistan,International Security Studies,Terrorism 5 February 2016.
16 Mazhar I Sharif (2017) ISIS guns down 6 ICRC workers in Afghanistan, Times
of Islamabad February, 8 2017.
17 Web Desk, (2016) Rise of ISIS in Afghanistan: The monster has reached at the
doorstep; GENERAL, Times of Islamabad, July, 24, 2016.
18 Green beret refers to an American Special Forces soldier Staff Sgt. Mark R. De
Alencar, 37, was killed near there.
19 Mujib, Mashal, Abed Fahim, Zahra Nader, Helen Cooper, Camilla Schick and
Mark Scheffler (2017) Mother of All Bombs Killed Dozens of Militants,
Afghan Officials Say, New York Times, April 14, 2017
20 An acronym for Improvised Explosive Detection.
21 Griffiths, James; Starr, Barbara and Dewan, Angela (2017) US defends
dropping mother of all bombs. CNN, April 14, 2017.
22 Ackerman, Spencer; Rasmussen, Sune Engel (2017)36 Isis militants killed in
US mother of all bombs attack, Afghan ministry says.The Guardian. April
14 , 2017.
23 Charlsy Panzino (2017)CENTCOM: US drops mother of all bombs on ISIS
in Afghanistan.Air Force Times. 13 April2017.
24 For a historical take on Pakistan and terrorism review: Bjrgo, Tore; John Horgan
(2009).Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement.
Taylor & Francis. Especially pp.1-228.
25 Golovnina, Maria and Amjad Ali (2014) Peace talks between Pakistan and
Taliban collapse after killings.Reuters. February 17, 2014.
26 Khan, Wajahat S (2014)Zarb-e-Azb: Gear up for the forever war.A series of
special reports on Operation Zarb-e-Azb by the newspapers National Security

zer Khalid
Editor. The News. 14 October, 2014.
27 Pakistani Taliban Splinter Group Again Pledges Allegiance to Islamic State,
(2015) Long War Journal, January 13, 2015.
28 TheHaqqani Networkis a Sunni extremist organization utilizing fifth generation
asymmetric warfare techniques to counter U.S. led NATO forces and the Afghan
government, founded by JalaluddinHaqqani, who became a top tier Afghan
insurgent commander during the anti-Soviet war; for more on the Haqqani
network read: Mazzetti, Mark, Scott Shane and Alissa J. Rubin (2011).Brutal
Haqqani Crime Clan Bedevils U.S. in Afghanistan.The New York Times, 24
September, 2014. For a deeper investigation into this topic read the Pulitzer
prize winning Mark Mazetti`s (2013) The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret
Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, Penguin Press, 2013.
29 The Hezb-e Islami faction was led by the Mujahedin commander Younis Khalid
and previously included Jalaludin Haqqani amongst its ranks.
30 SPILLOVER EFFECT: ISIS MAKES INROADS INTO PAKISTAN (2014),
THE EXPRESS TRIBUNE, 3 SEPTEMBER, 2014.
31 Nisar Says Daesh Has No Presence in Pakistan, (2016) Pakistan Herald,
February 13, 2016.
32 Khan, Iftikhar A. (2016) The director general of the Intelligence Bureau, Aftab
Sultan, informed the Senate Standing Committee on Interior that the militant
Islamic State group was emerging as a threat in the country., Dawn, Feb, 11
2016.
33 Out of Afghanistan`s 34 provinces it is mostly in the North Eastern provinces
where ISIS have tenuously institutionalized a support base.
34 Web Desk (2016) Daesh in Pakistan, Pakistan Today, September 16, 2016.
35 Gishkori, Zaheed (2015)National Action Plan: Pakistan in fresh push to choke
terror funding. Express Tribune, 2015. Express Tribune, January 10, 2015.
36 Daesh Commander Claims 44 Terrorism Acts in Deathbed Confessions,
(2016) Frontier Post, March 18, 2016.
37 Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into
Syria and Iraq, (2015) Soufan Group, December 2015.
38 About 100 Left Pakistan for Syria, Iraq to join Daesh: Sanaullah, (2016)
National International, January 4, 2016.
39 Abid Hussain, Umer Farooq, Ghulam Dastageer, and Shair Ali Khan (2016)
Islamic Republic versus Islamic State, Herald, March 2016.
40 Chaudhary, Asif (2015) IS Cell Busted in Sialkot, Claim Officials, Dawn
News, December 29, 2015.
41 Cheema, Umar 20 Men, Women, Children from Lahore Join Daesh, Go to
Syria, (2015) Geo News, December 31, 2015.
42 Ali, Imtiaz (2016) 25 IS Inspired Militants Operating in Karachi: CTD
Police, Dawn News, April 7, 2016.
43 Web Desk (2016) Daesh in Pakistan, Pakistan Today, September 16, 2016.
44 Not so imaginary after all (2017) Express Tribune, April 9, 2017.
45 Arfeen, Syed (2017) Daesh in Pakistan, GEO TV, February, 16, 2017.

46 CTD Official (2016) In Karachi, ISIS present in spirit only, The News, January,
25 2016.
47 Ibid.,
48 CTD Official (2016) In Karachi, ISIS present in spirit only, The News, January,
25 2016.
49 Ali, Imtiaz (2015) Four Well-Educated Men Held on Terrorism Charge, Dawn
News, December 9, 2015, www.dawn.com/news/1227381; Salls Bin Parwaiz
(2016) In Karachi ISIS Present in Spirit Only, The News, January 25, 2016.
50 Janowski, Kris (2015)Aga Khan Shocked and Saddened by Attack on the
Ismaili Community in Pakistan. Gouvieux, France:Aga Khan Development
Network. 13 May2015.
51 Ahmad, Tufail (2015) Massacre of Ismaili Muslims in Karachi Indicates
Islamic States (ISISs) Rise in Pakistan; South Asias Shiites Could Face
Serious Danger, MEMRI, Inquiry & Analysis Series no. 1158, May 14, 2015.
52 Hashmi, Talha (2017)Sehwan suicide bomber was not female: CTD official
Raja Umar Khattab.Geo TV, 17 February, 2017.
53 With the Chinese government bringing close collaboration, infrastructure and a
security apparatus.
54 Hali M. Sultan (2017) IS Threat and Pakistan, Pakistan Observer, March 31,
2017.
55 For further reading on CASA 1000 consult Putz, Catherin (2016)World Bank
Tries to Answer CASA-1000 Criticisms. The Diplomat. 11 May, 2016
56 Also known as Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline, a natural gas pipeline being
developed by the Asian Development Bank which is headquartered in Manila.
The pipeline will transport Caspian Sea natural gas from Turkmenistan
throughAfghanistaninto Pakistan and then over to India. For more on this topic
view LeVine, Steve (2007)The Oil and the Glory: The Pursuit of Empire and
Fortune on the Caspian Sea. Random House. Especially from pp. 1-293.
57 Afzal, Hussain (2017)Carnage at Parachinar market; 25 killed, 87
injured.Dawn, January 22, 2017.
58 Khalid, Ozer (2017) Islamabad`s ECO Summit, Express Tribune, March 3,
2017.
59 Not so imaginary after all (2017) Express Tribune, April 9, 2017.

Essay

Essay
Essays

Essay

Essay
TYRANNY, CIVIL SOCIETY &

TERRORISM
Sahar Pirzada*
We are all victims of tyranny in some way or another. Victims

either of the states incompetence, kleptocracy or by the possibility of
an unconstitutional extremist surge enabled by interest groups. We are
perhaps even victims of the tyranny of demagogues masquerading as
the dynamic of change because in the end all these elements employ
cruel, unreasonable, or arbitrary use of power and control for action
that is mostly centered around self-interest. It is for this reason that the
play of civil society becomes even more essential. Civil society and
democracy are closely linked though civil society is the aggregate of
non-governmental organizations and institutions that manifest interests
and the will of citizens including elements such as freedom of speech
and an independent judiciary.1
Aristotle was the first to talk about community which was

comparable with the Greek construct of free, equal citizenry of the city-
state of individuals who shared a common ethos. It was introduced to
Western political discourse after the translation of Aristotles work,
res publica into Latin during the Renaissance period. The concept of
democracy then was developed in the 20th century highlighting that a
democratic order must attribute a significant role to political culture
and political organizations as it facilitates better-informed voting
choices and this political element resultantly holds the government
more accountable. Even non-political organizations in civil society
are vital for democracy as they build social capital, trust, and shared
values which are transferred into the political sphere and hold society
together. 2 Needless to say they have and must exert this influence.
* The author is an educationist and an editor of the journal.

