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Nationalism, Liberalism,
and Democracy
ALBERT W DZUR, WESTERNMICHIGANUNIVERSITY
Liberal nationalist thinkers such as Yael Tamir, David Miller, Neil Mac-
Cormick, Avishai Margalit, and Joseph Raz attempt to reconcile the ideals of lib-
eralism with the facts of national affiliation. Their contemporary theoretical
project is significant because it draws attention to the importance of national
identity in people's lives and takes seriously the possibility that national identity
is not atavistic impulse, elite-manipulated desire, or short-sighted preference,
but something that serves basic human needs. It is true that some, very few, lib-
eral thinkers have considered national affiliation as a facet of legitimate gover-
nance. But these, like J. S. Mill in the 19th century and Isaiah Berlin in the 20th,
gave nationality only a grudging respect as a somewhat unfortunate fact of life
(Mill 1972; Berlin 1980). Liberal nationalists do more than point to the reality
of national identity; they attempt to justify national affiliations in the same way
all other liberal ideals are justified. They believe that without some understanding
NOTE: Much of the researchfor this articlewas done while I was a CommonwealthFellow in the
Humanitiesat the Universityof Kentucky I am gratefulfor the conducive environmentfor
applied political theory providedby WolfgangNatter,The Committeeon SocialTheory,and
the Departmentof PoliticalScience at the Universityof Kentucky.
PoliticalResearchQuarterly,Vol. 55, No. 1 (March2002): pp. 191-211
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LIBERALNATIONALISM:
THE DEPENDENCEOF LIBERALDEMOCRACYON THE NATIONALIDEAL
These values are connected because equality pertains to individual citizens rather than lots or
groups or parties, and because individualitygrants each citizen an importanceequivalentto any
other citizen. Note that "individuality"
does not entail "individualism." The formeris a claim about
the moral status of the person, while the latteris a claim about psychologicalorientationor moti-
vation. For a discussion of individuality,equality and liberalism,see Johnston 1994: 17-27.
2 These categoriesare drawn from Calhoun (1997: 4-5) and Miller (1995: 23-24).
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which hold "theview that all people ought to be partialto their own nation and
conationals"and reject"particularistic" conceptions, which claim that only one's
own nation deserves such partiality(Hurka 1997: 145). Universalisticexpres-
sions of the nationalidea are "reiterative," meaningthat the good reasonsused to
justify one's own national affiliations must be applied to members of other
nations and their national ideas (Walzer1990). If formalor informalself-deter-
minationis good for one'sown nation, it must be presumedto be good for others'
nations (Tamir1993; Miller 1995; Margalitand Raz 1990).
Definitionsaside, liberalnationalistshave offeredthree clustersof arguments
thatattemptto show how universalisticexpressionsof nationalityarenot only com-
patiblewith liberalideals but requiredfor their successfulexpressionand imple-
mentation.The first cluster,which links nationalityto the value of individuality,
assertsthatnationalpoliticaland socialmovementscan and do servegenuineindi-
vidual interests,in self-determination, in a sense of self that can be identifiedwith
pastand futurecompatriots, and in a rangeof possiblelife-options.The secondclus-
ter, which links nationality equality,involves the claim that nationalaffiliation
to
providesthe motivationalstructurenecessaryfor the implementationof egalitarian
policies,such as measuresof redistributive justice. The thirdclustermaintainsthat
nationalaffiliationis necessaryfor the functioningof democraticinstitutionsand
practices,and in factperformssuch a role in practice-if not in theory.
Continuityand Context
Nationalityand IndividualWell-Being:
An analyticallyprimitivedefense of the connection between nationalityand
individualityis the self-determinationargumentthat nationalityfulfillsindividu-
als' interestsin perpetuatingtheir collectivity (Barry1983: 141). This is just to
restatethe traditionalliberalposition that claims of nation are not to be heeded
in liberalinstitutions unless they are made by individualsand are connected in
some way to individualinterests.For liberals"TheNation,""TheTradition,""Our
Community,"arenot entities that have valid claimsgoverninginstitutionsshould
accept, apart from claims issued by existent individuals who support them.
These entities are not without value, but for the institutionsof governmentto be
legitimatethe value they have must stem fromthe experiencesof individualswho
enjoy or depend upon them. Therefore, though tautologically true, the self-
determinationargumentbegs the question of how and why claims of nation are
connected to individualinterests.
