Cold War History, 2013

Vol. 13, No. 1, 89108, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2012.727801

Local conflicts in a transnational war:

the Katangese gendarmes and the
Shaba wars of 1977 781
Miles Larmer
International History, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK

In analysing the Shaba wars of 197778, in which Angola-based Katangese rebels

invaded and destabilised Zaire, this article analyses the complex interaction between
local forces, national states and the wider Cold War in Africa. As well as a case study
of the National Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLNC) which carried out these
invasions, the article seeks to provide new understanding of the ways in which both
contemporaneous Cold War protagonists and subsequent historians have often
failed to understand the underlying motivations of local forces which fought in
conflicts that existed in problematic relationship to the wider Cold War.

Introduction
The specific interrelationship between local conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and the wider
framework of the Cold War is highly complex and fraught with potential for
misunderstanding. During the Cold War, it was often believed or assumed that African
forces which sided with either the Western or Eastern blocs did so either because they
shared the ideological outlook of those blocs, or because they sought by such an alliance to
acquire military or economic aid that would strengthen their hand against their enemies.
Arguably the two most important certainly the two hottest African battles of the Cold
War, the Angolan civil war in 197475 and the Ogaden in 197778, were initially seen in
this light. Westads seminal work radically revised these assumptions: the agency of Third

Miles Larmer is Senior Lecturer in International History at the University of Sheffield and Research
Fellow at the Department of Historical and Heritage Studies at the University of Pretoria.
Correspondence to: Email: m.larmer@sheffield.ac.uk
1
The author would like to express gratitude to Dr Erik Kennes, who has kindly made available some
archival and interview sources (marked by EK in relevant footnotes) which have been used in this article,
and to Nathaniel Kinsey-Powell, who generously provided archival material. Any errors of fact or
interpretation are of course the authors responsibility.

q 2013 Taylor & Francis

90 M. Larmer
World state and non-state actors was, he demonstrated, vital in shaping the actions and
outlook of both the United States and the Soviet Union, which were encouraged by
indigenous actors to interpret local conflicts (often primarily ethnic and/or nationalist in
nature) through a Cold War prism, and thereby cajoled, sometimes reluctantly, into
providing weaponry and economic aid to those who projected themselves as engaged in
vital action against their Cold War enemies.2
A particular example is that of President Mobutu Sese Seko, who ruled Zaire from 1965 to
1997. Mobutu, as this article will demonstrate, was particularly adept in presenting local
threats to his supremacy as quintessentially Cold War in nature, initiated by Moscow and
Havana and implemented by African puppets whose grievances against Zaires dictatorship
were thereby disregarded or made irrelevant.3 US officials were, however, aware that Mobutu
acted in this way and periodically pressured him to make economic and political reforms to
address the grievances of rebels who might otherwise turn to the Eastern bloc for support a
strategy that resembled US pressure for decolonisation in the 1950s.4 However, this approach
was commonly undermined by the enduring belief that opening up Zaires political system
would lead to ethnic conflict and the loss of state authority in peripheral areas,
creating opportunities for communist infiltration and (most importantly) control of Zaires
strategic minerals, located primarily in the southern Shaba province (formerly Katanga).
In the late 1970s, these tensions played out specifically around the two Shaba wars of 1977
and 1978, when Angolan-based Zairian/Katangese rebels launched two successive invasions
of Shaba, briefly seizing control of mining installations and western skilled personnel, thereby
destabilising the Zairian economy and polity.5 Gleijeses demonstrates that, during the second
Shaba war, both the United States and France, for reasons explained below, claimed that Cuba
and the Soviet Union had initiated these invasions, militating against understanding of the
motives of the National Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLNC), which carried out these
attacks.6 Gleijesess unparalleled access to Cuban archival and interview sources enabled him
to present a largely convincing critique of US and French motivations, but his approach is
undermined by a largely uncritical approach to Cubas own motives for its actions in Angola

2
Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Makings of our Times
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also the groundbreaking work on southern Africa in Sue
Onslow (ed.), Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).
3
This is a well established factor in studies of Congo/Zaire. See for example Crawford Young and
Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State (Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press,
1985), 363 373.
4
Wm. Roger Louis & Ronald Robinson, The Imperialism of Decolonization, Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, 22 (1994): 462 511.
5
Despite their importance, the Shaba wars remain a poorly understood event, something this article
aims to address. See Thomas Odom, Shaba II: The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire in 1978,
Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth KS, 1993);
Jean-Claude Willame, La seconde guerre du Shaba, Geneve-Afrique, 16 (1978): 8789; and Young &
Turner, Rise and Decline, 255 258.
6
Piero Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility: Castro, Carter, and the Invasions of Shaba, International History
Review, 18 (1996): 70 103. See also his Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959 1976
(Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
 Cold War History 91

and Africa more generally. Although Cuba was far better informed than the US about the
background and motives of the FLNC, it also saw central Africa through a Cold War prism,
and its focus on southern Africa meant that, far from extending the Cold War to Zaire, Cuba
(and, albeit reluctantly, its Angolan ally the Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) effectively repressed the best opportunity for ousting the Zairian dictatorship, an
opportunity that would not present itself again for two decades.7
This article will therefore argue that both contemporaneous actors and subsequent
analysts failed to understand the movement at the heart of the Shaba wars, the FLNC,
because it did not fit into the geo-political binaries of the African Cold War. More recent
studies of the non-state and quasi-state forces which served in Cold War conflicts have
been an important area of research.8 The opening up of archives and the use of oral
histories enables new insights into the actions and ideas of such forces. Uncovering the
historical trajectories, ideas and organisational structures of such movements, whilst far
from easy, makes an important contribution to the process of complicating and de-
centring Africas lived experience of the Cold War. This article therefore approaches this
important but under-researched chapter in the history of the Cold War in Africa from
the perspective of the FLNC itself. Utilising hitherto unused archival sources,
interviews, and documents from the FLNC leadership itself, this article explains the
motivations and strategy it used to challenge the Zairian regime. This article critically
analyses the FLNCs interaction with Cold War actors (primarily Angola and Cuba) and
the extent to which its own actions were informed by a complex interaction of ethno-
regional concerns, national liberation, and leftist ideology. In so doing, this article seeks
to shed light on wider questions of the ways in which the Cold War shaped the outcome
of inter- and intra-national conflicts, and was itself shaped by them.

The Katangese gendarmes, 1960 1975

It is first necessary to explain the origins of the FLNC, in a brief summary of the long and
complex history of its antecedents.9 Eleven days after Congo achieved independence from
Belgium on 30 June 1960, the mineral-rich southern province of Katanga declared itself
independent from Congo. Katanga had always led an autonomous existence from the
Belgian Congo, and with the rapid and largely unplanned advent of independence, efforts
were made by the Belgian military and multi-national mining concerns to ensure its
resources would remain in western hands. The Katangese government of Mose Tshombe

