0068 C01

I
Fundamentals
1
Earthquakes: A
Historical Perspective
1.1 Introduction
Global Earthquake Impacts
1.2 Review of Historical Earthquakes
Pre-Twentieth Century Events Early Twentieth Century
Events Mid-Century Events First Turning Point
Second Turning Point
Charles Scawthorn Dening Terms
Consulting Engineer References
Berkeley, CA Further Reading
Let us look at the facts.

Terence
Adelphoe, l. 796
1.1 Introduction
Earthquakes are a major problem for mankind, killing thousands each year. A review of Table 1.1 shows,
for example, that an average of almost 17,000 persons per year were killed in the twentieth century.1
Earthquakes are also multifaceted, sometimes causing death and destruction in a wide variety of ways,
from building collapse to conagrations, tsunamis, and landslides. This chapter therefore reviews selected
earthquakes and the damage they have caused, to inculcate in the reader the magnitude and complexity
of the problem earthquakes pose for mankind. To do this, we rst review in this introduction some basic
statistics on damage. Section 1.2, the heart of this chapter, then reviews selected earthquakes, chosen for
their particular damaging effects, or because the earthquake led to a signicant advance in mitigation.
This review is focused. It is relatively brief on earlier earthquakes, which are mentioned largely for
historical interest or because you should be aware of them as portents for future events; however, the
review is lengthier on selected recent events, especially U.S. events, because these provide the best record
on the performance of modern structures. Table 1.2 shows selected U.S. earthquakes.
Based on this review, the next section then extracts important lessons, following which we conclude
with a brief history of the response to earthquakes.
1 The average is still more than 10,000 if the single largest event (Tangshan, 1976) is omitted.
2003 by CRC Press LLC

TABLE 1.1 Selected Earthquakes Since 1900 (Fatalities Greater than 1,000)a
Comments/Damage
Year Day-Month Location Latitude Longitude Deaths M ($ millions)
1902 19-Apr Guatemala 14N 91W 2,000 7.5

16-Dec Turkestan 40.8N 72.6E 4,500 6.4
1903 19-Apr Turkey 39.1N 42.4E 1,700
28-Apr Turkey 39.1N 42.5E 2,200 6.3
1905 04-Apr India, Kangra 33.0N 76.0E 19,000 8.6
08-Sep Italy, Calabria 39.4N 16.4E 2,500 7.9
1906 31-Jan Colombia 1N 81.5W 1,000 8.9
16-Mar Taiwan, Kagi 23.6N 120.5E 1,300 7.1
18-Apr San Francisco, CA 38N 123W 2,000+ 8.3 Conagration
17-Aug Chile, Santiago 33S 72W 20,000 8.6 Conagration
1907 14-Jan Jamaica, Kingston 18.2N 76.7W 1,600 6.5 Conagration
21-Oct Central Asia 38N 69E 12,000 8.1
1908 28-Dec Italy, Messina 38N 15.5E 70,000 7.5 Deaths possibly 100,000
1909 23-Jan Iran 33.4N 49.1E 5,500 7.3
1912 09-Aug Turkey, Marmara Sea 40.5N 27E 1,950 7.8
1915 13-Jan Italy, Avezzano 42N 13.5E 29,980 7.5
1917 21-Jan Indonesia, Bali 8.0S 115.4E 15,000
30-Jul China 28.0N 104.0E 1,800 6.5
1918 13-Feb China, Canton 23.5N 117.0E 10,000 7.3
1920 16-Dec China, Gansu 35.8N 105.7E 200,000 8.6 Major fractures,
landslides
1923 24-Mar China 31.3N 100.8E 5,000 7.3
25-May Iran 35.3N 59.2E 2,200 5.7
01-Sep Japan, Kanto 35.0N 139.5E 143,000 8.3 $2800, conagration
1925 16-Mar China, Yunnan 25.5N 100.3E 5,000 7.1
1927 07-Mar Japan, Tango 35.8N 134.8E 3,020 7.9
22-May China, nr Xining 36.8N 102.8E 200,000 8.3 Large fractures
1929 01-May Iran 38N 58E 3,300 7.4
1930 06-May Iran 38.0N 44.5E 2,500 7.2
23-Jul Italy 41.1N 15.4E 1,430 6.5
1931 31-Mar Nicaragua 13.2N 85.7W 2,400 5.6
1932 25-Dec China, Gansu 39.7N 97.0E 70,000 7.6
1933 02-Mar Japan, Sanriku 39.0N 143.0E 2,990 8.9
25-Aug China 32.0N 103.7E 10,000 7.4
1934 15-Jan India, Bihar-Nepal 26.6N 86.8E 10,700 8.4
1935 20-Apr Formosa 24.0N 121.0E 3,280 7.1
30-May Pakistan, Quetta 29.6N 66.5E 30,000 7.5 Deaths possibly 60,000
16-Jul Taiwan 24.4N 120.7E 2,700 6.5
1939 25-Jan Chile, Chillan 36.2S 72.2W 28,000 8.3 $100
26-Dec Turkey, Erzincan 39.6N 38E 30,000 8
1940 10-Nov Romania 45.8N 26.8E 1,000 7.3
1942 26-Nov Turkey 40.5N 34.0E 4,000 7.6
20-Dec Turkey, Erbaa 40.9N 36.5E 3,000 7.3 Some reports of 1,000
killed
1943 10-Sep Japan, Tottori 35.6N 134.2E 1,190 7.4
26-Nov Turkey 41.0N 33.7E 4,000 7.6
1944 15-Jan Argentina, San Juan 31.6S 68.5W 5,000 7.8 Deaths possibly 8,000
01-Feb Turkey 41.4N 32.7E 2,800 7.4 Deaths possibly 5,000

07-Dec Japan, Tonankai 33.7N 136.2E 1,000 8.3
1945 12-Jan Japan, Mikawa 34.8N 137.0E 1,900 7.1
27-Nov Iran 25.0N 60.5E 4,000 8.2
1946 31-May Turkey 39.5N 41.5E 1,300 6
10-Nov Peru, Ancash 8.3S 77.8W 1,400 7.3 Landslides, great
destruction
20-Dec Japan, Tonankai 32.5N 134.5E 1,330 8.4

TABLE 1.1 (CONTINUED) Selected Earthquakes Since 1900 (Fatalities Greater than 1,000)a
Comments/Damage
1948 28-Jun Japan, Fukui 36.1N 136.2E 5,390 7.3 Conagration

05-Oct Turkmenistan 38.0N 58.3E 110,000 7.3
1949 05-Aug Ecuador, Ambato 1.2S 78.5E 6,000 6.8 Large landslides
1950 15-Aug India, Assam; Tibet 28.7N 96.6E 1,530 8.7 Great topographical
changes
1954 09-Sep Algeria, Orleansvl. 36N 1.6E 1,250 6.8
1957 27-Jun USSR (Russia) 56.3N 116.5E 1,200
02-Jul Iran 36.2N 52.7E 1,200 7.4
13-Dec Iran 34.4N 47.6E 1,130 7.3
1960 29-Feb Morocco, Agadir 30N 9W 10,000 5.9 Deaths possibly 15,000
22-May Chile 39.5S 74.5W 4,000 9.5 Deaths possibly 5,000
1962 01-Sep Iran, Qazvin 35.6N 49.9E 12,230 7.3
1963 26-Jul Yugoslavia, Skopje 42.1N 21.4E 1,100 6 Shallow depth just under
city
1966 19-Aug Turkey, Varto 39.2N 41.7E 2,520 7.1
1968 31-Aug Iran 34.0N 59.0E 12,000 7.3 Deaths possibly 20,000
1969 25-Jul Eastern China 21.6N 111.9E 3,000 5.9
1970 04-Jan Yunnan, China 24.1N 102.5E 10,000 7.5
28-Mar Turkey, Gediz 39.2N 29.5E 1,100 7.3
31-May Peru 9.2S 78.8W 66,000 7.8 Great rockslide; $500
1972 10-Apr Iran, southern 28.4N 52.8E 5,054 7.1
23-Dec Nicaragua 12.4N 86.1W 5,000 6.2 Managua
1974 10-May China 28.2N 104.0E 20,000 6.8
28-Dec Pakistan 35.0N 72.8E 5,300 6.2
1975 04-Feb China 40.6N 122.5E 10,000 7.4
06-Sep Turkey 38.5N 40.7E 2,300 6.7
1976 04-Feb Guatemala 15.3N 89.1W 23,000 7.5 $6,000
06-May Italy, northeastern 46.4N 13.3E 1,000 6.5
25-Jun New Guinea 4.6S 140.1E 422 7.1 West Irian
27-Jul China, Tangshan 39.6N 118.0E 255,000 8 Deaths possibly 655,000;
$2,000
16-Aug Philippines 6.3N 124.0E 8,000 7.9 Mindanao
24-Nov Iran-USSR border 39.1N 44.0E 5,000 7.3
1977 04-Mar Romania 45.8N 26.8E 1,500 7.2
1978 16-Sep Iran, Tabas 33.2N 57.4E 15,000 7.8 $11
1980 10-Oct Algeria, El Asnam 36.1N 1.4E 3,500 7.7
23-Nov Italy, southern 40.9N 15.3E 3,000 7.2
1981 11-Jun Iran, southern 29.9N 57.7E 3,000 6.9
28-Jul Iran, southern 30.0N 57.8E 1,500 7.3
1982 13-Dec W. Arabian Peninsula 14.7N 44.4E 2,800 6
1983 30-Oct Turkey 40.3N 42.2E 1,342 6.9
1985 19-Sep Mexico, Michoacan 18.2N 102.5W 9,500 8.1 Deaths possibly 30,000
1986 10-Oct El Salvador 13.8N 89.2W 1,000 5.5
1987 06-Mar Colombia-Ecuador 0.2N 77.8W 1,000 7
1988 20-Aug Nepal-India border 26.8N 86.6E 1,450 6.6
07-Dec Armenia, Spitak 41.0N 44.2E 25,000 7 $16,200
1990 20-Jun Iran, western 37.0N 49.4E 40,000 7.7 Deaths possibly 50,000
16-Jul Philippines, Luzon 15.7N 121.2E 1,621 7.8 Landslides, subsidence
1991 19-Oct India, northern 30.8N 78.8E 2,000 7
1992 12-Dec Indonesia, Flores 8.5S 121.9E 2,500 7.5 Tsunami wave height
25 m
1993 29-Sep India, southern 18.1N 76.5E 9,748 6.3
1995 16-Jan Japan, Kobe 34.6N 135E 6,000 6.9 $100,000, conagration
27-May Sakhalin Island 52.6N 142.8E 1,989 7.5
1997 10-May Iran, northern 33.9N 59.7E 1,560 7.5 4,460 injured; 60,000
homeless

TABLE 1.1 (CONTINUED) Selected Earthquakes Since 1900 (Fatalities Greater than 1,000)a
Comments/Damage
1998 04-Feb Afghanistan 37.1N 70.1E 2,323 6.1 Also Tajikistan

30-May Afghanistan 37.1N 70.1E 4,000 6.9 Also Tajikistan
17-Jul Papua New Guinea 2.96S 141.9E 2,183 7.1 Tsunami
1999 25-Jan Colombia 4.46N 75.82W 1,185 6.3
17-Aug Turkey 40.7N 30.0E 17,118 7.4 50,000 injured; $7,000
20-Sep Taiwan 23.7N 121.0E 2,297 7.6 8,700 injured; 600,000
homeless
2001 26-Jan India, Bhuj 23.3 N 70.3 E 19,988 7.7 166,812 injured; 600,000
homeless
Total Events = 108 Total Deaths = 1,762,802
aMagnitude scale varies.
Source: National Earthquake Information Center, Golden, CO, http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eqlists/eqsmajr.html.
TABLE 1.2 Selected U.S. Earthquakesa

Damage
US $
Year Month Day Latitude Longitude M MMI Fatalities (millions) Locale
1755 11 18 8 Massachusetts, Nr Cape Ann
1774 2 21 7 Eastern Virginia (MMI from Sta)
1791 5 16 8 Connecticut, E. Haddam (MMI from
Sta)
1811 12 16 36N 90W 8.6 Missouri, New Madrid
1812 1 23 36.6N 89.6W 8.4 12 Missouri, New Madrid
2 7 36.6N 89.6W 8.7 12 Missouri, New Madrid
1817 10 5 8 Massachusetts, Woburn (MMI from
Sta)
1836 6 10 38N 122W 10 California
1838 6 0 37.5N 123W 10 California
1857 1 9 35N 119W 8.3 7 California, Central
1865 10 8 37N 122W 9 California, San Jose, Santa Cruz
1868 4 3 19N 156W 10 81 Hawaii
10 21 37.5N 122W 6.8 10 3 California, Hayward
1872 3 26 36.5N 118W 8.5 10 50 California, Owens Valley
1886 9 1 32.9N 80W 7.7 9 60 5 South Carolina, Charleston
1892 2 24 31.5N 117W 10 California, San Diego County
4 19 38.5N 123W 9 California, Vacaville, Winters
5 16 14N 143W Guam, Agana
1897 5 31 5.8 8 Virignia, Giles County (Mb from Sta)
1899 9 4 60N 142W 8.3 Alaska, Cape Yakataga
1906 4 18 38N 123W 8.3 11 2,000 400 California, San Francisco (re)
1915 10 3 40.5N 118W 7.8 Nevada, Pleasant Valley
1925 6 29 34.3N 120W 6.2 13 8 California, Santa Barbara
1927 11 4 34.5N 121W 7.5 9 California, Lompoc
1933 3 11 33.6N 118W 6.3 115 40 California, Long Beach
1934 12 31 31.8N 116W 7.1 10 California, Baja, Imperial Valley
1935 10 19 46.6N 112W 6.2 2 19 Montana, Helena
1940 5 19 32.7N 116W 7.1 10 9 6 California, southeast of El Centro
1944 9 5 44.7N 74.7W 5.6 2 New York, Massena
1949 4 13 47.1N 123W 7 8 8 25 Washington, Olympia
1951 8 21 19.7N 156W 6.9 Hawaii
1952 7 21 35N 119W 7.7 11 13 60 California, Kern County
1954 12 16 39.3N 118W 7 10 Nevada, Dixie Valley
1957 3 9 51.3N 176W 8.6 3 Alaska
1958 7 10 58.6N 137W 7.9 5 Alaska, Lituyabay (landslide)
1959 8 18 44.8N 111W 7.7 Montana, Hebgen Lake
1962 8 30 41.8N 112W 5.8 2 Utah
1964 3 28 61N 148W 8.3 131 540 Alaska
1965 4 29 47.4N 122W 6.5 7 7 13 Washington, Seattle
1971 2 9 34.4N 118W 6.7 11 65 553 California, San Fernando
1975 3 28 42.1N 113W 6.2 8 1 Idaho, Pocatello Valley

TABLE 1.2 (CONTINUED) Selected U.S. Earthquakesa
Damage
US $
Year Month Day Latitude Longitude M MMI Fatalities (millions) Locale
1975 8 1 39.4N 122W 6.1 6 California, Oroville Reservoir
11 29 19.3N 155W 7.2 9 2 4 Hawaii
1980 1 24 37.8N 122W 5.9 7 1 4 California, Livermore
5 25 37.6N 119W 6.4 7 2 California, Mammoth Lakes
7 27 38.2N 83.9W 5.2 1 Kentucky, Maysville
11 8 41.2N 124W 7 7 5 3 California, northern coast
1983 5 2 36.2N 120W 6.5 8 31 California, central, Coalinga
10 28 43.9N 114W 7.3 2 13 Idaho, Borah Peak
11 16 19.5N 155W 6.6 8 7 Hawaii, Kapapala
1984 4 24 37.3N 122W 6.2 7 8 California, Morgan Hill
1986 7 8 34N 117W 6.1 7 5 California, Palm Springs
1987 10 1 34.1N 118W 6 8 8 358 California, Whittier
11 24 33.2N 116W 6.3 6 2 California, Superstition Hills
1989 6 26 19.4N 155W 6.1 6 Hawaii
10 18 37.1N 122W 7.1 9 62 6,000 California, Loma Prieta
1990 2 28 34.1N 118W 5.5 7 13 California, southern, Claremont,
Covina
1992 4 23 34N 116W 6.3 7 California, Joshua Tree
4 25 40.4N 124W 7.1 8 66 California, Humboldt, Ferndale
6 28 34.2N 117W 6.7 8 California, Big Bear
6 28 34.2N 116W 7.6 9 3 92 California, Landers, Yucca Valley
6 29 36.7N 116W 5.6 California-Nevada border T.S.
1993 3 25 45N 123W 5.6 7 Washington-Oregon
9 21 42.3N 122W 5.9 7 2 Oregon, Klamath Falls
1994 1 16 40.3N 76W 4.6 5 Pennsylvania (felt Canada)
1 17 34.2N 119W 6.8 9 57 30,000 California, Northridge
2 3 42.8N 111W 6 7 Wyoming, Afton
1995 10 6 65.2N 149W 6.4 Alaska (oil pipeline damaged)
aMagnitude scale varies.
Source: National Earthquake Information Center (1996). Database of Signicant Earthquakes Contained in Seismicity
Catalogs, Golden, CO.
1.1.1 Global Earthquake Impacts

