Executive Clemencies

Article VII Section 19: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress.

Reprieve = cancel or postpone punishment

Commutation = reduction of legal penalties

Article IX-C Section 5: No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election
laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of
the Commission.

Monsanto v Factoran: W/N a public officer who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment? Yes.
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights.

*Other notes: pardon is a deed and is valid only when there is delivery and acceptance

One does not lose civil liability after being pardoned unless the causes recognized by the
CC: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation.

The exception to no backwages: Expressly grounded on innocence

1973 Pardoning Power: The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, and with the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa, grant amnesty.

1981 Amendments: Deleted earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final conviction.
This means before clemency can be given before conviction.

Garcia v COA: W/N petitioner is entitled to backwages after pardoned. Yes. He was acquitted during trial
on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. This is the exception.

Pardon Distinguished from Probation:

People v Vera: W/N Act No. 4221 (Probation Act) is unconstitutional. Yes. It constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power and it denies the equal protection clause. In regards to undue delegation,
there is a lack of standards affixed by the act (sufficiency test?). It was not expressed whether or not
such act will be applicable to all provinces or specific ones. It can be assumed then that provincial boards
have the discretion to utilize this act or not. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the
provincial boards.
The act violates the equal protection clause due to the undue delegation of congress to the provincial
boards. Some provinces will only be able to reap such benefits. This permits inequality.

Jones Law vests pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive.

Probation: power to grand suspension of a sentence is a judicial power. One is not granted complete
liberty. It is a substitution of the imprisonment and fine prescribed by the criminal law. It pushes for the
individualization of the punishment. The adjustment of the penalty provides a grace period in order to
aid in rehabilitation to the offender.

Pardon: Act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws which
exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed.

Commutation: Remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one
originally imposed

Reprieve/Respite: withholding sentence for an interval of time.

Pardon Distinguished From Parole

Tesoro v Director of Prisons: By virtue of Section 63 (i) of the Admin Code, the petitioner was granted
parole. The Governor-General has the following powers and duties:

Section 63 (i) of the Administrative Code, by virtue of which the petitioner was granted parole, gives the
Governor- General the following powers and duties: To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons,
either plenary or partial, conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit
fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he
may impose; and to authorize the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment,
shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Torres v Gonzales:

RPC Article 159. Other cases of evasion of service of sentence. - The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon by the
Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by
the granting of such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion
of his original sentence.

Pardon Distinguished From Amnesty

Barrioquinto v Fernandez: Petition or the execution of the writ of mandamus for the Guerilla Amnesty
Commission to hear their petition for amnesty. Yes. Even if the petitioner committed murder, his actions
were regarded as heroic and patriotic as the petitioners rendered invaluable services to the nation in
committing such act. Thus, there is no crime to speak of.
Pardon: Granted by Chief Executive. It is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned since the courts take no notice thereof. This looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense. The punishment is forgiven.

Amnesty: Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress. It is a public act which
the judiciary should take note of. Amnesty looks back and abolishes puts the offense itself into oblivion.
He has committed no offense.

Amnesty Commissions: Executive instrumentalities acting for and in behalf of the President. No judicial
function.

Effects of Pardon

Cristobal v Labrador: W/N Santos will remain in the list of registered voters. Yes. Santos was given
ABSOLUTE pardon that blots out ALL disabilities from the crime. This includes, indemnities, serving
unexpired sentence, and the like. He is given his full civic capacity.

Pelobello v Palatino: W/N the petitioner is disqualified from voting and being voted upon for municipal
office through absolute pardon. No. An absolute pardon grants him FULL CIVIL and POLITICAL RIGHTS.

Lacuna v Abes: The exact same thing as Pelobello.

Sanctions for Violations of Conditional Pardon

Torres v Gonzales: W/N the order of arrest was valid as the petitioner claims that he had not violated the
condition for the CONDITIONAL pardon as he has not been convicted by final judgment for said criminal
case. Yes. This determination is subject NOT to the judiciary but to the President himself. Thus, no judicial
pronouncement is necessary for w/n the petitioner violated the conditional pardon granted. Unless the
President proceeds under Section 64 (i) of the RAC to make it a judicial act which consists of a trial and
conviction of conditional pardon under Art. 159 of the RPC. We must remember that what is involved is
NOT the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of
the criminal law BUT w/n the convict breached the condition that he would not again violate any of the
penal laws for purposes of imposition of his remaining sentence.

Civil Liability

People v Nacional: W/N the petitioner he is guilty of murder and more importantly is he exempt from civil
indemnity? Yes and no. He was a conspirator in committing the act ad he was a look-out. Furthermore,
CONDITIONAL PARDON does NOT extinguish civil liability.

Pardoning Powers Application to Administrative Cases

Llamas v Orbos: W/N the President has the power to grant exclusive clemency in administrative cases.
First, the court does have jurisdiction over the case since pursuant to the 1987 constitution, the SC was
given expanded jurisdiction to review the decisions of the other branches to determine w/n they have
acted within the bounds of the constitution. To be clear, this is not a purely political question. In answering
the question at hand, YES, the President has the power to grant exclusive clemency in administrative cases
WITHIN its own sphere. The executive only.

Other handy notes:

Preventive Suspension: Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides: Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension.

(1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a
provincial or city official

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the
evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense s warrants, or when the continuance in
office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity the
records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after
the start of said suspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without
prejudice to the continuation the proceedings against him until its termination.