7
Mobutu was eventually removed from power in 1997 by an alliance of external powers including
Angola (but after Cuban military withdrawal) and Congolese/Zairian opposition forces including the
FLNC, after the withdrawal of US support.
8
See for example Martin Rupiya (ed.), Evolutions and Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries
in Southern Africa (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2005), available online at: http://www.iss.co.za/
pubs/Books/Evol_Revol Oct 2005/Contents.htm
9
A book-length history of the Katangese gendarmes, co-authored by Miles Larmer and Erik Kennes, will
be published in late 2013 or early 2014.
92 M. Larmer
was established in part to represent these interests, against the radical central government
of new Congolese prime minister Patrice Lumumba.
However, the international community mobilised against Katangese secession.
The United Nations dispatched its second ever Blue Helmets force; in response, Katanga
established its own army, led by Belgian and later mercenary officers. The rank-and-file
soldiers, however, were youths recruited from southern areas of Katanga, who became
known as the Katangese gendarmerie. Over the next few years, UN forces clashed with this
army as they advanced into Katanga. In 1963, as the national Congolese army
(commanded by Joseph Mobutu) took control of Katanga under UN auspices, Katangese
forces moved out of the country. Tshombe had arranged the transfer of some gendarmes
(with some mercenary leaders) to Portuguese-controlled Angola. However, this was only
a brief sojourn into Angola. In 1964, the threat posed by Lumumbist rebels in eastern
Congo led western states to fear that Congo might fall into the hands of communist-
aligned leaders. Tshombe returned from exile as Congolese prime minister and arranged
the return of the gendarmes and their mercenary commanders from Angola. They played
an important role in the defeat of the rebels, ultimately achieved with the entry of Belgian
paratroopers, supported by the US, into Stanleyville in November 1964.10 The following
year Tshombe was ousted from power by a US-backed coup led by Mobutu.
Most gendarmes formally joined the Congolese armed forces, but never accepted the
writ of the Kinshasa government. When in 1967, Mobutu centralised all political
authority, granting himself the power to rule by decree, the gendarmes mutinied.
Tshombe initially sought to return to regain power using the gendarmes, but he was
kidnapped and transported to Algeria, where he died in custody two years later.
Ultimately, most of the gendarmes regrouped in Angola. Having lost their political and
mercenary leadership, the gendarmes were used in the late 1960s as an auxiliary force in
Portugals war against Angolan nationalists then infiltrating the territory from Zambia
and Congo/Zaire.11 For the Katangese, this provided a continuation of their war against
the central Zairian state and against Mobutu, who was supporting the National Liberation
Front of Angola (FNLA) forces of Holden Roberto. A major turning point was reached
with the arrival in the Angolan camps of a former Congolese police sergeant, Nathanael
Mbumba. Mbumba revitalised the gendarmes and, in the early 1970s, won them a greater
role in the struggle against the FNLA. Mbumba also sought to transform the gendarmes
into a legitimate political force, rechristening them the National Front for the Liberation
of Congo, or FLNC.12 The FLNCs military forces became known as the Tigres.

10
See Benot Verhaegen, Rebellions au Congo (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et dInformation Socio-
Politiques, 1966). More recently, see Benoit Verhaegen, Jean Omasombo, Edwine Simons and Franc
oise
Verhaegen, Mulele et la revolution populaire au Kwilu (Republique Democratique du Congo) (Paris: LHarmattan,
2006); and Erik Kennes, Essai biographique sur Laurent Desire Kabila (Paris: LHarmattan, 2003).
11
The best single study of the Angolan liberation wars remains John A. Marcum, The Angolan
Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962 1976) (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1978).
12
Materials for this period are available in the Portuguese national archives, for example: IANTT PIDE/
DGS SC CI(2) UI 7494 Processo No. 7477, Pasta 1: Commando das Operacoes Especiais (COE), Frente de
Libertac
ao Nac
ional Congaleza.
 Cold War History 93

The Portuguese revolution of 1974 transformed the position of the Katangese

gendarmes. It was initially proposed that they, along with other pro-Portuguese
African forces, would be transferred to South African bases in the Caprivi Strip.13
However, under the guidance of the leftist Portuguese governor, Admiral Rosa
Coutinho, the gendarmes in fact transferred their affiliation to the Marxist MPLA,
which had lost much of its own fighting force after a split in its ranks.14 Whilst their
affiliation with the MPLA involved, in Cold War terms, an ideological volte-face, it
enabled a continuation of the Katangese struggle against Mobutu and the central
Zairian state, important participants in the Angolan war of 1974 76. Their
arrangement with the MPLA was based on an explicit quid pro quo spelled out in the
Cossa Accords of 17 December 1974 that, after the MPLA came to power, the FLNC
would use Angolan territory as a base for attacks on Zaire, with the aim of liberating
Katanga from rule by Mobutu and Kinshasa.15
From July 1975, the well-trained and experienced Katangese forces played an important
and as yet under-documented role in the Angola conflict. Four FLNC battalions
participated in the attack on Luena with Cuban forces against Uniao Nacional para a
Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) in late October.16 UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi
stated that: The MPLA is no problem to us . . . They run away . . . [but the Katangese] . . .
are very strong and they dont run away.17 The gendarmes provided vital ground troops in
operations led by Cuban forces, particularly in the wars strategically decisive battle of
Quifangondo in November 1975, in which Zairian forces fought on both sides.18 Following
the MPLAs victory, the FLNC was mobilised in battles against South African-backed
UNITA forces, particularly in the diamond mining areas of north east Angola. Increasingly
however, their attention turned back to their unfinished war for Katanga.

The FLNC in Angola, 1975 76

The MPLAs victory radically changed the political outlook across central Africa.
The establishment of this overtly Marxist state placed southern Africas racist settler
regimes on the defensive and destroyed the assumptions on which US regional policy
had been built. No less seriously, it led to sustained tension and periodic indirect
conflict with Zaire, which had suffered a military humiliation in the Angolan civil war

13
Interview, Deogratias Symba, Lubumbashi, 1 June 2008.
14
Interview, Antonio Coutinho, Lisbon, 15 July 2008.
15
The essential terms of the Cossa Accords are not disputed, but no physical copy exists. The date of
17 December 1974 is provided in a semi-official history of the FLNC: Cartel DUnion Nationale Congolais
FLNC-MNC/L (Nathanael Mbumba), Naissance du FLNC, (Guinea-Bissau), 31 May 1981, 6.
16
Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 269; Fernando Andresen Guimaraes, Origins of the Angolan Civil War:
Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001), 111.
17
John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (London: Deutsch, 1978), 157.
18
Young and Turner state that . . . Katanga gendarmerie units, which had been brought into alliance
with the MPLA in January 1975 . . . helped blunt the Zairian offensive: Rise and Decline, 254. More
specifically, Gleijeses reports that Quifangondo was successfully defended on 10 November 1975 by . . . 850
FAPLA, 200 Katangans, 88 Cubans, and Yuri, the Soviet adviser, Conflicting Missions, 311.
94 M. Larmer
and which faced economic crisis and reduced western support. This weakness
represented an unprecedented opportunity to Mobutus many enemies inside and
outside Zaire, not least the FLNC. Rearmed by the MPLAs Cuban and Soviet allies and
strengthened by the Cossa Accords, they seized this opportunity, first to strengthen
their numbers and then to invade Katanga (renamed Shaba in 1971).
Within Angola, heavy fighting continued into 1976, with 36,000 Cuban troops
leading the rout of remaining FNLA and mercenary forces in the north and pursuing
South African forces southwards until their departure in March. The Cubans sought
a rapid end to their expensive commitment, but also to secure MPLA control of
Angolan territory.19 The deployment of inexperienced MPLA troops (now known as
the Forc
as Armadas Populares de Libertac
ao de Angola (FAPLA)), whilst most Cuban
troops remained in garrison towns, was unsuccessful; UNITA offered a surprisingly
substantial military threat. In this context, the well trained and experienced Tigres
remained a significant military asset. Limited evidence exists of direct Cuban and
Soviet supervision and training of Katangese forces, and the latter certainly benefited
from new Soviet equipment, supplied to the Tigres by the MPLA.20
However, Cubas priority, Angolan stabilisation, led it to discourage support for the
Tigres. Gleijeses demonstrates Cuban scepticism and even hostility towards the
FLNC.21 Jorge Risquet, head of the Cuban mission in Angola, met FLNC leader
Nathanael Mbumba in February 1976; Mbumba requested (according to Risquet)
heavy weapons, political instructors, and money which would enable the FLNC to
first recruit new troops in Zaire and then mount a major attack, seizing a city and
toppling the Mobutu regime.22 Risquet was unconvinced by Mbumbas claims that
. . . his ideology is Marxist and that he intends to lead his country towards
socialism . . . : he reported to Castro and Neto that the FLNC had . . . tainted pasts:
they were Katangan gendarmes, secessionists, and supporters of Mose Tshombe . . . .23
Cuba refused to provide the military aid (including tanks and anti-aircraft artillery)
Mbumba had requested.24 A relatively conservative Cuba thus prioritised protecting
its gains in Angola, and was unconvinced that the FLNC would advance their interests
in Zaire.
Mbumba had utilised the diamond mining activities near the FLNCs Chicapa
headquarters to establish some economic self-sufficiency for the movement.
He succeeded in improving the military effectiveness of the 1500 FLNC forces that
had survived the Angolan war for independence. However, Mbumbas authoritarian-
ism and suspicion was coupled with a lack of realism in his military evaluation. He did