Globally, earthquakes have caused massive death and destruction up to the present day. Table 1.1 provides
a list of selected twentieth century earthquakes with fatalities of approximately 1,000 or more, and
Table 1.3 provides a list of earthquakes with fatalities of approximately 50,000 or more prior to the
twentieth century. All the earthquakes are in the Trans-Alpide belt or the circum-Pacic Ring of Fire
(Figure 1.1), and the great loss of life is almost invariably due to low-strength masonry buildings and
dwellings. Exceptions to this rule are few in number but include the 1923 Kanto (Japan) earthquake,
where most of the approximately 140,000 fatalities were due to re; the 1970 Peru earthquake, where
large landslides destroyed whole towns; the 1988 Armenian event, where 25,000 were killed in Spitak and
Leninakan, mostly due to poor quality, precast construction; and the 1999 Marmara (Turkey) earth-
quakes, where 17,000 were killed in a rapidly urbanizing area where many mid-rise, soft story, reinforced
concrete buildings collapsed, due largely to inadequate code enforcement [Scawthorn, 2000].
The absolute trend for earthquake fatalities is not decreasing, as indicated in Figure 1.2, although if
population increase is taken into account, some relative decrease is occurring. Economic and insured
losses for all sources, as indicated in Figure 1.3, are increasing. The 1995 Kobe (Japan) earthquake, with
unprecedented losses of $100 billion,2 may only be a harbinger of even greater losses if an earthquake
strikes Tokyo, Los Angeles, San Francisco, or some other large urban region. To understand how these
losses occur and how they might be reduced, it is valuable to review some important earthquakes from
previous centuries as well as very recent earthquakes.
2
The largest previous loss due to any natural hazard was in the 1994 Northridge earthquake, estimated at about
$40 billion.
TABLE 1.3 Selected Pre-Twentieth Century Earthquakes (Fatalities Greater than 50,000)
Year Month Day Location Deaths M Comments
856 12 22 Iran, Damghan 200,000

893 3 23 Iran, Ardabil 150,000
1138 8 9 Syria, Aleppo 230,000
1268 Asia Minor, Silicia 60,000
1290 9 China, Chihli 100,000
1556 1 23 China, Shansi 830,000
1667 11 Caucasia, Shemakha 80,000
1693 1 11 Italy, Sicily 60,000
1727 11 18 Iran, Tabriz 77,000
1755 11 1 Portugal, Lisbon 70,000 8.7 Great tsunami, res
1783 2 4 Italy, Calabria 50,000
Source: National Earthquake Information Center, Golden, CO, http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eqlists/eqsmosde.html.
Earthquakes of 20th Century

Number of Deaths
100,000 - 255,000 (5)
50,000 - 100,000 (3)
20,000 - 50,000 (9)
10,000 - 20,000 (14)

5,000 - 10,000 (14)
2,000 - 5,000 (31)
1,000 - 2,000 (32)
1,000 or less (1)
FIGURE 1.1 Selected earthquakes since 1900 (fatalities greater than 1000).
1.2 Review of Historical Earthquakes

This section presents a review of selected historical earthquakes. The review is divided into several parts:
pre-twentieth century, early and mid-twentieth century, and two periods termed rst and second turning
points, respectively. Magnitudes (M, see Chapter 4) are indicated but, especially for the earlier events, are
necessarily estimated rather than measured, and are therefore quite approximate; later events are indicated
on the moment magnitude scale (Mw) where possible. Similarly, seismic intensity maps are provided
when available, in most cases using the Modied Mercalli Intensity scale (MMI, see Chapter 4).

10,000,000
1,000,000
100,000
10,000
1,000
100
10
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
FIGURE 1.2 Twentieth century global earthquake fatalities, by decade.
US$ 160bn
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Economic losses (2000 values)
of which insured losses (2000 values)
Trend of economic losses
Trend of insured losses
(Amounts in US$ bn)
FIGURE 1.3 Trend of worldwide economic and insured losses. (From Munich Reinsurance.)
1.2.1 Pre-Twentieth Century Events

As Table 1.3 indicates, truly catastrophic earthquakes have occurred for many centuries. Herein we review
very briey only a few of these events, selected for their historical importance.
1.2.1.1 1755: November 1, Lisbon, Portugal (M9)
The earthquake began at 9:30 on November 1, 1755, and was centered in the Atlantic Ocean, about
200 km WSW of Cape St. Vincent.3 Lisbon, the Portuguese capital, was the largest and most important
of the cities damaged; however, severe shaking also was felt in France, Switzerland, and Northern Italy,
and in North Africa shaking was felt with heavy loss of life in Fez and Mequinez. A devastating re
following the earthquake raged for ve days and destroyed a large part of Lisbon.
3 The following discussions are largely drawn from Kozak and James [n.d.].

FIGURE 1.4 Lisbon, Portugal, ruins of Praca de Patri-
arcal (Patriarchal Square) (copper engraving, Paris,
1757), Le Bas series, Bibliothque Nationale. Colleo de
algunas ruinas de Lisboa, 1755. Drawings executed by
Messrs Paris et Pedegache. Paris: Jacques-Phillippe
Le Bas, 1757. (From the Kozak Collection of Images of
Historical Earthquakes, National Information Service for
Earthquake Engineering, University of California, Berke-
ley. With permission.)
A very strong tsunami caused heavy destruction along the coasts of Portugal, southwestern Spain, and
western Morocco. About 30 min after the quake, a large wave swamped the area near Bugie Tower on
the mouth of the Tagus. The area between Junqueria and Alcantara in the western part of the city was
the most heavily damaged by a total of three waves with maximum height estimated at 6 m, each dragging
people and debris out to sea and leaving exposed large stretches of the river bottom. In Setubal, 30 km
south of Lisbon, the water reached the rst oor of buildings. The destruction was greatest in Algarve,
southern Portugal, where the tsunami dismantled some coastal fortresses and, in the lower levels, razed
houses. In some places, the waves crested at more than 30 m. The tsunami reached, with less intensity,
the coasts of France, Great Britain, Ireland, Belgium, and Holland. In Madeira and in the Azores, damage
was extensive and many ships were in danger of being wrecked. The tsunami crossed the Atlantic Ocean,
reaching the Antilles in the afternoon. Reports from Antigua, Martinique, and Barbados note that the
sea rst rose more than a meter, followed by large waves.
The oscillation of suspended objects at great distances from the epicenter indicates an enormous area
of perceptibility. The observation of seiches as far away as Finland suggests a magnitude approaching
9.0. Between the earthquake and the res and tsunami that followed (which were probably more damaging
than the actual earthquake), approximately 10,000 to 15,000 people died (population: 275,000) [Kendrick,
1956]. As Kozak and James [n.d.] note, most depictions of damaged Lisbon are fanciful; Figure 1.4,
however, is an accurate depiction of a portion of central Lisbon following the earthquake.
The 1755 Lisbon earthquake was felt across broad parts of Europe. It occurred at the height of the
Enlightenment and on the eve of the Industrial Revolution. Its massive death and destruction of one of
the largest and most beautiful cities in Europe shook thinkers such as Voltaire, whose inherent optimism
was deeply shaken by the event, as can be seen in his poem, Poeme sur le desastre de Lisbonne:
Did Lisbon, which is no more, have more vices
Than London and Paris immersed in their pleasures?
Lisbon is destroyed, and they dance in Paris!
Rousseau disagreed with Voltaires change in philosophy, taking a more pragmatic view:
it was not Nature that collected twenty thousand houses on the site if the inhabitants of this big
city had been more equally dispersed and more lightly housed, the damage would have been much
less. [Quoted in Goldberg, 1989]
From a scientic viewpoint, changes were made in building construction in Lisbon following the earthquake,
such as the gaiola (an internal wooden cage for masonry buildings), as well as in the planning of reconstructed
Lisbon; however, while the gaiola survived to the 1920s in Portugal, it was little publicized and not utilized
elsewhere [Tobriner, 1984]. Together with the 1783 Calabrian earthquakes, the Lisbon earthquake strengthened
nascent European efforts at construction of seismological instruments [Dewey and Byerly, 1969].
1.2.1.2 1755: November 18, Cape Ann, MA (M7)
The heaviest damage due to this earthquake occurred in the region around Cape Ann and Boston. At
Boston, much of the damage was conned to an area of inlled land near the wharfs. There, about 100

chimneys were leveled with the roofs of houses, and many others (1200 to 1500) were shattered and
partly thrown down. Stone fences were thrown down throughout the countryside, particularly on a line
extending from Boston to Montreal. New springs formed, and old springs dried up. Water and ne sand
issued from ground cracks at Pembroke. This earthquake was felt from Lake George, NY, to a point at
sea 200 miles east of Cape Ann, and from Chesapeake Bay to the Annapolis River, Nova Scotia, about
300,000 mi2 [Stover and Coffman, 1993]. Due to the proximity in dates, and observations of a tsunami
in the eastern Atlantic caused by the Lisbon earthquake, effects at distance between the two events are
sometimes confused.
1.2.1.3 18111812: New Madrid, MO, Sequence
The 18111812 sequence of earthquakes centered around New Madrid, on the Mississippi River in the
central United States, south of St. Louis and north of Memphis, are of note due to their being some of
the largest magnitude earthquakes ever recorded in North America, and denitely the largest earthquakes
east of the Rockies. Between 1811 and 1812, four catastrophic earthquakes, with magnitude estimates
greater than 7.0, occurred during a 3-month period. Nuttli [1973] determined a 7.2 mb body-wave
magnitude for the 2:15 a.m., December 16, 1811 event; and Street [1982] used the spatial attenuation of
intensities for all four events to show magnitudes of 7.0 for the 8:15 a.m., December 16, 1811 event; 7.1
for the January 23, 1812 event; and 7.3 for the February 7, 1812 event. Hundreds of aftershocks followed
over a period of several years. The total energy released by the principal shocks and their larger-magnitude
aftershocks is estimated to be equivalent to that of an mb = 7.5 (or MS = 8.0) earthquake, approximately
equivalent to the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. The largest earthquakes to have occurred since then
were on January 4, 1843 and October 31, 1895, with magnitude estimates of 6.0 and 6.2, respectively,
and considerable uncertainty exists as to the likelihood of large earthquakes in this region.
Figure 1.5 shows MMI observations for the December 16, 1811 event, in which it can be seen that
extremely violent shaking occurred in the Mississippi Valley, and the event was felt from Connecticut
to Illinois to South Carolina. In 18111812, however, these areas were quite sparsely populated, with
very few signicant structures of any kind. If such events were to occur today, considering the enormous
development in the central United States, including, for example, the massive navigational improve-
ments constructed over the last 100 years along the Mississippi and tributary rivers, the potential loss
of life, damage, and economic disruption would be catastrophic. No comprehensive loss estimates
have been performed for a repeat of the 18111812 sequence; however, losses have been estimated for
impacts to lifelines and ensuing economic impacts [Applied Technology Council, 1991], and for
annualized losses to buildings (structures only) [Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2000], from
which it can be approximately estimated that a repeat of the 18111812 events today would cause
economic losses in the range of $50 to $100 billion. Fuller [1912] provides detailed information on
topographical and geological effects, and Hopper [1985] provides estimates of intensity if similar events
were to occur today.
1.2.1.4 1857: January 9, Fort Tejon, CA (M7)
This earthquake occurred on the San Andreas fault, which ruptured from near Parkeld (in the Cholame
Valley) almost to Wrightwood (a distance of about 300 km) (Figure 1.6). Horizontal displacement of as
much as 9 m was observed on the Carrizo Plain. A comparison of this shock to the San Francisco
earthquake, which occurred on the San Andreas fault on April 18, 1906, shows that the fault break in
1906 was longer but that the maximum and average displacements in 1857 were larger. Property loss was
heavy in the sparsely populated area, and one person was killed in the collapse of an adobe house at
Gorman. Strong shaking lasted from 1 to 3 min. Instances of seiching, ssuring, sandblows, and hydro-
logic changes were reported from Sacramento to the Colorado River delta. Sandblows occurred at Santa
Barbara and in the ood plain of the Santa Clara River. The shock was felt from Marysville south to San
Diego and east to Las Vegas, NV. Several slight to moderate foreshocks preceded the main shock by 1 to
9 h. Many aftershocks occurred, and two (January 9 and 16) were large enough to have been widely felt
[Stover and Coffman, 1993].

F NF
F NF
F NF NF NF
4 5
F
5
F
5 NF
6
NF
F 5 NF
NF F
4 56 NF
6 5
6 5 5 6 5
6 6 5
7 6
7 5
6 78 7
67 5
7 56 5
8 7 5
67
8 7 6
7 78 6 67
NF
5
11 8 4
11 4 7 56 4
6 7
56
F 67
6
56
56
5
6
6 5
56 F
NF
DEC. 16, 1811

(02:15 A.M.)
0 KM 300
FIGURE 1.5 Isoseismal map of the December 16, 1811 earthquake. The arabic numbers give the Modied Mercalli
Intensities at each data point. (From Nuttli, O.W. 1979. Seismicity of the Central United States, in Geology in the
Siting of Nuclear Power Plants, Hatheway, A.W. and McClure, C.R., Eds., Geological Society of America, Rev. Eng.
Geol, 4, 6794. With permission.)
1.2.1.5 1886: Charleston, SC

The largest and by far the most destructive earthquake in the southeast United States occurred on August
31, 1886, with epicenter about 15 miles northwest of Charleston, SC (32.9 N, 80.0 W). The rst shock
was at 21:51, with magnitude of 7.6 [Johnston, 1991], and the second about 8 min later. The earthquake
was felt over 2.5 million mi2 (from Cuba to New York, and Bermuda to the Mississippi), equivalent to a

124 122 120 118 116 114
40
Reno
NEVADA UTAH
Sacramento
38
San Francisco
Monterey
CALIFORNIA
Las Vegas
36
Bakersfield
VII-IX II-VI
ARIZONA
34
Los Angeles
P
A
C
I
F
I
C
San Diego ATES

UNITED ST Blythe
MEXICO
O
C
E
A
32
N
EXPLANATION 0 100 KILOMETERS

Epicenter
GULF OF
IX Intensity 9 CALIFORNIA
FIGURE 1.6 Modied Mercalli Intensity map, 1857 Fort Tejon, CA, earthquake. (From Stover, C.W. and Coffman,
J.L. 1993. Seismicity of the United States, 15681989 (revised). U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper 1527,
Government Printing Ofce, Washington, D.C.)
radius of more than 800 mi; the strongly shaken portion extended to 100 mi. Approximately 110 persons
lost their lives and 90% of the brick structures in Charleston were damaged [Dutton, 1889]. Damaging
secondary effects were res, ruptured water and sewage lines, damaged wells, ooding from a cracked
dam in Langley, SC, and in the highest intensity area bent railroad tracks, throwing one train off the
tracks. Dollar damage estimates in 1886 dollars were about $5.5 million. Four decades later, Freeman
[1932] made a careful study of the damage, concluding that taking the city as a whole, the ratio of
earthquake damage to sound value was small in Charleston, and probably averaged little if any more
than 10%.
The bending of rails and lateral displacement of tracks due to ground displacements were very evident
in the epicentral region, though not at Charleston. There were severe bends of the track in places and
sudden and sharp depressions of the roadbed. At one place, there was a sharp S-curve. At a number of
locations, the effect on culverts and other structures demonstrated strong vertical force in action at the

Jedburg
Mt. Holly
Summerville
33
Rantowles CHARLESTON
Ravenel
Adams
Run
E AN
OC
T IC
L AN
AT
0 5 10 15 miles
0 5 10 15 kilometers
EXPLANATION
Railroad track damaged Craterlet area
Building destroyed Chimneys destroyed
Marked horizontal displacement

MP
Middleton Place
80
FIGURE 1.7 Effects in the epicentral area of the 1886 Charleston, SC, earthquake. (From Algermissen, S.T. 1983.
An Introduction to the Seismicity of the United States, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Berkeley, CA. With
permission.)
time of the earthquake. Figure 1.7 is a map of effects in the epicentral area, while Figure 1.8 shows damage
in central Charleston, bent rails due to ground movement, and large sand boils, indicating liquefaction,
in the surrounding hinterland. This and the 1755 Cape Ann, MA, earthquakes demonstrate the potential
for large, damaging earthquakes in the eastern United States.
1.2.2 Early Twentieth Century Events

1.2.2.1 1906: April 18, San Francisco (Mw 7.9)
This earthquake is the most devastating in the history of California, and one of the most important in
the history of earthquake engineering. The region of destructive intensity extended over a distance of

(A)
(B) (C)
FIGURE 1.8 (A) Damage in central Charleston, (B) bent rails due to ground movement, and (C) large sand boils
indicating liquefaction. (From Peters, K.E. and Herrmann, R.B., Eds. n.d. First-Hand Observations of the Charleston
Earthquake of August 31, 1886 and Other Earthquake Materials, South Carolina Geological Survey Bulletin 41.)
600 km. The total felt area included most of California and parts of western Nevada and southern Oregon
(Figure 1.9). This earthquake caused the most lengthy fault rupture observed in the contiguous United
States, i.e., from San Juan Bautista to Point Arena, where it passes out to sea, with additional displacement
observed farther north at Shelter Cove in Humbolt County, indicating a potential total length of rupture
of 430 km. Fault displacements were predominantly right lateral strike-slip, with the largest horizontal
displacement 6.4 m occurring near Point Reyes Station in Marin County (Figure 1.10). The surface
of the ground was torn and heaved into furrow-like ridges. Roads crossing the fault were impassable,
and pipelines were broken.
On or near the San Andreas fault, some buildings were destroyed but other buildings, close to or even
intersected by the fault, sustained nil to only light damage (Figure 1.11). South of San Francisco, the
concrete block gravity-arch dam of the Crystal Springs Reservoir (dam only 100 to 200 yards from the
fault, reservoir on the fault) was virtually undamaged by the event, and the San Andreas earthen dam,
whose abutment was intersected by the fault rupture, was also virtually undamaged, although surround-
ing structures sustained signicant damage or were destroyed [Lawson et al., 1908].
The earthquake and resulting res caused an estimated 3000 deaths and $524 million in property loss.
One pipeline that carried water from San Andreas Lake to San Francisco was broken, shutting off the
water supply to the city. However, distorted ground within the city resulted in hundreds of breaks in
water mains, which were the actual source of lack of water supply for reghting (Figure 1.12). Fires
that ignited in San Francisco soon after the onset of the earthquake burned for three days because of the
lack of water to control them (Figure 1.13). Damage in San Francisco was devastating, with 28,000
buildings destroyed, although 80% of the damage was due to the re, rather than the shaking (Figure 1.14).
Fires also intensied the loss at Fort Bragg and Santa Rosa. Damage was severe at Stanford University,
south of San Francisco (Figure 1.15). Although Santa Rosa lies about 30 km from the San Andreas fault,

124 122 120 118 116
44 Eugene
Boise
OREGON IDAHO
Ashland
42
IV II.8 Winnemucca
Arcata
VI VI V
40
Reno Eureka
VII NEVADA
Ukiah IV
V VI
Sacramento
Santa Rosa
Val IX
38 VI
VII
San Francisco VIII
VII VI
San Jose Bishop
VI
CALIFORNIA
VIII
VII
V
Monterey V IV
36 VI
Pa
Bakersfield
ci
fi
c
O
0.10
ce
an
Los Angeles
34 IV
EXPLANATION
0 100 Epicenter
San Diego States
KILOMETERS 1X Intensity 9 United
Mexico
FIGURE 1.9 MMI map of 1906 San Francisco earthquake. (From Stover, C.W. and Coffman, J.L. 1993. Seismicity
of the United States, 15681989 (revised). U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper 1527, U.S. Government Printing
Ofce, Washington, D.C.)
damage to property was severe and 50 people were killed. The earthquake also was severe in the Los
Banos area of the western San Joaquin Valley, where the MMI was IX more than 48 km from the fault
zone. The maximum intensity of XI was based on geologic effects, but the highest intensity based on
damage was IX. Several foreshocks probably occurred, and many aftershocks were reported, some of
which were severe [Stover and Coffman, 1993].