The more primafacie plausibleway liberalnationalistsconnect nation to self
is through the idea that people can only flourish in social environmentsorgan-
ized-informally or formally-as nations. One side of the flourishingargument,
the continuitythesis,reflectson how the featuresof nationalitysuch as temporal
depth and territorialrootedness provide a sense of continuity and place that
people need to understand the significance of their lives. Neil MacCormick
(1982: 252) expressesthis sense well: "Consciousnessof belonging to a nation is
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Nationalism.
one of the things which enablesus as individualsin some way in this earthlyexis-
tence to transcendthe limitationsof space, time, and mortality,and to participate
in that which had meaningbefore us and will continue to have meaningbeyond
us."YaelTamir(1993:85) arguesthat as members of a nation we see our actions
as "endowedwith [an] additionaldimension"as part of a historicaland ongoing
narrative,part of a "continuous creative effort whereby culture is made and
remade." This "additional dimension" is important because it matches our
actions to those of conationalsin a way that helps us see the value of our contri-
butions, and also because it fulfills our need to contribute to something larger
and longer lasting than our own lives.
Nationalityalso contributesto individual flourishingby providinga context
in which people can develop and choose their own life-plans. This side of the
flourishingargumentcan be called the contextthesis.Individualitymeans living
one's own life, but to do this one needs a range of possibilities that can only be
provided through the practices, traditions, and institutions of a stable social
order.AvishaiMargalitand Joseph Raz (1990:449) maintainthat social and pri-
vate relationships,careers,even the arts and sciences all "dependfor their exis-
tence on the sharingof patternsof expectations,on traditionspreservingimplicit
knowledge of how to do what, or tacit conventions regardingwhat is part of this
or that enterpriseand what is not, what is appropriateand what is not, what is
valuable and what is not." Not just any social or culturalbackgroundprovides
the context of choice requiredby the liberal value of individuality,however. In
keeping with the universalisticcharacterof their position, liberal nationalists
endorse only those expressionsof nationalitythat do not exploit, denigrate,per-
secute individuals-either conationalsor members of other nations (ibid.).
Any completeresponseto these claimswould take up a numberof issues that
I am going to neglect. It can be argued,for example, that the form of nationalism
described by liberal nationalistsis more liberal than nationalistand bears little
resemblanceto historicalmovementsexpressingthe idea of nationality(Levinson
1995).3 Their ideal-typiccharacterizationmisses the "actualsalty bite"of nation-
alist movementsand thereforemischaracterizesthe benefitsof nationalaffiliation,
which often stem from illiberal acts of violence and assertions of superiority
(Nairn 1997: 4). Further,by developing ethical argumentsdefending an ideal-
typic nationalismliberalnationalistsrun the risk of legitimatingthose contempo-
rarynationalismsthat are less than ideal. Under this critiqueany legitimationof
nationalismis dangerousso long as few active liberal-nationalistmovements are
in evidence. Such critiquesshould be takenseriously,but I want to focus in on the
normativequestion of how valuablenationalties are to individualflourishing.
3 Brian Barrynotes that in practice nationalism tends to dominate when it joins with liberalism:
"Everywherein the world nationalismcomes first and the other ideology occupies a subordinate
position, partiallydefining the content of the nationalideal"(1987: 354).
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Nationalityand Equality:Information,
Motivation,andJustification
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such as the weak and unhealthy-who will benefit from the common good far
more than they will contributeto it (Cohen 1986). As Miller(1995: 72) argues,
"itis difficultto explainwhy statesshould provideopportunitiesand resourcesto
people with permanenthandicapsif one is simply followingthe logic of reciproc-
ity. It is because we have prior obligationsof nationalitythat include obligations
to providefor needs that arisein this way that the practiceof citizenshipproperly
includes redistributiveelements of the kind that we commonly find in contem-
porary states."Other liberal nationalistscharacterizethese prior obligations as
"dutiesof gratitudeto the nation-moral reasons,in acknowledgmentof the ben-
efits one has receivedthroughthe nation"that are owed directlyto the nation and
then indirectlyto fellow nationals(McMahan1997: 130).