Essay
In modern history, Hegel redefined civil society as a market society
as opposed to institutions of a modern nation state and his vision is
centered around capitalist interests, protecting individual property rights
and in being ruled by a civil code. For him it was a domain parallel to
but separate from the state - a realm where citizens associate according
to their own interests and wishes. This new thinking reflected changing
economic realities: the rise of private property, market competition, and
the bourgeoisie .3 This capitalist overtone of the structure of a Hegelian
civil society was also endorsed by Karl Marx who agreed on a link
between capitalism and civil society as a base and a superstructure
encompassing a political society where civil society represented the
interests and domination of the bourgeoisie. Therefore, as would even
be highly applicable in our socio-political makeup today, he asserted
that the state cannot be a neutral problem solver. Rather it is a
defender of the interests of the bourgeoisie and acted much like the
executive arm of the bourgeoisie. This could only wither away once
the working class took control of democratic society. And herein lies
the tyranny of our present day civil society. It is an accomplice to the
seemingly nefarious antics of those in government - present or past.
The approach to governance and privilege in existing and past models
within Pakistan is not too different. Each looking after the others gains
-shrouded in a capitalist mindset - perhaps without forethought to the
general public interest. And in either directly engaging in or supporting
through a nonchalant silence, a growing kleptocracy.
The idea of Civil Society fell into disuse till the end of WW11 when
Antonio Gramsci revived the term to portray civil society as a special
nucleus of independent political activity and a crucial sphere of struggle
against tyranny. By the 1990s it became the mantra and catch phrase
for political scientists.
In post modern history the approach within the political field is to use
the idea of a civil society, rather than a political society, divided further
into the third sector which includes the family and private sphere.
According to the Washington Consensus of the 1990s4, conditioned
loans were given out to debt-laden poor countries like Pakistan by
the World Bank & IMF in an effort to shrink pressures. This led to
practical changes and an emphasis on civil society replacing the states

Essay
service provision and social care.5 Optimistically speaking, perhaps
this aid was designed with the best intent but the absolute tyranny of
these international financial institutions in todays reality is that they
are doing exactly the opposite and sinking us deeper and deeper into
the quicksand of debt servicing and additional loans. These take a vice-
like grip on the citizens everyday life through increased tax collection
and money rerouted indirectly from the struggling working classes back
to impotent governments who surrender to international pressures in
an effort to meet their wildly inflated commitments. The exact process
designed for relief mainly to the Third Sector. in civil society has taken
a death grip around its neck. Could we define this as global economic
tyranny or political tyranny of short term gains for the survival and
longevity of indigenous governments?
According to the German sociologist Jurgen Habermans, known for

his theories on communicative rationality, the public sphere encourages
rational will-formation, democratic and social interaction and civil
society develops when it emerges as non-economic and has a populace
aspect and when the state is not just represented by one political
party. In Pakistan this endeavor has been mildly successful though the
political discourse has been dominated by mainly 2 major parties that
oscillate the seat of power between themselves. Can it be assumed that
the experience these two parties gained over the years will outweigh the
stagnancy that comes in with the closure to fresh thought and recruits to
the political process? Is it not a form of tyranny though that we are not
afforded the option of change at all?
According to the post colonial political theory of Edward Said, the

notion of civil society, which is a western construct, in our part of the
world was introduced as an instrument of social legitimacy for colonial
rule. In the non-Western world, as a consequence of the turmoil of
decolonization and the nation-state as its consequence, the dominant
role of civil society, as based on the idea of Gramscis capitalistic class
system, was applied to a wider construct of colonizer and colonized
non-Western underdeveloped societies.6 During the colonial era indirect
rule, a kind of power-sharing was established with the local leaders where
legal and political powers were given to them. As a result the western
constitutional and legal framework of the nation-state was the preserve

Essay
of the settlers of urban life only.7 This dichotomous rule resulted in
power struggles between the rulers and ruled as it excluded rural, tribal
systems and indigenous social arrangements deeming them backward
and uncivil. This proved unfavourable especially since in the politico-
legal context the citizens were ruled by civil law. This Western model
proved inorganic and thus did not result in local social movements or a
cultural renaissance, nor any economic or financial transformation and
was driven by an ethno-centric model of the nation state, though it was
a liberation movement.8
Through this struggle one thing became clear that ethnic nationalities
within Pakistan could not unite in the new nation-state as all maintain
their separate identities with irreconcilable geographical claim based on
ethnicity though they all fought the same battle against British colonizing
agents. Thus indigenous civil society could not evolve as a single
force for socio-economic transformation in Pakistan. This can also be
explained as a phenomenon described by Prof. Mehmood Mamdani (as
explained by Amir Hussain) as decentralized despotism. In Pakistan
this dynamic is used by local despots to strike deals and bargains with
the central government. These very same people with the collusion of
the government have arrested the development and emergence of an
organic and transformative civil society movement.
Furthermore, in the aftermath of this miscalculation in the evolution

of civil society in Pakistan, the Western urban civil society movements
dismissed the local voices of dissent as chauvinistic and backward. This
proved to be a cruel, myopic act of presumed superiority of one form
of governance and civil character over another. The result of this action
is the alienation and suppression of the conservative, Islamic voice in
the country. It is this exclusion which has been a part of the cause in the
formation of extremist expression in the country. These view-points,
for a lack of free self expression, and due to a certain civil and social
ostracism have morphed to become extremist agents who consider the
Westernized nation state and its civil society as their enemy. We are
suffering the consequences of this decision in contemporary Pakistan in
spades. This is a case of one form of state terrorism, that of exclusion
and neglect, leading to a multi-faced extremist terror.

Essay
In response, first of all, we need to take them seriously. As cited
in a previous article by the author in Criterion Quarterly9 that there
are reasons for behaviour especially for extremist action because all
action takes place within a context and it is no longer enough to label
them (Islamists) with the dismissive moniker of fundo. Labels placate
our perturbed minds but contribute nothing towards an understanding
of the situation with intent to improving it. We must look at it from
the psychological perspective put forward by researchers at Cambridge
University of intergrative complexity i.e seeing an issue from multiple
view-points. Our application of a Western civil society model has failed
to play its role, bred terrorism and has been unsuccessful in triggering
social reconstruction. For any design to work it must be rooted in local
realities and be sensitive to the mindset of all spheres of indigenous
people. Otherwise we will arrive once again to the same place where we
are now. Or worse.
Civil Society is meant to be inclusive and according to Carothers in

Foreign Policy magazine the arrangement is not always warm & fuzzy.
Recognizing that people in any society associate and work together to
advance nefarious as well as worthy ends is critical to demystifying the
concept of civil society. Commentator David Rieff wrote If one limits
civil society to only those actors who pursue high-minded aims, the
concept becomes a theological notion, not a political or social one.10
There are many roles of a civil society and surely over time civil
society has evolved. If tuned to optimal caliber it can go a long way
in correcting social imbalances. It can restrain the powers of political
parties, expose the corrupt conduct of public office holders, lobby for
good governance reforms and promote political participation. In addition
it can help develop values of democratic life such as tolerance, moderation
and compromise making it possible to champion and advocate the needs
of different groups, especially the marginalized sectors of society. Most
organically, it can be the training ground for future political leaders as it
is the perfect conditioning environment for such an endeavor.
It is important however, to realize that civil society despite its

multifaceted roles and purposes is not simply an agent of tension with
the state. Simply because it is independent of the state it does not mean

Essay
it must always criticize the state since such actions are not corrective but
wear down the state machinery and legitimacy diverting attention from
real issues of development, governance and foreign policy to petty issues
of self-preservation on both ends. Upon saying this one cannot help but
focus on the dire political scenario that has unfolded in Pakistan in the
recent past. Is it not a form of both State and civilian terrorism to hijack
the whole country for debate only on one issue regarding the incumbent
government which uses all state resources for its defence while the civil
agitants, for political gain arrest the working of the state through this
movement? Both practices are criminal when viewed keeping in mind
the losses incurred to the common man. Both state and civil agitation
agents are responsible for this apathy towards the general public, which
is nothing short of inflicted tyranny from positions of power.
It seems as if a particular political party has taken it upon itself to

defy and denounce, through civil agitation, anything initiated or even
touched by the incumbent government. Perhaps they have taken to
heart Vaclav Havels explanation of the purpose of a civil society as a
call for living within the truth, with oneself and for tolerance towards
others: a vision of society that is not just independent from the state, but
opposed to it.11 Even with the best intent at heart constant opposition
to the state wears thin public patience and expectation of larger goals
and outcomes.
And according to Gyorgy Konrad, Energies generated by sheer

civic activism do not necessarily feed into the politics of tolerance and
inclusion. They can just as well be utilized for repressive ends. Civil
mobilization is also capable of fragmenting societies into different
pillars or milieus. We have perhaps seen this phenomenon unfold
right before our eyes with the youth especially, taking on an aggressive,
almost anarchist approach to politics and governance.
Perhaps the aim of such constant and sometimes mindless agitation

on perpetually all action taken by the government is an attempt at
social entropy of generating organization through chaos. One can
say this perhaps for both the party known for agitation and also the
Islamic radicals where on one end, the former are perhaps seeking a
scientific justification for social revolutions with expeditious results