FIGURE 1.10 Fence about 1 km northwest of Woodville
on the E.R. Strain farm. This fence was offset 2.6 m by
the main fault. Note the swerve in the fence as it
approaches the fault-trace. The total displacement of the
straight portions of the fence is about 3.3 m. (From
National Geophysical Data Center, wysiwyg://122/http:/
/www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/earthquakes/2/
2_slides.html.)
FIGURE 1.11 At W.D. Skinners farm near Olema, a

fence south of this barn was offset 4.7 m. The barn,
beneath which the fault-trace passed, remained attached
to the foundation on the southwest side, but was broken
from it on the northwest side and dragged 4.8 m. The
fault-trace at this location also showed vertical offset,
most likely caused by local soil conditions. The maxi-
mum vertical displacement of the faulting was 1.2 m.
(Photo: G.K. Gilbert, U.S. Geological Survey. From
National Geophysical Data Center, wysiwyg://122/http:/
/www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/earthquakes/2/
2_slides.html.)
FIGURE 1.12 Union Street, San Francisco, not more

than a quarter of a block in length between Pierce and
Steiner Streets, had been lled to equalize the street
grade, and the sides of the streets were not supported.
During the earthquake, the north sidewalk was shifted
about 3.0 m to the north and depressed about 3.0 m
below its original level. The south sidewalk was depressed
a few centimeters and shifted to the north as much as 1
m. The paving and cable conduit in this area incurred
more severe damage than at any other point in the city.
(From National Geophysical Data Center, wysiwyg://122/
http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/earth-
quakes/2/2_slides.html.)
The devastation in San Francisco was so enormous, and so largely due to re (Figure 1.16), however,
that some of the lessons of the event were lost. Studies on the effects of the earthquake and re on
structures and structural materials [USGS, 1907] focused as much on the re as on the earthquake. A
detailed review of a number of engineered buildings found that many had not been badly damaged by
the earthquake and even, if well-reproofed, had survived the re in reasonable shape. Enough buildings

FIGURE 1.13 This row of two-story buildings tilted
away from the street when the ground beneath the foun-
dations slumped. Such ground failures contributed to the
shaking intensity and to the subsequent building damage.
This photo was taken before re destroyed the entire
block. Note billowing smoke in the sky. (Photo: NOAA/
NGDC, wysiwyg://122/http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/
hazard/slideset/earthquakes/2/2_slides.html.)
(A)
(B) (C)
FIGURE 1.14 (A) Collapsed San Francisco City Hall; (B) the damndest nest ruins, this view looks east toward
Market Street in San Francisco. Wooden buildings, one to three stories high, with brick or stone-work fronts, were
closely interspersed with two- to eight-story brick buildings. Mingled with these were modern ofce buildings. Here
the re burned ercely. In its aftermath, the streets were heaped with rubble to a depth of a meter or more and were
nearly impassible. Because of the heat of the re, much of the damage due directly to the shock was concealed or
obliterated in this part of the city. (Photo: Eric Swenson, U.S. Geological Survey.) (C) One of the camps set up for
earthquake victims is depicted. Similar camps were established on the hills, parks, and open spaces of the city. Five
days after the earthquake rains brought indescribable suffering to the tens of thousands of people camped in the
open. Few people had waterproof covering initially. The downpour aggravated the unsanitary conditions of the camps
and added numbers of pneumonia cases to the already crowded regular and temporary hospitals of the city. Eventually
tents such as these were provided to the 300,000 homeless. (Photo: Eric Swenson, U.S. Geological Survey. From
National Geophysical Data Center, wysiwyg://122/http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/earthquakes/2/
2_slides.html.)

FIGURE 1.15 Memorial Church as seen from the inner
quadrangle at Stanford University, Palo Alto. The stone
tower of the church fell and destroyed the parts of the
roof immediately around the tower. The gable on the
north end of the church was thrown outward into the
quadrangle. (Photo: W.C. Mendenhall, U.S. Geological
Survey, wysiwyg://122/http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/haz-
ard/slideset/earthquakes/2/2_slides.html.)
Principal distribution mains.

Salt-water system.
Old shore line.
Boundary line of burned district.
Principal earthquake breaks in streets.
Districts covered largely
by brick structures.
Cisterns in service.
BA
Y
OF
AN S
FR
AN
ISC C
O
0 1000 2000 3000 FEET
FIGURE 1.16 Map of San Francisco showing district burned in 1907. (From U.S. Geological Survey. 1907. The San
Francisco Earthquake and Fire of April 18, 1906 and Their Effects on Structures and Structural Materials. Bulletin 324,
Washington, D.C.)
of various construction types were present that the study drew clear lessons from the event: that well-
engineered steel and reinforced concrete buildings could survive shaking of this intensity with little
damage. It was also noted that great earthquakes are followed by an interval of 50 or 100 years during
which no earthquakes occur [USGS, 1907] (which turned out to be true; see below). As a result, for
many years the event was more popularly known as the Fire, and earthquake provisions were not
especially emphasized in building codes in California until after the 1925 Santa Barbara and 1933 Long
Beach events (see Section 1.2.2.3).

FIGURE 1.17 San Francisco Bay area seismicity, showing pattern of seismicity leading up to 1906 earthquake,
subsequent quiescence, and initial stages of new cycle. (From U.S. Geological Survey. 1907. The San Francisco Earth-
quake and Fire of April 18, 1906 and Their Effects on Structures and Structural Materials. Bulletin 324, Washington, D.C.)
The San Francisco earthquake resulted in the largest urban re in history, only exceeded in peacetime
by the 1923 Tokyo earthquake and re (see below). It was the largest insurance loss in history up to that
time; and it resulted in the rst modern study and documentation of earthquake effects [Lawson et al.,
1908] and in the publication and dissemination of Reids theory of elastic rebound [Reid et al., 1910].
This theory was vital to the understanding of earthquakes, as it clearly and simply explained that an
earthquake was the sudden reaction of the Earths overly strained crust snapping back along the fault.
Coupled with advances in the study of the Earths structure, observations from the 1906 and other large
earthquakes in the early to mid-twentieth century increasingly provided an understanding of earthquake
sources, nally unied by the theory of plate tectonics in the 1960s.
An outcome of this is the ability to understand the earthquake cycle, as shown in Figure 1.17, from
which it can be seen that the 1906 earthquake was the nal (and by far largest) release of strain energy
stored in the Earths crust due to plate motion (in the case of California and the 1906 earthquake, the
North American and Pacic plates; see Chapter 4). That is, as the plates move past each other, the Earths
crust is deformed, storing strain energy, not unlike a spring as it is stretched. As the plates are deformed,
there are internal localized failures (i.e., small to intermediate earthquakes) and partial slippages (i.e.,
earthquakes), until nally the entire fault, strained to the breaking point, ruptures along its entire length,
and snaps back the several meters the plates had displaced during the previous several hundred years.
The previous cycle in the San Francisco Bay area is seen in Figure 1.17 to have begun with the 1838
earthquake,4 with an increasing rate of seismicity until 1906. From 1906 to the 1979 M5.7 Coyote Lake
earthquake, there were relatively few earthquakes, and then an increasing number, with the 1989 Loma
Prieta event (discussed below) being the analog of the 1838 event. The implications of this for the San
Francisco Bay area are, of course, ominous.
Another result of the 1906 earthquake was the founding of the Seismological Society of America.
However, given the magnitude of the event and resulting damage, it would seem that a more comprehensive
4Note that historic records in the San Francisco Bay area, although incomplete, date from the founding of the
Mission Dolores in San Francisco in 1776.

program of investigation into seismology and earthquake engineering would have emerged from the 1906
event. However, as Maher5 observes [Carder, 1965]:
The great San Francisco earthquake of Apr. 18, 1906, resulted in a temporary impetus in earthquake
investigation. However, after the excitement had died down, interest in research on earthquakes
declined, partly because of activity by pressure groups who considered that the dissemination of
information about earthquakes was detrimental to business.
The existence of pressure groups is conrmed by Branner [1913].6
1.2.2.2 1923: September 1, Kanto, Japan (M 7.9)
The M7.9 Kanto earthquake occurred at 11:58 a.m., September 1, 1923, with epicenter beneath Sagami
Bay (Figure 1.18). The Tokyo region (actually, Mt. Fuji) is the junction of four tectonic plates (Philippine
Sea, Pacic, Eurasian, and North American), and the subduction of the Pacic plate beneath the Eurasian
plate was the seismogenesis of the event. Figure 1.18 shows contours of shaking damage percentage for
Japanese wooden houses, contours of uplift and subsidence, locations of tsunami, and other effects in
the most severely affected region [Hamada et al., 1992]. Seismic intensity on the Japan Meteorological
Agency scale (JMA, see Chapter 4) is also indicated on the gure.
Damage was heaviest in the Yokohama and Tokyo urbanized areas, although the shore of Sagami Bay
and parts of the Boso peninsula also sustained heavy damage, a 3- to 6-m tsunami, and major geologic
effects, with maximum crustal uplift of 2 m. The death toll in Kanagawa and Tokyo prefectures was
97,000, including about 60,000 in Tokyo city. The total number of dead and missing reached about
143,000, with 104,000 people listed as injured. About 128,000 houses and buildings were destroyed,
another 126,000 heavily damaged, and as many as 447,000 lost to re (Figures 1.19 and 1.20). Fire
accounted for the majority of houses destroyed in Tokyo, and about 50% of houses lost in Kanagawa
prefecture could be attributed to re [Hamada et al., 1992].
The conagration as a result of this re is the largest peacetime conagration in history, with combined
re and earthquake fatalities exceeding those of the incendiary attacks on Tokyo in World War II, and
also probably exceeding the immediate fatalities in either of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima or
Nagasaki. The conagration was initially a mass re (Figure 1.21), although self-generated winds resulted
in large vortices or restorm conditions in several locations, most notably at the Military Clothing
Depot in Honjo Ward, where many refugees had gathered. Most of them carried clothing, bedrolls, and
other ammables rescued from their homes, which served as a ready fuel source, and the engulng ames
suffocated an estimated 40,000 people. The enormous conagration was due to hot, dry, windy conditions
(although there had been some rain recently), combined with the time of the earthquake, just before
noon, when the population was preparing its lunch. Coal or charcoal cooking stoves were in use through-
out Tokyo and Yokohama for the noontime meal, and res sprang up everywhere within moments of
the quake. Firespread was very rapid, due to high winds as well as lack of water for reghting because
of broken water mains [ASCE, 1929].
5 Thomas J. Maher was a captain of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, and inspector-in-charge of the Survey's
San Francisco eld station from 1928 to 1936. He retired in 1946, and died in June 1964.
6 Another and more serious obstacle is the attitude of many persons, organizations, and commercial interests
toward earthquakes in general. The idea back of this false position for it is a false one is that earthquakes are
detrimental to the good repute of the West Coast, and that they are likely to keep away business and capital, and therefore
the less said about them the better. This theory has led to the deliberate suppression of news about earthquakes, and even
of the simple mention of them. Shortly after the earthquake of April 1906, there was a general disposition that almost
amounted to concerted action for the purpose of suppressing all mention of that catastrophe. When efforts were made by
a few geologists to interest people and enterprises in the collection of information in regard to it, we were advised and
even urged over and over again to gather no such information, and above all not to publish it. Forget it, the less said,
the sooner mended, and there hasn't been any earthquake, were the sentiments we heard on all sides

EXPLANATION
Tsunami
City
Boundary between
Prefectures
1% Percentage of
Totally Damaged
10%
Houses due to
50% Ground Motion
+9 Uplift (cm)
9 Subsidence (cm)
Break of
Electric Cable
Observed Faulting
0 50km
FIGURE 1.18 Map of distribution of damage, 1923 Kanto earthquake. (From Hamada, M., Wakamatsu, K., and Yasuda, S. 1992. Liquefaction-Induced Ground Deformation
during the 1923 Kanto Earthquake, in Case Studies of Liquefaction and Lifeline Performance during Past Earthquakes, Vol. I, Japanese Case Studies, Hamada, M. and ORourke,
T.D., Eds., Technical report NCEER-920001, February, National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, State University of New York, Buffalo. With permission.)

FIGURE 1.19 Tokyo (Ginza) ruins. (From Home
Ofce. 1926. The Great Earthquake of 1923 in Japan,
Bureau of Social Affairs, Home Ofce, Tokyo. With
permission.)
FIGURE 1.20 Tokyo (Ginza) ruins. (From Home

permission.)
FIGURE 1.21 1923 Kanto earthquake conagration,

banks of Sumida River (aerial photo). (From Home
permission.)
As Cameron and James note:

The Great Kanto earthquake ushered in the modern age of earthquake engineering , [as exemplied
in] the World Engineering Congress of 1929 [where] an early base isolation technique by
Riuitchi Oka , promoting the use of spherical rockers at the base of columns . Also of note
was a paper by Kenzaburo Mashima, entitled Earthquakes and Building Construction, in which
exible construction was strongly endorsed. Mashima also concluded that masonry structures were
the most dangerous during an earthquake, followed by reinforced concrete buildings. He gave steel
and wood structures the highest marks for seismic resistance. Strongly in favor of rigid construction
was Dr. Taichu Naito, Professor of Architecture at Waseda University in Tokyo. Naito noted three
important elements in seismic resistant design: structural rigidity, a rational distribution of lateral
force, and the reduction of the natural period of elastic oscillation to one smaller than the probable
period of an earthquake immediate changes in building codes followed the 1923 earthquake and
were in effect in the rebuilding of Tokyo and Yokohama, including mandated maximum height and
added bracing for wood buildings; increased requirements for masonry buildings, including parapet
bracing; addition of brackets or braces to increase rigidity for connections between columns and girders
in steel buildings; and improved detailing for reinforced concrete structures [Cameron and James,
n.d., paraphrased].
122 120 118 116 114
38 NEVADA
San Francisco UTAH
Fresno II-III Las Vegas

36
CALIFORNIA
IV
ARIZONA
VI
Los Angeles
34
VII
Pa
V VIII
BIythe
ci
fi
II-III
c
VI
O
ce
an
IV
United States
San Diego Mexico
32
Gu
lf
EXPLANATION
of
0 100
Ca
Epicenter
lif
KILOMETERS
or
VIII Intensity
nia
FIGURE 1.22 MMI isoseismal map, 1933 Long Beach earthquake. (From Stover, C.W. and Coffman, J.L. 1993.
Seismicity of the United States, 15681989 (revised). U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper 1527, U.S. Government
Printing Ofce, Washington, D.C.)
1.2.2.3 1925: Santa Barbara; 1933: Long Beach Earthquakes

The M6.2 Santa Barbara earthquake occurred on June 29, 1925 and caused $8 million damage and 13
fatalities from an offshore shock in the Santa Barbara Channel, on an extension of the Mesa Fault or the
Santa Ynez system. On State Street, the principal business thoroughfare, few buildings escaped damage;
several collapsed. The shock occurred at 6:42 a.m., before many people had reported for work and when
streets were uncrowded, reducing death and injury.
The M6.3 Long Beach earthquake of March 10, 1933 had its epicenter offshore, southeast of Long
Beach, on the Newport-Inglewood fault, and caused $40 million property damage and 115 lives lost
(Figure 1.22). The major damage occurred in the thickly settled district from Long Beach to the industrial
section south of Los Angeles, where unfavorable geological conditions (made land, water-soaked allu-
vium) combined with much poor structural work to increase the damage. At Long Beach, buildings
collapsed, tanks fell through roofs, and houses displaced on foundations. School buildings were among
those structures most generally and severely damaged (Figure 1.23), and it was clear that a large number
of children would have been killed and injured had the earthquake occurred during school hours.
These two earthquakes are discussed not so much for the size or peculiarities of damage, but due to
advances in engineering and building code requirements instituted following these two events (see
Chapter 11, this volume, for a more detailed discussion of this aspect):

