Major Pagcaliuangan then ordered Sgts.

Teves and Ople to keep close watch on the second airplane

THIRD DIVISION parked inside the Domestic Airport terminal. This aircraft is an Airbus 300 with tail number RPC-3001. It
arrived at the NAIA at 10:25 in the evening of June 3, 1994 from Hong Kong as Flight No. PR-311. After its
passengers disembarked and its cargo unloaded, it was towed by the PAL ground crew and parked at the
ramp area of the Domestic Airport terminal.
[G.R. No. 146706. July 15, 2005] At around 11:30 that same evening, Sgt. Teves reported over his radio that three (3) persons had
boarded the Airbus 300. The team did not move, but continued its surveillance.

At 12:15 a.m. the following day (June 4), Sgt. Teves reported that the three (3) persons who earlier
boarded the Airbus 300 had disembarked with their abdominal areas bulging. They then boarded an
TOMAS SALVADOR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. airplane tow truck with its lights off.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
At bar is the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by Tomas Salvador assailing the Decision[2] dated
August 9, 2000 and Resolution dated January 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 20186.
On the wee hours of June 4, 1994, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and petitioner Tomas Salvador,
then aircraft mechanics employed by the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) and assigned at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and Manila Domestic Airport, were nabbed by intelligence operatives of the
Philippine Air Force (PAF) for possessing thirteen (13) packets containing assorted smuggled watches and
jewelries valued at more than half a million pesos.
Consequently, they were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 117, Pasay City with
violation of Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-5843. The
Information reads:
That on or about the 4th day of June 1994 at the NAIA/Domestic Airport vicinity, Pasay City and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and felonious assist in the
concealment and unlawful importation of the following items:
The PAF surveillance team promptly boarded their vehicles and followed the aircraft tow truck. At
the Lima Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team blocked and stopped the tow truck. Sgt. Teves then got
off, identified himself and asked the four (4) persons on board to alight. They were later identified as
Tomas Salvador, petitioner, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and Napoleon Clamor, the driver of the tow
truck.
Sgt. Teves approached Aurelio Mandin. He noticed that Mandins uniform was partly open, showing
a girdle. While Sgt. Teves was reaching for the girdle, a package wrapped in brown packaging tape fell.
Suspecting that the package contained smuggled items, Sgt. Teves yelled to his teammates, Positive!
Thereupon, the rest of the team surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused who surrendered without
a fight. The team searched their bodies and found that the three were wearing girdles beneath their
uniforms, all containing packets wrapped in packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5) packets, while
petitioner and Santos had four (4) each. The team confiscated the packets and brought all the accused to
the PAFSECOM Office.
At around 8:00 oclock the following morning, Emilen Balatbat, an examiner of the Bureau of
Customs, arrived at the PAFSECOM Office. She opened one of the packets and on seeing that it contained
dutiable goods, she proceeded to weigh the thirteen (13) packets seized from the accused. She then
prepared an inventory of the items seized and listed the weight of the packets.[4] Thereafter, she brought
the seized packets to the In-Board Section, Bureau of Customs, Airport Office where their contents were
identified and appraised. The Bureau of Customs found 248 pieces of assorted watches and fourteen karat
(14K) gold jewelries valued as follows:

QTY.
198 pieces of means watches P187,110.00 UNIT DESCRIPTION APPRAISED VALUE
76 pieces of mens diving watches 8,640.00
32 pieces of ladies watches 11,600.00 10
1600 grams of assorted jewelry. 322,000.00 pcs. Half-bangles with Charms Tricolors 122.8 gms.

6
with a total market value of P537,500.00 FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREEE HUNDRED pcs. Bracelet with Charms Tricolors 52.4 gms.
FIFTY PESOS, more or less, Philippine Currency, without authority or permit from proper authorities.
8
pcs. Bracelet (Tricolor) 64.2 gms.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
5
pcs. Bangles (3 pcs./set) Tricolor 155.3 gms.
When arraigned, all the accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on
the merits then ensued. Babys Bangles with charm 18.2 gms.

The prosecution established the following facts:

L-Bangles with charm 68.5 gms.
On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the PAF Special Operations Squadron, headed by
Major Gerardo B. Pagcaliuangan and composed of Sgts. Rodolfo A. Teves, Geronimo G. Escarola, Virgilio
M. Sindac and Edwin B. Ople, conducted routine surveillance operations at the Manila Domestic Airport L-Bangles 112.3 gms.
to check on reports of alleged drug trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by certain PAL personnel.
 L-Creolla Earrings 901.56 gms. Danilo Santos testified that on the night of June 3, 1994, he was assigned to the Airbus 300 with tail
No. RPC-3001, joining three junior mechanics who were then working on said aircraft. He was conducting
a visual check of the plane when a tow truck arrived on its way to Nichols Airfield. He told one of the junior
TOTAL GRAMS +P 299,052.00 mechanics that he would take a break and be back in an hour. He then boarded the tow truck. When it
1,495 x P200.00/gm. was near the Lima Gate, a jeep with four (4) men in civilian attire aboard approached him. The four pointed
their firearms at him and, after searching him for drugs, he was frisked but nothing was found. He was
nonetheless brought by the men to the PAFSECOM Office, then to Villamor Airbase Hospital for a medical
Assorted Watches examination and alcohol test. Thereafter, he was brought back to the PAFSECOM Office. There, another
military man arrived and brought out a box containing packets. Then he and his companions were told to
204 put on their mechanics uniforms and to wear girdles. The packets were placed on their bodies, after which
pcs. Citizen M watches with black dial
they were photographed. He further testified that he was asked to sign a certain paper but was not allowed
with gold metal bracelet (-1) x $25
$2,600.00 to read it thoroughly. During the investigation, he was not apprised of his rights nor assisted by a counsel.

24 Petitioner Tomas Salvador likewise denied any knowledge of the questioned items seized from him.
pcs. Seiko 5 Ladies watches with blue He testified that during the incident in question, he only boarded the tow truck to take a break at the PAL
dial with white metal bracelet (-1) canteen. He saw a box on the tow truck but was not aware of its contents. After his arrest, he was made
x $25 600.00 to sign a document under duress.

16 Aurelio Mandin also denied committing the offense charged. He declared that after his arrest, he
pcs. Seiko Divers Watch Mens- Black was made to sign a document by the PAF personnel, the contents of which he was not able to read. He
dial with rubberized bracelet (-1) x signed it because he was struck with a .45 caliber handgun by one of the military men and threatened him
$50 800.00 with summary execution if he would not do so. He was not informed of his rights nor given the services of
counsel during the investigation.
4
pcs. Seiko 5 Ladies watches with After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting all the accused of the offense charged,
yellow dial with gold metal thus:
bracelet (1) x $25 100.00

4 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Aurelio Mandin y Liston, Danilo
pcs. Citizen L-watches with white dial 80.00 Santos y Antonio and Tomas Salvador y Magno GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section
(4) x $20 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP). There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court sentences each of the accused to
62 an indeterminate term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to TEN (10)
pcs. Seiko 5 Mens watches with yellow
YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P8,000.00), without
dial with gold metal bracelet (1) x
1,550.00 subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The court also orders the forfeiture
$25
of the confiscated articles in favor of the Government.
34
pcs. Seiko 5 Mens watches with black SO ORDERED.[5]
dial with gold metal bracelet (1) x
$25 850.00
____ All the accused then seasonably interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
248 pcs. CR No. 20186.
$6,580.00
On August 9, 2000, the Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming the trial courts Decision,
thus:
The Investigating State Prosecutor conducted an inquest and thereafter recommended that
petitioner and his co-accused be charged with violating Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Accordingly, the Information, mentioned earlier, was filed with the RTC. We cannot see any justification for the setting aside of the contested Decision.

After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Joint Demurrer to Evidence. THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
In an Order dated October 12, 1995, the trial court denied the demurrer and directed the accused
to present their evidence. SO ORDERED.[6]

All the accused denied committing the offense charged, claiming they were framed-up by the
military. They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated January 9, 2001.[7]
 Only Tomas Salvador opted to elevate his case to this Court by way of the instant petition for review
on certiorari. He submits for our consideration the following assignments of error:
I
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION LIKE UNLAWFUL
IMPORTATION, POSSESSION OF UNLAWFULLY IMPORTED ARTICLES AND CONSPIRACY IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE SAME, WERE NEVER PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST AND SEARCH OF THE PERSONS OF THE ACCUSED.
III
THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE AFFIRMANCE BY THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES, AS WELL AS ALL ITS DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE SAME WERE APPARENTLY OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
THE ACCUSED WERE UNLAWFUL.
IV
THE DENIAL BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE CONCURRENCE BY THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WERE ALSO WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS.[8]
The above assignments of error boil down to these issues: (1) whether the seized items are
admissible in evidence; and (2) whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the
PAF operatives is illegal. Citing People v. Burgos,[9] he maintains that at the time he and his co-accused
were stopped by the PAF law enforces, they were unaware that a crime was being committed. Accordingly,
the law enforcers were actually engaged in a fishing expedition in violation of his Constitutional right
against unlawful search and seizure. Thus, the seized items should not have been admitted in evidence
against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that under the factual circumstances of the case
at bar, there was sufficient probable cause for the PAF surveillance team to stop and search petitioner and
his companions. They boarded the parked Air Bus 300 PAL plane at the time when there were no other
PAL personnel working therein. They stayed inside the plane for sometime and surprisingly, came out with
bulging waists. They then stopped and looked around and made apparent signals. All these acts were
sufficient to engender a reasonable suspicion that petitioner and his colleagues were up to something
illegal. Moreover, the search and seizure was conducted in connection with the enforcement of customs
law when the petitioner and his co-accused were riding a motor vehicle. In addition, the search was
conducted at the vicinity of Lima Gate of the Manila Domestic Airport which, like every gate in the airport
perimeter, has a checkpoint. Finally, the petitioner and his companions agreed to the search after one of
them was caught with a suspicious-looking packet. Under these circumstances, the search and seizure is
legal and the seized items are admissible in evidence.
We agree with the OSG.
As a rule, the Bill of Rights prohibits intrusions by the law enforcers to a persons body, personal
effects or residence, unless the same are conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant issued in
compliance with the procedure mandated by the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Thus, Sections 2 and
3(2), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provide:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 3.
xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
x x x.
The above Constitutional provisions do not prohibit searches and seizures, but only such as
are unreasonable. Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where searches and seizures may
lawfully be effected sans a search warrant. These recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving
vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop-and-
frisk situations; and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.[10]
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF
operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by
certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team on
petitioner and his co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected
the search and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs
law.[11]
In Papa vs. Mago[12] involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers who are tasked to effect
the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search
warrant, any article, cargo or other movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that the
said items have been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs law. They may
likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected of holding or conveying the said
articles, as in the case at bar.
In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the State to foil any fraudulent schemes resorted to
by importers who evade payment of customs duties. The Governments policy to combat the serious
malady of smuggling cannot be reduced to futility and impotence on the ground that dutiable articles on
which the duty has not been paid are entitled to the same Constitutional protection as an individuals
private papers and effects. Here, we see no reason not to apply this State policy which we have continued
to affirm.[13]
Moreover, we recall that at the time of the search, petitioner and his co-accused were on board
a moving PAL aircraft tow truck. As stated earlier, the search of a moving vehicle is recognized in this
jurisdiction as a valid exception to the requirement for a search warrant. Such exception is easy to
understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house
or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted in
a mobile ship, aircraft or other motor vehicle since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.[14] Verily, we rule that the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in holding that the articles involved in the instant controversy were validly seized by the
authorities even without a search warrant, hence, admissible in evidence against petitioner and his co- in the cover of darkness by concealing them inside their uniforms. When confronted by the PAF team, they
accused. were unable to satisfactorily explain why the questioned articles were in their possession. They could not
present any document to prove lawful importation. Thus, their conviction must necessarily be upheld.
On the second issue, petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for readily sustaining the trial courts Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial courts Decision convicting
finding that the witnesses for the prosecution were credible, notwithstanding that their testimonies petitioner and his co-accused.
contain glaring inconsistencies which tend to detract from their veracity. Petitioner submits that these
inconsistencies create serious doubt which should have been resolved in his favor. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 20186 are AFFIRMED IN ALL RESPECTS. Costs against the petitioner.
We are not persuaded.
SO ORDERED.
After a careful examination of the purported inconsistencies mentioned by petitioner, we find that
they do not relate with the elements of the offense charged. Rather, they tend to focus on minor and
insignificant matters as for instance: which PAF operative was in possession of the hand-held radio; how
the girdles (garters) were removed; and what time the aircraft in question arrived.

It bears stressing that these inconsistencies detract from the fact that all members of the special
PAF team who conducted the search positively identified the petitioner and his co-accused as the same
persons who boarded the PAL plane; stayed therein for a significant length of time; disembarked in a
manner which stirred suspicion from the team; and with unusually bulging uniforms, rode an aircraft tow
truck towards Lima Gate where they were caught in flagrante delicto.

As a rule, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to trivial and insignificant
details do not destroy their credibility.[15] Moreover, minor inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than
diminish the prosecutions case as they tend to erase suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed,
thereby negating any misgivings that the same were perjured.[16]

Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in part:

SEC. 3601. Unlawful Importation. Any person who shall fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines,
or assist in so doing, any article contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, seal or in any manner
facilitate the importation, concealment or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to
have been imported contrary to law, shall be guilty of smuggling

xxx

When, upon trial for violation of this section, the defendant is shown to have had possession of the
article in question, possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the
defendant shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the court: Provided, however, That
payment of the tax due after apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any prosecution under
this section.