19
Edward George, Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965 1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 116 117.
20
For Cuban and Soviet links: interview with Robert Yav, Lubumbashi, 28 February 2006 (EK); Shaba
I documents, Belgian Army Archives, Evere, Centre de Documentation Historique (hereafter BAA CDH).
21
Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility.
22
Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility, 73.
23
Memo, Risquet to Neto, n.d. but received February 1978, cited in Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility, 7374.
24
Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility, 9495.
 Cold War History 95

not hesitate to execute officers who were unable to meet the (probably) unrealistic
tasks he set them. Mbumba thus developed the political leadership of the FLNC, whilst
simultaneously ensuring he did not lose control of it.
The FLNCs role in bringing the MPLA to power raised the movements profile; it
had demonstrated its effectiveness as a fighting force, whilst the Angolan war had
exposed the weakness of the Zairian army and Mobutus willingness to collaborate
with apartheid South Africa. The former gendarmes of the Katangese secession,
hitherto considered beyond the Tshombist pale, were now under MPLA auspices
partly rehabilitated in leftist/nationalist eyes. Their dubious ideological record was less
important to Zairian and many Angolan, if not to Cuban eyes than their military
capacity.25 From 1975, various radical opponents of Mobutu came to Luanda, seeking
an alliance with the FLNC. The MPLA, whilst broadly supportive of the FLNCs aims,
consistently sought to ally it with left-leaning Congolese leaders, most notably the
Brussels-based Antoine Gizenga (the former head of the Lumumbist government in
Stanleyville in 1960 61) and Laurent Kabila, whose Peoples Revolutionary Party
(PRP) continued to offer limited guerrilla resistance in eastern Zaire.26 An initial
agreement with the PRP in October 1975 allowed Mbumbas FLNC to publicly
renounce the poisonous political heritage of the Katangese secession.27 In late 1976 a
plan (not enacted) was developed for a pincer attack on Zaire, with the Tigres attacking
Congo territory from Angola, simultaneous with a PRP attack from Kalemie towards
Mbuji-Mayi.28 Kabila may have visited Luanda in March 1977, just before the first
Shaba war.29 These contacts did not, however, lead to practical cooperation: each
initiative foundered on Mbumbas suspicions and refusal to share leadership. It is
however equally true that Mbumba controlled the only military force capable of taking
the military fight to Zaire itself.

Shaba I: the war of eighty days

On the night of 8 9 March 1977, the FLNC launched an invasion of the renamed
Shaba province. Under the command of Gregoire Mulombo, a force of around 1500
Tigres entered Zaire on foot or on bicycles. They advanced northwards and eastwards,
seizing the main towns including Kapanga, Dilolo and Mutshatsha by 10 March.
Their route of advance indicates that their aim was to take Kolwezi, the centre of
Shabas mining activities, where 75% of Zairian copper and 80 90% of cobalt were
produced. The slow progress of the Katangese troops, advancing ca. 250 kms in 15
days, confirms that Shaba I was primarily a war of recruitment, to enable a

25
Interview, Emile Ilunga, Kinshasa, 18 September 2009.
26
Jean-Pierre Sonck, Letrange destin de la Gendarmerie Katangaise Part 2, Fire, 16, Sept Oct 1994,
22 27.
27
Letter, Mbumba to Jean-Delphin Muland, 13 July 1977 (Mayele archives).
28
Interview (EK) with Jean-Baptiste Kibwe, Brussels, 23 August 2001.
29
Deogratias Symba states that Kabila arrived in Luanda on the day that Shaba I commenced: interview
(EK), 8 March 2008.
96 M. Larmer
subsequent operation of greater scale.30 It is also likely that the Tigres had orders to
attack FNLA/UNITA bases in this region, something of benefit to the Angolan
government and its Cuban allies.
The slow pace of progress towards Kolwezi is explained by the difficulties in providing
logistical support inside Zaire and not by significant resistance by the Zairian army (FAZ),
which retreated after the first gunfight. The US Embassy in Kinshasa warned that the
FAZs unwillingness to fight mean that . . . the loyalty of the military and the tolerance of
the people for Mobutus government could be drawn into serious question.31 For his part,
Mobutu framed urgent appeals for western military aid in claims that Cuba and Angola
had initiated and were participating in the invasion.32 On 2 April, Mobutu informed the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) of . . . the aggression to which my country is
subjected by a horde of mercenaries in the pay of the Cuban-Russian coalition.33 Zairian
Chief of Staff Bumba Moaso claimed that Russians and Cubans had been fighting with the
Tigres, but provided no evidence for this.34 In fact, it is likely that Shaba I was a surprise for
the Cubans: Risquet, out of Angola at the time, subsequently criticised the attack for
providing an opportunity for retaliatory western-backed action against Angola.35
The reaction of western countries was, however, decidedly lukewarm: the Carter
administration was predisposed against African intervention after the Angolan debacle,
whilst Belgium feared that active participation might lead to Belgian nationals being
taken hostage by FLNC forces in Shaba. President Carter stated publicly on 24 March
that We have no hard evidence, or any evidence as far as that goes, that the Cuban and
Angolan troops have crossed the border into Zaire . . . .36 Western diplomatic hesitation
certainly reflected poor intelligence, but also the lack of clarity, or at least poor
communication, of the FLNCs own objectives. In press interviews, Mbumba declared
his desire to drive out the Mobutu regime; otherwise, communication was carried out
by FLNC representatives in Brussels and Paris, whose own ideological divisions acted
against a coherent presentation of the organisations aims.37

30
A supposedly official FLNC document giving details of the operational plan (FLNC, Directives pour
loperation de lOuest du Katanga suivant la ligne Kaniama-Kolwezi, 4 April 1977), is reproduced in Zaires
official account of Shaba I: Departement de la Defense Nationale, Etat-Major General des Forces Armees
Zaroises (DDNEMG) Mobutu et la guerre de quatre-vingts jours (Tournai, 1978), 343.
31
US Embassy Kinshasa to US Secretary of State, 16 March 1977, quoted in Gleijeses, Truth or
Credibility, 76.
32
The wildest rumours during this period suggested the presence of ca. 200 nuclear warheads in
Angolan hands! Manuscript note for Chiefs of Staff of Defence and Foreign Affairs, 17 March 1977, BAA
CDH, Shaba I documents.
33
Mobutu to President of OAU Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, 2 April 1977, reprinted in French Embassy
Kinshasa to DAM, 7 April 1977, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Direction des Affaires Africanies et
Malgaches, La Courneuve archives (hereafter MAE DAM) Box 25 2, Reunions internationales.
34
Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility, 77. Young and Turner suggest that Bumbas failure to support his
accusations with evidence led in part to his removal: Rise and Decline, 265.
35
Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility, 95.
36
Department of State, Bulletin, 18 April 1977, 361, quoted in Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility, 76.
37
The FLNC Speaks, Africa (May 1977), 25; IPS, Congolese FLNC Leader Explains Goals, 8 April 1977.
 Cold War History 97

Diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis were led by Nigeria, western-aligned but with
considerable standing as an independent African power. The OAU and other powerful
African states (whose defence of territorial integrity trumped their enmity towards
Mobutu) lobbied Angola to ensure a FLNC withdrawal, whilst preventing hot pursuit
by FAZ forces into Angola that might escalate the conflict.38 Zairian foreign minister
Nguza Karl I Bond, himself of Katangese origin, emphasised both the leftist nature of
the FLNC and the strategic threat it presented:
The invaders . . . addressed each other as Comrade, in Spanish or Portuguese . . . .
The invaders aim was clearly not secession but the overthrow of Mobutu. . . . if
Zaire, given its vital position in Africa, were to fall into the hands of Moscow-
sympathisers, the rest of Africa would certainly, in time, follow suit.39
Belgian and French observers also interpreted the FLNC in Cold War terms:
. . . they also use infiltration methods of the Vietcong type, with the invaders
arriving in their village in plainclothes, where they are greeted as . . . the liberators of
Katanga . . . . their behaviour contrasts with the brutality and corruption of the
forces of order in Zaire. Such a technique bears the hallmarks of those who have
been trained and armed as part of a long-term strategy that exploits tribalism for
Marxist-Leninist aims.40
Zairian leftist leader Antoine Gizenga, despite having played no role in the invasion,
nevertheless encouraged erroneous claims that he was linked to the FLNCs action.41
He suggested that Zairian opposition forces, with Eastern bloc endorsement,
supported the actions of the Katangese gendarmes.42
Angola however claimed the conflict was wholly Zairian in nature and denied any
responsibility for the FLNCs actions. In mid-April 1977 Neto, asked by the British
foreign secretary David Owen whether Angola was supporting the Katangese, replied
that . . . the Katangese had decided to go to Zaire of their own free will. Angola only
gave them food.43 Britain, keen to work with Angola to resolve conflicts in southern
Africa, was willing to give Neto the benefit of the doubt. Rejecting the French belief
that . . . Soviet influence is the direct cause of most of the current tensions in
Africa . . . , one British official suggested: There has clearly been some degree of
Angolan support and the Cubans trained the ex-Katangese, but the Shaba operation is

38
Resume of a Meeting between Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba and Secretary Vance on March 21
[1977], in MAE DAM, Box 251, Aide et mediation etrangere, mars-juin 1977, Nigeria.
39
Zaire, London COREU to all COREU, 17 April 1977, in MAE DAM, Box 25 2, Reunions
internationales, 2.
40
Belgian analysis of the Zairian situation , response, French Embassy Lusaka to DAM, 24 March 1977,
in MAE DAM Box 25 4, Reactions des pays etrangers, sauf l Afrique, 1 2.
41
Very Secret Message, No. 314/206, 2 May 1977, BAA CDH, Shaba I. Gizenga was expelled from France
in April 1977, undoubtedly because of Shaba I.
42
La France et La Zaire, French Embassy Brussels to DAM, 25 March 1977, in MAE DAM, Box 25 4,
Reactions des pays etrangers, sauf l Afrique, 2.
43
UK National Archives (hereafter NAUK) FCO/31/2116, Shaba Invasion, 1977, Meeting at Luanda
airport, 17 April 1977, item 261.
98 M. Larmer
a good example of the kind of local problems that litter Africa and which can erupt
without external prompting.44
On 7 April, with the FLNC apparently close to seizing Kolwezi, Morocco sent 1200
soldiers to aid the Zairian cause. This was enabled by an airlift provided by France,
whose President Giscard DEstaing was increasingly worried about what he saw as a
rising communist threat in Africa.45 Moroccos King Hassan, drawing public attention
to the FLNCs secessionist origins, justified the intervention by the OAUs policy of
territorial integrity of African states.46 Arriving in Kinshasa on 8 April, Moroccan
forces left almost immediately for Kolwezi and Kamina and made rapid advances.
Two captured Katangese troops, questioned on Zairian television, stated that large
numbers of Cuban forces were fighting with the FLNC and that Gizenga was running
operations from Angola.47 Celebrating his victory in the liberated town of
Mutshatsha, Mobutu declared: We will do our best to prevent Soviet influence in
Africa. If Europe trembles every time Brezhnev coughs, it is not for me.48 After the re-
taking of Dilolo by the FAZ and their Moroccan allies on 21 May, the Tigres mounted
an organised retreat into Angola.49
As this brief account of the war of eighty days shows, international analysts and
diplomats (encouraged by both sides in the conflict) interpreted these events primarily
through Cold War perspectives, obscuring the underlying motivations and methods of
the FLNC itself. The unpredicted invasion shows not only the deficiencies of Zairian
and western intelligence, but also the lack of importance accorded by the external
actors to the underlying issues of the rebel struggle. External intelligence tended
to interpret events in solely geopolitical or ethnic terms, ignoring or failing to
comprehend the ethno-regional and nationalist motives crucial to the FLNCs actions.

The FLNC between the wars

Although a military failure, Shaba I provided new recruits for the Tigres; those recruited
during the operation itself were reinforced by further arrivals after reprisal operations
were carried out by the FAZ against civilians suspected of prior collaboration with the
FLNC.50 These were brought to the Chicapa base, where they received intensive military
training. The FLNCs overall strength increased thereby from three battalions of 500

44
NAUK FCO/31/2117, Shaba Invasion, 1977, P.R.A. Mansfield (FCO) to C.M. James, Paris Embassy,
French Views on Africa, 10 May 1977, item 284.
45
NAUK FCO/31/2115, Shaba Invasion, 1977, French Assistance to Zaire, C.M. James, British
Embassy Paris to P.R.A. Mansfield, FCO, 24 April 1977, item 234a.
46
NAUK FCO/31/2115, Shaba Invasion, 1977, Rabat Embassy to FCO, 20 April 1977, item 211;
Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs communique, Rabat, 27 April 1977.
47
Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility, 78; NAUK FCO/31/2115, Shaba Invasion, 1977, Kinshasa Embassy to
FCO, 25 April 1977: a British official commented: This interview smells strongly of a put-up job.
48
Salongo (Kinshasa) 26 April 1977, quoted in Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility, 78.
49
Zare: Situation militaire au Shaba, 24 May 1977, No. 373/77, BAA CDH, Shaba I.
50
Young & Turner, Rise and Decline, 257.
 Cold War History 99