FIGURE 1.23 Walls crumbled at Alexander Hamilton
Jr. High School on State Street, Long Beach. Great loss
of life would have occurred if the shock had taken place
during school hours.
Following the 1925 event, the rst modern code containing seismic provisions was published: the
rst edition of the Uniform Building Code, published by the Pacic Coast Building Ofcials in
1927 (see Chapter 11, this volume). Its seismic requirements were not mandatory and appeared
in an appendix.
As a result of the 1925 event [SEAOC, 1980] and the efforts by a number of parties,7 a Seismological
Field Survey was created in 1932 within the the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (USC&GS), with
ofces in San Francisco. A strong motion accelerometer designed in 1931 by McComb and
Parkhurst of the USC&GS, and Wenner of the National Bureau of Standards [Cloud, in Carder,
1965], modeled after the Wood-Anderson instrument [EERI, 1997], was deployed in 1932. During
the 1933 Long Beach earthquake the rst-ever recordings of earthquake strong ground motions
were thus made (actually three recordings of the main shock, at Long Beach, Vernon, and Los
Angeles [Maher, in Carder, 1965]). This was a milestone, as it was the rst time any such records
had been made anywhere in the world [EERI, 1997].
Following the 1933 Long Beach earthquake, which caused extensive damage to unreinforced masonry
buildings and, in particular, several public schools, the State of California adopted regulations:
Further construction of unreinforced masonry buildings was prohibited.
The Riley Act was required that all building in California be provided with a lateral strength equal
to 3% of the weight of the structure, making seismic design mandatory.
The Field Act established and charged the Ofce of the State Architect with responsibility for the
regulation of public school construction. Schools had been especially damaged in the 1933 event.
The Ofce of the State Architect established rigorous standards for structural design, plan review,
and inspection of construction that would affect structural engineering practice throughout Cal-
ifornia and eventually nd its way into the building code requirements applicable to all forms of
construction.
1.2.3 Mid-Century Events

1.2.3.1 July 21, 1952: Kern County, CA (M7.7)
This earthquake was the largest in the conterminous United States since the San Francisco shock of 1906
(Figure 1.24) and received considerable study by the earthquake community. Jenkins and Oakeshott
[1955] edited a volume focused on the geology, seismology, and structural damage specic to the event,
and the Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America published a special issue on data collected by
7 Sources vary. Housner [EERI, 1997] gives John Freeman full credit, indicating Freeman literally had to lobby
President Herbert Hoover and his Secretary of Commerce, while Maher [in Carder, 1965] cites efforts by a citizens
group, including Levison (president of Firemans Fund Insurance Company), Dewell (a practicing structural engineer
in San Francisco), Baily Willis, and others.

124 122 120 118 116 114
40
Oroville
Reno
I-III
IV
NEVADA UTAH
38 V
San Francisco
California
V-VI V-IV
IV Bishop
Monterey V-VI Fresno

Las Vagas
36 VII IV-V
Pa
cif
VI VII
V
ic
VII
VIII Bakersfield
ARIZONA
Oc
ean
VII VII
IV
34 Los Angeles
III
EXPLANATION Yuma
Epicenter San Diego Unit
0 100 ed
VIII Intensity 9 Mex States
ico
32 KILOMETERS
FIGURE 1.24 Modied Mercalli Intensity map, 1952 Kern County earthquake. (From Stover, C.W. and Coffman,
J.L. 1993. Seismicity of the United States, 15681989 (revised). U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper 1527, U.S.
Government Printing Ofce, Washington, D.C.)
the Pacic Fire Rating Bureau [Steinbrugge and Moran, 1954]. It claimed 12 lives and caused property
damage estimated at $60 million. It was unusual in that an aftershock (August 22, M5.8) actually caused
more damage in Bakerseld than the main shock, although the damage was to structures already some-
what damaged by the main shock.
The generally moderate damage in Bakerseld was conned mainly to isolated parapet failure. Cracks
formed in many brick buildings, and older school buildings were damaged somewhat. In contrast,
however, the Kern General Hospital was damaged heavily. Multistory steel and concrete structures
sustained minor damage, which commonly was conned to the rst story. MMI XI was assigned to a
small area on the Southern Pacic Railroad southeast of Bealville. There, the earthquake cracked rein-
forced-concrete tunnels having walls 46 cm thick, shortened the distance between portals of two tunnels
about 2.5 m, and bent the rails into S-shaped curves. Reports of long-period wave effects from the
earthquake were widespread. Water splashed from swimming pools as far distant as the Los Angeles area,
where damage to tall buildings was nonstructural but extensive. Water also splashed in pressure tanks
on tops of buildings in San Francisco [Stover and Coffman,1993].
The 1952 Kern County earthquake was investigated by a new generation of structural engineers and
earth scientists, who moved over the next several years to create the rst edition of the Structural
Engineers Association of Californias Recommended Lateral Force Requirements, or Blue Book, which

FIGURE 1.25 1960 Chile Mw 9.5 earthquake. The ship
in the photo was wrecked by the tsunami on Isla Mocha
(north of Valdivia). Note the raised beach and landslides.
Large landslides and massive ows of earthen debris and
rock occurred on the island. The tsunami runup on Isla
Mocha was 25 m (more than 82 ft). (From NOAA/
NGDC, http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/
tsunamis.)
FIGURE 1.26 1960 Chile Mw 9.5 earthquake. The sh-

ing village of Queule (north of Valdivia and south of
Lebu) before and after the catastrophe of May 1960. The
bottom photo was taken after the land subsidence and
after the tsunami. The town was destroyed. The houses,
together with the remains of shing boats and uprooted
trees, were washed as much as 2 km inland by a tsunami
4.5 m high. The sinking of the land also brought about
a permanent rise of the sea. The meandering creek bed
in the foreground has been changed into an estuary. The
trees that dot the river bank in the top photo are the only
ones that remain in the bottom photo. Also the linear
feature next to the solitary tree in the bottom photo can
be found in the top photo marked with smaller trees that
later disappeared in the wave. (From NOAA/NGDC,
http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/tsuna-
mis/.)
was the rst uniform code for seismic areas in the United States [SEAOC, 1980]. This was a critical
development, as the Blue Book became the model for seismic requirements and building codes around
the world.
1.2.3.2 1960: May 22, Chile (Mw 9.5)
On May 22, 1960, a Mw 9.5 earthquake, the largest earthquake ever instrumentally recorded, occurred
in southern Chile. The series of earthquakes that followed ravaged southern Chile and ruptured over
a period of days a 1000-km section of the fault, one of the longest ruptures ever reported. The
number of fatalities associated with both the tsunami and the earthquake has been estimated between
490 and 5,700. Reportedly there were 3,000 injured, and initially there were 717 missing. The Chilean
government estimated 2,000,000 people were left homeless and 58,622 houses were completely
destroyed. Damage (including tsunami damage) was more than U.S. $500 million. The main shock
set up a series of seismic sea waves (tsunamis) that not only was destructive along the coast of Chile
(Figures 1.25 and 1.26), but that also caused numerous casualties and extensive property damage in

180 172 164 156 148 140 132 124
Barrow Arctic Ocean
88
Inuvik
III-IV
United States
64 SR s
US State
Canada
n ited
U
Nome
Fairbanks
VI
Mayo
ALASKA
Sea
60 VII
Anchorage VII-X
ng
Beri
Yakutat u
Junea
56 Kodiak
hikan
Ketc
Pacific Ocean
EXPLANATION
0 100 Epicenter
KILOMETERS X Intensity 10
FIGURE 1.27 MMI map, 1964 Alaska earthquake. (From NOAA/NGDC, http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/
slideset/earthquakes/7/7_slides.html.)
Hawaii and Japan, and that was noticeable along shorelines throughout the Pacic Ocean area. There
were several other geologic phenomena besides tsunamis associated with this event. Subsidence
caused by the earthquake produced local ooding and permanently altered the shorelines of much
of the area in Chile impacted by the earthquake. Landslides were common on Chilean hillsides. The
Puyehue volcano erupted 47 h after the main shock [NOAA/NGDC, n.d.].
1.2.4 First Turning Point

This section briey describes salient points from selected earthquakes between 1964 and 1971, a period
that ended with a major change in the thinking of earthquake engineers and that, within a few years, led
to a National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program in the United States, and heightened activity in
other countries.
1.2.4.1 1964: March 28, Alaska (Mw 8.3)
This great earthquake and ensuing tsunami took 125 lives (tsunami 110, earthquake 15), and caused
about $311 million in property loss. Earthquake effects were heavy in many towns, including Anchorage,
Chitina, Glennallen, Homer, Hope, Kasilof, Kenai, Kodiak, Moose Pass, Portage, Seldovia, Seward, Ster-
ling, Valdez, Wasilla, and Whittier (Figure 1.27).
Anchorage, about 120 km northwest of the epicenter, sustained the most severe damage to property.
About 30 blocks of dwellings and commercial buildings were damaged or destroyed in the downtown
area. The J.C. Penney Company building was damaged beyond repair (Figure 1.28); the Four Seasons
apartment building, a new six-story structure, collapsed (Figure 1.29); and many other multistory

FIGURE 1.28 This slide shows the ve-story J.C. Penney building at 5th Avenue and Downing Street in Anchorage,
where two people died and one was injured. Concrete facing fell on automobiles in front of the building. Although
the building was approximately square, the arrangement of effective shear-resisting elements was quite asymmetrical,
consisting principally of the south and west walls that were constructed of poured concrete for the full building
height. The north and east sides of the building faced the street. The north side of the building had no shear wall
but was covered by a facade composed of 4-inch (10.2-cm) thick precast, nonstructural reinforced concrete panels.
The east wall, also covered with the precast panels, had poured-concrete shear walls between columns in the two
northerly bays and in the bottom three stories of the two southerly bays. The rotational displacement induced by
the earthquake apparently caused failure of this east wall shear-resistant element, the building became more suscep-
tible to rotational distortion, and the south and west shear walls failed. (From NOAA/NGDC, http://
www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/earthquakes/7/7_slides.html.)
FIGURE 1.29 The Four Seasons Apartments in Anchorage was a six-story, lift-slab reinforced concrete building that
crashed to the ground during the earthquake. The building was structurally complete but unoccupied at the time of
the earthquake. The main shear-resistant structural elements of the building, a poured-in-place, reinforced-concrete
stairwell and a combined elevator core and stairwell, fractured at the rst oor and toppled over, and came to rest
on top of the rubble of all six oors and the roof. The concrete stairwell is in the center of the picture. (From NOAA/
NGDC, http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/earthquakes/7/7_slides.html.)
buildings were damaged heavily. The schools in Anchorage were heavily damaged. The Government Hill
Grade School, sitting astride a huge landslide, was almost a total loss. Anchorage High School and Denali
Grade School were damaged severely. Duration of the shock was estimated at 3 min.
Landslides in Anchorage caused heavy damage. Huge slides occurred in the downtown business section
(Figure 1.30), at Government Hill, and especially at Turnagain Heights (Figure 1.31), where an area of
about 130 acres was devasted by displacements that broke the ground into many deranged blocks that
were collapsed and tilted at all angles. This slide destroyed about 75 private homes. Water mains and gas,
sewer, telephone, and electrical systems were disrupted throughout the area.
The earthquake was accompanied by vertical displacement over an area of about 52,000 km2. The
major area of uplift trended northeast from southern Kodiak Island to Prince William Sound and trended

FIGURE 1.30 This view of damage to Fourth Avenue buildings in downtown Anchorage shows the damage resulting
from the slide in this area. Before the earthquake, the sidewalk in front of the stores on the left, which are in the
graben, was at the level of the street on the right, which was not involved in the subsidence. The graben subsided
11 feet (3.3 m) in response to 14 feet (4.2 m) of horizontal movement of the slide block during the earthquake.
Lateral spreading produced a fan-shaped slide 1800 feet (545.5 m) across that covered about 36 acres (14.6 ha) and
moved a maximum of 17 feet (5.1 m). Movement on the landslide began after about 1 to 2 min of ground shaking
and stopped when the shaking stopped. (From NOAA/NGDC, http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/earth-
quakes/7/7_slides.html.)
FIGURE 1.31 The Turnagain Heights landslide in Anchorage. Seventy-ve homes twisted, slumped, or collapsed
when liquefaction of subsoils caused parts of the suburban bluff to move as much as 2000 feet (606 m) downward
toward the bay, forming a complex system of ridges and depressions. The slide developed because of a loss in strength
of the soils, particularly of lenses of sand, that underlay the slide. The motion involved the subsidence of large blocks
of soil, the lateral displacement of clay in a 25-foot (7.6-m) thick zone, and the simultaneous lateral translation of
the slide debris on liqueed sands and silts. (From NOAA/NGDC, http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/
earthquakes/7/7_slides.html.)
eastwest to the east of the sound. Vertical displacements ranged from about 11.5 m of uplift to 2.3 m
of subsidence relative to sea level. Off the southwest end of Montague Island, there was absolute vertical
displacement of about 13 to 15 m. Uplift also occurred along the extreme southeast coast of Kodiak
Island, Sitkalidak Island, and over part or all of Sitkinak Island. The zone of subsidence covered about
285,000 km2, including the north and west parts of Prince William Sound, the west part of the Chugach
Mountains, most of Kenai Peninsula, and almost all the Kodiak Island group.
This shock generated a tsunami that devastated many towns along the Gulf of Alaska (Figure 1.32),
and left serious damage at Alberni and Port Alberni, Canada, along the West Coast of the United States
(15 killed), and in Hawaii. The maximum wave height recorded was 67 m at Valdez Inlet. Seiche action
in rivers, lakes, bayous, and protected harbors and waterways along the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Texas
caused minor damage. It was also recorded on tide gages in Cuba and Puerto Rico. This great earthquake
was felt over a large area of Alaska and in parts of western Yukon Territory and British Columbia, Canada
[Stover and Coffman, 1993].

FIGURE 1.32 This photo was taken at Seward at the north end of Resurrection Bay, showing an overturned ship,
a demolished Texaco chemical truck, and a torn-up dock strewn with logs and scrap metal after the tsunamis.
The waves left a shambles of houses and boats in the lagoon area, some still looking relatively undamaged and
some almost completely battered. The total damage to port and harbor facilities at Seward was estimated at more
than $15,000. Most of this damage was the result of the tsunamis. Eleven persons lost their lives due to the sea
waves at Seward. (From NOAA/NGDC, http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/earthquakes/7/
7_slides.html.)
The Alaska earthquake had two signicant inuences: (1) its truly remarkable size, area affected, and
geologic effects greatly stimulated the earth sciences in the United States, and led to a major documen-
tation of the event [U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, 1967]; and (2) the impacts on modern structures,
such as the J.C. Penney and Four Seasons Apartment buildings, alarmed structural engineers and started
a thought process that would lead to major building code changes within a decade.
1.2.4.2 1964: June 16, Niigata, Japan (M7.5)

The city of Niigata, on the Japan Sea coast of the island of Honshu, Japan, was struck by a M7.5 earthquake
at 1:25 p.m, June 16, 1964, resulting in widespread damage (Figure 1.33) (see Chapter 4 for an explanation
of the JMA intensity scale). Many buildings, bridges, quay walls, and lifeline systems suffered severe
damage, and it was fortunate that only 26 persons were killed. The real signicance of this event was the
technical investigation and identication of the cause of some remarkable building failures, which were
caused by liquefaction. Being a natural phenomenon, liquefaction had occurred in most larger earth-
quakes since time immemorial (see Figure 1.8, for example), but had not been specically identied and
investigated.
At the Kawagishi-cho apartments in Niigata city, liquefaction occurred, resulting in the overturning
collapse of the buildings (Figure 1.34). Note the quality of the construction; even though overturned,
these buildings remained intact. Koizumi [1965] identied liquefaction and its cause and, combined with
the major examples of liquefaction observed in Alaska earlier the same year, this led to a major research
effort into the analysis and mitigation of liquefaction over the next several decades.
1.2.4.3 1971: February 9, San Fernando, CA (M6.5)
This destructive earthquake occurred in a sparsely populated area of the San Gabriel Mountains, near
San Fernando, killing 65, injuring more than 2000, and causing property damage estimated at $505
million [NOAA, 1973] (Figure 1.35). The earthquake created a zone of discontinuous surface faulting,
named the San Fernando fault zone, which partly follows the boundary between the San Gabriel Moun-
tains and the San Fernando-Tujunga Valleys and partly transects the northern salient of the San Fernando
Valley. This latter zone of tectonic ruptures was associated with some of the heaviest property damage
sustained in the region. Within the entire length of the surface faulting, which extended roughly eastwest
for about 15 km, the maximum vertical offset measured on a single scarp was about 1 m, the maximum
lateral offset about 1 m, and the maximum shortening (thrust component) about 0.9 m.