Smuggling is thus committed by any person who (1) fraudulently imports or brings into the
Philippines or assists in importing or bringing into the Philippines any article, contrary to law, or (2)
receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such
article after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law.[17] Importation
commences when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to
unload and is deemed terminated upon payment of the duties, taxes and other charges due upon the
articles and the legal permit for withdrawal has been issued, or where the articles are duty-free, once the
articles have left the jurisdiction of the customs.[18]

In the instant case, the prosecution established by positive, strong, and convincing evidence that
petitioner and his co-accused were caught red-handed by a team from the PAF Special Operations
Squadron, while in the possession of highly dutiable articles inside the premises of the airport. The
contraband items were taken by petitioner and his co-accused from a PAL plane which arrived from Hong
Kong on the night of June 3, 1994. Petitioner and his colleagues then attempted to bring out these items
[G.R. No. 141137. January 20, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO; ARNOLD ROBLE and GERLYN
WATES, appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
From the Decision of July 20, 1999, as amended by Order of September 9, 1999, of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, finding appellants Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, they lodged the present appeal.
The Information dated April 25, 1995, filed against appellants reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused for VIOLATION OF SECTION 4, ARTICLE II IN
RELATION TO SECTION 21, ARTICLE IV OF R.A. 6425, committed as follows:
That on or about April 10, 1995 in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another,
without being authorized by law, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transported, delivered and
possessed 1.7 kilos dried marijuana leaves which are prohibited drugs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Upon arraignment on September 11, 1995, appellants, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged.
The facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
On the night of April 10, 1995, at around 10:45 p.m., as about fifteen police officers were manning
a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the
COMELEC gun ban, a Honda TMX motorcycle with three men on board sped past them.[2] One of the police
officers blew his whistle[3] and ordered them to return to the checkpoint.
Obliging, the three men aboard the motorcycle returned to the checkpoint. SPO1 Haydenburge Goc-
ong (SPO1 Goc-ong) of the 11th Regional Mobile Force 4th Company thereupon asked them why they sped
away to which appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), who was seated behind appellant Arnold Roble
(Roble) and in front of appellant Gerlyn Wates (Wates) on the motorcycle, retorted that he is a member
of the army.[4] When asked by the law enforcers to produce an identification card, he could not, however,
offer any. At this point, the police officers noticed that a big military backpack was slung over the right
shoulder of Vinecario who was observed, as were his co-appellants, to be afraid and acting
suspiciously.[5] SPO1 Goc-ong thus asked Vinecario what the contents of the backpack were. Vinecario
answered that it merely contained a mat and proceeded to pass it to Wates, who in turn passed it to Roble
who, however, returned it to Vinecario.[6]
Suspecting that the backpack contained a bomb, SPO1 Goc-ong instructed his men to disperse,
following which he ordered Vinecario to open the bag. Vinecario did as ordered and as SPO1 Goc-ong
noticed something wrapped in paper, he told Vinecario to take the same out. Again Vinecario obliged,
albeit reiterating that it was only a mat.
SPO1 Goc-ong then touched the stuff wrapped in paper upon which Vinecario grabbed it,[7] resulting
to the tearing off of the paper wrapper. Soon the smell of marijuana wafted in the air.
Vinecario thereafter told SPO1 Goc-ong let us talk about this,[8] but the latter ignored Vinecario and
instead called his Commanding Officer and reported to him that marijuana was found in Vinecarios
possession.
On orders of the Commanding Officer, the other police officers brought appellants along with two
bundles of marijuana, the backpack and the motorcycle to the battalion office at Camp Catitipan in Davao
City and were turned over to one PO2 Cabalon, an investigator of Regional Mobile Force 11. Before
proceeding to said battalion office, however, the incident was blottered[9] by PO3 Edward Morado at the
Buhangin Police Station.[10]
On April 11, 1995, SPO1 Goc-ong, PO1 Vicente Carvajal (PO1 Carvajal) and PO1 Pual Padasay
brought the confiscated suspected marijuana to the camps crime laboratory for examination[11] which
determined it to weigh 1,700 grams[12] and to be indeed positive therefor.[13]
As for appellants, their version of the incident follows:
Vinecario, then a member of the 25th Infantry Battalion of the 6th Infantry Division of the Philippine
army stationed at Pagakpak, Pantukan,[14] approached motorcycle driver Wates at a terminal in Andile,
Mawab and requested him to bring him to his elder brother at Parang, Maguindanao for a fee of P500.00
which he paid.[15] The two thus proceeded to Carmen, Panabo where they picked up Roble to alternate
with Wates as driver, and at 8:00 a.m., the three left for Parang.[16]
On reaching Parang at about 1:20 p.m., Vinecario borrowed P3,000.00 from his brother Teofanis to
shoulder the medical expenses of his son. At about 4:30 p.m., after partaking of snacks at Teofanis
residence, appellants left for Davao City.
Along Parang Highway, Abdul Karim Datolarta, Vinecarios former co-employee at Emerson Plywood
where he previously worked, blocked the motorcycle.[17] Vinecario thus alighted from the motorcycle and
shook hands with Datolarta[18] who asked where they were headed for and requested that he ride with
them. Vinecario turned Datolarta down as there was no longer any room in the motorcycle. Datolarta then
asked if he (Vinecario) could take his bag of clothes and bring it to his cousin, one Merly, in Roxas, Tagum.
Without examining its contents, Vinecario acquiesced, took Datolartas bag and left with his co-
appellants.[19]
On reaching Ulas in the evening of the same day, appellants, seeing that there was a
checkpoint,[20] sped past it. When they were about 50 to 60 meters away from the checkpoint, they heard
a whistle, prompting Wates to tap Vinecario, telling him that the whistle came from the checkpoint.
Vinecario then told Roble to go back to the checkpoint.
While at the checkpoint, five police officers approached appellants and instructed them to alight
from the motorcycle. One of the officers asked Vinecario who he was, and Vinecario identified himself as
a member of the Philippine National Police.[21] The officer asked for identification and when Vinecario
could not produce any, the former got the backpack slung on Vinecarios shoulder.
The same officer then asked Vinecario if they could open the bag, and as Vinecario acquiesced, two
officers opened the bag upon which they shouted that it contained marijuana. Vinecario then grabbed the
backpack to confirm if there was indeed marijuana. At that instant, the police officers held his hands and
brought him, together with the other appellants, to the Buhangin Police Station, and later to Camp
Catitipan.
At the camp, appellants were investigated by police officials without the assistance of counsel,
following which they were made to sign some documents which they were not allowed to read.[22]
The trial court, by Decision of July 20, 1999, found appellants guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of all three
accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, accused PFC Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble
and Gerlyn Wates, pursuant to Sec. 4, Art. II in relation to Art. IV or (sic) Rep. Act 6425 as amended by
Rep. Act 7659, Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, are jointly sentence (sic) to suffer the supreme penalty of death by
lethal injection, under Rep Act 8177 in the manner and procedure therein provided, in relation to Sec. 24
of Rep. Act 7659, amending Art. 81 of the Revised Penal Code.
Finally pursuant to Rep. Act 7659 Sec. 22 the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC 16 Davao City, is ordered to
elevate the entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court, Supreme Court Manila, for the automatic
review of this Decision, after its promulgation.
SO ORDERED.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
By Order of September 9, 1999, the trial court set aside its decision of July 20, 1999 and disposed
as follows, quoted verbatim:
Accordingly, all accused (sic) motion for reconsideration on this aspect, on the imposition of the penalty
against all accused, even if invoked only be accused Venecaio (sic) through his counsel de officio, will
apply to all accused since there exists conspiracy of all in the commission of the offense charged.
Judgment of this court, dated July 20, 1999, is accordingly set aside and reconsidered, only insofar as the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death through lethal injection under Republic Act No. 8177, is
concerned.
All accused PFC Victor Venecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates, are instead sentence (sic) to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. IV, Sec. 21, in relation to Art. IV of Republic Act No.
6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, in accordance with Art. 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, as decided by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Peope (sic) vs. Ruben
Montilla G.R. No. 123872 dated January 30, 1998.
However, the findings of this court for the conviction of all aaccused (sic) of the offense charged, is (sic)
sustained. The corresponding motion (sic) for reconsideration of all accused through their counsel for
their acquittal of (sic) the offense charged, is denied, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis and Underscoring supplied)
The prosecution then filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25] dated September 14, 1995 of the above-
mentioned Order of the trial court, it arguing that the commission of the offense charged against
appellants was attended by an aggravating circumstance in that it was committed by an organized or
syndicated crime group, thus warranting the imposition of the death penalty.
In the meantime, Roble and Wates filed their Notice of Appeal[26] on September 15, 1999. Vinecario
followed suit and filed his Notice of Appeal.[27]
The trial court, by Order dated September 22, 1999, denied the prosecutions Motion.
In their brief, Roble and Wates assign the following errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURTS OBSERVATION THAT APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE CONSPIRED
WITH VICTOR VINECARIO IN TRANSPORTING MARIJUANA FROM PARANG,
MAGUINDANAO IS NOT BORNE BY THE EVIDNECE (sic) ON RECORD AND SHOWS THAT
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN MISAPPREHENDING FACTS IF NOT A COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE, BOTH DOCUMENTARY AND TESTIMONIAL.
2. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO AFFORD EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE
RECANTATION MADE BY POLICE OFFICERS HAYDENBURG GOC-ONG AND VICENTE
CARVAJAL THAT BOTH APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE WERE NOT NERVOUS AND
APPREHENSIVE AT THE TME (sic) OF THE OPENING OF THE MILITARY PACK CONTAINING
MARIJUANA NEAR THE CHECKPOINT.
3. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE THAT THEY WERE MERELY HIRED BY VICTOR VINECARIO
TO BRING HIM TO PARANG, MAGUINDANAO FOR A FEE OF P500.00 WITH FREE FOOD
AND GASOLINE.
4. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE RENTAL OF P500.00 WHICH
VINECARIO PAID TO THE OWNER OF THE [MOTORCYCLE] AS INADEQUATE BY TAKING
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE BUS FARE OF P268.00 FROM MACO, DAVAO PROVINCE TO SUN
WAY CROSSING, MAGUINDANAO DOWN TO PARANG, MAGUINDANAO.[28]
Wates and Roble argue that there is no iota of evidence to prove that they acted with unity of
purpose and in the execution of any unlawful objective with Vinecario.[29] They assert that they had no
prior knowledge of Vinecarios plan to meet with a man who would give the backpack containing marijuana;
that prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajals declaration that they (appellants Wates and
Roble) were not nervous, uneasy or apprehensive when the backpack was opened buttresses their claim
that they did not conspire with Vinecario; and that the prosecutions theory of conspiracy was merely based
on the testimony of PO1 Carvajal that they acted nervously when the backpack was ordered opened for
inspection; that there was a great variance in the testimonies of SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal in the
direct examination and their testimonies on rebuttal as to the events that transpired on April 10, 1995,
thus casting serious doubts on the trial courts findings of guilt.
On September 17, 2001, Vinecario filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal,[30] stating that he is
practically satisfied with the decision of the trial court; that he would not waste anymore the effort of the
honorable Supreme Court Justices in further reviewing his case; and that as he was driven by the sincerest
desire in renewing his life, he irrevocably moves for the withdrawal of his appeal. On even date, Roble and
Wates likewise filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal,[31] stating that they admit the commission of
the offense for which they were convicted; that they are satisfied with the decision of the trial court; and
that they are already serving the penalty for their offense and realize the overt admittance of guilt as the
only vehicle in [their] gradual renewal.
By Resolution of November 27, 2001, this Court denied the Motions of appellants and directed
Vinecario to file his brief within forty-five days from notice of the resolution.
In a brief dated January 25, 2002, Vinecario attributes the following errors to the trial court:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED 1,700 GRAMS OF MARIJUANA
AS (sic) VALID.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-
APPELLANT THE ALLEGED 1,700 GRAMS OF MARIJUANA AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN
ILLEGAL SEARCH.
III. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN GIVING THE POLICEMEN THE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY DESPITE THE APPARENT
IRREGULARITIES IN THE MANNER OF ARRESTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
 IV. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[32]
Vinecario argues that the prosecution failed to show that the search conducted by the police
officers was incident to a lawful arrest; that he could not have been deemed to have consented to the
search as any such consent was given under intimidating or coercive circumstances; and that there existed
no probable cause to justify the search and seizure of the backpack, hence, the marijuana is inadmissible
in evidence, it being a product of illegal search.
Vinecario adds that the police officers who arrested and investigated him failed to inform him of his
rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his choice, thereby violating
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution.[33]
The rule is constitutionally enshrined that no search and seizure can lawfully be conducted without
a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution so ordains:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
And Section 3(2), Article III of the same Constitution mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of
the right of the people under Section 2 shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions, however. Search and/or seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search
of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5)
when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop-and-
frisk situations.[34]
Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the exigencies of
public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.[35] For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a
visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against
unreasonable search.[36]
x x x [Checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of
organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril,
checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government.
xxx
No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present government its
ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and economic policies or performance.
But, at least, one must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power,
to pursue its program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives,
the government has the equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods
for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected.
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to free
passage without interruption, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of
travelers during which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. x x x
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. As held by the U.S.
Supreme Court:
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential
interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise
as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped
elsewhere. Second checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary
enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible
evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve
the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by official
responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement
resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears
arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class, and since field officers may stop only those cars
passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in
the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or
operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review.[37]
Judicial notice is taken of the existence of COMELEC Resolution No. 2735 imposing a gun ban during
an election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881).[38] The national and local elections in 1995 having been held on May 8, the present incident, which
occurred on April 10, 1995, was well within the election period.
Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through
checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively
searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints
that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of
some offense.[39]
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that
will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not detemined by any fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to
flee.[40] (Emphasis supplied).
That probable cause existed to justify the search conducted by the police officers at the checkpoint
is gathered from the following testimony of SPO1 Goc-ong:
Q: You said you saw three on board a motorcycle what did your unit do when these three
persons approached?
A: We were waiting for them. When they arrived they stopped and speeded away.
Q: What was your reaction when you saw the motor speeding away?
A: One of my men blew his whistle ordering to (sic) return back (sic).
 xxx A: Election was past (sic) approaching and there was a threat that Davao City will be bombed.