(1500 in total) to 14 battalions of 660 soldiers each, totalling 9240 soldiers.51 Five new
camps were established to house the new trainees, in which Mbumba established
a characteristically efficient and authoritarian system. Discipline was draconian, and
according to some sources, the death penalty awaited those who challenged Mbumbas
authority.52 Although the FLNC had showed it could fight a peoples war, it made no
pretence of being organised along Maoist ideological lines. It is, however, arguable that
its conventional military hierarchy made the Tigres a more effective fighting force than
more ostensibly ideological African liberation forces.
The FLNC was now the subject of greater international attention, although the
quality of analysis varied considerably. French reports subsequently alleged that the
FLNC was re-equipped during this period by Cuba, Algeria and Libya.53 It was
suggested that recruits had been trained under Cuban leadership in the use of anti-
aircraft and other heavy weaponry. French intelligence gathered in Kinshasa claimed
that . . . ideological training would also be pursued [and] the influence of Gizenga
would supplant that of Nathaniel Mbumba.54 Certainly, many Tigres recall military
training under Cuban supervision, whilst Soviet advisors provided training for the
Tigres military intelligence operations.55 However, training should not be conflated
with direction. International observers tended to assume that left-wing actors (both
Zairian and Cuban) would automatically acquire political influence over the FLNC,
assuming a lack of agency within the Front itself. In fact, whilst Mbumba certainly
adopted left-wing rhetoric to position himself more closely to Angolan and Cuban
advisors, he never relinquished control over the FLNC. Indeed the FLNCs Achilles
heel was arguably its resultant lack and incoherence of political direction.
The relative success of Shaba I only increased the pressure from President Neto to
bring the Tigres under what he regarded as a legitimate form of political control.
Accordingly, further contacts took place between Mbumba and Kabila. Kabila
returned to Luanda in July 1977 to formalise collaboration between the PRP and the
FLNC.56 This concluded with the creation of a Supreme Council of Liberation (CSL)
in an agreement signed on 26 August 1977. However, the PRPs lack of military
capacity, following a Zairian army offensive in June July, reduced the attractiveness of
this collaboration: the proven effectiveness of the Tigres made it possible for Mbumba

51
The figure of 9240 is given in FLNC, Mini-historique des ex-gendarmes katangais du Congo-Kinshasa,
Luanda, 1998, p. 14. This figure is supported by Belgian intelligence reports: BAA CDH, Shaba I, bulletins
dated 9 September and 19 September 1977.
52
National Sovereign Conference, Commission into Killings and Violation of Human Rights, Part II
(Kinshasa, 1992), 89.
53
Situation au Shaba: Les evenements de 1977 et la situation au debut de 1978, French Embassy
Kinshasa to DAM, 1 June 1978, in MAE DAM Box 24, Zaire, 1975 78, Situation militaire, octobre 1977
novembre 1978.
54
Gendarmes Katangais, French Embassy in Kinshasa to DAM, 14 November 1977, in MAE DAM, Box
27 2, Zaire 1975 78, Evolution de la situation militaire, fevrier - avril 1977.
55
Interview (EK) with Robert Yav, Lubumbashi, 28 February 2006.
56
FLNC, Decision No, 1, 01/CAB/PDT /75), 19 September 1975 (Mushitu archives).
100 M. Larmer
to resist an imposed strategy or leadership. The CSL treaty did not therefore lead to
practical cooperation; on 10 April 1978, the FLNC Central Committee annulled the
accord creating the CSL.57 The following month, the FLNC launched the second Shaba
war without Kabilas participation (see below).

Zaire between the wars

In the wake of Shaba I, the western powers pressured Mobutu to make meaningful
political and economic reforms. During Shaba I, Zaire had received a signal of external
support, in the form of an IMF loan of US$85m.58 The price to be paid was the
implementation of political reforms, formally announced on 1 July 1977.59 Mobutu
assured Carter that the . . . underlying meaning . . . [of the reforms was] the
liberalisation of our national system through profound political decentralisation;
economic decentralisation; and full implementation of the norms governing human
rights.60 Mobutu announced that two-thirds of the ruling Political Bureau would
henceforth be directly elected, and that direct elections would also take place for the
national parliament and local councils.61 Highly competitive elections were
accordingly held in October; despite the fact that all candidates belonged to the
single party Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR), more than 2000 candidates
stood for 270 parliamentary seats and 167 contested the 18 elected Political Bureau
seats.62 In December 1977 however, Mobutu was elected unopposed to a third seven-
year term as president. When the dust had settled on these reforms, even the
sympathetic French Foreign Ministry concluded: It is difficult to see anything other
than a parody in the elections of last October and December . . . Political reforms . . .
have been implemented in form only and have created a facade of democracy.63
These political reforms were matched, in November 1977, by Mobutus speech
condemning the mal zairois and advancing plans to resurrect the national economy.
This apparent economic liberalisation to outside control was positively received in
international markets and an additional loan of US$220m was provided by a
consortium of western banks.64 However, the disastrous economic situation showed
no signs of immediate improvement: inflation stood at 250% pa in November 1977
and that years budget deficit was US$340m.65

57
Naissance du FLNC, 10.
58
Le Soir (Brussels), 27 April 1977; New York Times, 28 April 1977; see also Gleijeses, Truth or
Credibility, 79.
59
Le Soir, 14 June 1977.
60
Mobutu to Carter, 23 July 1977, in White House Central File, CO 177, Executive, 20 Jan 197720 Jan
1981, Jimmy Carter Library (hereafter JCL), Atlanta GA.
61
Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 205.
62
Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 206.
63
Zaire, 29 March 1978, MAE DAM Box 16, Zaire, 1975 78, 2.
64
Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility, 81.
65
Zaire, 29 March 1978, in MAE DAM Box 16, Zaire, 1975 78, 2.
 Cold War History 101

These reforms however coincided with increased repression of the local and regional
proponents of more radical reform, particularly in southern Katanga. As noted, the
retreat of the Tigres in May 1977 was followed by a new reign of terror in Lunda areas,
where the victorious FAZ carried out revenge attacks against Lunda civilians assumed
to support the FLNC, driving 200,000 additional refugees into Angola.66 The foreign
minister Nguza Karl I Bond was dismissed in August 1977 from his position, allegedly
because he knew in advance about the Shaba I attack.67 After an obviously rigged
judicial process, Nguza was condemned to death in September (his sentence was
subsequently commuted to life in prison).68 Nguzas conviction highlighted the
broader exclusion of southern Katangas political elite; the new Political Bureau had no
southern Katangese members.
Finally, in February 1978, around 250 soldiers and civilians were arrested, accused of
involvement in actions designed to destabilise the state. The following month, 19 were
condemned to death, of whom 18 were executed. As Belgian military intelligence later
noted, these actions paralysed the military leadership, creating a climate of fear and
suspicion, coupled with the loss of experienced officers who were not immediately
replaced.69 These destabilising events occurred less than two months before the FLNC
mounted its second attack on Zaire.

Shaba II, May 1978

The second Shaba war, shorter but more significant than Shaba I, raised the stakes of
the conflict: the FLNC, taking a more direct route via Zambian territory, seized Zaires
globally important mineral assets. This led in turn to a far more rapid and significant
international intervention. On 2122 March 1978, Katangese forces began infiltrating
Zaire and advanced towards Mutshatsha, where they clashed with both FAZ and
UNITA forces in heavy fighting.70 Mbumba was apparently directed by Angolan
authorities to limit the FLNCs operation to areas of Shaba province away from the
Zairian-Angolan frontier. This appears to have influenced the decision to send the
majority of its forces into Zaire via north west Zambia, an unexpected route of attack
which caught FAZ forces, concentrated on the Angolan border, by surprise.71 Kolwezi
was defended by the 14th Brigade of the Kamanyola Division, considered the FAZs