N
Aomori Hachinohe
2
II
1
III
Morioka
3
Akita Miyako
4 4
IV 3
Ofunato
Sakata
5
Sendai
Yamagata 3
5 V
V 4
Niigata
Aikawa
5 5 4 4
Wakamatsu
Wajima
4 4
4 IV Shirakawa Onahama
4
3
Nagano 4 Mito
Maebashi
2 2 4
3 Matsushiro 4 2 Kakioka
Kanazawa 3
3
3 3
1 3 III
1 Takayama Tokyo Choshi
Fukui 3 2
II 3 Kofu
Iida 3
2 2 Yokohama
1
1
I Tomizaki
Shizuoka
3
Cape Omaezaki
FIGURE 1.33 Japan Meteorological Agency intensity map of 1964 Niigata, Japan, earthquake. (From Japan Mete-
orological Agency. With permission.)
FIGURE 1.34 1964 Niigata earthquake, over-

turning of apartment buildings, Kawagishi-cho,
Niigata. (From NOAA/NGDC, available online at
http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/
earthquakes/.)

122 120 118 116 114
38 Tonopah
Stockton UTAH
NEVADA
II-IV
Fresno
Monterey
I-IV
Las Vagas
36
California V
Barstow
Santa Maria
ARIZONA
Pa
cif
ic
VI
34 VII-XI VII
Los Angeles
Oc
II-IV
ea
n
San Diego United States

EXPLANATION Yuma
0 100 Mexico
Epicenter
KILOMETERS 1X Intensity 11
32
FIGURE 1.35 Modied Mercalli Intensity map of 1971 San Fernando earthquake. (From NOAA/NGDC, available
online at http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eqlists/USA/1971_02_09_iso.html.)
The most spectacular damage included the destruction of major structures at the Olive View and the
Veterans Administration Hospitals, and the collapse of freeway overpasses (Figure 1.36). The newly built
earthquake-resistant buildings at the Olive View Hospital in Sylmar were destroyed; four ve-story wings
pulled away from the main building and three stair towers toppled (Figure 1.37). Although newly built
and complying with the building code, the buildings columns lacked connement due to widely spaced
lateral ties. Older, unreinforced masonry buildings collapsed at the Veterans Administration Hospital at
San Fernando, killing 49 people (Figure 1.38). Many older buildings in the Alhambra, Beverly Hills,
Burbank, and Glendale areas were damaged beyond repair, and thousands of houses and chimneys were
damaged in the region (Figure 1.39). A large number of one-story commercial buildings, termed tilt-ups,
were found to have a common design aw, involving the roof-wall connection putting the wood ledger
in cross-grain bending, which is discussed in Chapter 14 of this volume.
Public utilities and facilities of all kinds were damaged, both above and below ground. Severe ground
fracturing and landslides were responsible for extensive damage in areas where faulting was not observed.
The most damaging landslide occurred in the Upper Lake area of Van Norman Lakes, where highway
overpasses, railroads, pipelines, and almost all structures in the path of the slide were damaged severely.
Several overpasses collapsed. Two dams were damaged severely (Lower Van Norman Dam and Pacoima
Dam) (Figure 1.40), and three others sustained minor damage. Lower Van Norman Dam came very close
to overtopping, which would have resulted in a sudden release of the impounded water and probable
mass casualties for the 80,000 people living below the dam [Stover and Coffman, 1993].
The impact of the San Fernando earthquake on engineers was out of all proportion to the number
killed, or even the monetary costs. Engineers were shocked to observe that modern structures, such as
Olive View Hospital, Van Norman Dam, highway bridges, and tilt-up buildings, were failing under a
moderate-sized earthquake. Of note also was the recording during the event of about 100 strong ground
motion records, which effectively doubled the number of new records then in existence!

FIGURE 1.36 The I-5 (Golden State) and I-210 (Foothills) Freeway Exchange. There was damage to both roadway
and structures on the completed portion of this freeway, from its intersection with Route 5 to the Maclay Street
separation. Throughout this section, the freeway appeared to settle on a somewhat uniform grade line. The settling
was especially noticeable at the bridges, where it varied from 6 to 24 inches. Pavement was buckled and broken for
several hundred feet on each side of the damaged structures. Structural damage varied, from minor damage to wing
walls and slope paving, to rotation and settlement of abutments, splaying and cracking of columns, displacement of
wing walls, and contortion of the sides of lls. Street sections beneath the various undercrossings suffered damage
to curbs, sidewalks, slope paving, and roadway sections. (Photo: E.V. Leyendecker, U.S. Geological Survey. From
NOAA/NGDC, available online at http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/earthquakes/20/20_slides.html.)
(A) (B)
FIGURE 1.37 Damage sustained in the 1971 San Fernando, California, earthquake. (A) This building, known as
the Medical Treatment and Care Building (in the Olive View Hospital complex) was completed in 1970 at a cost of
$25 million. The four towers containing the stairs and day-room areas were built to be structurally separated four
inches from the main building. The three towers that failed were supported by concrete columns. When these columns
failed, the towers overturned. Note that the base of the tower in this photo has fallen in the basement. After the
shock, the building leaned as much as 2 feet in a northerly direction with nearly all of this drift in the rst story.
Note also the broken columns on the rst oor. The rst story nearly collapsed, and the building was ultimately
demolished. The structure was located in a band that incurred heavy damage during the 1971 earthquake. (Photo:
E.V. Leyendecker, U.S. Geological Survey.) (B) Close-up of rst-story column failure at Olive View Hospital. The
column was located at the west end of Wing B on the rst story of the ve-story hospital. This is a typical rst-story
tied corner column, and the damage is characteristic of column damage found on the rst oor in all wings of the
hospital. These corner columns were square with a corner notch out, giving the appearance of a thick L-shaped
column. Note the broken ties, the spacing of the ties, and the bent rebar. The building was laterally displaced about
2 feet to the north in the earthquake. (Photo: E.V. Leyendecker, U.S. Geological Survey. From NOAA/NGDC, available
online at http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/earthquakes/20/20_slides.html.) Shown as Color Figure 1.37.

FIGURE 1.38 Aerial view of the damage to the San
Fernando Veterans Administration Hospital and com-
plex. This complex was located in the band of accentu-
ated damage found along the base of the San Gabriel
Mountains. The collapsed structure was built in 1926,
before earthquake building codes were in effect. Forty-
seven of the 65 deaths attributed to the earthquake
occurred as a result of the collapse of this structure.
(Photo: E.V. Leyendecker, U.S. Geological Survey. From
N OA A / N G D C , a v a i l a b l e o n l i n e a t h t t p : / /
www.ngdc.noaa.gov/seg/hazard/slideset/earthquakes/20/
20_slides.html.)
FIGURE 1.39 A home in Crestview Park on Almetz

Street. More than 700 dwellings were evacuated and
declared unsafe after the San Fernando earthquake.
(Photo: E.V. Leyendecker, U.S. Geological Survey. From
N OA A / N G D C , a v a i l a b l e o n l i n e a t h t t p : / /
20_slides.html.)
FIGURE 1.40 Van Norman Dam (Lower San Fernando

Dam). For a length of about 1800 feet, the embankment
(including the parapet wall, dam crest, most of the
upstream slope, and a portion of the downstream slope)
slid into the reservoir. A loss of about 30 feet of dam
height resulted when as much as 800,000 cubic yards of
dam embankment was displaced into the reservoir. This
material slid when liquefaction of the hydraulic ll on
the upstream side of the embankment occurred. The dam
was about half full at the time. Eighty-thousand people
living downstream of the dam were immediately ordered
to evacuate, and steps were taken to lower the water level
in the reservoir as rapidly as possible. The Los Angeles
Dam was constructed to replace the Van Norman Reser-
voir. (Photo: E.V. Leyendecker, U.S. Geological Survey.
From NOAA/NGDC, available online at http://
20_slides.html.)
1.2.4.4 New Directions

The 1971 San Fernando earthquake, coming within a few years of the 1964 Alaska, 1964 Niigata (Japan),
1967 Caracas (Venezuela), and 1968 Tokachi-oki (Japan) earthquakes (the latter two events are not
discussed here), brought a realization among geotechnical and structural engineers that major changes
were needed in the building codes, as well as that other earthquake mitigation measures were required
to deal with existing structures. During the 1970s:
The Uniform Building Code was revised in the 1973 and 1976 editions to increase lateral force
requirements, correct the defective detail for roof-wall connections in tilt-up and similar buildings,

and require adequate lateral spacing in reinforced concrete columns (see Hamburger, Chapter 11,
this volume).
A major reshaping of building code earthquake provisions was undertaken [Applied Technology
Council, 1978].
Investigation of liquefaction, which was the root of the failure of the Lower Van Norman Dam,
had begun following the 1964 events, and practical engineering tools soon emerged to analyze the
potential for liquefaction (see Brandes, Chapter 7, this volume).
The failures of power, water, and other infrastructure led to the birth of lifeline earthquake
engineering (see Eguchi, Chapter 22, this volume) to address seismic vulnerabilities in urban
infrastructure.
The United States instituted a national dam-safety program (see Bureau, Chapter 26, this volume).
In 1977, the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977, Public Law 95124, was passed,
culminating thinking that had begun prior to the 1964 Alaska earthquake and evolved into a series
of studies and high-level reports [see EERI, 1999; also available online at http://quake.wr.usgs.gov/
research/history/wallace-VI.html] leading to the passage of the NEHRP.
1.2.5 Second Turning Point

1.2.5.1 1985: September 19, Michoacan, Mexico (M7.9)
The earthquake occurred in the state of Michoacan, Mexico, on Thursday, September 19, 1985 at 7:18 a.m.
local time. The epicenter was approximately 40 miles west of El Inernillo Dam on the Balsas River, near
the town of Lazaro Cardenas on the Pacic coast. The next day, an aftershock of magnitude 7.5 struck
approximately 70 miles to the southwest, 15 miles north of Zihuatenejo, in the state of Guerrero, at 7:37
p.m. local time. At least 9,500 people were killed, about 30,000 were injured, more than 100,000 people
were left homeless, and severe damage was caused in parts of Mexico City and in several states of central
Mexico. It is widely rumored in Mexico that the death toll from this earthquake may have been as high
as 35,000. It is estimated that the quake seriously affected an area of approximately 825,000 km2, caused
between U.S. $3 and $4 billion of damage, and was felt by almost 20 million people. Four hundred twelve
buildings collapsed and another 3,124 were seriously damaged in Mexico City. About 60% of the buildings
were destroyed at Ciudad Guzman, Jalisco. Damage also occurred in the states of Colima, Guerrero,
Mexico, Michoacan, Morelos, parts of Veracruz, and in other areas of Jalisco.
This event was extremely remarkable and received wide attention because the epicenter was about 400
km from central Mexico City, where the greatest loss of life occurred. Earthquakes do not usually cause
signicant damage at this distance, and the major damage in Mexico City was due to an unfortunate
combination of circumstances:
1. It was a large, distant event, resulting in higher frequencies being largely attenuated, with peak
ground accelerations (PGA) of only 0.03 to 0.04 g on rm soils in Mexico City (CU station, see
Figure 1.41), but with lower frequencies (longer periods) still having signicant energy when the
seismic waves reached Mexico City.
2. The Valle de Mexico has unusual geology. It is an enclosed basin, surrounded by active volcanoes,
in which all drainage is trapped (a shallow lake still existed at the time of the Spanish Conquest,
ca. 1500). There are three zones: (1) a foothill zone consisting of rm volcanic deposits mostly
west of downtown; (2) a lake zone consisting of ash from the volcanoes which has fallen on the
basin for thousands of years and slowly settled (pluviated) in the central lake of the basin, formed
by the runoff trapped in the basin. The center of the basin is therefore a very deep, soft deposit
of saturated ash; and (3) intermediate between these two zones is a transition zone. The soft ash-
water deposits in the lake zone are very soft, but elastic over a large strain range, with a natural
period of about 2 sec.
3. The oldest part of the city, and many of the high rises, are in the Lake zone. Settlement of buildings
built in this zone is extreme, if not properly founded. A rule-of-thumb is that the natural period

C = V/W = 5% Response Spectrum
EW ComponetZat SCT
1.0
NS Componet at SCT
EW Componet at CU
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0 1 2 3 4
T (Seconds)
FIGURE 1.41 Response spectra (5% damped), Mexico City CU (rm) and SCT (soft) stations, September 19, 1985
Michoacan earthquake.
of buildings, T, = 0.1N, where N is the number of stories, i.e., a 10-story building normally has a
period of about 1 sec, a 20-story building 2 sec, etc.8
4. The long period motion from the large distant event therefore tuned in, i.e., matched the period
(of about 2 sec) on the deep, soft deposits of the Lake zone, resulting in resonance of the input
ground motion, with unusually strong amplication; PGA of 0.18 g was recorded at the SCT
station near the edge of the Transition-Lake zones (see Figure 1.41).
5. On the soft soils the amplied ground motions with response spectra (for an explanation of
response spectra, see Chapter 4) tuned in on buildings with periods of about 1.0 to 1.5 sec (i.e.,
10- to 15-story buildings). As these buildings were damaged and weakened, their period soft-
ened, i.e., became longer, and thus moved toward the peak amplication region at 2 sec in the
already amplied response spectra, resulting in a double resonance. As buildings in the 10- to
15-story range weakened, they were being more strongly loaded to collapse. As they weakened,
taller buildings (longer periods) were moving into the downhill side of Figure 1.41, and thus
shedding load.
The result was that damage was highly selective and occurred most in buildings in the 10- to 15-story
range. Figure 1.42 shows results of a survey by teachers and students at the Autonomous University of
Mexico [UNAM, 1985], in which it can be seen that 9- to 12-story buildings were found to be most
heavily damaged.
The damage was truly devastating. Figure 1.43 shows the Pino Suarez 23-story building,9 the tallest
building to collapse for any reason prior to September 11, 2001. In all three 23-story towers, the columns
were welded box columns that buckled at the fourth oor, leading to a story mechanism and collapse
[Osteraas and Krawinkler, 1989] of one of the 23-story towers onto the southern 16-story tower, both
towers nally collapsing into the street. Figure 1.43A shows the elevation of the complex: three central
8 Specic building data for Mexico City buildings indicated the relationship was T = 0.12 + 0.086N [Scawthorn
et al., 1986).
9 The Pino Suarez complex consisted of a 2-story, reinforced concrete base building supporting three 21-story and
two 14-story, steel-framed towers (one 14-story at the north and one at the south end of the row of towers). The
buildings are sometimes referred to as being 21 stories tall [e.g., Osteraas and Krawinkler, 1989], when in fact they
were 23 stories above the ground (21 stories + 2-story base).

DAMAGED BLDGS. VS. HGT, UNAM SURVEY
Central Mexico City, 19 Sept 1966
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
DAMAGED BLDGS (%)
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
N = 1 to 2 3 to5 6 to 8 9 to 12 > 12
No. FLOORS
FIGURE 1.42 Damage survey. (From Scawthorn, C. et al. 1986, after UNAM, 1985. With permission.)
23-story towers with two 16-story towers each at each end, all steel framed; Figure 1.43B shows the
collapsed towers; Figure 1.43B shows the remaining towers, with the southernmost one with cladding
removed, exposing the steel framing; Figures 1.43C and D show the buckled box column (note the welded
C-section around the buckle, placed following the earthquake to stabilize the buildings). In both remain-
ing 23-story towers, the pattern of buckled columns at the fourth oor was remarkably consistent.
Figure 1.44 shows the collapse of the 14-story reinforced concrete Nuevo Leon building in the Tlatelolco
complex. As can be seen in Figure 1.44A, the building had an unusual X-bracing scheme in the transverse
direction. Inspection indicated (1) columns sheared in the longitudinal direction at the sky-lobbies, and
(2) failed X-bracing connections in the transverse direction. Figure 1.45 shows examples of other damage
in this event.
Figure 1.46 shows the Hotel Regis, which partially collapsed in the earthquake. An immediate ignition
quickly engulfed the building and trapped occupants, and spread over the next 24 hours to all other
buildings in the block, including several important government buildings.
The Mexico City event was perhaps the rst earthquake, with the exception of the 1967 Caracas,
Venezuela, event (not discussed here), to cause the collapse of numerous major modern high-rise build-
ings. This was largely due to it being the rst earthquake (Caracas excepted) to strongly shake major,
modern high-rise buildings.
1.2.5.2 1988: December 7, Armenia (M7.0)
On December 7, 1988, at 11:41 a.m. local time, a M7.0 earthquake struck northwest Armenia, at the time
a Soviet republic with 3.5 million people. Armenia occupies approximately 30,000 km2 in the southern
Caucasus Mountains, generally considered the boundary between Europe and Asia (Figure 1.47). The
event caused catastrophic damage that resulted in 25,000 deaths and $16 billion loss in a 400-km2
epicentral region occupied by approximately 700,000 people. Damage and several deaths also occurred
in the Kars region of Turkey, 80 km southwest of the earthquakes epicenter.
The Armenian earthquake was a disaster of modern concrete buildings designed and constructed in
the 1970s, not of old, unreinforced stone masonry buildings, the predominant type of construction.