Q: When they returned back (sic) what happened? Q: Prior to that was there any incident?

A: When they returned back (sic) I asked them why they speeded away? xxx

Q: What did they answer? A: In Ipil, Zamboanga on April 4.

A: One of them said that he is a member of the army. Q: If you recall when was that?

Q: If that person who said that he is a member of the army is in court, can you point to him? A: April 4 of the same year.

A: (Witness went down from the witness stand and pointed to a man wearing yellow t-shirt Q: You said the bag was passed to Venecario and you told your men to scatter, what
who stood up and when asked about his name answered that he is Victor Venecario). happened next?

xxx A: I ordered Venecario to open the backpack.

Q: What was your reaction when Venecario failed to show any identification papers to show Q: What did Venecario do when you ordered him to open?
that he is really a member of the army?
A: They opened the backpack..[41]
A: We saw his big backpack and asked him what was inside.
SPO1 Goc-ongs testimony was corroborated by PO1 Vicente Carvajal:
Q: Who was carrying that big backpack?
Q: At about 10:45 in the evening of that date April 10, 1995 do you recall of any unusual
A: Venecario. incident while you were conducting that checkpoint?

xxx A: Yes, sir.

Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that backpack, can you tell us why
did you (sic) ask him?
A: I asked about that because I observed them to be acting suspiciously as if they were afraid
and different reactions (sic).
Q: What was that incident all about?
A: At that time, while we were conducting a checkpoint, we saw this motorcycle passing and
flagged them to stop and there were three (3) persons and one was manning and they
briefly stopped but speeded away.

Q: They were acting suspiciously? xxx

A: Yes. Q: When these three (3) persons retured (sic) back (sic) what happened?

Q: That is what you have observed from their faces? A: The one riding introduced himself as a member of the army.

A: Yes, sir. xxx

Q: What did Venecario do when you asked him about the contents of that backpack? Q: You said these three persons were nervous and one of them introduced himself as an
army man, what did you do?
A: He said that it is a mat and passed it on to his companion.
A: I asked for an ID.
Q: You said he passed it on to his companion, there were two (2) companions, to whom did
he pass it on? Q: Who among you asked for an ID?

A: He passed it on to Wates and Wates passed it on to Roble. A: Sgt. Goc-ong.

Q: What did Roble do when Wates passed it to him? Q: Where were you at that time when Goc-ong asked for his ID?

A: Roble returned it back (sic) to Venecario. A: I was behind him because I backed him up.

Q: So what was your reaction when you saw the three passing the bag from one person to Q: What was the reaction of Venecario when he was asked to produce an ID?
another?
A: He answered that he has no ID.
A: My suspicion was it was a bomb and ordered my men to scatter.
Q: What was the reaction of the group when Venecario failed to show any ID that he was an
Q: Tell us why are you (sic) concerned about explosives was there any incident prior to that army man?
checkpoint?
 A: Our other companion moved closer as security. As to Vinecarios allegation that his constitutional rights were violated during the custodial
investigation conducted by the police officers, the same is relevant and material only when an extrajudicial
Q: Why? admission or confession extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his conviction.[43] In the case at
bar, the trial court convicted appellants on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
A: We were on alert because on April 4 the one who attacked were (sic) in uniform.
particularly those of SPO1 Haydenburge Goc-ong and PO1 Vicente Carvajal.
Q: At that time what was Venecario wearing?
Finally, Vinecario harps on his defense of denial which he recounted as follows:
A: He was in camouflage and wearing sleepers (sic).
Q: After leaving the residence of your brother was there any unusual incident that took
xxx place?

Q: After that what happened? A: Yes, sir.

A: We were able to observe that he was carrying a bag. Q: What was that?

Q: What was the reaction of Venecario when he was asked what was (sic) the contents of the A: The moment we arrived there there was a person who blocked us.
bag?
Q: Where?
A: He appeared to be hesitant and he said that it contained clothes.
A: Parang Highway.
Q: Before that what did Venecario do?
Q: Coming here to Davao?
A: He placed it in (sic) his shoulder.
A: Yes.
Q: What did he do with the backpack?
Q: What happened after Crossing Parang?
A: When asked he passed it to his other companions.
A: There was a person who blocked us.
Q: What did Venecario when he passed it to his companion?
Q: A former companion of yours?
A: Venecario passed it to his companion and that companion passed it to his other
A: Yes.
companion.
Q: A former soldier?
Q: After this companion received the backpack from his companion what did he do?
A: No, sir.
A: He returned back (sic) to Venecario.
Q: You said your former companion, am I correct?
Q: They passed it from one person to another until it was returned to Venecario?
A: Before I became a soldier, I worked in Emerson Plywood.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So that person who flagged down you were (sic) your former companion?
xxx
A: Yes.
Q: You said that backpack was passed from one person to another and when he got hold of
that backpack what happened? Q: You are familiar with him?
A: He opened the backpack. A: I know him very well.
Q: Who told him to open the backpack? Q: He was your close friend?
[42]
A: Sgt. Goc-ong. A: Yes.
In light then of appellants speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having been Q: What is the name of that person who stopped you?
flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents
of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his A: Abdul Karim Datolarta.
co-appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently
in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable Q: He was alone when he stopped you?
cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the
A: Yes, sir.
law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some offense.
Q: What happened when your friend Abdul Karin (sic) Datolarta stopped you?
 A: When he stopped us, I immediately disembarked from the motor vehicle and shook hands acquaintance, Abdul Karim Datolarta, flagged down[45] the motorcycle, and as requested by Datolarta, he
with him. readily agreed to bring a backpack to Datolartas cousin without checking its contents - is incredible,
contrary to human experience, and taxes credulity. Datolarta was not even apprehended nor presented
Q: He was the one who stopped you or you were the one who told the driver to stop? at the trial, thus further eliciting serious doubts on Vinecarios tale.
A: My friend. The defense of denial, like alibi, has invariably been viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can
just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions of the
Q: You immediately recognized the face of that friend of yours?
Dangerous Drugs Act.[46]
A: Not yet.
The categorical and consistent testimonies, and the positive identification by prosecution witnesses
Q: What else happened aside from shaking hands and greeting? SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal, against whom no ill motive to falsely charge appellants was shown, must
thus then prevail over the unconvincing alibi and unsubstantiated denial of appellants.
A: He asked me where I was heading.
As for the challenged finding by the trial court of conspiracy among appellants, the same fails.
Q: What was your answer?
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
A: I told him that I am going back to Davao. a crime and decide to commit it.[47] Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate
the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy
Q: What else did he tell you? is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.[48] To exempt himself from criminal liability,
the conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan
A: He told me if he can also ride with us.
to commit the crime.[49]
Q: What did you tell him?
In People v. Concepcion,[50] this Court held:
A: I told him we were already three.
x x x Proof of agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the same may be inferred from the conduct
Q: What happened next?
of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the
A: Since I refused he asked me if I could bring his bag and he mentioned the name of that offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit
cousin of his in Tagum. agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to
be carried out. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or
Q: He mentioned the name? inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action
and community of interest.
A: Yes, Merly.

Q: What is the family name? In the case at bar, as established by the evidence, appellants connived in unlawfully transporting
the subject marijuana. Roble, who was driving the motorcycle at Ulas, did not stop but instead sped away
A: He just mentioned Merly who is residing in Tagum. upon seeing the checkpoint in a clear attempt to avoid inspection by the police officers. When asked as to
the contents of the backpack by SPO1 Goc-ong, appellants passed the same to one another, indicating that
Q: Where in Tagum?
they knew its contents. These circumstances manifest appellants concerted efforts and cooperation
A: Roxas, Tagum. towards the attainment of their criminal objective.

Q: What did you do when he asked you to bring that bag to his cousin in Tagum? Wates and Roble assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal,
they contending that these witnesses contradicted their testimonies-in-chief when they subsequently
A: I asked him what was (sic) the contents? testified on rebuttal that appellants were not nervous or apprehensive at all when they were being
inspected by the policemen.
Q: What did he answer you?
It bears noting, however, that the alleged conflicting observations of SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1
A: He answered clothes. Carvajal referred to by Roble and Wates on their deportment pertain to different stages of the checkpoint
Q: What did you do? inspection as a scrutiny of the records reveals. Thus, in his direct examination, SPO1 Goc-ong testified as
follows:
A: Because were (sic) were in a hurry I slung it in (sic) my shoulder.
Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that backpack, can you tell us why
Q: You did not become suspicious? did you (sic) ask him?

A: No more because I trusted the person and I have an emergency to take (sic) that time.[44] A: I asked about that because I observed them to be acting suspiciously as if they were afraid
and different reactions (sic).
Vinecarios account - that in the evening of April 10, 1995, while he and his co-appellants were
cruising along the highway, a person whom he failed to recognize but who turned out to be an Q: They were acting suspiciously?
 A: Yes. The evidence shows that accused-appellant was apprehended in the act of delivering or transporting
illegal drugs. Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean: to carry or convey
Q: That is what you observed in their faces? from one place to another. When accused-appellant used his vehicle to convey the package containing
marijuana to an unknown destination, his act was part of the process of transporting the said prohibited
A: Yes, sir.[51]
substance. Inherent in the crime of transporting the prohibited drug is the use of a motor vehicle. The
PO1 Carvajal, on cross-examination, echoed Goc-ongs observations on appellants deportment upon very act of transporting a prohibited drug, like in the instant case, is a malum prohibitum since it is
returning to the checkpoint: punished as an offense under a special law. The mere commission of the act constitutes the offense and
is sufficient to validly charge and convict an individual committing the act, regardless of criminal intent.
Q: You said when these three (3) suspects riding the motorcycle returned and stopped you Since the appellant was caught transporting marijuana, the crime being mala prohibita, accused-
said you noticed one of them was nervous, did I get you right? appellants intent, motive, or knowledge, thereof need not be shown.[56] (Underscoring supplied)

A: Yes, sir.
A word on the penalty. As provided in Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the penalty of reclusion
Q: Only one was nervous? perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall transport any prohibited drug. Section 20,
A: All of them. Article IV of the same act provides that the penalty imposed in Section 4 shall be applied if the dangerous
drug is, with respect to marijuana, 750 grams or more. In the case at bar, the marijuana involved weighed
Q: When you said they appeared to be nervous, could that mean that they were trembling?
1,700 grams. Since the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, a resort to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
A: Yes, sir. Code[57] is necessary. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance that attended the
commission of the offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed by the trial
Q: In fact they were pale, is that correct? court. A fine of P500,000.00 should, however, been likewise imposed on the appellants in solidum in
accordance with the law.
A: Yes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case No.
Q: You noticed they were pale despite the fact that it was dark and it was 10:00 oclock in the 35233-95 finding appellants Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates guilty beyond reasonable
evening? doubt of illegally transporting marijuana under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, appellants are sentenced to each suffer the penalty
A: There was light.
of reclusion perpetua and solidarity pay a fine of P500,000.00.
Q: The place was well-lighted?
SO ORDERED.
A: Yes, sir.[52]

On rebuttal, SPO1 Goc-ong stated that appellants were not anxious or apprehensive when he
flagged them down as they crossed the checkpoint.[53]

PO1 Carvajal, on the other hand, testified on rebuttal that Wates was not nervous as Vinecarios
backpack was being opened.[54]

As to the other alleged discrepancies pointed out by Wates and Roble, the following arguments of
the Office of the Solicitor General, which are quoted with approval, should dispose of the same:

It is incorrect to suggest that just because SPO1 Goc-ong testified that other vehicles passed through the
checkpoint before the appellants arrived, the latter could not have sped away from the checkpoint. SPO1
Goc-ong did not give any testimony that other vehicles were still at the checkpoint at the time the
appellants arrived. On the contrary, he testified there was no other vehicle ahead of the appellants at
the checkpoint when the latter arrived on their motorcycle (TSN, June 17, 1999, p.7).