EO 292 aka Administrative Code of 1987: Section I, Book III:

SECTION 1. Power of Control. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code
or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall
be categorized and defined as follows:

(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and
programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the
relationship of particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass supervision and control as
defined in this paragraph. ... (emphasis supplied) The disciplinary authority to investigate,
suspend, and remove provincial or city officials devolves at the first instance on the Department
of Interior and Local Government (Secs. 61 and 65, B.P. Blg. 337) and ultimately on the President
(Sec. 66). Implicit in this authority, however, is the "supervision and control" power of the
President
the President (Sec. 66). Implicit in this authority, however, is the "supervision and control" power
of the President to reduce, if circumstances so warrant, the imposable penalty or to modify the
suspension or removal order, even "in the sense" of granting executive clemency. "Control,"
within the meaning of the Constitution, is the power to substitute one's own judgment for that of
a subordinate. Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different executive
departments are mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are presumptively the acts of the
President until countermanded or reprobated

Administrative Code of 1987, Book V, Sec 53, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I: Removal of Administrative
Penalties or Disabilities.In meritorious cases and upon recommendation of the Commission, the
President may commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities imposed upon officers or
employees in disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose in the interest of
the service.

Who May Avail of Amnesty

Tolentino v Catoy: W/N amnesty can be availed by Tolentino. Yes. The assumption is that amnesty is all-
inclusive. Amnesty and pardon are synonymous (I dont think this is right). Pardon is construed strictly
against the state.

Macaga-an v People: W/N the petitioners can avail of amnesty pursuant to PD 1082? No. The Presidential
decree only gives amnesty for members and supporters of the MNLF and the Bangsa Moro Army and
other anti-government groups with similar motivations and aims. They, on the other hand, were convicted
for estafa. Not really outright rebellious acts against the government per say. Moreover, petitioners fall
under those who were EXPRESSLY disqualified from amnesty under Sec 2(a) of PD 1182(repealed 1082)
and they filed for amnesty after the prescribed time limit. Last, Marcos actions were contradictory to
each other. He promulgated PD 1429 in order to fix the limitations set by PD 1082 and PD 1182. However,
PD 1429 did not amend the decrees he intended to amend. This confuses me.

Pending Criminal Cases

People v Patriarca: W/N the petitioner can be acquitted of murder due to the grant of amnesty? Yes.
Amnesty is a public act in which the judiciary should take notice. Amnesty is to be equated NOT to
forgiveness but to say that there was NO CRIME DONE.

Denial of Commission of Offenses

People v Vera: W/N Act No. 4221 (Probation Act) is unconstitutional. Yes. It constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power and it denies the equal protection clause. In regards to undue delegation,
there is a lack of standards affixed by the act (sufficiency test?). It was not expressed whether or not
such act will be applicable to all provinces or specific ones. It can be assumed then that provincial boards
have the discretion to utilize this act or not. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the
provincial boards.

People v Llaneta: W/N the defendant can avail for amnesty. No. The acts made by the defendant are
contradictory. The defendant wants to justify his act or seek forgiveness to which he alleges that he did
not commit. The Amnesty Commission did not give cognizance since, again, the defendant denied having
any participation of the crime. There was no evidence that supported that the actions done by the
defendant were in resistance the Japanese. (I need to reread this)

Tax Cases

Republic v IAC: W/N Pastors (Defendants) still have to pay the difference of income tax even if they have
been granted amnesty. No. The Defendants paid almost the equivalent amount to the Government by
way of amnesty taxes under PD. 213. More importantly, the grant of amnesty RELIEVES or WAIVES the
right of the government to collect the difference prescribed.
Other notes: The rule is that in case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the
Government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed
beyond what the applicable statute (in this case P.D. 213) expressly and clearly declares

Requirement of Finality of Conviction

People v Salle: W/N the pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment
of the conviction by the trial court is enforceable? YES, for this case only. It is to be noted that the SC
granted Mengote an exception here. Sine Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal, the
conditional pardon should not have been enforced. However, since he stands on the same ground as the
accused-appellants in the Hinlo case (see Legal History below), he is freed from the full force of the ruling.
The ruling of this case will only take precedence after January 31, 1995.

REAL ANSWER: NO. The general rule is that before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must
first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal, ergo, the appealed conviction must be first brought to
finality.The SC declared that the "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Sec. 19, Art. 7 of the 1987
Consti prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of
his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. If someone then applies for an appeal, the pardon should
not be acted upon or processed towards its grant unless it is withdrawn. Also, the agencies of the Gov't
should require proof that the accused has withdrawn his appeal. The acceptance of the pardon shall not
operate as an abandonment or a waiver of the appeal. The reason the Constitutional Commission adopted
the "conviction by final judgment" requirement, reviving in effect the original provision of the 1973
Constitution on the pardoning power, was, as expounded by Commissioner Napoleon Rama, to prevent
the President from exercising executive power in derogation of the judicial power, ergo, SEPARATION OF
POWERS.

RULING: The conditional pardon granted to Mengote shall only take effect upon the grant of the Motion
to Withdraw Appeal.

People v Bacang: W/N the accused may withdraw their appeal in order to receive their grant of pardon.
No. Pursuant to Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there is a prohibition AGAINST the grant
of ANY KIND of pardons DURING THE PENDENCY of the appeal from his conviction.

Commutation

Drilon v CA: W/N the decision of the CA was right in prohibiting the Government from pursuing criminal
actions against the private respondents for the death of Longno and Chavez during early martial law? Yes.
A pardon was given and received with a presidential signature to the respondents. However, either way
he has served his sentence and can no longer be reinvestigated for the same offense. (Need to reread
this)