(A) (B)
(C) (D)
FIGURE 1.43 Pino Suarez collapse, September 19, 1985 Mexico City earthquake. (A) Collapsed 23-story and 16-
story Pino Suarez towers. (Photo: E.V. Leyendecker. NOAA/NGDC.) (B) Elevation of two remaining 23-story and
one remaining 16-story tower, showing framing. (C) Buckled box column, Pino Suarez tower. (D) Close-up of buckled
box column, Pino Suarez tower. (Photos B, C, D: C. Scawthorn.) Shown as Color Figure 1.43.
Faced with a housing shortage and a wave of urbanization in the 1970s, Soviet urban planners relaxed
standards for new multistory buildings and raised the height limit from ve stories to nine. Failure of
these new buildings claimed the most lives. When these buildings collapsed, they fell straight down, either
crushing occupants in the compact piles of rubble or suffocating them. In Spitak, there were no undam-
aged buildings because of the strong epicentral shaking and the shallow (15 km) depth (Figure 1.48). In
Leninakan (now called Gyumri), approximately 80% of the building stock was damaged, with many
schools, hospitals, apartment buildings, and factories collapsing (Figure 1.49). The predominant building
type (unreinforced stone masonry bearing-wall construction) performed poorly overall, although most
low-rise unreinforced masonry buildings performed well. Nine-story precast, nonductile concrete frame
buildings performed poorly, with less than 12 of the more than 50 buildings remaining standing after
the earthquake. In contrast, a group of nine-story buildings having precast concrete wall and oor panels
performed well. Of two lift-slab buildings, a 10-story collapsed and a 16-story (the tallest) exhibited
severe torsion effects and heavy damage to the rst oor.

(A)
(B) (C)
FIGURE 1.44 Nuevo Leon collapse, Tlatelolco complex, September 19, 1985 Mexico City earthquake. (A) Overview
of the collapse site. Building still standing is virtually identical to collapsed structure. (B) Overview of the wreckage.
(C) Search and rescue workers in the wreckage. (Photos: C. Scawthorn.) Shown as Color Figure 1.44.
(A) (B)
FIGURE 1.45 Examples of Mexico City building damage, September 19, 1985 earthquake. Parts (A), (B), (D), and
(G) shown as Color Figure 1.45.

(D)
(C)
(F)
(E)
(H)
(G)
(I)
FIGURE 1.45 (CONTINUED)

(A) (B)
FIGURE 1.46 Hotel Regis, Mexico City building damage, September 19, 1985 earthquake. (A) Before earthquake;
(B) afterward.
Both the 1985 Mexico City and 1988 Armenia events were now raising serious questions about the
safety of high-rise buildings.
1.2.5.3 1989: October 17, Loma Prieta (Mw 7.1)
At 5:04 p.m., Tuesday, October 17, 1989, an Mw 7.1 earthquake struck the San Francisco Bay area. The
20-second earthquake was centered about 60 miles south of San Francisco on the San Andreas fault, was
largely strike-slip motion, and was felt from Eureka to Los Angeles and east as far as Fallon, NV. It was
felt in high-rise buildings in San Diego. Maximum intensity was IX in parts of Oakland and San Francisco
(Figure 1.50), numerous landslides occurred in the epicentral area, liquefaction occurred in some areas
of Oakland and San Francisco, and a small tsunami with maximum wave height (peak-to-trough) of
40 cm was recorded at Monterey. Among the most catastrophic seismic-induced events were:
The collapse of the double-deck elevated Cypress Street section of Interstate 880 in Oakland
(Figure 1.51)
The collapse of a section of the roadbed of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge (Figure 1.52)
Multiple building collapses in San Franciscos Marina district, as well as a major re (see
Chapter 29) (Figure 1.53)
The collapse of several structures in the town of Santa Cruz at the Pacic Garden Mall and in
other areas around the epicentral region
Ground motions were amplied in soft, water-saturated soils around the Bays margin, resulting in much
of the dramatic damage in parts of San Francisco and Oakland.
Fatalities were 62 people, a remarkably low number given the time and size of the earthquake. This
was attributed to low trafc and many people having gone home early to watch the third game of the
World Series between the San Francisco Giants and the Oakland Athletics. Most casualties were caused
by the collapse of the Cypress Street section, which had much lighter trafc than usual for a rush hour,
although the fall of a parapet from one building accounted for eight deaths of persons not even in the
building (Figure 1.54).
The earthquake received extraordinary media attention due to the disruption of the World Series, with
national media already focused on the Bay area. Many people across the United States were seeing damage
live on TV, such as the collapsed Cypress Street elevated highway, before people only a few blocks away
from the damage were aware of it. Damage was estimated at $5.6 billion. Areas outside of Santa Cruz,
including the towns of Watsonville, Hollister, and Los Gatos, also suffered heavy damage. At least 3,700
people were reported injured and more than 12,000 were displaced. More than 18,000 homes were
damaged and 963 were destroyed. More than 2,500 other buildings were damaged and 147 were destroyed.

FIGURE 1.47 Intensity map of December 7, 1988 Armenia earthquake. (Courtesy EQE International)
FIGURE 1.48 Damage in Spitak, December 7, 1988

Armenia earthquake. (Courtesy EQE International)

(A) (B)
FIGURE 1.49 Damage in Leninakan, December 7, 1988 Armenia earthquake. (Courtesy EQE International)
km
0 10 20
Santa Rosa
Vallejo
38N
Stockton
Beverley
San Francisco Oakland
X - Extreme Damage
IX - Heavy Damage
VIII - Moderate Damage
Half Menlo Park
VII - Light Damage Sunnydale
Moon
VI - Minimal Damage San Jose
Bay
V - Strongly Felt
Morgan Hill
II-IV - Lightly to Moderately Felt
37N I - Not Felt Santa Clara
Undefined (White)
Hollister
123W 122W
FIGURE 1.50 Predictive intensity map, October 17, 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. (http://quake.wr.usgs.gov/
research/strongmotion/intensity/1989.html.)
Downtown San Francisco was effectively closed for 3 days due to curtailment of electric power and gas
service while the safety of those systems was restored.
Restoration of the San Francisco Bay area following the earthquake was varied. The Bay Bridge was
restored to service in 30 days and, surprisingly, impacts on commuter patterns during the disruption
were much less than anticipated, due to BART (the regional subway system) and an emergency ferry
system providing service. On the other hand, the Cypress Street elevated highway was a key link in the
East Bay highway network; opposition over rebuilding the highway along the same route delayed rebuild-
ing for 10 years, while an alternative route was found and the highway rebuilt. Chinatown in San Francisco
had major business losses compared to prior to the earthquake, due to the loss of the Embarcadero
Freeway. This elevated highway was very similar to the Cypress and sustained similar but not as severe
damage (there was no collapse of the Embarcadero Freeway). However, the Embarcadero Freeway had
always had signicant public opposition due to its route along the waterfront, and opponents seized the

(A) (B)
(C) (D)
FIGURE 1.51 Collapse of Cypress Street double-deck elevated highway, Oakland, October 17, 1989 Loma Prieta
earthquake. Various views. (Courtesy EQE International) Part (B) shown as Color Figure 1.51.
opportunity and the Freeway was demolished (and replaced by a gracious surface roadway). The freeway
provided quick access to Chinatown, however, and when this access was lost, tourism and local patronage
in Chinatown was slow to recover. Similarly, the pedestrian mall in Santa Cruz sustained signicant and
steady business drop-off, due to a lengthy decision-making process regarding rebuilding.
1.2.5.4 1994: January 17, Northridge (Mw 6.7)
At 4:31 a.m., Pacic Standard Time, Monday, January 17, a moderate but very damaging earthquake
with a moment magnitude of 6.7 struck the densely populated San Fernando Valley in northern Los
Angeles. This event was similar in magnitude, time of year, time of day, and epicentral location to the
1971 San Fernando earthquake, and affected largely the same area. Thousands of aftershocks, many in
the magnitude 4.0 to 5.0 range, occurred during the next few weeks, further damaging already affected
structures. The earthquake was felt throughout much of southern California and as far away as Turlock,
CA; Las Vegas, NV; Richeld, UT; and Ensenada, Mexico. The maximum recorded acceleration exceeded
1.0 g at several sites in the area, with the largest value of 1.8 g recorded at Tarzana, about 7 km south of
the epicenter, with corresponding MMI of IX (Figures 1.55 and 1.56). A maximum uplift of about 15 cm
occurred in the Santa Susana Mountains; many rockslides occurred in mountain areas, blocking some
roads; ground cracks were observed at Granada Hills and in Potrero Canyon; and liquefaction occurred
at Simi Valley and in some other parts of the Los Angeles basin. In all, these geologic effects were a
contributing but not major source of damage.

(A)
(B) (C)
FIGURE 1.52 Collapse of portion of the east span of the San Francisco Oakland Bay Bridge, October 17, 1989
Loma Prieta earthquake. (A) Collapsed span. (Courtesy EQE International) (B) Close-up of collapsed span; note
beam seat at lower left. (C) Close-up of beam seat, showing amount of movement. (Photos B, C: C. Scawthorn)
Shown as Color Figure 1.52.
Damage to several major freeways serving Los Angeles choked the trafc system in the days following
the earthquake. Major freeway damage occurred up to 32 km from the epicenter (Figure 1.57). Collapses
and other severe damage forced closure of portions of 11 major roads to downtown Los Angeles.
The death toll was 57, and more than 1,500 people were seriously injured. A few days after the
earthquake, 9,000 homes and businesses were still without electricity; 20,000 were without gas; and more
than 48,500 had little or no water. Fires caused additional damage in the San Fernando Valley and at
Malibu and Venice (Figure 1.58). About 12,500 structures were moderately to severely damaged, leaving
thousands of people temporarily homeless (Figure 1.59). Of the 66,546 buildings inspected, 6% were
severely damaged (red tagged) and 17% were moderately damaged (yellow tagged). Commercial build-
ings, especially parking structures and tilt-ups, sustained major damage in a number of cases
(Figure 1.60). A surprising nd was the cracking of connections in welded steel moment-resistant frames
(see Chapter 12).
Total direct damage, business interruption, and other losses that could be documented amounted to
U.S. $24 billion. Further, amounts that could not be documented were also estimated to arrive at a nal
estimated economic loss of U.S. $44 billion [EQE, 1997], making this the most expensive natural catas-
trophe in history up to that time. Signicantly, insurance claims were nally10 totaled at $15 billion,
leading to insurers foregoing future earthquake underwriting in California for a period.
Northridge, following within a little more than 5 years of the Loma Prieta earthquake, marked a
turning point in the United States. Given the magnitude of the losses, it was clear that a larger earthquake
10 It took several years for all accounting to be completed (see Chapter 32, this volume, or Scawthorn [1995]).

(A) (B)
(C) (D)
FIGURE 1.53 Collapse of buildings in the Marina district of San Francisco, October 17, 1989 Loma Prieta earth-
quake. Shown as Color Figure 1.53.
FIGURE 1.54 Collapse of parapet at building on Blux-

ome Street, San Francisco. Eight people died under the
brick falling from the parapet. Shown as Color Figure 1.54.
could be a severe catastrophe. Caltrans was funded to retrot all bridges in California by 2000 (and very
nearly did so); many utilities accelerated programs initiated following Loma Prieta; the federal govern-
ment signicantly funded research on mitigation, including a multimillion dollar research effort into
steel connections; several universities (Stanford and the University of California at Berkeley) accelerated
their retrot programs, and numerous local governments and private enterprises did likewise.

FIGURE 1.55 Trinet Shake Map: instrumental intensity map, January 17, 1994 Northridge earthquake. Rather than
using the traditional method of postcard responses from postmasters, this map is generated from instrumental data.
(Courtesy U.S. Geological Survey)
1.2.5.5 1995: January 17, Hanshin (Kobe), Japan (Mw 6.8)

The earthquake occurred at 5:46 a.m. with moment magnitude of 6.9, about 20 km southwest of
downtown Kobe, between the northeast tip of Awaji Island and the island of Honshu. The fault rupture
was 30 to 50 km in length, bilateral strike-slip, and ran directly through central Kobe, which contributed
to the high level of destruction. Total fatalities were 6,427 people conrmed killed, with 36,896 injured,
and extensive damage (VII JMA) in the Kobe area and on Awaji-shima. Over 90% of the casualties
occurred along the southern coast of Honshu between Kobe and Nishinomiya. At least 28 people were
killed by a landslide at Nishinomiya. About 310,000 people were evacuated to temporary shelters. Over
200,000 buildings were damaged or destroyed. Numerous res, gas and water main breaks, and power
outages occurred in the epicentral area. The earthquake was felt along a coastal strip extending from

FIGURE 1.56 Community Intensity map, January 17, 1994 Northridge earthquake. Rather than using the tradi-
tional method of postcard responses from postmasters, this map is generated from citizen voluntary intensity
observation data, via the Web. Citizens in California have quickly become familiar with this system and, for a major
event, thousands of contributed data will be received and a map generated within an hour or less. (Courtesy U.S.
Geological Survey)
FIGURE 1.57 Collapse of freeways, northern Los

Angeles County, January 17, 1994 Northridge earthquake
(M 6.7). (Courtesy EQE International) Shown as Color
Figure 1.57.

FIGURE 1.58 Gas are and burned home, Balboa Bou-
levard, January 17, 1994 Northridge earthquake. (Cour-
tesy EQE International)
FIGURE 1.59 Collapsed residential apartment build-

ings, January 17, 1994 Northridge earthquake. (Courtesy
EQE International) Shown as Color Figure 1.59.
(A) (B)
FIGURE 1.60 Collapse of parking structures, January 17, 1994 Northridge earthquake. (Courtesy EQE Interna-
tional) Shown as Color Figure 1.60.
Suma Ward, Kobe, to Nishinomiya, and in the Ichinomiya area on Awaji-shima (VII JMA); at Hikone,
Kyoto, and Toyooka (V JMA); at Nara, Okayama, Osaka, and Wakayama (IV JMA); at Iwakuni (V). The
earthquake was also felt at Takamatsu, Shikoku (IV JMA). Right-lateral surface faulting was observed for
9 km with horizontal displacement of 1.2 to 1.5 m in the northern part of Awaji-shima (Figure 1.61).
The number of buildings destroyed by the earthquake exceeded 100,000, or approximately one in ve
buildings in the strongly shaken area. An additional 80,000 buildings were badly damaged. The large
numbers of damaged traditional-style Japanese residences and small, traditional commercial buildings
of three stories or less account for a great deal of the damage. In sections where these buildings were

17 January 1995 Hyogoken Nanbu Earthquake, M=6.9
135E
163
Epicenter (JMA)
active fault
Kansai Committee 195 Kyoto
35N JR
Osaka Gas
JMA 263 113
aftershock zone (Kyoto U.)
323
601
229 251
270 792 >318 245
>775
561 Nishi-
819 833 nomiya 266 145
481 Kobe 113
616
Nojima 220
Osaka
Fault
240
Osaka Bay
Awaji 149
Island
0 20km
+ 200
FIGURE 1.61 Mainshock epicenter (JMA), aftershock zone, and peak ground motions (cm/s/s) of the 1995 Kobe
earthquake, superimposed on a map of active faults, January 17, 1995 Hanshin earthquake. (From EERI [Earthquake
Engineering Research Institute]. 1995. The Hyogo-Ken Nanbu Earthquake: Great Hanshin Earthquake Disaster, January
17, 1995. Preliminary Reconnaissance Report. Comartin, C.D., Greene, M., and Tubbesing, S.K., Tech. Eds. Earthquake
Engineering Research Institute Report 9504, sponsored by the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Oakland,
CA, with support from the National Science Foundation and Federal Emergency Management Agency.)
concentrated, entire blocks of collapsed buildings were common. Several thousand buildings were also
destroyed by the res following the earthquake.
Most of the heavily damaged wood-frame buildings were traditional one- or two-story residential or
small commercial buildings of Shinkabe or Okabe construction. These buildings normally have very
heavy mud and tile roofs (which are effective in preventing typhoon damage), supported by post-and-
beam construction. Foundations are often stone or concrete blocks, and the wood framing is not well
attached to the foundations. The Shinkabe construction has mud walls reinforced with a bamboo lattice.
Okabe construction has thin-spaced wood sheathing that spans between the wood posts and is attached
with limited nailing. The exterior plaster is not reinforced with wire mesh or well attached to the wood
framing, so it falls off in sheets when cracked. In new (post-1981) construction, nominal diagonal bracing
is required to resist lateral loads. Traditional wood-frame construction had the most widespread damage
throughout the region, resulting in the largest number of casualties. Collapses led to the rupture of many
gas lines. Failures in these buildings were typically caused by large inertial loads from the heavy roofs
that exceeded the lateral earthquake load-resisting capacity of the supporting walls. The relatively weak
bottom stories created by the open fronts typically collapsed. Unlike most U.S. homes, Japanese homes
typically have few if any substantive interior partitions to help resist the earthquake loads. In this respect,
the bottom stories are similar to the U.S. homes that are supported on unbraced cripple walls. In older
homes, many framing members had been weakened by wood rot. Soil failures exacerbated the damage,
because the foundations have virtually no strength to resist settlement, and connections between the
residences and their foundations were weak (Figure 1.62).
Mid-rise commercial buildings, generally 6 to 12 stories high, make up a substantial portion of the
buildings in the Kobe business district. The highest concentration of damaged mid-rise buildings was