It is also incorrect to suggest that appellants may not have noticed the checkpoint just because SPO1
Goc-ong made no mention of using reflectorized objects at the checkpoint. As described earlier in his
Brief, this witness explained that the checkpoint was visible because it had a sign board at the middle
of the road that read, COMELEC GUN BAN (TSN, June 17, 1999, pp. 6 and 8). There is no way for
appellants not to have noticed the checkpoint.[55]

In fine, appellants defenses fail in light of their clearly proven act of delivering or transporting
marijuana.
[G.R. Nos. 113511-12. July 11, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO SINOC, y SUMAYLO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
In a decision handed down on October 7, 1993 by Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao
City, Danilo Sinoc was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in two cases jointly tried:[1] one, of the special
complex crime of kidnapping with murder (under Article 267 in relation to Articles 248[2] and 48[3] of the
Revised Penal Code) -- in Criminal Case No. 3564; and the other, of the complex crime of kidnapping with
frustrated murder (under Articles 267, 248, 6,[4] and 48 of the same Code) -- in Criminal Case No. 3565. In
each case, the penalty ofreclusion perpetua was imposed on him.[5]
The amended informations under which Sinoc was tried and convicted, both dated January 23,
1992, included five (5) other accused, namely: Vicente Salon @ Dodong, Benjamin Espinosa @ Benji, Jaime
Jornales @ James, Victorino Delegencia @ Jun-Gren, and one Roger Doe @ Ram (at-large).[6] However,
only Sinoc and Vicente Salon were arraigned, on July 14, 1992, the other accused being then at large, as
they still appear to be to this day. Assisted by their respective counsel, both Sinoc and Salon entered pleas
of not guilty and were thereafter jointly tried. The joint trial resulted in Salons acquittal in both cases. The
court agreed with him that none of the witnesses presented by the prosecution remotely implicate** (him
in) the crimes charged, and that (i)ndeed, the only piece of evidence pointing to ** (him[Salon]) as the
mastermind is contained in the affidavit of confession of accused Danilo Sinoc, hence, conspiracy not
having been proved, the case against Salon has to be dismissed. Only Sinoc, therefore, is concerned in the
appeal at bar.
Respecting the essential facts constituting the corpus delicti, there appears to be no serious
dispute. It appears that on September 20, 1991, at about 6 oclock in the morning, Isidoro Viacrusis,
manager of Taganito Mining Corporation, was motoring from the company compound (at Taganito, Claver,
Surigao del Norte) to Surigao City. He was riding on a company vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero (with Plate No.
DFX-397), driven by Tarcisio Guijapon. As Viacrusis and Guijapon were approaching the public cemetery
of Claver, they were stopped by several armed men. The latter, identifying themselves as members of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), boarded the Pajero and ordered Guijapon to proceed. When they reached
Barobo, Surigao del Norte, the armed men ordered Viacrusis and Guijapon to alight, led them, their hands
bound behind their back, to a coconut grove some six meters from the road, and after making them lie
face down on the ground, shot them several times. Viacrusis miraculously survived. The driver, Guijapon,
was not as lucky; he died on the spot.
These facts set forth in, among others, a sworn statement given to the police by Sinoc, infra, and an
affidavit executed and sworn to by Viacrusis on October 17, 1991, about a month later.[7] In that affidavit,
Viacrusis described the armed men who had kidnapped and shot him and Guijapon. The only malefactor
he was able to identify by name, however, was Danilo Sinoc who, he said, had curly hair, (was) known as
Colot (Danilo Sinoc), (and was known to ) driver Tarcing **.
Two prosecution witnesses gave germane testimony at the trial of the consolidated cases: Marlyn
Legaspi a resident of San Vicente, Barobo, Surigao del Sur; and Barangay Captain Terencio Jamero, also of
Barangay San Vicente.
Marlyn testified that she was startled by the sound of gunshots that morning of September 20,
1991. She ran towards the direction of the gunfire and as she neared the place, heard the moaning of a
man. She moved quickly to the highway and saw a blue Pajero parked at the barangay road, its engine
idling; and moments later, she saw the same vehicle running fast towards San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur. She lost no time in reporting the incident to Brangay Councilor Terencio Jamero.
Jamero testified that on receiving Marlyn's report, he and another Councilor, Alberto Saliling, at
once proceeded to the place indicated. There they came upon the slain driver, and Isidoro Viacrusis, lying
on the ground, sorely wounded, crying out for help. With the assistance of policemen of Barobo, they
brought Viacrusis to the Agusan del Sur Provincial Hospital at Patin-ay. Timely medical attention enabled
Viacrusis to recover from his grievous wounds.
The evidence of the prosecution further establishes that in the morning of the following day,
September 21, 1991, at about 7 oclock, a secret informant (known as a civilian asset) named Boyet
reported to the Police Station at Monkayo, Davao del Norte that the stolen (carnapped) Pajero was parked
behind the apartment of a certain Paulino Overa at the Bliss Housing Project at Poblacion, Monkayo. On
instructions of the Station Commander, a police team[8] went to the place. They saw the Pajero and, their
initial inquiries having yielded the information that the man who had brought it there would return that
morning, posted themselves in such a manner as to keep it in view. Some three hours later, at about 10:30
oclock, they saw a man approach the Pajero who, on seeing them, tried to run away. They stopped
him. They found out that the man, identified as Danilo Sinoc, of Surigao del Norte,[9] had the key of the
Pajero, and was acting under instruction of certain companions who were waiting for him at the Star Lodge
at Tagum, Davao del Norte. Riding on the recovered Pajero, the police officers brought Sinoc to the Star
Lodge only to discover that his companions were no longer there. They later turned over Sinoc to the
459(th) Mobile Force, together with the Pajero.
Four months afterwards, in the afternoon of January 21, 1993, SPO1 Roger A. Basadre and two
other officers (of the CIS) brought Danilo Sinoc to the Public Attorneys Office at Curato Street Butuan
City. They asked one of the attorneys there, Atty. Alfredo Jalad, for permission to take Sinocs statement in
writing in his office. Sinoc asked Jalad to assist him because he wished to make an affidavit of confession.
Atty. Jalad told Sinoc that he had the right to choose his own counsel, and to remain silent. Sinoc
said he wanted to make the affidavit nonetheless, and be assisted by Jalad in doing so. The latter then had
Sinoc narrate the occurrence in question in Cebuano/Visayan, a dialect with which Sinoc was familiar. That
done, Jalad asked Sinoc if the CIS had promised him anything for the affidavit he would execute. Sinoc said
no. Only then did the CIS officers commence to take Sinocs statement, typing their questions and Sinocs
answer -- as well as the initial appraisal of his constitutional rights -- on a typewriter in Atty. Jalads office.
In his sworn statement,[10] Sinoc declared that he knew the victims, Isidoro Viacrusis and Tarcisio
Guijapon because he was formerly working at Taganito Mining Company (TAMICO); that in June, 1991, he
learned that Benjamin Espinosa (@ Benji), Jaime Jornales (@ James), Victorino Delegencio (@ Jun-Gren),
and a certain Ram had been monitoring the activities of TAMICO Manager Viacrusis whom they planned
to kidnap and rob of his Pajero, and make it appear to be an act of the NPA; that the criminal undertaking
was planned by a certain Vicente Salon (@ Dodong), who made available the needed funds and two (2)
hand guns; that in September, 1991, at a meeting of the group at the boarding house of Jun-Gren to which
he (Sinoc) was invited, Sinoc was offered P20,000.00 to join in the kidnapping and carnapping operation;
that he agreed because of poverty; that in the morning of September 20, 1991, at about 6:30 oclock, he,
Ram and Benjamin Espinosa stopped the Pajero driven by Tarcisio Guijapon in which Viacrusis was riding,
brandishing two .35 caliber revolvers, and a piece of wood shaped like a rifle; that they boarded the
vehicle, identifying themselves as NPA (soldiers of the New Peoples Army) and had the driver proceed
towards Surigao City; that at the bridge of Tres de Mayor, they had the Pajero stop to pick-up two other
companions, James (Jaime Jornales) and Jun-Gren (Victor Delegencia); that Ram took over the wheel and
drove towards Butuan City; that at San Vicente, Barobo, Ram turned into a feeder road and stopped about
seven (7) meters from the highway; that there, Viacrusis and Guijapon, whose hands had been tied behind
their back, were made to get down; that James Jornales shot Viacrusis four times after which Jun-Gren
Delegencia, Jr. fired at Guijapon four times , too; that when Sinoc remonstrated at the shootings, he was
told it was on Dodong Salons orders; that the malefactors then proceeded to the Bliss Housing Project at
Monkayo where they left the Pajero, this being the place where the mastermind, Vicente Salon, was
supposed to get the vehicle and pay Sinoc the promised sum of P20,000.00; that they then all went to
Tagum; that on the following day, Sinoc was instructed by Jun-gren and James to return to Monkayo with
the key of the Pajero and deliver it to Ram, and that when he arrived at the place at about 9 o clock in the
morning, he was apprehended by soldiers and brought to the 459(th) PNP Mobile Company.
 During the entire period of Sinocs interrogation, which commenced at about 3:00 P.M., Atty. Jalad
remained seated beside him; and at its conclusion, Jalad read to Sinoc the contents of his statement from
beginning to end. The statement was thereafter signed by Sinoc and by Jalad, the latter being described
as witness to signature.[11]
Sinoc was next brought to the home of Butuan City Prosecutor Ernesto M. Brocoy so that he might
take oath on his statement. This was about 7:00 P.M. After going over the statement, City Fiscal Brocoy
told Sinoc that it was very damaging, briefly discussing the contents thereof in Cebuano. The latter stood
by his answers, however, averring that they have been voluntarily given. Evidently satisfied of the
authenticity and voluntariness of the statement, Brocoy administered the oath to Sinoc, and signed the
certification typed at the left hand margin of page 4 thereof, reading: SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before
me this 21st day of January 1992, at Butuan City, Philippines. I hereby certify that I personally examined
the herein affiant and that I am satisfied that he voluntarily executed and understood his statement." He
also initialed every page of the statement.[12]
While under detention at the Provincial Jail, awaiting trial, Sinoc wrote two (2) letters to the Trial
Judge dated June and July, 1992, in both of which he asked that he be transferred to the City Jail because
he had heard that Vicente Salon, who had been arrested on the strength of his sworn statement, had made
plans to kill him. He sent the Judge a third letter -- dated August 11, 1993, consisting of four (4) pages --
which is described by His Honor as substantially a repetition of the contents of his affidavit of confession.
All the letters were handwritten in block letters in the Cebuano dialect.[13]
Sinoc proffered the defense of alibi. His claim, as summarized by his counsel, was that on September
19, 1991, he was in Sibagat, Agusan del Sur together with his wife and prepared on that early morning to
sell tableya (native chocolate) in Tagum, Davao del Norte. On the same day they reached Tagum and they
sold tableya and on the same day they were not able to sell the tableya; on September 20, 1991 they were
again selling tableya in Tagum, Davao del Norte. It was while in Tagum that ** (they met) a certain Darves,
they did not know exactly the name, he offered to them the money to accompany the said driver of Darves
who is name(d) Ram. He was offered ** money to accompany this Ram in prior (sic) to allegedly get the
Pajero vehicle from Moncayo together with Ram, and while in Moncayo he was first apprehended by the
police and detained at Moncayo, first ** (by) the 459 Mobile Force of ** Moncayo and on January 14,
1992 to January 24, 1992 he was detained by the CIS authorities in Butuan City.
Elaborating, Sinoc testified that he saw Darves with three companions at a certain restaurant in
Tagum; that Darves introduced himself, and offered to give him P1,000.00) if he would accompany his
driver to get a vehicle at Moncayo; that he agreed, and at 6 o clock in the morning of September 21, 1991
he went to the Star Lodge where Darves was staying; that there, he was introduced to the latters driver,
Ram, given P1,000.00, and told to go with Ram; and that he went out of the Star Lodge, gave his
wife P800.00, and then went with Ram to Moncayo on board a bus.
In Moncayo, they went to where the Pajero was parked. Sinoc went towards the vehicle. Ram
lagged behind, having paused to buy some cigarettes. When Sinoc reached the Pajero, five persons
suddenly pointed guns at him, searched him, and found on him the key to the Pajero which Darves had
given to him. The five persons, who were led by Sgt. Michael Aringgo of the PNP, brought him to the
Moncayo police station where they investigated him without informing him of his constitutional rights.
In the afternoon of that day, September 21, 1991, he was surrendered to the 459th Mobile Force
Company which detained him until January 14, 1992. On this date he was taken by CIS personnel and
brought to the CIS Compound at Butuan City, at which place he was confined up to January 24, 1992, and
subjected to interrogation without being informed that he had a right to remain silent. He was told,
however, that he had the right to counsel, but although he told the investigators that his lawyer was Atty.
Gavino Samontina, they never called the latter.
The investigators wish him to sign an affidavit. When he refused, they maltreated him by repeatedly
submerging his head in a toilet bowl full of excrement, as well as by tying him on a bed, raising the bed on
one end so that his feet were up and his head down, and keeping him in that position for hours.
On January 20, 1992, his wife and Efren Dak-ang came to see him at the CIS Compound. He talked
to them and revealed what was being done to him while under investigation.
On January 21, 1992, after having been interrogated the whole night, he finally agreed to sign the
affidavit because the CIS officers told him, (We) will kill you or salvage you. In fact, the night before, police
officers had brought him to an uninhabited place near the bridge and, with guns pointed at his head,
commanded him to run. He refused, of course. So, in the afternoon of that day, at around 4 o clock, he
was brought to the office of Public Attorney Jalad, where the police investigators hurriedly typed his
affidavit and made him sign it. He denied that Atty. Jalad informed him of his constitutional rights. He
asserted that when he told Jalad he had his own lawyer, Jalad merely remarked, Never mind, all attorneys
are just the same as long as it is attorney. He was next brought to Fiscal Brocoy who, without talking to
him, right away signed that document (his confession).
Sinoc also explained how he had come to write the letter of August 11, 1992 to the judge some
seven months after his confession. That letter -- it will be recalled and as is evident from a comparison of
both documents -- was described by the latter as substantially a repetition of the contents of his affidavits
of confession, supra.[14] He said: (T)here were persons who visited me while at the Provincial Jail and told
me to accept the crime ** because if I will not accept the crime my wife and my children (and) my parents,
they will liquidate all of them **.
Sinocs wife, Jovita, testified for the defense, and sought to corroborate his testimony. She affirmed
that she had seen her husband at the CIS on September 20, 1992, at about 8:30 in the evening, and he had
told her to keep ** silent, not to tell anybody that he will be accompan(ied) by the CIS. Efren Dak-ang also
gave corroborating testimony.
For some undisclosed reason, the surviving victim, Isodoro Viacrusis, did not testify; this, despite
the fiscals assurances to the Trial Judge that he was very interested in giving evidence.Obviously because
of Viacrusis failure to testify, his affidavit of October 17, 1991 was not formally offered, being obviously
hearsay, although it is attached to the record.
Be this at it may, the Trial Court was satisfied that the evidence actually presented by the
Government sufficed to establish Sinocs guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the two felonies with which he
stood charged.
Sinoc has taken an appeal to this Court and ascribes to the Trial Court the following errors: (1)
convicting him of the offenses charged although conspiracy had not been independently proven to exist
among him and the other persons named in the indictment; (2) not rejecting the evidence obtained after
he had been arrested without any warrant of arrest, and (3) not rejecting his confession after he had been
illegally arrested and had thereafter been under custodial investigation ..without a counsel of choice from
September 21, 1991 to January 20, 1992, first by the Monkayo 459th Mobile Force, and later by the C.I.S.,
Butuan City.
As regards Sinocs claim of illegal arrest, the law provides that an arrest without warrant may be
licitly effected by a peace officer, inter alia When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.[15]
There is no question that the police officers in this case were aware that an offense had just been
committed: i.e., that some twelve hours earlier, a Pajero belonging to a private company had been stolen
(carnapped) and its driver and passenger shot, the former having died and the latter being on the verge of
death. Nor is there any doubt that an informer (asset) had reported that the stolen Pajero was at the Bliss
Housing Project at the Moncayo. It was precisely to recover the Pajero that a team composed of SPO1
Micheal Aringo and joint elements of 459 PNP MFC and Monkayo Police Stn. Led by Insptr. Eden T. Ugale,
went to that place and, on taking custody of the Pajero, forthwith dispatched a radio message to Higher
Headquarters advising of that fact.[16]
There is no question either that when SPO1 Aringo and his companions reached the place where
the Pajero was parked, they were told by Paulino Overa, owner of the apartment behind which the vehicle
was parked, that the man who had brought the Pajero would be back by 12:00 noon; that the person thus
described did in fact show up at about 10:00 A.M., and was immediately identified by Overa as the one
who rode on that car pajero;'[17] just as there is no question that when the police officers accosted him,
Sinoc had the key to the stolen Pajero and was in the act of moving toward it admittedly to take possession
of it (after having arrived by bus from Tagum together with another suspect, Ram). Sinocs link to the stolen
vehicle (and hence to the kidnapping and killing accompanying its asportation) was thus palpable.
The foregoing circumstances left the police officers no alternative save to arrest Sinoc and take
possession of the Pajero. His arrest without warrant was justified; indeed, it was in the premises the
officers clear duty to apprehend him; their omission to do so would have been inexcusable.
Sinocs assault against the propriety of his interrogation after his warrantless arrest, because
conducted without advice to him of his constitutional rights, is pointless. It is true that, as candidly
admitted by the arresting officers, their initial interrogation of Sinoc was made without his first being told
of his corresponding rights. This is inconsequential, for the prosecution never attempted to prove what he
might have said on that occasion.
The confession made by him some time afterwards at the Public Attorneys Office at Butuan City is
altogether a different matter, however. The record adequately shows it to have been executed voluntarily
and under applicable safeguards, apart from being confirmed by, or consistent with, other evidence.
Sinoc does not dispute that he was taken to the Public Attorneys Office; that he spoke to Atty.
Alfredo Jalad and it was in the latters office that his confession was prepared by the CIS investigator. Nor
does he deny that he was then brought to the home of City Prosecutor Ernesto M. Brocoy who certified
that the confession had been subscribed and sworn to before him and that he was satisfied that Sinoc had
voluntarily executed and understood his statement. Sinoc nonetheless claims that he was under
intimidation at that time and never advised of his constitutional rights.
After carefully considering the evidence, this Court is convinced that the Trial Judge was correct in
accepting the account of the execution of Sinocs confession (Exhs. K, K-1 to K-5) narrated by Public Atty.
Alfedo Jalad and City Prosecutor Ernesto Brocoy, to the effect that the confession was voluntarily given
after he had been duly informed of his constitutional rights. No reason whatever is discernible in the record
for these Government officials to give false evidence against Sinoc, or testify otherwise than to the truth.
Sinocs confession of January 21, 1992 is confirmed by the letter he admittedly wrote to the Trial
Judge more than a year later, on August 11, 1993,[18] the contents of which are, as observed by the Trial
Judge, substantially identical with those of the confession. In said letter, in which he narrates in no little
detail the same story contained in his confession, he apologizes for bothering you again at this time
(obviously referring to his prior letters to the Judge of June and July 1992), and gives his reasons for writing
the latest letter: to ask for the Judges assistance and take account of his allegation that his agreement with
his co-accused was only to stop the "Pajero," that it was poverty that impelled him to join the plotters
(Vicente Salon, et al.); to see that Tarcisio Guijapon and Viacrucis be given justice; and to plead that the
Judge take pity on him, and not give him too heavy a penalty.
The confession is also consistent with Sinoc's testimony at his trial in which he admitted that he had
indeed traveled from Tagum to Monkayo where he was arrested; and that he had made the trip, together
with his co-accused, Ram, precisely to get the stolen Pajero the key of which he had on his person at the
time. It contains details (e.g., the use of two (2) hand guns and a wooden rifle, the bringing of the Pajero
from the scene of the killing to Moncayo, the identities of the individual malefactors who shot the victims)
which is improbable to think were conjured out of thin air by the police investigators or deduced from
other evidence. The confession is consistent, too, with the other proofs, particularly the testimony of
Marlyn Legaspi and Barangay Councilor Jamero as regards the time and place of the shooting of the hapless
victims.
In any event, the Trial Judge appears to have carefully assessed the demeanor of the witnesses for
the prosecution and those for the defense, in relation to the documents on record, and on this basis and
from his vantage point, found that the prosecutions proof were more credible than the defense, and that
their combined weight established beyond reasonable doubt the appellants culpable participation in the
crimes charged.
It must additionally be pointed out that apart from Sinocs protestations that his extrajudicial
confession was the result of torture and threats, no competent evidence exists on record to substantiate
that claim. He made no such claim to either Public Attorney Alfredo Jalad or City Prosecutor Ernesto Brocoy
although there is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate any cause for him to distrust either
government officer, much less believe they were in conspiracy with the police officers to concoct a case
against him. In fact, although he professes to have disclosed his supposed maltreatment to his wife when
she visited him at the place of his detention, the latter made no mention of it in her testimony, nor did she
ever attempt to have him medically examined to confirm such a revelation, if it had been made. Moreover,
the counsel he said he wanted to represent him during his interrogation at Public Attorney Jalads office,
Atty. Gavino Samontina, was never presented to confirm his statement.
While the evidence does show that Sinoc became embroiled in a criminal conspiracy[19] -- he agreed
(out of poverty, he says) to join in a crime being planned by certain men named by him and decided to
commit it with them -- the agreement, as far as he was concerned, was to waylay Viacrusis, the Manager
of the Tagum Mining Company, and rob him of his Pajero, for which his share would be P20,000.00; but it
did not include the shooting of Viacrusis or any one else. In fact, he raised a protest when Viacrusis and
Guijapon were shot. In other words, as far as Sinoc understood it, and as far as may in fact be deduced
from the evidence, the plan was not so much to capture Viacrusis and deprived him of liberty, even less to
assassinate him, but to steal his Pajero by violent means. The kidnapping was not the principal objective;
it was merely incidental to the forcible taking of the vehicle. Unfortunately, by reason or on the occasion
of the seizure of the Pajero -- and (as far as the proofs demonstrate) without foreknowledge on Sinocs
part -- its driver was killed, and the lone passenger seriously injured.
There was thus no kidnapping as the term is understood in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code --
the essential object of which is to kidnap, or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
liberty. The idea of kidnapping in this case appears to have been the result of the continuous but
uninformed use of that term by the peace officers involved in the investigation, carelessly carried over into
the indictments and the record of the trial, and even accepted by His Honor.[20]
The offense actually committed in Criminal Case No. 3564 -- where the killing of Tarcesio Guijapon
accompanied the taking of the Pajero-- is that defined and penalized by Article 294 of the Criminal
Code,[21] viz.:
ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons-- Penalties.-- Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime
of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson.
*** *** ***."
It is germane to observe that even if the intent to deprive of liberty were as important or primordial
an objective as the asportation of the Pajero, the kidnapping would be absorbed in the robbery with
homicide;[22] and that the term, homicide, is used in the quoted article in the generic sense-- i.e., as also
including murder, the nature of the offense not being altered by the treacherous character, or the number,
of the killings in connection with the robbery.[23]
On the other hand, the wrongful acts actually proven to have been committed by the defendants
in Criminal Case No. 3565 are: (1) robbery, of course, as above described, and (2) frustrated murder on the
occasion thereof -- gunshot wounds having been inflicted on Isidoro Viacrusis, while bound and prostrate
on the ground, utterly unable to put up any defense, the wounds being of such a nature as would have
resulted in his death were it not for timely medical intervention. Obviously, these acts do not fall within
the ambit of article 294, which treats of the special complex crime of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons, but NOT robbery with attempted or frustrated homicide (or murder), although the
law does punish the crime of attempted and frustrated robbery with homicide.[24]