Essay
and the latter, on the other end, applying annihilation for new social
construction and religio-political order. In the minds of both, this rush
toward social entropy is an attempt at reconstruction, a better order
through annihilative chaos.
If it works we might be forced to readjust our understanding and

reaction to it. But if it fails it is nothing short of tyranny, a failure of
the role of an ill-constructed and erroneously motivated civil society.
All three i.e present day and past multi-faceted tyranny, an inept and
misconfigured civil society and induced reactionary terrorism are
interrelated and interdependent. All three are responsible, each bearing
the onus of the injustice, violence and misadventures of our times. All
three are our fault.
References
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_society
2 ibid
3 http://www.osf.am/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Carothers-on-Civil-Society.
pdf
4 Though there is denial by Williamson of the assumption by many critics that the
purpose of the 9-point Washington Consensus proposed by him was to reduce
the powers of the state. - The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription
for Development by John Williamson Senior Fellow, Institute for International
Economics in A lecture in the series Practitioners of Development pg 2,
delivered at the World Bank on January 13, 2004.
pdf
6 The Paradox of Civil Society- Amir Husain 24th April 2017. The News
7 ibid
8 ibid
9 A Missing Counter Narrative for Terrorism by Sahar Pirzada http://www.
criterion-quarterly.com/missing-counter-narrative-terrorism/
pdf
11 Civility, Violence & Civil Society by Sven Riechardt - pg 140 https://books.
google.com.pk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=aV8-_BGjCCcC&oi=fnd&pg=PA21
3&dq=concept+of+civil+society+in+post+colonial+history+&ots=M7yj9V
mUuc&sig=VOBMlzlpH2qEhw6cQv6PvVxplO8#v=onepage&q=concept%-
20of%20civil%20society%20in%20post%20colonial%20history&f=false

Essay
MY FATHER, A PAKISTANI PRISONER

OF WAR IN INDIA*
A daughters tribute to the father who
never recovered from his war wounds
Sunniya Ahmad Pirzada
Doctors filled his file with words like Dementia, Alzheimers and
Schizophrenia. Our lives were measured out in what, for want of a
clearer diagnosis, we would just call his episodes.
This is a story Ive wanted to tell for a long time. Ive carried it
with me my whole life, in fact. And yet Id never found the words or
the time, or perhaps the courage, to commit it to paper. Doing so now
has required me to chip away at notions of privacy and pride the ones
that tell you family hardships ought to be kept quiet lest your neighbours
hear of them that I never even knew I held.
And now, as I write it, I realise that the story I thought I had to tell
wasnt as Id imagined it at all. For what started as an attempt to share the
life story of my late father, Major Naeem Ahmad, became the beginning
of my own journey to truly understand the man who continues to shape
my life in so many ways, big and small.
But, for now, Ill start at the beginning.
Naeem was born to a middle class Pakistani family in what was

then the walled city of Lahore on January 26, 1946. He was the second
of three siblings, and the only boy. During his school and college days,
* The story was first published on the Al Jazeera website.

The author is a journalist at Al Jazeera English and can be reached on Twitter @
SunniyaPirzada.

Essay
he developed a reputation as an avid sportsman and a daredevil with a
sometimes unnerving love for speed.
At the prestigious Government College University Lahore he was

a member of the rowing and swimming teams. So impressive were his
sporting feats that, 30 years after graduating, he was able to secure my
oldest brothers admission there purely on the basis of that reputation. In
welcoming my brother, the college principal told my father: We have
had millions walk through these college gates but very few leave a mark
like you; your photos still hang in our main hall.
The soldier
After graduating, my father was commissioned into the Pakistani

army. It was June 1968. He joined a non-fighting arm that was tasked
with supplying ammunition to those in combat. After passing through
the Pakistan Military Academy, he was sent to Karachi for further
training. It was there he met Lieutenant Khalil-ur-Rehman, a man who
would become one of his dearest friends and who now says of their
relationship: Destiny brought us together.
When a war of liberation began in what was then known as East

Pakistan and now as Bangladesh in 1971, my father was deployed to an
ordnance depot there. The conflict was brutal, with atrocities committed
by each side. Basically, the Bengalis killed us and we killed them,
Rehman, now a retired brigadier, tells me, although the stories he shares
suggest horrors that simple sentence cannot convey.
But as a non-combat soldier, my father saw little of that. He was

responsible for transporting ammunition and would often drive the train
that delivered it himself. Later on, hed proudly tell his children that he
had driven just about everything there was to drive and only regretted
never having piloted a plane or a helicopter.
Then on December 3, 1971, India entered the conflict on the side

of the Bangladeshi nationalist forces. The ensuing Indo-Pak War lasted
just 13 days.

Essay
On December 16, 1971, the Pakistan Armed Forces Eastern
Command surrendered.
But for my father, the war was just beginning. He was asked to
transport a convoy of ammunition to Dhaka, about 50km to the south of
his base. But his Officer in Command had little grasp of the geography
of the region and sent my father and his convoy in the wrong direction.
By the time Naeem realised they were heading north instead of south,
the convoy had already entered dense forest. It was there that they were
ambushed by Indian paratroopers, an elite group of soldiers, led by
Major Raj Pal.
A gun battle ensued, and much to the surprise of the Indian soldiers,
the 150 non-combat troops my father led put up a fierce fight. By the
time the shooting came to an end, three hours after it had begun, 64
Pakistanis and 26 Indians had been killed. Impressed by his bravery,
the Indian troops had been ordered to capture my father alive. Major
Raj Pal was later reported to have said: We were informed that these
were ordnance troops, but the way they fought was on par with trained
infantry personnel.
The Unknown Soldier
But my father had been severely wounded. A mortar shell had

grazed his left shoulder; its splinters damaging his left thumb and index
finger and several pieces entering his left cheek. A bullet was lodged
in his left shin and hed lost all vision in his left eye. But the most
serious damage was that done to his brain. Wed only realise the extent
of it many years later when a CT scan revealed hundreds of pieces of
embedded shrapnel.
He was unconscious so an Indian soldier drove him to a military

hospital in Dhaka, where his bloodied uniform had to be cut from his
ravaged body. There he waited 24 hours for surgery, as even more
serious cases were rushed through before him.

Essay
Unable to speak or open his eyes, and with his face swollen beyond
recognition, his identity remained unknown. Thus, for a fortnight, until
he was recognised by a colleague, then Captain Naeem Ahmad was
listed as Missing in Action. Assuming the worst, his friends went to pay
their condolences to his parents, who, in turn, refused to give up hope
that their son would return alive.
Although stationed around 20km apart, Naeem and Rehman had

been able to meet up regularly during much of their time in Bangladesh,
exchanging clothes Rehman had purchased and eggs my father had
haggled for, with no thought of owing each other a rupee for the goods.
But in the chaos of the last days of war, theyd lost touch with one
another.
Rehman had endured his own hardships. After spending seven days
in a trench, he contracted Malaria and was sent to a military hospital.
By pure chance, it happened to be the same place where my father was,
his face still swollen beyond recognition by anybody but the closest of
friends.
It meant a great deal to me that I was there at that time, even if it was
because I was suffering from Malaria, Rehman says now. Otherwise,
I would only have met him again upon our return to Pakistan.
Little did the two friends know then, but that day would come much
later than they had imagined.
The prisoner of war
My father remained in hospital for eight months. And, upon being

deemed well enough to leave, was sent to a prisoner of war camp in Bihar,
India. He was transported there, along with other Pakistani soldiers, in
a train boarded up with wooden planks intended to hide those inside
from the angry mobs outside. But if the people who gathered along the
railway track couldnt see the men inside, it didnt mean the POWs
couldnt hear the hate-filled slogans they shouted.