(A) (B)
FIGURE 1.62 Japanese house collapses, January 17, 1995 Hanshin earthquake. (Courtesy EQE International) Shown
as Color Figure 1.62.
observed in the Sannomiya area of Kobes central business district. In this area, most of the commercial
buildings had some structural damage, and a large number of buildings collapsed on virtually every
block. Most collapses were toward the north, which was evidently the result of a long-period velocity
pulse perpendicular to the fault. This effect has also been observed in other earthquakes. Failures of
major commercial and residential buildings were noted as far away as Ashiya, Nishinomiya, and Takara-
zuka. In general, many newer structures performed quite well and withstood the earthquake with little
or no damage.
In the heavily damaged central sections of downtown Kobe, approximately 60% of the buildings had
signicant structural damage, and about 20% completely or partially collapsed. One survey of a
120,000-m2 area in downtown Kobe (the Sannomiya area) found that 21 of 116 buildings, or 18%, were
visibly destroyed. Another report indicated that 22% of ofce buildings in a portion of the Kobe city
center were unusable, while an additional 66% needed more than 6 months for complete restoration.
City inspectors declared approximately 50% of the multifamily dwellings in Kobe unsafe to enter or unt
for habitation, leaving more than 300,000 people homeless (Figure 1.63).
At the Ashiyama seaside town, 21 of 52 mid- and high-rise condominium structures built between
1975 and 1979 had severe damage to the structural steel framing. This innovative and unconventional
structural system consisted of macro-steel moment frames in which the column and girder members
were large steel trusses. Girders were typically located at every fth oor. Housing units consisted of
precast concrete assemblies that had been brought to the site by barge. Damage observed included the
brittle fracture of square, tubular columns up to 50 cm wide with 5-cm-thick walls, and fracturing of
steel wide-ange diagonal bracing elements. Residual horizontal offsets in column elements were observed
to be as large as 2 cm in some cases. In general, it appeared that the brittle fractures had occurred in
framing elements subjected to high combined tensile and shear stresses. In one of the units, six of the
eight main steel columns forming the lateral-load-resisting system had fractured (Figure 1.64).
Two limited-access highways service the Kobe-Osaka transportation corridor, the Hanshin and Wangan
expressways. Built in the mid- to late 1960s, the Hanshin Expressway is the main through road and is
almost entirely elevated for more than 40 km. Much of the roadway is supported by single, large reinforced
concrete piers spaced every 32 m, many of which failed in shear or bending over a 20-km length. Similar
failures of the roadway occurred at many locations, including complete toppling of large reinforced
concrete pillars supporting a 500-m section. It was observed that the road deck changed from steel to a
heavier concrete section at the location where this collapse occurred. These failures not only closed the
Hanshin Expressway for an indenite period, but severely impeded trafc on Route 43, a street-level
highway beneath the expressway (Figure 1.65).
Elevated railroad structures and railway stations were particularly hard hit. Three main lines (JR West,
Hankyu, and Hanshin) run through the Kobe-Osaka transportation corridor, generally on elevated
structures and embankments. All the lines had elevated structure and embankment failures, overpass
collapses, distorted rails, and other severe damage. A large number of cars were damaged, and some fell
(A)
(B) (C)
FIGURE 1.63 Japanese commercial building collapses, January 17, 1995 Hanshin earthquake. (Courtesy EQE
International)
onto city streets. Several stations and several kilometers of reinforced concrete elevated structures were
destroyed, and numerous spans collapsed. The Rokkomichi Station (built in 1972) of the JR West line
was virtually destroyed (Figure 1.66).
The Shinkansen (Bullet Train) was constructed ca. 1964. Most of its path in the Kobe area is through
two long tunnels under Rokko Mountain. No information on the tunnels performance was immediately
available. At the east portal of the tunnel, the line is carried on an elevated viaduct built in 1968. For a
length of 3 km, this viaduct was severely damaged, with a number of the longer spans collapsing. In
general, these collapses were caused by shear failure of the supporting concrete columns (Figure 1.66C).
Damage to underground facilities, such as mines, tunnels, or subways, is rare in earthquakes. An
unusual example of severe damage to this type of facility occurred in the Kobe subway system, a two-
track line running under central Kobe, which was generally built by cut-and-cover methods in the mid-
1960s. The double track is typically carried through a concrete tube 9 m wide by 6.4 m high, which
widens to 17 m at the stations. The tube typically has about 5 m of overburden, which is supported by
0.4-m-thick walls and roof slabs. The walls and roof slab are supported midspan (between the tracks)
by a series of 5-m tall, 1-m long, 0.4-m wide reinforced concrete columns, which failed in shear due to
displacements imposed by ground strain.
The Port of Kobe, one of the largest container facilities in the world, sustained major damage during
the earthquake. In effect, the port was practically destroyed. The total direct damage to the port easily
exceeded U.S. $11 billion. The port complex, constructed on three man-made islands Maya Container

(A)
(B) (C)
FIGURE 1.64 Ashiyahama Steel Buildings and column failures, January 17, 1995 Hanshin earthquake. (Photos:
C. Scawthorn)
(A) (B)
FIGURE 1.65 Hanshin Expressway collapse, January 17, 1995 Hanshin earthquake. (Photo (B): C. Scawthorn)
Shown as Color Figure 1.65.
Terminal, Port Island (with an area of 10 km2), and Rokko Island (with an area of 6 km2) accounts
for approximately 30% (2.7 million containers per year) of Japans container shipping. At the time of the
earthquake, the three facilities included 27 active container berths and various other wharves, ferry
terminals, roll-on facilities, and warehousing. In addition, the older parts of the port contain numerous
other facilities, such as an extensive shipyard. Also, at the time of the earthquake, several new islands

(A)
(B) (C)
FIGURE 1.66 Railroad and subway damage, January 17, 1995 Hanshin earthquake. (Courtesy EQE International)
were under development, and new berths were under construction to the east of Rokko Island
(Figure 1.67).
Numerous res broke out, exacerbated by loss of water supply throughout the affected region
(Figure 1.68) (see Chapter 29).
1.2.5.6 1999: August 17, Turkey (Mw 7.4)
Similar to the San Andreas fault being the North American-Pacic plate boundary, Turkey lies on a major
boundary between the African and Eurasian plates. The North Anatolian Fault Zone (NAFZ) is the most
prominent active fault in Turkey and has been the source of numerous large earthquakes throughout
history, including a number of major earthquakes in the twentieth century [Ambraseys and Finkel, 1995]
(Figure 1.69).
The Mw 7.4 Marmara (also known as Kocaeli) earthquake occurred at 3:10 a.m. local time, August 17,
1999, on the eastwest trending north strand of the NAFZ, about 100 km southeast of Istanbul. The
125-km-long fault and high damage area follows or is close to the south shore of Izmit Bay (Figure 1.70),
and has predominantly 2.2 m right lateral displacement, from Adapazari in the east to Yalova in the west.
Signicant vertical fault scarps of as much as 2 m occur at several locations (Figure 1.71). Peak ground
accelerations of approximately 0.4 g were recorded near the fault, and liquefaction and subsidence were
observed on the shores of Izmit Bay and Lake Sapanca. Figure 1.72 presents the response spectra for the
northsouth (NS) component of the YPT record, recorded at the Yarimca petrochemical complex on the
north shore of Izmit Bay, approximately 4 km from the fault trace.
Substantial geotechnical effects occurred due to the earthquake, especially along the south shores of
Izmit Bay and Lake Sapanca, where settlement and slumping were observed at numerous locations
(Figure 1.73).
In Adapazari, signicant settlement and liquefaction were observed, resulting in very major damage
to buildings (Figure 1.74). Adapazari (at the eastern terminus of faulting) is a soft soil site that exhibited

(A)
(B) (C)
FIGURE 1.67 Port damage, January 17, 1995 Hanshin earthquake. (Courtesy EQE International) Shown as Color
Figure 1.67.
FIGURE 1.68 Fires, January 17, 1995 Hanshin earthquake. Shown as Color Figure 1.68.

Location of August 17, 1999 Turkish Earthquake
1992
1967
1957
1951
1944 1943 1942
1939
Black Sea
Istanbul 7.3
Izmit 7.3 n Fault 7.1
lla
Anato
7.1 7.0 Nor th
7.9
1999 Ankara
0 100km
Epicenter TURKEY 6.8
Historical earthquake epicenter and magnitude

1957 Extent of surface rupture
Direction of relative motion on fault
FIGURE 1.69 Progressive North Anatolian Fault rupture in adjacent earthquakes. (From quake.wr.usgs.gov/study/
turkey/.)
29 30 31
BOGAZIC UNIVERSITY KANDILLI
OBSERVATORY and EARTHQUAKE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE SEISMOLOGY LABORATORY
BLACK SEA
Istanbul
41 41
Dzce
Izmit Adapazan Hendek
MARMARA
SEA Glck Akyazi
Yalova
Gernlik
17.08.1999 Izmit Earthquake (Mw = 7.4)
Bursa
5<M<6 Aftershocks
Bileclk
4<M<5 Aftershocks
40 40
29 30 31
FIGURE 1.70 Aftershock pattern, August 17, 1999 Marmara earthquake. (From www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/.)
FIGURE 1.71 Vertical fault scarp near Golcuk, August

17, 1999 Marmara earthquake. Note lack of damage to
house literally on the fault. (Photo: C. Scawthorn) Shown
as Color Figure 1.71.

STATION YPT-NS
RESPONSE SPECTRA
1,000
500 for damping values

0, 0.02, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20
(from top to bottom)
cm
0
10
100
1.
8
50
cm/sec
cm
10
0.
18
cm
1
10
0.
01
8
5
cm
1
0.
cm
01
0.
1
0.1 0.5 1 5 10 50 100
freq. (Hz.)
FIGURE 1.72 YPT 5% damped response spectra, August 17, 1999 Marmara earthquake. (From http://geophys-
ics.gg.utk.edu/izmit/earthquake.htm.)
FIGURE 1.73 Subsidence, south shore of Izmit Bay,

east of Golchuk, August 17, 1999 Marmara earthquake.
Note crane and buildings in water, indicating subsided
quay or pier. (Photo: C. Scawthorn) Shown as Color
Figure 1.73.
(A) (B)
FIGURE 1.74 Adapazari, August 17, 1999 Marmara earthquake. (A) Overturned building, due to foundation failure
brought on by liquefaction. (B) Main street of Adapazari, showing damage to numerous buildings, due to soft soil
amplied ground motion and liquefaction. (Photos: C. Scawthorn) Shown as Color Figure 1.74.

(A) (B)
(C) (D)
FIGURE 1.75 August 17, 1999 Marmara earthquake. Complex of four-story reinforced concrete frames east of Gol-
chuk, all of which collapsed due to soft stories. (Photos: C. Scawthorn) Parts (B) and (C) shown as Color Figure 1.75.
liquefaction and settlement. The name Adapazari derives from ad meaning island, and pazari meaning
bazaar; originally the site was an island in a shallow lake, where a regional bazaar was held. As time went
on, traders congregated longer and longer, and eventually the city developed and the lake was lled in.
Although the north shore of Izmit Bay is bounded by steep mountains, and there is hilly terrain
elsewhere, no landsliding was observed.
Several million persons live in the Izmit region, which has experienced rapid growth and heavy
industrialization in the last two decades. The predominant building type is mid-rise nonductile reinforced
concrete (RC) frames with hollow clay tile inll and soft stories. Thousands of these collapsed in a
pancake mode, resulting in a death toll of approximately 17,000, with estimates of population requiring
short- to long-term shelter ranging from 200,000 to 600,000. Figure 1.75 illustrates collapse of this type
of building, thousands of which collapsed throughout the region. Steel buildings fared much better than
the nonductile RC frames shown.
Lifeline damage was moderate to major, as follows:
Electric: Power failed within minutes of the earthquake, but was generally restored to most areas
within several days. Substations did not appear to be damaged, nor transmission lines or towers,
except where the lines crossed the fault.
Telephone: Service continued with only minor disruptions, and cell service was reportedly
uninterrupted.

Gas: There is no domestic underground gas piping in the area. It is unknown as of this writing if
there are bulk transmission lines in the area.
Rail: Rail lines were buckled at fault crossings, but repairs were quickly effected, and rail service
restored within several days.
Highways: Roads and highways were generally undamaged except for several highway bridges
intersected by traces of the fault. Where this put the bridge in tension, spans were pulled off their
beam seats, and the spans collapsed. The main motorway connecting Istanbul and Ankara passes
along the north shore of Izmit Bay and close to Adapazari; in general, it was undamaged.
Water: The main source of water is the recently constructed Izmit Water Project, built and operated
by Thames Water. It is the largest privatized water project in the world as of this writing, and
replaces a variety of low-quality sources for the various municipalities in the area. The water
treatment plant is 440 million liter/day capacity (110 mgd) and sustained minor but manageable
damage. Downstream of the plant, water is conveyed to retail customers via a 2.2-m spiral-welded
steel pipe, which crosses the fault trace with approximately a 2-m right lateral offset at that location.
The pipe was uncovered and found to need repairs, but service was largely unaffected.
A number of ignitions occurred in building collapses, but these were generally conned to the building
of origin, due to the prevalent nonammable building materials. The most dramatic re was at the Tupras
oil renery, where it appears that two separate res initiated during the earthquake and burned for several
days (see Chapter 20).
The Mw 7.4 Kocaeli earthquake was a devastating catastrophe and great human tragedy for the Turkish
people. The earthquake should have come as no surprise, because the long history of earthquakes and
clear pattern of sequential segmented rupturing of the NAFZ was well known. Rapid development of the
Marmara region led to unregulated building, resulting in inadequate lateral force systems in buildings.
Almost the only building type is nonductile RC frames with hollow clay tile inll which, combined with
soft stories, results in a pancake type of collapse. As a result, approximately 17,000 fatalities occurred.
The Izmit Bay area is heavily industrialized and accounts for perhaps 10% of Turkeys gross domestic
product. Combined with other economic problems, the earthquake exacerbated an already severe burden
on the national economy. Considering the entire spectrum of the built environment, the damage resulting
from the event, while substantial, was generally within the resources of Turkey to manage and tolerate.
The exception to this was the dismal performance of the RC frames, virtually ubiquitous in the region.
The collapse of thousands of these buildings transformed this earthquake from a damaging event to a
catastrophe. Within the spectrum of the built environment, only this aspect was a spike. Design and
construction of RC frames to withstand strong earthquake motions are possible, and the principles were
well understood by Turkish engineers. Unfortunately, the rapid development of the region overtaxed the
ability of the society to assure that these principles were followed. The result was inadequate buildings,
when there need not have been, and a tragic catastrophe. A review of Figure 1.69 indicates that Istanbul
is now threatened by a similar catastrophe, in the form of a seismic gap in the Sea of Marmara.
1.2.5.7 1999: September 21, Taiwan (Mw 7.5)
This earthquake came only a month after the Marmara earthquake, and caused at least 2,297 people
killed, 8,700 injured, 600,000 people left homeless, and about 82,000 housing units damaged by the
earthquake and larger aftershocks. Damage was estimated at U.S. $14 billion. Major geologic effects were
observed; half of a village was lost by subsidence into the Ta-an Hsi and landslides blocked the Ching-
shui Hsi, creating a large lake. Surface faulting occurred along 75 km of the Chelungpu Fault.
Many high-rise building collapses occurred due to inherent weaknesses of soft rst stories. In sharp
contrast to Turkeys quick recovery of its electrical distribution system, Taiwans system was slow to
recover, in large part because it was highly dependent on a single junction station 10 km from the epicenter
that suffered landslide and shaking damage. Although Taiwan has very high-tech factories, they were
signicantly disrupted due to prolonged disruption to the power grid. The Shih-kang Dam failed because
it straddled one of the faults that ruptured and released its water, 40% of the Taichung Countys supply.

1.2.5.8 2001: January 26, Bhuj (Mw 7.7)
At least 20,005 people were killed, 166,836 injured, approximately 339,000 buildings destroyed, and
783,000 damaged in the Bhuj-Ahmadabad-Rajkot area and other parts of Gujarat. Many bridges and
roads were damaged in Gujarat. This earthquake was felt throughout northern India and much of
Pakistan, and also felt in Bangladesh and western Nepal. The earthquake occurred along an approximately
eastwest trending thrust fault at shallow depth. The stress that caused this earthquake is due to the
Indian plate pushing northward into the Eurasian plate.
1.2.5.9 Newer Directions
The 1994 Northridge earthquake, coming within a few years of the 1989 Loma Prieta event, brought a
realization among government and private sector leaders that what the earthquake community had been
saying for decades had indeed to be heard and acted upon. During the 1990s:
Infrastructure systems in California and the Pacic Northwest conducted major projects to reduce
their vulnerability.
Selected cities similarly conducted major projects to reduce their vulnerability.
Many large corporations similarly conducted major projects to reduce their vulnerability.
The insurance industry moved from a paper-based PML methodology to modern, probabilistic
risk assessment and management of their book of business (see Chapter 32).
The federal government moved ahead with an assessment of the seismic vulnerability of all of its
buildings, and developed HAZUS, a sophisticated earthquake loss-estimation methodology and
free software code, for use by the general public. The federal government quickly responded to
the new problem of cracked steel column connections, and funded a major study into this problem
in a timely manner.
Major efforts were put into the writing of new modern building codes (see Chapter 11).
Most of these were U.S. developments. Following the 1995 Hanshin (Kobe) earthquake, Japan quickly
moved ahead on a parallel track to strengthen key infrastructure and reduce major vulnerabilities. Japan
also liberalized earthquake insurance. However, Japans earthquake risk problem is enormous, and it will
be a number of years before it can signicantly reduce its earthquake risk, due to its existing housing
stock and pattern of land development. Still, Japans leaders were also listening and acting.
However, most of these developments were in the advanced industrialized nations. The 1985 Mexico
City and 1988 Armenia events, as well as others not reviewed here (e.g., 1990 Iran, with 40,000 killed;
1990 Philippines, 1,600 killed; 1993 India, 10,000 killed, etc., see Table 1.1), started responsible persons
also thinking and acting. When the 1999 Marmara earthquake occurred, it served as a springboard for
a new initiative by the World Bank to introduce natural hazards catastrophe insurance into developing
nations, as both a method for scal responsibility and to bring into play the benets of the market
mechanism for mitigation. With World Bank assistance, Turkey initiated the TCIP program (see
Chapter 32), which appears to have been well designed and launched. Other nations are expected to
follow suit.
Defining Terms
Attenuation The rate at which earthquake ground motion decreases with distance.
Earthquake cycle Concept that seismicity follows a cyclical pattern, with repetitions of similar events
every several hundred to thousands of years, depending on the region. Clearly demonstrated
by repeated similar events where record is long, such as on the Nankai trough, offshore Japan.
Epicenter The projection on the surface of the Earth directly above the hypocenter.
Fault A zone of the Earths crust within which the two sides have moved. Faults may be hundreds of
miles long, from 1 to more than 100 miles deep, and not readily apparent on the ground surface.