Neither do the crimes come within the operation of Article 48 of the Criminal Code which, speaking
of complex crimes, provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Actually in this case, the two crimes of
carnapping and frustrated murder did not result from a single act. Nor was either offense a necessary
means for committing the other. The shooting of the victim was not necessary to commit the carnapping;
indeed, at the time the victim was shot, the carnapping had already been consummated. And, of course,
the cannapping which, according to the evidence, was the conspirators principal objective, was not
necessary to perpetrate the shooting.

It follows then that the malefactors felonious acts in Criminal Case No. 3565 cannot be regarded as
juridically fused into a complex crime under Article 48. They should be considered separate offenses,
separately punishable.

Now, Sinoc admittedly entered into a conspiracy with his co-accused; but he insists that as far as he
was concerned, the conspiracy was to carnap the Pajero, and did not include any killing or assault against
persons. His theory is that the slaying of the driver and passenger might conceivably have been
contemplated from the outset by one or some or all his co-conspirators; But Sinoc himself never had that
intention. Indeed, he says he had no inkling that the shooting would take place; had no opportunity to
prevent it, and could only remonstrate about it after it was done; and he invokes the doctrine that
conspirators may only be held accountable for the acts embraced in the criminal agreement; and as
regards felonious acts not included, only the author thereof would be liable.[25]

Sinocs disclaimers notwithstanding, it is this Courts view that the crime that may properly be
ascribed to him in Case No. 3564 is robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. For
unfortunately for him, there is no avoiding the fact that a homicide -- although not agreed to or expected
by him -- was committed on the occasion of the robbery of the Pajero; and he could not but have realized
or anticipated the possibility of serious harm, even death, being inflicted on the person or persons in the
Pajero targeted for robbery, since two of his companions were armed with guns, even if in his mind, to
repeat, his agreement with them did not include killing.[26] The most that can be conceded is to credit him
with the mitigating circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.[27]

Sinoc may not be held liable in Case No. 3565 for the separate offense of frustrated murder as
regards Viacrusis, for the reasons already mentioned; in this particular case, the evidence shows that he
agreed only to the plan to carnap the Pajero, but not to any assault or killing.[28] Nor is it logical to convict
him twice of robbery of the same property under the same circumstances. Hence, he may not be
pronounced responsible for the separate offense of robbery of the same Pajero, in addition to being
declared guilty of robbery (of that same Pajero) with homicide under Article 294.