66
Refugies du Shaba en Angola, French Embassy Lusaka to French Embassy Kinshasa, 22 July 1977,
in MAE CAD, Box 45, Ambassade Kinshasa-Shaba correspondence, 1973 78, I-134.
67
Nguza Karl-i-Bond, Mobutu ou lIncarnation du Mal Zarois (Rex Collings, London, 1982), 47.
68
Nguza was released in July 1978 and re-appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 1979, before
going into exile in April 1981.
69
Climat de desorganisation accentuee au departement de la defense nationale et a lEtat-major
general, Note No. 325/78, 4 April 1978: BAA CDH, Shaba II.
70
Echec dune infiltration Katangaise, French Embassy in Kinshasa to DAM, 30 March 1978, in MAE
DAM Box 24, Zaire, 1975 78, Situation militaire, octobre 1977 novembre 1978.
71
The effectiveness of the Zambia path of entry was widely noted by contemporaneous diplomatic
sources, for example NAUK FCO/99/162 Cuba/Zaire Shaba Invasion, 1978, Paris embassy to FCO,
17 May 1978, item 3.
102 M. Larmer
weakest unit.72 2000 2500 FLNC forces, their uniforms initially hidden beneath
civilian clothes, entered Zaire on 11 May; their surprise attack on 13 May captured
Kolwezi in a few hours, destroying 12 Zairian air force planes in the process. Also in
FLNC hands were approximately 2500 European employees of various mining
operators in Kolwezi. The majority were Belgian (1750) and French (400) nationals,
and for this reason their governments took the lead in the international response.
The following day, Mobutu appealed for military assistance from the US, France,
Belgium, Morocco, and China.73 Zaire again sought to portray the invasion as controlled
and initiated by Cuba and the Soviet Union. In a briefing of western ambassadors, Zaires
acting foreign minister Umba Di Lutete claimed that white faces had been seen amongst
the Katangese troops, implying the physical presence of Cubans.74 Zaires representative
to the UN protested the invasion of pretend refugees, . . . armed and supported by the
Luanda government, under the instigation of Soviet-Cuban imperialism.75 The CIA,
whilst sceptical of the Cuban presence inside Zaire, argued that . . . Cubans have been
involved in training and advising the ex-Katangan exiles . . . the Cuban government
clearly had foreknowledge of the attack . . . [and] . . . Cuban advisers doubtless assisted
the rebels in their preparations for the incursion.76 This report continued:.
. . . the FNLC probably has some freedom of action regarding tactics and local
objectives, and, to a degree, the timing of specific operations . . . . The rebels . . .
would be capable of training their own recruits and launching a one-shot operation
independently if they were willing to take the risk that such wholly independent
operations might put them at cross-purposes with the Cubans, Soviets, and
Angolans . . . . The FNLC can also draw on a large number of sympathisers and
guerrillas in place throughout the Shaba region to support its operations.77
In fact, Cuba had sought to avoid or at least delay a second Katangese attack.78 When
Risquet learned in February 1978 from Mbumba about preparations for a second attack,
he immediately expressed Cubas opposition to Neto.79 Cuba sought to avoid any pretext
for attacks on Angola and, publicly and diplomatically, denied any role in Shaba II.80

72
Odom, Shaba II, 1992, pp. 31 32; Zare Angola Katangese, note No. 315/78, 23 February 1978,
BAA CDH, Shaba documents.
73
NAUK FCO/31/2287, Zaire Shaba Invasion, 1978, A.G. Munro, Shaba: Present Situation, 15 May
1978, item 22.
74
Zaire: New Katangan Attacks, in National Intelligence Daily Cable, 15 May 1978, CIA FOIA ERR,
ESDN: CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010006-4.
75
United Nations Press Communication, Weekly review no.20 19 25 May 1978, in MAE DAM Box
21 3, Zaire 1975 78, 15.
76
Zaire: Military Situation Report, in National Intelligence Daily Cable, 17 May 1978, CIA FOIA ERR,
ESDN: CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010010-9.
77
Zaire: Military Situation Report, in National Intelligence Daily Cable, 17 May 1978, CIA FOIA ERR,
ESDN: CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010010-9.
78
George, Cuban Intervention in Angola, 133.
79
Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility, 97.
80
NAUK FCO/99/162 Cuba/Zaire Shaba Invasion, 1978, UK Embassy Washington to FCO, 18 May
1978, item 20.
 Cold War History 103

Angola also consistently denied supporting the FLNC: a press statement issued on 15
May, emphasising the supposedly internal nature of the conflict, stated: Angola is
completely alien to any movements of Zaireois elements in armed opposition to
Kinshasa authorities.81 Mbumba had been ordered on 8 May (three days before the
Tigres entered Zaire) by the Angolan government to return to Luanda. He was held there
under house arrest until the completion of Shaba II.82 This and other evidence suggest
either divisions within the MPLA leadership, or else an abrupt change of regime opinion,
perhaps under Soviet pressure. Risquet thought it possible that Netos instructions were
not being respected.83 Tigres who participated in Shaba II report that Mbumba was in
contact with them by telephone from his residence in Angola.84
Both Belgium and France initially resisted Zairian appeals for armed intervention.85
By 17 May, however, by which time the inability of local FAZ forces to retake Kolwezi
was clear, a British civil servant spelt out the seriousness of the situation:
If President Mobutu cannot deal with the problem quickly, his position could be
seriously threatened, leading to chaos and the opportunity for external interference,
which the Russians would no doubt exploit. He could face an army revolt. The loss
of Kolwezi will damage Zaires already bankrupt economy.86
The FLNC forces occupying Kolwezi were initially relatively disciplined. However,
faced with a lack of coherent instructions from Mbumba, and limited supplies,
disorganisation took hold, above all amongst the young recruits from Shaba I. Popular
tribunals issued summary judgements and the young troops, some using drugs, were
trigger happy and did not always follow their orders to protect expatriates. A report
based on a Gecamines source claimed on 15 May that eight Belgians and one Italian had
been killed.87 The following day, the French ambassador in Kinshasa reported:
The attitude of the Katangese [gendarmes] in . . . [Kolwezi] has suddenly changed,
indifferent to discipline, its occupiers have lost all restraint, and are looting and
killing foreigners regardless of occupation, age or nationality.88
Such reports accelerated western efforts towards establishing an intervention force
(see below). However, before this could be mobilised, President Mobutu directed
a parachute battalion into the area surrounding Kolwezi on 16 May; this was despite CIA