Hypocenter The location of initial radiation of seismic waves (i.e., the rst location of dynamic
rupture).
Intensity A metric of the effect, or the strength, of an earthquake hazard at a specic location,
commonly measured on qualitative scales such as MMI, MSK, and JMA.
Lateral-force-resisting system A structural system for resisting horizontal forces, due for example to
earthquake or wind (as opposed to the vertical-force-resisting system, which provides support
against gravity).
Liquefaction A process resulting in a soils loss of shear strength, due to a transient excess of pore
water pressure.
Magnitude A unique measure of an individual earthquakes release of strain energy, measured on a
variety of scales, of which the moment magnitude Mw (derived from seismic moment) is
preferred.
Meizoseismal The area of strong shaking and damage.
Near-eld Within one source dimension of the epicenter, where source dimension refers to the length
or width of faulting, whichever is less.
Normal fault A fault that exhibits dip-slip motion, where the two sides are in tension and move away
from each other.
Peak ground acceleration (PGA) The maximum amplitude of recorded acceleration (also termed
the ZPA, or zero period acceleration).
PML Probable maximum loss.
Pounding The collision of adjacent buildings during an earthquake due to insufcient lateral
clearance.
Response spectrum A plot of maximum amplitudes (acceleration, velocity, or displacement) of a
single-degree-of-freedom oscillator (SDOF), as the natural period of the SDOF is varied across
a spectrum of engineering interest (typically, for natural periods from 0.03 to 3.0 or more
seconds, or frequencies of 0.3 to 30 or more hertz).
Ring of Fire A zone of major global seismicity due to the interaction (collision and subduction) of
the Pacic plate with several other plates.
Sand boils or mud volcanoes Ejecta of solids (i.e., sand, silt) carried to the surface by water, due to
liquefaction.
Seismic gap A portion of a fault or seismogenic zone that can be deduced to be likely to rupture in
the near term, based on patterns of seismicity and geological evidence.
Seismic hazards The phenomenon or expectation (or both) of an earthquake-related agent of dam-
age, such as fault rupture, vibratory ground motion (i.e., shaking), inundation (e.g., tsunami,
seiche, dam failure), various kinds of permanent ground failure (e.g., liquefaction), re, or
hazardous materials release.
Seismic moment The moment generated by the forces generated on an earthquake fault during slip.
Seismic risk The product of the hazard and the vulnerability (i.e., the expected damage or loss, or
the full probability distribution).
Soft story A story of a building signiantly less stiff than adjacent stories, i.e., lateral stiffness is 70%
or less than that in the story above, or less than 80% of the average stiffness of the three stories
above.
Spectrum amplication factor The ratio of a response spectral parameter to the ground motion
parameter (where parameter indicates acceleration, velocity, or displacement).
Subduction Refers to the plunging of a tectonic plate (e.g., the Pacic) beneath another (e.g., the
North American) down into the mantle, due to convergent motion.
Tectonic Relating to, causing, or resulting from structural deformation of the Earths crust (from
Greek tektonikos, from tektn, builder).

Theory of elastic rebound Concept that the Earths crust is deformed by plate movements, thus
storing strain energy, until energy is released by fault rupture, resulting in an earthquake
(formulated by H.F. Reid, 1910).
Thrust fault Low-angle reverse faulting. Blind thrust faults are faults at depth occurring under anti-
clinal folds. They have only subtle surface expression.
Trans-Alpide belt A zone of major global seismicity, extending from the Mediterranean through the
Middle East, the Himalayas, and the Indonesian archipelago, resulting from the collision of
several major tectonic plates.
Transform or strike-slip fault A fault where relative fault motion occurs in the horizontal plane,
parallel to the strike of the fault.
References
Algermissen, S.T. 1983. An Introduction to the Seismicity of the United States, Earthquake Engineering
Research Institute, Berkeley, CA.
Ambraseys, N.N. and Finkel, C.F. 1995. The Seismicity of Turkey and Adjacent Areas, A Historical Review,
15001800, EREN, Istanbul.
ASCE (American Society of Civil Engineers). 1929. Report of Special Committee on Effects of Earth-
quakes on Engineering Structures. Unpublished manuscript, American Society of Civil Engineers,
New York.
Applied Technology Council. 1978. Tentative Provisions for the Development of Seismic Regulations for
Buildings (ATC-306). Report funded by National Science Foundation and National Bureau of
Standards. Applied Technology Council, Redwood City, CA.
Applied Technology Council. 1991. Seismic Vulnerability and Impact of Disruption of Lifelines in the
Conterminous United States (ATC-25). Report prepared by Applied Technology Council, Redwood
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as FEMA 224).
Branner, J.C. 1913. Earthquakes and structural engineering, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am., 3(1), 15. Full
article available online at: http://www.sfmuseum.org/1906/branner.html.
Cameron, C. and James, C. n.d. The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake and Fire, National Information Service
for Earthquake Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, http://nisee.berkeley.edu/kanto/
yokohama.html.
Carder, D.S., Ed. 1965. Earthquake Investigations in the Western United States, 19311964, U.S. Coast and
Geodetic Survey. Publication 412, U.S. Department of Commerce, Coast and Geodetic Survey;
U.S. Government Printing Ofce, Washington, D.C.
Dewey, J. and Byerly, P. 1969. The Early History of Seismometry (to 1900): Seismoscopes in Eighteenth
Century Europe, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am., 59(1), 183227, available online at http://neic.usgs.gov/
neis/seismology/part04.html.
Dutton, C.E. 1889. The Charleston Earthquake of August 31, 1886, U.S. Geological Survey Ninth Annual
Report, 18871888, U.S. Geological Survey, Washington, D.C., 203528.
EERI (Earthquake Engineering Research Institute). 1995. The Hyogo-Ken Nanbu Earthquake: Great Han-
shin Earthquake Disaster, January 17, 1995. Preliminary Reconnaissance Report. Comartin, C.D.,
Greene, M., and Tubbesing, S.K., Tech. Eds. Earthquake Engineering Research Institute Report
9504, sponsored by the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Oakland, CA, with support
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EERI (Earthquake Engineering Research Institute). 1997. George Housner, Connections, the EERI
Oral History Series, Stanley Scott, interviewer. Earthquake Engineering Research Institute,
Oakland, CA.

EERI (Earthquake Engineering Research Institute). 1999. Robert E. Wallace, Connections, The EERI
Oral History Series, Stanley Scott, interviewer. Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Oak-
land, CA (also available as U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 96260, Robert E. Wallace:
Earthquakes, Minerals and Me, online at http://quake.wr.usgs.gov/research/history/wallace-
VI.html).
EQE. 1995. The Northridge Earthquake of January 17, 1994: Report of Data Collection and Analysis, Part
A: Damage and Inventory Data. Prepared by EQE International, Inc. and the Geographic Informa-
tion Systems Group of the Governors Ofce of Emergency Services of the State of California,
Sacramento.
EQE. 1997. The Northridge Earthquake of January 17, 1994: Report of Data Collection and Analysis, Part
B: Analysis and Trends. Prepared by EQE International, Inc. and the Geographic Information
Systems Group of the Governors Ofce of Emergency Services of the State of California, Sacramento.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2000. HAZUS 99 Estimated Annualized Earthquake Losses for
the United States (FEMA 366), Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C.
Freeman, J.H. 1932. Earthquake Damage and Earthquake Insurance. McGraw-Hill, New York.
Fuller, M.L. 1912. The New Madrid Earthquake, Bulletin 494, U.S. Geological Survey, Washington, D.C.
Goldberg, R. 1989. Voltaire, Rousseau, and the Lisbon Earthquake, Eighteenth Century Life, 13(2), 120.
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NCEER-920001, February, National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, State University
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Home Ofce. 1926. The Great Earthquake of 1923 in Japan. Bureau of Social Affairs, Home Ofce, Tokyo.
Hopper, M.G. 1985. Estimation of Earthquake Effects Associated with Large Earthquakes in the New Madrid
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Jenkins, O.P. and Oakeshott, G.B. 1955. Earthquakes in Kern County, California during 1952. Bulletin
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Johnston, A.C. 1991. The Stable Continental Region Earthquake Data Base, in Methods for Measuring
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Kendrick, T.D. 1956. The Lisbon Earthquake. Methuen, London.
Koizumi, Y. 1965. Change of Density of Stand Layer Due to Niigate Earthquake, Tsuchi to Kiso, 13(2).
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at http://nisee.berkeley.edu/lisbon/.
Lawson, A.C. et al. 1908. The California Earthquake of April 18, 1906. Report of the State Earthquake
Investigation Commission (two volumes and atlas), Vol. I, Carnegie Institution, Washington, D.C.
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in Seismicity Catalogs. National Earthquake Information Center, Golden, CO.
NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration). 1973. San Fernando, California, Earthquake
of February 9, 1971, Vol. I, Parts A and B: Effect on Buildings; Vol. II: Utilities, Transportation, and
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NOAA/NGDC (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and National Geophysical Data Cen-
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Nuttli, O.W. 1973. The Mississippi Valley Earthquakes of 1811 and 1812: Intensities, Ground Motion
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Plants, Hatheway, A.W. and McClure, C.R., Eds., Geological Society of America, Rev. Eng. Geol.,
4, 6794.

Osteraas, J. and Krawinkler, H. 1989. The Mexico Earthquake of September 19, 1985: Behavior of Steel
Buildings, Earthquake Spectra, 5(1), 5188.
Peters, K.E. and Herrmann, R.B., Eds. n.d. First-Hand Observations of the Charleston Earthquake of August
31, 1886 and Other Earthquake Materials, South Carolina Geological Survey Bulletin 41.
Reid, H.F. et al. 1910. The California Earthquake of April 18, 1906. Report of the State Earthquake
Investigation Commission (two volumes and atlas), Vol. II: The Mechanics of the Earthquake,
Carnegie Institution, Washington, D.C. (reprinted 1969).
Reitherman, R.K. n.d. Frank Lloyd Wrights Imperial Hotel: A Seismic Re-Evaluation. National Infor-
mation Service for Earthquake Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, http://nisee.berke-
ley.edu/kanto/kanto.html.
Scawthorn, C. 1995. Insurance Estimation: Performance in the Northridge Earthquake, Contingencies,
the magazine of the American Institute of Actuaries, Washington, D.C.
Scawthorn, C., Ed. 2000. The Marmara, Turkey Earthquake of August 17, 1999. Reconnaissance Report.
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Research, State University of New York, Buffalo.
Scawthorn, C., Celebi, M., and Prince, J. 1986. Performance Characteristics of Structures, 1985 Mexico
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Recommended Lateral Force Requirements, Structural Engineers Association of California, San
Francisco.
Steinbrugge, K.V. and Moran, D.F. 1954. An Engineering Study of the Southern California Earthquake
of July 21, 1952 and its Aftershocks, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am., 44(2B).
Stover, C.W. and Coffman, J.L. 1993. Seismicity of the United States, 15681989 (revised). U.S. Geological
Survey Professional Paper 1527, U.S. Government Printing Ofce, Washington, D.C.
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Sequence, Earthquake Notes, 53(2).
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Aspectos Estructurales, Segundo informe del Instituto de lng. de la Universidad Nacional Auton.
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U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey. 1967. The Prince William Sound, Alaska, Earthquake of 1964 and After-
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USGS (U.S. Geological Survey). 1907. The San Francisco Earthquake and Fire of April 18, 1906 and Their
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Community Intensity Maps, Seismol. Res. Lett., available online at: http://pasadena.wr.usgs.gov/
shake/pubs/ciim/ciimweb.html.
Further Reading
There is a vast literature on historical earthquakes, due to observers feeling the importance of recording
the natural event and its human consequences, which goes back to Biblical times and expanded enor-
mously with the advent of modern science. Several repositories that can be searched for reports and data
on historical events can be accessed via:
National Information Service For Earthquake Engineering: (http://nisee.ce.berkeley.edu/)
National Earthquake Information Center (USGS): http://neic.usgs.gov/
MCEER: (http://mceer.buffalo.edu/)
EQNET: http://www.eqnet.org/

Listed here are a few references for selected important events or to provide an overview for major
regions of the globe:
Ambraseys, N.N. and Melville, C.P. 1982. History of Persian Earthquakes, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Ambraseys, N.N. and Melville, C.P. 1994. In Seismicity of Egypt, Arabia and the Red Sea: A Historical
Review, Adams, R.D., Ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Ambraseys, N.N. and Finkel, C.E. 1995. The Seismicity of Turkey and Adjacent Areas, A Historical Review,
15001800, EREN, Istanbul.
American Society of Civil Engineers. 1929. Report of Special Committee on Effects of Earthquakes on
Engineering Structures, American Society of Civil Engineers, New York (unpublished manuscript,
on the 1923 Tokyo earthquake).
Atlas of Isoseismal Maps, Central and Eastern Europe. 1978. Geophysical Institute of the Czechoslavak
Academy of Sciences, Prague.
Bapat, A. et al. 1983. Catalogue of Earthquakes in India and Neighborhood from Historical Period up to
1979. Indian Society of Earthquake Technology, Roorkee.
Benfer, N.A. and Coffman, J.L., Eds. 1973. The San Fernando, California, Earthquake of February 9, 1971,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington, D.C.
Bureau of Social Affairs. 1926. The Great Earthquake of 1923 in Japan, Home Ofce, Tokyo.
Cassaro, M. and Martinez Romero, E. 1987. The Mexico Earthquakes: 1985, Factors Involved and Lessons
Learned, American Society of Civil Engineers, New York.
Chen, Y. 1988. The Great Tangshan Earthquake of 1976: An Anatomy of Disaster, Pergamon Press, Oxford.
Chien, K. 1989. The Great China Earthquake, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing.
Chung, R., Ed. 1996. The January 17, 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu (Kobe) Earthquake, Performance of Structures,
Lifelines and Fire Protection Systems, NIST Special Publication 901, National Institute of Standards
and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD.
CNR. 1993. Historical Investigations of European Earthquakes 1, Materials of the CEC Project Review of
Historical Seismicity in Europe, Stucchi, M., Ed., Istituto di Ricerca sul Rischio Sismico, Milan, Italy.
CNR. 1994. Historical Investigations of European Earthquakes 2, Materials of the CEC Project Review of
Historical Seismicity in Europe, Albini P. and Moroni, A., Eds., Istituto di Ricerca sul Rischio Sismico,
Milan, Italy.
Coffman, J.L., von Hake, C.A., and Stover, C.W. 1980. Earthquake History of the United States, NOAA
Publ. 411, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.
Downes, G.L. 1995. Atlas of Isoseismal Maps of New Zealand Earthquakes, Institute of Geological and
Nuclear Sciences, Lower Hutt.
Dutton, C.E., Ed. 1889. The Charleston Earthquake of August 31, 1886, U.S. Geological Survey, Ninth
Annual Report 18871888, U.S. Geological Survey, Washington, D.C.
EQE Engineering. 1990. Earthquakes of the 1980s, EQE, San Francisco.
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Let us look at the facts.

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1902 19-Apr Guatemala 14N 91W 2,000 7.5

01-Feb Turkey 41.4N 32.7E 2,800 7.4 Deaths possibly 5,000

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1948 28-Jun Japan, Fukui 36.1N 136.2E 5,390 7.3 Conagration

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1998 04-Feb Afghanistan 37.1N 70.1E 2,323 6.1 Also Tajikistan

TABLE 1.2 Selected U.S. Earthquakesa

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1.1.1 Global Earthquake Impacts

856 12 22 Iran, Damghan 200,000

Source: National Earthquake Information Center, Golden, CO, http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eqlists/eqsmosde.html.

Earthquakes of 20th Century

100,000 - 255,000 (5)

50,000 - 100,000 (3)

20,000 - 50,000 (9)

10,000 - 20,000 (14)

1.2 Review of Historical Earthquakes

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FIGURE 1.2 Twentieth century global earthquake fatalities, by decade.

1.2.1 Pre-Twentieth Century Events

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DEC. 16, 1811

1.2.1.5 1886: Charleston, SC

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San Diego ATES

EXPLANATION 0 100 KILOMETERS

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Building destroyed Chimneys destroyed

Marked horizontal displacement

1.2.2 Early Twentieth Century Events

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FIGURE 1.11 At W.D. Skinners farm near Olema, a

FIGURE 1.12 Union Street, San Francisco, not more

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Principal distribution mains.

0 1000 2000 3000 FEET

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FIGURE 1.20 Tokyo (Ginza) ruins. (From Home

FIGURE 1.21 1923 Kanto earthquake conagration,

As Cameron and James note:

San Francisco UTAH

Fresno II-III Las Vegas

1.2.2.3 1925: Santa Barbara; 1933: Long Beach Earthquakes

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1.2.3 Mid-Century Events

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Monterey V-VI Fresno

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FIGURE 1.26 1960 Chile Mw 9.5 earthquake. The sh-

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1.2.4 First Turning Point

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