Essay
When my father disembarked at Camp 95 Ranchi he had nothing
but the hospital clothes he wore. A fellow POW gave him some fabric
from which he stitched his own trousers. It was a camp for officers, and
for every four there was an orderly tasked with caring for them. But
my fathers needs were greater than any orderly could cater to, so a
campmate from the Army Medical Corp. kept a close eye on him over
the months it took him to recuperate. As he grew stronger, my father,
who was a deeply spiritual man with a strong belief in the power of
prayer, began to teach the Quran to his fellow POWs.
Then, in February 1974, along with 93,000 other POWs who had
been held by India, he was repatriated to Pakistan. But the country they
returned to did not extend the welcome they had expected. The hostility
was palpable. Pakistan had been shamed by its surrender and the reports
of rape and mass murder attributed to some of its troops. Civilians
would often question returning soldiers about their involvement in such
atrocities. But those stories couldnt have been further from my fathers
experience of the war. Until the gun fight that caused his injuries, he
hadnt even had to use a weapon during that conflict.
Surely, though, if the general population was less than welcoming,

the army would embrace its returning soldiers?
Not so, says Rehman. An army whose top officials are all sent
home on the same day is automatically shaken to its core .... There was
a lack of leadership. They neither realised nor acknowledged what the
POWs had been through in their two to three years of captivity.
We were all declared black meaning that we should be sent

home and deemed not fit for service. Its a global procedure that upon
return you have to be questioned in order to eliminate any doubts about
your possible loyalty towards the enemy. After further enquiry, your
status might be changed to white or grey.
But their professional troubles ran deeper than this. The support
extended by the army and the government was almost non-existent,
Rehman says. We should have been offered some monetary

Essay
compensation that could have facilitated our rehabilitation. The army
hadnt drawn up a plan, [despite] knowing full well that all of these
POWs would be returning and in need of practical help with housing
and so on.
Instead, the returning soldiers found that, while theyd been away,
peers who hadnt been captured had advanced their careers, usurping
them in new skills, confidence and position. Many felt that there was
little place left for them in an army that had literally and otherwise
left them behind.
But for my father, his injuries added another layer of doubt and
uncertainty. After he was debriefed, he was posted to Lahore on
compassionate grounds so that he might be close to his family. It was
during his medical assessment there that the bullet that had remained
lodged in his shin for more than two years was removed.
A few months later, his condition was re-evaluated and he was

declared 50 percent disabled due to the loss of vision in his left eye. It
was a decision he challenged, with some success.
Nobody realised how seriously he had been wounded, his medical

history wasnt sent with him, explains Rehman, who remains angry
about the situation his friend found himself in.
The fact that this [the ambush and gun fight] happened after the
Pakistan army had surrendered shows the brutal nature of that conflict,
he says, attributing blame to both the Pakistani army and the Indian one.
It was a command failure; the command of the Pakistan army

had been completely paralysed at that stage. The command was just
extricate yourself. It was the last signal that was transferred from the
Eastern Command. It was very clear that from then on we were on our
own. There was no indication that the command was going to support us
in terms of guiding troops towards a safe route [home].

Essay
A reasonable evacuation plan for our troops would have been
planned and approved well in advance, Rehman says, puzzled by why
it was never implemented.
But, he adds, I believe the Indians could have done more .

They should not have held him. What threat did a seriously wounded,
completely unarmed, physically incapacitated soldier pose to the Indian
army?
Had he been sent back to receive the medical care and attention
he required, it may have reduced the amount of suffering he had to bear
in the last 15 years of his life. Perhaps he could have been saved had
he been sent to Pakistan and then abroad for the complex surgery he
required.
The husband
My father would most likely have had a more positive perspective

on it all, such was his nature. He believed firmly in finding the joy
in everything. And one of the things he threw himself into with his
characteristic energy and enthusiasm upon his return was marriage.
Many of the returning men were quick to marry, Rehman explains.

Perhaps it was a natural desire to build a future in the form of a family,
to establish a new sense of normalcy, to find a place to belong.
Talks between my mothers family and my fathers began in

September 1975. They were married that December. My mother was
just 19 and studying for her BA. My father was 29.
Rehmans marriage followed soon after. In fact, the friends were

married within two months of each other.
I remember that when my marriage was being arranged, it was

Naeem who resolved issues that arose during the talks between the two
families. In fact, Naeem was at the forefront, while my own family took
a backseat, Rehman recalls.

Essay
And once the deal had been done and the marriage confirmed, it
was my father who took Rehman to the tailors to get him fitted for his
wedding suit.
The father
Within two years of their wedding, my mother gave birth to their

first child, and to my big brother, Zeeshan. I came along two years after
that.
The early years of mine and Zeeshans childhood were filled with
laughter and adventure. Our father would take us on long drives, boat
trips and hikes. Our home was filled with the sound of him singing. He
kept a notebook filled with the lyrics of his favourite songs from the
time he was a POW and tried to infuse me with the same musical spirit,
urging me to sing it with passion, sing it like you can feel it, sing it from
your heart. It may have been a lost cause but my father didnt believe in
those. So we sang and we sang and we sang. And life was good.
At work, his popularity crossed barriers of rank and class. Hed

offer words of advice, his prayers, friendship and what little money he
had to anybody who needed it. Instead of eating in the area reserved
for officers, hed often eat with the men. He said he wanted to make
sure that their food was of a suitable quality. In reality, he enjoyed their
company and liked to immerse himself in their daily lives, doing all he
could to ensure that they were happy.
But, gradually things began to change. It started in 1984, when my

father was posted to Quetta. It was just small things at first; slight changes
in his behaviour that even he didnt notice. Hed remember numbers and
dates, but other things would just slip away from him, obscured by an
inexplicable fog. Then, the following year, he was posted to Karachi and
the changes became more extreme, more noticeable, less easy to deny.
On March 23, 1986, he was admitted to a navy medical facility,

where he was kept in a lock-up with drug addicts and the mentally ill.
A psychiatrist diagnosed him with Paranoid traits.

Essay
By then, a third child, Hasnain, had arrived. My mother diligently
kept the details of his diagnosis from us all, resiliently carrying on with
as little disruption to our lives as possible. It was only then that she
learnt that my father had no vision in his left eye, a detail revealed to
her by a doctor who first checked whether she would leave her husband
if she were to discover such a thing. I cannot be sure why my father
hadnt revealed this himself, but I suspect he didnt want to burden her
and feared anything that might make him appear less able in the eyes
of his family. But my mother wasnt isnt the sort to be put off by
something like that, which was fortunate, I guess, as much worse was
to come.
Her visits to the lock-up were difficult. Guards would examine

everything she took with her, as though she were entering a jail rather
than a hospital, which was apt, she says, as punishment, rather than
treatment, seemed to be the order of the day there. My father remained
there for six long months. It was a time that took a heavy toll on him,
making him wary of hospitals ever after.
In 1987, we returned to Lahore, where my father was admitted to

another military hospital. For a year, he wasnt permitted to wear his
uniform. It came as a huge personal and professional blow and, a
couple of months later, fearing that he might be invalided out of the
army and unable to face such a prospect, he applied for early retirement.
His application was rejected on the grounds that his mental illness made
him incapable of making such a decision.
Later that year, my youngest brother, Mustafa, was born.
The Patient
In January 1989, my father began private treatment with a young

psychiatrist who, unlike many of his peers, favoured behavioural therapy
to medication. He was treated for Schizophrenia and hallucinations. And
while there were slight signs of improvement, they were, ultimately,
insubstantial.

Essay
Later that year, he finally retired from the army. But with no place
of work to head to each day, hed accompany friends to theirs or go to
his brother-in-laws textile unit anything to keep himself occupied.
After a couple of years spent shadowing the work lives of others, he
was offered a job in the real estate department of the Army Welfare
Trust, an organisation that employs former officers. His colleagues were
accepting of his limitations, making him feel valued and of use, even
when he couldnt really perform his duties.
My mother believes the seven-and-a-half years he spent there added

years to his life. But that period wasnt without its difficulties.
When he was three-and-a-half, Mustafa was admitted to hospital

with meningitis. The doctors had little hope that hed recover and warned
my parents that even if he were to survive, he would most probably be
left with some form of physical or mental disability; quite possibly both.
As my mother kept vigil at Mustafas bedside, my father became the
primary carer for the rest of us. Even as our family was shrouded in
sadness, he made sure that when we werent in the hospital, our time
was filled with his songs, stories and sense of fun. One day, he took us
to see an air show. As we drove home from it, he turned to speak to us
in the back of the car. But the words just wouldnt come. As hard as he
tried to find them, the only sound he could make was a kind of groan.
Without warning, hed lost the ability to speak and, with it, any way
to reassure his worried children. Somehow finding my own voice, I told
him: Abbu [dad], it is okay, we understand. Well get home and youll
be fine. But I didnt really believe that.
What I was certain of, however, was that my mother would know
how to handle it just as she handled everything: my fathers illness,
his stubborn refusal to take his medication and attend his medical
appointments, her youngest sons battle to survive. And, sure enough,
she did, with a quiet stoicism I still marvel at today.
My father eventually got his voice back, and Mustafa turned out to
be just as much of a fighter. He pulled through with no long-term side
effects.

Essay
The fighter
In December 1993, my father suffered his first epileptic fit. That it

took place at work must have pained him greatly. That it meant he was
no longer allowed to drive and had to relinquish control of the wheel to
his wife and oldest son, must have demoralised him further still. But, of
course, he didnt show any of this.
In March 1994, his doctor suggested a full medical evaluation,

including a CT scan of his brain. As it was conducted, at Lahores
general hospital, the doctors present wondered at how he was even alive.
It revealed that hundreds of foreign bodies were lodged in his brain.
A medical board, featuring a psychiatrist and a neurosurgeon,

concluded that he had Alzheimers disease. The neurosurgeon predicted
that hed be in a vegetative state within six months.
Alarmed by the prognosis, my mother decided to stop private

treatment and return to Lahores military hospital. In a psychiatric unit
there, the doctors set about filling his file with words like Dementia,
Alzheimers and Parkinsons. They concluded that it was impossible to
remove the shrapnel without causing further damage to his brain, and
warned us that his was a progressive illness: it would only get worse.
We lost count of the number of times he was admitted to hospital after
that. There were seizures and comas; hed lose his ability to speak and
to walk.
Our lives were measured out in what, for want of a better word or
a clearer diagnosis, wed call episodes. There was one just before I
was due to sit my matric examinations in February 1994. Then another,
in November of that year, when he suffered a 36-hour long epileptic fit
and remained comatose for weeks. Doctors told us then to prepare for
the worst. But the man we knew was a fighter. Hed infused us with
his own positivity and we werent going to give up believing in it now.
Sure enough, he made a near complete recovery and began walking and
talking again.