The penalty imposable on Sinoc is that provided in Article 294 of the Penal Code, which is reclusion
perpetua to death. Appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that done, the penalty that should be applied to him is reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 3564, appellant Danilo Sinoc, being guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of robbery with homicide defined and punished by Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Criminal Case No. 3565 is DISMISSED as to him.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74189 May 26, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO ENRILE Y VILLAROMAN and ROGELIO ABUGATAL Y MARQUEZ, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Felix O. Lodero, Jr. for accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P30,000.00 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
Antonio Enrile faults the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for convicting him.1 His co-accused, Rogelio
Abugatal, was killed in an attempted jailbreak and this appeal is dismissed as to him.2 We deal here only
with Enrile.
The evidence for the prosecution showed that at about half past six in the evening of October 25, 1985, a
buy-bust team composed of Pat. Jaime Flores and Pat. Wilson Rances of the Quezon City Police Anti-
Narcotics Unit was dispatched to entrap Rogelio Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San Francisco Del
Monte, Quezon City. The plan was made on the strength of a tip given by Renato Polines, a police
informer, who was himself to pose as the buyer.3
In their separate testimonies,4 both policemen said that on the occasion they saw Polines hand over to
Abugatal the marked money representing payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the
money and returned ten minutes later with a wrapped object which he gave Polines. The two policemen
then approached Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the wrapped
object. Subsequent laboratory examination revealed this to be marijuana with flowering tops weighing
22 grams.5
The prosecution also showed that, upon providing Abugatal led the policemen to a house at 20 De Vera
Street, also in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City, where he called out for Antonio Enrile. Enrile came
out and met them at the gate. Abugatal pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana, whereupon the
policemen immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right front pocket of his trousers the
marked money earlier delivered to Abugatal, with Serial No. PJ966425.6
At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession affirming the above narration.7 Enrile
refused to make any statement pending consultation with a lawyer.
In his defense, Enrile testified that the marked money was "planted" on him by the police officers, who
he said simply barged into his house without a warrant and arrested him. He stoutly denied any
knowledge of the marijuana. He claimed that at the time of the alleged incident, he was attending, as a
dental technician, to a patient whom he was fitting for dentures.8 The supposed patient, Alicia Tiempo,
corroborated him.
Enrile admitted that he had earlier been convicted of selling marijuana and that he had a pending
application for probation. He suggested that this could be the reason the policemen sought to implicate
him in the new charge and thus weaken his application.10
Abugatal contradicted his earlier sworn statement and declared on the stand that he had not sold any
marijuana to Polines. What really happened, he said, was that two male teenagers approached him that
evening and told him to buy marijuana, giving him P50.00 for the purpose. When he said he did not have
any marijuana and did not know where to buy it, they forced him to go to Enrile's house and to give him
the marked money. He did so because they had a knife. Enrile handed him a plastic bag which was later
found to contain dried marijuana fruiting tops.
Judge Willelmo C. Fortun erred when he gave credence to the sworn statement of Abugatal, considering
that it was made without compliance with the requisites of a custodial investigation, including the right
to the assistance of counsel. The confession was clearly inadmissible. It did not follow the ruling of this
Court in Morales v. Enrile,12 promulgated on April 26, 1983, as reiterated in People v. Galit,13
promulgated on March 20, 1985, where Justice Hermogenes Concepcion laid down the correct
procedure, thus:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of
the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein
laid down, whether exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The challenged decision of the trial court was promulgated on February 14, 1986, long after the above-
cited decisions had become effective.
Even under the old doctrine, in fact, it is doubtful if Abugatal's confession without the assistance of
counsel could have been sustained. It was not enough then to inform the suspect of his constitutional
rights. The trial court had to ascertain for itself that the accused clearly understood the import and
consequences of his confession and had the intelligence and mental capacity to do so.14 There is no
showing in the record that this was done, short of the statement in the decision that Abugatal had been
informed of his rights and had validly waived the assistance of counsel.
If the sworn statement of Abugatal was inadmissible against him, much less was it admissible against
Enrile.
The prosecution rejected Abugatal's testimony that he was forced to go to Enrile's house and buy
marijuana from him, insisting instead on the extrajudicial confession. With that confession outlawed and
the testimony disowned by the prosecution itself, there is no evidence at all against Enrile to tie him with
Abugatal.
It was Abugatal who was allegedly caught red-handed by the policemen as he sold the marijuana to
Polines. Enrile was not even at the scene of the entrapment at that time. Abugatal said he did lead the
policemen to Enrile's house where he pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana. Even assuming
this to be true, that circumstance alone did not justify Enrile's warrantless arrest and search.
Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or a private person may make a
warrantless arrest only under any of the following circumstances :
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;.
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in point because the policemen
who later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal knowledge that he was the source of marijuana.
According to the policemen themselves, what happened was that they asked Abugatal who gave him the
marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this reason that they proceeded to Enrile's house and
immediately arrested him.15

What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the basis of the information
supplied by Abugatal, and then, with such authority, proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful,
arrest Enrile. They had no right to simply force themselves into his house on the bare (and subsequently
disallowed) allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the police station as if he had been caught in
flagrante delicto.

The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the act of selling marijuana.
The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not retroactively
validate the warrantless search and seizure.

The principle has been honored through the ages in all liberty-loving regimes that a man's house is his
castle that not even the mighty monarch, with all its forces, may violate. There were measures available
under the law to enable the authorities to search Enrile's house and to arrest him if he was found in
possession of prohibited articles. The police did not employ these measures.

What they did was simply intrude into Enrile's house and arrest him without the slightest heed to the
injunctions of the Bill of Rights. By so doing, they were using the tactics of the police state, where the
minions of the government place little value on human rights and individual liberties and are obssessed
only with the maintenance of peace and punishment of crime.

These are laudible objectives in any well-ordered society. But it should never be pursued at the cost of
dismantling the intricate apparatus for the protection of the individual from overzealous law-enforcers
who mistakenly believe that suspected criminals have forfeited the safeguards afforded them by the
Constitution. Law-enforcers are not licensed to themselves break the law to apprehend and punish law-
breakers. Such a practice only leads to further defiance of the law by those who have been denied its
protectio.

In the light of the proven circumstances of this case, the Court is not convinced that there is enough
evidence to establish Enrile's guilt beyond the shadow of doubt. The paucity of such evidence only
strengthens the suspicion that the marked money was really "planted" on Enrile by the police officers
who were probably worried that their earlier efforts in securing Enrile's conviction as a drug pusher
would be thwarted by his application for probation.

Whatever their motives, the fact is that Abugatal's sworn statement implicating Enrile is inadmissible
against Enrile, and so is the marked money allegedly found on him as a result of the illegal search. The
only remaining evidence against the appellant is Abugatal's testimony, but this has been questioned and
discredited by the prosecution itself. Its case against Enrile is thus left without a leg to stand on and must
therefore be dismissed.