81
NAUK FCO/99/162 Cuba/Zaire Shaba Invasion, 1978, British Embassy Luanda to FCO, 17 May 1978.
82
This detention was confirmed by an eyewitness, Prof Justin Mulangu of the University of Luanda:
interview (EK), Brussels, July 1999.
83
Gleijeses. Truth or Credibility, 100.
84
Anonymous interview (EK) with former FLNC commander, Kinshasa, 19 May 2012.
85
NAUK FCO/99/162 Cuba/Zaire Shaba Invasion, 1978, Paris Embassy to FCO, 17 May 1978, item 18.
86
NAUK FCO/31/2288 Zaire Shaba Invasion 1978, EAD Briefing Note for Cabinet, 17 May 1978,
item 85.
87
Assassinat de Belges, French Embassy Kinshasa to DAM, 15 May 1978, in MAE DAM Box 29, Zaire
1975 78, Franc
ais Morts et disparus.
88
Situation of the Foreigners in Kolwezi, French Embassy in Kinshasa to DAM, 16 May 1978, in MAE
DAM Box 29, Zaire 197578. The accuracy of these reports is perhaps less significant herein than their
impact on western governments.
104 M. Larmer
concerns that . . . the threat to the European community in Kolwezi could increase if the
Zairians attacked the residential sector.89 Indeed, this disastrous operation left most of
the Zairian paratroopers dead, injured or captured; they were, however, able to recapture
Kolwezi airport 10 km south of the town, which Mobutu briefly visited on 18 May.
The FAZ attack certainly increased violence against expatriates. On 18 May, the FAZ
took custody of 50 Europeans in the Baron Leveque company offices in the P2 quarter.
As FLNC forces approached, grenades were thrown and 37 of the Europeans were killed.
Zairian foreign minister Di Lutete . . . said the rebel troops had been ordered to massacre
the whites . . . messages intercepted by his government showed that Gen. Nathaniel
MBumba . . . had given the order to kill Europeans after it became apparent his invasion
was doomed.90 Belgian intelligence states that the expatriates were killed by the Tigres after
FAZ troops had fled.91 However, other testimony accuses the FAZ troops already in the
area.92 Lourtie argues that by the time of the P2 massacre, the FLNC forces had already
retreated.93 Whatever the evidence, one conspiratorial rumour in later circulation claimed
that the FAZ deliberately killed these Europeans to spark a foreign intervention.
Since Shaba I, US Africa policy had altered in ways that would shape its reaction to
Shaba II. Cubas deployment of troops to the Ethiopian force that successfully reversed the
Somali invasion of the Ogaden in late 1977/early 1978 fuelled a more hawkish US policy,
with National Security advisor Zbignew Brzezinski gaining support for a stronger
military response to Cuban-Soviet aggression.94 The US now agreed to provide logistical
support to a Franco-Belgian evacuation plan (Operation Red Bean).95 The military
operation, . . . strictly limited to evacuation of expatriates . . . [and] . . . in no way
connected with the broader conflict between the Zairians and Katangans, was designed to
avoid the accusation that western states were interfering in African affairs.96
When, on 19 May, a first group of 420 French legionnaires parachuted into Kolwezi, the
Tigres had already retreated.97 The situation they found on the ground was chaotic, with
FAZ paratroopers carrying out attacks against civilians.98 The unexpected French action
irritated Belgian politicians who questioned the supposedly humanitarian purpose of the

89
Zaire: Military Situation Report, in National Intelligence Daily Cable, 17 May 1978, CIA FOIA ERR,
ESDN: CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010010-9.
90
Paris troops find bodies of 44 Europeans in Zaire, International Herald Tribune, 20 May 1978.
91
Attitude des rebelles a Kolwezi entre le 13 et le 19 mai 1978, Note No, 335/78, 22 May 1978, BAH
CDH, Shaba II.
92
Pierre Yambuya, Zare: labattoir. Un Pilote de Mobutu Parle (Anvers: EPP 1991), 46.
93
Charles Lourtie, Kolwezi mai 1978: la seconde guerre du Shaba, Tam Tam Ommegang, 31 (2006):
15 28.
94
Westad, Global Cold War, pp. 282 3.
95
The White House, memo, 4.35 am, 18 May 1978, and Chronology, in National Security Affairs 6,
Brzezinski Material, Box 87, Zaire, 1979 81, in JCL.
96
NAUK FCO/99/162 Cuba/Zaire Shaba Invasion, 1978, FCO to UK Embassy Lusaka, 19 May 1978,
item 21.
97
Gen. Yves Gras, Loperation Kolwezi, Mondes et Cultures, 45, 4, 8 November 1985, 691 702.
98
Confirmed in numerous testimonies and in a Belgian military intelligence report: Ops Red Bean,
R. Zare/36.210, 24 May 1978, Appendix 4, BAA CDH, Shaba II.
 Cold War History 105

French drop.99 The French foreign minister Louis de Guiringaud claimed that the sudden
deterioration of conditions, and the danger to expatriates, necessitated prompt action.100
Belgian paratroops arrived the following day and, having evacuated the expatriates, did
not participate in overt military action. Mobutu publicly criticised Belgiums limited
operation and contrasted it to Frances more interventionist approach. The French not
only worked with the FAZ to secure Kolwezi, but also pursued FLNC forces as they
retreated in vehicles they had seized. The final death total in Kolwezi was c.160 expatriates,
150 Zairian soldiers, 200 Katangese, 3 French soldiers and c.800 Zairian civilians.101
On the day of the airdrop, Guiringaud was already claiming French troops in Kolwezi
had . . . identified the presence of a motorised company of Cubans . . . [and] . . . several
Cuban vehicles102 A month later, he declared: We now know from several different
sources . . . that Cuban instructors in Angola helped train the Katangans to launch the
attack against Shaba.103 Cuban President Fidel Castro not only denied his countrys
involvement, but insisted he had sought to prevent the Katangese action.104 He publicly
explained why: The fundamental problems of Africa are in southern Africa . . . This is
why, for political reasons, we have been absolutely opposed to this kind of action on the
part of the Katangans.105 Neto publicly insisted that Angola did not train or arm any army
nor did it organise any expedition against Zaire. Our Soviet and Cuban allies did not
intervene in any way on Angolan territory to provoke the rebellion.
US President Carter however castigated the Soviet Union for its continued
. . . interference in the internal affairs of African nations, via its Cuban ally.106
In response to Castros denials, the White House released a CIA memorandum suggesting
Eastern bloc training for the FLNC, Cuban military support during Shaba I and advisory
support in the run-up to Shaba II.107 Gleijeses convincingly demonstrates the
poor quality of this intelligence, which assumed that any competent military action by
the Katangese could only have occurred under close Cuban direction.108 A more
dispassionate private CIA assessment drew an instructive distinction:

99
NAUK FCO/31/2289, Zaire Shaba Invasion, 1978, Brussels Embassy to FCO, Shaba: French Military
Action, 19 May 1978, item 163.
100
NAUK FCO/31/2289, Zaire Shaba Invasion, 1978, Paris Embassy (Henderson) to FCO, Shaba,
19 May 1978, item 172.
101
NAUK FCO/99/162 Cuba/Zaire Shaba Invasion, 1978, Parliamentary Statement briefing, 22 May
1978, item 27.
102
NAUK, FCO/99/162, Cuba/Zaire Shaba Invasion, 1978, FCO to Lusaka Embassy, 19 May 1978, item 21.
103
Le Monde, 18 June 1978, quoted in Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility, 86.
104
No Cubans in Zaire Raid, International Herald Tribune, 20 May 1978; Gleijeses, Truth or
Credibility, 86.
105
Granma (Havana), 19 June 1978, quoted in Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility, 91.
106
Countering the communists, Time Magazine, 5 June 1978.
107
Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility, 91.
108
For example, a CIA report compiled in the wake of Shaba II asserted that The Katangans were not a
significant threat until 1975 when they were reequipped and reorganized by Cuban advisers, and that the
Cubans . . . had established guerrilla training bases for the ex-Katangan gendarmes in the Angolan towns
of Cozambo [sic], Luacano, Nova Chaves, Chicapa, Mariege, Chiluage. Evidence of Cuban Involvement in
Training FNLC Forces, 28 May 1978, CIA FOIA ERR, ESDN: CIA-RDP81B00401R002100020010-9.
106 M. Larmer
. . . it is impossible for a military expedition, such as that mounted against Kolwezi
this year . . . to have occurred without the knowledge and logistic support of
the Cuban government and its representatives in Angola . . . [but] we do not have
evidence that Cuban personnel physically accompanied the basically ex-Katangan
gendarme elements who invaded Shaba in 1977 and 1978109
This did not however prevent a search for physical evidence of Cuban presence inside
Zaire: on 2 June, an NSA staffer wrote excitedly to Brzezinski:
Recent overhead reconnaissance of the Shaba region has turned up evidence of
Cuban participation in the recent invasion of Zaire . . . a photograph of what
appears to be according to the best analysts at CIA a half-smoked Cuban cigar
(Cohiba brand) . . . While it is possible that the cigar was smoked by a Katangan, this
is highly unlikely . . . the Cubans do not like either the Katangans or the
Angolans . . . . Thus, the Cubans might pass arms to the Katangans, but NOT their
best cigars. We have, to paraphrase the expression used during Watergate found
the smoking Cuban.110
This supposedly definitive evidence did not apparently convince the White House,
which never publicly claimed that Cuban troops were inside Zaire.
A more convincing perspective was offered by Sergio Martinez of the Cuban Interest
Section (one of Cubas few links to the US) who explained that Cuban . . . involvement
in Shaba is contrary to Cubas interest since Cuba knows that the Katangese are
uncontrollable and any support could prove to be embarrassing.111 Castro was indeed
telling a form of the truth although Cuba had trained and armed the FLNC (though
not to the extent of its demands), the purpose of this training was essentially defensive.
Cuba and, to a lesser extent, Angola were unhappy about the FLNCs unilateral actions,
which destabilised the fragile balance of the Cold War in Africa.112