Essay
Then, one day in 1995, as all of us sat in the front room of our
house, my dad humming, me trying to sing along, my younger brothers
chasing each other around a coffee table, he suddenly slumped in the
sofa and then fell to the floor. His body contorted, his mouth twitched
as white foam gathered at its corners, his eyes rolled back in his head.
My mother called for the family doctor, who lived across the street and
had become a close family friend, helping my father handle his illness
from home as much as was possible. She came immediately and tried
to administer an injection that would end the seizure. But my fathers
body shook so violently that she just couldnt do it. Another family
friend who was an anaesthetist was called in. As all of this went on, my
mother noticed Mustafa, who was now seven, sitting alone, his head in
his hands, clearly disturbed by what hed witnessed. She comforted him
as best she could but his was a kind of sadness that couldnt be easily
eased; his worries the sort that couldnt be wished away.
We didnt speak of what went on to our friends not because we

consciously sought to conceal it, but because as the only reality we
knew, we never realised that it warranted being mentioned. In fact, my
friends parents only came to learn of it when they happened to discuss
my alarmingly poor mock exam results with a friend of my fathers.
But you know what shes going through, right? his friend had said to
them. They didnt. Theyd never asked why my father looked so much
older than his years so old, in fact, that he was sometimes mistaken for
a veteran of World War II. If they asked why the man who answered the
phone sounded drunk, we didnt explain the cause of our fathers slurred
speech. We just carried on. Because, for us, normal meant living every
day on the edge of a precipice, waiting for the time wed inevitably fall
off.
And then that time came. In the summer of 2000, I was misdiagnosed,
as it turned out, with Tuberculosis. My father did what he did in any time
of trouble: he prayed. On August 25, 2000, as he was deep in prayer for
me, he had a seizure. He was rushed to the military hospital, where he
remained in a coma for 10 weeks. A neurophysician suggested he may,
in fact, have been suffering from Cerebral Atrophy, a shrinkage of the
brain that had caused his Alzheimers and Dementia. It was the first

Essay
time that a medical professional had questioned how somebody of such
relative youth could have been inflicted with so many illnesses.
On October 30, I visited him in hospital, as I did every day. As I

waited outside while the nurses checked on him, I heard the evening call
to pray. For the first time, instead of asking God to make him better, as I
always did, I simply asked that whatever was best for him should come
to be. When the nurses had finished, I returned to his bedside and held
his hand. I felt him squeeze mine and stir. For a second he woke up and
lifted his head from the pillow. Then he took his last breath.
He was pronounced dead at 6.36pm, and buried the following

afternoon in a funeral attended by people from across the country. At a
time when few used email, news of his death spread by word of mouth.
We had never even met many of those in attendance, but they had each
been touched in some way by my father. And, while it wasnt an official
military funeral, members of the Ordnance Corp. insisted upon arranging
it with full military honours.
This article was first published on Al Jazeera English.

Book Reviews
Book Reviews

Book Reviews

Book Reviews
TRUTHS & MYTHS OF 1971
A. G. NOORANI
How Pakistan Got Divided

by Rao Farman Ali Khan;
Oxford University Press, Karachi,
298 pages; Rs. 1150.
The truths about the break up of Pakistan in 1971 are still shrouded
in myths. Hasan Zaheers book The Separation of East Pakistan was
a partisan account. One of the best accounts so far is by R. Sison
and Leo Rose War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation
of Bangladesh (1990). Recently a retired member of Indias Foreign
Service wrote an article for a scholarly periodical based on privileged
access to the archives. Major General (Retd.) Rao Farman Ali was
posted to Dhaka in 1967 and was Advisor on Civil-Political Relations
to successive Governors. He was a prisoner of war in India until 1974.
Fully exonerated by the Hamoodur Reham Commission, he retired
from the army in 1976 and served as Federal Minister for Petroleum
and Natural Resources (1981-83, 1983) under Zia-ul-Haq. His narrative
departs significantly from the conventional view but bears imprints of a
soldiers limitations on matters political.
He writes: The solution was to accept Sheikh Mujibur Rahman

and his party as the majority party of Pakistan. Unfortunately, we in
West Pakistan persistently stated that there were two majority parties
in the country. The fact is, we did attempt some political action in East
Pakistan, but it was small and insignificant, and therefore ineffective.
In fact, some attempts were counterproductive. For example: Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman was captured to facilitate a political solution through
discussions with the West Pakistani leadership. Instead of negotiations,
President Yahya Khan and his advisors sent him to jail and filed a case
of treason against him, later handing him a death sentence. All the

Book Reviews
while, Sheikh Mujibir Rahman had been telling his lawyer, Brohi, that a
political solution was possible. Brohi left no memoir behind.
His appraisal of Sheikh Mujibur Rahmans aims is contradictory.

It is without hesitation that I say the defeat was a result of Pakistans
national political leaderships ineptitude, personal ego, and pursuit of
personal gains. After the elections, both Mujib and Bhutto displayed
a complete lack of political wisdom and focused solely on the goal of
achieving power. They were fixated on achieving their own personal
objective over that of the nation. Since there could not be two prime
ministers in one country, by creating two countries, both became prime
minister. The Pakistan Army suffered a military defeat because 80 per
cent of East Pakistanis had become its enemy and allied with India.
Even at the very end of the conflict, however, a ceasefire could
have been obtained from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
if conciliatory resolution, coupled with a political solution, had been
accepted. But a military defeat was what the political leadership of West
Pakistan desired.
It is hardly fair to bracket Mujib with Bhutto. Mujib was justified

in aspiring to be Prime Minister of Pakistan. Bhutto was not justified in
denying him that right. His formula idhar hum udhar tum (we here,
you there) spelt a break up. The statesmanlike course for both sides
would have been to propose a Grand Coalition like the one in former
Western Germany between the SPD and the CDU.
The last line in the quote confirms the view expressed in this writers
analysis of the Polish Resolution in Criterion querterly (Volume 7
Number 2, April/June 2012) that Bhutto desired the break up of
his country so that he could rule in its Western part. As for Mujib, the
evidence cited by the former Indian diplomat reveals that he was in touch
with Indian intelligence agencies well before the 1970 elections. But he
was not Indias agent or stooge. He was keeping an option open. In
March 1971 he was prepared to settle for a confederation with executive
powers for the centre.

Book Reviews
The author claims: I was trying to get Mujib to become the Prime
Minister of Pakistan (after his election victory) and wanted the Bengalis
to get their rights. I also helped in getting Bengali political leaders freed
(Ata ur Rahman, Jadu Mian, Zahoor ul Islam) and asked for inquiries
into unlawful Bengali killings (Saeed Hasan). The senior officers in West
Pakistan considered me a pro-Bengali officer. In his view a settlement
was possible at the U.N. Security Council even in December 1971 the
Polish Resolution. Bhutto wrecked it. Had he not, instead of a surrender
there would have been an orderly transfer of power from Islamabad to
Dacca; not a single POW or inch of territory would have gone to India;
and, there would have been no Simla Agreement. Furthermore, Pakistan
would have gained immense goodwill in Moscow.
Surrender is the most ignominious and degrading outcome of any

war. We should have avoided it at all costs. The Governor of East Pakistan
and I tried for a ceasefire but were not successful as all attempts were
subverted by people who wanted the army defeated in East Pakistan so
they could acquire power in West Pakistan.
An important turning point was the Agartala Conspiracy Case. The

Agartala Case did more harm to the integrity of Pakistan than anything
else. The case was framed in the light of a conspiracy unearthed. The
main charge in this case against the accused was that they had planned
to remove East Pakistan from Rawalpindis control through violent
means; with arms, ammunition, and other material help provided by
India. The Intelligence agencies, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
and the Intelligence Bureau (IB), had alleged that a certain number
of Bengali personnel from all three Services of the armed forces had
coordinated with the Indians and, with the active support of Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman and a few other politicians had hatched a conspiracy
to undo Pakistan. Several meetings with the Indians had taken place in
the bordering Indian town of Agartala. The case was not handled well,
and several mistakes were made.
I refer to an open letter written by Kohinoor Hossain, the late

Lieutenant Commander Moazzem Hossains wife, one of the accused
in the Agartala Conspiracy case. This letter took the form of an in