Law-enforcement authorities are admonished that mere enthusiasm in the discharge of their duties is
not enough to build a case against a person charged with a crime. They should build it with painstaking
care, stone by stone of provable fact, and with constant regard for the rights of the accused, before they
can hope to secure a conviction that can be sustained in a court of justice.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Antonio Enrile in the challenged decision is hereby SET ASIDE and
REVERSED. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and shall be released immediately. It is so ordered.
 RODEL LUZ y ONG, G. R. No. 197788
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,[1] Promulgated:
Respondent.
February 29, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 2011[2]and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the
prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of
the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on
March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was
coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga
City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down
the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers
to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to
come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is
almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante
were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that
the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was
alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his
jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly
put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal
container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one
(1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he
asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he
noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction,
the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out
to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two
(2) contained suspected shabu.[3]
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of Not guilty to the
charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after
which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the
prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of
evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,[4] the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs[5] committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that
he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the
discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense
of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its
Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ
y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum,
to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance
with law.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent
to file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS
INVALID.
 (ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY
OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).[7]
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He
claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation
ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims
that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this
case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-
012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders
thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The
accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he
was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his
possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers
to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually committing a
crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other
words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance,
he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x
x x.[8]
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal
cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors,
though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds
other than those that the parties raised as errors.[9]
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation,
he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense.[10] It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by
that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission
is necessary.[11]
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for
dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license
of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and
peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in
apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant
thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this
Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed
and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a
motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date
of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and
shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen
days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or
revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual[12] provides the following procedure for
flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in
Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit
operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when applicable: x x
x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT)
or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged,
unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the
vehicles occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not
be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive
him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which
petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the
trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that
petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,[13] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether
the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered
custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation,
nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the
motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly
curtails the freedom of action of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the
detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a
policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away without
permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the
Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in
Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in
which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide
 whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently
impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he
be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person
questioned will be induced to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a
traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside
detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists expectations, when he sees a
policemans light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short
period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license
and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most
likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to
an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which
frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning
will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at
451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not
such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the
aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that
the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in
combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But
other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a
so-called Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x
x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains
the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the
dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops
prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are
not in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
xxxxxxxxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will
not come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become
applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated
with formal arrest. California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If
a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected
to treatment that renders him in custody for practical purposes, he will be entitled
to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest
questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such
that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly
characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be
considered under arrest at the time that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure
to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a
warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a
fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an
intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody,
the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or
intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon being flagged
down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a
valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest,
if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement they might make could be used against them.[14] It may also be noted that in this case, these
constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a
person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that
the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the
inherently compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting itself, which
work to undermine the individuals will to resist, and as much as possible to free
courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the
fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated
as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they
are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged down for a traffic
violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested
for a second timeafter the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances.[15] None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest,
are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in
plain view. It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the
evidence was not immediately apparent.[16]
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
shown by clear and convincing evidence.[17] It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza,
this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that
petitioner was merely told to take out the contents of his pocket.[18]
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from
the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the
search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7)
the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving,
by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily
given.[19] In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the
morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of
valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when a police
officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be
afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.[20]
In Knowles v. Iowa,[21] the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding
and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the
officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-
blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct
minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the search
incident to arrest exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him
into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But
neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is
sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis both
legitimate and weighty, x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic
citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In
Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves danger to an officer because of
the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and
transporting him to the police station. 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that
[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant
proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest. Id., at 234,
n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and is
more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest. Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296
(1973) (Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to
the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy
incriminating evidence).
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case
of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra,
at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the
minimal additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it
does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full
fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other,
independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For
example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and
any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a patdown of a driver and any
passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a Terry patdown of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous
and may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032,
1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment,
including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton,
453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to
arrestthe need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for
speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense
had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found
either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality
of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean
a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.[22]
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.[23] Any evidence obtained in violation of
said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize
may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without
contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.[24]
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.[25] The drugs are the
very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility
precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.[26]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause
or ground.
 SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122764. September 24, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNESTO PEREZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Before us for automatic review is the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog
City, Samar[2] Criminal Case No. 1899 convicting accused-appellant Ernesto Perez, also known as Erning, of
the felony of rape committed against his stepdaughter, sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death,
and ordering him to pay his victim the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of the
criminal action.
On the basis of a complaint[3] subscribed by Maribel Perez, an information was filed in the court a
quo against appellant for allegedly raping Maribel, his stepdaughter. The indictment alleges:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1994, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Ilo,
Municipality of Sta. Margarita, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) MARIBEL PEREZ
against her will; that in the commission of the said offense, the accused acted with grave abuse of
confidence, he being the stepfather of the complainant, by enticing her to leave their house located at
159 J. Fegiras (sic) St., Sampaloc, Manila and was brought to Barangay Ilo, Sta. Margarita, Samar where
the above-mentioned offense was committed.[4]
On being duly arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the accusation against him.[5] Thereafter, a
full-blown trial was conducted in the court below, wherein the People and appellant were afforded full
opportunity to establish their respective versions of the criminal charge.
Under meticulous examination by the public prosecutor and appellant's counsel de
oficio, complainant Maribel candidly and innocently related in open court the circumstances surrounding
the rape, together with the unfortunate antecedents which culminated in its commission.
According to Maribel,[6] appellant brought her to Samar from their residence in Sampaloc, Manila
sometime in February 1994, supposedly to separate her from her siblings who were drug users or
addicts. Maribel was only thirteen years old then. Appellant is her stepfather, he being the second
husband of her mother, Anacleta de la Cruz. When they arrived in Samar, they stayed in the house of the
spouses Raul and Nida Nieva at Barangay Ilo in the town of Sta. Margarita.
While appellant and the Nievas were drinking in the kitchen on he night of February 21, 1994,
complainant proceeded to the bedroom to sleep. The kitchen, wherein the Nievas would be spending the
night was about one arm's length away from the bedroom.
At around nine o'clock that evening, Maribel was awakened by the presence of someone pulling
down her panties. Complainant soon realized that it was appellant who was removing
her underwear.Appellant spread her legs, went on top of her and started thrusting his genital organ
toward her private parts. Complainant cried in pain when appellant's penis penetrated into her vagina. To
stifle Maribel's outcries, appellant covered her mouth with his hand and warned her that he would box
her if she again shouted or resisted his bestial advances.
Faced with that threat, complainant no longer struggled against appellant as he continued with his
lechery. After a while, appellant withdrew from Maribel and masturbated in front of her. Semen, which
complainant later naively referred to as water, was thereafter ejaculated by appellant toward her
vagina. Eventually, appellant proceeded to sleep beside the victim.
The following morning, Nida Nieva asked Maribel why she was crying the night before. After
complainant revealed to Nida the sexual assault committed by appellant, the two immediately went to
the capitan of Barangay Ilo and then to the police headquarters of Sta. Margarita to report the
incident. On the same day, Maribel was brought to the Calbayog District Hospital for physical examination.
Dr. Flora M. RosaleS[7] examined Maribel on February 22, 1994 and found a fresh laceration on her
hymen at a 3 o'clock position. She later explained before the trial court that said laceration could have
been caused by the insertion of a male sex organ within twenty-four hours prior to the examination.
Maribel, on her part, recounted in vivid detail the antecedents which led to her coming to Samar
and the facts of the rape committed against her, as hereinbefore narrated. She explained that she was
able to identify appellant as her assailant due to the illumination coming from the light on the electric post
outside the house.
Appellant[8] denied the charge against him and claimed that nothing felonious happened on the
night of February 21, 1994. He testified that he slept on the terrace near the stairs of the Nieva house at 9
o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1994. On that same night, Raul's brother, Lito, together with his four
children, came and spent the night in the house of the Nievas.
Because the house is small, the four daughters of Lito slept with appellant on the terrace while Raul,
Nida, Lito and Maribel slept in the bedroom, When appellant arose at midnight to urinate, he was surprised
to see Maribel lying and sleeping beside him on the terrace. Appellant proceeded. to the river nearby, here
he urinated and then went back to sleep beside Maribel.
In the morning of the following day, Maribel told appellant that she was having her
menstruation. Like a good father, appellant. claims that he gave complainant money to buy sanitary
napkins.
Appellant admitted that he married Anacleta de la Cruz in a civil ceremony before a judge when
Maribel was only five years old. He treated Maribel as his own child and provided for her support. When
asked for complainant's age, he answered at she was thirteen years old. He went to Samar on February
f994 to visit Raul, the son of his kumadre Maria Nieva. He brought Maribel along with him because he
wanted to keep her away from the two other sons of his wife who were drug addicts.
He surmised that Maribel probably suspected him to be her assailant because he was the one lying
beside her when she woke up in the morning. He gave no other reason or explanation why she would
impute to him such a heinous and capital offense.
To impeach the credibility of Maribel, the defense presented Rodolfo Francisco, [9] a detention
prisoner who came to know appellant at the Municipal Jail of Sta. Margarita. Francisco declared that while
he was sweeping the floor near the investigation room of the police headquarters on February 23, 1994,
he heard Maribel denying before the Chief of Police of Sta. Margarita that her father raped her. He also
heard her saying that appellant was just being suspected by the people in Barangay Ilo as the rapist who
attacked her.
 On February 13, 1995, the presiding judge of the lower court conducted an ocular inspection[10] of
the locus criminis and ascertained the presence of the electric post near the Nieva house as testified to by
Maribel. In the course of his inspection, he also asked the present occupant of the house, Francisca
Cajurao, and a barangay councilor, Jovito de los Santos, a number of questions seeking clarification of
some matters concerning the crime.
Finding the testimony of complainant credible and trustworthy, the trial court declared appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge lodged against him. Since Maribel was less than eighteen
years of age at the time of the rape and her attacker is her stepfather, appellant was condemned by the
lower court to suffer the death penalty.
After a conscientious review of the records and an objective evaluation of the evidence, we agree
with the lower court that Maribel is indeed telling the truth. The trial court drew its conclusion from the
direct, positive and categorical assertions made by complainant on the witness stand on the material
occurrences of the criminal incident. Her testimony palpably bears the, earmarks of truth and jibes with
the material points involved.
Maribel did not waver during her testimony when asked by the judge a quo, the public prosecutor
and the defense counsel to describe how she was sexually abused. Her detailed narration before the lower
court was given in a straightforward and candid manner. We have heretofore concluded that a rape victim
who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains consistent, is
a credible witness.[11]
Moreover, when the testimony of a rape victim is simple and straightforward, unshaken by a rigid
cross-examination and unflawed by any inconsistency or contradiction, as in the present case, the same
must be given full faith and credit.[12] Maribel's testimony gives no impression whatsoever that her story
is a mere fabrication. If her story had only been contrived, she would not have been so composed and
consistent throughout her entire testimony in the face of intense and lengthy interrogation.[13]
[14]
We also note that her account of the rape in her affidavit during the investigation by the police
and her testimony during the trial are concordant with each other. There is no material deficiency or
substantial inconsistency between such testimony and affidavit of Maribel. Furthermore, being young and
immature, the testimony of this complainant deserves full credence.[15]
It has long been firmly settled that an unmarried teenage lass would not ordinarily file a complaint
for rape against anyone if it were not true.[16] We repeat once again that a woman would not admit that
she has been raped, make public the offense, allow the examination of her private parts, undergo the
trouble and humiliation of public trial, and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its sordid details if she had
not in fact been raped.[17] It is her instinct to protect her honor.[18]
We also find her prompt report of the crime to the authorities, and her persistent efforts to have
appellant brought to justice, as convincing indications that she has been truly wronged. A complainant's
act in immediately reporting the commission of rape has been considered by this Court as a factor
strengthening her credibility.[19]
Finally, the willingness of Maribel to face police investigators and to submit to a physical
examination is a mute but eloquent testimony of the truth of her charge against her own stepfather. If she
had merely been prodded to relate a fabricated story to build up that serious charge, she would have
recoiled at the possibility of being caught in prevarication, inexperienced as she was in such matters. She
would have been deterred by the grave consequences of such willful falsehoods which could easily be
unmasked by the medical findings that she would be made after a thorough examination of her body.[20]
Appellant nonetheless questions before us the credence accorded by the trial court to Maribel and
seeks to overturn the case established against him by the prosecution in the court below. He insists that
the trial court should have doubted the unbelievable testimony of complainant which contains narrations
of facts contrary to human experience, thus negating Maribel's claims of having been raped by him.
Catalogued from appellant's brief,[21] these are the supposedly unusual and queer circumstances:
(1) if appellant merely wanted to rape Maribel, he could have easily raped her in Manila with its abundance
of hotels and motels, rather than go to the trouble of taking her to Samar; (2) it was unusual for appellant
not to ejaculate inside Maribel's vagina if his purpose was to satisfy his lust; (3) it was impossible for
appellant to rape Maribel because the house of the Nievas was small and overcrowded, with the spouses
sleeping only one arm's length away from them; (4) considering that distance between them, the spouses
should have been awakened by Maribel's cries; and (5) for the same reason, Maribel could have easily
sought the assistance of the spouses, especially since only a curtain separated the bedroom and the
kitchen.
The above litany of arguments conjured by appellant does not persuade us. Suffice it to say that his
contentions do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that no rape was committed or that he was not the
one who raped Maribel. The elements of the rape and the identity of the malefactor were adequately
proven beyond moral certainty by the testimony of Maribel, not to mention the admissions of appellant
himself.
We find undeserving of any consideration the first and second assertions of appellant. Their
hypothetical and self-serving nature destroys their viability. They beg for a conclusion without providing
the premises which, whether from behavioral science or from settled jurisprudence, would support his
claim of improbabilities.
Only appellant can give the answer to his own assumptions which, sad to say, he did not present
during the trial. While we can hazard some rationalizations, we decline from doing so lest we also be guilty
of speculation, As we have earlier ruled, this Court this not tasked to delve into the workings of the mind
of the accused and to determine why he did not previously rape his victim even if he could have done
so[22]and, in a manner of speaking anent the instant case, why he opted out when he could have stayed in.
The fact that the rape took place in a room not far from the Nievas does not diminish the credibility
of Maribel. The nearby presence of people in a certain place is no guarantee that rape will not and cannot
be committed.[23] Up to now, there is nor rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion.[24]
We reiterate the dictum, drawn from judicial experience, that lust is no respecter of time and
place. Rape, we have often held, can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks,
along the roadside, within school premises and even inside a house where there are other occupants or
where other members of the family are also sleeping.[25] Thus, it is an accepted rule in criminal law that
rape may be committed even when the rapist and the victim are not alone. Rape was held to have been
committed in the same room while the rapist's spouse was asleep, or in a small room where other family
members also slept.[26]
Whether or not the sleeping Nievas were awakened by the cries of Maribel and why they did not
help her will not and cannot affect complainant's credibility. As maintained by the public prosecutor and
correctly sustained by the trial court, Maribel is incompetent to know whether Raul and Nida were
awakened by her crying.[27] Be that as it may, the questioning of Maribel by Nida the following morning
indicates that she was awakened by and heard the cries of Maribel. But why she did not help complainant
is again foreign to Maribel's perception, and would be pure conjecture for us to deal with.
Maribel's failure to shout or seek the assistance of the nearby spouses cannot also yield the
inference that no rape was committed. It will be recalled that when complainant began to cry, appellant
covered her mouth with his hand and uttered some menacing words.[28] With those threats in mind, it
becomes easy to understand why complainant did not call for help. The continuing intimidation by
appellant was sufficient to cow complainant into submission without any protest, as has been the fate of
a multitude of' rape victims.
Through the numerous cases brought before this Court, we leave learned to adopt the rule in
psychology that different people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard
form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. One
person's spontaneous or unthinking, or even instinctive, response to a horrid and repulsive stimulus may
be aggression, while another person's reaction may be cold indifference.[29] Complainant, therefore,
cannot be expected to solicit the aid of the spouses in the presence of her fearsome molester.
As we have stated earlier, appellant's hollow submissions cannot stand against the positive
testimony and identification made by Maribel. He was not able to overcome through his feeble defense
the overwhelming weight of the case established by the People against him. His insipid attempt to impeach
complainant, therefore, is unavailing for failure on his part to lay the proper predicate therefore[30]Thus,
neither can appellant's alibi overwhelm the positive identification of appellant's rape victim. [31] Maribel's
positive identification of appellant at the trial was made with no trace of hesitation or uncertainty, which
fact was obviously not lost upon the court below.
Parenthetically, appellant would attack such identification and posit that it was impossible for
Maribel to identify the person who raped her because the bulb on the electric post allegedly did not
illuminate the house of the Nievas. He refers to the observations of De los Santos and Cajurao during the
ocular inspection. It should be pointed out, however, that both De los Santos and Cajurao never stated
that the bedroom was dark when the rape was committed on the night of February 21, 1994, since there
was a 10-watt electric bulb attached to the lamp post at the time of the incident. More importantly, no
reliance can be reposed on what these two persons said because they were not put under oath, they did
not testify as witnesses in court,[32] and their statements were not formally offered as evidence therein[33]
Even if the lamp post did not directly illuminate the interior of the house, however, it does not mean
that there was total, darkness in the bedroom where the crime was committed. The records reveal that
the lamp post lit the bedroom through its open window as bright as a candlelight. [34] Such luminosity,
together with the familiarity of Maribel with appellant, was more than sufficient to enable her to identify
the felon. When the conditions of visibility are favorable, the eyewitness identification of appellant as the
malefactor and the specific acts constituting the crime should be accepted. [35]
Withal, all is not lost for appellant.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the penalty of' reclusion perpetua for the carnal
knowledge of a woman procured through force or intimidation and without any other
attendantcircumstance. With the advent of Republic Act No. 7659 on December 31, 1993, and in addition
to the two instances theretofore introduced by Republic Act No. 4111, seven new special circumstances
of rape were added to Article 335 calling for the single indivisible penalty of death. The first of such
additional circumstances, upon which the trial court based its judgment of conviction against herein
appellant, is the conjoined factual requirement, which must be alleged and proved, that the victim is under
eighteen years of age and that the offender inter alia is the stepparent of the victim, which quality and
concurrence of circumstances could warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
The modality of the rape above stated, as well as the other six modes introduced by Republic Act
No. 7659, partakes of the nature of a qualifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code since it
increases the penalty for rape by ore degree. It cannot be considered as equivalent to an aggravating
circumstance because aggravating circumstances affect only the period of the penalty and do not increase
the penalty to a higher degree. [36] Also, under the rules of criminal procedure, a qualifying circumstance
to be considered as such must be so alleged in the information, which is not required of aggravating
circumstances.
The information filed against appellant in the present case does not support or justify the penalty
of death imposed upon him by the trial court. A reading of the information discloses that, contrary to the
findings of said court, only the crime of simple rape was charged against appellant and no attendant special
circumstance, which would in effect qualify the crime, was alleged as such in the information.
While the fact that appellant is the stepfather of complainant was pleaded in the information, it
was mentioned therein merely as the basis for the allegation that appellant acted with grave abuse of
confidence. On the other hand, and of significant importance, the circumstance that Maribel was less than
eighteen years of age at the time of the rape was never, in any manner, stated in the information. For that
matter, the allegations in the victim's complaint[37] are substantially the same as those in the information,
including the omission of her age at the time of the rape.
As we have explained in People vs. Garcia, [38] it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple
rape and be convicted of its qualified from punishable by death, although the attendant circumstance
qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he
was arraigned. Procedurally, then, while the minority of Maribel and the relationship of appellant and his
victim were established during the trial, appellant can only be convicted of simple rape because he cannot
be punished for a graver offense than that with which he was charged[39]
It may be contended that such a rule, if applied to the instant case would appear to be unduly
resorting to sheer technicality. The requirement for complete allegations on the particulars of the
indictment is based on the right of the accused to be fully informed of the nature of the charge against
him, so that he may adequately prepare for this defense pursuant to the due process clause of the
Constitution. But, then, herein appellant cannot be unaware that he is the stepfather of the complainant
and that the latter was only thirteen years of age at the time of the commission of the crime charged. It
then seems to be illogical to fault the information for not stating that the victim here was less than
eighteen years old, a fact known to and even admitted by appellant, hence he could not have been denied
the right to be informed of the real nature of the charge.
The fact, however, is that it is the prosecution which determines the charges to be filed and how
the legal and factual elements in the case shall be utilized as components of the information. It is not for
the accused, usually a layman, to speculate upon the purposes and strategy of the prosecution and be
thereafter prejudiced through erroneous guesswork. Thus, since the People dictate what he should be
charged with, fairness demands that he should not be convicted of a crime with which he is not charged
or which is not necessarily included therein. Thus, where an accused killed his father, but is charged with
homicide, it would be absurd to convict him of parricide just because of his inevitable knowledge of his
relation to the victim. Such potential prejudice to the accused would be more apparent in the matter of
modifying circumstances since some of them may be used either as qualifying or as aggravating
circumstances, hence the technical rules on pleadings by way of procedural regulation. Law, after all, is a
technical science; it must perforce observe the necessary technicalities to avoid an injustice.
We cannot even justly rule that the circumstance of grave abuse of confidence can aggravate the
liability for the simple rape charged in this case. There was no showing by the prosecution that the abuse
of confidence facilitated the attainment of the rape. It was not established that appellant took advantage
of complainant's belief that he would not abuse the trust she reposed in him[40]
However, even considering arguendo that abuse of confidence was present in the commission of
the crime, it cannot also affect the penalty to be imposed. As already discussed, herein appellant can be
convicted only of simple rape and the imposable penalty therefore is reclusion perpetua. Where the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attendant to the crime.[41]
On the matter of appellant's civil liability ex delicto, and it, in view of the lower court's award
of P50,000.00 to Maribel in the concept of moral damages, we digress at this juncture to once again
elaborate on and clarify the nature and amount of damages for which appellant is liable.
It has been the policy of this Court to outrightly award an amount not exceeding P50,000.00 to
victims of rape upon indubitable showing of its commission. However, trial courts, and even this Court,
have at times referred to such amount as moral damages. As pointed out in People vs. Gementiza,[42] that
mandatory award of P50,000.00 relates to and should be categorized as actual or compensatory damages.
In response to the rising incidence of heinous crimes against chastity, this Court recently established
a distinction between the amounts of compensatory damages to be awarded in simple and qualified rape
cases. In People vs. Victor[43] we laid down the rule that if the crime of rape is committed or effectively
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by law, the indemnity
for the victim shall be increase to the amount of P75,000.00.