After Shaba II
Following the invasion, FLNC forces withdrew via Zambia to Angola with their
numbers largely intact, having dealt a considerable blow to the Zairian economy; the
Kolwezi occupation had driven up the world price of cobalt by 24% and forced western
donors to inject an additional US$100m to prevent the collapse of Zaires economy.
The United States recognised their achievement:
In the space of one week, the . . . FLNC . . . successfully accomplished their prime
mission . . . of impairing the mining complex . . . [in a] swift, well prepared, well
organized attack . . . The extent of that impairment in terms of psychological,

109
Cuban Involvement with the Shaba Problem, CIA Director Adm. Stansfield Turner to Jody Powell
(Presidential Press Secretary), 24 May 1978, in JCL Database Documents, 1.
110
Cuban Assistance to the Katangese, Rick Inderfurth to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 2 June 1978, in JCL
Database Documents.
111
Memorandum of Conversation, Department of Commerce Industry and Trade Administration,
30 May 1978, in JCL Database Documents, 1.
112
Gleijeses, Truth or Credibility, 87 90.
 Cold War History 107

economic, political and social consequences has deep significance for the viability of
the Mobutu regime.113
French officials admitted that the gendarmes continued to pose a threat because of
their ability to move amongst the civilian Zairian population . . . like fish in water.114
Britain argued that Shaba II pointed to the need for greater reform; the Foreign Office
insisted: We do not want to see Mobutu get away with a series of cosmetic reforms as he
did in 1977.115 The reality was, however, that both France and the US had in practice
reinforced Mobutus position; western powers were unable to imagine, let alone bring
about, an alternative political model for Zaire that would not imperil both vital western
mineral supplies and create an opening to communism. Their lack of intelligence of or
relations with Zairian opposition led them to see such forces in solely Cold War terms.
Mobutus awareness that western states had no alternative to his rule made it possible
for him to delay or disregard demands for reform. In the aftermath of Shaba II,
Brzezinski argued that . . . Zaire is too important and the global stakes too high for the
United States to continue its past posture of marginal support for the Zaire economic
[reform] effort . . . not participating in this effort would probably lead to a rapid
economic collapse in Zaire and political fragmentation of the country . . . . any long-
term economic recovery could not take place unless there was an improvement in the
security situation.116 Thus, the United States continued not only economic but also
military aid, and would do so until the end of the Cold War.
Under international pressure, diplomatic relations were established between Zaire
and Angola in July 1978. Neto (with Moscows endorsement) visited Kinshasa in
mid-August, where both leaders agreed to terminate support to groups hostile to each
others regimes.117 Cuba, keen to focus international attention on South African
aggression in the Cassinga Raid of May 1978, pressured Neto to end Katangese military
autonomy.118 It was agreed that the Tigres would be moved away from their
shared frontier.119 With the withdrawal of Angolan patronage, the FLNC was finished
as a coherent political force and its leadership was expelled from Angola.120
One contemporary observer rightly concluded: It seems that Mbumba did not think
about military categories or tactics and did not have a comprehensive plan that
included political factors.121 Zaires promulgation of an amnesty in June 1978 and the

113
Untitled telex report, White House Situation Room, 22 May 1978, in JCL Database Documents.
114
Situation au Shaba, French Embassy Kinshasa to DAM, 1 June 1978, in MAE DAM Box 24, Zaire,
1975 78, Situation militaire, octobre-1977-novembre 1978.
115
NAUK FCO/99/162 Cuba/Zaire Shaba Invasion, 1978, A.G. Munro (EAD), 20 June 1978, Zaire:
After the Shaba Invasion, item 40.
116
Next Steps in Zaire, Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, 26 May 1978, in JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski
collection, Special Coordination Committee (SCC) meetings, Box 28, 1 2.
117
Le Zare apres Kolwezi, 13 September 1978, MAE DAM Box 16, Zaire, 197578, 1.
118
George, Cuban Intervention in Angola, 136.
119
Agence Zaire Presse (AZAP - Kinshasa), Angola-Zare. Les retrouvailles, Kinshasa, 19 August 1978, 14.
120
Symba interview.
121
Rudolf Schmidt, Zare after the 1978 Shaba Crisis, Aussenpolitik, 30, no. 1 (1979): 88 99, 92.
108 M. Larmer
normalisation of relations with Angola led to the return of approximately 52,000
refugees from Angola and Zambia to Zaire (although many more remained). Some
were, however, accused of sympathies with the FLNC and then executed.122 Tensions
between Mobutu and the province of Katanga remained a powerful source of internal
dissent for the remainder of his time in power, and Katangese leaders and forces,
including remnants of the FLNC forces in Angola, would play a leading role in his
overthrow in 1997, long after the end of the Cold War.

Conclusion
This article has, in analysing the specific events of Shaba I and II, argued that a full
understanding of the events of the Cold War in Africa necessitates greater attention to
the history, composition and motivations of the local non-state or quasi-state forces
that played a significant but neglected role in conflicts normally understood as
overwhelmingly geo-political or ideological in nature. The transformation of the public
image of the ex-Katangese gendarmes from the neo-colonial forces of the 1960 63
secession to the Cuban-backed Marxist Tigres of the late 1970s suggests the inadequacy
of understanding such a force through the ideological bifurcation of Cold War
protagonists. Nor does their periodic characterisation as mercenary forces do justice to
their capacity for self-initiative or their ability to trouble their ostensible political
masters, as they did Cuba and Angola during the events analysed above. Rather, they
consistently aspired to revive the Katangese nation-state or to reform the Congolese/
Zairian state in ways that would address the specific form in which Katanga had been
integrated into it. The failure or unwillingness of non-African states, on both sides of the
Cold War, to understand this led them to marginalise one of the few Congolese forces
with the capacity to effectively challenge Mobutus predatory regime.
This analysis has consequences for the ways in which the local histories of the Cold War
are written. The increasing accessibility of the state archives of Cold War powers provide
an invaluable body of sources for such histories, enabling greater understanding of the
activities of forces such as the FLNC. However, the perspectives of officials from, for
example, the US State Department, the French Foreign Ministry, or the Cuban delegation
to Angola, were inevitably coloured by both their ideological predispositions and their
desire to use local forces as pawns in the wider Cold War, whether by sexing up
intelligence to demonstrate a Cuban presence in Zaire or by deploying Katangese forces in
the Angolan civil war whilst denying them the self-determination that was supposedly the
underlying aim of national liberation. Such archives need therefore to be read critically
and in conjunction with other forms of evidence, including the documents of and
interviews with representatives of the local forces concerned. This type of approach makes
it possible both to understand the complex and sometimes contradictory nature of the
Cold War in Africa and the local conflicts with which it tended to become intertwined.

122
Amnesty International, Les violations des droits de lhomme au Zare (London/Brussels, 1980), 69.
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