Book Reviews
memoriam to her husband published in an issue of the daily Purbadesh
of Dacca, dated 26 March 1972. I distinctly remember some of the lines,
which I quote verbatim here, after translation from Bangla:
Dearest husband,
[] You are no longer with me. I remember your contribution
towards the cause of Independent Bangladesh. I remember how you
came to Dacca from Karachi on leave under a pseudonym, met P.N.
Ojha, first Secretary of the Indian Embassy, at the border at Agartala
along with other Indian and Bangladeshi officers. You negotiated with
Indian authorities for arms and other kinds of help. []
Readers in the Indian subcontinent may recall that P.N. Ojha was
none other than the man who the Government of Pakistan had expelled
on charges of espionage and subversive activities. There is no doubt
that the Indians had all along been working towards the separation of
East Pakistan, and they took full advantage of the situation that resulted
from East Pakistans demand for independence.
The author records an important talk with Mujib. I rang up Mujib

and asked him whether I could come over to see him. Despite the time
(late in the night), he readily agreed. I started the conversation without
any preliminaries or pleasantries. I asked him if Pakistan could be saved.
My question reveals the seriousness of the situation and the agony in
which we all were in East Pakistan. He replied in the affirmative, saying,
It can be saved if somebody listens to us. So many people are being
killed by the army. They listen to Bhutto. They do not listen to me. Even
now, even after all this, we are willing to discuss.
Before he could elaborate, I spotted a shadow on the wall. I told

him that somebody was eavesdropping. He got up saying there cannot be
anybody. However, upon seeing the person, I heard him invite him in. It
was Tajuddin, the die-hard, pro-India, Awami Leaguer. He hated West
Pakistan and perhaps Pakistan itself. Mujib recounted our conversation
to Tajuddin who shared the same opinion as Mujib. He said, Yes, it
could be but under a new formula. We cannot, after all this butchery,
sit with Bhutto under the same roof. He is responsible for all this. Let

Book Reviews
the assembly be divided into two houses, one for East and the other for
West Pakistan. Each assembly should write the constitution for its own
Wing. Then the two assemblies should meet to write a constitution for
Pakistan. When I said that they would have to sit with Bhutto, they
responded with: but that will be as equals. What they were suggesting
was a formula for a confederation. I told them this was not a solution
to save Pakistan. However, I promised to convey their thoughts to the
President when I met him, which I did. In his demands Sheikh Mujib
had the support of almost all the prominent leaders of the province.
This was natural for a soldier; politically that was the only way to
save a united Pakistan. Read this: I rang up Mujib on 19 March (four
days before the crack-down) to get some information from him. He told
me that they had arrived at an agreement and the President would issue
a proclamation, which would contain the outline of arrangements for
the transfer of power. He also stated that he was to be Prime Minister
with five ministers each from West and East Pakistan. I asked whether
he was satisfied with the arrangement. He said yes and asked for prayers
for his success. It was essential that this agreement be approved by
Bhutto. Bhutto objected to the agreement; he termed it a massive
betrayal of West Pakistan. He proposed that the National Assembly
session be called to approve the agreement or that he be allowed to have
further discussions with Mujib. But Awami League leaders adamantly
opposed further protracted negotiations and were pressurizing Mujib to
declare independence. Mujib, like many leaders in such situations, had
to reckon with hardliners.
The author describes graphically General A.A.K. Niazis disgraceful

conduct before, during and after the surrender. Particularly useful
is his account of the procedure adopted by the Homoodur Rahman
Commission.
A definitive history of that period remains to be written. But no

historian or student can afford to ignore this informative book.

Book Reviews
PAKISTAN AND A WORLD IN

DISORDER
A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First
Century
By Javid Husain
Published by Palgrave Macmillan, New York - 2016
Book Review by M Saeed Khalid

A year before Donald Trump was elected as president of the worlds
premier power, a veteran Pakistani diplomat, Javid Husain was mulling
over the increasing disorder on the global scene and its repercussions on
Pakistan. The world appeared to have moved away from the optimistic
scenarios of a new rule based order after the end of the cold war. The
lofty ideals of an international system based on justice, fair play and
principles of the UN Charter were receding at an alarming pace.
Events that followed strengthened the view held by Husain and

other observers that realpolitik increasingly prevailed upon idealism
in the foreign policies of other major world powers. In his book titled
Pakistan and a World in Disorder, he argues that the certainties of
the Cold War were replaced by an unstable and unpredictable global
environment.
The collapse of the Soviet bloc emboldened the US. Two aspects
were noteworthy. First, to prevent the emergence of a new rival that
could pose a threat to it on the level of the Soviet Union. Secondly,
after 9/11, the Bush administration announced the doctrine of unilateral
and preemptive military action in the face of external threats. Another
important development was the retention and subsequent expansion of
NATO eastward.

Book Reviews
The writer recalls that in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking
of World Order, Samuel Huntington had observed that the euphoria at the
end of the Cold War had generated an illusion of harmony in the world
order, that was soon dissipated by the multiplication of ethnic conflicts
and ethnic cleansing, the breakdown of law and order, the emergence
of a new pattern of alliance and conflict among states, the resurgence of
neo-communist and neo-fascist movements, intensification of religious
fundamentalism, the end of diplomacy of smiles and policy of yes in
Russias relations with the west, the inability of the United Nations and
the United States to suppress bloody local conflicts, and the increasing
assertiveness of a rising China.
Javid Husain observes that the present era, marked by the absence
of checks and balances of the Cold War, the domination of power over
principles, the diminished authority of the UN on issues of war and
peace, the rise of new great powers demanding modification of the
existing pro-West international system to accommodate their interests,
civilization fault lines, the growing number of non-state actors resorting
to terrorism, and shifting alliances can be described as a world in
disorder. Pakistan, he says must understand the nature of this world of
the 21st century and its implications to be able to safeguard its security,
economic prosperity, and cultural identity.
An important issue raised in the book is the evolving pattern of

global power. Despite the lead the US currently has over other states
in military, economic and cultural terms, the long term trend is towards
a multipolar world in the twenty-first century. The author cites China,
Japan, the EU, India, Russia, South Korea, ASEAN, Nigeria, Turkey and
South Africa as players with increasingly important role in international
politics in the years to come because of their high economic growth
rates and the rapid increase in their military capabilities. There will be a
corresponding decline in the overall relative power and influence of the
USA, particularly in the second half of the current century.
Pakistan is conspicuous by its absence from the list of emerging

powers cited in the book. In my view, Pakistan has its place along Turkey,
Nigeria and South Africa in the growing list of mid-sized powers. As the

Book Reviews
sixth largest country in population with a strategic location, a recognized
military power, a nuclear arsenal, and an active role in the multilateral
fora, Pakistan certainly deserves to be included in the list of countries
mentioned by the author.
Russia sees a threat to its vital security interests in the eastward

expansion of NATO and the EU. Similarly, the US policy of containment
of China is a source of concern to Beijing. Russia and China have
reacted to these moves by strengthening their own strategic partnership
both bilaterally and within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization(SCO). In the Middle East, US policies in favour of forces
trying to overthrow Bashar al-Assad of Syria have been opposed by
Russia and Iran. The emergence of ISIS, now posing a challenge to the
US is related to the mismanagement of the war in Iraq.
Though the US succeeded in downgrading Al Qaeda in Afghanistan,

its franchises remain active in other parts of the world. The Afghan
Taliban have staged a comeback despite the divisions following the
death of their supreme leader, Mulla Umar. These developments, the
author says, show that the US is no longer in the position to dictate to
the rest of the world unilaterally, a position that it enjoyed briefly in the
1990s and the first few years of this century.
According to the writer, a salient feature of the current international

system is the primacy of power politics as against the principles of the
UN Charter and international law. The authority of the UN was reduced
considerably in the post Cold War period because of the absence of an
effective countervailing force.
There is a tendency on the part of the great powers and major regional
powers to flout the UN Charter in pursuit of their national interests. By
virtue of their preponderance in military, economic and cultural power,
the West, despite the emergence of new centres of power, continues to
play the most influential role in determining the international agenda.
Husain is of the view that in the critically important institutions dealing
with issues of international security and economy such as the UN
Security Council, the World Bank and the IMF, the Western countries

Book Reviews
virtually control the decision-making process, and no decision on any
important issue is possible without their agreement.
Husain says that the rise of China and other emerging powers
will eventually lead to a decline of the Wests relative advantage over
other countries in terms of power and influence. That would involve
the rewriting of the rules of interstate conduct in political, security and
economic fields to accommodate the interests of the emerging powers.
While acknowledging the vast damage caused by terrorism, and

agreeing with the need to fight and eliminate the menace of international
terrorism, the author rightly asks whether the use of overwhelming force
alone is the best way to crush this menace. He goes on to recommend
a more sophisticated approach employing military, political, economic
and cultural instruments.
The book also refers to the limitations of medium sized powers

in a more disorderly world. In the international scenario marked by
a weakened UN collective security system and the primacy of power
politics, the ultimate guarantor of a countrys security would increasingly
be its national power and the collective power of the coalition of its
friends.
The military capability, however, must be matched by economic

development. Husain feels that ideally, at the early stage of development,
a country should assign high priority to the growth of its economic
strength because a sound military superstructure can be built only on
the solid foundation of economic prowess.
He cites the example of China which under the guidance of