While there is ample proof before us that Maribel was minor at the time she was raped by appellant,
we cannot increase the civil indemnity in her favor because, as explained earlier, the death penalty is not
imposable on appellant due to the deficiency in the allegations of the information against him.

Now, the conventional rule in the past was also that moral damages can be awarded only upon
sufficient showing that the complainant in a rape case suffered the different forms of pain or suffering
provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code.[44] However, this doctrine has been effectively abandoned with
the recent promulgation of People vs. Prades.[45] In the said case, we dispensed with the requirement of
proof of mental and physical suffering and recognized the victim's injury as being inherently concomitant
with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se an award for moral
damages. With this jurisprudential evolution, appellant should therefore pay Maribel moral damages in
the amount subject to the discretion of this Court.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant Ernesto Perez is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the additional amount of P50,000.0 as moral damages to complainant Maribel Perez. The amount
of P50,000.00 granted to complainant by the trial court is maintained but should be considered and
designated as actual or compensatory drainages. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 That on the 28th day of December 1996, in the evening at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran West,
Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually abuse the
herein complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES, an 11 years old and daughter of the herein accused with
the use of sharp pointed bladed weapon and all against her will.

x x x (Emphasis supplied).
[G. R. No. 128823-24. December 27, 2002]
Arraigned on February 10, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.[3]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, accused-appellee, vs. PEDRO FLORES, JR., y
FLORES ALIAS PESIONG, accused-appellant. Culled from the records of the case are the following facts established by the prosecution:

On December 5, 1996, private complainant Filipina L. Flores (Filipina), 11 years old at the time, and
DECISION
her younger sister Catherine were left to the care of their father, herein accused-appellant, at their family
CARPIO-MORALES, J.: residence in Sitio Buenlag, Barangay Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, their mother Marcelina
L. Flores having departed for Singapore to work as an overseas contract worker.

An assault on sexual innocence can open a floodgate of emotions. This Court, however, cannot allow
emotions to drown an accuseds right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
For automatic review before this Court is the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan finding accused-appellant Pedro Flores Jr. y Flores aliasPesiong guilty of two counts
of rape of his then 11 year old daughter and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death in each.
The complaints against accused-appellant filed on February 3, 1997 read as follows:
After partaking of supper on the night of December 9, 1996,[4] accused-appellant asked Filipina to
accompany him to the comfort room situated outside their house,[5] claiming that he was afraid of
ghosts.[6] Albeit Filipina did not believe[7] him, she acquiesced because her mother had told her to always
obey her father.[8]
When accused-appellant came out of the comfort room, he ordered Filipina to remove her short
pants, threatening her with death if she disobeyed,[9] and made her lie down.[10] He then removed his short
pants and brief and, against her will, he inserted his finger and later his penis into Filipinas vagina[11] where
she later felt hot fluid.[12]

Accused-appellant thereafter wiped Filipinas vagina and his hand, threatened to kill her if she
Criminal Case No. U-9184:
reported what he did, directed her to put on her shorts, and they both went home. The following morning,
Filipina reported the incident to her Inang Lorie whose full name is Norielyn Antonio, the aunt of her
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT[1] mother, who told her that if her father would sexually assault her again, he would have him detained.

The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, grade three pupil and a resident of Sitio Buenlag,
Brgy Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, under oath, hereby accuses PEDRO FLORES, JR., Y
FLORES for the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That on the 9th day of December 1996, in the morning at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran West,
Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually abuse the herein complaining witness FILIPINA
FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, all against her will.
x x x (Emphasis supplied).
Criminal Case No. U-9185:
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT[2]
Nineteen nights later or on December 28, 1996, as Filipina lay asleep in their house, she was
awakened when accused-appellant touched her right foot.[13] Armed with a knife[14], accused-appellant
told her not to talk[15] and ordered her to remove her short pants and panty. She complied. Accused-
appellant thereupon removed his short pants and brief and went on top of her chest during which she
tried to push him away but failed.
Accused-appellant then inserted his finger into Filipinas vagina for some time,[16] wiped his hands,
and then inserted his penis for a long time as he was sucking her breast. Filipina felt accused-appellants
semen drop into her private organ where she noticed the presence of blood and a bit of whitish substance.
Accused-appellant later wiped her vagina with a towel. The following morning, private complainant
again reported the matter to her grandaunt Norielyn,[17] and to her playmate Carla Salvador.[18]
On January 31, 1997, Filipina, accompanied by Norielyn, a relative, and a tricycle driver-neighbor,
reported the matter to the Philippine National Police of Urdaneta where she gave a statement. On the
same day, she, still accompanied by Norielyn, submitted herself to a medical examination at the Don
Amadeo J. Perez, Jr. Memorial General Hospital the results of which are contained in a medical
certificate[19] showing the following:

The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, grade three pupil and a resident of Sitio Buenlag, (-) Negative menarche
Brgy. Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, under oath, hereby accuses PEDRO FLORES, JR., Y
FLORES, ALIAS PESYONG, committed as follows: - Multiple deep healed lacerations all over the labia majora.
- Admits examining finger with ease.
- (+) sticky whitish discharge.
Dr. Jeanna B. Nebril, the examining physician, found the presence of deep-healed lacerations all
over the labia majora[20] which deep-healed lacerations connote, according to the doctor, the application
of force, possibly two weeks before the examination.
Denying the accusations, accused-appellant claimed as follows:
Filipina, whom he whipped in the afternoon of December 9, 1996 for not attending school on the
6th, 7th and 8th of December that year and for having received money from her classmate,[21] was not in
their house on the night of December 9, 1996 because she was in the house of Norielyn. Neither was she
in their house on the night of December 28, 1996 as she was at the house of his mother Margarita
Flores[22] in Cafloresan.
Accused-appellants testimony was corroborated by his mother Margarita, and his teenaged
children Benito and Baby Jean Flores who were staying in his mothers house. It was also corroborated by
another teenaged child, Jocelyn Flores, who was staying in the house of accused-appellants mother-in-
law, Lourdes Lazo, also in Barangay Nancamaliran West.[23] Jocelyn added that Filipina had intimated to
her that she fabricated the rape charges because their maternal grandmother Lourdes wanted their father,
accused-appellant, jailed as he begrudged him for having eloped with their mother,[24] and that Lourdes
threatened her with abandonment or detention in jail in case she defied, and promised to give her jewelry,
shoes and dress if she agreed to carry out her desire.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of Statutory Rape and sentenced her to
death in both cases in its April 7, 1997 Joint Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is rendered CONVICTING PEDRO FLORES, JR. Y FLORES ALIAS PESIONG beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape, an offense defined and penalized under paragraph 3,
Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 1, Republic Act 7659 aggravated by
relationship, the Court sentences, PEDRO FLORES, JR. Y FLORES ALIAS PESIONG as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9184 to suffer the penalty of DEATH; ordering Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias
Pesiong to pay Filipina the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus
all the necessary penalties and costs.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9185 to suffer the penalty of DEATH; ordering Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias
Pesiong to pay Filipina the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus
all the necessary penalties and costs.
Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias Pesiong shall be committed immediately to the National Bilibid Prisons.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the entire records of this case to the Honorable
Supreme Court of the Philippines for automatic review of this Decision.
In view of the penalty of death imposed by the court a quo, the case is now before this Court on
automatic review. Accused-appellant assigns as errors the following:
I. THAT THE FILING OF THE CASE [AT BAR] WAS MOTIVATED BY SOME FACTORS OTHER THAN
THE TRUTH AS TO ITS COMMISSION, AND SO THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE ACQUITTED.
II. THAT THE COURT [A QUO] ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT THAT THE COMPLAINANT WAS NOT AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME WHEN THE
ALLEGED INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE, A DEFENSE SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME AND DESTROY
THE TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT THAT WOULD HAVE WARRANTED THE
ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED-APELLANT.
It is settled that in a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes
the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from,
whether they are made the subject of assignment of errors or not.[25]
It is at once apparent, from a reading of the above-quoted complaints, that accused-appellant was
denied the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This
right has the following objectives: [26]
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make
the defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further prosecution for the same
cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction if one should be had.
The right cannot be waived for reasons of public policy.[27] Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or
information filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully
state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed.[28] For an accused cannot be
convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint
or information.[29]
The court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of Statutory Rape under Article 335[30] of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R. A. No. 7659 (which restored the death penalty for heinous crimes
effective December 31, 1993) which provides:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed.--- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse between a man and
a woman under the circumstances enumerated in the penal code.[31] Thus, to sustain a conviction, the
complaint or information must allege that the accused had carnal knowledge of or sexual
intercourse with the private complainant. In the criminal complaints at bar, however, no such allegation
was made.
The allegation that accused-appellant did sexually abuse Filipina does not suffice. In the recent case
of People v. Lito Egan alias Akiao[32], this Court ruled that although the prosecution has proved that [the
therein private complainant] Lenie was sexually abused, the evidence proffered is inadequate to
establish carnal knowledge.[33] Hence, sexual abuse cannot be equated with carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse.[34] The allegation in the instant criminal complaints that accused-appellant sexually abuse[d]
the private complainant cannot thus be read to mean that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge or
sexual intercourse with the private complainant.
This Court is not unaware of the rule in case there is a variance between allegation and proof as
etched in Section 4 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.When there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included
in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which
is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.[35]
The case at bar, however, is not one of variance between allegation and proof. The recital of facts
in the criminal complaints simply does not properly charge rape, sexual abuse not being an essential
element or ingredient thereof.
Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of acts of lasciviousness or of any offense for that
matter under our penal laws. It is settled that what characterizes the charge is the actual recital of
facts [36] in the complaint or information. For every crime is made up of certain acts and intent which must
be set forth in the complaint or information with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff
and defendant), and circumstances. In other words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of
every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged[37], the accused being presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[38]
And even under the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act),[39] accused-appellant cannot be held liable. Section 5 of
said Act provides:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -- Children, whether male or female, who for money,
profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are
not limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with the intent
to engage such child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3,
for rape and Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3815, for rape or
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; and
(c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or owner of the
establishment where the prostitution takes place or of the sauna, disco, bar, resort, place of
entertainment or establishment serving as a cover or which engages in prostitution in
addition to the activity for which the license has been issued to said establishment. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied).
Section 2 (g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases[40], issued pursuant to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7610, defines sexual abuse by inclusion as
follows:
Sexual abuse includes 1) the employment, use, persuasion, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage
in, or assist another person to engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or 2) the molestation,
3) prostitution, or 4) incest with children. (Underscoring supplied)
From this broad, non-exclusive definition, this Court finds that the phrase sexually abuse in the
criminal complaints at bar does not comply with the requirement that the complaint must contain a
specific averment of every fact necessary to constitute the crime. Notably, the phrase sexual abuse is not
used under R.A. No. 7610 as an elemental fact but as an altogether separate offense. Above-quoted
Section 5 thereof enumerates the punishable acts that must be alleged in the complaint or information to
hold an accused liable, none of which is reflected in the complaints at bar charging accused-appellant.
The case of People v. Cruz [41] is instructive. There the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R
read:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1997, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter either by raping her or committing acts of
lasciviousness on her, which has debased, degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of his
daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied)
Finding the above-quoted information void, this Court held:
The Court also finds that accused-appellant cannot be convicted of rape or acts of lasciviousness under
the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R, which charges accused-appellant of a violation of R.A. No.
7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), either
by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness.
It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information do not constitute an offense. The
information does not cite which among the numerous sections or subsections of R.A. No. 7610 has been
violated by accused-appellant. Moreover, it does not state the acts and omissions constituting the
offense, or any special or aggravating circumstances attending the same, as required under the rules of
criminal procedure. Section 8, Rule 110 thereof provides:
Designation of the offense.The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statue, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

The allegation in the information that accused-appellant willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on
her is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the offense as required under Section 8, for these
are conclusions of law, not facts. The information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is therefore void for
being violative of the accused-appellants constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. (Emphasis & underscoring supplied)

As held by this Court in the above-case of Cruz, the allegation in the information that the therein
accused-appellant sexually abused the therein private complainant by either raping or committing acts
of lasciviousness on her is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the offense as required under
Section 8 [of Rule 110], for these are conclusions of law, not facts. Nothing less can be said of the criminal
complaints in the cases at bar. They are void for being violative of the accused-appellants constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

This Court thus takes this occasion to remind public prosecutors of their crucial role in crafting
criminal complaints and information. For all efforts may be rendered futile and justice may be denied by a
failure to state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense as exemplified by the
present case.

The foregoing disquisition leaves it unnecessary to dwell on accused-appellants assigned errors or

of other errors including failure to allege relationship in the first complaint, and lack of proof of minority
in both cases.

WHEREFORE, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. U-9184 and U-9185 are hereby declared null
and void for being violative of the constitutional right of accused-appellant Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias
Pesiong, for Rape to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, the cases
against him are hereby DISMISSED.

The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the release of accused-appellant unless
the latter is being lawfully held for another cause and to inform the Court accordingly within 10 days from
notice.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.