Liberalnationalists believe that liberal egalitarianpolicy is legitimated by
associativeobligationsrooted in nationalexperienceratherthan voluntary,recip-
rocal relationshipsbetween individuals. To exemplify this point, they draw a
comparison and even make a connection between "specialduties"owed mem-
bers of familiesand the associativeobligationsof conationals(Hurka 1997). We
are concerned for the welfare of our family because of our shared history: no
other people have been throughas many of the same experiencesas our families.
Liberalnationalistsarguethat this is true, in a less powerfulbut still salient way,
of our relationwith conationalsas comparedwith members of other countries.
As Tamirargues, "The'others'whose welfarewe ought to consider are those we
care about, those who are relevant to our associativeidentity Communal soli-
daritycreatesa feeling, or an illusion, of closeness and sharedfate,which is a pre-
condition of distributivejustice. It endows particularisticrelations with moral
power, supporting the claim that 'charitybegins at home"'(1993: 121). Liberal
nationalistsimagine a series of concentriccircles delineatingspecial duties owed
to family members, associativeduties owed to fellow members of our collectiv-
ity, and generalhumanisticduties owed to all people (Tamir1993: 109).
Beforetakingup these claims about nationalityand equalityI want to notice
an ambiguityin the liberalnationalistposition that makes it a shifting targetof
analysis.Some liberalnationalistsbelieve that the nationalidea is action-oriented
and that the purpose of the nation, ultimately,is to form or build up a state.
Nationalism under this account is an ideology that motivates political action.
Other liberalnationalists,however,think that the nationalidea is less action-ori-
ented than expressiveof culturalidentity.In this latteraccount nationalismdoes
not requirea state, and in fact may even challengethe status of states. Now this
ambiguitymakes it difficultto addressclaims that connect liberalismto national-
ity.It is true thatreducingthe idea of nationalityto the culturalspherereduceslib-
eral anxietiesabout linking the coercivepowers of the state to particularisticand
quasi-mythicnationalsentiments.But at the same time strictlyculturalnational-
ism nullifies any linkagebetween nationalityand what we could call liberalstate
capacity-the politicalabilityto furtheregalitarianpolicy and supportdemocratic
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7For more on the necessity of a minimum level of trust for the basic functioningof adversarypro-
cedures, see the essays in Gambetta(1988) and Warren(1999).
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8
Contemporarydemocratictheoristslike JurgenHabermasagreewith liberalnationaliststhat public
culture is importantfor democraticpractices,but they reject the idea that public culture depends
upon a network of specificallynationalties and sentiments:"Thisconcept of popular sovereignty
does not refer to some substantivecollective will which would owe its identity to a prior homo-
geneity of descent or form of life. The consensus achieved in the course of argumentin an associ-
ation of free and equal citizens stems in the final instance froman identicallyappliedprocedurerec-
ognized by all"(Habermas1992: 4).
9 James Fishkin'sdeliberativepoll is one example of how such opportunitiesmight be made practi-
cal in complexpolities(1991, 1995). See Dahl 1997 formoreon how it could be implementedbroadly.
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Nationalism, andDemocracy
Liberalism,
CONCLUSION
Now liberal nationalists can respond that the ties of citizenship and the
motivations resulting from the practice of participatorydemocraticpolitics are
insufficientto supply the functionaldemands of liberal-democraticinstitutions.
Some have raised doubts about democraticpraxis, arguingthat without a degree
of national affiliationeven democraticallyactive citizens would be motivatedby
a strict form of reciprocitywhere "eachwould expect to benefit from their asso-
ciation in proportion to his or her contribution"(Miller 1995, 72). Under this
view, states supportedonly by the social ties formedby democraticaction would
be minimal, night-watchmanstates at best. Liberalnationalistsdoubt that dem-
ocraticpracticeand commitmentto politicalinstitutionsalone could provide the
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For differentversions of how local democraticaction might ratchetup to promote public culture
at the nationallevel see Barber1984 and Elkin 1987.
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Is there something missing from liberaltheories of the state that can be pro-
vided by closer attentionto the personal,social, and politicaluses of the national
idea? Afterrecognizingthat the benefits of national affiliationare more tenuous
and less closely connected to the values of equality and individualityor to the
functioning of democraticinstitutions than liberal nationalistssuggest, we have
found a differentanswer:democraticpractice.The argumentsof liberalnational-
ists arebetterseen as misplacedcalls for a more participatoryand deliberative,not
more nationalistic,liberaldemocracy.
REFERENCES
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albert.dzur@wmich.edu
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