Deng Xiaoping, assigned the highest priority to the goal of economic
development. That he says should be a model for countries like
Pakistan.
Focusing on Pakistan, the former ambassador suggests that the

daunting challenges to its internal and external security can be faced

Book Reviews
successfully only through a comprehensive approach leading to the
adoption of a grand strategy.
He pleads that Pakistans grand strategy must come to grips with

the ground realities in such a manner as would safeguard its legitimate
national interests. This grand strategy should be a well thought mix
of political, economic, security and diplomatic policies to meet the
challenges confronting it.
As a China hand, Husain has devoted a chapter to Chinas phenomenal

rise and the centrality of Pak-China friendship in this countrys foreign
policy. Both countries have been a source of support to each other on
issues of critical importance to them. There is extensive cooperation
between the two countries in the spheres of defence and security.
Economic and strategic cooperation has reached new heights with the
launch of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor connecting Chinas
Xinjiang to the port of Gwadar in Pakistans province of Balochistan.
He is of the view that their time-tested convergence of interests will
remain in effect throughout the twenty-first century.
Chinas rise is presaged to pose a big challenge to the US in the

Asia-Pacific region but Husain thinks that at the global level, this
challenge will take longer - up to half a century - to materialize as
Chinas economic and military power increases and the gap with the US
in scientific and technological advancement narrows down.
The geopolitical scene in Asia would also witness the rise of India
as a major power in economic and military fields. India is expected to
emerge as the worlds third largest economy behind China and the US
by 2030. It has undertaken a vast programme of increasing its defence
potential to project power in South and West Asia, the Indian Ocean and
particularly as a competitor to China. The US has already accorded an
important role to India in its strategy to counter China.
Any effort to formulate a grand strategy for Pakistan should take

into account Indias growth as a major regional power and its regional
and global strategic goals. The writer says, it is important to know, in

Book Reviews
particular, whether India wants to have good neighborly relations with
Pakistan based on sovereign equality and peaceful settlement of disputes
or if it wants to establish its hegemony rejecting offers of peaceful and
friendly ties.
The book refers to the observations made by Zbigniew Brzezinski

as well as Henry Kissinger with regard to Indias quest for regional
hegemony and a major global role. According to Kissinger, India is
applying its own version of the Monroe Doctrine in South Asia and the
Indian Ocean. The BJPs victory in 2014 election has accentuated Indias
policy of muzzling the Kashmiri freedom struggle while intimidating
Pakistan through incessant shelling on the Line of Control.
Husain expresses the view that with the hardening Indian position
steeped in Hindutva, Pakistan should maintain its guard while avoiding
any adventure (e.g., Kargil) or provocative activity from its side. It
should establish a firm grip on the jihadi organizations to prevent them
from aggravating tensions between the two countries. Pakistan must,
however, avoid a posture of appeasement as that kind of approach
towards an expansionist power whets its appetite for more, thereby
precipitating the crisis that appeasement was supposed to prevent.
The writer argues that Nawaz Sharif is pursuing an India policy

based on illusions and naivete. Example: the Pakistan-India joint
statement issued at Ufa (Russia) on 10 July, 2015 tilting heavily in
favour of the Indian point of view on outstanding bilateral problems
and disputes. The text worked out at Ufa was in doldrums just a month
later when Pakistan attempted to highlight the Kashmir issue and India
exploited the situation to torpedo the NSAs meeting envisaged in the
joint statement.
Indias strategy to tame Pakistan has political, military, economic

and cultural dimensions. In view of Pakistans nuclear deterrent, India
is not in a position to inflict a conclusive military defeat on Pakistan.
However, the possibility of limited skirmishes cannot be totally ruled
out. Pakistan would also feel the pressure in the face of Indias fast
growing economy that would provide greater resources for defence

Book Reviews
spending. Pakistan will have to spend a larger portion of its smaller
economy to maintain the required level of preparedness.
Indias military and economic policies aimed at subduing Pakistan

are backed by a cultural onslaught through cinema and a network of
terrorists aimed at destabilizing the country through acts of sabotage
and violence particularly in Balochistan and Karachi. In sum, Pakistan-
India relations are likely to continue to suffer from recurrent periods of
tension and strain because of Indias hegemonic designs and outstanding
disputes, especially the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.
The author recommends that while maintaining its principled

position on Kashmir seeking settlement on the basis of UN resolutions
and the wishes of the Kashmiri people, Pakistan should for now, aim at
the protection of the human rights of the Kashmiris, through dialogue
with India. The final settlement of the dispute should be left to some
opportune time in the future when the necessary conditions are available.
Trade with India should be conducted on a level playing field with

due regard to Pakistans economy.
Hussain is a firm advocate of strengthening Pakistans partnership

with China and friendly relations with Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and
Saudi Arabia to balance Indias power advantage. Pakistan should also
work for greater cooperation with Russia and Central Asia. For regional
cooperation and integration, the Economic Cooperation Organization
(ECO) rather than SAARC should be the organization of choice for
several reasons.
First, SAARC countries lack the complementarities of economies

which can lead to mutually beneficial free trade. Secondly, they are
not homogenous in religious and cultural traditions. Thirdly, there
are outstanding disputes among the member states, notably between
Pakistan and India over Kashmir and the common rivers. For Pakistan,
it is the Tehran based Economic Cooperation Organization - grouping
Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,

Book Reviews
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan - that meets the requisites of
regional integration.
ECO offers economic complementarities, common cultural heritage

and the absence of serious disputes and hegemonic designs among its
members. Some of the member states of ECO are major oil and gas
exporters while Turkey and Pakistan are large importers of these
commodities. Both these countries are textile exporters whereas Iran
and other ECO members are textile importers.
The economies of South Asia are on the other hand competitive.

Thus the possibilities of increased trade and economic cooperation
among the ECO members are far greater than those available within
the framework of SAARC. Finally the signing of the Iran nuclear deal
should remove sanctions inhibiting trade and economic cooperation
between Iran and Pakistan.
Javid Husain may be justified in highlighting ECOs potential. Its

track record is no better than that of the SAARC. His calls to familiarize
the member states bureaucracies to the great potential of trade among
the ECO members will remain unheeded. Where trade opportunities
exist, businessmen will rush to benefit provided a level playing field
exists. A closer look at tariff and non tariff barriers in the biggest ECO
markets like Iran may provide clues to the reasons behind its restricted
trade with Pakistan.
A chapter of the book is devoted to the conflict in Afghanistan and

its fallout on Pakistan. Husain is critical of Pakistans alignment with
the Taliban which he calls a great blunder of its foreign policy. The
initial mistake was continued even when the international community,
including Pakistans close friend China, refused to recognize the Taliban
government. Sheltering them after the US invasion led to problems with
the US and its allies.
According to the writer, Pakistan did comply with the US demands to

an extent by preventing Pakistani fighters to take up arms in Afghanistan
post 9/11. But that might have led to the tribal backlash in the form

Book Reviews
of the terror outfit assuming the name of Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan or
the TTP that inflicted 50,000 deaths in terror attacks. Eventually, the
Pakistani forces had to undertake major operations against the TTP
bases in FATA. Flushing the TTP and assorted terror networks out of
their hideouts has not fully eliminated their capacity, as seen in recurrent
attacks guided from sanctuaries in Afghanistan.
The author suggests that terrorism cannot be defeated by force

alone but through a combination that includes political means, including
dialogue. As regards to Afghanistan, the only way out of the stalemate
is a political settlement between the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan
government which should encompass a role for the former in the political
set-up.
As Pakistans former envoy to Tehran, Javid Husain lived through

the strains in Pak-Iran ties as a result of their divergences over the
conflict in Afghanistan since the 1990s. Husain writes that Pakistans
suggestions for rapprochement between the Afghan Taliban and the
Rabbani led government in Kabul were not heeded by Tehran. Later,
after the Taliban conquered Kabul and the Northern Alliance was
marginalized, Iran approached Pakistan for reconciliation between the
warring factions but that was turned down by Pakistan, saying that they
could not interfere in another countrys internal affairs.
Pak-Iran relations improved after 9/11 and the US-led invasion,

resulting in the ouster of the Taliban regime in Kabul. Trade also picked
up and the two countries concluded an accord for building a gas pipeline.
The upturn was, however, marred by sanctions on Iran over its nuclear
programme, preventing further progress on the gas project and a drastic
reduction in trade.
The book views the leaders of both Iran and Pakistan as lacking
in vision to strengthen political and economic cooperation between
the two neighbours. He cites efforts by India to scuttle Pak-Iran ties. It
should, however, be noted that the relations between Pakistan and Iran
are marred by other factors. After the fall of the Shah in 1979, Iran had
turbulent relations with the West, particularly the US, while Pakistan

Book Reviews
remained in the US camp. Further, Pak-Iran interests do not always
match. The latest episode began with the civil war in Yemen. Pakistan
remains neutral but is courted by the Saudi-led Gulf group to raise a
pan-Islamic force to counter terrorism, an initiative that is watched by
Iran with great suspicion.
Returning to the problems arising from the lack of a grand

national strategy, the author concedes that at its inception, Pakistan
was confronted with a very difficult and hostile security environment
as India used all kinds of pressure tactics to make life hard for the
new nation. Afghanistan also adopted an unfriendly posture through
claims on territory and by supporting the slogan of Pakhtunistan. The
policy makers had to make difficult choices to safeguard Pakistans
independence, security, territorial integrity, and economic well being.
Serious security threats forced Pakistan to allocate a high proportion

of its resources to the defence sector, leading to a shortage of resources
for economic development. In the long run it is a nations economic
and technological strength that provides the foundation for its military
strength and determines its relative position in the comity of nations.
Husain has cited Paul Kennedys argument that all of the major shifts
in the worlds military power balances have followed alterations in the
productive balances and in the rising and falling of the various empires
and states. Victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material
resources.
The writer affirms that an economically weak and technologically

backward country cannot hope to achieve a great power status or even
safeguard its security in the long run in the face of serious threats. Over
time, Pakistan was severely constrained by the disequilibrium between
its economic development and growing defence expenditure.
Repeated military takeovers resulted in a quasi permanent

domination of the generals in foreign policy formulation on critical
issues such as Kashmir and Afghanistan. There was also an element
of adventurism and risky policies, leading to strategic overstretch and
national exhaustion.

Book Reviews
Pakistans excessive dependence on foreign economic and military
assistance and its status as a client state of the US have narrowed down
the nations foreign policy options and restricted its maneuverability in
the management of foreign affairs.
Husain says that military means and economic strength are essential
elements of national security and defence against external aggression.
But there is a third element of national security - internal political
stability, cohesion and the unity of a nation. Pakistans dismemberment
in 1971 provides a classic example of internal divisions leading to a
military defeat.
Pakistan has suffered enormously from the pursuit of a national

security policy that focused almost exclusively on the military
dimension to the neglect of other components. This approach resulted in
a flawed foreign policy and the primary cause of its internal and external
problems. It also resulted in the disrupt of the democratic process and
weakening of institutions. Destabilization occurred through repeated
spells of military rule.
The book makes no reference to the inadequacies of the countrys

political class or the rapacious character of the private sector that thrived
on an array of facilities. The two groups failed to ensure the provision
of essential financial resources to the state to meet its developmental
and defence needs. Successive governments, in an effort to overcome
Pakistans financial constraints, resorted to the begging bowl.
Lamentably, Pakistans major political parties have dishonored

politics as a vocation, by using power to amass fortunes. The business
community and industrial tycoons have done their bit of damage by
denying the state of its due revenues. Massive corruption by the
democratically elected rulers rattles the army leadership. This is not
to say that many generals and other commanders of the forces did not
indulge in great financial malpractices. The point to ponder is whether
our democratic leaders have tarnished the system by failing to rise to the
challenge of delivering good governance.

Book Reviews
The second point missing from the narrative is whether Pakistan had
choices other than joining the western camp in mustering a deterrent force
to Indias openly hostile posture toward Pakistan after independence.
In the concluding chapter titled A Grand Strategy for Pakistan

Husain reiterates that the country is faced with a world in disorder in the
twenty-first century. It is a world that is increasingly governed by power
politics rather than the UN Charter or international law on vital issues of
peace and security. The world is passing through a period of transition
from a unipolar moment towards multipolarity.
Russias resurgence under President Putin as seen in Moscows

resistance to the further eastward expansion of NATO and the EU, and
the growing strategic partnership between China and Russia offer new
opportunities for safeguarding Pakistans national interests.
According to Husain, the linchpin of Pakistans grand strategy

should be that of assigning top priority to the goal of rapid economic
growth. This would require a single-minded focus on and maximum
allocation of resources to the task of economic development. In order
to move in that direction, we need peace in our neighbourhood. That,
in turn, would need the pursuance of a low risk and non-adventurist
foreign policy to avoid a major conflict. Over ambitious foreign policy
goals should be avoided so as not to fall into strategic overdrive and
exhaustion in which we are caught at present.
While pursuing a policy of peace and dialogue with India, we should

remain firm on our national interests. We should adopt a long term
strategy for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute instead of rushing into
an agreement that we may regret later. Finally, we should pursue a policy
of noninterference in Afghanistans internal affairs in coordination with
Iran, Turkey, China and other neighboring countries. In parallel, we
should facilitate intra-afghan dialogue aimed at reconciliation and a fair
settlement.
The grand strategy has an important internal component to be

achieved through successfully tackling the menace of terrorism and

Book Reviews
religious extremism. Husain concludes that a grand strategy on the
suggested lines may not produce immediate results but it certainly
would enable Pakistan to avoid a major disaster if it continues with its
current haphazard policies. The recommended grand strategy should in
the long run enable us to realize our considered foreign policy goals and
objectives.
Pakistan and a World in Disorder is a valuable addition to

the literature on Pakistans foreign policy as it is probably the first
systematic effort to identify the pitfalls of overdependence on military
strength at the cost of the vital and pressing mission of the countrys
economic development. Indeed Pakistans economy, though showing
signs of revival, is marked by growing military expenditure at a time of
declining exports, foreign remittances and foreign exchange reserves.
Javid Husains book is a timely reminder to reappraise and redirect

Pakistans national strategy to successfully meet the challenges of
economic development while maintaining a credible deterrence in the
face of an insecure regional and global security environment.

Criterion Vol 12 No 1

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Criterion Vol 12 No 1

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

April/June 2017

Volume 12, Number 2

Pakistans Counter Terrorism Efforts: Air Com. (R) Khalid Iqbal 20

ISIS in Pakistan & Afghanistan: Ozer Khalid 41

My Father, a Pakistani Prisoner Sunniya Ahmad Pirzada 88

Pakistan and a World in Disorder M Saeed Khalid 108

LAHORE RESOLUTION &

On 23 March 1940 the All India Muslim League adopted the

These parts of the Resolution were rooted in experience. The

CRITERION April/June 2017 3

This is a neglected phase. But it explains the raison detre of the

No settlement with majority community is possible, as no Hindu

4 CRITERION Volume 12 No.2

He went to the heart of the problem. We in India have been

CRITERION April/June 2017 5

That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be

The Session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame

That even a highly educated person like Begum Shaista Subrawardy

6 CRITERION Volume 12 No.2

Why the Quaid accepted what he himself had earlier rejected as

The second para of the Resolution envisaged adequate effective and

CRITERION April/June 2017 7

The Constitution Committee of the League set up in March 1939

The report contained a precious nugget in paragraph 16 which

8 CRITERION Volume 12 No.2

There is every reason to believe that Jinnah, the hard-headed lawyer,

Prof. R. J. Moores works on Indias politics since 1937 are noted

CRITERION April/June 2017 9

In his speech at the Lahore session in 1940 demanding Pakistan,

On 10 March 1941 Jinnah said at Aligarh: As a self-respective

But his rhetoric underwent change as he pursued the demand. He

10 CRITERION Volume 12 No.2

The Cripps proposals of 1942 provided for the signing of a Treaty

The Advisory Committee on the rights of citizens, minorities and

CRITERION April/June 2017 11

The guarantee of protection which both governments give to the

A vital part of the Lahore Resolution on the minorities was ignored.

2. We further declare that we consider peace and unity amongst the

12 CRITERION Volume 12 No.2

5. We further solemnly declare that it shall be our endeavour to put

6. We hereby guarantee to the minorities within our Dominions

7. We call upon the people of the Dominions to shed any tendency

CRITERION April/June 2017 13

9. In order to ensure cooperation between two Dominions as well as

10. In order to obviate misunderstandings and to enable us to take joint

11. For the purpose of instilling confidence in the minorities we have

12. We also desire, in order to give further confidence to the minorities

14 CRITERION Volume 12 No.2

14. We strongly condemn the acts of brutality which have been

CRITERION April/June 2017 15

Unfortunately Subrawardy had goofed in mentioning to Jinnah,

16 CRITERION Volume 12 No.2

I made the mistake of showing the endorsement of Gandhiji to

Suhrawardys folly and Jinnahs wrath fall in one part. The

Having rejected the Act of 1935 Jinnah had to evolve an alternative.

CRITERION April/June 2017 17

As Ayesh Jalal notes: There were contradictions between Muslim

On 6 and 25 April 1948 the Cabinet Mission offered Jinnah a choice

18 CRITERION Volume 12 No.2

That explains why he accepted the Missions Plan of 16 May 1946.

CRITERION April/June 2017 19

PAKISTANS COUNTER TERRORISM

Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal, TI (M)*

20 CRITERION Volume 12 No.2